DUMLAO VS COMELEC (1980)

95 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he
has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This
law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different
issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP
52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which
bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the
mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been
merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed
in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office
and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify
them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings
are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement,
while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be
a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should
be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might
be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local
officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official
just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
ALSO:
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains
constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In
this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The
purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards
to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should bedeclared null and void for being violative of
the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the
constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and
one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible
to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44,
Revised Penal Code).”

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore,
may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of
the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of
guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is

hereby declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed
COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to
arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not
considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class.
The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective
posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal
protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As
illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not germane to the
purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought
to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices
as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or
even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency,
integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil
servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they
would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the
ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law.
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-
President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to
take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that
they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections.
Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could
be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for
excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to
meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

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