01 GUERRERO v. TERAN (1909)
Teran, the defendant in this case, is the
Rule 78-85, 87 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Johnson
Summary
1. In 1901, Teran was appointed administrator of the
estate. In 1902, Maria Muñoz was appointed
guardian of minors; from this date therefore, with
respect to the interests of the minors in the estate,
Maria Muñoz was in charge of its administration and
not Teran. In 1906, the Court revoked the
appointment of Maria Muñoz as guardian because
she was not a Philippine resident.
2. WON the revocation of Maria Muñoz as guardian
was proper.
3. YES. When this case was promulgated, there was
no rule yet that non-residents should not be allowed
as administrators or guardians. However, the Court
still held that they should disallow appointments of
non-residents as administrators or guardians
because the courts will find it difficult to fulfil their
duty of protecting estates of deceased persons and
wards of the estate if the administrators and
guardians are not personally subject to their
jurisdiction.
4. (There’s another issue but it’s not the relevant
syllabus issue. If you wanna read it, it’s issue #2
and held #2).
Facts
1. Guerrero, the plaintiff in this case, is the current
guardian of the minors Manuela and Del Carmen
Muñoz.
administrator of the estate of Antonio Muñoz.
2. In 1901, Teran was appointed administrator of the
estate of Antonio Muñoz.
3. In 1902, Maria Muñoz was appointed as guardian
of minors Manuela and Del Carmen Muñoz.
4. While Teran acted as administrator of the estate
after the appointment of Maria Muñoz as guardian,
the fact exists and must be accepted as true that
Maria Muñoz was the actual representative of the
minors in the administration of their interests in the
estate, and thus must be responsible for the
property belonging to such minors.
5. In 1906, CFI Albay removed Maria Muñoz as the
guardian of the minors because she was not a
resident of the Philippines at the time of her
appointment in 1902. CFI Albay appointed Samson
as provisional guardian instead.
6. From the order of CFI Albay annulling her
appointment as guardian, Maria Muñoz appealed to
the Supreme Court. However, she subsequently
withdrew her appeal, making the annulment of her
appointment final.
7. In 1906, Guerrero was appointed as guardian of the
minors.
8. Guerrero is now claiming to recover P4,000 from
Teran on the theory that Teran was the
administrator of the estate from 1901 until 1906.
Issue
1. WON Maria Muñoz was properly removed as guardian.
a. YES. Even if there was no statutory rule on the
residence of guardianship at this time, the Court
 justified that non-residents should not be
appointed as guardians.
b. MAIN ISSUE
2. WON Teran is liable to Guerrero.
a. NO. Records failed to show that any of the
amounts claimed by Guerrero was a result of
Teran’s management in 1901-1902.
b. NOT the main issue
Held
1. WON Maria Muñoz was properly removed as
guardian.
YES. Doña Maria Munoz y Gomez was, as above
indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment
was void because she did not reside in the Philippine
Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the
courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there
are no statutory requirements upon this question, the
courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the
estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will
find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding
that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should
not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
. unsuitable to administrate and in these cases, the
2. WON Teran is liable to Guerrero.
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 2 is special.
The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed
by the Plaintiff were due as a result of the management of
the said estate during the time while the said Defendant
was administering their interests therein (from 1901 to
1902, when the minors did not have a guardian yet),
except the sum of P188. 39, admitted to be due by the
Defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the only
amount which the Plaintiff is entitled to recover in this
action is the said amount of P188. 39.
02 NAVAS v. GARCIA (1923)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Ostrand
Summary (Extremely Short Case)
5. Appellant is the surviving spouse of the deceased,
hence the first in the preference provided in the
ROC, however the lower court gave the
administrative rights to a certain Garcia. The case
did not provide Garcia’s relation to the deceased.
6. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
7. No, Nava was proven to have had adverse interests
in the estate. The court may determine whether or
not the person next in the order is incompetent or
court may assign another person it deems suitable.
Adverse interest may be seen in the hostility of the
 potential administrator with the other persons
interested in the estate.
Facts
9. (Parties) – Appellant in this case is the surviving
spouse of the deceased while appellee is the
appointed administrator of the estate of the
deceased Geronima Uy Coque.
10. (Antecedents) – Appellant maintains that the court
erred in not appointing him administrator instead of
Jose Garcia. (Ito lang talaga yung background facts
hehe promise)
11. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
Appellant wants to be administrator of the estate.
Issue
3. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
Ruling
4. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the
preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate, but if the person enjoying
such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may
appoint another. This determination rests on the sound
discretion of the court and this judgement will not be
interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively
that the court below was in error.
It was indicated in the records that appellant had
adverse interests in the estate of such a character as to
render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness
may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility
to those immediately interested in the estate.
.
03 Mercado v. Vda de Jaen
Rule 78 | Letters Testemantary and Administration,
When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Diaz
Facts
12. (Parties) - Gorordo is a retired bishop of Cebu.
When he died he left a will naming his heirs and
executor. The respondent De Jean is the sister of
Gorodo who is named as universal heirs including
his nieces, Telesfora and Cesorea Gorordo . The
petitioner Fr Mercado was named in the will as the
executor and in his absence, Fr. Espina (Mercado
being the parish priest in San Nicolas, Cebu and
Espina being the parish priest in Cebu Central).
13. (Antecedents) The will was submitted for probate
before the CFI Cebu. It was allowed and duly
probated. Fr. Mercado, as the executor named in
the will, was confirmed by CFI Cebu and he filed a
bond of 5000. The Heirs opposed the order
appointing Fr Mercado as executor and prayed for
suspension of said order.
 The heirs alleged that even if Fr. Mercado is named
as executor in the will, there is no need to appoint
him because the heirs are already of age and the
estate has no debts. Mercado is also incapable as
executor because he is partial since his parish, San
Nicolas was named as one of the legatees in the
will.
14. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) - WON the
court is bound to appoint Mercado as executor
since he is the named executor in the will.
Issue
5. WON the court is bound to appoint Mercado as
executor since he is the named executor in the
will.
Held
1. Yes. Under Section 641 of Act no. 190 (An Act
Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Action and
Special Proceedings in the Phil now Section 4,
Rule 78), once a will is probated, the court is bound
to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
so named as executor of the will provided he
accepts the trust and files the required bond. While
it may be true that such should not be strictly
interpreted, for the court may be deprived of its
power to appoint another should the executor so
named is incapacitated, it is also true that incapacity
must be manifest and real and not merely
imaginary. Fr. Mercado was found to be fit as an
executor for the estate. He further alleged that the
parish of San Nicolas is not the legatee but the poor
people of San Nicolas. When Gorordo chose
Mercado as executor of his estate after his death,
he must have had good and sufficient reasons and
as such, his will must be respected.
04 Ozaeta v. Pecson (1953)
Rule 78 | Letters Testamentary and of Administration,
Executors, Executors and Administrators
Ponente J. Labrador
Summary
8. (Short Facts) Carlos Palanca died leaving a will
where he named Petitioner Ramon Ozaeta as
executor. Upon Palanca’s death, petitioner
presented a petition for the probate of the will with
a prayer that he be appointed special administrator.
Some of decedent’s heirs oppose the petition. The
court appointed Phil. Trust Company as special
administrator, which later presented a petition to
resign as such. The court then appointed Sebastian
Palanca. However, it reconsidered its order
appointing Sebastian Palanca as special
administrator and appointed BPI instead. It held
that it has the discretion to choose the special
administrator and is not bound to appoint the
person named in the will as executor because the
order had been appealed.
9. (Short Issue) WON the probate court erred in
appointing as special administrator a person other
than the executor named in the probated will even
if its order of probate is on appeal – YES
10. (Short Held) When a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of the probate court to issue
letters testamentary to the person named as
executor in the will upon the latter's application,
even if the order of probate is on appeal.
Facts
15. (Parties) – The petitioner is former SC Associate
Justice Ramon Ozaeta & other heirs of Carlos
Palanca, and the respondents are Hon. Judge
Pecson of CFI Manila & BPI.
16. (Antecedents) – Carlos Palanca died leaving a will.
The will named petitioner Ramon Ozaeta as
executor if General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify.
Upon Palanca’s death (with Gen. Roxas having
predeceased him), petitioner presented a petition
for the probate of the will, at the same time praying
that he be appointed special administrator.
Some of the decedent’s heirs opposed this petition,
and the court on October 6, 1950, appointed as
special administrator Philippine Trust Company, a
non-applicant and a stranger to the proceedings.
Philippine Trust Company presented a petition to
resign as special administrator on the ground of
incompatibility of interest since it had granted a loan
to heir Angel Palanca, who had pledged to it shares
of the FEU allegedly belonging to the estate of the
deceased.
On June 30, 1951, the court appointed Sebastian
Palanca, one of the heirs, to take the place of
Philippine Trust Company. But on Oct. 23, it
rendered another order admitting the will to probate
and appointing petitioner as administrator.
17. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – On Oct.
25, the court allowed the Philippine Trust Company
to resign, reconsidered its order appointing
Sebastian Palanca special administrator, and
appointed BPI instead. Petitioner moved to
reconsider the order, but his motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition was filed.
In its order the court held that it has discretion to
choose the special administrator and is not bound
to appoint the person named therein as executor,
because the order had been appealed.
Issue
Does a probate court commit an abuse of discretion if,
pending an appeal against its order of probate of a will, it
appoints as special administrator any person other than
the executor named in said will? YES.
Held
Yes. When a will has been admitted to probate, it is the
duty of the probate court to issue letters testamentary to
the person named as executor in the will upon the latter's
application, even if the order of probate is on appeal.
Mandamus lies to compel such appointment.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a
testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of
his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the
testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence,
one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the
disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as
the rights granted by will take effect from the time of his
death, the management of his estate by the administrator
of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when
no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can
be interposed any longer.
It has been held that when a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters
testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application. It is the testator that appoints his executor, as
the question as to his peculiar fitness for such a position
or his want of ability to manage the estate cannot be
addressed to the discretion of the county judge.
In the case at bar, the will has already been probated, and
respondent judge himself has expressly appointed
petitioner as administrator. Philippine Trust Company,
which had acted as special administrator, has submitted a
bill for P90,000 – this expensive cost of administration
would cut deep in the income of the estate. If BPI would
be the special administrator, it is not improbable that the
estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost
of administration. It would seem unreasonable to refuse to
appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so
would be delaying the fulfillment of the wishes of the
testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary
expense.
05 De Guzman v. Limcolioc (1939)
Rule 78 – 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Villareal
Summary
11. The CFI Rizal ordered that Apolinario De Guzman,
the son of the decedent, was appointed as the co-
administrator of his father’s estate, together with his
sister, Nicolasa. His father’s wife by a second
marriage opposed the court’s decision
12. Issue: WON the court erred in appointing Apolinario
De Guzman as the administrator
13. No. It did not appear that the said court committed
grave abuse of discretion. Apolinario has a greater
share than that of the oppositor, the childless widow
of the deceased by a second marriage, and that he
will only act as a helper of his sister in administering
the estate. It is also discretionary on the part of the
court to determine who should be appointed as an
administrator.
Facts
18. (Parties) – Petitioner – Nicolasa De Guzman,
daughter of the deceased (also mentioned is
Apolinario, his brother); Respondent – Angela
Limcolioc – wife of the deceased by a second
marriage
19. (Antecedents) – In a judgment, CFI Rizal
appointed Apolinario de Guzman as a co-
administrator. In its decision, it stated that although
there’s a preference over the surviving spouse to
administer the deceased spouse’s estate, the rule
is not absolute. It stated that “But this preference
 established by law is not absolute, if there are other
reasons justifying the appointment of an
administrator other than the surviving spouse. If the
interest in the estate is what principally determines
the preference in .the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
and if, under the circumstances of each case, it
develops that there is another who has more
interest therein than the surviving spouse, the
preference established in the latter's favor falls to
the ground."
In the case at bar, Apolinario, the son, has a larger
share than the oppositor and that he would merely
help her sister administer the estate, which consists
mostly of fisheries situated in the provinces.
Although the father filed a complaint against him
during his lifetime for misappropriation, the
complaint was dismissed at the instance of the
father himself.
20. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – This is
an appeal by the respondent-appellant to the
decision of the court in appointing Apolinario de
Guzman as the co-administrator of the decedent’s
estate.
Issue
WON the court gravely abused its discretion in appointing
Apolinario as co-administrator – No.
Held
No. In the present case, aside from the fact that Apolinario
de Guzman, as co-administrator, will administer properties
in which he has a greater share than that of the oppositor,
the childless widow of the deceased by a second marriage,
and will act merely as a helper of his sister, there is no
ground to believe that he would squander said properties
and the products thereof.
The lower court having been of the opinion that Apolinario
de Guzman deserves the appointment of co-administrator,
and it being discretionary on its part to determine who
should be appointed administrator of the properties of a
deceased person, the Court believes it is unjustified for it
to meddle in the exercise of such discretion, it not
appearing that said court has committed a grave abuse
thereof.
06 GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (1990)
Rule 82 | Revocation of Administration, Death,
Resignation, and Removal of Executors or
Administrators
Ponente J. Padilla
Summary
14. Facts: Petitioner and respondent were co-
administrators of the estate. When petitioner left for the
US for the medical treatment of her husband,
respondent filed for petitioner’s removal which was
granted. Petitioner contends that her removal was
improper because it was not anchored on the grounds
provided under Section 2, Rule 82 of ROC.
15. (Short Issue): WON the removal of petitioner was
proper?
16. (Short Held): No, the removal was improper. In the
appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator. Administrators have such
an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them
to protection from removal without just cause. While it
is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it however
must have some fact legally before it in order to justify
a removal. In the present case, the court a quo did not
base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix
on any of the causes specified in respondent's motion
for relief of the petitioner. For mere disagreements
between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct,
one's removal is not favored. Moreover, , temporary
absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate. Finally, the removal of an
administrator does not he on the whims, caprices and
dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor
on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly
and efficient administration. As the appointment of
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no
satisfactory cause for her removal was shown,
Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of
said estate.
Facts
(Parties)
21. The petitioner in this case is the removed co-
administratix and heir, Beatriz F. Gonzales,
22. the respondents are Hon Zoilo Aguinaldo, and
Teresa F. Olbes, co-administratix and heir.
(Antecedents)
1. Spec. Pro. No. 021, pending before the court a quo is
an intestate proceeding involving the estate of the
deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis who
is survived by her four (4) children who are her only
heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales,
Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
2. The court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales and private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-
administratrices of the estate.
3. While petitioner Beatriz was in the US to accompany
her husband for his medical treatment, private
respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion to remove
Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, which the
respondent judge granted. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
(Summary of Cause of Action/Issues)
1. Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent
Judge's Order should be nullified on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not
shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the
grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, ROC.
Issue
6. WON the removal of petitioner Beatriz as co-
adminstratrix is proper?
Held
NO. The removal was improper.
3. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of
a deceased person, the principal consideration
 reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator. This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
4. Administrators have such an interest in the execution
of their trust as entitle them to protection from removal
without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the court to remove an administrator.
5. While it is conceded that the court is invested with
ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it
however must have some fact legally before it in order
to justify a removal.
6. In the present case, the court a quo did not base the
removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix on any of
the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief of
the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the
validity of the charges brought against petitioner by
respondent Olbes. The court based the removal of the
petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the
estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have existed
between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes
which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the
added circumstance that petitioner had been absent
from the country since October 1984, and up to 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order.
7. The court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that
the conflict and disharmony between the 2 co-
administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner, or
that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the
fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management
of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or
any other act or omission showing that her continuance
as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers
the interests of the estate. Petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the
other heirs in that the properties of the estate be duly
administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs;
and there is as yet no ground to believe that she has
prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant
the probate court into removing petitioner as co-
administratrix.
8. Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also on the
ground that she had been absent from the country.
petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-
administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in
the fulfillment of her duties. Suffice it to state,
temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one
to be an administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re
Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the
state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the
executors' family, is not such a removal from the state
as to necessitate his removal as executor.
9. the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of
the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased
(Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have
opposed the retention or re-appointment of petitioner
as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that
 the removal of an administrator does not he on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court
that it would result in orderly and efficient
administration.
10. Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of
said estate.
07 Johannes v. Harvey
Rule 78 | Executor and Administrator
Ponente J. Malcolm
Summary
17. (Short Facts) – Carmen died in Singapore. Her
husband B.E. was named the administrator of her
Singapore property while her brother Alfred was
named the administrator of her Manila property.
The husband questions the need of another
administrator in Manila.
18. (Short (Short Issue) - WON an administrator in
Manila was still necessary – YES.
19. (Held) – When a person has property in two or more
countries, a different administrator is needed in
each country. This is because any powers of
administration given in one country is limited only to
property located in said country.
Facts
23. (Parties) – Petitioners = B.E. Johannes,
administrator and husband of deceased Carmen
Johannes, 2 of the decedent’s siblings;
Respondents = Judge Harvey of CFI Manila and
Alfred D’Almeida
24. (Antecedents) – Carmen Johannes died intestate
in Singapore. Her heirs were her husband, B.E.
Johannes, 2 siblings also living in Singapore, and
Alfred D’Almeida, her only sibling who lived in
Manila. Her husband was named the administrator
of her property in Singapore while her brother
Alfred, through his petition, was named the
administrator of her property in Manila by Judge
Harvey.
25. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
husband says the appointment of an administrator
in Manila is unnecessary because he was already
appointed the administrator in Singapore.
Issue
7. WON an administrator in Manila was still necessary –
YES.
Held
1. It is often necessary to have more than one
administrator of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in
a foreign country, administration is to be held in both
countries. A grant of administration does not have any
effect beyond the limit of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, even though the husband was declared the
administrator of the Singapore property, he had no
administration powers over the Manila property since the
latter property was located in another country.
 08 GUTIERREZ DE OCAMPO v CALDERON (1934)
Rule 87 | Actions By and Against Executors and
Administrators
Ponente: J. Goddard
Summary
20. Dr. Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor, a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at the time he
made his will was residing temporarily in France
and that at the time of his death he left no
ascendants. The petitioner in this case is the
administrator of the estate of Dr. Calderon The
appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of
the deceased and have filed an opposition to the
project of partition of their deceased brother
Calderon, the lower court denied their intervention.
The beneficiaries of Calderon are his illegitimate
children.
21. WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants
to intervene.
22. No. It must be noted that the appellants are not the
deceased’s forced heirs. As such, they have no
right to any part of the property left by the testator,
once he had disposed of the same by will. Only
forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced
have a right to intervene in a case of this character.
Facts
26. (Parties) – Dr. Francisco Varela Calderon was a
bachelor, a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at
the time he made his will was residing temporarily
in France and that at the time of his death he left no
ascendants. The petitioner in this case is the
administrator of the estate of Dr. Calderon. The
appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of
the deceased and have filed an opposition to the
project of partition of their deceased brother
Calderon, the lower court denied their intervention.
The beneficiaries of Calderon are his illegitimate
children.
27. (Antecedents) – The CFI of Manila issued an order
of partition based from the will of Calderon. The
appellants who are siblings of the testator, sought
to intervene and oppose the approval of the project
of partition since the beneficiaries of the will are his
illegitimate children. The appellants contend that
the illegitimate children are not qualified to inherit
from the deceased. However, the CFI rejected the
opposition, stating that the siblings have no right to
intervene in the consideration of the project of
partition as well as the adjudication of the property
of Dr. Calderon.
28. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – With the
opposition being denied, the appellants appealed
before the Supreme Court.
Issue
8. WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants
to intervene.
a. No.
Held
11. WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants to
intervene.
No. The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela
Calderon, granting that they are illegitimate children, are
not incapacitated to take property under the will of their
father. Article 763 of the Civil Code provides that a person
who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his
property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire.
The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the
deceased and therefore have no right to any part of the
property left by the testator, once he had disposed of the
same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would
be entitled to intervene in this case and protect their
interest in so far as they may have been prejudiced by the
will. It is evident therefore that they have not been injured
or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced heirs
whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to
intervene in a case of this character.
09 Testate Estate of the Deceased Damasa
Crisostomo, Nazario Trillana, administrator-appellee v.
Consorcia P. Crisostomo, et al., petitioners-appellants
(1951)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Feria
Summary
1. (Short Facts) – CFI Bulacan admitted the 2nd will of
Deceased Damasa Crisostomo. The petitioners
questions the such judgment claiming that the latter
was obtained through fraud, and that the court
failed to set date for the other (1st) will (there are two
wills).
2. (Short Issue) – Was there fraud? And was there
need to set date for the 1st will?
3. (Short Held) – No fraud. It was not proven. There’s
no need to set date for the 1st will as it was revoked
by the 2nd. Besides, it would be held that the
petitioners are not interested parties which would
entitle them the right to question the probate of the
decedent’s will.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are nephews
and nieces of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo,
and the respondent is the administrator of the
Damasa’s estate.
2. (Antecedents) – According to the facts, Damasa
Crisostomo executed two wills dated August 16,
1948 and October 19, 1948. In both wills, the
testatrix left all her properties as legacies to other
persons (unidentified in the case). On January 5,
1949, CFI of Bulacan admitted to probate the will
dated October 19, 1948. The petitioners filed a
petition for relief from the judgment but was denied.
Hence, they appealed to the Supreme Court
contending that the lower court erred in denying
their petition for relief.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – They
claim that (a) the judgment admitting the will was
obtained through fraud, (b) the lower court failed to
perform its legal duty to set date for proving the will
of August 16, 1948

Issue
1. Was the judgment obtained through fraud?.
a. No. Fraud was not proven in this case.
2. Was there failure to set date for proving the will dated
August 16?
a. No. There was no need to set date because this
will was proven to be revoked by the subsequent
will dated October 19 (the one admitted to
probate by the lower court)
Held
1. Was the judgment obtained through fraud?
No. First of all, the allegation that there was fraud was
belatedly raised. It was not raised as an issue before the
lower court and in the petition for relief and so it cannot
now be raised for the first time in this appeal.
Nevertheless, fraud was not proven in this case. Hence,
we abide by the legal presumption that the court complied
with its duty and acted in lawful exercise of its jurisdiction
in probating said will. Besides, appellee's attorney, in the
statement of facts, stated that "This Honorable Court set
its hearing [of the petition for allowance of the will of
October 19, 1948] on December 2, 1948. Copy of this
order was published in a newspaper of general circulation
in Bulacan on November 5, 12 and 19 respectively, and
the corresponding notices served by the office of the Clerk
of Court, in accordance with law. And the attorneys for the
petitioners- appellant had not denied said statement.
Important pronouncement: Where a will is duly probated
after publication pursuant to 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the order admitting the will is, in the absence
of fraud, effective against any persons. The fact that an
heir or other interested party lives so far away as to make
it impossible for such party to be present at the date
appointed for the, probate of the will does not render the
order of probate void for lack of due process.
3. Was there failure to set date for proving the will dated
August 16?
No. There was no need to set date because this will was
proven to be revoked by the subsequent will dated October
19 (the one admitted to probate by the lower court). It
stands to reason that if two wills are presented for
allowance but one of them is revoked, such will cannot be
included in the probate of the other will, because it would
be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the
subsequent revoking will is allowed. The revoked will may
be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking
will is disallowed.
Lastly, the petitioners this case who merely allege that they
are nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of the
deceased would have no interest in the probate of said
wills (this was not explained, but maybe because they are
not compulsory heirs hence no interest). Appellants argue
that they are in interested parties, because in the event the
will of October 19 is disallowed and that of August 16 is
allowed, and the legacies in the latter are declared invalid
or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to
appellants. This argument has no merit. In civil actions and
special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law,
the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal
must be material and direct. The interest claimed by the
appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several
uncertain and future events.
10 Gutierrez v. Villegas (1962)
Rule 78 to Rule 85, Rule 87 | Letters Testamentary
and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Paredes
Summary
1. (Short Facts) Irene Santos died intestate, leaving
as her only heirs her surviving spouse Jose D.
Villegas and two nieces — Rizalina and Adela. In
an unverified manifestation signed by Adela
Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan”, Adela
manifested that all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate now belong to aher sister,
Rizalina Santos-Rivera and that she will no longer
take part in the proceedings. 13 days later, she filed
verified manifestation, stating that said deed of
assignment was obtained thru fraud. Adela
presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying
that the administrator and/or his attorneys be
required to furnish her all copies of pleadings. An
opposition was interposed by the administrator,
who alleged that the movant, although originally a
party to the probate proceedings, has voluntarily
and expressly desisted from being so, and that
having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and
participations in the estate, she has no longer any
legal standing in the case.
2. (Short Issue) WON Adela Santos Gutierrez is still
entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the
administrator in the probate proceedings and
orders therein issued by the lower court.
3. (Short Held) The judicial approval of the partition
on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment did
not have the effect of making the party making the
assignment lose his standing in the proceedings.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Adela
Santos Gutierrez, one of the intestate heirs of the
deceased, Irene Santos. The respondents are Jose
D. Villegas, the administrator of the estate and
Rizalina Santos Rivera, another intestate heir.
2. (Antecedents) – Irene Santos died intestate,
leaving as her only heirs her surviving spouse Jose
D. Villegas and two nieces — Rizalina Santos
Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. The surviving
spouse filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City Branch,
a petition for Letters of Administration and was
appointed administrator of the estate. In the special
proceedings case, an unverified manifestation
signed by Adela Gutierrez, accompanied by a
public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at
Salinan”, was presented to the probate court which
solemnly manifests that all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate now belong to her sister,
Rizalina Santos-Rivera and that she will no longer
take part in the proceedings. 13 days later, she filed
verified manifestation, stating that the deed of
assignment was obtained thru fraud. The
 administrator Villegas and Rizalina filed exceptions
and/or objections to the Manifestation, denying the
allegations of fraud, undue influence and the like.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Adela
presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying
that the administrator and/or his attorneys be
required to furnish her all copies of pleadings filed
or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it
appearing that the administrator presented
pleadings in Court without serving her copies
thereof. An opposition was interposed by the
administrator, who alleged that the movant,
although originally a party to the probate
proceedings, has voluntarily and expressly desisted
from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all
her rights, interests and participations in the estate,
she has no longer any legal standing in the case.
Issue
1. WON Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be
furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in
the probate proceedings and orders therein issued by
the lower court.
a. Yes. The judicial approval of the partition on the
basis of the alleged deed of assignment did not
have the effect of making the party making the
assignment lose his standing in the
proceedings.
Held
1. WON Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be
furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in
the probate proceedings and orders therein issued by
the lower court.
YES. Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to
the proceedings. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate,
it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos.
While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it
is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled,
which action is now pending before the Rizal CFI, Pasig
Branch. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping
herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the
supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless
fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the
probate Court. No serious argument can be offered to
deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate under
probate. It appearing that the transaction is in the nature
of extra- judicial partition, court approval is imperative, and
the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over
the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of
assignment and desistance, Also, it could not divest the
Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction
by the mere fact of dividing and distributing extrajudicially
the estate of the deceased among themselves. But even if
the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of
the alleged deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does
not lose her standing in the probate court.
We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator
and Rizalina, if they are required to furnish copies of their
pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so, will give
appellee her day in court and provide protection to the
administrator himself.
 11 Duran v. Duran (1967)
Rule 79 | Opposition to issuance of letters
testamentary. Petition and Contest for letters of
administration.
Ponente J. Bengzon
Summary
23. Petitioner assigned his share in the estate of his
decedent brother to the surviving spouse of the
latter for a consideration of 2,500. A year later, he
instituted an intestate proceeding for the settlement
of estate of said decedent, with letters of
administration in his favor. Respondent opposed,
claiming that petitioner is not an “interested person”
for the purposes of issuance of letters of
assignment in view of the deed of assignment he
executed. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss,
alleging the assignment was tainted with fraud and
the price is grossly inadequate. CFI denied the
petition for administration, while also holding that it
has no power to rule on questions of fraud.
Petitioner appealed, citing that assignment by an
heir to a co-heir needs approval by the court to be
valid, the transfer being one of partition.
24. WON Cipriano is an interested person for the
purpose of issuance of letters of administration.
25. No, Cipriano is not an interested person in the
estate of decedent. Court approval is not required
in this case because at the time of assignment, no
settlement proceeding is instituted – properties
assigned was not under the Court’s jurisdiction.
Even allowing the assignment to be one of partition,
it is still valid as between the parties even if non-
compliant with requirements of Rule 74 on
extrajudicial partition since said requisites are only
for purposes of binding creditors. The allegations of
fraud shall be resolved in an action for that purpose
during which time petitioner shall remain a person
not interested in the estate because the assignment
is deemed valid until annulled.
Facts
29. (Parties) – Petitioners Cipriano and Miguel Duran
are two of the surviving sibling of decedent Pio
Duran. Respondent Josefina Duran is the surviving
spouse of decedent.
30. (Antecedents) – Cipriano executed a public
instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary
rights in the intestate estate of Pio Duran in favor of
Josefina, for the consideration of 2,500. A year
later, Cipriano filed petition for an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent, further asking in an ex parte motion that
he be assigned administrator. Josefina filed an
opposition to the ex parte motion, saying that
Cipriano is not an “interested person” in view of the
assignment and renunciation he executed. Cipriano
opposed the motion to dismiss claiming that the
sale was vitiated with fraud, with gross inadequacy
of price. CFI dismissed Cipriano’s petition for his
lack of interest in the estate based on the deed of
transfer he executed. CFI further held that it has no
power to rule on the issue of fraud and inadequacy
of consideration in the said proceeding.
31. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
petitioners appealed directly to the Court, based on
 questions of laws. Petitioners cited the case of In
Re Irene Santos where the court held that an
assignment by an heir of his share in the estate to
another co-heir needs the approval of court, and the
assigning heir does not lose his status as an
interested person in the estate, even after said
assignment is approved by the court.
Issue
9. WON Cipriano is an interested person for the purpose
of issuance of letters of administration.
a. No. The assignment took place when no
settlement proceedings were pending.
Therefore, no court approval was needed.
Held
12. WON Cipriano is an interested person for the purpose
of issuance of letters of administration.
No, Cipriano is not an interested person.
The Santos case is not applicable in this case. In said
case, the assignment between co-heirs happened during
settlement proceedings. At that time, the settlement court
had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of
estate. As a result, any assignment regarding the same
had to be approved by said court. The assigning heir
remains an interested person in proceedings even after
said approval, since it can still be vacated until the estate
is closed.
In the present case, however, the assignment took place
when no settlement proceedings were pending. The
properties subject matter of the assignment was not under
the jurisdiction of a settlement court.
Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition
as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not
need court approval to be effective as between the parties.
An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the
participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for
extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said
requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-
participating heirs only
The remedy for allegations of fraud and inadequacy of
price is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that
purpose. Such assignment is deemed valid until annulled.
Thus, the assignee heir cannot institute a settlement
proceeding because he is left without that "interest" in the
estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.
12) De Guzman v. Angeles, 162 SCRA 347 (1988)
Rule 78,85,87 | Rule on Letters Testamentary/
Executors and Administrators
Ponente J. Gutierrez JR.
Summary
26. Surviving spouse of the decedent filed for the
settlement of intestate estate of her husband. 2
motions where filed: 1. Writ of possession of the 5
vehicles registered in the name of her husband but
found in the possession of his father in law; and, 2.
Ex parte motion to appoint as Special
 Administratrix. A hearing was set but no notice was
given to the Father-in-law.
27. May a probate court appoint special administratrix
and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties
of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a
petition for the settlement of intestate estate even
before the probate court causes notice to be served
upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3,
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
28. No. there is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate
and its jurisdiction over the persons who are
interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person.
a. respondent court acquired jurisdiction over
the proceedings upon the filing of a petition
for the settlement of an intestate estate
b. however, it failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the persons interested in the settlement
29. Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79
of the Rules of Court has been given to persons
believed to have an interest in the estate of the
deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement
of the estate is void and should be annulled. The
requirement as to notice is essential to the validity
of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law.
(Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).
30. notice through publication of the petition for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the
petition void and subject to annulment
Term defined in the case:
Special administrator: the representative of
decedent appointed by the probate court to care for
and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed
Facts
32. Respondent Elaine G. de Guzman (surviving
spouse of the decedent) filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de
Guzman, before the RTC of Makati.
33. ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN filed a motion for writ of
possession over five (5) vehicles registered under
the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be
conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which
are at present in the possession of the private
respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro
de Guzman.
34. Elaine D.G. filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of Manolito de Guzman." The motion was
set for hearing but no notice of such order was
given to Pedro D.G. The lower court granted the
Elaine D.G.’s motion to be appointed as special
administratrix. Also an Ex-Parte Motion for
Assistance was granted in favor of Elaine to assist
in the preserving the estate (writ of possession)
35. Pedro D.G. resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B.
Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject
vehicles on the ground that they were his personal
properties. This resulted in a "near shoot-out
between members of the Makati Police, who were
to maintain peace and order, and the CAPCOM
soldiers who were ostensibly aiding respondent
sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman". The timely
arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati defused
the very volatile situation which resulted in an
agreement between the parties that the bulldozer,
sought to be taken, be temporarily placed in the
custody of Mayor Binay, while the parties seek
clarification of the order from respondent Judge
Zosimo Angeles the next day, June 9, 1981 at 10:30
a.m.
36. In the conference held before the respondent court
attended by the counsels for both parties, the order
was clarified to the effect that the order "must be
merely to take and preserve assets admittedly
belonging to the estate, but not properties, the
ownership of which is claimed by third
persons."
37. Pedro D.G. then filed a manifestation listing
properties which he claimed to be his own.
38. The instant petition was filed to annul the lower
court's orders, 2 previous decisions (administratix
and ex-parte motion for assistance), and a TRO
was issued enjoining such decisions
39. Causes of action:
PEDRO D.G.’s arguments
40. He contends that the order is a patent nullity, the
respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to
appoint a special administratrix because the
petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito
de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and
published for three consecutive weeks, as
mandated by the Rules of Court. the appointment
of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse
of discretion for having been made without
giving petitioner and other parties an
opportunity to oppose said appointment.
Issue: whether or not a probate court may appoint a
special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the
estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the said deceased person even before the probate court
causes notice to be served upon all interested parties
pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
NO. The questioned orders are set aside.
The case is remanded to the lower court.
The court can’t appoint a special
administratix and issue a writ of possession
if no notice was served to all interested
parties.
Held
• the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
 settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased
Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79
of the Revised Rules of Court.
• However, there is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate
and its jurisdiction over the persons who are
interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person. The court may also have
jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased
person but the determination of the properties
comprising that estate must follow established
rules.
• Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that the Court should set time for hearing
and Notice thereof
o It is very clear from this provision that the
probate court must cause notice through
publication of the petition after it receives the
same. The purpose of this notice is to bring
all the interested persons within the court's
jurisdiction so that the judgment therein
becomes binding on all the world.
• Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79
of the Rules of Court has been given to persons
believed to have an interest in the estate of the
deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement
of the estate is void and should be annulled. The
requirement as to notice is essential to the validity
of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law.
(Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).
• notice through publication of the petition for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the
petition void and subject to annulment
• IN THIS CASE, no notice as mandated by
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
was caused to be given by the probate court
before it acted on the motions of the private
respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of the deceased person in the
widow's favor, and to grant her motion for
assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de
Guzman.
• All interested persons including herein petitioner
who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the
Petition (P850,240.80) could have participated in
the proceedings especially so, because the
respondent immediately filed a motion to have
herself appointed as administratrix.
o Special administrator: the "representative
of decedent appointed by the probate court
to care for and preserve his estate until an
executor or general administrator is
appointed
• The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar
interest in the preservation of the estate as the
private respondent who happens to be the widow of
deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the
 necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court.
13 GARCIA FULE v. CA (1976)
Rule 80 | Executors and Administrators
J. Martin
Summary
1. Virginia G. Fule (llegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of
Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging “that
on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba
and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
Judge Malvar granted the motion. A motion of
reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia (surviving
spouse) but was denied. CA reversed decision of CFI
Laguna but before Fule could receive the CA decision,
Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of
administration at the CFI Quezon City. Garcia urgently
moved for her appointment as the special administratrix of
the estate. Judge Ericta granted the motion and Garcia
assumed the office.
2. Whether CFI Quezon City erred in granting Garcia
special administratorship. NO
3. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate
of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner is Virginia Fule, the illegitimate
sister of the decedent, Amado Garcia. The respondent is
Preciosa Garcia, the widow of the decedent.
2. (Antecedents) - Virginia G. Fule (llegitimate sister) filed
with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of
administration alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba and in other places, within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time,
she moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the
motion. A motion of reconsideration was filed by Preciosa
Garcia (surviving spouse) but was denied.
Garcia appealed CFI Laguna. CA reversed decision of CFI
Laguna but before Fule could receive the CA decision,
Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of
administration at the CFI Quezon City. Garcia urgently
moved for her appointment as the special administratrix of
the estate. Judge Ericta granted the motion and Garcia
assumed the office.
Issue: Whether CFI Quezon City erred in granting Garcia
special administratorship. NO

Held: Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors
or administrators appointed. Formerly, the appointment of
a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment
and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a
special administrator or not lies in the probate court.
The consideration that overrides all others in this respect
is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of
the decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property
of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if
not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits
than the naked ownership of a property.
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa
B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With
equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G.
Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or
that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable
of any successional rights. On this point, We rule that
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs to be
emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment,
which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not
determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
decedent but who is entitled to the administration.
14 Roxas v. Pecson (1948)
Rule 78 | Special Administrator
Ponente J. Feria
Summary
- In intestate proceedings, the respondent Judge
appointed two special administrators. The wife of
the deceased was special administrator of all the
conjugal properties. On the other hand, the sister of
the deceased was special administrator of all the
exclusive property.
- May a judge appoint two special administrators,
each with separate and distinct roles in the
administration of the estate? – NO
- Generally, the Judge exercises discretion on who to
appoint as special administrator. However, there is
no reason to appoint two separate special
administratices of the estate of the decedent: one
 of the conjugal or community property and another
of the capital or exclusive property of the deceased
Pablo M. Roxas.
- As under the law only one general administrator
may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly
follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate,
because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the
general administrator.
Facts
41. (Parties) – Petitioner Natividad is the wife of the
deceased while respondents Maria and Pedro are
the siblings of the deceased. The other respondent
is the Judge who appointed two separate special
administrators.
42.
- The respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister
and brother respectively of the deceased (Pablo
Roxas), fi︎led a petition for the administration of the
latter's estate (intestate proceedings).
- Subsequently, the petitioner Natividad Vda. de
Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for
the probate of an alleged will of her deceased
husband, and for her appointment as executrix of
his estate designated in said will
- Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate
proceeding was dismissed and ordered closed by
the court.
- In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by
the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, the
petitioner was appointed as special administratrix
and qualified as such over the objection of the
respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, who sought
the appointment of Maria as such.
o Respondent Judge rendered a decision
denying probate of the will.
- Respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed
their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as
special administratrix or special co- administratrix,
and on May 5, 1948, the respondent judge rendered
his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad
I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only
of all the conjugal properties of the deceased,
and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all
capital or properties belonging exclusively to
the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
Issue
- Can a judge appoint two special co-
administratices of the estate of the deceased, one
of the capital or properties belonging exclusively to
the deceased, and another of his conjugal
properties with his wife (now widow)? - NO

Held
- As the law does not say who shall be appointed as
special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is,
not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity.
- But the respondent's subsequent act of appointing
Natividad Vda de Roxas as special administratrix
only of the conjugal or community property, and
Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital
or exclusive property of the decedent, does not
seem to be in conformity with logic or reason
- The respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing two separate special
administratices of the estate of the decedent: one
of the conjugal or community property and another
of the capital or exclusive property of the deceased
Pablo M. Roxas.
- Section 6, Rule 78, provides for appointment of one
administrator in case of intestacy, except in certain
cases in which two or more joint, but not separate
and independent, administrators may be appointed
under section 3 Rule 81. Therefore the
administrator appointed to administer and liquidate
the exclusive property of a deceased spouse shall
also administer, liquidate and distribute the
community property, because the estate of a
deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is,
administered, liquidated and distributed, consists
not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent,
but also of one-half of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, if any, which may pertain to the
deceased, as determined after the liquidation
thereof
- As under the law only one general administrator
may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly
follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate,
because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the
general administrator.
- In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court
below has no power to appoint two special
administratrices of the estate of a deceased
husband or wife, one of the community property and
another of the exclusive property of the decedent,
and therefore the respondent judge acted in excess
of the court's jurisdiction in rendering or issuing the
order complained of, and therefore said order is
hereby set aside, with costs against the
respondents.
 15 PIJUAN v. GURREA
Rule 78
Ponente C.J. Conception
Summary
1. Manuela and Carlos were married in Spain and
lived there with their son Teodoro, until Carlos
abandoned her and returned to the PH where he
lived with Teodoro and his common law wife
Rizalina.
2. Upon having knowledge of her husband’s
whereabouts, Manuela came to the Philippines but
since she was refused by her husband, lived with
her son Teodoro.
3. She secured an order from the CFI of Negros for
alimony pendent lite in the amount of 1k per month
from her husband. However the alimony ended
when her husband died.
4. Carlos left a document purporting to be a will
which appointed Pijuan as executor and
disinherited Manuela and their son Teodoro.
5. The will was presented for probate, and Pijuan
was appointed as special administrator.
6. During the probate proceedings, Manuela filed a
motion for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. She claims that as the
surviving spouse, she is given preference under
Section 6, Rule 78.
7. the probate court denied her motion.
8. WON she should be appointed as administratrix –
NO.
9. In the language of this provision, said preference
exists if no executor is named in the will or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate. None of these conditions obtains
however in the case at bar.
10. It may not be amiss to note that the preference
accorded by the aforementioned provision of the
Rules to the surviving spouse refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator or
administratrix, and not to that of a special
administrator, and that the order appointing the
latter lies within the discretion of the probate court.
Facts
1. (Parties) – Marcelo Pijuan, as the executor of the
estate of deceased Carlos Gurrea, and Manuela
Ruiz, deceased’s surviving spouse
2. (Antecedents) – Manuela and Carlos were
married in Spain, until he abandoned her and
returned to the Philippines with their son, Teodoro.
3. He lived martially in Negros Occidental with a
woman named Rizalina with whom he had two
children.
4. After being informed of her husband’s
whereabouts, Manuela came to the Philippines but
Carlos refused to admit her to his residence.
Hence, she stayed with her son in Bacolod.
5. She instituted against Carlos an action for support
and the annulment of some alleged donations of
conjugal property in favor of his common law
 spouse Rizalina with the CFI of Negros. In due
course, the CFI issued an order granting her a
monthly alimony pendente lite of P1,000.
6. Carlos died leaving a document purporting to be
his last will and testament in which he named
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and
disinherited Manuela and his son Teodoro.
7. Soon, Pijuan instituted a special proceeding for the
probate of said will, and was thereafter upon his ex
parte motion, appointed as Special Administrator
of the estate, without bond.
8. (Cause of action) Manuela moved for her
appointment as the administratrix of the estate
of the deceased. However this motion was
denied in view of the provision of the will of the
deceased designating another person as
executor thereof.
Issue
10. WON she should be allowed to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate – NO.
Held
13. Manuela argued that the lower court erred in denying
her petition for appointment as administratrix. As a
widow of the deceased, she claims a right of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78.
14. In the language of this provision, said preference
exists if no executor is named in the will or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate.
15. None of these conditions obtains however in the case
at bar.
16. The deceased Carlos has left a document purporting
to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. (sic)
It cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate.
17. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as
executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is
incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only
not refused the trust but has also expressly accepted
it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and
upon his appointment as special administrator has
assumed the duties thereof.
18. It may not be amiss to note that the preference
accorded by the aforementioned provision of the
Rules to the surviving spouse refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator or
administratrix, and not to that of a special
administrator, and that the order appointing the latter
lies within the discretion of the probate court.
16 TAN v. GO CHIONG LEE (1924)
Rule 78-87
Ponente J. Malcolm
Summary
31. Go Chiong Lee was appointed administrator of the
estate Go Bung Kiu. He filed a petition in court so
that he could be allowed to operate two stores
belonging to the estate. Court granted such
however it was subject to the condition that Go
Chiong Lee must submit a report every month.
During his time as administrator, the estate incurred
losses because the two stores hardly made any
 profit, he failed to file monthly reports, failed to
inventory certain sacks of corn, and the creditors of
the estate were not completely paid. Petitioner, as
administrator who replaced respondent, filed case
against respondent and his sureties to recover the
losses incurred by the estate.
32. Issue: WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the losses
incurred by the estate during his administration. --
NO
WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for 850 sacks of corn,
valued at P6,375, which he failed to inventory. --
YES
WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the fact that only
some creditors were paid completely, some
partially, while there some who were not paid at all.
-- NO
33. Issue 1: where an administrator, entrusted with the
carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in
accordance with the usual rules and methods
obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable
for losses incurred.
Issue 2: Law says that the administrator shall make
an inventory. The administrator is accountable on his
bond along with the sureties for the performance of
these legal obligations.
Issue 3: A personal representative will be protected
in the payment of a claim which has been duly
allowed or ordered paid by the court, although it
should not have been paid in full, unless it is made
to appear that such allowance of the claim or order
for the payment thereof, was obtained through his
collusion or bad faith.
Facts
43. (Parties) – Respondent is decedent’s encargador
who was appointed as administrator. Petitioner
replaced respondent as administrator
44. (Antecedents) – In 1920, Go Bung Kiu died in
China. His encargado Go Chiong Lee was
appointed special administrator of his estate. Go
Chiong Lee's status was later changed to that of
administrator. He filed a motion that he be allowed
to operate two stores belonging to the estate. The
court granted the motion but the judge added in ink
a condition stating that a report must be filed
monthly. After filing a bond with the same sureties,
letters of administration were issued in his favor. Go
Chiong Lee continued to discharge his duties as
administrator until he was relieved by Maximina Tan
in 1921. During this period, he filed 3 reports each
covering periods more than a month long.- The
committee on claims rendered its report in1921,
admitting as proved, claims amounting to
P69,029.91. The court issued an order to pay each
and everyone of the persons mentioned in the
report the whole amount appearing there in without
any preference either as to the amount or as to the
time of payment. Go Chiong Lee paid the creditors
of the estate P16,700.39. It appeared that during his
administration, the estate lost over P19,000 as the
two stores hardly made any sales. Maximina Tan
now sues Go Chiong Lee and his sureties on four
causes of action, on amounts totaling P54,700. The
trial court awarded 42,849.08 but limited the
liabilities of the sureties to P30,000.
 Issue
11. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the losses incurred
by the estate during his administration. NO
12. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for 850 sacks of corn,
valued at P6,375, which he failed to inventory. YES
3. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the fact that only
some creditors were paid completely, some partially,
while there some who were not paid at all. NO
Held
19. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the losses incurred
by the estate during his administration.
NO. The standard of responsibility of the administrator
is best measured as in essence the responsibility of a
bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretion
honestly and in good faith, or he will become personally
liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for
waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where an
administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an
estate, acts in good faith and in accordance with the
usual rules and methods obtaining in such business,
he will not be held liable for losses incurred.
The Court said that the failure to file monthly reports
was not fatal because it was seen that Go Chiong Lee
submitted reports whenever it was requested of him.
The losses sustained by the estate resulted from the
risk necessarily attending the operation of the two
stores is a much more reasonable assumption. The
personal responsibility of the former administrator and
the sureties on his bond for losses incurred by the
estate during his administration has not been proved.
20. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for 850 sacks of corn,
valued at P6,375, which he failed to inventory.
YES. An administrator who has qualified shall, within 3
months after his appointment, return to the court a true
inventory of the real estate and of the goods, chattels,
rights, and credits of the deceased, which come into his
possession or knowledge. The administrator shall be
chargeable in his account with the goods, chattels,
rights, and credits of the deceased, which come into his
possession. The administrator is accountable on his
bond along with the sureties for the performance of
these legal obligations
21. WON Go Chiong Lee is liable for the fact that only
some creditors were paid completely, some partially,
while there some who were not paid at all.
NO, A personal representative will be protected in the
payment of a claim which has been duly allowed or
ordered paid by the court, although it should not have
been paid in full, unless it is made to appear that such
allowance of the claim or order for the payment thereof,
was obtained through his collusion or bad faith. After
reading the order of the trial court relating to the
distribution of the assets among the creditors, the
impression of the Court is that the administrator,
although unwisely, attempted to follow the order to the
best of his ability. Moreover, it is not at all certain but
that the estate will finally show enough on the profit
side of the ledger either to pay all of the creditors to the
full extent of their claims, or to give to most of the
creditors who have not been paid a proportion similar
 to that of the creditors who have been paid. In these
same proceedings, the administratrix on her motion, or
the creditors at their initiative, may recover the excess
imprudently paid out to certain creditors.
17 LIZZARGA HERMANOS V. FELICISIMA ABADA
PONENTE J. MOIR
Summary:
The first husband of Abada died leaving hacienda
Coronacion to her administration. Also left by the husband
is a loan from Lizzarga Hermanos amounting to Php.
12,783.74. When Abada performed her role, she leased
out the hacienda to a third person and contracted a loan
personally with Lizzarga. This loan ballooned to what
Lizzarga is claiming at aeound Php. 68,611.01. The heirs
of the deceased decided to enter into a compromise
agreement as approved by court. Lizzarga now claims that
the compromise agreement is void as their 68k claim is not
yet satisfied.
Issue: WON Lizzarga Hermanos has the right to assail the
compromise agreement for the alleged non-payment of
debts of the estate?
No.
The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the
commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this has been
paid, and there was a balance due plaintiffs of P8,555.78
at the time of the trial, plus interest. The plaintiffs, after
their claim had been presented and allowed by the
commissioners, made advances to the administratrix
till their claim was more than P68,000.
It is urged that the major part of this debt of P68,000 is
administration expenses, and as such is chargeable
against the assets of the estate. No reason is given
why the expense of administration should be so great,
and the evidence fails to sustain this position.
By expense of administration we understand to be the
reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the
property and managing it till the debts are paid, as
provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as
to partition it and deliver to the heirs.
1. FACTS:
Francisco Caponong died in October, 1906, owing
the Lizzarga Hermanos a sum of money which was
then less than the amount allowed by the
commissioners.
Francisco’s widow, Felicisima Abada, was
appointed administratrix of the estate,
commissioners to appraise the estate and to pass
on the claims against the estate were duly
appointed, and Lizzarga presented their claim
which was allowed by the commissioners in the
sum of P12,783.74. The commissioner's report was
dated in February, 1909.
The administratrix leased the hacienda [farm]
known as "Coronacion" to Hilario Zayco for a term
of years, but afterwards she married Vicente
Alvarez, one of the defendants, and the lease was
transferred to Alvarez by Zayco, October 2, 1908.

AFTER 7 YEARS OF CAPONONG’S DEATH.
Lizzarga herein filed a suit in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros against Felicisima
Abada personally and as administratrix of the
estate of Francisco Caponong, alleging that
Francisco Caponong owed plaintiffs P12,783.74,
and that Felicisima Abada in her own name and
as administratrix, had been receiving from the
plaintiffs money and effects from 1908 to 1912
which money and effects were used by the
defendant in "the expense of cultivation and the
exploitation of the Hacienda 'Coronacion,' "and
that defendant had delivered to plaintiffs the sugar
produced until the last crop which she refused to
deliver to them.
However in the defense of the estate, Abada and the
guardian of the child of Caponong alleges that, upon
entering into a compromise agreement as approved by the
court, the debts are already settled otherwise, the
compromise agreement is a nullity.
Issue: WON Lizzarga Hermanos has the right to assail the
compromise agreement for the alleged non-payment of
debts of the estate?
Held: It seems this claim should have been wholly denied
by the trial court, and we think the judgment in favor of the
administratrix and against the plaintiffs should be reduced
from P13,262.50 to P8,262.50 with interest as provided
therein. The other damages allowed by the trial court are
so fully sustained by the evidence, it is not necessary to
discuss them.
Coming now to the present action, the plaintiffs allege in
the complaint in this suit, the former suit and its settlement
with judicial approval; the amount due thereunder; i. e.,
P68,611.01; that defendants had let two installments go by
without paying anything; that the amount due them with
accrued interest was P90,383.49;
In approving the compromise agreement, the record in
case No. 969 is presented as Exhibit C by plaintiffs. In their
complaint in that action (which suit should never have
been filed as all the property was in the custody of the
court), plaintiffs allege that their original claim against the
estate of Francisco Caponong was only P12,783.74, and
that the balance of the claim was due from Felicisima
Abada as administratrix and personally without stating
how much was owed by her personally and how much was
owed by her as administratrix.
Whether the court in approving the compromise intended
to hold the defendant estate liable only for the original
debt, and defendant Abada for the balance, is not material.
The language used by the court is very clear and seems
to be an outright approval of the "transaccion"
(compromise), and would, so far as the language goes,
leave no room for doubt of the court's approval of the
agreement in full and as written.
The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the
commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this has been
paid, and there was a balance due plaintiffs of P8,555.78
at the time of the trial, plus interest. The plaintiffs, after
their claim had been presented and allowed by the
commissioners, made advances to the administratrix
till their claim was more than P68,000.
It is urged that the major part of this debt of P68,000 is
administration expenses, and as such is chargeable
against the assets of the estate. No reason is given
why the expense of administration should be so great,
and the evidence fails to sustain this position.
By expense of administration we understand to be the
reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the
property and managing it till the debts are paid, as
provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as
to partition it and deliver to the heirs.
The administration expense would be the necessary
expenses of handling the property, of protecting it
against destruction or deterioration, and possibly
producing a crop, but if plaintiffs, holding a claim
originally for less than P13,000 against the estate, let
the administratrix have money and effects till their
claim grow to P68,000 they can not be permitted to
charge this amount as expense of administration.
They might be allowed to charge it against the current
revenue from the hacienda or the net proceeds of the
"exploitation of the hacienda" for which it was
obtained and used, as plaintiffs allege, but it cannot
relate back to the presenting of their claim to the
commissioners, and be a charge against the
inheritance of the heirs, or even a claim to prorate with
other creditors' claims allowed by the commissioners
That the mortgage given at the same time and as a
result of the agreement was without legal warrant is
equally clear. No mortgage can be placed by an
administrator on the estate of a descendant, unless it
is specifically authorized by statute.
18 WARNER BARNES V. LUZON SURETY
Rule 78 | Rule 85 & 87
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
1. Plaintiff has a claim over the estate of the
deceased. The administratix of the estate filed a
bond under the condition that the bond shall be void
if she violated the terms of her administration.
Plaintiff is now claiming the bond against the surety
since the administratix allegedly violated the
condition. The CFI later granted summary judgment
of the estate ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff.
Defendant claims that there is no cause of action.
2. WON the lower court had jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim. YES
WON defendant is liable even though the
administratix was not authorized to pay the
plaintiff. YES
WON the claim under the bond may be paid to the
plaintiff despite having been executed in favor of
the Republic. YES
3. While the probate court has jurisidcition over the
enforcement of an administrator’s bond, it is not to
say that the matter may not be litigated in an
ordinary civil action before the CFI. Moreover,
allegations of the plaintiff was uncontroverted by
counter-affidacits which the defendant could have
easily fixed. Lastly, though payable to the Republic,
the bond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs,
legatees or devisees of the estate of the deceased,
there is no valid reason why a creditor may not
directly in his name enforce the bond in so far as he
is concerned
Facts
1. Plaintiff is Warner, Barnes & Co. (Warner) and
defendant is Luzon Surety Co. Inc. (Luzon Surety)
2. Agueda Gonzaga, administratix of the intestate
estate of Agueda Gonzaga, filed a bond in the
amount of 6,000 in the special proceedings case
before the CFI of Negros Occidental
3. The bond was filed under a condition that the bond
would be void if the administratix faithfully prepared
the inventory of the property of the deceased,
administers the property, pays all the debts and
renders a true account of the administration.
4. Plaintiff, who has a claim against the estate of
Agueda Gonzaga in the amount of P6,482 claims
that the plaintiff violated the terms of the bond by
failing to file an inventory, failing to pay the claim of
plaintiff and failing to render a true account of her
administration. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for
recovery of the 6k bond plus costs against the
adminsitratix’s surety, Luzon Surety.
5. Plaintiff later filed a motion for summary judgment
which was approved by the CFI and ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of 6k plus
costs.
6. Defendant appeals to the SC contending that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its
liability under the bond because it is only the
probate court that can hold a surety accountable.
Moreover the defendant claims that there is no
showing that the administratix was ever authorized
to pay the claim of plaintiff. Lastly, defendant claims
that the bond in question was executed in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines and the proper
procedure is to enforce the claim in the probate
proceedings.
Issue
1. WON the lower court had jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim. YES
2. WON defendant is liable even though the
administratix was not authorized to pay the plaintiff.
YES
3. WON the claim under the bond may be paid to the
plaintiff despite having been executed in favor of the
Republic. YES
 Held
1. WON the lower court had jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim. YES
While the probate court has jurisidcition over the
enforcement of an administrator’s bond, it is not to say that
the matter may not be litigated in an ordinary civil action
before the CFI.
Summary
2. WON defendant is liable even though the
administratix was not authorized to pay the plaintiff.
YES
The allegations of the plaintiff was uncontroverted by
counter-affidacits which the defendant could have easily
fixed.
3. WON the claim under the bond may be paid to the
plaintiff despite having been executed in favor of the
Republic. YES
Though payable to the Republic, the bond is expressly for
the benefit of the heirs, legatees or devisees of the estate
of the deceased, there is no valid reason why a creditor
may not directly in his name enforce the bond in so far as
he is concerned
Facts
019 In the matter of the Estate of Charles C. Rear
(Deceased) and J.J. Wilson (Administrator) v. M. T.
Rear, et. al. (Heirs) (1930)
Rule 78
Ponente J. Johns
1. Wilson, administrator of Charles Rear’s estate,
rendered a final account of the properties of said
estate. The court approved the account but the
heirs of Rear objected, stating that he was
neglectful and imprudent in dealing with the
properties of the estate.
2. In ruling whether Wilson can be held liable for the
claims against the estate, the Court ruled on the
affirmative. Because of his failure to seek an
authority from the Court to sell the property to pay
the claims promptly, the estate suffered from a
deficit. The administrator is under no duty to
continue the business of the estate, and when
losses are incurred, he must be held liable for the
same.
3. However, in computing for his liability, the Court
became lenient considering his circumstances that
he lived 300km away from the plantation. Operating
expenses of the plantation for the first 8 months and
claims of the Commissioners were deducted from
his liability.
1. The petitioner in this case is the estate of the
decedent Charles Rear and the administrator J.J.
Wilson.
2. The respondents in this case are M.T. Rear and the
rest of the heirs of Charles Rear.
3. On July 14, 1925, Charles Rear was murdered by
some Moros on an isolated area of his plantation at
Cotabato. Said plantation consisted of public lands.
4. J.J. Wilson became qualified as a special
administrator of the estate. After appraisal, an
inventory and report of the property was made by
the Commissioners.
5. The Commissioners then made a report of claims
against the estate. Because those claims weren’t
paid, the court ordered the administrator to sell a
portion of the property. Upon petition, the property
was sold to Wm. Mannion on October 10, 1927.
6. Welson submitted a report covering his
administration until April 26, 1927 and it was
approved. When he filed his final account on June
10, 1928, although the heirs made objections, the
court approved the account. Hence, this petition
alleging the following errors:
a. The disbursements made by the
administrator are in excess of the amount
required to preserve the estate;
b. Loans and advances made cannot be
applied against the estate because no
authority was granted by the court;
c. Wilson must be held liable because he was
neglectful and imprudent.
Issue
1. WON
a. No.
Held
1. Administrator Wilson did not render accounts from
1925 until before the Commissioners ordered him to
sell parts of the estate.
a. First Inventory on Dec. 27, 1925 - the assets of
the estate including real property, coconut trees,
and houses were P15,300, and the personal
property was valued at P5,250, which included
80 head of cattle, carabao and horses of the
value of P4,000. TOTAL IS 20,550.
b. Although he was appointed special
administrator on November 17, 1925, he never
made any report or filed any account nor applied
for an order from the court until 1927.
c. The attention of the court was for the first time
called to the administration of the estate in 1927
when the commissioners on claims asked to
have their fees paid.
2. Sales of Property of the Estate
d. Livestock
i. According to the account, Wilson sold
hogs, a carabao, and steers which
amounted to P628.
ii. This is the only account ever rendered of
the livestock that was appraised at
P4,000, and yet no specific objection was
made for his failure to render any other or
different account of the livestock. (So,
 kulang yung in-account niya for livestock,
but no one ever made an objection.)
e. Sale to Mannion
i. Made by and with the consent of the
heirs.
3. From the amended account the administrator
submitted, the total amount of cash he should have
received is P9,519.25, but the total amount of cash he
disbursed was P11,328.94, leaving a deficit or balance
due and owing from the estate of P1,809,69.
4. At the time the claims (includes those by one J.S.
Alano, taxes, and salary of Fleming) against the
deceased were paid, the amount of the claims were
P1,655.54.
(Summary of the facts stated above:
● Wilson did not account for the estate until 1927.
● Some portions in the livestock are unaccounted
for;
● The amount the administrator disbursed does not
match the amount he received based on sales of
the property leading to a deficit; and
● The claims after payment creditors/employees
amount to .1,655.54)
5. It the legal duty of the administrator to apply to the
court for an order to sell the personal property to pay the
debts of the deceased and the expenses of
administration.
a. At the time of Wilson’s appointment, the personal
property of the deceased was P5,800, and the
whole amount of claims against Rear at the time
of his death and the court costs and expenses of
administration was P3,422.58.
b. If the personal property of the estate had been
promptly sold, and sold for its appraised value, all
the debts of the deceased and the court costs and
expenses of administration would have been paid,
and the estate would have a balance left of
P2,377.42.
c. Instead of doing that, the administrator without
any authority from the court, continued the
operation of the plantation and the employment of
Fleming as manager and a large number of men,
so that at the time of the filing of the amended final
account, the total expense for labor was
P2,863.62, and the amount of the manager's
salary was P4,533.33, the net result of which was
that all of the property of the estate was
consumed, lost or destroyed, leaving a deficit
against the estate of P1,809.69.
d. If the administrator had followed the law and
promptly sold the personal property, all of the
debts of the estate would have been paid, and it
would have a cash balance in its favor of
P2,377.42, and all of its real property left, which
was appraised at P15,000.
e. Wilson's place of business is in Zamboanga, at
least 300 kilometers from the plantation. He
declined to serve as administrator and only
accepted it under pressure. He operated and left
the management of the plantation largely in the
discretion of Fleming, and he was not a party to
any fraud. But even so, he was appointed and
qualified as administrator, and the law imposed
 upon him legal duties and obligations, among
which was to handle the estate in a business-like
manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate
without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay.
f. An administrator, in particular, without a specific
showing or an order of the court, have any legal
right to continue the operation of the business in
which the deceased was engaged, or to eat up
and absorb the assets of the estate in the
payment of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant
case, the administrator on his own volition and
without any authority or process of court
continued the operation of the plantation, and in
the end, as shown by his own report, the estate,
which was appraised at P20,800, with actual
debts of the deceased of only P1,655.54, was all
wiped out and lost, and left with a deficit of
P1,809.69.
g. The penalty for continuing a business of the
decedent without authority is the imposition of a
personal liability on the executor or administrator
so doing for all debts of the business. Even so,
considering the fact the circumstances in this
case, that Wilson was located far away from the
plantation and could not give the business of the
estate his personal attention, the SC no longer
charged him with the operating expenses of the
plantation for the first 8 months and the claims of
the commissioners.
h. In computing his liability, the amount of
P1,919.25 from the sale of personal property and
the P7,600 he received from the remaining assets
sold to Mannion, the total of P9,519.25, should be
deducted by P5,680.03 for and on account of the
items above stated, leaving a balance of
P3,839.22.
i. To entitle the administrator to credit for money
paid out in the course of administration, the sales
must be made in the ordinary course of business
and he should submit and file with the court a
corresponding receipt or voucher.
j. The SC reversed the order of the lower court
approving Wilson’s final account as an
administrator and held him liable to pay
P3,839.22.
20 Luzon Surety v. Quebrar (1984)
Rule 81 | Rule on Bonds of Executors and
Administrators
Ponente J. Makasiar
Summary
FACTS: Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in
behalf of defendant Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates
(Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and
Kilayko bound themselves solidarily after executing an
indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed
to pay the premiums every year. In the years 1954-55, the
defendants paid the premiums and the documentary
stamps. In 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments of
premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year
when the court granted the motion of the defendants to
have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff files a case in
the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover
since the bonds were in force and effect from the filing until
1962.
ISSUES: W/N the bonds still in force and effect from 1955
to 1962?
HELD: YES, term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the
bond by the defendants-appellants.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Luzon Surety,
the surety of the respondent, Pastor T. Quebrar, who is the
administrator of two estates.
2. (Antecedents) – Luzon Surety issued two
administrator's bond in behalf of defendant Quebrar as
administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff
and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves solidarily
after executing an indemnity agreement where both the
defendants agreed to pay the premiums every year. In the
years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums and the
documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the
project of partition of the estates that Quebrar was
handling. In 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments of
premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year
when the court granted the motion of the Quebrar to have
both bonds cancelled. Hence, Luzon Surety filed a case in
the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover
since the bonds were in force and effect from the filing until
1962.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – On March 20,
1975, the Court of Appeals in a resolution certified the
herein case to this Court after finding that this case
involves only errors or questions of law. Both parties
agreed on the ultimate issue - "whether or not the
administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and
after the year (1954) that they were filed and approved by
the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled."
Issue
Whether or not the administrator's bonds were in force
and effect from and after the year (1954) that they were
filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they
were cancelled?
-YES, term of a bond does not usually expire until the
administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law.
Held
YES, term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the
bond by the defendants-appellants.
The proper determination of the liability of the surety
and of the principal on the bond must depend primarily
upon the language of the bond itself. The bonds herein
were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court. While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it
is required by statute, said statutory bonds are construed
in the light of the statute creating the obligation secured
and the purposes for which the bond is required, as
expressed in the statute. The statute which requires the
giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and imparts
into the bond any conditions prescribed by the statute.
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law,
the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for
as long as the administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is
co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces
the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform
in the course of administration, it follows that the
administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity
agreements entered into by him in consideration of the
suretyship. It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor
T. Quebrar, still had something to do as an
administrator/executor even after the approval of the
amended project of partition and accounts on June 6,
1957.The contention of the defendants-appellants that the
administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect
with the approval of the project of partition and statement
of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The
defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as
administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for
the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of
the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation
means the determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses. It appears that
there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June
6, 1957.
As for the argument that non-payment of the
premium extinguished the suretyship, such non-payment
alone of the premiums for the succeeding years does not
necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the
counter-bond in the absence of an express stipulation in
the contract making such non-payment of premiums a
cause for the extinguishment or termination of the
undertaking. There is no necessity for an extension or
renewal of the agreement because by specific provision
thereof, the duration of the counter-bond was made
dependent upon the existence of the original bond.
21 COSME DE MENDOZA v. PACHECO AND
CORDERO (1937)
Rule 78 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Laurel
Summary
1. Soriano is the administrator of the estate of
Baldomero Cosme. He filed a bond of PhP5,000
with Cordero and Pacheco as there sureties to the
bond. Later, the account of the administrator in the
intestate proceeding shows that he is indebted to
the estate in an amount of PhP23,601.21. Upon
application of the administratrix, the court ordered
the execution of the bond. A motion to be
discharged was filed by the sureties to no avail.
Upon remand to the lower court, the sureties
challenge the authority of the lower court, acting as
probate court, to issue an order of execution on the
bond.
2. WON the CFI of Laguna, acting as probate court,
had jurisdiction to order the execution of the
 administrator’s bond? estate in the sum of PhP23,603.21. The court
ordered the execution of his bond after notice duly
3. A Court of First Instance, exercising probate served upon the sureties. (Note: this order is the
jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the challenged act in this case)
administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and
to hold it accountable for any breach of the Later, the court approved a settlement between
administrator's duty. Soriano and a new administratrix, whereby Soriano
ceded real properties to the estate. His
While, it is true that the law does not say expressly indebtedness to the estate was reduced from
or in so many words that such court has power to PhP23,603.21 to PhP5,000.
execute the bond of an administrator, but by
necessary and logical implication, the power is Now, the administratrix had the sheriff levy on the
there as eloquently as if it were phrased in property of the sureties to collect the remaining
unequivocal terms. PhP5,000.

Facts Pacheco and Corder filed motions to be discharged

from the bond. Both were denied.
1. (Parties) – PETITIONER is Rosario Cosme de
Mendoza, administratrix of the intestate estate of They brought an appeal to the Supreme Court. It
Baldomero Cosme; was dismissed.

DEFENDANTs are Januario Pacheco and 3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – When

Raymundo Cordero, sureties for the bond posted the case was remanded to the lower court, Pacheco
by the first administrator of the estate of Baldomero and Cordero filed a motion challenging the
Cosme. jurisdiction of the trial court to issue executing on
the bond.
2. (Antecedents) – Manuel Soriano was the former
administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. To Issue
assure faithful compliance with his duties as 1. WON the CFI of Laguna, acting as probate court,
administrator, he filed a bond for PhP5,000 with had jurisdiction to order the execution of the
Pacheco and Cordero as sureties. administrator’s bond?

Soriano’s account showed him indebted to the

 a. YES. The probate court had jurisdiction to
issue the order.
2. WON a separate action is necessary to go against
the administrator’s bond?
a. NO. It can be done within the probate
proceeding
Held
1. YES. The probate court had jurisdiction to issue the
order.
Before an administrator, or an executor, enters
upon the execution of his trust, and letters
testamentary or of administration are issued, the
person to whom they are issued is required to give
a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs,
with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned
upon the faithful performance of his trust. The
administrator is accountable on his bond along with
the sureties for the performance of certain legal
obligations.
It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising
probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the
filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount
thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of
the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an
all-embracing power over the administrator's bond
and over administration proceedings, a Court of
First Instance in a probate proceeding can not be
devoid of legal authority to execute and make that
bond answerable for the very purpose for which it
was filed.
It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so
many words that such court has power to execute
the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and
logical implication, the power is there as eloquently
as if it were phrased in unequivocal terms.
2. It can be done within the probate proceeding.
It should be observed that section 683 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the
settlement of the account of an executor or
administrator, trustee, or guardian, a person liable
as surety in respect to such account may, upon
application, be admitted as a party to such
accounting, and may have the right to appeal as
hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a
person who may be held liable as surety in respect
to an administrator's account the right, upon
application, to be admitted as a party to the
accounting, from which we may not unreasonably
infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case
before us, may be charged with liability upon the
bond during the process of accounting, that is,
within the recognized confines of probate
proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct
from such proceedings.
 22 Gustilo vs. Sian (R 82 2) 53 SCRA 155
J. Street
S. Facts: Agripino S. Gustilo was appointed administrator
of the estate of his deceased father, Angel Gustilo; In
1925, Agrapino filed his accounts for the years 1923 to
1925, inclusive. In 1926, the widow and the other heirs
moved for the removal of Agrapino for negligence,
exorbitant accounts and illegal expenses, ruinous to the
state under administration.
S. Issue: WON Judge Salas erred in approving the two
accounts;
S. Held: Yes. It was improvident, to say the least, and
made without a reasonable opportunity having been given
to the adverse creditors to make effective opposition
A careful examination of the facts revealed in this record
concerning the activities of Agripino S. Gustilo, as
administrator of Angel Gustilo, convinces this court that he
is not a fit person to be administrator of this estate and that
he has not in fact administered it so far with due regard to
the rights of other persons in interest.
FACTS:
Agripino S. Gustilo was appointed administrator of the
estate of his deceased father, Angel Gustilo; In 1925,
Agrapino filed his accounts for the years 1923 to 1925,
inclusive. In 1926, the widow and the other heirs moved
for the removal of Agrapino for negligence, exorbitant
accounts and illegal expenses, ruinous to the state
under administration.
On July 16, 1927, Agrapino moved that he be granted a
salary of P3,000 annually. On the same day, Agrapino
presented separate accounts 1925-1926 and 1926-1927.
In the first of these accounts there appeared a deficit of
P462.25; while in the second there appeared a deficit of
P3,222.91. Leocadia Majito, one of the creditors, opposed
to the accounts, especially to the annual salary of P3,000
and the sum of P1,000 paid to his attorney. This opposition
was reiterated in writing in which exception was taken to
the distribution of surplus in the amount of P11,304.50. Still
later, Leocadia Majito, in a more detailed writing of
opposition, pointed out that certain alleged debts had been
charged twice to the estate and that no adequate vouchers
were exhibited to justify the charges.
On August 23, 1927, Judge Santamaria (of the CFI of
Iloilo), disapproved the accounts of the administrator and
ordered him to file amended accounts within thirty days.
On September 30, 1927, the administrator asked for an
extension. On February 28, 1928, the administrator
presented for a second time the old accounts without
change.
On March 26, 1928, Judge Fernando Salas (in the
absence of Santamaria) ordered the administrator to
present amended accounts within ten days; but, on April
7, 1928, he reconsidered the order Judge Santamaria and
at the same time approved the same two accounts.
On his order the opposing creditors do not appear to have
received due notices. On June 26, 1928, the attorney for
the appellant moved for reconsideration of Judge Salas’
order, alleging fraud, mistake and surprise, for the removal
of the administrator and for forfeiture of his bond.
ISSUE: WON Judge Salas erred in approving the two
accounts;
HELD: Yes. It was improvident, to say the least, and made
without a reasonable opportunity having been given to the
adverse creditors to make effective opposition. We hereby
set aside the order of Judge Fernando Salas of April 7,
1928, with the result of the proceedings will be restored to
the position in which they stood before that order was
entered, except as stated in the next paragraph. A careful
examination of the facts revealed in this record concerning
the activities of Agripino S. Gustilo, as administrator of
Angel Gustilo, convinces this court that he is not a fit
person to be administrator of this estate and that he has
not in fact administered it so far with due regard to the
rights of other persons in interest. It is the opinion of the
court, therefore, that he should be removed and required
to render his accounts as administrator. However, to order
the forfeiture of the bond of the administrator would be
premature.
23 DEGALA v. CENIZA & UMIPIG (1947)
Rule 76 | Allowance/Disallowance of Wills
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
1. Petitioner Degala wanted Judge Ceniza to remove
respondent Umipig as the special administrator of
the estate of deceased Mina. Among the grounds
claimed by her are adverse interest, failure to
include properties in the inventory and failure to pay
taxes.
2. WoN WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his
discretion in appointing Umipig as the
administrator.
a. NO. The removal of an administrator lies within
the discretion of the court appointing him.
3. The sufficiency of the ground must be determined
by the court. Just because the former administrator
removed by court on the ground of adverse interest
is the attorney for respondent administrator Umipig,
it doesn’t mean that the latter is already disqualified.
Any interest which said attorney may have is
exclusively personal to him, in which the
respondent Umipig can have nothing to do.
Facts
1. he petitioner is Santiago Degala who seeks relief
from refusal of Judge Ceniza to remove the special
administrator (respondent) Umipig of the estate of
deceased Placida Mina.
2. Petitioner’s grounds for respondent’s removal as
administrator are as follows: 1. Umipig has an
adverse interest to the estate 2. He is a stranger to
the estate and not a beneficiary 3. He failed to
include some properties in the inventory 4. He failed
to pay taxes due 5. He failed to render an
accounting.
a. He invoked Rule of Court No. 83, section 2
which says that “if an executor or
administrator neglects to render his account
and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its
discretion, may permit him to resign.”
Issue
1. WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his discretion in
appointing Umipig as the administrator.
 a. NO. The removal of an administrator lies within
the discretion of the court appointing him.
2. As to the other allegations of failure to render an
accounting, to include properties in the inventory etc.
a. See below
Held
1. WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his discretion in
appointing Umipig as the administrator.
NO. The removal of an administrator lies within the
discretion of the court appointing him. The sufficiency of
the ground must be determined by the court. Just because
the former administrator removed by court on the ground
of adverse interest is the attorney for respondent
administrator Umipig, it doesn’t mean that the latter is
already disqualified. Any interest which said attorney may
have is exclusively personal to him, in which the
respondent Umipig can have nothing to do.
2. As to the other allegations of failure to render an
accounting, to include properties in the inventory etc.
Whether the respondent administrator failed to include in
his inventory some properties belonging to the estate, is a
question of fact to be determined by the respondent Judge
after the reception of necessary evidence. It may be true
that the respondent administrator failed to pay all the taxes
due from the estate, but said failure may be due to lack of
funds, and not to a wilful omission. Regarding the alleged
failure of the respondent administrator to render an
accounting, it appears that he did so. The timeliness of the
accounting is addressed to the judge’s discretion. Thus,
petition is hereby dismissed.
24 Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario (1932)
Rule 78 l Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente: J. Villa-real
Summary
1. This case involves two cases involving the Intestate
Proceedings of Chua Piaco (Father) and the
Intestate Proceedings of Chua Toco (Adopted son)
Petitioners were assailing that during the Intestate
proceedings of the Father, certain sums of money
(P20k and 38k) belonged to the Adopted son. The
CFI dismissed the case and ordered costs against
the petitioner. – since questions raised by Petitioner
were already decided in the previous Intestate
proceeding of the Father. (basically, settled na yung
claims sa intestate and decided na ng judge yung
issues dun)
Respondents in this case were alleging that there
was already RES JUDICATA between the two
cases since
2. w/n there was Res Judicata between the two cases
3. Held: YUP! Briefly: (1) While there is no identity
between the plaintiff in the former case and the
plaintiffs in the present case, there is the relation of
representation between them; (2) there is identity of
cause of action; (3) there is identity of subject
matter; and (4) there is identity of issue, upon which
depends the granting or denial of the relief sought
in each of said cases, and this issue has been
impliedly decided in the former case. Therefore, all
the elements of res judicata in accordance with the
aforecited legal provisions are present.
Facts
1. Parties: Chua Tan – Heirs of Chua Toco
(Adopted son of Chua Piaco)
Del Rosario – administratix of intestate estate of
Chua Toco
2. Antecedents – Chua Tan is seeking to appeal
the decision of CFI Manila for dismissing their
complaint and absolving Del Rosario as
administratix of estate of Chua Toco
- Petitioner is alleging that CFI erred in
sustaining the Res Judicata argument of the
Respondents
o Because there was already a decided
case by the SC on the Intestate
proceedings of Chua Piaco
- Petitioner was arguing that CFI erred in not
holding that the sums of P20,000 and
P38,559 did not belong to Chua Toco
exclusively as an heir of Chua Piaco
Issue
W/n Res Judicata applies in this case
Held
Yup!
- Requisites of Res Judicata
o (1) the former judgment must be final;
o (2) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
o (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and
o (4) there is — between the first and
the second actions — an identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of
action
- All requisites for Res Judicata are present in
this case
o Identity of parties - Benedicta Santa
Juana, as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the late Chua
Piaco, was the legal representative
not only of said estate but also of its
creditors and heirs. In view of this
relation of agent and principal
between her and the plaintiffs in the
present case, the decision rendered
against Benedicta Santa Juana, as
such administratrix, in the former
case is conclusive and binding
upon said plaintiffs in the present
case,
§ Under the provisions of the
law, the judicial administrator
is the legal representative not
only of the testate or intestate
estate, but also of the
creditors, and heirs and
legatees, inasmuch as he
 represents their interest in the
estate of the deceased.
o Identity of Subject Matter - In the
former case the petition was for the
rendering of an accounting of certain
funds alleged to have been delivered
in trust by the late Chua Piaco to his
adopted son, the late Chua Toco. In
the present case the petition is for
the partition of those same funds
and their fruits between the heirs
of both deceased.
o Identity of Cause of Action – Former
case - had refused to render an
accounting of said funds and the fruits
thereof. In the present case the
plaintiffs include the same allegation
of trust, and the defendant makes the
same denial, except that instead of a
rendition of accounts, the partition of
said funds and the product thereof is
asked.
o Identity of Cause of Action - he
rendition of accounts in the former
case, is different from the relief
sought in the case now before us,
which is the partition of funds, but the
question at issue, upon the
determination of which depended
the granting or denial of such
relief, is the same, namely, whether
Chua Piaco or Chua Toco was the
owner of said funds.
25 Adapon v. Maralit (1940)
Rule 78, 85, 87 | Letters Testamentary and of
Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Laurel
Facts
1. Petitioner in this case is Pedro Adapon, the
administrator of the estate of deceased Rudocindo
Adapon. The surviving spouse of the testator by a
second marriage, Felisa Maralit, is the oppositor-
respondent.
2. Petitioner filed an inventory of the properties and
assets of the estate and respondent presented a
petition asking the court to order the administrator
to pay her a monthly allowance of P50, and to
include in the submitted inventory various
properties that include credit due to the testator,
1000 cavans of palay, 100 animals (carabaos etc,
the inventory was in Spanish so I can’t understand
entirely), a house, and a tract of land for raising
palay crops.
3. (Assumption based on held, because some facts
are in Spanish) The administrator claimed that he
owned some of the properties listed in the petitioner
of respondent listed above.
4. When the petition was set for hearing, the
respondent moved that the administrator should be
relived of his duties and another appointed to act in
his place. The probate court suspended the hearing
 for sometime in an effort to have the parties reach
an agreement.
5. The decision of the trial court on the petition to have
the petitioner is in Spanish, but I assume that it was
granted because the petitioner elevated the case
through appeal.
Issue
1. (Issued raised also in Spanish, this is an inference)
WON the CFI could, upon petition of an oppositor to
include certain properties in the inventory prepared by
the administrator determine the question of ownership
(because administrator raises the issue of ownership
over some properties).
a. Yes. It is not seen how the probate court can
determine the respective merits of the
conflicting claims made by the administrator
and the oppositor without necessarily
declaring the lawful ownership of the
properties involved.
Held
1. WON the CFI could, upon petition of an oppositor to
include certain properties in the inventory prepared by
the administrator determine the question of ownership
over the properties involved.
Yes. It is not seen how the probate court can determine
the respective merits of the conflicting claims made by the
administrator and the oppositor without necessarily
declaring the lawful ownership of the properties involved.
Such a declaration is necessary and inevitable, and
without it the probate court cannot properly proceed and
dispose of the petition submitted by the oppositor. (That’s
the extent of their explanation on this issue, short case).
26 INTESTATE ESTATE OF SAMUEL WILLIAM
ALLEN. MOORE & SONS MERCANTILE CO.,
APPELLANT, VS. CARMEN WAGNER, APPELLEE.
(1927)
Rule 78-Rule 85 and Rule 87
Summary
34. (Short Facts) The wife and the child wants to claim
support from the estate of the deceased husband.
However, liabilities of the deceased are greater
than the value of the estate.
35. (Short Issue) May support be demanded when the
liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of the
deceased spouse? No
36. (Short Held) Support cannot be granted if proved
that there is no more property, private or conjugal,
pertaining to the surviving spouses or heirs of the
deceased since by virtue of Art. 1430 (NCC),
support is only an advance payment on account of
the respective share of each partner. In this case, it
is indisputable that the deceased Samuel Allen's
estate liabilities exceed the assets.
Facts
45. In the proceeding for settlement of the intestate
estate of deceased Samuel Allen, his widow
petitioned for provision of allowance for hreself and
her daughter Avelina Allen amounting to P80.00.
The Special Administrator appointed objected to
 the allowance requested on the ground that the
estate is insolvent since the total claims presented
against it amounts to P2,457.00 while the estate's
balance only amounted to P870.97. The lower court
approved the allowance citing Art. 1430 of the New
Civil Code and Sec. 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
lower court's decision.
Issue
May a widow validly demand for support or
allowance when the liabilities of the deceased's
estate exceed its assets?
Held
No. Support cannot be granted if proved that there is
no more property, private or conjugal, pertaining to
the surviving spouses or heirs of the deceased since
by virtue of Art. 1430 (NCC), support is only an
advance payment on account of the respective share
of each partner. In this case, it is indisputable that the
deceased Samuel Allen's estate liabilities exceed the
assets. Moreover, his widow admitted that she has
not contributed to the property of marriage. As such, it
is therefore unlawful to grant support when there is no
property to be partitioned.
1. WON the request for support shall be denied
27 Santero vs CFI of Cavite (1987)
Rule 83 Sec. 3 | Rule on Provision for Support of
Family
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
1. This case is for the allowance of support filed by
one of the mothers and her children. This allowance
is contested because there are missing children in
the allowance and that these children have already
achieved age of majority.
2. WON they are entitled to support
3. Yes, support is provided in the civil code and that
age, employment and marriage is of no moment in
the civil code. Support under civil code is
substantive while the minor requirement in rule 83
sec.3 is procedural only
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are the
illegitmate sons of the decedent from the second
woman (not wife).
2. (Antecedents) – So there is a mass of inventory
held in trust located in Kawit. The petitioners are
asking for support for the education of the children.
The administrator said that the money is held in
trust.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Due to
the fact that some are already of age and working,
support shall be denied
Issue
 a. No. Because Article 188 and 290 doesn’t qualify declared null and void. The court granted the
age marriage or employment motion, ordering Fenix to lease the lands to the
Held highest bidder in a public auction.
1. WON the request for support shall be denied
3. Nava, as lessee, now asks Supreme Court to set
NO. Because Rule 83 Sec. 3 which talks about children aside the said order of the lower court for being
being minor is a procedural rule and cannot go over issued without jurisdiction. Nava argues that the
those found in the civil code which is left unqualified. contract can only be annulled in a separate,
Procedural cannot go over substantial provision. Since it independent proceeding.
will be used for schooling which is under support then it
shall be allowed.
Issue
1. WON the lower court has the power to annul, in the
intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by
28 Hilado v. Nava (1939)
the administratrix without its intervention
Rule 78 | Letters Testamentary and of Administration,
When and to Whom Issued
a. No. The lease contract was a mere act of
Moran J.
administration
Facts
1. Petitioner, Concepcion de Hilado (Hilado), an
Held
intervenor in the intestate proceedings of the
1. WON the lower court has the power to annul, in the
estate of Jocson. Respondent, Jesus Nava (Nava)
intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by
was the lessee over certain properties of the said
the administratrix without its intervention
estate.
No. The contract of lease, being a mere act of
administration, could validly be entered into by the
2. Estefania Fenix was the administratrix of the
administratrix within her powers of admin, even without
intestate estate of Jocson. Fenix executed in favor
the court’s previous authority. The court had no power to
of Nava a contract of lease wherein for a period of
annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate
5 crop years, certain properties of the estate would
proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the
be rented out to the latter for P1,000 a year.
person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is
Initially, the court did not intervene in the
necessary to that effect
conclusion of the contract. However, petitioner
Hilado filed a motion asking for details of such
lease contract and asked that the same be
 29 SAN DIEGO v. NOMBRE (1964)
Rule 78 - 85 | Letters Testamentary and of
Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Ponente J. Paredes
Summary
46. Nombre, as judicial administrator of the intestate
estate subject of the Sp. Proc., leased one of the
properties of the estate (fishpond) to Pedro
Escanlar, the other respondent. [Terms of the
lease: 3 years with a yearly rental of P3,000 to
expire on May 1, 1963]. The transaction was done
without previous authority of approval of the Court
where the proceedings was pending.
Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of
the court and one Sofronio Campillanos was
appointed instead. Respondent Escanlar then was
cited for contempt for allegedly refusing to
surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed
administrator.
47. WON a judicial administrator can validly lease
property of the estate without prior judicial
authority and approval
48. Rule 85 Sec 3 of the Rules of Court authorizes a
judicial administrator to administer the estate of the
deceased not disposed of by will. Under this
provision, the executor or administrator has the
power of administering the estate of the deceased
for purposed of liquidation and distribution. He may,
therefore, exercise all acts of administration without
special authority of the Court.
Facts
1. The case at bar had its origin in Special
Proceedings No. 7279 of the CFI of Negros
Occidental, wherein respondent Adelo Nombre was
the duly constituted judicial administrator.
2. On May 1, 1961, Nombre, as judicial administrator
of the intestate estate subject of the Sp. Proc.
Stated above, leased one of the properties of the
estate (fishpond) to Pedro Escanlar, the other
respondent. [Terms of the lease: 3 years with a
yearly rental of P3,000 to expire on May 1, 1963].
The transaction was done without previous
authority of approval of the Court where the
proceedings was pending.
On January 17, 1961, Nombre was removed as
administrator by Order of the court and one
Sofronio Campillanos was appointed instead.
Respondent Escanlar then was cited for contempt
for allegedly refusing to surrender the fishpond to
the newly appointed administrator.
On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion
asking for authority to execute a lease contract of
the same fishpond in favor of petitioner herein,
Moises San Diego Sr for 5 years from 1961 at a
yearly rental of P5,000.00.
Escanlar was not notified of such motion. Nombre
presented a written opposition pointing out that the
 fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3
years. He also invited the attention of the Court that
to grant the motion of the new administrator would
in effect nullify the contract in favor of Escanlar, a
person on whom the Court has no jurisdiction. The
Court declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar
was null and void for want of judicial authority and
that unless he would offer the same as or better
conditions than the prospective lessee, there was
no good reason why the motion for authority to
lease the property to San Diego should not be
granted.
Nombre moved to reconsider stating that Escanlar
was willing to increase the rental to P5,000.00 but
only after the termination of his original contract.
The MR was denied.
3. A petition for Certiorari asking for the annulment of
the Orders was presented by Nombre and Escanlar
with the CA. A writ of preliminary injunction was
likewise prayed.
Issue
13. WON a judicial administrator can validly lease property
of the estate without prior judicial authority and
approval
a. Yes, no such limitation on the power of a judicial
administrator to grant a lease of property placed
under his custody is provided for in the present
law.
Held
Under Art 1647 of the present Civil Code, it is only when
the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that
it cannot be instituted without special authority.
Rule 85 Sec 3 of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial
administrator to administer the estate of the deceased not
disposed of by will. Under this provision, the executor or
administrator has the power of administering the estate of
the deceased for purposed of liquidation and distribution.
He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration
without special authority of the Court.
For instance, he may lease the property without securing
previously any permission from the court. And where the
lease has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in
the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of
the lessee, over whose person it has no jurisdiction. The
proper remedy would be a separate action by the
administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.
30| JARODA V. CUSI JR. (1969)
Rule 78 – RULE 85 AND RULE 87
J. REYES
Summary
1. Facts: Two orders were issued by the Judge in the
intestate proceeding of the deceased. The first is
the approval of withdrawal of deposits in the bank
while the second is the approval of the power of
attorney executed by Tan and the appointment of
him as attorney-in-fact to sell the subdivision lots.
2. Issue: WON the orders are valid.

3. Both orders are invalid. The first being outside the
powers that may be granted to the special
administrator. Also, said order was issued without
notice and hearing of the heirs of the deceased. As
for the second order, it is invalid for want of notice
to the heirs.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner Natividad Jaroda, one of
the children of the deceased. The respondents are
Vicente Cusi, Jr., the Presiding Judge of CFI Davao
and Antonio Tan, the judicial administrator of
intestate estate of Carlos Villa Abrille.
2. (Antecedents) – Judge Cusi issued 2 orders in the
intestate proceeding of Carlos Abrille. The first
order granted an ex-parte petition by Tan to
withdraw money from PNB (savings and checking
account in the name of Abrille. The money was
allegedly held in trust for the decedent’s co-owners
in the San Juan Subdivision. The second order
approved ex-parte the power of attorney executed
by Tan appointing himself attorney-in-fact to sell the
share of estate in the subdivision lots.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
Petitioner moved to nullify the orders but the Court
denied for “lack of merit”.
Issues
1. WON the order allowing the special administrator to
withdraw the bank deposits is valid.
• No. The said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
and duties of a special administrator.
2. WON the order approving the power of attorney is
valid.
• No. It is void for want of notice and for approving an
improper contract or transaction.
Held
1. WON the order allowing the special administrator to
withdraw the bank deposits is valid.
No. Said order was invalid. First, said withdrawal is foreign
to the powers and duties of a special administrator as
provided by Sec. 2 of Rule 80. Its powers are to: take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits and estate of the decease and preserve the same
for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits
as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.
Second, the order was issued without notice to, and
hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. Said withdrawal is
a waiver by the special administrator of a prima
facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank
deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision,
who were allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the
administrator in his motion
2. WON the order allowing the special administrator to
withdraw the bank deposits is valid.
The very rule, Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court,
relied on by respondent Tan to sustain the power of
attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate
in the subdivision requires "written notice to the heirs,
devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to
be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish
such notice. Without such notice, the order of the court
authorizing the sale is void.
31 Garcia v. Escudero (1922)
Rule 78
J. Romualdez
Summary
37. Gregorio Verdejo died, leaving an open will where
he named as heirs his three sisters (plaintiffs
herein) and Escudero (defendant) as one of the
administrators. The intestate proceedings were
commenced for the properties not disposed of by
will. Plaintiffs brought an action against the
defendant to render an account of the properties
inherited by them. The trial court ordered Escudero
to deliver the properties of the deceased (such as
furniture, jewelry, cattle, and coconut lands). In
Escudero’s statement, he explained that these
properties have been either seized, destroyed by
fire, and the cattle died due to rinderpest.
38. WON the administrator should be held liable for the
properties under his administration through
fortuitous event (please read all issues in the long
form)
39. No. The administrator in an administration
proceeding is not responsible for the loss, by a
fortuitous event, of the personal properties under
administration in the absence of proof that said loss
was due to his negligence. lso the administrator is
not bound to render an account of the products of
the realties seized by the Philippine revolutionary
troops during the Philippine Revolution.
Facts
49. Plaintiffs are the three sisters of Gregorio Verdejo
(decedent), while defendant Placido Escudero is
one of the decedent’s appointed administrators.
50. Gregorio Garcia Verdejo is the owner of properties
situated in the Dolores, Tayabas. He died in Manila
in 1895, leaving and open will where he named as
his heirs his three sisters, and appointed as
administrators Marasigan and Escudero.
51. Intestate proceedings were commenced in Dolores
for the settlement of the deceased’s estate
undisposed of by will, and testamentary
proceedings leading to the settlement of his estate
covered by his will were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas by whose order said
justice of the peace, on February 24, 1896,
delivered to the defendant the properties of the
deceased.
52. The plaintiffs, as the testamentary heirs of said
deceased, brought this action, it is prayed that they
be declared heirs of the deceased and the
defendant ordered: (a) To deliver to them the
 properties inherited by them, and (b) to render an
account of his administration from February 24,
1896.
53. The trial court granted these reliefs, ordering
Escudero to deliver all the properties to the
plaintiffs;
a. and to render accounts duly verified for each
year of his administration and management
thereof,
b. and in lieu of the furniture and jewels, he
must pay P230 unless he can deliver the
same.
c. In lieu of cattle, the sum of P1447 unless he
can deliver the animals themselves whose
deaths were not proven.
54. Escudero filed the necessary bond in order to stay
the execution, which was granted by the Court. He
however, agreed to rendered an accounting of the
properties in his custody.
55. The plaintiffs impugned these accounts. After
hearing, the trial court ordered Escudero to file an
amended statement of account in accordance with
its findings that:
a. Items under Sundries account – amounting
to P1,491.50; disapproved and must be
deducted from the general account
b. He must render an accounting of the lands
w/c had 1997 coconut trees which yielded 50
nuts per year from February 24, 1896 to
January 1, 1902. The fact that these were
seized by the Revolutionary government and
taken from his administration and control
was immaterial.
c. He must render an accounting of the ‘fourth
period’, which is from Jan. 1, 1902 to August
15, 1906.
56. Defendant perfected this present appeal.
Issues
1. WON the administrators should be liable for certain
personal properties destroyed by fire. No.
2. WON the administrator should be held liable for the
value of the cattle that perished during the
rinderpest in 1989. No.
3. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the coconut lands and liable for their
value. No.
4. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the ‘fourth period. No.
5. WON the sundries account was properly
disapproved by the court. No.
Held
1. WON the administrators should be liable for certain
personal properties destroyed by fire.
No. The trial court held the defendant responsible
for such properties, it being of the opinion that he
was negligent in having left them in the barrio of
Santo Nino where they were. Taking into account
the fact that the fire occurred in a calamitous time,
for, as appears from the evidence, it was caused by
the North American forces who were fighting the
Philippine revolutionists, we find that the disaster
could not have been prevented by the defendant. It
might be said that he could have foreseen it, but it
 does not appear just how and where those
properties could have been proven that the town of
San Pablo, the place of residence of the defendant,
was any safer than that of Santo Nino. It was not
shown that such properties were destroyed through
the negligence of the defendant.
2. WON the administrator should be held liable for the
value of the cattle that perished during the
rinderpest in 1989.
No. In the first place the fact of the death of those
animals is proven by the testimony of the defendant
based on his personal knowledge, and this
testimony is not a secondary, but original, evidence
of such fact. It would be a secondary evidence if
such testimony were a mere recital of the contents
of the credentials or annotated certificates issued in
accordance with article 7 of the Large Cattle
Regulation approved by Royal Order dated August
19, 1862, in force in the Philippines in 1898.
Besides, it does not appear that whenever an
animal died, the officer having authority on the
matter (teniente de ganados) was notified in all
cases of the fact and the regulations complied with.
In the second place, no timely objection was made
to said testimony of the defendant.
3. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the coconut lands and liable for their
value.
No. The evidence shows that those coconut lands
were seized by the Philippine revolutionists in the
year 1899 to 1902, they were a forest. The
Philippine Revolution lasted, practically, during the
whole period from 1896 to 1902, and the defendant,
residing as he was, in a town far away from the
coconut lands, could not, as he testified, go to the
lands to gather their fruits, and thus he got none,
according to his testimony.
4. WON the administrator was bound to render an
account of the ‘fourth period.
No. The defendant says in his statement of
accounts that in 1902 and 1903 the fruit of the
coconut trees hardly covered the small expenses;
that in 1904 and 1905, they began to yield
something but very little. It not having been proven
that in those periods the coconut lands produced
anything to be accounted for, we find the report
made by the defendant sufficient on this matter, and
it is unnecessary to require him to make a detailed
statement of said products.
5. WON the sundries account was properly
disapproved by the court.
No. those items are proved by the testimony of the
defendant, the plaintiffs' evidence being insufficient
to overthrow or weaken it. We believe that the items
under "Sundries" account in defendant's statement
should have been approved.

32 Nicolas v. Nicolas
Rule 78, 85 and 87 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Villa-real
Summary
40. Facts: Domingo as the ex-administrator of the
estate appealed because the court rejected as
evidence some of the pleadings he submitted in
support of his position as ex-administrator. He also
assails that the court erred when it did not submit
him to an examination under oath and in not holding
a hearing on his accounts. Lastly, there were
expenses he incurred as administrator which the
court rejected.
41. Issue: WON the court erred in eliminating his
pleadings, in not examining him under oath, and in
not allowing the expenses he incurred
42. Ruling: NO. The court stated that the pleadings had
to be certified transcripts of the the order appealed
from and not the inclusion of any other order,
pleading etc. The court also stated that it allowed
the petitioner to be heard when it conducted a
hearing and lastly, expenses were disapproved
because he failed to get authorization from the
court.
Facts
57. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case is Domingo
Nicolas who was the ex-administrator of the estate
of Santiago Nicolas.
58. (Antecedents) – Domingo appealed the courts
decisions which stated:
“The court, therefore, approves the two accounts dated
August 14, 1933 and March 14, 1934, presented by the
ex-administrator Domingo Nicolas, with the amendments
above-stated and with a balance of P726.01 in favor of the
administration, which sum said Domingo Nicolas must turn
over to the administrator Protasio Santos, through the
clerk of this court, within the period of twenty (20) days
from this date. In case of noncompliance with this order on
the part of Domingo Nicolas, let the bond given by said ex-
administrator be attached in order to collect said sum of
P726.01”
He alleged numerous errors committed by the court.
The first assignment of alleged error consists in that the
lower court erred in disapproving the record on
appeal presented by the appellant on August 1934, and in
ordering the amendment thereof by eliminating certain
pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments not related to
the order of June 20, 1934, appealed from
The appellant in insisting upon the inclusion of said
pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments in the record on
appeal alleges as a ground thereof that they constitute the
best evidence of the services rendered by him and his
attorney.
The second question to be decided, by reason of its
procedural nature, which is raised in the eighth and last
assignment of alleged error, is whether or not the court a
quo erred in not submitting the appellant to an examination
under oath and in not holding a hearing on his accounts.
There were also expenses done for the estate which
Domingo Nicolas wanted to be reimbursed for such as
Money advanced to Attorney Bartolome Domingo, P400,
Partial payment of debt of deceased in favor of Miguel
Julian, P105.1, partial payment to Commissioner Gabriel,
P100. Expenses during the anniversary of the deceased,
P36.5.
(Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – This is an
appeal taken by Domingo Nicolas, ex-administrator of the
intestate of the deceased Santiago Nicolas, from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
Issue
14. WON the court committed errors in eliminating the
pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments - NO
15. WON the court erred in not submitting the appellant to
an examination under oath and in not holding a hearing
on his accounts - NO
16. WON the court erred in rejecting certain expenses
incurred by Domingo as the administrator - NO
Held
1. With regards to the the first issue of eliminating
certain pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments,
the court ruled:
What section 779 of the Code of Civil Procedure
requires to be transmitted to this court in case of an
appeal from a decree or order approving or
disapproving the accounts of an administrator, in
accordance with the provisions of section 778, is a
certified transcript of the appeal, order, decree or
judgment appealed from and of the accounts
embraced in the order, the inclusion of any other
order, decree or judgment from which no appeal
has been taken being unnecessary and
superfluous.
The court a quo, therefore, committed no error in
ordering the elimination from the record on appeal
of the other pleadings, decrees, orders and
judgments not appealed from, which, according to
the appellant himself, are nothing more than
evidence of the services rendered by him and his
attorney.
2. With regards to not examining under oath:
"Upon calling for hearing the accounts of the ex-
administrator Domingo Nicolas, the one dated
August 14, 1933, only with respect to Nos. 3,5 and
6 of the item 'III—Payments', and No. 9 of the item
'IV—Traveling Expenses', and another dated May
15, 1934, there appeared the said ex-administrator
Domingo Nicolas in his own behalf and Sisenando
Palarca who is opposed to the approval thereof.
It is clear, therefore, that the ex-administrator-
appellant Domingo Nicolas was given the
 opportunity to explain his accounts and present his
evidence in support thereof, and that he appeared
at the hearing of said accounts.
3. Expenses:
We are of the opinion that the court a quo correctly
rejected them on the ground that they had not been
authorized by said court
Item 9 thereof, consisting in expenses incurred by
the appellant on the occasion of the anniversary of
the death of the deceased, amounting to P36.50,
cannot be considered a part of the funeral expenses
nor treated as the erection of a mausoleum which
forms part of the sepulture of the deceased,
because it bears no relation to the funeral.
With respect to the other expenses and fees which
the ex-administrator- appellant seeks to collect and
which the lower court rejected, the law only
authorizes the administrator to collect for his
services as such the sum of P4 for every day
actually and necessarily spent by him in the
administration and care of the estate of a deceased
person, not for every act or task he might perform,
even if it were to take only a few minutes to do so,
as indicated by the nature of the great majority of
the task performed by him, for each and every one
of which he seeks to collect P4.
33 UY TIOCO v. IMPERIAL (1928)
Rule 78-85, 87 | Administrator or Executor
J. Ostrand
Summary
1. Respondent Panis filed a motion (which was
granted) in a probate proceeding for the allowance
of attorney’s fees. The guardian of the decedent’s
sons filed a notice of appeal. Later, Respondent
filed for an order (which was granted twice) for
payment of ¾ of the attorney’s fees. Petitioner
refused to make the payment and filed an action
with the SC.
2. WON, despite an appeal, the estate should be liable
for attorney’s fees.
3. No. The lower court is not authorized to enforce
immediate execution of its orders after an appeal
has been perfected. Moreover, the attorney cannot
hold the estate directly liable for attorney’s fees.
The liability rests on the executor or the
administrator. However, if the fees paid are
beneficial to the estate and reasonable, the
executor or administrator is entitled to
reimbursement from the estate. Hence, the probate
court may not enforce payment until the appeal has
been decided.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The petitioner in this case is Uy Tioco,
the administrator of the estate and husband of the
 deceased. The respondents are Judge Imperial and
Panis, the counsel for the estate’s administration.
2. (Antecedents) – Respondent Panis filed a motion
during the probate proceedings for the allowance of
attorney’s fees. The court granted the motion
despite the objection by Petitioner Uy Tioco. The
guardian of the decedent’s (and Petitioner’s) sons
filed a MR but was denied because notice to the
administrator was deemed sufficient compliance
with the law on the notice to the heirs.
3. The guardian filed a notice of appeal to the SC. In
this regard, Respondent filed a motion in the
probate court setting that the appeal can only be on
¼ of the attorney’s fees and that ¾ of it should be
ordered paid. This is because one of the minors
died and the share will go to Petitioner as the father.
Since the property is also community property, ½
belongs to Petitioner also as husband. Only ¼
therefore remains with the other minor, who the
guardian represents. The probate court ordered the
payment of such amount.
4. Petitioner refused to make the payment despite two
orders by the court. Hence, the present action
brought to the SC.
Issue
1. WON the immediate execution of a probate court’s
order is allowed despite an appeal. NO
2. WON the liability for attorney’s fees is on the estate and
not the administrator or executor. NO
Held
1. WON the immediate execution of a probate court’s
order is allowed despite an appeal.
No. The orders of the probate court for partial payment
were issued after an appeal was taken and perfected (by
the filing of an appeal bond). No law authorizes the lower
court to enforce the immediate execution of such orders in
probate proceedings after an appeal has been perfected.
The probate court may not enforce the payment of the
attorney's fees until the appeal taken has been passed
upon or dismissed.
2. WON the liability for attorney’s fees is on the estate and
not the administrator or executor.
No. The services for which attorney’s fees are claimed are
rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in
the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not
hold the estate directly liable for the fees. Such fees are
allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the
attorney.
The liability for the payment rests on the executor or
administrator. But, if the fees paid are beneficial to the
estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement
from the estate. Such payments should be included in his
accounts and the reimbursement therefor settled upon the
notice.
34 DACANAY v. HERNANDEZ (1928)
Rule 78-Rule 85 and 87
Ponente J. Ostrand
Facts
1. The parties are TIRSO DACANAY, administrator of the
estate of Justiniano Rogero Dacanay. Tirso is one of
Justiniano’s three acknowledged natural children. On
the other side is SILVERIO HERNANDEZ, in his own
behalf and as guardian of minor MARIA HERNANDEZ.
Silverio is the surviving spouse of Justiniano’s only
legitimate child, BIENVENIDA.
2. Justiniano died testate. His natural child Tirso was
named executor. The will greatly favored the natural
children at the expense of Bienvenida, the only
legitimate child. The will stated that Bienvenida had
been disobedient thus the decedent felt justified in
curtailing her inheritance. The will was presented for
probate and was duly probated.
3. Tirso qualified as administrator and commissioners on
claims and appraisal were appointed. The
commissioners prepared a final report but no further
steps were taken towards settlement until the Judge of
the CFI appointed commissioners for the partition of
the estate. The commissioners submitted a scheme of
partition in which the provisions of the will were closely
followed while the law on succession appears to have
been clearly disregarded.
4. Silverio Hernandez, in representation of his deceased
wife and his children, opposed the approval of the
scheme on the ground that the portions of the estate
assigned to the natural children greatly exceeded the
maximum shares allowed them as acknowledged
natural children.
5. The CFI rendered a decision finding that the will
resulted into Bienvenida receiving only part of the
estate of her deceased mother and none of the
property acquired by the testator father. The court
disapproved the partition and ordered the
commissioners to make a new partition.
6. No further action was taken by the commissioners. The
executor Tirso Dacanay presented a plan for the
partition of the estate. Another scheme was submitted
by Silverio. Both were unsatisfactory to the court. The
judge rendered a decision providing for a complete and
fair distribution of the estate according to evidence.
7. Tirso filed before the SC a motion for the reopening of
the case on the ground that he had discovered new
evidence consisting in an inventory of property alleged
to have been donated to Bienvenida on the occasion of
her marriage. The Court granted the motion and
ordered the case remanded to the CFI for additional
proof. The CFI judge found the inventory genuine and
directed the commissioners to submit a new scheme of
partition.
8. The record was again remanded to the CFI and the
commissioners submitted another scheme of partition
which was opposed by Silverio.
9. The parties, finding the plan by the commissioners
unsatisfactory, entered into stipulation. The court
approved this stipulation.
10. No regular final account was presented by the
administrator, but annual accounts for 10 years were
submitted. The accounts show income as against
expenses. Silverio and his daughters opposed the
approval of accounts.
Issue
1. WON the will is an authentic document executed by
decedent Justiniano.
2. WON the scheme of partition presented by
administrator Tirso Dacanay should not have been
approved.
Held
1. No. The document in question is a forgery. Pedro
Floresca, who at the time was the principal public
school teacher in Bacnotan and a boarder in the house
of Tirso Dacanay, testified that while there, he wrote
the document from a draft furnished by Tirso. He did
not however write the signatures. An examination with
a good lens of the alleged signature of Justiniano
Dacanay appearing at the bottom shows clearly that
the pen strokes are different from those of the authentic
signatures of Justiniano. Note also that the paper on
which the document is written bears indications of
having been subjected to some artificial process for the
evident purpose of giving it the appearance of age.
2. Yes. The fees and deductions laid down in the
accounts (deduction of value of bundles of palay
allegedly stolen and spoiled, compensation for
administrator Dacanay’s services, attorney’s fees -
NOTE THAT THE CASE LISTS THE SPECIFIC
EXPENSES IN SPANISH) relate to services rendered
for the benefit of the administrator and for that of the
other natural children of Justiniano, not for the benefit
of the estate.
• It is true than an administrator may employ competent
counsel on questions affecting his duties and on which
he is in reasonable doubt and that reasonable expenses
may be charged against the estate subject to the
approval of the court. Such however, is not the case
here. The administrator deliberately and knowingly
resorted to falsified documents for the purpose of
defrauding legitimate heirs of the deceased.
• The claims that palay was lost and spoiled cannot be
entertained. Repairs in the storehouse were made from
time to time with permission of the court. There is room
for grave suspicions that the administrator converted to
his own use at least a part of the palay alleged to have
been stolen or spoiled. The administrator was in a
position in some respects analogous to that of a bailee
for his own sole benefit and was bound to exercise great
care and attention in the conservation of the property
under administration. The administrator must then be
held responsible for loss or disappearance of the palay
and must be ordered to pay the value of the same to the
estate.
• The compensation administrator is asking for seems
excessive. The prolongation of the settlement of the
estate was entirely due to the efforts of the administrator
 to defraud the legitimate heirs and he cannot be allowed
to profit from his own fraud. The per diem compensation
of an administrator can only be allowed for necessary
services.
• Commissioners’ compensation is allowed.
• The services of the handwriting expert and the
stenographer who transcribed the notes taken down
during the hearing upon the will and the fees of the clerk
cannot be allowed. These services were contracted in
furtherance of administrator’s fraudulent designs.
Other notes:
• Having been unfaithful to his trust, the administrator has
no right to be retained as administrator. The court below
erred in not removing him from office.
• Instead of being a creditor of the estate, the administrator
is now indebted to it. This is because of the
discrepancies between the accounts and vouchers
presented to the court.
• The income of property donated to Tirso Dacanay by his
father should have been brought to collation but there is
no sufficient data from which the amount of said income
may be ascertained. Thus the parties may bring a
separate suit against the administrator for recovery of
their share of the collationable income.
• The Court has decided to make the distribution upon the
data existing in the record and without the appointment
of other commissioners. It adhered to the plan of
distribution made in the CFI in 1916, in accordance with
the evidence presented. (The distribution was
reproduced but in Spanish.)
35 Lacson v. Reyes (1990)
Rule 85 (Sec. 7) | Accountability and Compensation
of Executors and Administrators
Sarmiento, J.
Summary
43. Respondent, Atty. Emphraim Serguina, petitioned
the court for the probate of the last will and
testament of Carmelita Farlin. Respondent likewise
petitioned the court to be the executor under the
will. The court issued the certificate of allowance,
and was named executor. Respondent filed a
motion for attorney’s fees alleging that the heirs
agreed to pay the sum of P68,000.00 for his
services. Heirs denied this, but RTC granted
P65,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Hence, this appeal.
44. WON respondent court gravely abused its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to
the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules
of Court.
45. Yes. Because Rule 85 Sec. 7 provides that when
the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall
not charge against the estate any professional fees
for legal services rendered by him. It is pointed out
that an attorney who is concurrently an executor of
a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees from
the estate. The rule is therefore clear that an
administrator or executor may be allowed fees for
the necessary expenses he has incurred as such,
 but he may not recover attorney's fees from the
estate.
Facts
59. (Antecedents) – private respondent, Atty. Ephraim
Serquina, petitioned the respondent court for the
probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita
Farlin.
60. He also petitioned the court in his capacity as
counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as
executor under the will.
61. The petition was not opposed. Court issued the
certificate of allowance.
62. Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for attorney's
fees" against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs
had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services
rendered, the sum of P68,000.00.
63. The heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for
P68,000.00 alleging that the sum agreed upon was
only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already
paid.
64. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue
17. WON respondent court gravely abused its discretion in
awarding attorney's fees contrary to the provisions of
Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.
a. Yes. Because Rule 85 Sec. 7 provides that
when the executor or administrator is an
attorney, he shall not charge against the estate
any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him.
Held
Yes. It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently
an executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney's
fees from the estate. The rule is therefore clear that an
administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the
necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may
not recover attorney's fees from the estate. (Please read
the whole Rule 85, Sec. 7)
Sec. 7 of Rule 85:
Xxx
But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the
settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has
required a high degree of capacity on the part of the
executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed.
If objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance
may be reexamined on appeal.
Xxx
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall
not charge against the estate any professional fees for
legal services rendered by him.
xxx
Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set aside the
sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's
fees, to operate as a "lien on the subject properties," the
trial judge must be said to have gravely abused its
discretion.
Who pays the attorney’s fees?
We have held that a lawyer of an administrator or executor
may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his
client. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself
the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay
therefor.
The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty.
Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed by him
(P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower court
(P65,000.00).
Attorney’s fees are subject to the following standards:
(1) they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must have
a bearing on the importance of the subject matter in
controversy;
(2) the extent of the services rendered; and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer.
The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already
been paid the sum of P6,000.00. It is our considered
opinion that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for his
efforts on a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the
heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.
36 ROSENSTOCK v. ELSER (1925)
Rule 78 | COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS
(RULE 85)
J. JOHNS
Summary
1. When Elser died, Rosenstock was appointed as
executor, with a monthly compensation of P1,000
as agreed by all interested parties. This was
questioned by the widow, stating that the
compensation of the executor must be based on the
Code of Civil Procedure. The Court lowered the
compensation to P400/month (but this was already
19 months after his appointment).
2. Issue: w/n the trial court erred in reducing the
executor’s compensation from P1,000 to P400 a
month - NO
3. Although by mutual consent his compensation was
fixed at P1,000 per month at the time of his
appointment, that was not a valid or binding
contract continuous throughout the whole
administration of the estate. It was always subject
to change and the approval of the court, and to
either an increase or decrease as conditions might
warrant. At all times the compensation of the
executor was a matter largely in the discretion of the
probate court.
Facts
1. When Elser died, Rosenstock filed a petition in the
CFI of Manila for the probate of the former’s will,
and that he, Rosenstock, be appointed as executor
of the estate. Rosenstock also asked the court in a
 separate petition to allow a P1,000/month
compensation as executor, owing to the size and
involved condition of the estate. In asking for the
said amount as compensation, it was alleged by
Rosenstock that all interested parties in the estate
had agreed to such. These petitions were granted
by the CFI.
2. The widow of Elser filed a petition praying for the
revocation of the order allowing the P1,000/month
compensation of Rosenstock, and instead
contended that the compensation of the executor
should be based upon the provisions of section 680
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. The widow’s petition was granted and the
executor’s compensation was reduced to
P400/month, but the widow still appealed this order,
stating that the court erred in failing to reduce the
compensation of the executor to the statutory
amount allowed under section 680.
Issue
W/N the trial court erred in reducing the executor’s
compensation from P1,000 to P400 a month
- NO
Held
1. At the time of his appointment, all parties agreed
that the executor should have and receive P1,000
per month for his services. The order of granting
Rosenstock such compensation, among other
things, recites the agreed facts, and is largely
founded upon that stipulation.
2. The present order, reducing the executor's fee to
P400 per month, from which both parties have
appealed, was made more than nineteen months
after the original order was made. That is to say,
that at the time the last order was made,
Rosenstock had been acting as executor of the
estate for more than nineteen months.
3. As such, he must have been administering the
affairs of the estate, with the ultimate view of
winding up and closing it. It is very apparent that
whatever reasons may have existed for allowing
him a compensation of P1,000 per month at the
time of his appointment have ceased to exist.
During that period, all of the assets and liabilities of
the estate should have been legally ascertained
and determined.
4. In other words, the character and class of the work
which now devolves upon the executor is of a very
different type and nature now than at the time of his
appointment.
5. Although by mutual consent his compensation was
fixed at P1,000 per month at the time of his
appointment, that was not a valid or binding
contract continuous throughout the whole
administration of the estate. It was always subject
to change and the approval of the court, and to
either an increase or decrease as conditions might
warrant. At all times the compensation of the
executor was a matter largely in the discretion of the
probate court.
 37 Joson v. Joson (1961)
Rule 85 | Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators
Bautista J.
Summary
1. When Tomas Joson died, Eduardo, his son,
presented his will for probate. Eduardo was
appointed as administrator of the estate. He filed an
inventory of the properties left by the deceased but
it was opposed several times by different heirs. The
heirs entered into an extrajudicial compromise but
since the court was not informed of the said
compromise, it still ordered Eduardo to file an
accounting of his administration from 1949 to 1954.
Without complying with this order, the administrator
filed a motion to declare the proceeding closed and
terminated. The trial court granted the motion.
2. Issues: a. Is the duty of an administrator to make an
accounting of his administration a mere incident
which can be avoided once the estate has been
settled? NO
The duty of an administrator to render an account
is not a mere incident of an administration
proceeding which can be waived or disregarded
when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty
that has to be performed and duly acted upon by
the court before the administration is finally
ordered closed and terminated.
b. Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the
mere execution of an extrajudicial partition of the
estate without the necessity of having the accounts
of the administrator heard and approved by the
court?
The fact that all the heirs of the estate have
entered into an extrajudicial settlement and
partition in order to put an end to their differences
cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of
the objections of the heirs to the accounts
submitted by the administrator
Facts
1. Tomas Joson died leaving behind heirs and
properties. He married thrice and was survived by
nine heirs. Upon his death, his will was presented
to the CFI of Nueva Ecija by his son Felicisimo for
probate. Felicisimo was appointed administrator of
the estate so he filed an inventory of the properties
left by the deceased.
2. Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition
to all the accounts filed by the administrator wherein
he alleged that the administrator diminished the
shares of the heirs in the yearly produce of the
properties and had padded his expenses of
administration.
3. In the meantime, the heirs were able to compromise
their differences and entered into an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of the entire estate.
However, as the court was never informed of this
extraj. settlement it issued an order requiring the
 administrator to file an accounting of his
administration from 1949 to 1954.
4. Without complying with the order of the court to
render an account for such years, the administrator
filed a motion to declare the proceeding closed and
terminated and to relieve him of his duties.
5. The trial court granted such motion and declared
the proceedings terminated and relieving the
administrator not only of his duties as such but also
of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs’
opposition to said accounts.
6. It is claimed by the oppositors that the estate cannot
be declared closed and terminated for the reason
that some of the accounts have not been approved.
Issue
1. Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting
of his administration a mere incident which can be
avoided once the estate has been settled? NO
2. Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate
without the necessity of having the accounts of the
administrator heard and approved by the court? NO.||
NO
3. Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of
proving his account from the moment said partition has
been executed?||| NO
Held
1. Is the duty of an administrator to make an
accounting of his administration a mere incident
which can be avoided once the estate has been
settled?
● Section 1 of Rule 86 (now Rule 85) categorically
charges an administrator "with the whole of the
estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession at the value of appraisement contained
in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and
income of such a estate; and with the proceeds of
so much of the estate as is sold by him, at the
price at which sold."|||
● Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the
duty to render an account of his administration
within one year from his appointment, unless the
court otherwise directs, as well as to render such
further accounts as the courts may require until the
estate is fully settled. |||
● It thus appears that the duty of an administrator to
render an account is not a mere incident of an
administration proceeding which can be waived or
disregarded when the same is terminated, but that
it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted
upon by the court before the administration is
finally ordered closed and terminated.
● Here the administrator has submitted his accounts
for several years not only motu proprio but upon
requirement of the court, to which accounts the
heirs have seasonably submitted their opposition.
● Verily, the trial court erred in acceding to the
motion for in doing so it disregarded the express
provisions of our rules relative to the settlement of
accounts of a judicial administrator.|||
2. Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate without
the necessity of having the accounts of the administrator
heard and approved by the court? NO
● The fact that all the heirs of the estate have
entered into an extrajudicial settlement and
partition in order to put an end to their differences
cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of
the objections of the heirs to the accounts
submitted by the administrator not only because to
so hold would be a derogation of the pertinent
provisions of our rules but also because there is
nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid
accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned.
3. Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of
proving his account from the moment said partition has
been executed?||| NO
● While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said
extrajudicial settlement is plausible and has
contributed to the early settlement of the estate,
the same cannot however be considered as a
release of the obligation of the administrator to
prove his accounts. |||
38 Philippine Trust Co. vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
(1961)
Rule 78 | Venue and Process
Ponente: J. Dizon
Summary
46. Picard was appointed as administrator of the
Intestate Estae of James Burt upon filing a bond of
1k. After some time, he was dismissed as
administrator and appointed Phil Trust in his place.
An inventory report was done by the latter showing
only 57.75 pesos as the only asset left in the estate
of Burt. After review by the Court, it was found that
there is still 7k balance so Picard was ordered to
deliver within 48 hours from receipt of a copy of the
Order. Later on, he was prosecuted for estafa. The
Court then ordered Luzon Surety to show cause
why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of
Picard would not be confiscated.
Luzon filed a motion to set aside said order upon
the following grounds:
• Firstly, that the Court cannot order the
confiscation of the administrator's bond, on
prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or
heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having
been shown
• Secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex
proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond."
Court denied the motion as well as the MR.
 47. WON the surety privy to the proceedings against
the executor or administrator? (Thus, giving the
probate court the power to confiscate the bond)
48. YES. From the very nature of the obligation entered
into by the surety on an administrator’s bond, he
(surety) is bound and concluded, in the absence of
fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his
principal, even though said surety was not a party
to the proceedings against the administrator, nor
notified in connection therewith prior to the
issuance of the court order for the confiscation of
the bond.
Facts
CFI of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr. as
Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James
R. Burt upon a bond of P1,000.00. Thereafter he submitted
and the Court approved his bond in the required amount,
with appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety. For
reasons that do not fully appear of record, the Court
dismissed Picard, as administrator and appointed the
Philippine Trust Co. in his place.
After qualifying for the position, Phil Trust, on July 19,
1948, submitted an inventory-report showing that the only
asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its
possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the
balance of the checking account of said deceased with the
Philippine National Bank.
It appears that Piccard, deducted his expenses amounting
to P887.22 from the total amount of property amounting to
P8,873.73, leaving a balance of P7,986.53. He likewise
deducted further expenses amounting to P865.20 from the
balance of P7,986.53; hence, leaving the balance of
P7,121.33 as of May 27, 1948.
CFI of Manila ordered Piccard to deliver the difference
amounting to P7,063.58 to PNB. In compliance with the
above order, Picard submitted an itemized statement of
disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate,
showing that as of February 6, 1947 the estate funds
amounted to P7,986.53; that on June 8, 1948 he reported
to the Court additional expenses incurred amounting to
P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33; that
thereafter he disbursed the sum of P250 to defray the
burial expenses of the deceased, thus leaving a balance
of P6,871.33; that on several occasions during the period
from February 22, 1946 to May 14, 1947, he had delivered
to Feliciano Burt, adopted son of the deceased James R.
Burt, different sums of money totalling P5,825, thus
leaving a balance of P972.33. After considering this
statement, the Court, on September 18, 1948, issued an
order finding Picard guilty of having disbursed funds of the
estate amounting to about P8,000, without authority.
For this reason, the Court referred the matter to the City
Fiscal of Manila for investigation. Result of this was the
prosecution of Picard for estafa. Having pleaded guilty to
the charge, judgment of conviction was accordingly
rendered, and he was, besides, held civilly liable in the
sum of P8,000.00. The Court issued an order requiring
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the
administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of Picard should
not be confiscated.
Luzon Surety filed a motion to set aside said order upon
the following grounds: firstly, that the Court cannot order
the confiscation of the administrator's bond, no prejudice
or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of
James R. Burt having been shown, and secondly, that "a
probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the
probate bond". Court denied appellant's motion and
ordered the confiscation of its bond. After the denial of
appellant's motion for reconsideration, it took the present
appeal.
Issue
WON the the surety is privy to the proceedings against the
executor or administrator?
Held
YES. From the very nature of the obligation entered into
by the surety on an administrator’s bond, he (surety) is
bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and
collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though
said surety was not a party to the proceedings against the
administrator, nor notified in connection therewith prior to
the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the
bond.
In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 135,
the sureties on the administrator’s bond were held liable
thereon altho they were not parties to the proceeding
against the administrator, nor were they notified in
connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court
order for the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to
Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the
settlement of the account of an executor or administrator,
his sureties “may upon application, be admitted as a party
to such accounting.” The import of this provision is that the
sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to
intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor
or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.
39 Dela Cruz v. Camon (1966)
Rule 85 | Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators
Ponente J. Escalante
Summary
1. The administrator of the estate of Thomas Fallon
and Anne Fallon Murphy moved the court for an
order to direct Camon to pay the estate's 2/3 share
of the rentals for the previous years. Camon
challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his
person. Court ruled that it must be made by
independent action.
2. WON the probate court may rule on the demand
for rentals
3. NO. The amount demanded is not, by any means,
liquidated. Camon may set up defenses, one of
which is that the hacienda has already been sold
along with the right to the accrued rents, which the
administrator denied. Because of all of these, the
money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the
 hands of the administrator; it is not thus within the
effective control of the probate court.
The administrator may not pull him against his will,
by motion, into the administration proceedings.
Even "matters affecting property under judicial
administration" may not be taken cognizance of by
the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if
the "interests of third persons are prejudiced"
Facts
1. (Parties) – Petitioner is the administrator of the
estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy,
while respondent is the lessee of a property owned
by the estate.
2. (Antecedents) – The estate of Thomas Fallon and
Anne Fallon Murphy owned 2/4 share pro-indiviso
of Hacienda Rosario. The whole hacienda was held
in lease by Camon. The administrator of the estate
moved the court for an order to direct Camon to pay
the estate's 2/3 share of the rentals for the previous
years.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Camon
challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his
person. The court ruled that the demand for rentals
cannot be made "by mere motion by the
administrator but by independent action." From this
the administrator appealed.
Issue
1. WON the probate court has jurisdiction over the 3rd
party
a. No. The property has already been sold. The
demand is for money due allegedly for rentals.
Camon is a third person. Hence, the
administrator may not pull him against his will,
by motion, into the administration proceedings.
Even "matters affecting property under judicial
administration" may not be taken cognizance of
by the court in the course of intestate
proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are
prejudiced"
Held
1. WON the probate court may rule on the demand for
rentals
NO. Appellee's opposition to the motion served a warning
that at the proper time he will set up the defense that the
administrator, had sold the estate's share in Hacienda
Rosario together with "all the rights, title and interest
(including all accrued rents) that said heirs had inherited
from the said deceased." Appellant administrator in his
reply to the opposition admits the fact of sale of the land,
but not of the rentals due. Accordingly, the right to collect
the rentals is still in a fluid state. That right remains to be
threshed out upon a full-dress trial on the merits.
Because of all of these, the money (rentals) allegedly due
is not property in the hands of the administrator; it is not
thus within the effective control of the probate court.
Recovery thereof, we are persuaded to say, should be by
separate suit commenced by the administrator. With
reason, because of the absence of express statutory
authorization to coerce the lessee debtor into defending
himself in the probate court. And, we are confronted with
the unyielding refusal of appellee to submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the probate court.
 40. QUIRINO v. GROSPE (1989)
Rule 78-85 and 87 | Accountability and
compensation of executor and administrator
Ponente J. Padilla
Summary
49. This involves settlement of issues claimed by
different parties to the intestate proceedings of Don
Alfonso. Different parties filed their respective
motions for reconsideration citing various issues
predicated on alleged error of judgment of Judge
Grospe (respondent).
50. On claims against the estate for attorney’s fees,
transportation, and representation expenses, the
court held that these are services rendered to the
substituted heirs of Don Juan, hence these can not
be charged to the estate of Don Alfonso.
51. As for expenses related to acts of administration,
the rule is that where the monetary claim against
the administrator has a relation to his acts of
administration in the ordinary course thereof, such
claims can be presented for payment with the court
where a special proceeding for the settlement of
estate is pending, although said claims were not
incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and
collectible after his death.
52. Respective MRs denied.
Facts
65. (Parties) – Petitioners are Juan F. Gomez, Jesus
T. David, Raquiza children and their father Antonio
V. Raquiza (as alleged heirs of Natividad Castellvi),
and petitioner Antonio Quirino (motion for
reconsideration); Carmen Castellvi et al. (as
alleged heirs of Don Juan Castellvi) (motion for
intervention); Juan F. Gomez (motion for
clarificatory order); and Raquiza children (omnibus
motion for early resolution and immediate release
of funds) against Judge Grospe of CFI-Pampanga.
66. (Antecedents) – Petitioners have various issues
on the settlement of estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi,
which the SC decided by piecemeal.
Issue
18. Whether the claims for transportation and
representation expenses for services rendered to the
heirs of Don Juan can be chargeable to the estate of
Don Alfonso.
a. No. Did not inure to benefit of Don Alfonso’s
estate.
19. Whether claim for attorney’s fees of intervenor Jesus
David rendered for Dona Carmen’s estate can be
chargeable to the estate of Don Alfonso.
a. No. Did not inure to benefit of Don Alfonso’s
estate.
20. Whether expenses related to the acts of administration
can be chargeable to the estate of Don Alfonso.
a. Yes, but such must be presented with the court
where a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate is pending!
Held
ISSUES 1 and 2: As to different claims for services
rendered for other decedents’ estates, they cannot be
allowed as claims against the estate of Don Alfonso.

The term “claims” required to be presented against a
decedent’s estate is generally construed to mean debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been
enforced against the deceased in his lifetime or liability
contracted by the deceased before his death.
It is important to note that movant’s claims for attorney’s
fees and transportation as well as representation
expenses are for services rendered to the alleged
substituted heirs of Don Juan Castellvi and such services
did not inure to the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his
estate.
The court charged with the settlement of the estate of Don
Alfonso Castellvi is bound to protect the estate from any
disbursements based on claims not chargeable to the
estate.
ISSUE 3: Meanwhile, a monetary claim against the
administrator which has a relation to his acts of
administration may be presented for payment with the
court where a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate is pending, though such claim was not
incurred by the deceased in his lifetime and collectible
after his death.
With regard to Floro’s claim for payment for services
rendered to the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, the rule is
that where the monetary claim against the administrator
has a relation to his acts of administration in the ordinary
course thereof, such claims can be presented for payment
with the court where a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate is pending, although said claims
were not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and
collectible after his death. This is so, because the
administration is under the direct supervision of the court
and the administrator is subject to its authority.
MINOR ISSUE: Jurisdiction of Probate Court
The court a quo has limited jurisdiction to settle only the
estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, and any act done in
excess of such limits may not be given effect.
Where movant’s claim is chargeable to the heirs of Don
Juan Castellvi, his clients, then the court a quo has no
jurisdiction to fix such fees for services rendered not to the
estate of Don Alfonso, but to the heirs of Don Juan.
It follows that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to approve
a contract of legal services between claimant and the heirs
of Don Juan. The court a quo is of limited jurisdiction,
empowered to settle only the estate of Don Alfonso
Castellvi, any act done in excess of such limits may not be
given force and effect.
41 AGUAS v. LLEMOS (1062)
Rule (78, 85) 87 | Actions by and against Executors
and Administrators
Ponente J. JBL Reyes
Summary
53. Petitioners Sps. Aguas and Francisco Salinas
allegedly received by registered mail a copy of a
 petition for a writ of possession with notice that it
would be submitted to the CFI of Catbalogan,
Samar from Defendant Hermogenes Llemos. So,
from Manila, Petitioners Aguas et.al (w/ their
lawyers) went to the said CFI only to discover that
no such petition had actually been filed.
54. Thus, Petitioners Aguas et.al jointly filed an action
in said CFI to recover damages from Llemos saying
that Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court
making their expenditure & trouble in vain which
caused them mental anguish and undue
embarrassment.
55. However, before Llemos could answer the
complaint, he died. Petitioners Aguas et.al
amended their complaint to include the Heirs of
Llemos. Meanwhile, the Heirs filed an MTD w/c was
granted on the ground that the legal representatives
(not the heirs) should have been defendants. Also,
since the action was for recovery of money,
testate/intestate proceedings should be initiated
and petitioner’s claim filed therein.
56. WON actions for damages caused by tortious
conduct of defendant survive his death and may be
prosecuted against decedent’s
executors/administrators?
57. YES. 2 rules were discussed in this case. Rule 86,
sec. 5(3) provides for actions abated by death – all
claims for money against decedent arising from
contract, express or implied. Rule 87, Sec. 1(3)
provides for actions that survive and may be
prosecuted against a decedent’s
executors/administrators – actions to recover
damages for an injury to person/property.
58. SC held that this case does not fall under said Rule
86 bec. the cause of action arises from tort, not
contract. Rather, this case falls under said Rule 87
bec. SC considered that when Llemos maliciously
caused Petitioners Aguas et. al to incur
unnecessary expenses, it caused injury to their
property/estate. Thus, the action can be prosecuted
against decedent’s executor/administrator.
59. Note that the parties eventually arrived at an
amicable settlement so the case became moot.
Facts
1. Short case. The whole facts of the case are already
in the summary.
Issue
1. WON actions for damages caused by tortious
conduct of defendant survive his death and may be
prosecuted against decedent’s
executors/administrators?
a. Yes.
Held
1. WON actions for damages caused by tortious
conduct of defendant survive his death and may be
prosecuted against decedent’s
executors/administrators?
YES. 2 rules were discussed in this case: Rule 86 and
Rule 87 (w/c were mistakenly cited by the Ponente as Rule
87 and Rule 88 respectively).
Rule 86, Sec. 5 – Actions abated by death:
 1. Claims for funeral expenses and those for the last
sickness of decedent;
2. Judgments for money;
3. All claims for money against decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied.
Rule 87, Sec. 1 – Actions that survive against a
decedent’s executors/administrators:
1. Actions to recover real & personal
property from the estate;
2. Actions to enforce a lien thereon;
3. Actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property.
SC held that this case does not fall under Rule 86, Sec.
5(3) bec. the cause of action arises from tort, not contract.
Rather, this case falls under said Rule 87, Sec. 1(3) bec.
SC considered that when Llemos maliciously caused
Petitioners Aguas et. al to incur unnecessary expenses, it
caused injury to their property/estate. Thus, the action can
be prosecuted against decedent’s executor/administrator.
“Injury to Property” is not limited to injuries specific to
property. But extends to other wrongs by w/c personal
estate is injured/diminished.
Anyway, parties have arrived at an amicable settlement so
the case became moot.
42 MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (1989)
Rule 87 | Actions By and Against Executors and
Administrators
Ponente J. Paras
Summary
60. Balla and Paredes died in a head-on collision of two
buses; Balla owned and operated the first bus while
Paredes drove the second bus. Heirs of Paredes
filed a torts case against the heirs of Balla, alleging
that Balla was at fault. The Heirs of Balla moved to
dismiss, claiming that there is no cause of action
against them as it is incorrect to hold them liable for
Balla’s negligence. The Heirs of Paredes amended
their complaint to include Balla’s estate as
defendant. CFI still denied the motion to dismiss of
the heirs of Balla. Note that the Heirs of Balla never
instituted testate/intestate proceedings as they
claim that Balla left no properties (even though in
reality, Balla actually left the bus as inheritance).
61. WON CFI may entertain a case for damages arising
from the death of a person, filed against the estate
of another deceased person as represented by the
heirs
62. YES. It was correct for the Heirs of Balla to move
for dismissal and proper for the Heirs of Paredes to
correct the deficiency by amending the complaint to
include the estate of Balla; however, this is still futile
since there were no steps taken towards settling the
estate of Balla, nor was an administrator or
executor appointed. It is true that Rule 87, Section
1 states that actions to recover damages against
the deceased may be brought against the
administrator. However, the Court held that in case
of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an
executor or administrator of the estate, in case
 where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate, or when it is reasonable to believe that
the heirs will not take any step to settle the estate
(such as in this case), then the court will allow the
heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the
deceased.
Facts
67. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case, the Melgas,
are children of the decedent Felicidad Balla. The
public respondent, Buenviaje, is the CFI Judge who
rendered the assailed decision. Private
respondents, Spouses Paredes, are forced heirs of
the decedent Fabian Paredes.
68. (Antecedents) – A bus swerved to the left, collided
head-on with a Ford Fierra, swerved further to the
left, and then collided with a second bus.
69. As a result of the accident, Felicided Balla, owner-
operator of the first bus and mother of the
petitioners, died. The driver of the first bus. The
driver of the second bus, Fabian Paredes, also
died.
70. Spouses Paredes filed a case for damages against
the children of Felicidad Balla, alleging that it was
the latter’s driver’s negligence that caused the
accident.
71. Defendants of the complaint, the petitioners in this
case, moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action against
them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to hold the
children liable for the alleged negligence of their
deceased mother and to consider suing the heirs of
a deceased person the same as suing the estate of
said deceased person inasmuch as the last portion
of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means
that the creditor should institute the proper intestate
proceedings wherein which he may be able to
interpose his claim.
a. Petitioners argue that distinction should be
made between a suit against the estate of
Felicidad Balla and the present action which
is a personal action against the children of
Felicidad Balla, considering that the children
have absolutely no participation directly or
indirectly in the alleged negligent acts of
Felicidad Balla, and there is absolutely no
logical basis to hold the children liable for
damages resulting from alleged negligent
acts of Felicidad Balla. In fact that second
sentence of Article 1311 of the New Civil
Code provides:
b. ... The heir is not liable beyond the value of
the property he received from the decedent
72. CFI denied the MTD.
73. Spouses Paredes then AMENDED THE
COMPLAINT and NAMING THE ESTATE OF
FELICIDED BELLA AS DEFENDANTS.
74. CFI denied the subsequent MR.
75. Hence, this petition.
Issue
21. WON CFI may entertain a case for damages arising
from the death of a person, filed against the estate of
another deeased persona s represented by the heirs.
a. YES. Because there were
 Held
22. WON Rule 1 is applicable in this case.
Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that
are abated by death are: (1) All claims for money against
the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due or contingent; (2) All
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent; and (3) Judgments for money
against the.
It is evident that the case at bar is not among those
enumerated. Otherwise stated, actions for damages
caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant survive
the death of the latter.
The action can therefore be properly brought under
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an
executor or administrator. The rule provides:
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. — No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the state, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
Hence, the inclusion of the "estate of Felicidad Balla" in the
amended complaint as defendant.
The point of controversy is however on the fact that no
estate proceedings exist for the reason that her children
had not filed any proceedings for the settlement of her
estate, claiming that Balla left no properties.
Thus, while petitioners may have correctly moved for the
dismissal of the case and private respondents have
forthwith corrected the deficiency by filing an amended
complaint, even before the lower court could act on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the denial of their
motion to dismiss, such action would still be futile because
no steps were taken to settle the estate of Felicidad Balla,
nor has an executor or administrator been appointed.
From the statement made by the petitioners that "many
persons die without leaving any asset at all" (Reply to
Respondents' Comment, p. 78; Memorandum for
Petitioners, Rollo, p. 5), which insinuates that the
deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to believe that the
petitioners will not take any step to expedite the early
settlement of the estate, judicially or extra-judicially if only
to defeat the damage suit against the estate. (Note
however the deceased Balla apparently left the bus).
Under the circumstances the absence of an estate
proceeding may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take
the place of the deceased.
As restated in a much later case, in case of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator of
the estate or in case where the heirs resort to an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court may adopt
the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted for the deceased.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
dismissed and petitioners are ordered substituted for the
deceased Felicidad Balla.
43 NAVAS v. GARCIA (1923)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Cruz
Summary
63. Appellant is the surviving spouse of the deceased,
hence the first in the preference provided in the
ROC, however the lower court gave the
administrative rights to a certain Garcia. The case
did not provide Garcia’s relation to the deceased.
64. WON the court erred when it chose Garcia to be the
administrator rather than Navas, disregarding the
preferential rights provided in Rule 78.
65. No, Nava was proven to have had adverse interests
in the estate. The court may determine whether or
not the person next in the order is incompetent or
unsuitable to administrate and in these cases, the
court may assign another person it deems suitable.
Facts
76. (Parties) – Petitioner in this case is the widow and
the heirs of the brother of private respondent while
private respondent is the daughter of the mother,
who was the principal actor in this case.
77. (Antecedents) – The mother was a person named
Juana Suterio. She had two siblings named
Perfecta and Felipe and upon the death of Perfecta,
Juana and Felipe executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased. By virtue
of this settlement, the two forced heirs donated the
subject property to a person named Salud, the
private respondent in this case.
Even though the property was donated, it was never
registered in Salud’s name even though it was said
in the record that she took possession of the subject
land immediately. Eventually, Salud said that
according to her mother Juana’s request, she
transferred the possession of the donated property
back to her mother, who was staying with a certain
person named Claudio. What happened next
though was the Juana sold the property to Claudio
even though she did not have title to the land but
only its possession.
78. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – After
Claudio’s death, private respondents filed a
complaint for reconveyance of the property saying
that the deed of conveyance was fictitious and the
registration was null and void due to this.
Issue
1. WON the respondent has right to the subject
property.
Ruling
1. WON the respondent has right to the subject
property.
 YES. Petitioners assail the intrinsic validity of the
extrajudicial settlement and that it is not really a donation
because they argue that the real donor of the property
was Perfecta who could no longer bestow the gift as she
died already. The court was not persuaded as the
argument was already nitpicking. Felipe and Juana had
declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners
of the property, as such they were free to give the land to
whomever they chose. In fact, the donation of the land to
Salud shows the two forced heirs’ integrity as it was in
accordance with the wishes of the deceased.
Furthermore, Juana had no right to sell the property to
Claudio as she was no longer the owner, having
previously donated it to Salud. She only held the land as
a trustee to Salud who had transferred merely the
possession of the land upon her request.
44 Bernardo v. CA (1963)
Rule 87 | Rule on SpecPro
Ponente J. Barrerra
Summary
1. (Short Facts)
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were
husband and wife. The first died and his will was
admitted to probate disposing of his properties in
favor of his widow; his cousins. Thereafter,
Hermogena Reyes died. Upon petition of Bernardo,
executor of the estate of Eusebio Capili, she was
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate
heirs.
The executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,.
These collateral relatives of Hermogenia filed an
opposition to the executor's project of partition and
submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will
of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that
they belonged not to the latter alone but to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses.
Petitioners claimed that the properties disposed of
in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged
to him exclusively and not to the conjugal
partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had
donated to him her half share of such partnership;
1. The probate court, the issued an order declaring the
donation void for violating prohibition against
donations between spouses and alternatively, for
not conforming with the formalities of a will.
.
2. (Short Issue) WON the probate court has authority
to pass upon questions on whether certain
properties belong to the estate or the conjugal
partnership - YES
3. (Short Held) The matter in controversy is the
question of ownership of certain of the properties
 involved — whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a
matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court which necessarily has to liquidate the
conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now
represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily
Facts
2. (Parties) – The petitioners in this case are
Deogracias Bernardo (Executor of estate of
Eusebio) and the heirs of Eusebio. The
respondents are the collateral heirs of Hermogena
Reyes who substituted her in her participation in the
estate of Eusebio.
3. (Antecedents) – Eusebio Capili and Hermogena
Reyes were husband and wife. The first died and a
testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate
was instituted in the CFI of Bulacan. His will was
admitted to probate disposing of his properties in
favor of his widow; his cousins. Thereafter,
Hermogena Reyes herself died. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the
deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by
her collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
The executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her
collateral relatives aforementioned. These relatives
filed an opposition to the executor's project of
partition and submitted a counter-project of partition
of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties
mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio
Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the
latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses.
In the memorandum for the executor and the
instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the
properties disposed of in the will of the deceased
Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not
to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena
Reyes had donated to him her half share of such
partnership;
4. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –the
probate court, the issued an order declaring the
donation void without making any specific finding as
to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter
vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that,
considered under the first category, it falls under
Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits
donations between spouses during the marriage;
and considered under the second category, it does
not comply with the formalities of a will
 .
Issue
1. WON the probate court has authority to pass upon
questions on whether certain properties belong to the
estate or the conjugal partnership - YES
Held
1. The jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a
deceased person regarding the ownership of
properties alleged to belong to his estate, has
beenrecognized to be vested in probate courts. This is
so because the purpose of an administration
proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and
legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and
expenses. Thereafter, distribution is made of the
decedent's liquidated estate among the persons
entitled to succeed him.
The matter in controversy is the question of ownership
of certain of the properties involved — whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has
to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now
represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily.
45 Guanco v. Philippine National Bank (1930)
Rule 78 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Ostrand
Summary
1. Decedent Espiridion Guanco, during his lifetime,
obtained a credit from PNB. He pledged shares of
the Binalbagan Estate and of Hinigaran Sugar
Plantation. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation gave PNB a
promissory note which covers Guanco’s debt. It
also secured a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB
for the note and for future credits. However, the
shares given to PNB as security for the decedent’s
transaction were not mentioned in such mortgage.
Upon motion of the administrator of Guanco’s
estate, the CFI ordered PNB’s bank manager to
appear in court for examination in regard to the
shares of the Binalbagan Estate under Sec. 709 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. It thereafter ordered –
in the same proceedings and without trial – the
manager to deliver the said shares to the
administrator.
2. WON the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering
the bank manager to deliver the subject shares to
the administrator – YES
3. The purpose of the proceedings provided for in
section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to elicit
evidence and does not, in terms, authorize the court
to enforce delivery of possession of the things
 involved. To obtain such possession, recourse
must generally be had to an ordinary action.
A certain number of shares of corporate stock was
turned over to the defendant bank as security for
credits granted the deceased. The SC held that CFI
could not compel the bank to surrender possession
of the shares upon a mere citation under section
709.
Facts
1. (Parties) – The appellee is Celso Guanco, the
administrator of the Guanco Estate and the
oppositor-appellant is PNB.
2. (Antecedents) – On January 18, 1921, the now
deceased Espiridion Guanco obtained a credit (not
exceeding P175.00, with interest) from PNB,
pledging as security 250 shares of the capital stock
of the Binalbagan Estate, Inc. and 1,916 shares of
the Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, Inc.
Hinigaran Sugar Plantation gave the bank a
promissory note, which includes Guanco’s
original debt.
Hinigaran Sugar Plantation also gave a mortgage
on real property in favor of PNB as security for the
note and for such future credits as might be
granted the company. The shares given to the
bank as security for the decedent’s transaction
were not mentioned in the mortgage.
Section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure only provides
a proceeding for examining persons suspected of having
After Guanco's death, the administrator of his
estate filed a petition in the proceedings asking that
the CFI order PNB’s president/manager to
appear in court for examination in regard to the 250
shares of the Binalbagan Estate under Sec. 709 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
The CFI ordered bank manager Miguel Cuaderno
to appear before the court. The bank’s attorney filed
an answer asserting that the pledge of the 250
shares was still in force as security for the debts of
Guanco and the Hinigaran Estate.
3. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – The
CFI, in the same proceedings and without any trial,
ordered the bank manager to deliver the said 250
shares to the administrator of the Guanco Estate
within thirty days from notice of the order.
Upon appeal, the bank’s counsel maintains that the
CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the delivery
of the shares to the administrator in a proceeding
under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue
WON the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the
delivery of the shares to the administrator in a
proceeding under Section 709 of the Code of Civil
Procedure – YES
Held
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away property of the
deceased or withholds information of documentary
evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the
deceased to such property or to disclose the possession
of his last will and testament.
The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit evidence, and
the section does not, in terms, authorize the court to
enforce delivery of possession of the things involved. To
obtain the possession, recourse must therefore generally
be had to an ordinary action.
The CFI largely relied on a dictum in the Alafriz case that
"there may be cases, where papers and documentary
evidence of ownership of property are held by a third
person belonging to the estate of a deceased person, in
which it would be perfectly proper for the court to order the
same turned over to the court."
That may be true; it might apply to the possession of a will.
But in the same case, it was ruled that "the court had no
right to deprive appellant of her evidence relating to the
property, until the question of ownership had been settled."
That is practically this case. The bank maintains that the
pledge of the 250 shares is still in force. It may have
documentary evidence to that effect, and it was not under
obligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a
third party, on the strength of a citation under section 709.
The possession of the certificates of the shares in question
is a part of that evidence and it is obvious that if they are
surrendered to the administrator of the estate and possibly
disposed of by him, the bank will lose its hold on the shares
as a pledge. The bank is entitled to its day in court, and its
right can only be determined in a corresponding action.
46 ALFARIZ v. MINA (1914)
Rule 78 – 85 and 87 (Rule 87, Sec. 6)
Ponente J. Johnson
Summary
4. Petitioner Alafriz was appointed as administrator of
the estate of Navarro. Navarro at the time of his
death, left some minor children, a widow, and
properties, real and personal. Respondent Mina
was appointed as the guardian of some of the minor
children. Mina had in her possession a certain
document for a certain jewelry deposited by
Navarro before his death as a security for a loan.
The administrator asked through a motion that Mina
be cited to appear in court for the purpose of
showing whether she had such document. Mina
offered proof for the purpose of showing that the
said jewelry belonged to her and her mother.
5. Issues:
a) WON the administrator may bring such
actions against Pia Mina as he may deem
necessary and the rights of which pertain
to the intestate estate of which he is the
administrator? - YES

b) WON the court erred in not permitting the
introduction of evidence relative to the
ownership of the said jewel? – NO.
1. YES. Section 709 of the Code (presently Rule
87, Sec. 6) expressly authorized the order of
which complaint is made. If upon the hearing,
there was good reason for believing that the
person cited had property in his or her
possession belonging to the estate, then it was
the duty of the administrator to proceed by an
ordinary action to recover possession of the
same.
2. NO. Section 709 does not seem to make
provision for the determination of the right of
ownership of property. Said section provides
that the person suspected of having property
belonging to the estate may be cited, and the
court may examine such person, under oath, on
the matter of such property.
It will be observed that the section nowhere
expressly gives the court the power to determine
the right of property. The usual way of
determining the right of contending parties to the
ownership of property is by instituting an
ordinary action for that purpose.
Facts
3. (Parties) – Petitioner Alafriz – appointed
administrator of the estate of deceased Navarro;
Respondent Mina – widow of the deceased Navarro
4. (Antecedents) – Petitioner Alafriz was appointed
as administrator of the estate of Navarro. Navarro
at the time of his death, left some minor children, a
widow, and properties, real and personal.
Respondent Mina was appointed as the guardian of
some of the minor children. Mina had in her
possession a certain document for a certain jewelry
deposited by Navarro before his death as a security
for a loan. The administrator asked through a
motion that Mina be cited to appear in court for the
purpose of showing whether she had such
document. Mina offered proof for the purpose of
showing that the said jewelry belonged to her and
her mother. The court ordered the administrator to
commence an ordinary action against Mina to
recover the said jewelries. In the present case, the
defendant (Mina) was entitled to retain possession
of the pawn ticket (the document) until the question
of the ownership of the jewels should be determined
in the proper way.
Issues
1. WON the administrator may bring such actions
against Pia Mina as he may deem necessary and
the rights of which pertain to the intestate estate
of which he is the administrator? - YES
2. WON the court erred in not permitting the
introduction of evidence relative to the
ownership of the said jewel? – NO.

Held
1. YES. Section 709 of the Code (presently Rule 87, Sec.
6) expressly authorized the order of which complaint is
made. If upon the hearing, there was good reason for
believing that the person cited had property in his or
her possession belonging to the estate, then it was the
duty of the administrator to proceed by an ordinary
action to recover possession of the same.
2. NO. Section 709 does not seem to make provision for
the determination of the right of ownership of property.
Said section provides that the person suspected of
having property belonging to the estate may be cited,
and the court may examine such person, under oath,
on the matter of such property.
It will be observed that the section nowhere expressly
gives the court the power to determine the right of
property. The usual way of determining the right of
contending parties to the ownership of property is by
instituting an ordinary action for that purpose.
The court believes that Sec. 709 did not provide for a
trial of the right of property of a deceased person,
embezzled or alienated by a third person.
The administrator in this case placed the jewelry In his
inventory but this is in no way deprives the appellant of
her property therein. She is still entitled to be heard
upon the question of ownership to a proper court.
47 Heirs of Gregoire v. Baker (1927)
Rule 87 | Actions against Administrators and
Executors
Ponente J. Street
Summary
6. (Short Facts) : Heirs of Gregoire filed claims against
the estate of Ankrom, administered by Baker. At first,
the estate appeared to be sufficient to cover the claims,
but later it was discovered that decedent assigned all
his interest on a tract of land to a certain Jung. Hence,
Baker amended the inventory and omitted the subject
tract of land. A 1st order to restore the inventory was
made, but a later order approved the omission.
7. Issue #1: What is the remedy of the appellants? The
remedy of the appellants is to indemnify the
administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to
institute an action in the name of the administrator to
set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed
to have been made in fraud of creditors.
8. Issue #2: WON the 1st order is final and the 2nd
order is invalid? NO. Orders made by a court with
reference to the inclusion of items of property in the
inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are
manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and
interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or
change at any time during the course of the
administration proceedings. Such orders are not
conclusive of the rights of any one, and the order in
question not final in the sense necessary to make it
appealable.

Facts
(Parties)
5. The petitioners in this case are the claimants against
the estate, heirs of gregoire; and
6. The respondent is the administrator of the estate of
Ankrome, Albert L. Baker.
(Antecedents)
1. J.H. Ankrom died and A.L. Baker (appellee) qualified
as his administrator. Administrator field his inventory
of the assets of the decedent, which included a
tract of land covered by a TCT and an area of more
than 930 hectares, estimated nearly at P60,000.
2. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire (appellants) filed a
claim against the estate of Ankrom for the
sum of $35,438.78 or P70,877.56, based upon a
judgment rendered in the SC of Panama. This claim
was allowed by the commissioners in the
estate of Ankrom, and no appeal was at any time
taken against the order so allowing it. Total claims
against the estate was P76,645.13 but 4 creditors
were paid in full, thus the balance is P75,005.31, the
greater part to the appellants.
3. At first, the assets appeared to be sufficient to pay all
claimants but administrator later discovered that
decedent executed a REM on the subject property to
Philippine Trust Company (PTC). 2 days after,
decedent made an assignment of all his interest in
the mortgaged property to one J. G.
Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported
consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable
considerations. Thus, administrator amended his
inventory, omitting the subject property which made
the estate insolvent.
(Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) –
1. A 1st order to restore the property to the inventory was
made by the court, but a 2nd order approved the
omission. This order is the subject of the appeal.
Issue
22. What is the remedy of the appellants?
a. Action for conveyance with a bond.
23. WON the 1st order is final and the 2nd order is invalid?
a. No. Because orders of this nature is subject to
modification or change at any time during
the course of the administration
proceedings.
Held
1. What is the remedy of the appellants?
The precise remedy open to the appellants in the
predicament above described is clearly pointed out in
section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads
as follows:
"When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an
executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and
when the deceased person made in his life-time such
fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate
or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding
section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the
court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced
such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment,
in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for
the recovery of the same, and may recover for the
benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or
interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be
commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with
sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned
to indemnify the executor or administrator against the
costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon
the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred
and such other expenses as the court deems equitable."
The remedy of the appellants is to indemnify the
administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to
institute an action in the name of the administrator to
set aside the assignment or other conveyance
believed to have been made in fraud of creditors.
2. WON the 1st order is final and the 2nd order is invalid?
Appellants also contended that the 1st order to restore the
item was not appealed and must be final, and the 2nd order
be considered beyond the competence of the court.
This contention is untenable. Orders made by a court with
reference to the inclusion of items of property in the
inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are
manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and
interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or
change at any time during the course of the
administration proceedings. Such orders are not
conclusive of the rights of any one, and the order in
question not final in the sense necessary to make it
appealable. In fact we note that the appealed order was
expressly made without prejudice to the rights of the
creditors to proceed in the manner indicated in the
provision above quoted from the Code of Civil Procedure.
The order appealed from not being of an appealable
nature, it results that this appeal must be dismissed.
48 Velasquez v. George (1983)
Rule 87 | Rule 85 and Rule 87
Ponente J. Gutierrez
Summary
9. Benjamin died leaving behind his wife Maria and
their children. He was a majority stockholder of a
company. The officers of this company and the
administrator of Benjamin’s estate mortgaged and
sold 3 company lands to Villanueva. Villanueva said
the heirs could not contest the sale since the Rules
of Court gives this power to the administrator.
10. WON Maria and her children could file the
complaint – YES.
11. Considering that the sale due to the machinations
of the administrator, it would be far-fetched to
expect the said administrator himself to file the
action in behalf of the estate. Since the
administrator is the one at fault, the heirs can file
the case themselves as the owners of the property.
 Facts administrator himself to file the action in behalf of
7. (Parties) – Petitioners = Maria Velasquez vda. De the estate.
George and her children; Respondents = Officers of
Island Associates Inc. and Andres Muñoz, the
administrator of the estate of Benjamin George
8. (Antecedents) – Maria’s husband Benjamin died.
While he was alive Benjamin owned 64% of the
shares of stock of Island Associates Inc.. Without
approval of the probate court and without notice to
the heirs, the officers of the company and Muñoz
mortgaged 3 of the company’s lands to Erlinda
Villanueva. The lands were eventually sold to her.
9. (Summary of Cause of Action/Issues) – Maria
and her children filed a complaint to annul the sale
since it will impair the distribution of Benjamin’s
estate. Villanueva contends that they have no legal
personality to do so. She says that according to
Sec. 3, Rule 87, only the estate’s administrator has
the capacity to file the case.

Issue
2. WON Maria and her children could file the
complaint – YES.
Ruling
2. The administrator is not the only person who can
file the case. They heirs of the deceased can do
so as well because they are now the owners of the
property. Especially so in this situation because
the administrator is also one of the persons who
caused the contested sale. Considering that the
sale due to the machinations of the administrator,
it would be far-fetched to expect the said