Recognition Gaps in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:

The People-State and Self-Other Axes

This document is a pre-publication of the following:

Friedman, E. 2016. "Recognition Gaps in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The People-

State and Self-Other Axes." Journal of Language and Politics. 15(2), 193-214. DOI
10.1075/jlp.15.2.04fri.

Elie Friedman

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract
This study identifies gaps in official discourse between recognition of the

other as a nation and recognition of the other's right to statehood within identity

conflicts. Using as a case study the discourse of Israeli political leaders during three

distinct periods from 1967 until the present, the study proposes analytical tools based

on recognition theory to examine how the relationship between recognition of the

other and constitution of the self impact recognition gaps. The study illustrates that

partial recognition of the other – either affirmation of peoplehood coupled with denial

of statehood or conversely affirmation of statehood coupled with denial of

peoplehood – can result from an untenable view of self based on ontological

dissonance. Recognition of the other is shown to be an essential aspect of self-

constitution within the context of a transformation of self-identity towards an identity

that frees itself of mastery over the other.

Keywords: Conflict resolution; identity; recognition; other; nationalism; political

discourse; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; ontological security; Hegel; speeches

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1. Introduction
Recognition represents the process through which entities come to exist as

legitimate actors within the international system and take on a particular identity. It

became a central political concept during the latter half of the 20th century, as it

facilitated an "emancipatory promise" for oppressed ethnic groups who sought

political self-determination (Fraser 2000). The "politics of recognition" has enabled

former peripheral groups to become subjects and demand recognition as national

entities in the international arena (Taylor 1994). Such recognition claims are

particularly relevant for the resolution of identity conflicts which erupt when at least

one side feels that the other has negated its identity and denied its right as a legitimate

player (Greenhill 2008). Recognition theory has yet to disassemble the concept of

recognition into its two main components – recognition of the other as an authentic

nation and recognition of the other's right to statehood – nor has the relationship

between these components been examined. Does recognition of peoplehood

necessarily entail recognition of the right to a state? Does recognition of the other's

right to a state entail recognition of its perceived authenticity as a nation?

Discourse analysis provides an appropriate approach for examining this research

lacuna. The act of recognition can be viewed as a discursive, performative act, as "one

comes to 'exist' by virtue of (sic) fundamental dependency on the address of the

Other" (Butler 1997, 5). In particular, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is relevant

for the analysis of texts which encompass a struggle for recognition, as CDA develops

tools which examine how ideological discourses struggle for power through the

language of inclusion and exclusion (Fairclough 1989; Van Dijk 2001; Wodak 2009).

Specifically, Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) "embeds the

communicative or interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of

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social and political relations" (Wodak 2001, 65) while examining the impact of

historically-grown macro-structures of meaning and requisite language games

(Wodak 2009); thus, it offers an appropriate framework for examining recognition

gaps as manipulative discursive structures that impede conflict resolution. DHA views

national identity as a practice which is negotiated, constructed, and enacted (Wodak

2009) following the concept of the nation as a product of "invention and social

engineering" (Hobsbawm 1991, 10) or "imagined political communities" represented

in the minds of nationalized subjects (Anderson 1988, 6).

This study assumes that recognition gaps are discursive, as the international order

does not require the matching of states and nations. On one hand, the UN Charter

negates the possibility of recognition gaps by aiming for the ideal of matching states

to nations through its commitment to the principle of "equal rights and self-

determination of peoples" (Charter of the United Nations 1945, Chapter 1, Article

1.2), while the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states, "All

peoples have the right of self-determination" (United Nations Declaration on the

Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2008). However, these principles do not clarify what the

delimitation between nations should be, as there are conflicting definitions for

determining which groups may claim the right to self-determination (Caesse 1995).

The hesitancy to automatically grant self-declared nations statehood is illustrated by

the fact that when discussing the Kosovo crisis of 1998–99, the UNSC was careful to

avoid making any mention of ‘self-determination’ and instead used the term ‘self-

administration’ (Greenhill 2008). Furthermore, Canada's recognition Quebecois

nationalism as "a nation within a united Canada" (Parliament of Canada 2006) further

illustrates that national recognition need not lead to statehood. Indeed, there is no a

3
priori problem with nations and states not being paired, as both multi-national states

and nations without complete self-determination are recognized as legitimate entities

(Atzili 2007). Thus, recognition gaps are best understood through the tools offered by

political discourse analysis, assuming that recognition gaps are a discursive means

exploited by leaders to impede conflict resolution.

This study generates new analytical categories for understanding how politicians

employ strategies that attempt to exclude the other from categories granted to the self.

I adopt aspects of the definition delineated in the International Encyclopedia of

Language and Social Interaction, in which political discourse is defined as natural,

institutional, or mediated text and talk dealing with concrete political issues (Kampf

2015). In addition, this study examines how the relationship between recognition of

the other and constitution of the self impacts recognition gaps. Following a discussion

of the relevant recognition theory, this article analyzes political discourse of three

periods in Israel which deals with recognition of the Palestinian other to illustrate the

character of recognition gaps.

2. Recognition Theory
A significant range of literature posits recognition as an essential aspect of conflict

resolution. Rouhana (2004) argues that recognition involves the public granting of

legitimacy to the other, with each party achieving the feeling that its collective

ontological security is no longer in question. Bauman (2001) divides recognition into

negative and positive recognition, the former assuming a tolerant approach towards

the other, while the latter endorsing the intrinsic values of differences between people,

leading to distributive justice. The former type of recognition indicates only that a

state is recognized as having fulfilled the conditions of statehood, expressing

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acceptance of a given state of affairs, rather than serving as a normative statement

about the actor's legitimacy as a unique, distinct entity (Honneth 2012). The latter

involves recognizing "that upon which a community founds its self-image" (Honneth

2012, 142). Such a legitimization of the other is essential to Bar-Tal's (2004)

approach, who claims that recognition of the legitimacy of the other's differences,

including its goals, values, ideology, religion, race, nationality, ethnicity, and culture,

is essential to conflict resolution.

While the demand for recognition of legitimacy of peoplehood is generally

perceived as a "symbolic" demand (in contrast to "concrete" demands such control

over resources), it has concrete implications, as recognition assures that the other side

will make no additional demands, guaranteeing that collective existential security is

no longer in question. The symbolic recognition of authenticity of a nation seemingly

implies the granting of self-determination, with all of its concrete implications such as

borders, a military, a national economy, etc. (Nagar and Shamir 2013). This study

illustrates that this apparent symbiosis between symbolic and concrete aspects of

recognition can be thwarted through political discourse that emphasizes recognition

gaps whose purpose is to impede conflict resolution.

2.1 The Self, the Other, and Recognition

Recognition theory that deals with the constitution of self and other provides

an understanding of the type of recognition the self is prepared to grant the other in

identity conflicts. It grapples with the central question of whether recognition of other

is essential for the constitution of self (Wendt 2003) or whether it can result in the

destruction of self, imposing restrictions on the actor's independence (Markell 2003).

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This theoretical approach is an extension of Hegel's Master-Slave dialectic, which is

sketched by Fukuyama as follows: Two actors in a hypothetical ‘state of nature’

attempt to secure the recognition of the other by entering into a life-threatening battle.

Their confrontation ends with one actor surrendering, creating a relationship of

domination characterized as a master–slave relationship. However, the master remains

dissatisfied that he has only secured recognition from an actor that he himself cannot

recognize, while the slave develops a growing sense of agency, due to the master's

dependence on his work. Eventually the slave fights to free himself from the master's

control and sets the stage for the emergence of a society built upon the principles of

liberal democracy that enables lasting recognition (Hegel 1977; Fukuyama 1992). The

act of recognizing the other is essential for arriving at a consciousness of self

(Honneth 2012). Identity based on negating the other is a precarious, unstable

identity, which necessitates movement towards mutual recognition.

Despite this positive association between recognition of the other and

constitution of the self, recognizing the rights of the other automatically imposes

various constraints on the self (Honneth 1995; Markell 2003). Recognition of the

other requires the self to revise its identity to accommodate the other, removing the

negation of the other from its own identity (Kelman 2004). Thus, the possibility of

recognizing the other is intimately connected with the demands of a nation's collective

identity (Honneth 2012). While, according to Hegel's dialectic, identity of the self

based on recognition of the other results in a more stable self, Honneth (1995) and

Markell (2003) argue that recognition of the other can constrain and undermine the

identity of the self. Within this context, Greenhill argues that recognition must imply

that the other has a right to exist in a way that does not threaten the self's desired

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identity. However, if the self perceives that the other's existence threatens its identity,

then the self will have a problem recognizing the other (Greenhill 2008). Both of

these aspects of self-other relations can be conceptualized within the context of

ontological security, as an actor needs to feel assured that he himself recognizes his

identity as stable (which is only possible once the actor has moved beyond mastery

over the other), and that the other also recognizes this specific identity (Mitzen 2006;

Lupovici 2012).

These two approaches towards constitution of self and other are utilized to

develop analytical categories for understanding recognition gaps. CDA and in

particular DHA provides tools for analyzing the historical evolution of self-other

relations through the discursive construction of "us" versus "them" groups and the

attribution of various active versus passive agency characteristics to each (Van

Leeuwen 1996, Van Dijk 2001, Wodak 2009). The possibilities of self-other relations

are reflected through discursive strategies which can justify a problematic status quo

(i.e. the initial moment of mastery over the slave) or transform and dismantle well-

established aspect of national identity (i.e. the master's revision of self that removes

negation of the other from its identity) (Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999). Discourse

can create a change in the nature of relations between groups and serve to cleanse an

actor from a moral perspective (Kampf 2012). Furthermore, through an imminent

critique of textual structures, DHA aims to discover contradictions and paradoxes

within texts (Wodak 2009), highly relevant for understanding the dissonance entailed

in intermediate stages of self-other relations that facilitate dissonant recognition gaps.

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3. Case Study: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, recognition of the other has become a central

issue, as each party views its very existence as a national group being at stake in the

conflict (Kelman 2001). It has been argued that the lack of a solution to the conflict is

attributable to symbolic factors, such as the issue of recognition (Hermann and

Newman 2000). Contrary to the perception that Israel has focused on concrete

demands and the Palestinians on symbolic demands, Nagar and Shamir (2013)

illustrate that both sides make concrete and symbolic demands. Their study showed

that while Israelis attributed great importance to mutual recognition of each state as

the national homes of their respective peoples, the Palestinians view Israeli

recognition of Palestine as essential, while they oppose the demand that each side

recognize the national identity of the other. Thus, this study indicates that on the

recognition issue, it is in fact the Israeli side that is more concerned with symbolic

aspects, while the Palestinians desire concrete recognition of statehood.

Questions of the kind of recognition each side is willing to grant the other

have been central to the conflict.1 Kelman (2004) argues that a resolution to the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires comprehensive recognition: an end of negation of

the other's authenticity as a nation and its links to the land coupled with its right to

national self-determination. However, the rhetoric of Israeli leaders has demonstrated

a recognition gap: a leader's positive approach towards the Palestinian peoplehood

does not necessarily entail an acceptance of Palestinian statehood, nor does rejection

of peoplehood necessarily entail a negation of statehood.

Despite the 1993 Declaration of Principles, which was based on the concept of

mutual recognition, neither side has engaged in a comprehensive or positive

8
recognition of the other. While the Palestinian Liberation Organization recognized

Israel in 1988, Palestinians continue to negate the Jewish people's right to establish a

Jewish state in Palestine as such recognition would entail self-negation (Rouhana

2004). Furthermore, Israeli comprehensive recognition of a Palestinian other would

have far-reaching ramifications for the definition of self. Israel faces competing

definitions of identity which alter depending on recognition of the other. Recognition

of a Palestinian other frames Zionism within an identity associated with liberalism,

while the lack of recognition of the Palestinian other constitutes an Israeli identity

based on ethno-centrism (Barnett 1999; Waxman 2006). Hence, different approaches

to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict result in a discord between various aspects of Israel

identity, causing ontological dissonance and insecurity (Lupovici 2012).

These two options for Israeli identity can be understood via the above

theoretical concepts: according to Hegel's dialectic an identity based on the negation

of the other is unstable and must necessarily advance towards mutual recognition,

resulting in the constitution of a different self – a society based on the principles of

liberal democracy. However, recognition of the Palestinian other could be perceived

as a threat to Israeli identity, if the self perceives that the other does not recognize its

identity – that is, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Therefore, the Israeli-

Palestinian case serves as a pertinent for examining the relationship between

recognition of other and constitution of self and how this relationship affects

recognition gaps.

4. Methodology

The corpus is comprised of political messages which deal with the issue of

recognition, presented by official representatives in public forums such as the

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Knesset, the United Nations, academic conferences, and in media interviews. The

total corpus includes 518 speeches and media quotations delivered by Prime Ministers

and Foreign Ministers within various public forums. Sources include the State

Archives, minutes from Knesset Debates, the Yearbook of Official Documents, and

the web sites of Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The

corpus ranges from 1967 until 2012, as the Arab countries' defeat of 1967 following

by the Israeli military occupation of the newly conquered territories ignited a new

Palestinian national consciousness, thus offering new circumstances for re-evaluation

of the lack of recognition of a Palestinian other (Caplan 2010).

Specifically, the following periods in time are studied, each of which

represents a unique ideological framework:

 The Meir government (1969-1973): A euphoric period of Israel as regional

superpower, during which the nature of the conflict was redefined by the "land for

peace" premise, through UN Security Council Resolution 242 (Reich 2008).

 The second Rabin government (1993-1995): The Oslo Accords and their

aftermath, which included a revision of Israeli national identity within the context

of possible acceptance in the region (Barnett 1999).

 The second Netanyahu government (2009-2012): A period of little official

Israeli-Palestinian dialogue characterized by a lack of trust and little negotiations

between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, coupled with the rise of nationalist

politics within Israel (Ravid 2011).

This study develops new categories of political discourse analysis by

combining recognition theory with a various discourse analysis tools including

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semantics, pragmatics, and lexical analysis, making particular use of tools offered by

DHA (see Wodak 2009). The following table presents analytic categories, their

expression in recognition theory and in the case study, as well as the relevant

discursive strategies, which are utilized to explore the relationship between

recognition of other and constitution of self:

Table 1: Recognition Gap Categories, Theory, and Discursive Strategies

Analytical Recognition theory Israeli-Palestinian case Discursive

category study application strategies

Assessment Status quo as Israeli occupation is "Us versus them"

of the tenable: the master perceived as tenable, through attribution,

status quo assumes subjectivity constituting an Israeli lexical choice, and

of self- upon his victory in identity based on ethno- activation versus

other battle over the other. centrism. passivation.

relations
Status quo as Israeli occupation of the Performative

untenable: the Palestinians is perceived speech situation

master perceives his as untenable, signaling

mastery over the constituting an Israeli acknowledgement

slave as identity associated with of a new reality

unsatisfactory. liberalism. and cleansing of

self.

Assessment Negative assessment Israel perceives that the Undermining of

of other's of other recognition Palestinians do not oppositional texts,

recognition of self: the self does recognize Israel's pre-supposition of

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 of self not recognize the identity as a Jewish state. the truth of "our"

other, as he perceives reality.

that other does not

accept the self's

identity.

Positive assessment Israel perceives that the Performative

of other recognition Palestinians recognize speech situation

of self: the self Israel's identity as a announcing a

recognizes the other, Jewish state. change in "their"

as he perceives that text.

the other has

recognized the self's

identity.

5. Analysis of Political Discourse

Through the analysis of exemplary texts from three distinct periods, the

following section scrutinizes recognition gaps through the lens of the above analytic

categories.

5.1 The Meir Government (1969-1973)

PM Golda Meir adopts a recognition strategy in which mastery over the other

is claimed to be tenable, while the other is perceived to reject the self's existence. This

can be labeled as an I will rule the other as he does not exist as an authentic people

and rejects my existence worldview. Her strategy leads to a rejection of both

12
recognition of a Palestinian people and a Palestinian state, advanced through the lens

of a positive approach to the status quo of military occupation in the territories and an

assessment of the other's rejection of Israel's existence. Meir's discursive strategy

involves the denial of agency to the other and negation of "their" identity.

The following famous quotation is exemplary of her approach towards

recognition of the other:

I’m not saying that there are no Palestinians, but there is no such thing that can

be entitled Palestinian people (Meir 1970a).

Meir argues that the Palestinians cannot be considered a people, denying "that

'the Palestinians' is a valid category of national identity" (Kampf 2012, 437). Since

they are denied existence as a political entity, any statement of recognition is

redundant (Kampf 2012).

Meir further undermines the opposing text "Palestinian people" by connecting

it to a rejection of Israel's existence:

The Khartoum doctrine is unchanged: no peace, no recognition, no

negotiation. Israel must withdraw to the borders of 4 June 1967 and thereafter

surrender its sovereignty to the "Palestinian people" (Meir 1970b).

She calls into question the validity of the existence of a Palestinian people by

presenting the term "Palestinian people" in quotations2, a text attributed to the

rejectionist "Khartoum doctrine", the statement made at the Arab League summit

which rejected rapprochement with Israel (Arab League Summit 1967). By placing

the other's utterance in quotations, Meir creates irony and undermines the legitimacy

of opposing texts (Blum-Kulka 2000). Furthermore, she contextualizes "Palestinians"

13
within calls for Israel's destruction. Not only is the "Palestinian people" entity created

by "them" a fiction, but it has only been created for the purpose of "our" destruction.

Thus, Meir's lack of recognition of the other is underpinned by her perception that the

other does not itself recognize the self.

Meir's negation of Palestinian peoplehood is advanced by her perception of the

relatively new status quo:

Terrorist organizations have been set up to infiltrate and establish bases in the

administered areas, to get the inhabitants to take part in terrorism and to incite

the population against the Israel administration: that 80 per cent of all

terrorism still takes the form of shooting and shelling from across the border

proves how limited has been the success of its design….

Our policy is to maintain our rule in the administered areas with a minimum of

interference in affairs of the local authorities and the regular existence of the

population. We consider ourselves responsible for the maintenance of

services, employment and economic and agricultural development. Twenty-

two thousand Arabs from Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, thousands of

refugees among them, are employed in Israel, and several thousand Arabs of

the Gaza Strip in Judea and Samaria. Consequently, there is no unemployment

in Judea and Samaria, and few are jobless in the Gaza Strip. Laborers from the

areas working in Israel receive the Israel wage, which is 250 per cent higher,

on average, than what they earned under Jordanian rule (Meir 1970b).

Meir adopts a discursive strategy whose purpose is to justify a problematic

status quo (Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999) by endowing actors with either active or

14
passive roles (Van Leeuwen 1996). She divides the other into two oppositional

categories. The first group is subject to "passivation", a group that is "undergoing" or

"on the receiving end" (Van Leeuwen 1996, 44-45). Passivation is discursively

constructed through the lexicon which labels this group "the Arabs from Judea,

Samaria, and Gaza". The lexical-categorical differentiation between "Arabs" and

"Palestinian people" is based on the conception of "Arabs" being a softer term which

stresses lack a concrete national identity, a passive sub-entity of Pan-Arabism

(Rabinovitch 1993). Furthermore, "laborers" are a passive lexical category, as they are

dependent upon someone else to provide them work, while "inhabitants" do not have

an innate connection to the land nor the ability to develop a national awareness (as

would a "people"). The second grouping, which is subject to "activation" (Van

Leeuwen 1996), are termed "terrorist organizations" and "infiltrators"[sic] from across

the border (i.e. those who wave the banner of the "Palestinian People") who attempt to

"incite" the passive laborers. Thus, the other is divided into two categories – the first,

passive workers who have no desire to be recognized as an entity, but only to labor

and inhabit, and the second, active terrorists who surely cannot be recognized as they

are a threat to "us". This attribution is contrasted with "our" fruitful activation, as "we

consider ourselves responsible" for their "services, employment and economic and

agricultural development." Through first person, plural pronoun choice, "we" are

portrayed as an active collective who provide welfare for "them".

In summary, Prime Minister Meir adopts a discursive strategy in which

mastery is viewed as tenable and even necessary, as the other is perceived as either a

passive benefactor bereft of political identity or a terrorist who rejects the self's

existence. This "us" versus "them" discursive strategy firmly entrenches the master in

15
the moment in which he first assumes subjectivity upon his victory in the life-or-death

battle (i.e. the 1967 war), subjecting the other to slavery to affirm his subjectivity. The

idea that the defeated slave could want to assume a national identity is conceived as a

potential life-threatening situation, as the previous life-or-death battle is only a recent

memory. This unequivocal recognition strategy leads to a rejection of both

recognition of a Palestinian people and a Palestinian state.

5.2 The Rabin Government (1993-1995)

The second Rabin government illustrates a different approach than the Meir

government – recognition of Palestinian peoplehood complemented by a rejection of

Palestinian statehood. The Rabin government presents a recognition strategy which

asserts that the status quo is untenable – that is, the master perceives mastery as

unsatisfactory, as it is predicated upon domination over an actor who has not gained

subjectivity. This approach is based on the assessment that the other has recognized

the self's identity – Israel as a Jewish state. This leads to an I recognize the other's

subjectivity who accepts my identity worldview, as the need to end the stage of

mastery over the slave is deemed essential for constituting Israeli identity. This

worldview is discursively facilitated through a meta-pragmatic, performative total

speech situation (Austin 1962; Butler 1997) which includes speech acts, rhetorical

questions, and promises whose perlocutionary effect announces a new state of affairs

regarding both the existence of the other as a people and its acceptance of the self.

The following statement, delivered in the Knesset by FM Shimon Peres,

presents the Palestinian people within a framework of legitimacy:

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 Regarding the reasons [that a lack of peace will have a cost in blood], I want

to say with all honesty, and I know that it is painful, but it is preferable to tell

the truth – one of the reasons is that there is a Palestinian people. We can state

that we do not recognize them. But saying that we don't recognize them will

not cause the nation to disappear, the demand for recognition of the people

will not disappear. And again, I praise the Camp David Accords, in which

there was a recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, just

and legitimate. If a people has legitimate and just rights, what do you expect it

to do? (Peres 1994b).

Even though Peres attributes the granting of peoplehood to the Camp David

accords, thus avoiding ultimate responsibility, his statement offers the perlocutionary

effect of declaring a new state of affairs by claiming that the Palestinians are a people

that both exists and has "just and legitimate" rights. He declares the existence of a

Palestinian people, by referring to the binding nature of a text, a peace agreement

initiated by a former political rival (PM Begin) which he praises – an expressive

speech act. Peres portrays the subject's approach towards the other as either an

acknowledgement of an entity that already exists or alternatively as a denial of reality,

a wish for something that exists to disappear. He re-contextualizes opposing voices

who make assertive speech acts which deny the existence of a Palestinian people ("we

can state we don't recognize them"…"saying that we don't recognize them") in order

to portray this as a simple denial of reality. Thus, Peres' strategy takes on the meta-

pragmatic function of affirming the binding nature of recognition made by a past

political rival, which has never been implemented, and is being denied by current

political rivals.

17
 Peres' positive approach towards Palestinian peoplehood is directly connected

to his assessment of the situation in the territories – his belief that mastery of the other

is unsatisfactory. While Meir posits the invented "Palestinian people" and the actual

situation of the "Arab residents" as oppositional entities, Peres states that the situation

on the ground is untenable due to the need to satisfy Palestinian nationalist

aspirations:

We cannot comprehend the idea of holding under a single sovereignty two

nationalist populations, one with full civic rights, including the right to vote

for the Knesset, and the other subjected constant prejudice, due to

convenience. Israel cannot be, and will not be, a land of apartheid….The

moral issue is unequivocal: we do not want to rule by the fist over another

nation….the personal dignity of the Palestinians will be returned to them, to a

great extent, when we will no longer be their rulers (Peres 1995).

Peres rejects the proposition that under the current situation of inequality,

there can be positive relations between Jews and Arabs, or that Palestinians can have

a dignified existence. He sets up two oppositional sets of terms – on one hand,

prejudice, convenience, apartheid, rule by the fist, and on the other, civil rights,

morality, personal dignity, in order to present the choice of a desired ethical self-

perception as "unequivocal". The speaker sets up commissive speech acts by

repeatedly negating future scenarios ("cannot be, and will not be"…"we do not want")

while connecting these negations with terminology ("apartheid") which is taboo

within the Israeli political discourse (Friedman and Kampf 2014). Thus, he employs a

discourse that dismantles aspects of national identity (Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak

1999). Peres approaches the question of recognition through the lens of how

18
recognition or lack thereof reflects upon the self: the subject cannot be predicated

upon domination of the other, as he feels a discord between his perceived moral

identity and the situation on the ground, resulting in ontological dissonance. Thus, he

must recognize the subjectivity of the other through a declarative acknowledgement

of reality to re-constitute and cleanse his own moral identity (Kampf 2012).

In addition to a re-assessment of the status quo, the Rabin government asserts

that the other has recognized the self's identity. The following statement by Rabin in

the Knesset illustrates that recognition of a Palestinian people is directly related to the

government's perception that the Palestinian Liberation Organization recognizes the

authentic existence of the Jewish state:

We took a decision for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, Mr.

Arafat giving in writing a full commitment, denouncing and rejecting violence

and terror, expressing a readiness to discipline his people who continue with

terror and violence and recognizing the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish

independent state (Rabin 1993).

Rabin offers a two-pronged argument to justify recognition of the PLO, which

takes the form of reporting on a joint meta-pragmatic performative speech situation

made by Israel and the PLO: 1) Arafat's rejection of violence and terror and his

readiness to "discipline" those who continue on this path and 2) Arafat's recognition

of Israel as "recognizing the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish independent state", an

assessment that the other accepts the self's desired identity. Rabin, in essence, is

reporting on a series of commissive ("readiness to discipline his people") and

declarative speech acts ("denouncing and rejecting violence and terror"…"recognizing

the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish independent state") which serve as assessments
19
of a change in how the other perceives the self. The subject believes that recognition

of the other does not limit the self, as the other has accepted the self for who he is

(Greenhill 2008). These statements create an overall performative speech situation

which declares a change in the status quo of relations with the other.

However, acceptance of Palestinian national existence, does not translate into

an acceptance of a Palestinian state, as Peres states:

I can promise that we negate a Palestinian state and require full autonomy as

we promised. Through the establishment of autonomy, we prevented a

Palestinian state, because the alternative to autonomy is a Palestinian state

(Peres 1994a).

Autonomy and statehood are posited as two oppositional terms, with statehood

presented as a threat whose realization is prevented through autonomy. The above

"us" group which sides with civil rights, morality, and personal dignity is the same

"us" group which "negates" and "prevents" [sic] Palestinian statehood. While

recognition of a Palestinian people and perception of Palestinian acceptance of a

Jewish state are presented as declarations of a new reality, this statement serves as a

promise to adhere to a consensual position – opposition to Palestinian statehood.

Peres utilizes a commissive speech act through a promise (Searle 1969) to rebut the

assumed perception that recognition and autonomy lead to statehood.

In summary, the Rabin government discourse is characterized by a recognition

gap – the view of the status quo as problematic and assessment of Palestinian

recognition of authentic Jewish national existence, which translates into recognition

of Palestinian peoplehood, coupled with a rejection of Palestinian statehood. The

21
master recognizes the problem of denying the other's subjectivity; however, his

ontological insecurity prevents him from allowing the other to adopt an equal footing

to the self, for fear that the other's self-determination as a sovereign state would

threaten the self. According to Hegel's dialectic, this is an untenable intermediary

position that must progress to the next moment of comprehensive recognition of the

other.

5.3 The Netanyahu Government (2009-2012)

The second Netanyahu government (2009-2012) is characterized by a different

strategy regarding recognition of Palestinian peoplehood and statehood: Netanyahu

accepts Palestinian statehood while compromising the authenticity of Palestinian

peoplehood. His worldview can be conceived as I accept a state as a necessary

inconvenience but do not accept the other as an authentic nation.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, in his famous "Bar-Ilan speech", accepts a

Palestinian state, albeit conditionally:

If we receive this guarantee regarding demilitarization and Israel’s security

needs, and if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people,

then we will be ready in a future peace agreement to reach a solution where a

demilitarized Palestinian state exists alongside the Jewish state (Netanyahu

2009a).

Despite this acceptance of Palestinian statehood, the text places certain

conditions that allow him to avoid implementation (Livnat 2008): Palestinian

acceptance of Israel's desired identity and a guarantee of Israel's security needs. He

utilizes a discursive strategy through the repeated use of the conditional "if" to create

21
conditions for implementation. This statement presents "we" as the side willing to

make concessions, while "they" undermine this effort by refusing to meet minimal

conditions.

Despite Netanyahu's apparent acceptance of a Palestinian state, within the

same speech, the PM illustrates his lack of a belief in an authentic Palestinian people:

But our right to build our sovereign state here, in the land of Israel, arises from

one simple fact: this is the homeland of the Jewish people, this is where our

identity was forged.…

But we must also tell the truth in its entirety: Within this homeland lives a

large Palestinian community. We do not want to rule over them, we do not

want to govern their lives, we do not want to impose our flag and our culture

on them….

These two realities – our connection to the Land of Israel and the Palestinian

population living within it – have created deep divisions in Israeli society

(Netanyahu 2009a).

Netanyahu attributes "us" with "activation" (Van Leeuwen 1996), defined by

terms such as "right", "sovereign state", "homeland" and "identity was forged", while

"they" are attributed passive non-peoplehood terminology, as they are cast as a

"community" or "population" "living within it" (our homeland), an unfortunate

circumstance which has caused divisions within Israel. The declaration of the

existence of a Palestinian "community" is preceded by the rhetorical strategy of

making a dramatic declarative speech act ("But we must also tell the truth in its

22
entirety"), as though a new reality has been announced, despite it serving as the

declaration of a degraded level of peoplehood.

Thus, the authenticity of Palestinian nationalism is compromised by

contrasting it to Jewish national rights, characterized by connection to a homeland.

Netanyahu adopts a primordialist approach towards nationalism which posits the

nation as an ancient, natural, ethnically-based phenomenon (van den Berghe 1979;

Smith 1998) in order to differentiate between authentic nationalist claims and those

which are inauthentic. While Netanyahu's perception of a Palestinian population or

community is different than Meir's unequivocal rejection of a Palestinian people, it is

also categorically different than Peres' description of "legitimate rights of the

Palestinian people". Although Netanyahu shows a readiness to accept a Palestinian

state, he concurrently adopts a strategy which compromises the authenticity

Palestinian peoplehood.

This recognition gap, the exact opposite of the gap displayed by the Rabin

government, can be understood within the context of the self's assessment of the

status quo coupled with the assessment of whether the other accepts the self's identity.

In his analysis of the status quo, Netanyahu attempts to deflate the civil rights and

occupation discourse, by arguing that Palestinian autonomy entails that they are no

longer occupied, in the following message delivered at the UN General Assembly:

One hundred percent of Palestinians in the Gaza district and 98 percent of the

Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, known as the West Bank, are now living

under Palestinian rule. They enjoy the attributes of self-government: a flag,

their own executive, judiciary, and legislative bodies, and their own police

23
 force. It can no longer be claimed that the Palestinians are occupied by Israel.

We do not govern their lives (Netanyahu 2009b).

Here Netanyahu attempts to disconnect the need for Palestinian statehood

from the opposing civil rights, occupation-based text, granting to the other a list of

"attributes of self-government" that attempt to place it on an equal footing as the self.

However, Netanyahu stated in his "Bar-Ilan" speech, "We do not want to rule over

them, we do not want to govern their lives", yet when speaking at the UN argues that

the other is no longer living under occupation. This message gap between domestic-

targeted and foreign-targeted messages can be explained by the need for political

leaders to play a two-level game between the conflicting demands of different

audiences (Putnam 1988; Friedman and Kampf 2014). However, this gap also

illustrates that the subject is stuck in a self-contradictory moment in which the master

realizes that his ontological security cannot be based on rule over another but is

unable to recognize the slave as self, creating ontological dissonance. His discourse is

contextualized within its historical reality, and cannot "turn back the clock" to the

moment after which the master defeated the slave in a life-threatening battle (i.e. the

post 1967 War reality), as he has inherited the post-Oslo Accords reality defined by

mutual recognition. However, he believes that the other does not share his primordial

subjectivity, preventing the adoption of a civil rights-based discourse.

Furthermore, Netanyahu's lack of acceptance of Palestinian peoplehood is

informed by his assessment that the other has not accepted the self's identity. In

countless speeches, Netanyahu identifies the lack of Palestinian recognition of the

Jewish character of Israel, as illustrated in the following statement delivered to the

U.S. Congress:

24
 Because so far, the Palestinians have been unwilling to accept a Palestinian

state if it meant accepting a Jewish state alongside it. You see, our conflict has

never been about the establishment of a Palestinian state. It has always been

about the existence of the Jewish state. This is what this conflict is about

(Netanyahu 2011).

Netanyahu utilizes the discursive strategy of opposition to posit "us" versus

"them", claiming that "we" have recognized a Palestinian state, while "they" reject a

Jewish state. Thus, "they" are posited as rejectionists, while "we" as being open to

compromise. He repeats the term "about" thrice to emphasize the claim that "their"

rejectionism of Israel's self-definition is the ultimate reason the conflict persists (i.e.

"what this conflict is about").

Netanyahu's assessment of the Palestinian lack of recognition of a Jewish

nation-state is intimately related to his compromised position towards Palestinian

peoplehood, a manifestation of Greenhill's claim that the self has trouble recognizing

the other if he perceives the other's lack of acceptance of the self's identity (Greenhill

2008). Netanyahu's recognition of a Palestinian state is comparable to his assessment

of the Palestinian recognition of Israel – the acceptance of an unfortunate set of

circumstances due to a balance of power which cannot be denied, rather than the

acceptance of an authentic national existence. While the recognition of Palestinian

peoplehood by the Rabin government was a function of Israel's self-perception as a

liberal state, Netanyahu's lack of acceptance of Palestinian peoplehood is a function of

his perception of Israel as a Jewish state, which implies exclusivity of primordial

connection to the land, in which another authentic national existence cannot be

accepted. A Palestinian state can be acknowledged as an unavoidable circumstance,

25
but recognizing the authenticity of a Palestinian national self would require a revision

of the exclusivist Zionist narrative. In summary, Netanyahu's discourse presents a

complex type of recognition gap based on ontological dissonance, on one hand

accepting a Palestinian state, while on the other, compromising the authenticity of a

Palestinian people.

5.4 Summary Table

The following table presents a summary of the above results, illustrating the

relationship between analytical categories and recognition gaps:

Table 2: Recognition Gaps in Israeli Political Discourse

Status quo as tenable Status quo as untenable

Negative assessment No Recognition Gap: Recognition Gap

of other recognition (Meir government) (Netanyahu Government):3
of self
No recognition of Recognition of Palestinian
Palestinian state state

No recognition of Compromised recognition

Palestinian people of Palestinian people

Positive assessment No case4 Recognition Gap (Rabin

of other recognition Government):
of self
No recognition of
Palestinian state

Recognition of Palestinian
people

6. Conclusion

This article illustrates how political discourse divides recognition into two

distinct elements: recognition of the other as a people and recognition of its rights to

statehood. Anti-recognition texts, which cling to the status quo and argue that the
26
other rejects "our" identity tend to utilize "us versus them" strategies, which attribute

oppositional values to "in" and "out" groups, including activation versus passivation

strategies (even if they do accept that the other form a state as an inconvenience that

must be accepted). Conversely, pro-recognition texts, which assess that the status quo

is untenable and that the other does recognize us, tend to utilize meta-pragmatic

performative speech situations which announce a new reality. However, such texts

suffice with a partial recognition, without embracing comprehensive, positive

recognition, resulting in a recognition gap.

Although political leaders' discourse attempts to disassemble recognition into

concrete and symbolic components, thus avoiding comprehensive recognition of the

other, such partial recognition positions the self in an untenable and ontologically

dissonant position. Through an imminent critique of the textual structures, this study

has disclosed such contradictions and paradoxes within texts. While the international

system has numerous examples of states which are not based on a single nationality

and, conversely, nationalities which do not enjoy complete self-determination, the

political discourse of partial recognition is utilized in our case study, primarily, to

undermine conflict resolution.

This study advocates for a political discourse that embraces the kind of

comprehensive, positive recognition defined by Bauman (2001), Bar-Tal (2004), and

Rouhana (2004), which grants legitimacy to the intrinsic values of differences

between people. However, such recognition can only be advocated through political

rhetoric once the self has resolved its own ontological dissonance and insecurity by

removing negation of the other from its own identity, while accepting that recognition

of the other does not pose a threat to its identity. In such a discourse, a self based on

27
negation of the other and the fear that the other does not accept the self is transformed

into an inclusive discourse in which self and other are posited as distinct entities,

neither one negating the other.

An attempt to utilize the analytical categories used in this study to examine the

political discourse of other conflicts, such as the Northern Ireland conflict or the

Kosovo conflict, could shed light on the extent to which discursive recognition gaps

exist in other identity conflicts and whether during conflict resolution processes such

gaps give way to a more comprehensive, positive recognition discourse. If such a

process were found to exist in other case studies, further research could analyze the

political discourse that signifies the transition from a recognition gap strategy towards

a positive recognition strategy, including how self-other relations are re-constituted in

such a discourse.

Acknowledgements
This article was written within the context of my dissertation at the

Department of Communication and Journalism of the Hebrew University of

Jerusalem. I thank my dissertation supervisor, Dr. Zohar Kampf, for his essential

guidance throughout the process of researching and writing this article. I would also

like to thank the Department of Communication and Journalism and the Harry S.

Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at Hebrew University for

supporting this study. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Ariel Zellman for his valuable

comments on an earlier version of this article.

28
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Author's Address
Elie Friedman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Department of Communication and Journalism

Jerusalem, 9190501

Israel

elie.friedman@mail.huji.ac.il

32
About the Author
Elie Friedman has recently completed his PhD at the Department of

Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University. He serves as an associate

research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of

Peace. He is an adjunct lecturer at Hadassah Academic College and at Netanya

Academic College and serves as project manager of its Strategic Dialogue Center. His

research interests include political discourse in national and international contexts

with an emphasis on public diplomacy, conflict studies, and media studies.

1
The Netanyahu governments from 2009 onwards has turned the issue of recognition into a central
issue of a negotiated solution to the conflict, claiming that the Palestinians must not only recognize
Israel's right to exist, but also recognize Israel as a "Jewish state" or conversely as "the national home
of the Jewish people" (see, for example: Netanyahu, 2014a; Netanyahu 2014b, and Netanyahu 2014c).
2
The quotations appear on the copy of the speech which was delivered. I assume that Meir's vocal
inflection reflected these quotations in the written text.
3
Netanyahu's assessment of the status quo of self-other relations is characterized by a compromised
and even contradictory position – on one hand, rule over the other is deemed undesirable, while on the
other hand, the self refuses to accept a civil rights-based approach towards relations.
4
A case in which the subject both assesses that the status quo of occupation of the other is tenable
coupled with positive assessment of other's recognition of self does not exist in our case study, as such
a rhetorical approach would likely require overtly racist claims for its justification.

33