Anti-Rape Law

RA 8353

1. People vs Campuhan
(Consummated Rape)

- Touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis
on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis—there must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or
slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
- Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape—and only
of attempted rape—are present in the instant case, hence, the accused
should be punished only for it.

2. People vs Orita
(Attempted Rape)

- Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he
has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated.
- In a long line of cases We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration
of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction.
- Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into
account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape
and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated
stage in rape can ever be committed.

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3. People vs Orilla
(Count and Consummated)

- The mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victim’s
genitalia engenders the crime of rape. Hence, it is the “touching” or “entry” of
the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the
victim’s genitalia that consummates rape.
- Appellant committed only one count of rape because while appellant
ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s vagina, the first and second ejaculations
occurred during “one single body connection.”8 The trial court considered
Criminal Case No. 3220-A involving the second count of rape as a qualifying
circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty in Criminal Cast
No. 3219-A.
- Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he consummated the rape.
Appellant did not withdraw his penis to insert it again into the vagina or to
“touch” the labia majora or the labia minora when he ejaculated the second
time. It is not the number of times that appellant ejaculated but the
penetration or “touching” that determines the consummation of the sexual
act.36 Thus, appellant committed only one count of rape.

4. People vs Tionlic
(Rape; Lack of Resistance)

- Rape by Sexual Intercourse; Elements of.—The prosecution had to overcome

the presumption of innocence of appellant by presenting evidence that would
establish the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1,
Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit:
o (1) the offender is a man;
o (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
o (3) such act was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation.
- “In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or
intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element
of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The
prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by
accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its
cause.”
- Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes
which the accused had in mind. On the other hand, intimidation must
produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the
accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter
as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.
“Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the
girl with a knife or pistol.”

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 - It would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman who,
after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit
consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind
in the middle and charged him with rape.

5. People vs Marmol
(Classification of Rape)

- Rape can be committed either through sexual intercourse or sexual assault.

Rape under paragraph 1 of the above cited article is rape through sexual
intercourse; often denominated as “organ rape” or “penile rape,” carnal
knowledge is its central element and must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.
- Rape; When and How committed.—Rape is committed —
o 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:

 a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

 b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;

 c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

authority; and

 d. When the woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
o 2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
- Rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
- The elements of qualified rape are:
o (1) sexual congress;
o (2) with a woman;
o (3) done by force and without consent;
o (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape;
and
o (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim.

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6. People vs Jumawan
(Marital Rape)

- Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly
rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife’s body by reason of
marriage.
- By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive
autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or
withhold her consent to marital coitus.
- A husband aggrieved by his wife’s unremitting refusal to engage in sexual
intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He
can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her
refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the
marriage.
- Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and
biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It
entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual
sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.

7. People vs Dalan
(Statutory Rape vs Simple Rape)

- For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that
o (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and
o (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when
she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented.
- Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article
266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
- Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not
capable of giving consent to a sexual act.
- What need to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused
and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.
- The term “deprived of reason” has been construed to encompass those
suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.
- The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-
A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years old.
- To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must
prove:
o first, the age of the complainant;
o second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the
carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.

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 - In the present case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 17 years old when
she was raped. In People v. Butiong, 659 SCRA 557 (2011), we held that carnal
knowledge of a female mental retardate with the mental age below 12 years
of age is considered as rape of a woman deprived of reason, thus: It should no
longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph
1(b), of Article 266-A, x x x, because the provision refers to a rape of a female
“deprived of reason,” a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency
or retardation.

Hazing Regulation Act

RA 8049

1. Dandy Dungo vs People

(Hazing)

- Section 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
- Elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
o 1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
o 2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity,
sorority or organization; and
o 3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

2. Dominador Bayabos vs People

(Accomplice, Hazing)

- In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it
is shown that:
o (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred;
o (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and
o (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing
in spite actual knowledge thereof.

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Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
RA 9208, as amended RA 10364

1. People vs Lalli
(Recruitment and Trafficking-prostitute; no double jeopardy)

- Illegal Recruitment is commited by persons who, without authority from the

government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers
abroad for employment purposes.
- Syndicated Illegal Recruitment; Elements;
o (1) the accused have no valid license or authority required by law to
enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers;
o (2) the accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement
by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting;
o (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons, conspiring and
confederating with one another.
- When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two
different offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under
the other. The constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to risk
of punishment twice for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and
an ordinance. The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or
series of acts constituting different offenses.

2. People vs Hirang
(Qualified Trafficking; Minor; Consent)

- Elements of trafficking in persons, as derived from the aforequoted Section

3(a), to wit:
o (1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders”;
o (2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another”; and
o (3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
“exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal
or sale of organs.”

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 - Qualified Trafficking in Persons; Pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was
committed in a large scale and his four (4) victims were under eighteen (18)
years of age.

VAWC
RA 9262

1. Sharica vs Sps Tan

(Offender in VAWC; Application of Conspiracy under RPC)

- Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ‘‘[v]iolence against women and their
children’’ as
o “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
o with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
o or with whom he has a common child,
o or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
o within or without the family abode,
o which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.”
- While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected
to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship,
it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
RPC.
- Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children may be committed by an offender through
another.
- Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may
be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. Go-Tan vs.
Tan, 567 SCRA 231, G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008

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2. Karlo Angelo Dabalos vs RTC
(Violence against women through harassment)

- The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to

wit:
o 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
o 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or
series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
o 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.

3. BBB vs AAA
(TPO, No Compromise under RA 9262

- Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her

application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions
of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially being assailed is
the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules,
however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not
subjects of compromise agreements.

- It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly

prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against
women.

4. Del Socorro vs Wilsem

(Economic abuse; Prescription)

- The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act

of violence against women and children. In addition, considering that
respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that: “[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations.”
- On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent
in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu
City.
- As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent.
- It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.

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 5. Dinamling vs People
(Elements-psychological abuse)

- “Psychological violence” refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause

mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity.
- Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is
the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish
is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or
similar such acts.
- And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. All of
this was complied with in the case at bar.

Anti-Child Abuse Law

RA 7610

1. Virginia Jabalde vs People

(Sec 10 RA 7610 req. Intent)

- Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his nape,
and immediately thereafter, choking the said offended party causing the
latter to sustain injuries. However, the records of the case do not show that
Jabalde intended to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Lin as a human being.
- The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the
instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and
danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered
by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries.
- Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element
of intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for
a successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
- Section 10(a), Art. II, R.A. 7610 is limited to acts not punishable under the
[RPC]. As the law is being defined in this section:

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 - “Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the [RPC], as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period[.”]

2. People vs Samuel “Tiw-Tiw”

(Sec. 5 – Sexual Abuse)

- In the herein assailed decision, the CA explained that during the trial, the
prosecution was able to prove the existence of the requisites of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610. The CA thus modified the penalty and
imposed instead the one provided for in R.A. No. 7610. In Flordeliz v. People,
614 SCRA 225 (2010), we allowed the imposition of a penalty provided for in
R.A. No. 7610 despite the absence in the Information filed of any explicit
reference to the said statute.
- We declared that: We are aware that the Information specifically charged
petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, without stating therein
that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the
offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or
an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the
crime charged.
- The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances
in the complaint or information. In the instant case, the body of the
Information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been
committed by petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

3. Pinlac vs People
(Lascivious Conduct)

- Under Section 5, Article III of RA No. 7610, the penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on those who
commit acts of lasciviousness with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. Notwithstanding the fact that RA No. 7610 is
a special law, the petitioner in this case may enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty next lower in degree is prisión mayor in its medium period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the CA correctly imposed the
indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

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 4. Quimvel vs People
(Application of RPC vs RA 7610)

- Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness
on a child who is neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other
sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of RA 7610, the accused performs
the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or
subjected to "other sexual abuse."
- Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness
are committed on a child already either exploited in prostitution or subjected
to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of lasciviousness committed on the
child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance that the child is
either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."
(emphasis supplied)
- Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b)
of RA 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act
of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec.
5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse
against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.

Anti-Wiretapping Law
RA 4200

1. Ramirez vs CA
(Prohibited wiretapping, consent is required)

- Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify
as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
- Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

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2. Gaanan vs IAC
(Wiretapping-phone extension)

- The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “deviee or

arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension
telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone
line.
- The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to deterrniiss the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isoiated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in ftxing the meaning of any of its parts.

3. Felipe vs Navarro
(Conversation must be private)

- Indeed, Jalbuena’s testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had

made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No.
4200, which prohibits wiretapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law
provides: x x x Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

4. Mamba vs Garcia
(Tape recording of crime; bribery)

- The Investigating Judge’s reliance on the tape-recorded conversation

between Bulatao and the two police officers is erroneous. The recording of
private conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping
Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. The
law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private
communications, as in this case. Thus, the contents of the tape recorder
cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability of respondent judge.
- To constitute bribery, the following must be shown:
o (1) the offender is a public officer within the scope of Art. 203;
o (2) the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another;

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 o (3) such offer or promise is accepted, or gift received by the public
officer, (a) with a view to committing some crime; (b) in consideration
of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, but which
is unjust; or (c) to refrain from doing something which it is his official
duty to do; and
o (4) the act which he agrees to perform is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

Anti-Carnapping Law
RA 6539

1. Ramirez vs CA
(Felonious Taking, Animus Lucrandi)

- On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines
“carnapping” as “the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging
to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.” The elements of
carnapping are thus:
o (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;
o (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon
things; and
o (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Carnapping is essentially the
robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking
in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.

- Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the

unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term “gain” is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may
be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use
of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.

2. People vs Arnel Nocum

(Carnapping with Homicide)

- Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as “the taking, with intent to gain, of

a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.” The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section
14 of the said law, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of

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 the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated “in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.”

3. People vs Jeffrey
(Carnapping with Homicide)

- Essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it

becomes qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on
the occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed or
raped. As we have ruled in People v. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127 (1997): The killing
or the rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping x x x and no distinction
must be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other
which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof”
makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.

- Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the
prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the
homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that
the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing
was perpetrated “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.” In other words, to prove the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential
elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the
culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

Anti-Highway Robbery
PD 532

1. People vs Cerbito
(No Specific Victim in Brigandage)

- Highway robbery/brigandage is defined in Section 2(e) of P.D. 532 entitled

“Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law” as “(t)he seizure of any person
for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the
property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or
force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any
Philippine Highway.”
- The robbery must be directed not only against specific, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims. All the
above elements were established.

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2. Rustico vs People
(Purpose of Highway Robbery Law)

- Considering the testimonies of witnesses and the evidence presented by the

parties, we are in agreement that the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage
was duly proven in this case.
- As defined under Section 2(e) of Presidential Decree No. 532, Highway
Robbery/Brigandage is the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or
other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by
means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or
other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway.
- Also, as held in People v. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 (1993):
- In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway
robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery,
or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants…
- Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately
against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular
victim…[Emphasis supplied.]
- The elements of the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage have been clearly
established in this case.
- First, the prosecution evidence demonstrated with clarity that the petitioners’
group was organized for the purpose of committing robbery in a highway.
- Next, there is no predetermined victim.
- The Kapalaran bus was chosen indiscriminately by the accused upon reaching
their agreed destination—Alabang, Muntinlupa.

3. People vs Sanoy
(Robbery with Homicide vs Highway Robbery)

- The RTC and the CA were likewise correct in finding accused Israel guilty only
of robbery with homicide, not of robbery on the highway as defined in P.D.
532. Conviction for the latter crime requires proof that several accused
organized themselves for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately,
preying upon innocent and defenseless people on the highway. Here, the
prosecution proved only one act of robbery.

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Anti-Cattle Rustling Law
PD 533

1. Canta vs People
(Elements of Cattle Rustling)

- The crime is committed if the following elements concur:

o (1) a large cattle is taken;
o (2) it belongs to another;
o (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner;
o (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme;
o (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and
o (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation
against person or force upon things.

BP 22

1. Cecilio vs CA
(Foreign Checks Covered-BP22)

- However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the
dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered
by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22). But it will be noted that the law
does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court
correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988: “Under the Bouncing Checks
Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued
in the Philippines though payable outside thereof x x x are within the
coverage of said law.”

2. Erlinda San Mateo vs People

(Presumption; Notice of Dishonor)

- To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be
present:
o (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
o (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
o (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had

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 not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

- It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered
letters including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must
be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed
to be a notice of dishonor.
- To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated
signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to
prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused.
- The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the
fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice
of dishonor by the accused.

3. Amanda Resterio vs People

(Written Notice of Dishonor)

- What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a
worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the
check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the
intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not
intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her incurring
criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

- The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for
the second element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts
up but also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the
offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by
the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that
the check had not been paid. The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the
offender of this statutory right by not giving the proper notice of dishonor.

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Access Device Regulation
RA 8484

1. Ermitano vs CA
(Notice in case of loss access device)

- Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or
theft of his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability
occasioned by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card.
- The questioned stipulation in this case, which still requires the cardholder to
wait until the credit card company has notified all its member-establishments,
puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card company which may delay
indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if not to eliminate the
possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases.
- Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to
promptly notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder.
- To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has
given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company
would simply be unfair and unjust.
- The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly run
against public policy.

2. Anthony vs People
(Possession and use)

- Section 9(a) and (e) make the possession and use of a counterfeit access
device as “access device fraud” that is punishable by law: SECTION 9.
Prohibited Acts.—
- The following acts shall constitute access device fraud and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
- (a) producing, using, trafficking in one or more counterfeit access devices; . . .
- (e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices
fraudulently applied for[.]
- A counterfeit access device is “any access device that is counterfeit, fictitious,
altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or
counterfeit access device.”
- Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use
of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession
and use of a counterfeit access device.

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 3. Soledad vs People
(Fraudulently Applied Access Device)

- In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly stated that the accused
is petitioner “Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur.” It was also
specified in the preamble of the Information that he was being charged with
Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e) for possessing a counterfeit access
device or access device fraudulently applied for.
- In the accusatory portion thereof, the acts constituting the offense were
clearly narrated in that “[petitioner], together with other persons[,] willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private complainant by applying [for] a
credit card, an access device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from Metrobank
Card Corporation, using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his
personal documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in
the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused
using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and
prejudice of the real Henry Yu.”
- Moreover, it was identified that the offended party was private complainant
Henry Yu and the crime was committed on or about the 13th day of August
2004 in the City of Las Piñas. Undoubtedly, the Information contained all the
necessary details of the offense committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
- As aptly argued by respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, although the word “possession” was not used in the
accusatory portion of the Information, the word “possessing” appeared in its
preamble or the first paragraph thereof.
- Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, he was apprised that he was being
charged with violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically section 9(e) thereof, for
possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for.

Arson
PD 1613

1. People vs Alamanda
(Destructive vs Simple Arson)

- The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are:
o (a) there is intentional burning; and
o (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both
these elements have been proven in the present case.
- The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that
the fire spread to other inhabited houses.
- These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and

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 convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which
stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional.
- Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings.
- The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a
residence. T
- hat the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to
destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to
those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC.
- The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his
own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.

2. People vs Baluntong
(Arson with homicide vs Murder)

- In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated—whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the
malefactor:
o (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply
arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
o (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular
person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as
the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder
only; lastly,
o (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed—homicide/murder and arson.

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Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Law
RA 10591

1. People vs Castillo
(Elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms)

- Prescinding therefrom, and considering that the provisions of the amendatory

law are favorable to herein appellant, the new law should be retroactively
applied in the case at bar. It was thus error for the trial court to convict the
appellant of two (2) separate offenses, i.e., Homicide and Illegal Possession of
Firearms, and punish him separately for each crime. Based on the facts of the
case, the crime for which the appellant may be charged is homicide,
aggravated by illegal possession of firearm, the correct denomination for the
crime, and not illegal possession of firearm, aggravated by homicide as ruled
by the trial court, as it is the former offense which aggravates the crime of
homicide under the amendatory law. Same; Same;
- Elements.—Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of
firearms:
o first, the existence of the subject firearm, and
o second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did
not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his
residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged
in the Information lies with the prosecution.

2. People vs Reynaldo Cruz

(Ownership not necessary in illegal possession)

- The appellant maintains that the revolver and hand grenade in question did
not belong to him; nor was he in actual possession thereof at the time he was
arrested. Ownership, however, is not an essential element of the offense
charged. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection
of the thing to one’s control and management.

3. Eugene Firaza vs People

(Mission Order)

- Petitioner is mistaken. Permit to carry firearm is not the same as permit to

carry licensed firearm outside one’s residence. Under the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, a Mission Order is defined as “a written
directive or order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5
hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a definite
purpose or objective during a specified period and to such place or places as
therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly
issued or licensed firearms outside of residence when so specified therein.”

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 - The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry firearms “in
connection with confidential (illegible) cases assigned to [him].” Admittedly,
petitioner was at Rivas’ restaurant in connection with a private business
transaction. Additionally, the Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to
carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.

Cybercrime Prevention Act

RA 10175

1. Jose Jesus Disini vs Secretary of DOJ

(Cybercrime; Double Jeopardy)

- The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional. It held that Section
4(c)(3) violated the right to freedom of expression by prohibiting the
electronic transmission of unsolicited commercial communications. It found
Section 12 in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data.
- It struck down Section 19 of the Act for giving the government the authority
to restrict or block access to computer data without any judicial warrant.

Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

RA 1405

1. PNB vs Gancayco
(Exemption to bank secrecy-Sec.8 RA 3019)

- Whereas section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are
"absolutely conf idential x x x and, theref ore, may not be examined, inquired
or looked into," except in those cases enumerated therein, section 8 of
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) directs in mandatory terms that bank
deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
not-withstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The onIy conclusion
possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2
of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule
against the disclosure of bank deposits.

- The disclosure would not be contrary to the policy making bank deposits
confidential for while section 2 of Republic Act No. 1406 declares bank
deposits to be "absolutely confidential" it nevertheless allows such discloin
the following instances:

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 o (1) upon written permission of the depositor;
o (2) in of impeachment;
o (3) upon of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials;
o (4) in cases where the money deposited is the subject of the litigation.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of
cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential.

2. Ejercito vs Sandiganbayan
(Plunder-exemption to RA 1405)

- The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being
recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the
present case, two exceptions apply, to wit:
o (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and
o (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.

3. Karen SAlvacion vs CBP

(Exemption against Garnishment)

- In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice
would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli.
- This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro.” Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that
would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

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 4. Republic vs Judge Antonio Eugenio
(Exemption under AMLA)

- The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act.

- Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of
any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been
established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money
laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there
is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping
for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson
and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order
before it could inquire into such accounts.

Anti-Money Laundering Act

RA 9160

1. Republic vs Judge Antonio Eugenio

(AMLAC, Bank Inquiry)

- We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead with the then
Solicitor General who conceded that the use of the phrase “in cases of” was
unfortunate, yet submitted that it should be interpreted to mean “in the
event there are violations” of the AMLA, and not that there are already cases
pending in court concerning such violations.
- If the contrary position is adopted, then the bank inquiry order would be
limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile
as a means for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient
evidence to sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for
violation of the AMLA. Should that be the situation, in all likelihood the AMLC
would be virtually deprived of its character as a discovery tool, and thus
would become less circumspect in filing complaints against suspect account
holders.
- After all, under such set-up the preferred strategy would be to allow or even
encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints under the AMLA with the
hope or expectation that the evidence of money laundering would somehow
surface during the trial.
- Since the AMLC could not make use of the bank inquiry order to determine
whether there is evidentiary basis to prosecute the suspected malefactors,
not filing any case at all would not be an alternative. Such unwholesome
setup should not come to pass.

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 - Thus Section 11 cannot be interpreted in a way that would emasculate the
remedy it has established and encourage the unfounded initiation of
complaints for money laundering.
- Still, even if the bank inquiry order may be availed of without need of a pre-
existing case under the AMLA, it does not follow that such order may be
availed of ex parte. There are several reasons why the AMLA does not
generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the bank inquiry
order.

2. Subido Pagente vs CA
(Constitutionality of Sec 11 – Bank Inquiry Order)

- Although the bank inquiry order ex-parte passes constitutional muster, there
is nothing in Section 11 nor the implementing rules and regulations of the
AMLA which prohibits the owner of the bank account, as in his instance
SPCMB, to ascertain from the CA, post issuance of the bank inquiry order ex
parte, if his account is indeed the subject of an examination.
- Emphasized by our discussion of the safeguards under Section 11 preceding
the issuance of such an order, we find that there is nothing therein which
precludes the owner of the account from challenging the basis for the
issuance thereof.
- Plainly, the AMLC’s investigation of money laundering offenses and its
determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry
into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into
an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of
the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate
SPCMB’s constitutional right to procedural due process.

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