JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents

ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE
II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented
by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents
ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL,
and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66,
respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment
of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters
per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including
the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent
spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result
from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the
reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic
changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

1. 7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

2. 8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

3. 9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

4. 10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.

5. 11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's')
to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

6. A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

7. 12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour —
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the
end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

8. 13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

9. 14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will
work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who
may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

10. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds
in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

11. 15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
 12. 16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

13. A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

14. 17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

15. 18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid
of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

16. 19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
—

a. to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each other;

b. to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

c. to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being.
(P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

17. 20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —
i. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
ii. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
iii. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,
id.);
iv. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
18. 21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

19. 22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition
to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order,
not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined
the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section
4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by
the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They
then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that
the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would
ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition
to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as
a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both
in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless
to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by
law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity
of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective
of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive
to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said
policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal
right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In
Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its
failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants
or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the
reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need
to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if
we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one
of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision
are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which
of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought
to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of
this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a
class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the
suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to
require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some
failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence
to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than
a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears
to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels,
oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;
destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as
general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced
and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners
are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings
and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are
self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found
in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable
legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable
to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or
proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. ...

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments
— must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies
of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of
the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners'
specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may
also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one
of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision
are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which
of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought
to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of
this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a
class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the
suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to
require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some
failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence
to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than
a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears
to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels,
oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;
destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as
general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced
and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners
are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings
and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are
self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found
in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable
legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable
to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or
proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. ...

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments
— must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies
of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of
the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners'
specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may
also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.
ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, JR., G.R. No. 174536
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
- versus- Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
AZCUNA,**
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
LAGUNA LAKEDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VELASCO, JR.,*** JJ.
and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:

October 29, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In the present Petition for Review,[1] petitioner Roberto Y. Ponciano, Jr. primarily assails the Resolution[2] dated 4
September 2006 of the Court of Appeals denying his plea for the admission of his Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80705 and taking no action on said Motion since it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner prays of
this Court to vacate and set aside the assailed Resolution and to order the reinstatement of his Motion for Reconsideration
by the appellate court. In the alternative, petitioner implores that this Court directly vacate and set aside the
Decision[3] dated 22 February 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705, the subject of his Motion for
Reconsideration, and render judgment reinstating the Decision[4] dated 10 June 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 74, of Taguig, Metro Manila, in LRC Case No. 273, which confirmed and ordered the registration of
petitioners title over the contested parcel of land.

At the crux of the present controversy is a parcel of unregistered land (Lot 8689-D, Csd-00-000627, MCadm-590-
D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping), situated in Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila, measuring about 2,890 square meters
(subject property).

Alleging to be the owner of the subject property, petitioner filed with the MeTC on 5 September 2001 an
Application[5] for the original registration thereof, which was docketed as LRC Case No. 273.
The MeTC set LRC Case No. 273 for initial hearing on 30 January 2002 at 10:00 a.m. Copies of the Notice of Initial
Hearing were accordingly served, published, and posted.
 On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in LRC Case No. 273 as
counsel for the respondent Republic of the Philippines. At the same time, it deputized the Public Prosecutor of Taguig,
Metro Manila, to appear in said case.[6]

Respondent Republic then filed with the MeTC its Opposition[7] dated 29 January 2002 seeking the denial of
petitioners Application for original registration of the subject property based on the following grounds:

1. That neither the [herein petitioner] nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for thirty (30)
years in accordance with Section 48(b), Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073 and R.A. No. 6940.

2. That the muniments of title, the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of [petitioner], if
any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
bona-fide acquisition of the land applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945, or prior
thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment
receipts indicate pretended possession of [petitioner] to be of recent vintage.

3. That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.[8]

During the initial hearing of LRC Case No. 273 held on 30 January 2002, the MeTC issued, upon the motion of
petitioners counsel, an Order[9] of general default against the whole world, except against the government (which, more
appropriately, should be the respondent Republic), represented by the OSG through the Public Prosecutor.

Hearings were held in LRC Case No. 273 on 6 and 27 February 2002, wherein petitioner presented testimonial and
documentary evidence in support of his Application.

Petitioners evidence, taken as a whole, painted the following picture:

Petitioner purchased the subject property from Dolores Viar Vda. De Roldan (Dolores) on 27 July 1998 as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale[10] bearing the same date. Dolores bought the subject property from her
father, Eleuterio Viar (Eleuterio), in 1966 or 1967;[11] who, in turn, inherited the same property from his own father (or
Dolores grandfather). The subject property had been in the possession of the Viar family since 1941, or even
earlier. Witness Crispina Viar Vda. De Garcia (Crispina), Dolores niece and neighbor, testified that the subject property had
been in the possession of the Viar family for about 70 to 80 years.[12] The earliest Tax Declaration covering the subject
property, though, was issued only in 1949 in the name of Eleuterio Viar.[13]

Petitioner paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the
sale of the subject property from Dolores to him; hence, the BIR issued in petitioners favor a Certificate Authorizing
Registration[14] dated 30 July 1998. Petitioner likewise paid the appropriate local transfer taxes due on the same sale, so
the Municipal Assessor of Taguig, Metro Manila, issued in petitioners name Tax Declarations No. D-009-03162[15] and No.
EL-009-02683[16] in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Petitioner had been diligently paying the annual real property tax on the
subject property since his acquisition thereof in 1998.[17]

Dolores already had the subject property surveyed on 25 March 1998, prior to its sale to petitioner, and the
resulting survey plan was approved on 18 February 1999.[18] The Urban Forestry and Law Enforcement Unit of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) issued a Certification dated 5
February 2002verifying that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable land certified and released as
such on 3 January 1968 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141.[19]

The subject property was already surrounded by a fence. Although the subject property was declared as bamboo
land, it has since been classified as residential. Petitioner intended to build on the subject property a residential house or
a warehouse.[20]

Petitioner has taken possession of the subject property. His period of possession, tacked to that of his
predecessors-in-interest, has exceeded 60 years. The possession of the subject property by the petitioner and his
predecessors-interest has been open, actual, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse, never been disturbed by
anyone. The subject property has not been covered by a patent or administrative title, or mortgaged or encumbered.[21]

The Public Prosecutor, being deputized by the OSG, did not offer any evidence on behalf of respondent Republic.

The MeTC thereafter considered LRC Case No. 273 submitted for decision as of 8 May 2002.[22]
 While awaiting the decision of the MeTC in LRC Case No. 273, respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) filed therein its Opposition[23] dated 17 December 2002also praying for the denial of petitioners Application for
original registration of the subject property. Respondent LLDA averred:

2. That projection of the subject lot in our topographic map based on the technical descriptions
appearing in the Notice of the Initial Hearing indicated that the lot subject of this application for
registration particularly described as Lot 8689-D, Mcadm 590-D containing an area of Two Thousand
Eight Hundred Ninety Two (sic) (2,890) square meters more or less are located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower
water. Site is, therefore, part of the bed of Laguna Lake considered public land and is within the
jurisdiction of Laguna Lake Development Authority pursuant to its mandate under R. A. 4850, as
amended. x x x

3. That Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850, states that, whenever Laguna Lake or Lake is used in this
Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at
the average annual maximum lake level of elevation of 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.0
meters below mean low water (MLLW). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands
which form part of the bed of said lake (Section 14, R.A. 4850, as amended, underlining supplied [sic]).

4. That on the strength of the [herein respondent LLDA]s finding and applying the above-quoted
provision of law, [herein petitioners] application for registration of the subject land has no leg to stand
on, both in fact and in law;

5. That unless the Honorable Court renders judgment to declare the land as part of the Laguna Lake or
that of the public domain, the [petitioner] will continue to unlawfully possess, occupy and claim the
land as their (sic) own to the damage and prejudice of the Government in general and the Laguna Lake
Development Authority in particular;

6. That moreover, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable and indisposable in the absence
of declaration by the Director of Lands as required by law.[24]

On 10 June 2003, the MeTC promulgated its Decision[25] in LRC Case No. 273. After recounting petitioners evidence,
the MeTC adjudged:

WHEREFORE, finding the allegations in the application to have been sufficiently established by
the [herein petitioners] evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of [petitioner] ROBERTO Y.
PONCIANO, of legal age, Filipino, single with residence at No. 30 S. Santos St., Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Metro
Manila over the subject parcel of land designated at Lot 8689-DC, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral
Mapping under Conversion-Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000627 consisting of Two Thousand Eight Hundred
Ninety (2,890) square meters and hereby order the registration of the same in his name.

After finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due on the said lot,
let an order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued.[26]

Without seeking reconsideration of the afore-quoted MeTC Decision, respondent Republic, through the OSG, filed
its Notice of Appeal.

The appeal of respondent Republic before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 80705.

After an exchange of pleadings by the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[27] dated 22 February
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705. The appellate court rejected the argument of respondent Republic that the subject property
was unalienable because it formed part of the Laguna Lake bed under Republic Act No. 4890, otherwise known as the
Laguna Lake Development Authority Act of 1966, as amended; and still part of the public domain. It took note that
respondent Republic failed to present any evidence in support of its position.

However, the Court of Appeals proceeded to rule as follows:

[T]his does not necessarily mean that the application for registration of title would prosper. As pointed
out by [herein respondent Republic], [herein petitioner] failed to present any evidence regarding specific
acts of ownership to show compliance with the possessory requirements of the law. It is settled that a
claimant must present evidence as to acts taken regarding the subject parcel of land, which would show
ownership in fee simple and cannot offer merely general statements sans factual evidence of
 possession. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 693 [2000], the Supreme
Court held:

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and
that of its predecessors in interest. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership
to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements, which are mere
conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession of land consists
in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.

The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open,
adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly the
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. In other words, facts
constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence.

In the present case, [petitioner] merely showed that he bought the land, paid real estate taxes
and had it surveyed. Beyond these actions he failed to site (sic) any other act which he took regarding the
land such as cultivation, putting ways and boundaries to prove his claim of ownership.[28]

Consequently, the fallo of the 22 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro
Manila, Branch 74, in LRC Case No. 273 dated 10 June 2003 for registration of title is hereby REVERSED and
the application for registration is hereby DENIED.[29]

Records show that Atty. Nestor C. Beltran (Atty. Beltran), petitioners counsel in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705, received a
copy of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 February 2006 on 28 February 2006. Petitioner, thus, had until 15 March
2006 to file his Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision; yet, said Motion was filed only on 16 March 2006, or a
day late.Petitioner followed up by filing Manifestations dated 10 and 21 April 2006 begging the indulgence of the appellate
court to admit his Motion for Reconsideration, considering that the delayed filing thereof was a procedural lapse which
should be considered as excusable negligence, and which did not impair the rights of the respondent Republic.

The Court of Appeals was not persuaded. In its Resolution[30] dated 4 September 2006, the appellate court
reasoned:

To begin with, basic is the legal truism in this jurisdiction that any party seeking to reconsider a
judgment or final resolution must do so within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof (Section 1, Rule 52 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

The above rule is too elementary to even cause confusion upon any lawyer for that matter, unless
compelling reasons actually exist to justify the relaxation of the prescriptive period mandated by law
within which to file a motion for reconsideration.

Having thus established herein [herein petitioner]s Motion for Reconsideration was actually filed
beyond the reglementary period, the assailed Decision dated 22 February 2006 became final
and executory, thereby depriving this Court of any power to review, much more, modify or alter the
same. In Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Garrido, 374 SCRA 154 [2002], the Supreme Court ruled that:

The period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Appellate
Court is, therefore, correct in ruling that (t)he failure of the respondents to file their
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period renders the Decision sought
to be reconsidered final and executory, thereby depriving this Court the power to alter,
modify or reverse the same.

In his attempt to persuade this Court to act on his plea to admit his Motion for
Reconsideration with favor, herein [petitioner] posits:

It bears stressing once again that the undersigned got hold of the Notice of
Judgment on March 2, 2006 and the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on March 16,
2006, or on the 14th day from receipt thereof. Upon verification of the records of the case,
however, the undersigned counsel found out that the maid received the mail on February
28, 2006 but put the mail on its (sic) table only on March 2, 2006. The maid who received
 the mail earlier from the postman must have accidentally forgot to place the mail
immediately on the undersigned counsels table as time again instructed to her (Rollo, pp.
115-116; Underscoring supplied).

While a deviation from the mandated prescriptive period to file a motion for reconsideration has
been allowed so many times by the Highest Tribunal due to concrete, valid and compelling reasons,
however, this Court cannot really find its way to even give the slightest consideration to the reason
adverted to above by the [petitioner]. By any stretch of imagination, the afore-cited explanation offered
by the [petitioner] to substantiate his prayer for the admission of his Motion for Reconsideration does not
constitute as a justifiable reason as the same is essentially lame, if not down right preposterous.[31]

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioner]s plea for the admission of his Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Perfunctorily, NO ACTION will be taken by this Court on [herein
petitioner]s Motion for Reconsideration, the same having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[32]

Petitioner presently comes before this Court raising the following issues in his Petition:

1. Whether or not the gross negligence of petitioners counsel binds his client; and

2. Whether or not a decision based on a technicality of procedure is favored over a decision based on
the merits.[33]

In his Memorandum, petitioner, though, re-states and presents additional issues for resolution of the Court, viz:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of,
or in excess of, jurisdiction in refusing to consider that the cause of the delay in filing the Motion for
Reconsideration was due to excusable negligence, and in effect, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in reversing the Decision, dated June 10, 2003, of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 74, Taguig, Metro Manila.

3. Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development Authority acted with grave abuse of discretion
in declaring that the subject property cannot be appropriated or be subject of private ownership.

4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of, or excess of, jurisdiction for overlooking the evidence presented by the petitioner for his confirmation
of imperfect title and declaring that petitioner failed to prove specific acts of ownership for confirmation
of his title.

5. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to confirmation of title over the property subject matter
of this petition.[34]

The Court addresses foremost the procedural issue of whether petitioners Motion for Reconsideration should
have been admitted by the Court of Appeals, for the jurisdiction of this Court over the instant Petition and the other
substantive issues raised therein actually depends upon the resolution thereof.

Under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution within 15 days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.

There is no question that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 was filed one day
beyond the reglementary period for doing so. Atty. Beltran, petitioners former counsel, received notice and a copy of the
22 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals on 28 February 2006, and had only until 15 March 2006 to file
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration thereof. However, Atty. Beltran filed said Motion on 16 March 2006.

The 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.[35] Provisions of the Rules
of Court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken, are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
businesses. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.[36]

Indeed, there are cases where this Court allowed the liberal application of procedural rules, but these are
exceptions, sufficiently justified by meritorious and exceptional circumstances attendant therein. Not every entreaty for
relaxation of rules of procedure shall be so lightly granted by the Court for it will render such rules inutile. In Hon. Fortich v.
Hon. Corona,[37] the Court had the occasion to explain that:
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since
they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill
of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." The adjudicatory
bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. There have been some instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the
rules, but this flexibility was "never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity." A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.(Emphasis ours.)

Upon petitioner, thus, falls the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that cogent reasons exist herein
to excuse his non-compliance with the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately,
petitioner utterly failed in this regard.

Petitioner can only invoke the supposed excusable negligence of Atty. Beltran, his former counsel in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80705. Petitioner points out that his Motion for Reconsideration was dated and ready as of 12 March 2006, yet Atty.
Beltran was grossly negligent in filing said Motion only on 16 March 2006. For his part, Atty. Beltran manifested before
the appellate court that he filed petitioners Motion for Reconsideration a day late because his maid, who received the
notice and copy of the 22 February 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705, did not immediately place the same on his
desk.

A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer, otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit as long
as a new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent
or experienced or learned.[38] While it is true that excusable negligence is one of the recognized grounds for a motion for
new trial or reconsideration,[39] there can be no excusable negligence when ordinary prudence could have guarded against
it.[40]

The Court imposes upon the attorney the duty, to himself and to his clients, to invariably adopt a system whereby
he can be sure of receiving promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his address of record. The attorney must
so arrange matters that communications sent by mail, addressed to his office or residence, may reach him promptly.[41] In
earlier cases, the Court did not excuse a counsels tardiness in complying with reglementary periods for filing pleadings
attributed to the negligence of said counsels secretary[42] or clerk.[43] In the same light, the Court can neither sanction the
late filing by Atty. Beltran of the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 which he blamed on his maid, nor
free petitioner from the effect of Atty. Beltrans faux pas.

A petition for reconsideration on the ground of excusable negligence is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. This discretion can not be interfered with except in a clear case of abuse.[ 4 4 ] Taking into account all the
circumstances of the instant case, the Court finds no such abuse committed by the Court of Appeals in refusing to admit
and act on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration since the judgment subject of said Motion had already become final
upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of the same. At that point, the appellate court had already
lost jurisdiction over the case and the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the
judgment nor restore jurisdiction which had already been lost.[45]

That the Motion for Reconsideration was filed only a day late is of no moment. The Court had previously refused
to admit motions for reconsideration which were filed only one[46]or two[47] days late.

Without a motion for reconsideration of the 22 February 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 having been
timely filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner had also lost his right to appeal the said Decision to this Court. For
purposes of determining its timeliness, a motion for reconsideration may properly be treated as an appeal. As a step to
allow an inferior court to correct itself before review by a higher court, a motion for reconsideration must necessarily be
filed within the period to appeal. When filed beyond such period, the motion for reconsideration ipso facto forecloses the
right to appeal.[48]
 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, being filed beyond the reglementary period, did not toll the Decision
dated 22 February 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 from becoming final and executory. As such the
Decision is past appellate review and constitutes res judicata as to every matter offered and received in the proceedings
below as well as to any other matter admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose.[49]

The Court is without jurisdiction to modify, much less, reverse, a final and executory judgment. It has been
pronounced by the Court in Paramount Vinyl Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[50] that:

Well-settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary
period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or a motion for
reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the
appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42739, January 31,
1978, 81 SCRA 445; Volkshel Labor Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-39686, June 28, 1980, 98 SCRA 314; Acda v.
Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51607, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 306; Rizal Empire Insurance Group v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 73140, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 565; MAI Philippines Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73662, June 18,
1987, 151 SCRA 196; Narag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69628, October 28, 1987, 155 SCRA 199; John Clement
Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 72096, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 635; Bongay v. Martinez, G.R. No.
77188, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 552; Manuel L. Quezon University v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational
Institution, G.R. No. 82312, April 19, 1989, 172 SCRA 597]. This rule "is applicable indiscriminately to one
and all since the rule is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that
at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final at some definite date fixed by law" [Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, supra, at p. 322]. Although, in a
few instances, the Court has disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed
beyond the reglementary period (See Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 55971, February
28, 1985,135 SCRA 145; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, February 27, 1989, 148
SCRA 187; Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831], the Court did so
on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave
miscarriage thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the unjustified delay in the filing of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 is not just a procedural lapse, but also a jurisdictional defect which effectively prevents this Court
from taking cognizance of the Petition at bar.

Petitioner cannot claim that he has been deprived of due process. He was able to fully participate in the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705. The Court of Appeals actually took into consideration
petitioners evidence when it rendered its Decision dated 22 February 2006; only, it found that said evidence failed to
establish specific acts of ownership over the subject property in compliance with the possessory requirements of the law
for an imperfect title. Petitioner was not arbitrarily deprived of his right to file a motion for reconsideration of the Decision
dated 22 February 2006 of the Court of Appeals; petitioner failed to avail himself of such a remedy within the reglementary
period prescribed by law.

Moreover, even if, for the sake of argument, the Court can take cognizance of the present Petition in its appellate
jurisdiction, it would still deny the same for lack of merit.

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, specifically identifies the persons
who are entitled to the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title to the land, to wit

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (Emphasis ours.)
 It is true that petitioner was able to present testimonial evidence that his predecessors-in-interest had possessed
the land prior to 12 June 1945 or even earlier. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that also by petitioners own evidence,
particularly, the Certification dated 5 February 2002 issued by the Urban Forestry and Law Enforcement Unit of the DENR-
NCR, it has been established that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 3 January 1968 by virtue
of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141. It is already settled that any period of possession prior to the date when the
subject property was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been
classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[51]

It is also worthy to point out that petitioners insistence that the subject property and the other surrounding
properties are being used for residential purposes does not work in his favor, and even militates against him. Taken
together with the declaration, for realty tax purposes, by petitioner himself that the subject property is bamboo land, as
well as the claim of respondent LLDA that the same property is part of the Laguna Lake bed, there is an apparent and
unsettled confusion on the proper classification of the subject property.

The classification of the subject property is important for it determines the applicable statutory requirements and
procedures for the proper disposition thereof. Confirmation or legalization of an imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48, Title II of the Public Land Act, as amended, applies only to agricultural lands. Lands of the public domain for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes,[52] on the other hand, are governed by Sections 58 to 68, Title III of the
same statute. Without a definite classification of the subject property, there results reasonable doubt as to the appropriate
legal means for petitioner to acquire title to the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner
Roberto Y. Ponciano, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming
a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.
of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public
Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant
to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as
such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October
29, 1962;
 5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates
back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from
1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought
said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral
lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00)
Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the
land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by
the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the
townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors
of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels
for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to
the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17,
1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section
11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except
by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when
Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall
be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and
affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer
Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural
minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme,
as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any
provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in
1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was
already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration
proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other
hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of
facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which
is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed
by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the
Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the
ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public
land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title
to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due
course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand)
alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable
lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535,
July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in
1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-
becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment
of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but
certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would
be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
 grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming
the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable
to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had
a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in
the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and
their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there
can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to
which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then
extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution
which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
 xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in
the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt
or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as
simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935
or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the
letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the
basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from
the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again,
finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed
the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there
any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in
their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended
to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title
to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying
for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But
this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained,
with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in
the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no
precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that
the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public
land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is
hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to
the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26,
1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive
prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor,
whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write
this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the
public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by
a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other
person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in
the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his
application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and
adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as
well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to
adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when
the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of
alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate
of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to
and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis
of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024
hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption
that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial,
respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which
it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted
eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which
needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the
"policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to
recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and
record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December
31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31,
1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality
of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence,
i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation
of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly
sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I
dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a
juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the
approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and
possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that
the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing
spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the
procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated
his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they
were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed
and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically
and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot
do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers
on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions,
that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the
realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private
land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights
to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application
for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying
to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449;
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this
case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate
of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles,
and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
 and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the
original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein
provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply
for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section
11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction
adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat
the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative,
or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the
other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to
render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement
of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words
used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from
becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47;
cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take
is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that
policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and
related cases.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to
the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26,
1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive
prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor,
whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write
this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the
public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by
a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other
person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in
the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his
application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and
adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as
well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to
adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when
the Meralco decision was promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance
of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis
of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024
hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption
that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial,
respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which
it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted
eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which
needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the
"policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to
recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and
record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December
31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31,
1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality
of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence,
i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation
of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly
sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I
dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a
juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the
approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and
possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that
the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing
spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the
procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated
his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they
were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed
and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically
and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot
do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers
on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions,
that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the
realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private
land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights
to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application
for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying
to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449;
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this
case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate
of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles,
and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the
original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein
provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Emphasis supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply
for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section
11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction
adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat
the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative,
or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the
other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to
render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement
of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words
used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from
becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47;
cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take
is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that
policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and
related cases.
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

MORAN, C.J.:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the
registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied
by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko
then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court
rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.

There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire
residential land.

It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which
should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the
effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds.
There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is
unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds
if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a
constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade
the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different
considerations now to be stated.

According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal
after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs
been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for
withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in
this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration
all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to
obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly
defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-
appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the
Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why
appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now
immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular
and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations
and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our
conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful
consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full
advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before
this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and
very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court
to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a
permanent offense to the Constitution.

All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result
of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the
proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that
question.

Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
 corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the
public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization
of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes
mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said
three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial
decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical
meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal
profession.

As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several
sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for
timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs.Insular
Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.,
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect
to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be
classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:

Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted
with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily
be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances;
besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to
building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.

In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it
is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be,
the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and
jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as
referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed,
therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was
this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.

Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been
in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have
used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) AlsoCalder vs. Bull,
3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)

It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which
had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument.
If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have
been employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A.,
1918 E, 581.)

Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in
which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal
meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)

Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed
as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the
Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been
adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the
Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law
and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino
citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that
residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same
"public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and
for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning.
Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral.
This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands"
for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these
lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive
indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.

It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens
could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under
section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out,
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public
Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens,
but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not
sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion
of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative
construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.

Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the
Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the
phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include
residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and
crystal-clear opinion:

Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the
term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court
of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase
'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral
lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .

Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or
more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified
as agricultural.

Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the
character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In
other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods
which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).

Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person
if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.

This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this
Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated
in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p.
598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña
administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.

It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have always
maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands
include residential lots.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result
that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens'
hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above
indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore,
be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against
whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the
non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the
same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that
"a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention
appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5,
is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The
lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature
or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.

Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to
the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands
of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no
valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral
part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above,
the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally
applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more
important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals,
almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.

It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed
into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is
argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the
word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft
was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft,
unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1,
this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand,
section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under
section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural
lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural
land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with
a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural,
the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but
entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area
for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf
courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly
agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in
the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the
Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage
of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for
their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee
on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy
on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning
real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the
Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With
the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should
be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared
to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If
we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when
we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are
we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego
says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the
conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr.
Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the
Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he
allowed to own a pieace of land.

This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed
soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution,
there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by
way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations
organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any
interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while
the same are in force but not thereafter.

SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any
other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine
Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were
actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right
to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the
same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such
purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this
section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated
within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the
contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)

It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural,
residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided
in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could
be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands
the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the
right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141
was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:

SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations
organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.

SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal
order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public
lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the
 public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them
to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in
the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to
acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to
alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise,
such property shall revert to the Government.

These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that
in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform
to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional
Convention.

It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not,
however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been
formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits
the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real
property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part
in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private
lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale
of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the
constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the
Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been
deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden
by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not
within the constitutional prohibition.

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is
and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the
Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we
will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not
completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the
Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinion

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future generations
always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case would
have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or
unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long
patrimony of our people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for
unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform
lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the day arrive when our people
will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial moment of our history , when the vision of judicial
statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the
banner of our convictions for truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned
an impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people from a looming catastrophe.

On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision. The case was
initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied
for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house
thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a
Chinese, is not qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."

On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of Lands appealed. In the
brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of
Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised
but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment of error as follows:

The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who, according
to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.

The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos — who, while Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese — addressed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands.
The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the
several amici curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.

As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that is, six
years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court was
recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed in February, 1945,
during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor
General, filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be
submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3, 1946.

After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal question
as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming majority answered no.
But when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding
our efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the
uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our
opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The constitutional question was by-passed by the
majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the
main and only legal question upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost
exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that
in the next case in which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on the
question.

The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we deliberated on the
constitutional question for several days.

On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional question was
decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the
Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.

While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. On July 10, 1947,
appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing the rendering of the
majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important constitutional question as to whether aliens may
acquire urban lots in the Philippines.

Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its conformity to
the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at all. Would the Supreme
Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24, 1947?

Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether this Court should
abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after
more than six years during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the
same has failed to form a definite opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and and Mr.
Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr.
Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock
resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that
"where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied."
And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.

Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of casting
his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later, when all the members of the Court
were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would
have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven
votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.

But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration by the
register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one section of the press,
followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular
No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows:

TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or
association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for
registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)

"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands, or
any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national,
may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained
in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by those
who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion No. 284,
series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since
the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.

"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the
Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens
are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or
controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the
Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain."

ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:

Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is
transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the primary entry
book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied — unless and/or until otherwise
specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised
of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200
of the Revised Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition
contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and
123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.

The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and tense
deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29, 1947:

In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the appellant filed
a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the matter
specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado,
Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
 Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was
consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be
asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the
Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the motion
to withdraw is considered denied.

Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of
seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.

Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has voted once
on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be present
at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to
4. Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2
of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the majority
to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the resolution of the motion for
withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.

Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition to
withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices
voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then, according to the rules,
the petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to
by Mr. Justice Padilla.

Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were
granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the
same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were present.
The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice
Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about one month
afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to
5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence,
was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he changed
his mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration
nor a previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every
reason to believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting
should, if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the vote for the allowance
of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been denied on grounds of pure
technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal.

The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings and
why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote on the
question.

Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it became moot
in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or
unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of an important constitutional
question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration. We did not want to entertain
any obstruction to the promulgation of our decision.

If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of this Supreme
Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of
the members of this Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded
from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that
sense on February 24, 1947.

The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest. The
uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt among the people as to what is
the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be uneasiness, undermining public morale and
leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct
answer is, and should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the
Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people may
know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most cherished
treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a new one. The long
chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest
pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the
Tigris and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the
achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and German colonial empires,
had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa
and paid, for his daring enterprises, with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.

Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to defend
the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First came the
Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of
land. Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt
their greed whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the
uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience, resignation, humility, and
credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with
the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern
civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through
the practice of confession and other means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were
able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal
bliss of heaven, renounced all their property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies
or other apparently religious purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed
estates were formed, and under the system unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just
an index of the situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution
not only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.

Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the
fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be disputed in
a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars,
thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the
guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety
and survival.

When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be needed and our
people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the
Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a case, like the one
now before us.

One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it "shall
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all departments and branches of our
government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so
as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most
important of our natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional
amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession — the only exception
allowed by the Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That
was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the
great majority of the Delegates, that was the dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great
document, that was what the Committee on Style — the drafter of the final text — has written in the Constitution, and
that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally
Japanized Davao.

The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be overemphasized.
If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and registered in the name of
alien purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification
may create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective lesson upon
which we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under
the Throne," we quote the following:

It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock
example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The
1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was
the greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature
repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had completed the
deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had bought, and their
 title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of
Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was
void under the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.

But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had bought
fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a
friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it
appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in
his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that Marshall
rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest proofs of his greatness. A
weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may
be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial
diffidence on state occasions.

We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal technicalities
the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had fallen into American
hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should
fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates
to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.

We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or
residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since
the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty
bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition
as laid down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all violations which may
have taken place should be corrected.

We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino citizen, could
not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate,
Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we
affirm.

HILADO, J., concurring:

Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of appellee,
indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I ultimately voted to grant the motion
after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided,
and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The resolution to deny was
adopted in the exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the
withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when appellee's brief has
been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have concurred in an opinion or resolution, the decision
or determination rendered is the decision or determination of the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion
to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally
divided in opinion, such a motion "shall be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the
merits.

After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government like ours that I have
always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide
the constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the three coordinate, co-equal and independent
departments should be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of
each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence in each department
must be striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence will in the same measure
take away from the very usefulness of the respective department to the people. For this reason, I believe that we should
avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this Court.

I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice, was issued in
good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already
amended, to the effect that private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed
included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time
when the self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should this Court
refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate, the people may see
in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty, peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a
momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion, given in advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department.
This will naturally detract in no small degree from public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of
course, none of us — the other governmental departments included — would desire such a situation to ensue.

I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here presented,
namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential
lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision.

With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief Justice, I
have signed said decision.

We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect that
"the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part
of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands
and natural resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and
the terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands",
under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he
was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was made in connection with the
national policy on agricultural lands; (3) the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate
Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include
urban propeties. Neither are we bound to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections)
of the Justices who were members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of
Delegate Sotto.

The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is surely not controlling,
because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it was expressly held that the phrase
"agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands," — the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and
after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is
the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations
for the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that
is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural
land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
(Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)

The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the approval of the
Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions
of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance,
royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public
domain." (Section 123.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by said
Act." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said sections refer to lands
originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which
of course do not include lands not originally of the public domain. The lands that may be acquired under Act No. 141
necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition
under the Constitution. Hence, even if they become private, said lands retained their original agricultural character and
may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and
implement the constitutional objective. In the case before us, however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the
appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein.

The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public Land Act No. 2874
aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and
under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken
out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of
the Public Land Act No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may
only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purpose
referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the approval of the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter
(public agricultural land, which includes public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to
consider said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already
of private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution.
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government — Judicial, Legislative and
Executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber,
and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our position. While the
construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private
residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us
particularize in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion,
limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain . . . must be
classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the following subsequent
opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in
section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners,
the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable."

This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the Register of
Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this Department
quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among others, that the phrase "public agricultural land"
in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial
or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch
of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code
which holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.

There is no conflict between the two opinions.

Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public agricultural
lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential
lot is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly
Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the
public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly
Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that
residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners
of public agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public
domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly
Article XII) governs.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in favor
of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions formerly in force
in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming
that of the Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was
held that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During
theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines contained an almost verbatim
reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or
juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not
agricultural lands) including buildings and other improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal
succession of proper cases, unless authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497,
February,1944.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it
cannot have any persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department
pending judicial determination of the question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect
the opinion of his Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous
transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any
opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the majority believe, our Government
has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution.

I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself to be blinded
by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to any of its provisions a
construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to convey. We need not express any
unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens, as long as we have
faith in our independence and in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by
Congressional action.
There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the conformity of the
appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should have been granted outright. In Co
Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should
not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised
by the the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a court will always avoid a
constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action was not only possible but absolutely
imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there might be some reasons for its
denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be
allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal
where a constitutional question will thereby be avoided.

In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason) that led to teh
denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven members were present, seven voted
to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the
matter was again submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand,
with the result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under the
technicality provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who
was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted
for the granting of the motion. The real explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for
the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in the
majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for
registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by this
Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander
A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued
while this case was pending before this Court." The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open
to question. The denial of course is another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had
connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose
of the national patrimony in favor of aliens.

In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to issue any
circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the appellant to take advantage thereof.
What is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot
be as patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. If the circular in question is objectionable, the same
can be said of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of private
residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43
Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a
residential lot and register it in his name," and notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in
favor of the alien applicant and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had
renderd in 1943 a decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to evade the only
issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on
the constitutional question resolved in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the
majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the
circular of the Department of Justice which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse
of the majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of today might
signify a permanent offense to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a
monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of
the impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the
constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not
worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional question,
because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the parties
have already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the recent newspaper discussion which
naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there will be those who will dispute their sales of residential lots
in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional prohibition.

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition. Both parties having
agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to give advice
to other person who might be interested to give advice to other persons who might be interested to know the validity or
invalidity of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. It must be
remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from passing on constitutional question
arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not
established, nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other Government departments, with the
obligation to seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the constitutional
mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has interpreted the
fundamental law, no case will ever arise before the court, because the registers of deeds under his command, will transfer
on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite
views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or creditors of the seller — may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens,
invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides
we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough that briefs — as in this case — have been filed; it is desirable,
perhaps essential, to make sure that in a motion for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall
be invited to points inadequately touched or improperly considered.

It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales will be subject to the
final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity out of the existence of such conveyances,
might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And
yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one
questioned their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for such
transfers.

The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the conflicting politico-
economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international cooperation, and vice-versa. We
could also delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:

(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners at the time of
its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should become landowners after the approval of the
Constitution;7

(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the United Nations
Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds; and

(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the United States and
Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the United States? If
so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty during the existence of the Commonwealth Government?

The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the parties, and for
withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to cast my vote. I am convinced that
the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood — not including residential,
commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice
Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the
prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying it; whereas a liberal
and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly expensive process of a constitutional
amendment.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended for residence
may be alienated or sold to an alien.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is included in the
term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands
of private ownership suitable for residence are included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or
sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds
that urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority
overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the term "public agricultural
land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known
as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands of the public domain were classified into agricultural, timber and mineral. The only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the
public domain suitable for residence, which was neither timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless
classified as public agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not
the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as
foreshore lands, which would hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159,
167-168), and yet the same come under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of
land of the public domain suitable for residence are included in the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe
guide or index of what the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is
contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or
ordinary meaning as understood by he average citizen.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act No. 2874. Under
this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations or associations described in section
23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire
the public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act
No. 2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:

No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may
acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial
or residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any
permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided, however, That
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect, hold
agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used for industrial or residence purposes, that
belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or
a real right upon such lands and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force
at the date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey,
or alienate the same to persons, corporations, associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three
of this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:

Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation,
or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . Provided further, That
any person, corporation, association, or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural
purposes under the provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial
or residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued for the purposes
referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 121 of the Act provides:

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with
regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on
such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may
acquire land of the public domain under this Act; . . . Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized
by competent Courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while
used for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that were neither timber
nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase
or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were
familiar with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to
disqualified persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial
or residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act,
lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In
spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it
necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence
purposes. It adopted the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for
residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with timber, mineral and private
agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years — from 1919
to 1935. There is nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which
would have justified a departure from the policy theretofore adopted.

If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase or lease lands of
the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, how can it be presumed
that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for
industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of
the public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were not included in
the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for believing that the framers of the
Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in force, did not have the intention of applying the prohibition contained
in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, there
being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which, as above
stated, would have justified a departure from the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends
lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of
implementing a self-executory prohibition found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in
section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution
does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. The term "private agricultural
land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the raising of agricultural products, and does not include
urban lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has
the effect of excluding all other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included
among the excluded, because these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land grants known
as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13
February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No.
141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No. 2874, did not change the
meaning of the term "private agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the
people that adopted it.

The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the Register of Deeds of
Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien.

There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant —
whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a private land that had never been
a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866).
If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section
123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat —

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal
decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos
baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain,
or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain
under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: . . .

is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section unconstitutional, for it
violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs.Ramirez,
40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also
be declared unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the
one infringed upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress to
prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid offending against the
constitutional provision referred to above.

Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of the case, despite
the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If discretion was to be exercised, this Court
did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such
questions are raised may be decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional
question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co
Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of
the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming
within their jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless
they cannot be deprived of such power. Of course, the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional
provision must come from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct
interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the
understanding of such provision by the poeple that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which
embodies what its framers had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The
eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the
withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other
coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all
the members of the Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that
eagerness might be justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon such
provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the
constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the course
of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an amendment to the
Constitution — a costly process — would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for
the withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question. It
would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom, foresight and patriotism. They,
too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive possession of the members of this Court. The end
sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law. And if the law
should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment or repeal would not be as costly a process as a
constitutional amendment.

In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and consented to by
the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under
review should be reversed.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the Constitution as we see
it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the
name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their
opinion. As it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed what according to our
humble understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal result. The
denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave his conformity collides with
the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:

5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in this section? Before
answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions
as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law authors.

It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to give effect
to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the
apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where the assumption
would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)

Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the
context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical
or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the
exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature founded on the
common business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common
understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with
the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary
gloss. (1 Story, Const. sec. 451.)

Marshall , Ch. J., says:

The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have employed words
in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law.
ed., 23).
 Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for construction
where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read
into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade
the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at
liberty to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.)

There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal interpretation of the
words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no technical meaning, and the same could
not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is understood by the men in the street.

That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the sovereign.
And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth
which no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution,
by necessary implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property. The express mention of one thing
excludes all others of the same kind.

Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see what lands do
not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international Dictionary defines this word as
"of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural implements,
wages, etc." According to this definition and according to the popular conception of the word, lands in cities and towns
intended or used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They are either
residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided into residential, commercial and
industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional
Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as agricultural land.

If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under consideration will dispel all
doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as properties that may be assigned to
foreigners.

Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the committee on
nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report recommended the incorporation into
the Constitution of the following provision:

SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the
owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned
by persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this Constitution to acquire or
hold lands in the Philippine Islands.

In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of seven embodied
the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee on agricultural development,
national defense, industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources:

SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by
the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.

But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n General
Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the committee in consultation with President
Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned
by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.)

The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in the
phraseology.

It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the Constitution
all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private ownership without regard to its nature
or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before
the word "land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition
to agricultural lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural character.
The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating any possibility that its implication
was not comprehended.

In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's decision
are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the premises.

According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope of the provision.
It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid
uncertainties."

If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of messing up and
obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties,"
the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land" produced the exact opposite of the result which the change
was expected to accomplish — as witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they
let well enough alone.

But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as "merely
one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by sound principles of construction.
There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional Convention, which was guided by wise men, men
of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after
consultation with the President, without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation. "We are not at liberty
to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language."
(People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors
made the change with intention that it should not operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of
drawing logical inferences. The theory is against the presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a
constitution "have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of
the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.)
"As men, whose intention require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the
ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must
be understood to have employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said."
(Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)

When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally proposed, the prohibition
was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other lands may be
acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men of average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the
Constitutional Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct
from another. It is from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule
of interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.

If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land or mineral land,
or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only be residential,
commercial, industrial or other lands that are not agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the
owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be
decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.

The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for home building are
considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential, commercial or industrial lands should be
considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind
when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical
meaning then prevailing."

As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The classification of public lands
was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively
made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which
were not forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the
nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came up for construction,
will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public lands.

In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple and manifest
reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands — agricultural — can find their way into the
hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting
what is possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained
patents or titles, it would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves will not admit that
the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the conveyance of private forests and
mines.

In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in view. Classification
of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose principally of segregating lands that may
be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1, 1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands
of the public domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes
to the end that natural resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands
may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant preoccupation.
These are important parts of the country's natural resources. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the
category of natural resources. Natural resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or
produced by nature. The United States Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands.

It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above mentioned was an organic
law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a Congress whose members were not closely
familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words
in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions.
"The United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration, exploitation,
and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local authorities and courts entrusted
with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.

It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered small parcels of
public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the Congress had not bothered itself to
mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public
lands that were fit for residential purposes, public swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral,
were to be regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law or
constitution, and this Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural lands
and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that for the purpose of judging their
alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the class of agricultural lands.

On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim. This Court is not
now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such as faced it when the question of
determining the character of public residential land came up for decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a private
residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the position where it found
itself with reference to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public residential lands,
agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to
compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in
question. Since there are no private timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be transferred to
foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws
covering public lands, we have to have different standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this
constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective. When a private non-agricultural land demands to know
where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether
it is within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.

The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the special considerations
which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups, there is no alternative but to take the term
"agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which
involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land
is specified in section 5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other
than agriculture.

It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law, Justice Story
and Professor Cooley:

"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution.
Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well
observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one connection in the
Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This
would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole
clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the
Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and
harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite theory
of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They
have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their
purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and
crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many
instances where, in the National Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So
that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a
different intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)

As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that the Constitution
has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. If a technical import has been affixed
to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge
that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never
held. While in the construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have acquired,
the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting
them." To give an example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by
that designation; the meaning of the phrase having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so
familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality,
this is not a departure from the general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular
mind, "for the technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the
words in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a
technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and even among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the
decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures
than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional Assembly.

The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The sentiments expressed in
those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the
first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway
for reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the
intention of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5 of Article
XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all lands, without exception,
offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the change was not "merely one of words" but
represented something real and substantial. Firm and resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong,
unequivocal and unqualified language. This is specially true when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and
deliberate of human writings, always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance."

The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the principles
underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests and other natural resources
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all
lands without exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which
the statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an expression that "lies
but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, and every one knows we don't.

The decision says:

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad
and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands
that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly
agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public
agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution."

If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble opinion is that
there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What to me seems clearly to emerge from it is
that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built
upon the foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and
the inexistence of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No. 141, section 9,
classifies disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And these are lands of the public
domain.
The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII, which is entitled
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public lands and private lands on the same
footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural
resources. But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense
these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which
prompted the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with reasons, of foreign
policy, economics and politics.

From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any comfort unless we cling to
the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that opinion the question propounded was whether a
piece of public land which was more profitable as a homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. The
illustrious Secretary answered yes, which was correct. But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly
involved. It is the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the law-
officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority say but which I doubt, as
representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If
the Solicitor General's attitude as interested counsel for the government in a judicial action is — as the decision also
suggests but which, I think, is still more incorrect both in theory and in practice — then this Court should have given heed
to the motion for withdrawal of the present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line
presumably with the opinion of the head of his department.

The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons
that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123
of Act No. 141 should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent private
lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in fee simple. Without
this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and
residential lands are synonymous, be they public or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only
lands which are not agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens.

Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII.
Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under its provisions or under the
provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines
with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature, whose interpretation
the majority correctly say should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the
Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.

The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jeepney
for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land." There is no similitude
between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a
jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. A foreigner is not barred from owning the
costliest motor cars, steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He can
not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals, and the operation of a
jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class
of industry that performs a vital function in the country's economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization,
supplying needs so fundamental for communal living and for the development of the country's economy, that the
government finds need of subjecting them to some measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit
their operation by Filipino citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as
a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it
would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or scene of the nation.

This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural lands' is
to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result will be that aliens may freely acquire
and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and
that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses, playgrounds, airfields and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments like this have no place where
there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and
certain simply because its enforcement would work inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious
results. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience or consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of
constitutional government and is so well known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General dread, we should
not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if and when the
menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private
non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such
transfer, to define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for which lands
may be dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses,
cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the country or settling here.
If I may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted
precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political departments of the Government the regulation
or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions
demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all
private lands, as Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced
proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not
carry such prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely agree with the majority, should
be given serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because
it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special
emphasis on the fact that "many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been
members of the Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the bills I have
referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the Constitutional Convention

Footnotes

JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, its Chairman and
Members; ASSET PRIVATIZATIONTRUST and PHILYARDS HOLDINGS, INC., respondents.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
The core issue posed by the Motions for Reconsideration is whether a shipyard is a public utility whose capitalization
must be sixty percent (60%) owned by Filipinos. Our resolution of this issue will determine the fate of the shipbuilding and
ship repair industry. It can either spell the industrys demise or breathe new life to the struggling but potentially healthy
partner in the countrys bid for economic growth. It can either kill an initiative yet in its infancy, or harness creativity in the
productive disposition of government assets.
The facts are undisputed and can be summarized briefly as follows:
On January 27, 1977, the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation,
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) for the
construction, operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc. (SNS) which subsequently became the
Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, the NIDC and KAWASAKI will contribute P330
million for the capitalization of PHILSECO in the proportion of 60%-40% respectively.[1] One of its salient features is the
grant to the parties of the right of first refusal should either of them decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the
joint venture, viz:

1.4 Neither party shall sell, transfer or assign all or any part of its interest in SNS [PHILSECO] to any third party without
giving the other under the same terms the right of first refusal. This provision shall not apply if the transferee is a
corporation owned or controlled by the GOVERNMENT or by a KAWASAKI affiliate.[2]
On November 25, 1986, NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). Such interests were subsequently transferred to the National Government pursuant to Administrative Order No.
14. On December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the Committee on
Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take title to, and possession of, conserve, manage and dispose
of non-performing assets of the National Government. Thereafter, on February 27, 1987, a trust agreement was entered
into between the National Government and the APT wherein the latter was named the trustee of the National
Governments share in PHILSECO. In 1989, as a result of a quasi-reorganization of PHILSECO to settle its huge obligations
to PNB, the National Governments shareholdings in PHILSECO increased to 97.41% thereby reducing KAWASAKIs
shareholdings to 2.59%.[3]
In the interest of the national economy and the government, the COP and the APT deemed it best to sell the National
Governments share in PHILSECO to private entities. After a series of negotiations between the APT and KAWASAKI, they
agreed that the latters right of first refusal under the JVA be exchanged for the right to top by five percent (5%) the highest
bid for the said shares. They further agreed that KAWASAKI would be entitled to name a company in which it was a
stockholder, which could exercise the right to top. On September 7, 1990, KAWASAKI informed APT that Philyards
Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right to top.[4]
 At the pre-bidding conference held on September 18, 1993, interested bidders were given copies of the JVA between
NIDC and KAWASAKI, and of the Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the National Governments 87.6% equity
share in PHILSECO.[5] The provisions of the ASBR were explained to the interested bidders who were notified that the
bidding would be held on December 2, 1993. A portion of the ASBR reads:

1.0 The subject of this Asset Privatization Trust (APT) sale through public bidding is the National Governments equity in
PHILSECO consisting of 896,869,942 shares of stock (representing 87.67% of PHILSECOs outstanding capital stock), which
will be sold as a whole block in accordance with the rules herein enumerated.

...

2.0 The highest bid, as well as the buyer, shall be subject to the final approval of both the APT Board of Trustees and the
Committee on Privatization (COP).

2.1 APT reserves the right in its sole discretion, to reject any or all bids.

3.0 This public bidding shall be on an Indicative Price Bidding basis. The Indicative price set for the National Governments
87.67% equity in PHILSECO is PESOS: ONE BILLION THREE HUNDRED MILLION (P1,300,000,000.00).

...

6.0 The highest qualified bid will be submitted to the APT Board of Trustees at its regular meeting following the bidding,
for the purpose of determining whether or not it should be endorsed by the APT Board of Trustees to the COP, and the
latter approves the same. The APT shall advise Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or its nominee, Philyards Holdings,
Inc., that the highest bid is acceptable to the National Government. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards
Holdings, Inc. shall then have a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of such advice from APT within
which to exercise their Option to Top the Highest Bid by offering a bid equivalent to the highest bid plus five (5%) percent
thereof.

6.1 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. exercise their Option to Top the Highest Bid,
they shall so notify the APT about such exercise of their option and deposit with APT the amount equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the highest bid plus five percent (5%) thereof within the thirty (30)-day period mentioned in paragraph 6.0 above.
APT will then serve notice upon Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. declaring them as the
preferred bidder and they shall have a period of ninety (90) days from the receipt of the APTs notice within which to pay
the balance of their bid price.

6.2 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. fail to exercise their Option to Top the Highest
Bid within the thirty (30)-day period, APT will declare the highest bidder as the winning bidder.

...

12.0 The bidder shall be solely responsible for examining with appropriate care these rules, the official bid forms, including
any addenda or amendments thereto issued during the bidding period. The bidder shall likewise be responsible for
informing itself with respect to any and all conditions concerning the PHILSECO Shares which may, in any manner, affect
the bidders proposal. Failure on the part of the bidder to so examine and inform itself shall be its sole risk and no relief
for error or omission will be given by APT or COP. . ..[6]
At the public bidding on the said date, petitioner J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc. submitted a bid of Two Billion and Thirty
Million Pesos (P2,030,000,000.00) with an acknowledgement of KAWASAKI/Philyards right to top, viz:

4. I/We understand that the Committee on Privatization (COP) has up to thirty (30) days to act on APTs recommendation
based on the result of this bidding. Should the COP approve the highest bid, APT shall advise Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
Inc. and/or its nominee, Philyards Holdings, Inc. that the highest bid is acceptable to the National Government. Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. shall then have a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of
receipt of such advice from APT within which to exercise their Option to Top the Highest Bid by offering a bid equivalent
to the highest bid plus five (5%) percent thereof.[7]
As petitioner was declared the highest bidder, the COP approved the sale on December 3, 1993 subject to the right
of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc./Philyards Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMIs bid by 5% as specified in the bidding rules.[8]
On December 29, 1993, petitioner informed APT that it was protesting the offer of PHI to top its bid on the grounds
that: (a) the KAWASAKI/PHI consortium composed of Kawasaki, Philyards, Mitsui, Keppel, SM Group, ICTSI and Insular Life
violated the ASBR because the last four (4) companies were the losing bidders thereby circumventing the law and
prejudicing the weak winning bidder; (b) only KAWASAKI could exercise the right to top; (c) giving the same option to top
to PHI constituted unwarranted benefit to a third party; (d) no right of first refusal can be exercised in a public bidding or
auction sale; and (e) the JG Summit consortium was not estopped from questioning the proceedings.[9]
On February 2, 1994, petitioner was notified that PHI had fully paid the balance of the purchase price of the subject
bidding. On February 7, 1994, the APT notified petitioner that PHI had exercised its option to top the highest bid and that
the COP had approved the same on January 6, 1994. On February 24, 1994, the APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase
Agreement.[10]Consequently, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus under G.R. No. 114057. On May 11,
1994, said petition was referred to the Court of Appeals. On July 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack
of merit. It ruled that the petition for mandamus was not the proper remedy to question the constitutionality or legality
of the right of first refusal and the right to top that was exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI, and that the matter must be brought
by the proper party in the proper forum at the proper time and threshed out in a full blown trial. The Court of Appeals
further ruled that the right of first refusal and the right to top are prima facie legal and that the petitioner, by participating
in the public bidding, with full knowledge of the right to top granted to KASAWASAKI/Philyards is . . .estopped from
questioning the validity of the award given to Philyards after the latter exercised the right to top and had paid in full the
purchase price of the subject shares, pursuant to the ASBR. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision
which was denied on March 15, 1996. Petitioner thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court.[11]
On November 20, 2000, this Court rendered the now assailed Decision ruling among others that the Court of Appeals
erred when it dismissed the petition on the sole ground of the impropriety of the special civil action of mandamus because
the petition was also one of certiorari.[12] It further ruled that a shipyard like PHILSECO is a public utility whose
capitalization must be sixty percent (60%) Filipino-owned.[13] Consequently, the right to top granted to KAWASAKI under
the Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the sale of the 87.67% equity of the National Government in PHILSECO
is illegal---not only because it violates the rules on competitive bidding--- but more so, because it allows foreign
corporations to own more than 40% equity in the shipyard.[14] It also held that although the petitioner had the opportunity
to examine the ASBR before it participated in the bidding, it cannot be estopped from questioning the unconstitutional,
illegal and inequitable provisions thereof.[15] Thus, this Court voided the transfer of the national governments 87.67%
share in PHILSECO to Philyard Holdings, Inc., and upheld the right of JG Summit, as the highest bidder, to take title to the
said shares, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to pay to APT its bid price of Two Billion Thirty Million Pesos
(P2,030,000,000.00 ), less its bid deposit plus interests upon the finality of this Decision. In turn, APT is ordered to:

(a) accept the said amount of P2,030,000,000.00 less bid deposit and interests from petitioner;

(b) execute a Stock Purchase Agreement with petitioner;

(c) cause the issuance in favor of petitioner of the certificates of stocks representing 87.6% of PHILSECOs
total capitalization;

(d) return to private respondent PHGI the amount of Two Billion One Hundred Thirty-One Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,131,500,000.00); and

(e) cause the cancellation of the stock certificates issued to PHI.

SO ORDERED.[16]
In separate Motions for Reconsideration,[17] respondents submit three basic issues for our resolution: (1) Whether
PHILSECO is a public utility; (2) Whether under the 1977 JVA, KAWASAKI can exercise its right of first refusal only up to
40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO; and (3) Whether the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles
of competitive bidding.

I.
Whether PHILSECO is a Public Utility.
After carefully reviewing the applicable laws and jurisprudence, we hold that PHILSECO is not a public utility for the
following reasons:
First. By nature, a shipyard is not a public utility.
A public utility is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of
public consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph service.[18] To constitute a public
utility, the facility must be necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation of the residents. However, the fact that
a business offers services or goods that promote public good and serve the interest of the public does not automatically
make it a public utility. Public use is not synonymous with public interest. As its name indicates, the term public utility
implies public use and service to the public. The principal determinative characteristic of a public utility is that of service
to, or readiness to serve, an indefinite public or portion of the public as such which has a legal right to demand and receive
its services or commodities. Stated otherwise, the owner or person in control of a public utility must have devoted it to
such use that the public generally or that part of the public which has been served and has accepted the service, has the
right to demand that use or service so long as it is continued, with reasonable efficiency and under proper
charges.[19] Unlike a private enterprise which independently determines whom it will serve, a public utility holds out
generally and may not refuse legitimate demand for service.[20] Thus, in Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Public Utility
Board,[21] this Court defined public use, viz:

Public use means the same as use by the public. The essential feature of the public use is that it is not confined to privileged
individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its public character.
In determining whether a use is public, we must look not only to the character of the business to be done, but also to the
proposed mode of doing it. If the use is merely optional with the owners, or the public benefit is merely incidental, it is
not a public use, authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction of the public utility commission. There must be, in general, a right
which the law compels the owner to give to the general public. It is not enough that the general prosperity of the public
is promoted. Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The true criterion by which to judge the character of the
use is whether the public may enjoy it by right or only by permission. [22] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the criterion laid down in Iloilo to the case at bar, it is crystal clear that a shipyard cannot be considered a
public utility.
A shipyard is a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired.[23] Its nature dictates that it serves but a limited
clientele whom it may choose to serve at its discretion. While it offers its facilities to whoever may wish to avail of its
services, a shipyard is not legally obliged to render its services indiscriminately to the public. It has no legal obligation to
render the services sought by each and every client. The fact that it publicly offers its services does not give the public a
legal right to demand that such services be rendered.
There can be no disagreement that the shipbuilding and ship repair industry is imbued with public interest as it
involves the maintenance of the seaworthiness of vessels dedicated to the transportation of either persons or goods.
Nevertheless, the fact that a business is affected with public interest does not imply that it is under a duty to serve the
public. While the business may be regulated for public good, the regulation cannot justify the classification of a purely
private enterprise as a public utility. The legislature cannot, by its mere declaration, make something a public utility which
is not in fact such; and a private business operated under private contracts with selected customers and not devoted to
public use cannot, by legislative fiat or by order of a public service commission, be declared a public utility, since that
would be taking private property for public use without just compensation, which cannot be done consistently with the
due process clause.[24]
It is worthy to note that automobile and aircraft manufacturers, which are of similar nature to shipyards, are not
considered public utilities despite the fact that their operations greatly impact on land and air transportation. The reason
is simple. Unlike commodities or services traditionally regarded as public utilities such as electricity, gas, water,
transportation, telephone or telegraph service, automobile and aircraft manufacturing---and for that matter ship building
and ship repair--- serve the public only incidentally.
Second. There is no law declaring a shipyard as a public utility.
History provides us hindsight and hindsight ought to give us a better view of the intent of any law. The succession of
laws affecting the status of shipyards ought not to obliterate, but rather, give us full picture of the intent of the legislature.
The totality of the circumstances, including the contemporaneous interpretation accorded by the administrative bodies
tasked with the enforcement of the law all lead to a singular conclusion: that shipyards are not public utilities.
Since the enactment of Act No. 2307 which created the Public Utility Commission (PUC) until its repeal by
Commonwealth Act No. 146, establishing the Public Service Commission (PSC), a shipyard, by legislative declaration, has
been considered a public utility.[25] A Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) from the PSC to the effect that the operation
of the said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner
is required before any person or corporation may operate a shipyard.[26] In addition, such persons or corporations should
abide by the citizenship requirement provided in Article XIII, section 8 of the 1935 Constitution,[27] viz:

Sec. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form or authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the
Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be
granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. (emphasis supplied)
To accelerate the development of shipbuilding and ship repair industry, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
P.D. No. 666 granting the following incentives:
SECTION 1. Shipbuilding and ship repair yards duly registered with the Maritime Industry Authority shall be entitled to the
following incentive benefits:

(a) Exemption from import duties and taxes.- The importation of machinery, equipment and materials for shipbuilding,
ship repair and/or alteration, including indirect import, as well as replacement and spare parts for the repair and overhaul
of vessels such as steel plates, electrical machinery and electronic parts, shall be exempt from the payment of customs
duty and compensating tax: Provided, however, That the Maritime Industry Authority certifies that the item or items
imported are not produced locally in sufficient quantity and acceptable quality at reasonable prices, and that the
importation is directly and actually needed and will be used exclusively for the construction, repair, alteration, or overhaul
of merchant vessels, and other watercrafts; Provided, further, That if the above machinery, equipment, materials and
spare parts are sold to non-tax exempt persons or entities, the corresponding duties and taxes shall be paid by the original
importer; Provided, finally, That local dealers and/or agents who sell machinery, equipment, materials and accessories to
shipyards for shipbuilding and ship repair are entitled to tax credits, subject to approval by the total tariff duties and
compensating tax paid for said machinery, equipment, materials and accessories.

(b) Accelerated depreciation.- Industrial plant and equipment may, at the option of the shipbuilder and ship repairer, be
depreciated for any number of years between five years and expected economic life.

(c) Exemption from contractors percentage tax.- The gross receipts derived by shipbuilders and ship repairers from
shipbuilding and ship repairing activities shall be exempt from the Contractors Tax provided in Section 91 of the National
Internal Revenue Code during the first ten years from registration with the Maritime Industry Authority, provided that
such registration is effected not later than the year 1990; Provided, That any and all amounts which would otherwise have
been paid as contractors tax shall be set aside as a separate fund, to be known as Shipyard Development Fund, by the
contractor for the purpose of expansion, modernization and/or improvement of the contractors own shipbuilding or ship
repairing facilities; Provided, That, for this purpose, the contractor shall submit an annual statement of its receipts to the
Maritime Industry Authority; and Provided, further, That any disbursement from such fund for any of the purposes
hereinabove stated shall be subject to approval by the Maritime Industry Authority.
In addition, P.D. No. 666 removed the shipbuilding and ship repair industry from the list of public utilities, thereby
freeing the industry from the 60% citizenship requirement under the Constitution and from the need to obtain Certificate
of Public Convenience pursuant to section 15 of C.A No. 146. Section 1 (d) of P.D. 666 reads:

(d) Registration required but not as a Public Utility.- The business of constructing and repairing vessels or parts thereof
shall not be considered a public utility and no Certificate of Public Convenience shall be required therefor. However, no
shipyard, graving dock, marine railway or marine repair shop and no person or enterprise shall engage in construction
and/or repair of any vessel, or any phase or part thereof, without a valid Certificate of Registration and license for this
purpose from the Maritime Industry Authority, except those owned or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or by foreign governments pursuant to a treaty or agreement. (emphasis supplied)
Any law, decree, executive order, or rules and regulations inconsistent with P.D. No. 666 were repealed or modified
accordingly.[28] Consequently, sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146 were repealed in so far as the former law included
shipyards in the list of public utilities and required the certificate of public convenience for their operation. Simply stated,
the repeal was due to irreconcilable inconsistency, and by definition, this kind of repeal falls under the category of an
implied repeal.[29]
On April 28, 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 391, also known as the Investment Incentive Policy Act of 1983, was enacted.
It laid down the general policy of the government to encourage private domestic and foreign investments in the various
sectors of the economy, to wit:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Investment Policy.- It is the policy of the State to encourage private domestic and foreign investments
in industry, agriculture, mining and other sectors of the economy which shall: provide significant employment
opportunities relative to the amount of the capital being invested; increase productivity of the land, minerals, forestry,
aquatic and other resources of the country, and improve utilization of the products thereof; improve technical skills of the
people employed in the enterprise; provide a foundation for the future development of the economy; accelerate
development of less developed regions of the country; and result in increased volume and value of exports for the
economy.

It is the policy of the State to extend to projects which will significantly contribute to the attainment of these
objectives, fiscal incentives without which said projects may not be established in the locales, number and/or pace
required for optimum national economic development. Fiscal incentive systems shall be devised to compensate for
market imperfections, reward performance of making contributions to economic development, cost-efficient and be
simple to administer.
The fiscal incentives shall be extended to stimulate establishment and assist initial operations of the enterprise, and shall
terminate after a period of not more than 10 years from registration or start-up of operation unless a special period is
otherwise stated.

The foregoing declaration shall apply to all investment incentive schemes and in particular will supersede article 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1789. (emphases supplied)
With the new investment incentive regime, Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 repealed the following laws, viz:

Sec. 20. The following provisions are hereby repealed:

1) Section 53, P.D. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree);

2.) Section 1, P.D. 666 (Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Industry);

3) Section 6, P.D. 1101 (Radioactive Minerals);

4) LOI 508 extending P.D. 791 and P.D. 924 (Sugar); and

5) The following articles of Presidential Decree 1789: 2, 18, 19, 22, 28, 30, 39, 49 (d), 62, and 77. Articles 45, 46
and 48 are hereby amended only with respect to domestic and export producers.

All other laws, decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

All other incentive systems which are not in any way affected by the provisions of this Act may be restructured by the
President so as to render them cost-efficient and to make them conform with the other policy guidelines in the declaration
of policy provided in Section 2 of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
From the language of the afore-quoted provision, the whole of P.D. No. 666, section 1 was expressly and categorically
repealed. As a consequence, the provisions of C.A. No. 146, which were impliedly repealed by P.D. No. 666, section 1 were
revived.[30] In other words, with the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391, a shipyard reverted back to its status as a
public utility and as such, requires a CPC for its operation.
The crux of the present controversy is the effect of the express repeal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 by Executive Order
No. 226 issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino under her emergency powers.
We rule that the express repeal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226 did not revive Section 1 of P.D. No. 666.
But more importantly, it also put a period to the existence of sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146. It bears emphasis that
sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146, as originally written, owed their continued existence to Batas Pambansa Blg. 391.
Had the latter not repealed P.D. No. 666, the former should have been modified accordingly and shipyards effectively
removed from the list of public utilities. Ergo, with the express repeal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226, the
revival of sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146 had no more leg to stand on. A law that has been expressly repealed
ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective.[31] Hence, there is simply
no basis in the conclusion that shipyards remain to be a public utility. A repealed statute cannot be the basis for classifying
shipyards as public utilities.
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than to hold that a shipyard is not a pubic utility. A shipyard
has been considered a public utility merely by legislative declaration. Absent this declaration, there is no more reason why
it should continuously be regarded as such. The fact that the legislature did not clearly and unambiguously express its
intention to include shipyards in the list of public utilities indicates that that it did not intend to do so. Thus, a shipyard
reverts back to its status as non-public utility prior to the enactment of the Public Service Law.
This interpretation is in accord with the uniform interpretation placed upon it by the Board of Investments (BOI),
which was entrusted by the legislature with the preparation of annual Investment Priorities Plan (IPPs). The BOI has
consistently classified shipyards as part of the manufacturing sector and not of the public utilities sector. The enactment
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 did not alter the treatment of the BOI on shipyards. It has been, as at present, classified as
part of the manufacturing and not of the public utilities sector.[32]
Furthermore, of the 441 Ship Building and Ship Repair (SBSR) entities registered with the MARINA,[33] none appears
to have an existing franchise. If we continue to hold that a shipyard is a pubic utility, it is a necessary consequence that all
these entities should have obtained a franchise as was the rule prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 666. But MARINA
remains without authority, pursuant to P.D. No. 474[34] to issue franchises for the operation of shipyards. Surely,
the legislature did not intend to create a vacuum by continuously treating a shipyard as a public utility without giving
MARINA the power to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) or a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(CPCN) as required by section 15 of C.A. No. 146.
II.
Whether under the 1977 Joint Venture Agreement,
KAWASAKI can purchase only a maximum of 40%
of PHILSECOs total capitalization.
A careful reading of the 1977 Joint Venture Agreement reveals that there is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI from
acquiring more than 40% of PHILSECOs total capitalization. Section 1 of the 1977 JVA states:

1.3 The authorized capital stock of Philseco shall be P330 million. The parties shall thereafter increase their subscription
in Philseco as may be necessary and as called by the Board of Directors, maintaining a proportion of 60%-40% for NIDC
and KAWASAKI respectively, up to a total subscribed and paid-up capital stock of P312 million.

1.4 Neither party shall sell, transfer or assign all or any part of its interest in SNS [renamed PHILSECO] to any third party
without giving the other under the same terms the right of first refusal. This provision shall not apply if the transferee is a
corporation owned and controlled by the GOVERMENT [of the Philippines] or by a Kawasaki affiliate.

1.5 The By-Laws of SNS [PHILSECO] shall grant the parties preemptive rights to unissued shares of SNS [PHILSECO].[35]
Under section 1.3, the parties agreed to the amount of P330 million as the total capitalization of their joint venture.
There was no mention of the amount of their initial subscription. What is clear is that they are to infuse the needed capital
from time to time until the total subscribed and paid-up capital reaches P312 million. The phrase maintaining a proportion
of 60%-40% refers to their respective share of the burden each time the Board of Directors decides to increase the
subscription to reach the target paid-up capital of P312 million. It does not bind the parties to maintain the sharing scheme
all throughout the existence of their partnership.
The parties likewise agreed to arm themselves with protective mechanisms to preserve their respective interests in
the partnership in the event that (a) one party decides to sell its shares to third parties; and (b) new Philseco shares are
issued. Anent the first situation, the non-selling party is given the right of first refusal under section 1.4 to have a
preferential right to buy or to refuse the selling partys shares. The right of first refusal is meant to protect the original or
remaining joint venturer(s) or shareholder(s) from the entry of third persons who are not acceptable to it as co-venturer(s)
or co-shareholder(s). The joint venture between the Philippine Government and KAWASAKI is in the nature of a
partnership[36] which, unlike an ordinary corporation, is based on delectus personae.[37] No one can become a member of
the partnership association without the consent of all the other associates. The right of first refusal thus ensures that the
parties are given control over who may become a new partner in substitution of or in addition to the original partners.
Should the selling partner decide to dispose all its shares, the non-selling partner may acquire all these shares and
terminate the partnership. No person or corporation can be compelled to remain or to continue the partnership. Of
course, this presupposes that there are no other restrictions in the maximum allowable share that the non-selling partner
may acquire such as the constitutional restriction on foreign ownership in public utility. The theory that KAWASAKI can
acquire, as a maximum, only 40% of PHILSECOs shares is correct only if a shipyard is a public utility. In such instance, the
non-selling partner who is an alien can acquire only a maximum of 40% of the total capitalization of a public utility despite
the grant of first refusal. The partners cannot, by mere agreement, avoid the constitutional proscription. But as afore-
discussed, PHILSECO is not a public utility and no other restriction is present that would limit the right of KAWASAKI to
purchase the Governments share to 40% of Philsecos total capitalization.
Furthermore, the phrase under the same terms in section 1.4 cannot be given an interpretation that would limit the
right of KAWASAKI to purchase PHILSECO shares only to the extent of its original proportionate contribution of 40% to the
total capitalization of the PHILSECO. Taken together with the whole of section 1.4, the phrase under the same terms
means that a partner to the joint venture that decides to sell its shares to a third party shall make a similar offer to the
non-selling partner. The selling partner cannot make a different or a more onerous offer to the non-selling partner.
The exercise of first refusal presupposes that the non-selling partner is aware of the terms of the conditions attendant
to the sale for it to have a guided choice. While the right of first refusal protects the non-selling partner from the entry of
third persons, it cannot also deprive the other partner the right to sell its shares to third persons if, under the same offer,
it does not buy the shares.
Apart from the right of first refusal, the parties also have preemptive rights under section 1.5 in the unissued shares
of Philseco. Unlike the former, this situation does not contemplate transfer of a partners shares to third parties but the
issuance of new Philseco shares. The grant of preemptive rights preserves the proportionate shares of the original partners
so as not to dilute their respective interests with the issuance of the new shares. Unlike the right of first refusal, a
preemptive right gives a partner a preferential right over the newly issued shares only to the extent that it retains its
original proportionate share in the joint venture.
The case at bar does not concern the issuance of new shares but the transfer of a partners share in the joint venture.
Verily, the operative protective mechanism is the right of first refusal which does not impose any limitation in the
maximum shares that the non-selling partner may acquire.
III.
Whether the right to top granted to KAWASAKI
in exchange for its right of first refusal violates
the principles of competitive bidding.
We also hold that the right to top granted to KAWASAKI and exercised by private respondent did not violate the rules
of competitive bidding.
The word bidding in its comprehensive sense means making an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors
whereby the government manifests its intention to make proposals for the purpose of supplies, materials and equipment
for official business or public use, or for public works or repair.[38] The three principles of public bidding are: (1) the offer
to the public; (2) an opportunity for competition; and (3) a basis for comparison of bids.[39] As long as these three principles
are complied with, the public bidding can be considered valid and legal. It is not necessary that the highest bid be
automatically accepted. The bidding rules may specify other conditions or the bidding process be subjected to certain
reservation or qualification such as when the owner reserves to himself openly at the time of the sale the right to bid upon
the property, or openly announces a price below which the property will not be sold. Hence, where the seller reserves the
right to refuse to accept any bid made, a binding sale is not consummated between the seller and the bidder until the
seller accepts the bid. Furthermore, where a right is reserved in the seller to reject any and all bids received, the owner
may exercise the right even after the auctioneer has accepted a bid, and this applies to the auction of public as well as
private property. [40] Thus:

It is a settled rule that where the invitation to bid contains a reservation for the Government to reject any or all bids, the
lowest or the highest bidder, as the case may be, is not entitled to an award as a matter of right for it does not become a
ministerial duty of the Government to make such an award. Thus, it has been held that where the right to reject is so
reserved, the lowest bid or any bid for that matter may be rejected on a mere technicality, that all bids may be rejected,
even if arbitrarily and unwisely, or under a mistake, and that in the exercise of a sound discretion, the award may be made
to another than the lowest bidder. And so, where the Government as advertiser, availing itself of that right, makes its
choice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to complain nor right to dispute that choice, unless an
unfairness or injustice is shown. Accordingly, he has no ground of action to compel the Government to award the contract
in his favor, nor compel it to accept his bid.[41]
In the instant case, the sale of the Government shares in PHILSECO was publicly known. All interested bidders were
welcomed. The basis for comparing the bids were laid down. All bids were accepted sealed and were opened and read in
the presence of the COAs official representative and before all interested bidders. The only question that remains is
whether or not the existence of KAWASAKIs right to top destroys the essence of competitive bidding so as to say that the
bidders did not have an opportunity for competition. We hold that it does not.
The essence of competition in public bidding is that the bidders are placed on equal footing. This means that all
qualified bidders have an equal chance of winning the auction through their bids. In the case at bar, all of the bidders were
exposed to the same risk and were subjected to the same condition, i.e., the existence of KAWASAKIs right to top. Under
the ASBR, the Government expressly reserved the right to reject any or all bids, and manifested its intention not to accept
the highest bid should KAWASAKI decide to exercise its right to top under the ABSR. This reservation or qualification was
made known to the bidders in a pre-bidding conference held on September 28, 1993. They all expressly accepted this
condition in writing without any qualification. Furthermore, when the Committee on Privatization notified petitioner of
the approval of the sale of the National Government shares of stock in PHILSECO, it specifically stated that such approval
was subject to the right of KAWASAKI Heavy Industries, Inc./Philyards Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMIs bid by 5% as specified
in the bidding rules. Clearly, the approval of the sale was a conditional one. Since Philyards eventually exercised its right
to top petitioners bid by 5%, the sale was not consummated. Parenthetically, it cannot be argued that the existence of the
right to top set for naught the entire public bidding. Had Philyards Holdings, Inc. failed or refused to exercise its right to
top, the sale between the petitioner and the National Government would have been consummated. In like manner, the
existence of the right to top cannot be likened to a second bidding, which is countenanced, except when there is failure
to bid as when there is only one bidder or none at all. A prohibited second bidding presupposes that based on the terms
and conditions of the sale, there is already a highest bidder with the right to demand that the seller accept its bid. In the
instant case, the highest bidder was well aware that the acceptance of its bid was conditioned upon the non-exercise of
the right to top.
To be sure, respondents did not circumvent the requirements for bidding by granting KAWASAKI, a non-bidder, the
right to top the highest bidder. The fact that KAWASAKIs nominee to exercise the right to top has among its stockholders
some losing bidders cannot also be deemed unfair.
It must be emphasized that none of the parties questions the existence of KAWASAKIs right of first refusal, which is
concededly the basis for the grant of the right to top. Under KAWASAKIs right of first refusal, the National Government is
under the obligation to give preferential right to KAWASAKI in the event it decides to sell its shares in PHILSECO. It has to
offer to KAWASAKI the shares and give it the option to buy or refuse under the same terms for which it is willing to sell
the said shares to third parties. KAWASAKI is not a mere non-bidder. It is a partner in the joint venture; the incidents of
which are governed by the law on contracts and on partnership.
 It is true that properties of the National Government, as a rule, may be sold only after a public bidding is held. Public
bidding is the accepted method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price and ensures that overpricing, favoritism and other
anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized.[42] But the requirement for public bidding does not negate the exercise
of the right of first refusal. In fact, public bidding is an essential first step in the exercise of the right of first refusal because
it is only after the public bidding that the terms upon which the Government may be said to be willing to sell its shares to
third parties may be known. It is only after the public bidding that the Government will have a basis with which to offer
KAWASAKI the option to buy or forego the shares.
Assuming that the parties did not swap KAWASAKIs right of first refusal with the right to top, KAWASAKI would have
been able to buy the National Governments shares in PHILSECO under the same terms as offered by the highest bidder.
Stated otherwise, by exercising its right of first refusal, KAWASAKI could have bought the shares for only P2.03 billion and
not the higher amount of P2.1315 billion. There is, thus, no basis in the submission that the right to top unfairly favored
KAWASAKI. In fact, with the right to top, KAWASAKI stands to pay higher than it should had it settled with its right of first
refusal. The obvious beneficiary of the scheme is the National Government.
If at all, the obvious consideration for the exchange of the right of first refusal with the right to top is that KAWASAKI
can name a nominee, which it is a shareholder, to exercise the right to top.This is a valid contractual stipulation; the right
to top is an assignable right and both parties are aware of the full legal consequences of its exercise. As aforesaid, all
bidders were aware of the existence of the right to top, and its possible effects on the result of the public bidding was fully
disclosed to them. The petitioner, thus, cannot feign ignorance nor can it be allowed to repudiate its acts and question
the proceedings it had fully adhered to.[43]
The fact that the losing bidder, Keppel Consortium (composed of Keppel, SM Group, Insular Life Assurance, Mitsui
and ICTSI), has joined Philyards in the latters effort to raise P2.131 billion necessary in exercising the right to top is not
contrary to law, public policy or public morals. There is nothing in the ASBR that bars the losing bidders from joining either
the winning bidder (should the right to top is not exercised) or KAWASAKI/PHI (should it exercise its right to top as it did),
to raise the purchase price. The petitioner did not allege, nor was it shown by competent evidence, that the participation
of the losing bidders in the public bidding was done with fraudulent intent. Absent any proof of fraud, the formation by
Philyards of a consortium is legitimate in a free enterprise system. The appellate court is thus correct in holding the
petitioner estopped from questioning the validity of the transfer of the National Governments shares in PHILSECO to
respondent.
Finally, no factual basis exists to support the view that the drafting of the ASBR was illegal because no prior approval
was given by the COA for it, specifically the provision on the right to top the highest bidder and that the public auction on
December 2, 1993 was not witnessed by a COA representative. No evidence was proffered to prove these allegations and
the Court cannot make legal conclusions out of mere allegations. Regularity in the performance of official duties is
presumed[44] and in the absence of competent evidence to rebut this presumption, this Court is duty bound to uphold this
presumption.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The impugned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA,
represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA,
represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the
land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a
common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa
on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to
Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development,
as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of
prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was
born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961
from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to
bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos,
67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax
declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty
tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934,
by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14,
1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings,
geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining
recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided
that:

SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed and
unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the
land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said
islands.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and
ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the
trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its
own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies
have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but
this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared
that:

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the
"Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the
16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of
 the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All
of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is
that it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It
had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling
and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the
taxes.

The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in 1931, and which
Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having been
perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from
the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected
prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was
inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by
this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining
claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The
moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted
from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands
cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a
valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such
inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as
against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160
Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from
the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and
the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed
by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated
from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co.
v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a
mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited
by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well
as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right
by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of
the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as
he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the mining laws,
the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can
take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the
oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands
of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII,
Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
 SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong
to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
government established under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding, all locations
of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826
of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence
of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective
locations.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it
from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or
even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However,
the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the
applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and
applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16The trial
judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test
their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave
abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in possession of the
subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural
land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not
disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining
of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did
not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface rights and
the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land
has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject
to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be
boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the
miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go
without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In
the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became
mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it
was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:
 Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations,
or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right to
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all areas for
which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents.

SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all areas for
which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of
private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is
the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both
mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the
land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and
may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could
not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated
March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO
WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M.
COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO
BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO,
TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-
LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
 MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID,
SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID,
MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D.
EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO,
MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by
her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND,
PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.[1] In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which
they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear
as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For
this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
 (4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development
and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than
25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands
which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and
which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain
and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied
first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a
lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. They contend that said Rule
infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the
filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated
upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion