merely provides that “an adopted child
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Trial court granted the petition and
declared Stephanie as his legitimate child
and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the
Family Code, she is now known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification
and/or reconsideration that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname
Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed
with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and
preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article
189 she remains to be an intestate heir of
her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon
adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her
middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an
illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother’s surname, we find no
reason why she should not be allowed to do
so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname
Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle
name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC
1
shall bear the surname of the adopter.”
Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption,
is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child
by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to
a legitimate child without discrimination of
any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother.
Teotico vs. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 – Anna
Facts:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died
on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila with no
ascendants or descendants. She left properties
worth P600,000.00 and a will written in Spanish
which she executed at her residence at No. 2
Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the
presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed
their signatures below the attestation clause and
on the left margin of each and every page of the
will in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other. Said will was acknowledged before a
Notary Public by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will Maria stated among others that she
was possessed of the full use of her mental
faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure
or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of
the will and from any influence of fear or threat
and that she freely and spontaneously executed
said will.
She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married
to her niece named Josefina Mortera; and the
usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building to
the said spouses. However, the naked
ownership of the building was left in equal parts
to the legitimate children of said spouses. She
also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for
the probate of the will before the Court of First
Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan,
claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as
well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose
Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix.
Issues:
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to
intervene in this proceeding?;
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted
to probate?;
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in
passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of the will and in determining who should inherit
the portion to be vacated by the nullification of
the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
Held:
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no
right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to
any property affected by the will, because
nowhere in the will was any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any
portion of the estate. She has also no interest in
the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of
the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
2
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she
would not acquire any interest in any portion of
the estate left by the testatrix. She would acquire
such right only if she were a legal heir of the
deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It
is true that she claims to be an acknowledged
natural child of Jose and also an adopted
daughter of Francisca. But the law does not give
her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria
because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,
Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: “An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; … .”
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to
intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir
in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling
of the court a quo.
On the secon issue, the claim that the will was
not properly attested to is contradicted by the
evidence of record. The will was duly executed
because it was signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public in
the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper
pressure and influence is also belied by the
evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her
husband Rene had the opportunity to exert
pressure on the testatrix simply because she
lived in their house several years prior to the
execution of the will and that she was old and
suffering from hypertension in that she was
virtually isolated from her friends for several
years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove
what the instrumental witnesses had testified in
court. The exercise of improper pressure and
undue influence must be supported by
substantial evidence and must be of a kind that
would overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make
her express the will of another rather than her
own
On the third issue, the question of whether the
probate court could determine the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of a will has been
decided by this Court in a long line of decisions.
In Castañeda v. Alemany, the Court had stated,
thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone,
and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law
and that the testator was in a condition to make
a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings
under the new code for the probate of a
will. The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In
them the court has no power to pass upon the
validity of any provisions made in the will. It can
not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is
void and another one is valid.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MAXIMO WONG,
respondents.
FACTS:
 Maximo Wong petitioned for the change of his
name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. which was his name
prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong.
 Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo
Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala.
 Siblings Maximo Alcala, Jr. (2 ½ years old) and
Margaret Alcala (9 years old) were adopted by
3
Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong
(naturalized Filipino citizens) with the consent
of their parents.
 Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an insurance
agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high
school teacher. They decided to adopt the
children as they remained childless after
fifteen years of marriage. The couple showered
their adopted children with parental love and
reared them as their own children.
 Maximo Wong (22 years old) then married and
a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame
University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to
change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
o It was averred that his use of the
surname Wong embarrassed and
isolated him from his relatives and
friends, as the same suggests a Chinese
ancestry when in truth and in fact he is
a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community,
o he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality;
o that he is being ridiculed for carrying a
Chinese surname, thus hampering his
business and social life;
o and that his adoptive mother does not
oppose his desire to revert to his former
surname.
 RTC Ruling: Ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE (having
complied with the necessary requisites)
 OSG appealed the decision
 CA Ruling: AFFIRMED RTC decision in full
 OSG’s Contentions:
o Maximo's allegations of ridicule and/or
isolation from family and friends were
unsubstantiated and cannot justify the
petition for change of name.
o For Maximo to cast aside the name of
his adoptive father is crass ingratitude
to the memory of the latter and his
adoptive mother who is still alive,
despite her consent to the petition for
change of name.
o The reversion of Maximo Wong to his
old name violates Articles 341 and 365
 of the Civil Code, which requires an
adoptive child to use the surname of the
adopter, and would identify him with his
parents by nature, thus giving the
impression that he has severed his
relationship with his adoptive parents.
 Maximo refutes these saying:
o he did as the law required (used the
surname of the adopter)
o Being already emancipated, he can now
decide what is best for and by himself. It
is at this time that he realized that the
Chinese name he carries causes him
undue ridicule and embarrassment and
affects his business and social life.
o His adoptive mother, being aware of his
predicament, gave her consent to the
petition for change of name, albeit
making it clear that the same shall in no
way affect the legal adoption, and even
underwent the rigors of trial to
substantiate her sworn statement.
o If his adoptive mother does not take
offense nor feel any resentment,
abhorrence or insecurity about his
desire to change his name, Maximo
avers that there can be no possible
prejudice on her, much less the State.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maximo Wong may legally
change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
HELD: YES. Maximo Wong may legally change his
name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Change of name is a privilege,
given the proper or reasonable cause or compelling
reason.
 SC: We are guided by the jurisprudential
dictum that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for the
purpose of identification, and a change of
name is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of reasons adduced and the consequences that
will likely follow; it is a privilege which may be
granted only upon a showing of a proper or
reasonable cause or compelling reason
therefor.
4
 SC: We find unacceptable the assertion of the
SolGen that Maximo's allegation of ridicule and
embarrassment due to the use of his present
surname is unsubstantiated.
 Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are: (a) When the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (b) When the change
results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid
confusion; (d) Having continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the
surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public
interest.
 While it is true that the statutory fiat under
Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that
an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind
that the change of the surname of the adopted
child is more an incident rather than the object
of adoption proceedings.
RULING: CA Ruling is AFFIRMED in toto.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the
pronouncement made by the court a quo
declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene
Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as
having been made in excess of its jurisdiction.
Another reason why said pronouncement should
be set aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy
for he was not allowed to intervene in this
proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the
deceased should also be set aside for the same
reason.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZENAIDA ELEPANO
Facts:
The private respondent Corazon Santos
Punsalan filed a verified petition for adoption
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch CXXVIII praying that after due
notice and hearing, the minors Pinky
Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter of her full
blood brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan
Urbano, the daughter of her full blood sister,
be declared her daughters by adoption for all
intents and purposes.
However, private respondent filed a
"MOTION FOR TAKING OF DEPOSITION" on
the ground that she received an urgent call
from the United Nations Office in Geneva,
Switzerland requiring her to report for work,
so much so that she will not be able to testify
at the hearing of her petition yet to be
scheduled by the respondent judge. The
respondent judge granted the motion and
ordered that notice of the taking of the
deposition be furnished to the OSG (the only
known oppositor in the case).
The private respondent's deposition was
taken. Despite notice, no representative
from the OSG appeared to oppose the taking
of the deposition.
The OSG, however, subsequently filed an
"Opposition to the Deposition", averring that
5
Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court
allows deposition by leave of Court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or property subject of the action.
Since the jurisdictional requirement of
publication has not been complied with, the
OSG goes on to argue, the lower court had
not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant. The respondent judge denied the
said Opposition. The respondent judge
granted the petition for adoption
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the jurisdictional
requirement of publication should be
complied first to allow the deposition taking
in adoption proceedings?
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
While it is true that in an action in personam,
personal service of summons within the
forum or voluntary appearance in the case is
essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, in an
adoption case which involves the status of a
person, there is no particular defendant to
speak of since the action is one in rem. In
such case, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is a non-essential condition for the
taking of a deposition for the jurisdiction of
the court is based on its power over the res,
to render judgment with respect to such
"thing" (or status, as in this case) so as to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection against the right so
established. (Banco Espanol Filipino vs.
Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Greg Alba vs. de la Cruz,
17 Phil. 49).
Indeed, publication of the scheduled hearing
for the petition for adoption is necessary for
the validity of a decree of adoption but not
for the purpose merely of taking a deposition.
In taking a deposition, no substantial rights
are affected since depositions may or may
not be presented or may even be objected to
when formally offered as evidence at the trial
of the main case later on.
In the instant case, We find no abuse of
discretion committed by the respondent
judge in allowing the taking of private
respondent's deposition. Due to urgent and
compelling reasons beyond her control,
private respondent could not be present to
testify at the trial of the main case for
adoption. The OSG, however, was notified of
the scheduled taking of the deposition, as
well as of all the hearings of the petition for
adoption, but the OSG chose not to
attendALL the said hearings, without
explanation. The OSG, therefore, has no
reason to invoke lack of procedural due
process.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the
philosophy behind adoption statutes is to
promote the welfare of the child and every
reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote that objective. (Santos et al. vs.
Aranzanso, et al. 16 SCRA 353). In the instant
case, the record shows that private
respondent's adoption of the minors shall
redound to the best interests of the latter.
6
Ellis vs Republic 7 SCRA 962
Facts:
Court of First Instance of Pampanga granting
the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C.
Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby girl
named Rose.
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San
Fransisco, California, is 28 years of age.
On September 3, 1949, he married Gloria G.
Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both
are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose
was born on September 26, 1959, at the
Caloocan Maternity Hospital.
Four or five days later, the mother of Rose
left her with the Heart of Mary Villa — an
institution for unwed mothers and their
babies — stating that she (the mother) could
not take of Rose without bringing disgrace
upon her (the mother’s family.)
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959,
Mr. and Mrs.
Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of
the aforementioned baby. At the time of the
hearing of the petition on January 14,1960,
petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had
been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he
being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in
the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles,
Pampanga where both lived at that time.
They had been in the Philippines before, or,
to exact, in 1953.
Issue: Whether or not being permanent
residents in the Philippines, petitioners are
qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
Held: No .Article 335 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, provides that non-residents
aliens cannot adopt.
In this connection, it should be noted that
this is a proceedings in rem, which no court
may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not
only over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties, but also over the res, which
is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as
that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural
person is determined by the latters’
nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she
being a citizen of the Philippines, but not
over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners. Under our political law, which is
patterned after the Anglo-American legal
system, we have, likewise, adopted the
latter’s view to the effect that personal
status, in general, is determined by and/or
subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary
law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale,
Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This,
perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code
does not permit adoption by non-resident
aliens, and we have consistently refused to
recognize the validity of foreign decrees of
divorce — regardless of the grounds upon
which the same are based — involving
citizens of the Philippines who are not bona
fide residents of the forum, even when our
laws authorized absolute divorce in the
Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855;
Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix
v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v.
Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-
6897, Nov. 29, 1955)”.
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not
domiciled in the Philippines -and, hence,
non-resident aliens - we cannot assume and
exercise jurisdiction over the status, under
7
either the nationality theory or the
domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the
above -quoted provision of said Art. 335 is
predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the
res or merely affects the cause of action, we
have no authority to grant the relief prayed
for by petitioners herein, and it has been so
held in Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April
25, 1962) and Katansik v. Republic L-15472
(June 30, 1962).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered denying the petition in this case.
Daoang vs Municipal Judge of
San Nicolas (GR L-34568)
Facts:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses
Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos. On 22 April 1971, the minors
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by
their father and guardian ad litem, the
petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption,
claiming that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter
named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother,
who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore,
said spouses were disqualified to adopt
under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent spouses
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy
are disqualified to adopt under paragraph
(1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as
follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or children
by legal fiction;
HELD:
The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article
335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was
adopted, it changed the word “descendant”,
found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the
New Civil Code was patterned, to “children”.
The children thus mentioned have a clearly
defined meaning in law and do not include
grandchildren. Well known is the rule of
statutory construction to the effect that a
statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
meaning may be subjects of interpretation. In
the present case, Roderick and Rommel
Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero and
Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption
of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the
Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the
petition and affirmed the judgement of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents
and purposes, the children by adoption of
the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and
Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be
freed from legal obedience and maintenance
by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla
8
and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and
Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales
for Wilson Marcos and their family names
‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with
“Agonoy”, which is the family name of the
petitioners, without pronouncements as to
costs
REPUBLIC THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. CONCEPCION S.
ALARCON VERGARA
FACTS:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R.
Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R.
Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively,
younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye,
Jr, a member of the United States Air Force,
is an American citizen who resided at the
Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife
Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a
naturalized American. They have two
children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well
as their natural parents, gave their consent to
the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its
decision on September 10, 1990 granting the
petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be
the children of the spouses Dye by
adoption.Respondent Regional Trial Court
disregarded the sixteen-year age gap
requirement of the law, the spouses being
only fifteen years and three months and
fifteen years and nine months older than
Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal
implementation of the law would defeat the
very philosophy behind adoption statutes,
namely, to promote the welfare of a child.The
court also found that the petitioning spouses
are mentally and physically fit to adopt,
possess good moral character, sufficient
financial capability and love and affection for
the intended adoptees.
The Republic filed this petition for review on
a pure question of law, contending that the
spouses Dye are not qualified under the law
to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Dye are not qualified under
the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due?
Held:The Republic filed this petition for
review on a pure question of law, contending
that the spouses Dye are not qualified under
the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
The Court finds the petition meritorious and
hereby grants it.
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt
Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under
Article 184 of the Family Code which states:
"Art. 184. The following persons may not
adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
9
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing
exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law."
Republic vs Claude
A. Miller and Jumrus
E. Miller
G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999
Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both
American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles
City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno
Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows
aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the
adoption and the DSWD recommended approval
of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On
May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision
granting the petition for adoption.
On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became
effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino
child by aliens.
The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of
the petition for adoption by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a
Filipino child when the petition for adoption was
filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
prohibiting the same.
Held:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at
the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a
vested right which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying
him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective

August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of Benitez-Badua vs. CA
respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino
child because the right has become vested at the
time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall
be governed by the law then in force. A vested
right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent does not depend upon events foreign to FACTS:
the will of the holder. Vested rights include not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations created after the right has vested. Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian
were owners of various properties located in
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband
in form and substance in accordance with the law died in 1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a
in governance at the time it was filed, the court
acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully complaint for the issuance of letters of
disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the
of the court is determined by the statute in force nephew, herein private respondent.
at the time of the commencement of the
action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be raised and cared by the deceased spouses since
ousted by a subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have childhood, though not related to them by blood,
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she
instance. is the only legitimate child of the spouses
submitted documents such as her certificate of
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for
adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, live birth where the spouses name were
although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 reflected as her parents. She even testified that
of said Code, may continue with his petition under said spouses continuously treated her as their
the law prevailing before the Family Code.
legitimate daughter.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente
hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to declared that said spouses were unable to
provide homes, parental care and education for physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give be the biological child. Trial court decided in
them the protection of society and family in the
favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter
person of the adopter, as well as childless
couples or persons to experience the joy of and sole heir of the spouses.
parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and ISSUE: WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives will suffice to establish her legitimacy.
of the law.

HELD:

10
The Court dismissed the case for lack of
merit. The mere registration of a child in his or
her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of
his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of
the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In
the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she
died without descendants and ascendants”. In
executing such deed, Vicente effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the
petitioner where it appeared thathe was the
petitioner’s father.
CASTRO VS. CA
Facts: This is a petition for review on
Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners. The petition
before the appellate court sought to annul
the judgment of the trial court that granted
Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to
Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately,
they separated later on due to their
incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged
homosexual tendencies. Their marriage
bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who
succumbed to death after nine days from
birth due to congenital heart disease, and
Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro
(Petitioner).
11
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of
Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana
Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was
instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro
alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio
(Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was
granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against
Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that
Jose had been remiss in providing support
to his daughter Joanne for the past 36
year; that she single-handedly raised and
provided financial support to Joanne while
Jose had been showering gifts to his driver
and allege lover, Larry, and even went to
the extent of adopting Larry’s two children,
Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne
knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro
denied the allegation that he had remiss his
fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that
he always offered help but it was often
declined. He also alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children that’s
why he adopted them. Later on Atty.
Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment seeking to annul
the decision of the TC approving Jed and
Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was
not obtained and the document purporting
as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was
fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and
Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity.
One set shows that the father to is Jose,
while another set of NSO certificates shows
the father to be Larry. P further alleged
that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate
children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth. CA denied
the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by
the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit
provision in the rules that spouses and
legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be
personally notified of the hearing.”
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets
of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the
persons stated therein and was, therefore,
beyond the scope of the action for
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud
could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for
annulment of judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the
instant case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and
legitimate children 10 years or over of
the adopter is required?
Decision:
1. The grant of adoption over R should be
annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision
was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party
precisely to prevent the participation of any
other interested party, as in this case, then
the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether
the fraud was committed through the use
of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and
Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had
12
Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he
failed to fulfill the necessary requirements
under the law. There can be no other
conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts,
the trial court granted the decree of
adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by
the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate
children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a
joint petition for adoption. The law,
however, provides for several exceptions to
the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock. In this
instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal
separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de
facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first
signify her consent to the adoption. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent
of the adopter’s children if they are 10
years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA
8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’
consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should
have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not
enough to rely on constructive notice as in
this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally
serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
Landingin vs. Republic,
Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino
parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the
children were left to their paternal grandmother
for their biological mother went to Italy, re-
married there and now has 2 children by her
second marriage and no longer communicates
from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother
passed away, the minors were being supported
by the petitioner and her children abroad and
gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report
recommending for the adoption and narrated
that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted
with the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she
voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said
social worker as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
13
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted
without the written consent of the adoptee’s
biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides
that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice
if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice
to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of
the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to
his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit
the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations
of love and support. Merely permitting the child
to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of
others is not such abandonment. To dispense
with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at
the time of adoption.

LAHOM VS SIBULO
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's
nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for
adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to
change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose
Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in
which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted
son refused to use their surname Lahom and
continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities. Prior to the institution of the case,
in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The
new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous
indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in
Court in December 1999 to rescind the
decree of adoption previously issued way
back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said
petition there was already a new law on
adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on
March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that:
"Adoption, being in the interest of the child,
shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the
affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s
action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The
controversy should be resolved in the light of
14
the law governing at the time the petition was
filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had
already abrogated and repealed the right of
the adopter under the Civil Code and the
family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
So the rescission of the adoption decree,
having been initiated by Lahom after RA
8552 had come into force, could no longer be
pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of
RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule
100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could
not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. Rights are considered
vested when the right to the enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept
of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right
of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree,
are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before
it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his
legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in
the disposable portion of his estate.
Reyes vs. Sotero,
Facts:
Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and
settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising
claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising
who died intestate. Respondent claims that real
and personal properties were allegedly in the
possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a
grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the
petition, claiming that she was an adopted child
of Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting
that the petition be dismissed since she was the
only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to
the Opposition attaching thereto the
certification of her adoption from the local civil
registrar’s office that the adoption decree was
registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial
Form and a certification issued by the clerk of
court that the decree was on file in the General
Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition
stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on
Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted
due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”
The appellate court refused to dismiss the
proceeding because it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove before the trial court that she
was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse
since, “imputations of irregularities permeating
15
the adoption decree render its authenticity
under a cloud of doubt.”
Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity
of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities.
Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal
adoption by any evidence other than those
which she had already presented before the trial
court.
An adoption decree is a public document
required by law to be entered into public
records, the official repository of which, as well
as all other judicial pronouncements affecting
the status of individuals, is the local civil
registrar’s office as well as the court which
rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. As such, the certifications issued
by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court
regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which
are entered in the records kept under their
official custody, are prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. These certifications
suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s
adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence.
Mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast
a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since
the certifications and its contents are presumed
valid until proof to the contrary is offered.