BOAC vs

LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE G.R. Nos. 184461-62
ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE
SAMSON,
Petitioners,

- versus -

ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION

E. EMPEO,
Respondents.

x-------------------------------x
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION
E. EMPEO, G.R. No. 184495
Petitioners,

- versus -

GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN.

AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO
TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO
PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT.
COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL.,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------x

ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION

E. EMPEO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 187109

- versus -
Present:

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. CORONA, C.J.,

HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. CARPIO,
AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO CARPIO MORALES,
TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO VELASCO, JR.,
PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. NACHURA,
COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,
A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL ENRIQUEZ PERALTA,
AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, BERSAMIN,
Respondents. DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,**
VILLARAMA,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ.

Promulgated:
 May 31, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo
(Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were
herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.

Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured
nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.

On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition
for habeas corpus[1] before the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo
Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and
Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006,[2] the Court
issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 95303.

By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006,[3] the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied
that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits
from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and disappearance of the three
but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with
plate number RTF 597.Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land Transportation Office
(LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been manufactured as of July 26, 2006.

Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.

Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on
June 26, 2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men wearing bonnets
abduct Sherlyn and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that tied and
blindfolded, the three were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy. [4]
 Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his
house, he was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified armed men, repaired
to his house; that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez) was taken to a
place in Mercado, Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew Sierra, Tanya, Vincent and Lisa; and
that Enriquez described the appearance of two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom
he was familiar with as the two had previously slept in his house.[5]

Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and
detained for five months, testified that when he was detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw
two women fitting the descriptions of Sherlyn and Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare.[6]

Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to
neutralize the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups, declared that he conducted an
inquiry on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.[7]

While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance
of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was sought by the mayor of
Hagonoy.

Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Armys 7 th Infantry Division
in FortMagsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of his infantry as in fact his name did
not appear in the roster of troops.[8]

Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied
that his office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597.[9]

On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness stand as hostile
witnesses.

Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing anything about the abduction of
Ramirez nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.[10]

Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names
of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col.
Boac to conduct an investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. [11] When pressed to
elaborate, he stated: I said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that, I mean,
that incident happened in Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your Honor, and
another one. That was the report coming from the people in the area.[12]

By Decision of March 29, 2007,[13] the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in
this wise:

As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the
present petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main
office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of ones
detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons
subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers, means
and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x.

It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but
criminal proceedings by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime
punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v. Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated
the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the
whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or
caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being
no strong evidence that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.

The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on
Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for
separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and
to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations
and the actions taken thereon.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate
actions.

SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision. They also moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion
Paulino, Sherlyns mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who
allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp.
 During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan
and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo[14] With Prayers for Inspection
of Place and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No. 179994. The petition
impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil.
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado)
and Donald Caigas.

Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit
while in office.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of
the following places:

1. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija

2. 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan

3. Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan

4. Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan

5. The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th Infantry Batallion
at Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan

6. 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan

7. Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan

8. Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military
personnel as a caretaker;

By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo returnable
to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of
the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.

Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General,
filed their Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.[15] In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac and Lt.
Mirabelle reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus case.
 Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate
and verify the identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision of the appellate court
ordering the police, the Commission on Human Rights and the National Bureau of Investigation to take
further action on the matter.[16]

Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion based
in Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24th Infantry Battalion
detachment was reported to be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that he
found no untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was no report of
the death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police. [17]

Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent
records, papers and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three, and that the police
exhausted all possible actions available under the circumstances.[18]

In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on
Adoracion Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial.

Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11,
2007, accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were soldiers. She averred that she
did not report the incident to the police nor inform Sherlyns mother about the visit.[19]

Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally
detained by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in
Limay, Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in detention. [20]

In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,[21] Manalo recounted:

xxxx

59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?

Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson

sa ilalim ng 24th IB.

xxxx

Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.

 Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks,
may nakita akong babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong
makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw, nakausap ko yung babaeng
nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na dinukot
si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto
niyang umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin
ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal
ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba.

x x x x.

61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?

Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si Allan Alvin (maya-maya nalaman naming
na siya pala si Donald Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na master o commander ng
kanyang mga tauhan.

Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating

sina Karen Empeo at Manuel Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel
sa kwarto ni Allan[.] Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto, kasama
si Sherlyn.

xxxx

62. xxxx

Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang

sina Sherlyn at Karen ay ginawang labandera.

Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na
siyay ginahasa.

xxxx

63. xxxx

xxxx

Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa

Limay. Sinakay ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na
jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni Donald Caigas. x x x x

xxxx

66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?

Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay

dinala sa isang safehouse sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring
supplied; italics and emphasis in the original)

On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to the witness stand.
 Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him
because he was very active in conducting lectures in Bataan and even appeared on television regarding
an incident involving the 24th Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino to be detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area.

Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment
in Camp Tecson, testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it conduct military operations
as it only serves as a training facility for scout rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any
command relation with either the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion.[22]

By Decision of September 17, 2008,[23] the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration
in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino in CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED.

Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-
G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately
RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino.

Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the]

PNPs unfinished investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate
charges filed against those truly responsible.

SO ORDERED.

In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily
on the testimony of Manalo in this wise:

With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been
able to convincingly prove the fact of their detention by some elements in the
military. His testimony is a first hand account that military and civilian personnel
under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of Oscar
Leuterio that the latter was detained in FortMagsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio)
saw Manuel Merino.

His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be
hearsay but not with respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three
desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay. Raymond Manalo saw the
three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. In fact, he
claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory
proof, however, the Court will presume that he is still alive.
 The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed
aside. His narration and those of the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more
than substantial evidence warranting an order that the three be released from detention if
they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be moved from place to place but still
they are considered under detention and custody of the respondents.

His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.

xxxx

The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles
Davalan were of no help either.Again, their averments were the same negative ones which
cannot prevail over those of Raymond Manalo. Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as
a training camp for army scout rangers. Even Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camps
use for purposes other than training cannot be discounted.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the
three missing persons, [Sherlyn, Karen and Merino], are being detained in military
camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division.Being not held for a lawful cause, they
should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection
order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found
that the three detainees right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately
release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with
its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the
appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the three.

Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17,
2008 Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-captioned
case- subject of the present Decision.

Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only insofar as
the amparo aspect is concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No.
184495, the second above-captioned case.

By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R.
Nos. 1844461-62.[24]
 Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a Motion to
Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas
corpus cases to comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing
persons. By Resolution of March 5, 2009,[25] the appellate court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:

While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents to immediately
RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino, the decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term
immediately does not mean that that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision rendered is immediately
executory. x x x.

Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties
questioned the Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.

Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution
pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not
have issued, and did not issue, a writ of execution. x x x.(underscoring supplied)

Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeo challenged the appellate courts March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their motion to cite
respondents in contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last above-captioned case
subject of the present Decision.

Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in
the amparo and habeas corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from government
service.[26] The AFP has denied that Arnel Enriquez was a member of the Philippine Army. [27] The
whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain unknown.[28]
In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND MANALO.

II

THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD

BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN
EMPEO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY.

III
 PETITIONERS DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST
THEM BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
ALLEGED ABDUCTION; MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR
TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.

IV

THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND

INCONGRUENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE

FATAL PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.[29]

In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows:

5. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of
Places;

6. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of
Documents;

7. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino
Razon did not make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced
disappearance of the aggrieved parties

8. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming
from the highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine
Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear
[sic] the aggrieved parties

9. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as

party respondent in this case;

10. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
had command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention
of the three aggrieved parties

11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then
Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command
responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three
aggrieved parties[30]

In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues:

[1] Whether the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.]

[2] Whetherthere is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus

decision or in an Amparo decision[.]

[3] Whetheran appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an
Amparo case[.][31]
 Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the testimony
of Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine
Army, as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to
cause the release of the aggrieved parties.

G.R. Nos. 184461-62

Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to the
testimony of Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures of Camp Tecson where he
claimed to have been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore
that Camp Tecson is not under the jurisdiction of the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalos testimony is
incredible and full of inconsistencies.[32]

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[33] an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having
taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the
personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on
detention. Thus it held:

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on

respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:

x x x x.

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos

statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of
evidence. Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of
respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic
specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on
respondents, also corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in
detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay
such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the
Division Training Unit, firms up respondents story that they were detained for some time in
said military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On Manalos having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court in the
immediately cited case synthesized his tale as follows:

The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean
outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered
to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from
Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was
abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture
and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the
day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his
arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and
Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald
Caigas, called master or commander by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond
and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were
threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would
all be killed.

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the

detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their
renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to
their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already
left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that
camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue
using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with
soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his
affidavit.

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were
many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the
battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar
and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also
suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in
raising livestock.

Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some
other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the
NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataanwhere he witnessed the
killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son
who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another time,
in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where
NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was
there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes.

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were

transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men
stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five
detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or
9, 2007 until June 2007.
 In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond,
Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the
camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:

x x x x.[34] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo[35]which assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his
brother Reynaldos abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same case,
of Manalos brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalos graphic description of the
detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its
appreciation in Manalos testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.

Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is vague and
incongruent with [its] findings for, so they contend, while the appellate court referred to the perpetrators as
misguided and self-righteous civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry Division, it failed to identify
who these perpetrators are.Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald Caigas and Arnel Enriquez are not
members of the AFP. They furthermore point out that their co-petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and
Palparan have already retired from the service and thus have no more control of any military camp or base
in the country.[36]

There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for
petitioners to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the appellate court merely referred to a
few misguided self-righteous people who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who
disagree with the countrys democratic system of government. Nowhere did it specifically refer to the
members of the 7th Infantry Division as the misguided self-righteous ones.

Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing
to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the
parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were concerned with Manuel Merino as basis for
filing the petition on his behalf.[37]

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo[38] provides:

The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity
in the following order:
 (a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents
of the aggrieved party;

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or

(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is

no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.

Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the
immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted
provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reasonto prevent the indiscriminate and
groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party.[39]

The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on
Merinos behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply
for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party. [40]

It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are
precluded from filing the application on Merinos behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule.

G.R. No. 184495

Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate courts dismissal of the petitions against then President
Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were
filed.[41]

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President,
the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation
of the Government. x x x [42]
 Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted,
condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.

On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates
in an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application
insofar as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in order.

Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo[43] expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command
responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a
superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss
in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an
omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)[44]

It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, [45] and thus
a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of
individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. [46] Rather, it is
a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard
the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. [47]

Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis [48] enlightens:

[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability
for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearancefor purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [49] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz:

 x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them,
the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In
all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and
security are restored.[50] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to

determine criminal liability.[51] The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far
as amparo cases are concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility

in amparocases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are
duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it

should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As
intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability
on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be
any.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes
an amparo court would issue.[53] In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of
the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate
government agency.
 Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851[54] (RA 9851) to include command
responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide
and other crimes.[55] RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those
superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their
power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.

The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents
that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For,
from the records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt.
Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to
comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino.

The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit
as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and
continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

G.R. No. 187109.

Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for
an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the
proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as
possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
immediately protect.

The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules
strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory
motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to
state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered
by an amparo proceeding.
 In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary
proceedings[56] in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory
without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.[57]

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the following judgment:

1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED with modification in that respondents in G.R.
No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col.
Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately release Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention.

The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED.

2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are directed to forthwith
comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or
reassignment to other places of assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No. 184495,
the incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the incumbent battalion commander of
the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention.

Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col.
Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain personally impleaded in the petitions to
answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further
investigation to determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents.

All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed at
monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of their results.
 SO ORDERED.

SPS. FORTUNATO SANTOS and ROSALINDA R. SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPS. MARIANO R. CASEDA and CARMEN CASEDA, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 28, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 30955, which reversed and set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133,
in Civil Case No. 89-4759.Petitioners (the Santoses) were the owners of a house and lot informally sold,
with conditions, to herein private respondents (the Casedas). In the trial court, the Casedas had complained
that the Santoses refused to deliver said house and lot despite repeated demands. The trial court dismissed
the complaint for specific performance and damages, but in the Court of Appeals, the dismissal was
reversed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered:

1. GRANTING plaintiffs-appellants a period of NINETY (90) DAYS from the date of the finality of judgment
within which to pay the balance of the obligation in accordance with their agreement;

2. Ordering appellees to restore possession of the subject house and lot to the appellants upon receipt of
the full amount of the balance due on the purchase price; and

3. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[1]

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

The spouses Fortunato and Rosalinda Santos owned the house and lot consisting of 350 square
meters located at Lot 7, Block 8, Better Living Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, as evidenced by TCT
(S-11029) 28005 of the Register of Deeds of Paranaque. The land together with the house, was mortgaged
with the Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc., to secure a loan of P150,000.00 maturing on June 16, 1987.
Sometime in 1984, Rosalinda Santos met Carmen Caseda, a fellow market vendor of hers in Pasay
City and soon became very good friends with her. The duo even became kumadres when Carmen stood
as a wedding sponsor of Rosalinda's nephew.
On June 16, 1984, the bank sent Rosalinda Santos a letter demanding payment of P16,915.84 in
unpaid interest and other charges. Since the Santos couple had no funds, Rosalinda offered to sell the
house and lot to Carmen. After inspecting the real property, Carmen and her husband agreed.
Sometime that month of June, Carmen and Rosalinda signed a document, which reads:

Received the amount of P54,100.00 as a partial payment of Mrs. Carmen Caseda to the (total) amount of
350,000.00 (house and lot) that is own (sic) by Mrs. Rosalinda R. Santos.

(Mrs.) (Sgd.) Carmen Caseda

direct buyer
Mrs. Carmen Caseda

(Sgd.) Rosalinda Del R. Santos

Owner
Mrs. Rosalinda R. Santos

House and Lot

Better Living Subd. Paraaque, Metro Manila
Section V Don Bosco St."[2]
The other terms and conditions that the parties agreed upon were for the Caseda spouses to pay: (1)
the balance of the mortgage loan with the Rural bank amounting to P135,385.18; (2) the real estate taxes;
(3) the electric and water bills; and (4) the balance of the cash price to be paid not later than June 16, 1987,
which was the maturity date of the loan.[3]
The Casedas gave an initial payment of P54,100.00 and immediately took possession of the property,
which they then leased out. They also paid in installments, P81,696.84 of the mortgage loan. The Casedas,
however, in 1987.Notwithstanding the state of their finances, Carmen nonetheless paid in March 1990, the
real estate taxes on the property for 1981-1984. She also settled the electric bills from December 12, 1988
to July 12, 1989. All these payments were made in the name of Rosalinda Santos.
In January 1989, the Santoses, seeing that the Casedas lacked the means to pay the remaining
installments and/or amortization of the loan, repossessed the property. The Santoses then collected the
rentals from the tenants.
In February 1989, Carmen Caseda sold her fishpond in Batangas. She then approached petitioners
and offered to pay the balance of the purchase price for the house and lot. The parties, however, could not
agree, and the deal could not push through because the Santoses wanted a higher price. For
understandably, the real estate boom in Metro Manila at this time, had considerably jacked up realty values.
On August 11, 1989, the Casedas filed Civil Case No. 89-4759, with the RTC of Makati, to have the
Santoses execute the final deed of conveyance over the property, or in default thereof, to reimburse the
amount of P180,000.00 paid in cash and P249,900.00 paid to the rural bank, plus interest; as well as rentals
for eight months amounting to P32,000.00, plus damages and costs of suit.
After trial on the merits, the lower court disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ordered:

(a) dismissing plaintiff's (Casedas') complaint; and

(b) declaring the agreement marked as Annex "C" of the complaint rescinded. Costs against
plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Said judgment of dismissal is mainly based on the trial court's finding that:

Admittedly, the purchase price of the house and lot was P485,385.18, i.e. P350,000.00 as cash payment
and P135,385.18, assumption of mortgage. Of it plaintiffs [Casedas] paid the following: (1) P54,100.00
down payment; and (2) P81,694.64 installment payments to the bank on the loan (Exhs. E to E-19) or a
total of P135,794.64. Thus, plaintiffs were short of the purchase price. They cannot, therefore, demand
specific performance.[5]

The trial court further held that the Casedas were not entitled to reimbursement of payments already
made, reasoning that:
As, earlier mentioned, plaintiffs made a total payment of P135,794.64 out of the purchase price of
P485,385.18. The property was in plaintiffs' possession from June 1984 to January 1989 or a period of
fifty-five months. During that time, plaintiffs leased the property. Carmen said the property was rented for
P25.00 a day or P750.00 a month at the start and in 1987 it was increased to P2,000.00 and P4,000.00 a
month. But the evidence is not precise when the different amounts of rental took place. Be that as it may,
fairness demands that plaintiffs must pay defendants for their exercise of dominical rights over the
property by renting it to others. The amount of P2,000.00 a month would be reasonable based on the
average of P750.00, P2,000.00, P4,000.00 lease-rentals charged. Multiply P2,000.00 by 55 months, the
plaintiffs must pay defendants P110,000.00 for the use of the property. Deducting this amount from the
P135,794.64 payment of the plaintiffs on the property, the difference is P25,794.64. Should the plaintiffs
be entitled to a reimbursement of this amount? The answer is in the negative. Because of failure of
plaintiffs to liquidated the mortgage loan on time, it had ballooned from its original figure of P135,384.18
as of June 1984 to P337,280.78 as of December 31, 1988. Defendants [Santoses] had to pay the last
amount to the bank to save the property from foreclosure. Logically, plaintiffs must share in the burden
arising from their failure to liquidate the loan per their contractual commitment. Hence, the amount of
P25,794.64 as their share in the defendants' damages in the form of increased loan-amount, is
reasonable.[6]

On appeal, the appellate court, as earlier noted, reversed the lower court. The appellate court held
that rescission was not justified under the circumstances and allowed the Caseda spouses a period of
ninety days within which to pay the balance of the agreed purchase price.
Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari filed by the Santoses.
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our consideration:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PRIVATE

RESPONDENT'S APPEAL INTERPOSING PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW.

WHETHER THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION IS NOT A CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE BUT A MERE
ORAL CONTRACT TO SELL IN WHICH CASE JUDICIAL DEMAND FOR RESCISSION (ART.
1592,[7] CIVIL CODE) IS NOT APPLICABLE.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A JUDICIAL DEMAND FOR RESCISSION IS REQUIRED, WHETHER

PETITIONERS' DEMAND AND PRAYER FOR RESCISSION CONTAINED IN THEIR ANSWER FILED
BEFORE THE TRIAL SATISFIED THE SAID REQUIREMENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NON-PAYMENT OF MORE THAN HALF OF THE ENTIRE PURCHASE
PRICE INCLUDING THE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE STIPULATION TO LIQUIDATE THE
MORTGAGE LOAN ON TIME WHICH CAUSED GRAVE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE TO
PETITIONERS, CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL BREACH TO JUSTIFY RESCISSION OF A CONTRACT
TO SELL UNDER ARTICLE 1191[8] (CIVIL CODE).

On the first issue, petitioners argue that, since both the parties and the appellate court adopted the
findings of trial court,[9] no questions of fact were raised before the Court of Appeals. According to
petitioners, CA-G.R. CV No. 30955, involved only pure questions of law. They aver that the court a quo had
no jurisdiction to hear, much less decide, CA-G.R. CV No. 30955, without running afoul of Supreme Court
Circular No. 2-90 (4) [c].[10]
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain set of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.[11]But we note that the first assignment of error submitted by respondents for
consideration by the appellate court dealt with the trial court's finding that herein petitioners got back the
property in question because respondents did not have the means to pay the installments and/or
amortization of the loan.[12] The resolution of this question involved an evaluation of proof, and not only a
consideration of the applicable statutory and case laws. Clearly, CA-G.R. CV No. 30955 did not involve
pure questions of law, hence the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction and there was no violation of our Circular
No. 2-90.
Moreover, we find that petitioners took an active part in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals,
yet they did not raise there the issue of jurisdiction. They should have raised this issue at the earliest
opportunity before the Court of Appeals. A party taking part in the proceedings before the appellate court
and submitting his case for as decision ought not to later on attack the court's decision for want of jurisdiction
because the decision turns out to be adverse to him.[13]
The second and third issues deal with the question: Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that a
judicial rescission of the agreement was necessary? In resolving both issues, we must first make a
preliminary determination of the nature of the contract in question: Was it a contract of sale, as insisted by
respondents or a mere contract to sell, as contended by petitioners?
Petitioners argue that the transaction between them and respondents was a mere contract to sell, and
not a contract of sale, since the sole documentary evidence (Exh. D, receipt) referring to their agreement
clearly showed that they did not transfer ownership of the property in question simultaneous with its delivery
and hence remained its owners, pending fulfillment of the other suspensive conditions, i.e., full payment of
the balance of the purchase price and the loan amortizations. Petitioners point to Manuel v. Rodriguez,
109 Phil. 1 (1960) and Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 43 SCRA 93 (1972), where
we held that Article 1592 of the Civil Code is inapplicable to a contract to sell. They charge the court a quo
with reversible error in holding that petitioners should have judicially rescinded the agreement with
respondents when the latter failed to pay the amortizations on the bank loan.
Respondents insist that there was a perfected contract of sale, since upon their partial payment of the
purchase price, they immediately took possession of the property as vendees, and subsequently leased it,
thus exercising all the rights of ownership over the property. This showed that transfer of ownership was
simultaneous with the delivery of the realty sold, according to respondents.
It must be emphasized from the outset that a contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into
consideration its essential elements, and not what the contracting parties call it. [14] Article 1458[15] of the
Civil Code defines a contract of sale. Note that the said article expressly obliges the vendor to transfer
ownership of the thing sold as an essential element of a contract of sale. This is because the transfer of
ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised is the very essence of a contract of sale.[16] We have
carefully examined the contents of the unofficial receipt, Exh. D, with the terms and conditions informally
agreed upon by the parties, as well as the proofs submitted to support their respective contentions. We are
far from persuaded that there was a transfer of ownership simultaneously with the delivery of the property
purportedly sold. The records clearly show that, notwithstanding the fact that the Casedas first took then
lost possession of the disputed house and lot, the title to the property, TCT No. 28005 (S-11029) issued by
the Register of Deeds of Paraaque, has remained always in the name of Rosalinda Santos. [17] Note further
that although the parties had agreed that the Casedas would assume the mortgage, all amortization
payments made by Carmen Caseda to the bank were in the name of Rosalinda Santos.[18] We likewise find
that the bank's cancellation and discharge of mortgage dated January 20, 1990, was made in favor of
Rosalinda Santos.[19] The foregoing circumstances categorically and clearly show that no valid transfer of
ownership was made by the Santoses to the Casedas. Absent this essential element, their agreement
cannot be deemed a contract of sale. We agree with petitioners' averment that the agreement between
Rosalinda Santos and Carmen Caseda is a contract to sell. In contracts to sell, ownership is reserved by
the vendor and is not to pass until full payment of the purchase price. This we find fully applicable and
understandable in this case, given that the property involved is a titled realty under mortgage to a bank and
would require notarial and other formalities of law before transfer thereof could be validly effected.
In view of our finding in the present case that the agreement between the parties is a contract to sell,
it follows that the appellate court erred when it decreed that a judicial rescission of said agreement was
necessary. This is because there was no rescission to speak of in the first place. As we earlier pointed out,
in a contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the vendee until the purchase
price is paid in full. Thus, in a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition. Failure to pay the price agreed upon is not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.[20] This is entirely
different from the situation in a contract of sale, where non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory
condition. The effects in law are not identical. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost ownership of the
thing sold and cannot recover it, unless the contract of sale is rescinded and set aside. [21] In a contract to
sell, however, the vendor remains the owner for as long as the vendee has not complied fully with the
condition of paying the purchase price. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to meet the condition
precedent, he is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. When the petitioners in the instant case
repossessed the disputed house and lot for failure of private respondents to pay the purchase price in full,
they were merely enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. As petitioners correctly point out, the Court
of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners should have judicially rescinded the contract pursuant to
Articles 1592 and 1191 of the Civil Code. Article 1592 speaks of non-payment of the purchase price as a
resolutory condition. It does not apply to a contract to sell.[22] As to Article 1191, it is subordinated to the
provisions of Article 1592 when applied to sales of immovable property. [23] Neither provision is applicable
in the present case.
As to the last issue, we need not tarry to make a determination of whether the breach of contract by
private respondents is so substantial as to defeat the purpose of the parties in entering into the agreement
and thus entitle petitioners to rescission. Having ruled that there is no rescission to speak of in this case,
the question is moot.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 30955 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 133, with respect to the DISMISSAL of the complaint in Civil Case No. 89-4759, is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173594 February 6, 2008

SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE, LTD., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner, Silkair (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (Silkair), a corporation organized under the laws of Singapore
which has a Philippine representative office, is an online international air carrier operating the Singapore-
Cebu-Davao-Singapore, Singapore-Davao-Cebu-Singapore, and Singapore-Cebu-Singapore routes.

On December 19, 2001, Silkair filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) a written application for
the refund of P4,567,450.79 excise taxes it claimed to have paid on its purchases of jet fuel from Petron
Corporation from January to June 2000.1

As the BIR had not yet acted on the application as of December 26, 2001, Silkair filed a Petition for
Review2 before the CTA following Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., et al. 3

Opposing the petition, respondent Commissioner on Internal Revenue (CIR) alleged in his Answer that,
among other things,

Petitioner failed to prove that the sale of the petroleum products was directly made from a
domestic oil company to the international carrier. The excise tax on petroleum products is the
 direct liability of the manufacturer/producer, and when added to the cost of the goods sold to the
buyer, it is no longer a tax but part of the price which the buyer has to pay to obtain the
article.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Decision of May 27, 2005, the Second Division of the CTA denied Silkair’s petition on the ground that
as the excise tax was imposed on Petron Corporation as the manufacturer of petroleum products, any
claim for refund should be filed by the latter; and where the burden of tax is shifted to the purchaser, the
amount passed on to it is no longer a tax but becomes an added cost of the goods purchased. Thus the
CTA discoursed:

The liability for excise tax on petroleum products that are being removed from its refinery is
imposed on the manufacturer/producer (Section 130 of the NIRC of 1997). x x x

xxxx

While it is true that in the case of excise tax imposed on petroleum products, the seller thereof
may shift the tax burden to the buyer, the latter is the proper party to claim for the refund in the
case of exemption from excise tax. Since the excise tax was imposed upon Petron
Corporation as the manufacturer of petroleum products, pursuant to Section 130(A)(2), and
that the corresponding excise taxes were indeed, paid by it, . . . any claim for refund of the
subject excise taxes should be filed by Petron Corporation as the taxpayer contemplated
under the law. Petitioner cannot be considered as the taxpayer because it merely shouldered the
burden of the excise tax and not the excise tax itself.

Therefore, the right to claim for the refund of excise taxes paid on petroleum products lies with
Petron Corporation who paid and remitted the excise tax to the BIR. Respondent, on the other
hand, may only claim from Petron Corporation the reimbursement of the tax burden shifted to the
former by the latter. The excise tax partaking the nature of an indirect tax, is clearly the liability of
the manufacturer or seller who has the option whether or not to shift the burden of the tax to the
purchaser. Where the burden of the tax is shifted to the [purchaser], the amount passed on
to it is no longer a tax but becomes an added cost on the goods purchased which constitutes
a part of the purchase price. The incidence of taxation or the person statutorily liable to pay the
tax falls on Petron Corporation though the impact of taxation or the burden of taxation falls on
another person, which in this case is petitioner Silkair.5 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Silkair filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 during the pendency of which or on September 12, 2005 the
Bengzon Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel, 7 without Silkair’s then-counsel of record (Jimenez
Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez or "JGLaw") having withdrawn as such.

By Resolution8 of September 22, 2005, the CTA Second Division denied Silkair’s motion for
reconsideration. A copy of the Resolution was furnished Silkair’s counsel JGLaw which received it on
October 3, 2005.9

On October 13, 2005, JGLaw, with the conformity of Silkair, filed its Notice of Withdrawal of
Appearance.10 On even date, Silkair, through the Bengzon Law Firm, filed a
Manifestation/Motion11 stating:

Petitioner was formerly represented xxx by JIMENEZ GONZALES LIWANAG BELLO VALDEZ
CALUYA & FERNANDEZ (JGLaw).

1. On 24 August 2005, petitioner served notice to JGLaw of its decision to cease all legal
representation handled by the latter on behalf of the petitioner. Petitioner also requested
 JGLaw to make arrangements for the transfer of all files relating to its legal
representation on behalf of petitioner to the undersigned counsel. x x x

2. The undersigned counsel was engaged to act as counsel for the petitioner in the
above-entitled case; and thus, filed its entry of appearance on 12 September 2005. x x x

3. The undersigned counsel, through petitioner, has received information that the
Honorable Court promulgated a Resolution on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. To
date, the undersigned counsel has yet to receive an official copy of the above-mentioned
Resolution. In light of the foregoing, undersigned counsel hereby respectfully requests for
an official copy of the Honorable Court’s Resolution on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration x x x.12 (Underscoring supplied)

On October 14, 2005, the Bengzon Law Firm received its requested copy of the September 22,
200513 CTA Second Division Resolution. Thirty-seven days later or on October 28, 2005, Silkair, through
said counsel, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review14 before the CTA En Banc
which gave it until November 14, 2005 to file a petition for review.

On November 11, 2005, Silkair filed another Motion for Extension of Time.15 On even date, the Bengzon
Law Firm informed the CTA of its withdrawal of appearance as counsel for Silkair with the information,
that Silkair would continue to be represented by Atty. Teodoro A. Pastrana, who used to be with the firm
but who had become a partner of the Pastrana and Fallar Law Offices. 16

The CTA En Banc granted Silkair’s second Motion for Extension of Time, giving Silkair until November 24,
2005 to file its petition for review. On November 17, 2005, Silkair filed its Petition for Review17 before the
CTA En Banc.

By Resolution of May 19,2006, the CTA En Banc dismissed18 Silkair’s petition for review for having been
filed out of time in this wise:

A petitioner is given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of award, judgment, final order or
resolution, or denial of motion for new trial or reconsideration to appeal to the proper forum, in this
case, the CTA En Banc. This is clear from both Section 11 and Section 9 of Republic Act No.
9282 x x x.

xxxx

The petitioner, through its counsel of record Jimenez, Gonzalez, L[iwanag], Bello, Valdez, Caluya
& Fernandez Law Offices, received the Resolution dated September 22, 2005 on October 3,
2005. At that time, the petitioner had two counsels of record, namely, Jimenez, Gonzales,
L[iwanag], Bello, Valdez, Caluya & Fernandez Law Offices and The Bengzon Law Firm which
filed its Entry of Appearance on September 12, 2005. However, as of said date, Atty. Mary Jane
B. Austria-Delgado of Jimenez, Gonzales, L[iwanag], Bello, Valdez, Caluya & Fernandez Law
Offices was still the counsel of record considering that the Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance
signed by Atty. Mary Jane B. Austria-Delgado was filed only on October 13, 2005 or ten (10) days
after receipt of the September 22, 2005 Resolution of the Court’s Second Division. This
notwithstanding, Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the Court. Where a party is represented by more
than one counsel of record, "notice to any one of the several counsel on record is equivalent to
notice to all the counsel (Damasco vs. Arrieta, et. al., 7 SCRA 224)." Considering that petitioner,
through its counsel of record, had received the September 22, 2005 Resolution as early as
October 3, 2005, it had only until October 18, 2005 within which to file its Petition for Review.
 Petitioner only managed to file the Petition for Review with the Court En Banc on November 17,
2005 or [after] thirty (30) days had lapsed from the final date of October 18, 2005 to appeal.

The argument that it requested Motions for Extension of Time on October 28, 2005 or ten (10)
days from the appeal period and the second Motion for Extension of Time to file its Petition for
Review on November 11, 2005 and its allowance by the CTA En Banc notwithstanding, the
questioned Decision is no longer appealable for failure to timely file the necessary Petition for
Review.19 (Emphasis in the original)

In a Separate Concurring Opinion,20 CTA Associate Justice Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr. posited that Silkair
is not the proper party to claim the tax refund.

Silkair filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 which the CTA En Banc denied.22 Hence, the present Petition
for Review23 which raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE HONORABLE COURT
OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC WAS TIMELY FILED.

II. APPEAL BEING AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM, WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER SHOULD BE DEPRIVED OF ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL ON THE BASIS OF
TECHNICALITY.

III. ASSUMING THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WOULD HOLD THAT THE FILING OF
THE PETITITON FOR REVIEW WITH THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC
WAS TIMELY, WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS THE PROPER PARTY TO CLAIM
FOR REFUND OR TAX CREDIT.24 (Underscoring supplied)

Silkair posits that "the instant case does not involve a situation where the petitioner was represented by
two (2) counsels on record, such that notice to the former counsel would be held binding on the petitioner,
as in the case of Damasco v. Arrieta, etc., et al.25 x x x heavily relied upon by the respondent";26 and that
"the case of Dolores De Mesa Abad v. Court of Appeals27 has more appropriate application to the present
case."28

In Dolores De Mesa Abad, the trial court issued an order of November 19, 1974 granting the therein
private respondents’ Motion for Annulment of documents and titles. The order was received by the therein
petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Escolastico R. Viola, on November 22, 1974 prior to which or on July
17, 1974, Atty. Vicente Millora of the Millora, Tobias and Calimlim Law Office had filed an "Appearance
and Manifestation." Atty. Millora received a copy of the trial court’s order on December 9, 1974. On
January 4, 1975, the therein petitioners, through Atty. Ernesto D. Tobias also of the Millora, Tobias and
Calimlim Law Office, filed their Notice of Appeal and Cash Appeal Bond as well as a Motion for Extension
of the period to file a Record on Appeal. They filed the Record on Appeal on January 24, 1975. The trial
court dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals on
the ground that the period within which to appeal should be counted from November 22, 1974, the date
Atty. Viola received a copy of the November 19, 1974 order. The appellate court held that Atty. Viola was
still the counsel of record, he not having yet withdrawn his appearance as counsel for the therein
petitioners. On petition for certiorari,29 this Court held

x x x [R]espondent Court reckoned the period of appeal from the time petitioners’ original
counsel, Atty. Escolastico R. Viola, received the Order granting the Motion for Annulment of
documents and titles on November 22, 1974. But as petitioners stress, Atty. Vicente Millora of the
Millora, Tobias and Calimlim Law Office had filed an "Appearance and Manifestation" on July 16,
1974. Where there may have been no specific withdrawal by Atty. Escolastico R. Viola, for which
he should be admonished, by the appearance of a new counsel, it can be said that Atty. Viola had
 ceased as counsel for petitioners. In fact, Orders subsequent to the aforesaid date were already
sent by the trial Court to the Millora, Tobias and Calimlim Law Office and not to Atty. Viola.

Under the circumstances, December 9, 1974 is the controlling date of receipt by petitioners’
counsel and from which the period of appeal from the Order of November 19, 1974 should be
reckoned. That being the case, petitioner’s x x x appeal filed on January 4, 1975 was timely
filed.30 (Underscoring supplied)

The facts of Dolores De Mesa Abad are not on all fours with those of the present case. In any event,
more recent jurisprudence holds that in case of failure to comply with the procedure established by
Section 26, Rule 13831 of the Rules of Court re the withdrawal of a lawyer as a counsel in a case, the
attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders
and pleadings.32 Thus, where no notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel has been shown, notice to
counsel of record is, for all purposes, notice to the client.33 The court cannot be expected to itself
ascertain whether the counsel of record has been changed. 34

In the case at bar, JGLaw filed its Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance on October 13, 2005 35 after the
Bengzon Law Firm had entered its appearance. While Silkair claims it dismissed JGLaw as its counsel as
early as August 24, 2005, the same was communicated to the CTA only on October 13, 2005. 36 Thus,
JGLaw was still Silkair’s counsel of record as of October 3, 2005 when a copy of the September 22, 2005
resolution of the CTA Second Division was served on it. The service upon JGLaw on October 3, 2005 of
the September 22, 2005 resolution of CTA Second Division was, therefore, for all legal intents and
purposes, service to Silkair, and the CTA correctly reckoned the period of appeal from such date.

TECHNICALITY ASIDE, on the merits, the petition just the same fails.

Silkair bases its claim for refund or tax credit on Section 135 (b) of the NIRC of 1997 which reads

Sec. 135. Petroleum Products sold to International Carriers and Exempt Entities of
Agencies. – Petroleum products sold to the following are exempt from excise tax:

xxxx

(b) Exempt entities or agencies covered by tax treaties, conventions, and other international
agreements for their use and consumption: Provided, however, That the country of said foreign
international carrier or exempt entities or agencies exempts from similar taxes petroleum products
sold to Philippine carriers, entities or agencies; x x x

x x x x,

and Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the Republic of Singapore (Air Transport Agreement between RP and
Singapore) which reads

Fuel, lubricants, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores introduced into, or taken on
board aircraft in the territory of one Contracting party by, or on behalf of, a designated airline of
the other Contracting Party and intended solely for use in the operation of the agreed services
shall, with the exception of charges corresponding to the service performed, be exempt from the
same customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes imposed in the territories of the
first Contracting Party , even when these supplies are to be used on the parts of the journey
performed over the territory of the Contracting Party in which they are introduced into or taken on
board. The materials referred to above may be required to be kept under customs supervision
and control.
The proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on
whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to
another.37 Section 130 (A) (2) of the NIRC provides that "[u]nless otherwise specifically allowed, the
return shall be filed and the excise tax paid by the manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic
products from place of production." Thus, Petron Corporation, not Silkair, is the statutory taxpayer which
is entitled to claim a refund based on Section 135 of the NIRC of 1997 and Article 4(2) of the Air
Transport Agreement between RP and Singapore.

Even if Petron Corporation passed on to Silkair the burden of the tax, the additional amount billed to
Silkair for jet fuel is not a tax but part of the price which Silkair had to pay as a purchaser.38

Silkair nevertheless argues that it is exempt from indirect taxes because the Air Transport Agreement
between RP and Singapore grants exemption "from the same customs duties, inspection fees and other
duties or taxes imposed in the territory of the first Contracting Party."39 It invokes Maceda v. Macaraig,
Jr.40 which upheld the claim for tax credit or refund by the National Power Corporation (NPC) on the
ground that the NPC is exempt even from the payment of indirect taxes.

Silkairs’s argument does not persuade. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company,41 this Court clarified the ruling in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr., viz:

It may be so that in Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., the Court held that an exemption from "all taxes"
granted to the National Power Corporation (NPC) under its charter includes both direct and
indirect taxes. But far from providing PLDT comfort, Maceda in fact supports the case of herein
petitioner, the correct lesson of Macedabeing that an exemption from "all taxes" excludes indirect
taxes, unless the exempting statute, like NPC’s charter, is so couched as to include indirect tax
from the exemption. Wrote the Court:

x x x However, the amendment under Republic Act No. 6395 enumerated the details
covered by the exemption. Subsequently, P.D. 380, made even more specific the details
of the exemption of NPC to cover, among others, both direct and indirect taxes on all
petroleum products used in its operation. Presidential Decree No. 938 [NPC’s amended
charter] amended the tax exemption by simplifying the same law in general terms. It
succinctly exempts NPC from "all forms of taxes, duties[,] fees…"

The use of the phrase "all forms" of taxes demonstrates the intention of the law to give
NPC all the tax exemptions it has been enjoying before…

xxxx

It is evident from the provisions of P.D. No. 938 that its purpose is to maintain the tax
exemption of NPC from all forms of taxes including indirect taxes as provided under R.A.
No. 6395 and P.D. 380 if it is to attain its goals. (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)42

The exemption granted under Section 135 (b) of the NIRC of 1997 and Article 4(2) of the Air Transport
Agreement between RP and Singapore cannot, without a clear showing of legislative intent, be construed
as including indirect taxes. Statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, 43 and if an exemption is found to exist, it must
not be enlarged by construction.44

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-

KUWAITPetitioners,
vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-
co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist
under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.

Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are
covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11,
2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March
17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by
petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there
was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee,
held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00,
representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.

On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of
January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution 5 of April 22,
2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year period
as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be
liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.

In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot
be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private
employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal
for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant
and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency
may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and
damages awarded to overseas workers.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution 7 of June
27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.

Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract
specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of
Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply
the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.

Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to
master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the
"customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country."

Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the
foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any
document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable,
more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired
over it.

The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of
Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its
foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s
liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals,
Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad 8 explains:

. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the
local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if
either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law
governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the
plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its
foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before petitioner
can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.

As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable
since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into,
that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and
Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host
country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they
wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws
will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract,
Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International
Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they
must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry,
as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1)
year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to
English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without
specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of termination,12 both of which
documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of
Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter 13 of reconsideration to
the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of
"Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was
validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a
copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials
thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting
only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not
prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti
laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:

xxxx

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa
was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in
order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may
serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the
express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 regarding
the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering
that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified
to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her
contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch
54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in
Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending
action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was
valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal
in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an
interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. 4

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have
been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest.
Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedent’s properties, the
RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the
wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari.
Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing
a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the
merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for
the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A
petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary
civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of
proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of
administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same
decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a
party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a
party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of
the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for
that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be
appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of
the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator
under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a
spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has
not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second
or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of
the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her
subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even
an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for
us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando
B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. 6 She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was
illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still
holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol
still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the
marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested
party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that
the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, 9 to
wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was
no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she
is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with
the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had
lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating
it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
(Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under
the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a
need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of
divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential
right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with
Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: