Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The conflict between the management and the employee is inherent in an industrial
society. One argues for more investment and profits while the other argues for better standard
of living. These two conflicting interests can be adjusted temporarily through the principle of
"give and take", The principle of give and take has been infused in the principle of collective
bargaining. The phrase "collective bargaining" was coined by British labor reformers Sidney
and Beatrice Webb of Great Britain which was the “home of collective bargaining” in the
1890. The idea of collective bargaining emerged as a result of industrial conflict and growth
of trade union movement and was first given currency in the United States by Samuel
Crompers. In India the first collective bargaining agreement was conducted in 1920 at the
instance of Mahatma Gandhi to regulate labour management relation between a group of
employers and their workers in the textile industry in Ahmadabad
ISSUES:
Whether employer has appeared in person before conciliation officer is wholly irrelevant to
consider the validity of plea of consent under coercion or of free will, during the course of
pending proceeding before Labour Court?
REASONING:
In the context of Section 2-A where the dispute is individual the right of an individual to
withdraw from the dispute at his free will by negotiating the terms which is best suited to him
in individual capacity obviously cannot be put to same stress to which settlement arrived at
between the union representing all or majority of workmen and employer to safeguard the
interest of a body of workmen which requires greater amount of caution and sanctity of
procedure so as to make it a fair process making it binding on to those also who may not have
participated in the proceedings and who may not have agreed to such process.
CONCLUSION: For the reasons mentioned the impugned award of the Labour Court is set
aside. The Labour Court is directed to decide the dispute afresh in accordance with law
keeping in view the observations made above. If so required by the parties the parties may be
permitted to lead further evidence subject to the condition that party leading evidence shall,
whether producing oral evidence by documentary, tender such evidence simultaneously with
the request for taking further evidence, about the question of voluntary nature of the
compromise deed and affidavit, which has been executed by the workmen and the
representative of the employer on 25.7.95 with right of the other side to produce evidence.
The award shall be made within a period of six months.
ISSUES:
1. Whether both the units at Hubli and Harihar could be treated as a single unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining by the union.
2. whether a settlement entered into under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act
between the recognised union and the management is binding on the minority union.
REASONING:
It is common ground that this was the practice that was being followed within the
knowledge of the petitioner-Union. It is also common ground that when the petitioner-Union
was the recognised union during the period 1994-96 it was on the basis that the unit at Hubli
and Harihar were treated as a single unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. In fact it
was the petitioner-Union that was the representative of the workmen during the period 1994-
96. Therefore, it is not permissible for the petitioner to state that the units should be divided
and that a separate secret ballet should have been held for the unit at Hubli when it is
established that by practice and by agreement that both Hubli and Harihar were to be
represented as a single unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. therefore, the collective
bargaining for the purpose of this settlement can be done only by the union that commands
the majority in both Hubli and Harihar. In this case, admittedly, the 2nd respondent-Union is
the recognised union to enter into any settlement.
CONCLUSION:
The petitioner is not the majority union, the petitioner cannot be a spoilt-sport in
raking up this issue having once earlier represented both the units. Therefore, hold that the
collective bargaining for the purpose of this settlement can be done only by the union that
commands the majority in both Hubli and Harihar. In this case, admittedly, the 2nd
respondent-Union is the recognised union to enter into any settlement. According to section
18(3) of the act the settlement is binding.
ISSUES:
Whether the action of the management of Hillson and DinshaW Ltd. Mumbai in not
reinstating Shri P.G. Pednekar who is senior among the retrenched employees in the same
category is just, proper and legal? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?
REASONING:
In the instant case it is not disputed that the settlement arrived by the union with the appellant
company was not in the course of conciliation proceedings. Therefore, it would be binding on
the parties to the agreement namely the appellant company on the one hand and the union
representing the respondent workman who was its member. In the circumstances, the
respondent workman also would be ordinarily bound by the settlement entered into by his
representative union with the company unless it is shown that the said settlement was ex facie
unfair, unjust or mala fide. No such case was even alleged, much less made out by the
respondent workman either before the Tribunal or before the learned single Judge. It is
interesting to note that before the learned single Judge the only argument put forward on
behalf of the respondent workman was that, he was not a party to the settlement and his
consent was not taken by the union and, therefore, it was not binding on him. Once it is kept
in view that the industrial dispute was raised by the union on behalf of the retrenched,
workmen including respondent workman, and it was an industrial dispute covered by Section
2(k) it cannot be held that the settlement which was entered into under Section 2(p) read
with Section 18(1) of the Act is not binding on the individual workman.
CONCLUSION:
The learned single Judge held that under Section 18(1) of the Act settlement is intended to be
binding only on the signatories or parties to the settlement and as the respondent workman
was not signatory to the settlement it was not binding on him. The learned Judge therefore
directed the appellant-company to reinstate the workman and so far as back wages are
concerned directed the union to pay the amount of back wages on the ground that the union
alone was responsible for the loss of back wages of the workman. For the reasons mentioned,
it is not possible to sustain the finding of the learned single Judge that the settlement was not
binding on the respondent workman on the, ground that the workman was not a signatory to
the settlement. In the present case the reference is in respect of the action of the management
in not re-employing the workman and it does not relate to the retrenchment or layoff and,
therefore, Chapter V-B which contains this provision has no application. In the result appeals
are allowed. Order of the learned single Judge is set aside.
ISSUE:
Whether it can be said that the industrial dispute has ended because the parties to the dispute
have come to a private agreement?
REASONING:
The only settlement between the parties which is binding is the settlement arrived at through
the instrumentality of the conciliation officer. That is clear from the provisions of Section
19(3). It is only that settlement upon which the law has put its imprimatur and to which the
law has given sanctity and which the law has made binding. Industrial law takes no notice of
any private settlement or agreement arrived at between the parties in the course of an
industrial dispute. Such r private agreement belongs to the realm of contract; it may give rise
to contractual rights; but then we are dealing with Industrial law it has no sanction
whatsoever, and therefore in the eye of the industrial law, in our opinion, an industrial dispute
does not end until a settlement is arrived at, which settlement has been given a binding effect
under the provisions of Section 19(2), and such a settlement can only be arrived at when
conciliation proceedings are held under Section 12. Therefore, it would not be true to say that
the industrial dispute ended with the settlement arrived at between the parties on 7-4-1955,
that the conciliation officer had no jurisdiction to record the settlement, & that in raising
another dispute in June 1955
CONCLUSION:
Although the conciliation officer has a discretion, it is obvious that that discretion
cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised, and if we had agreed with the contention put
forward by Mr. Bhandare then we would certainly have required the conciliation officer to
consider the question on merits and exercise his discretion as required by the statute. But
inasmuch we have taken the view that conciliation proceedings cannot be initiated when there
is a settlement in force, the question of the exercise of the discretion of the conciliation
officer does not arise. Accordingly the petition is dismissed.
ISSUE:
whether non-publication of the arbitration agreement as required under subsec. (3) of sec. 10-
A, renders the arbitral award invalid and unenforceable?
REASONING:
The parties entered into the above agreement and referred the dispute for arbitration under
sec. 10-A of the Act.
1. Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the employer and the
workmen agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, they may, at any time before the
dispute has been referred under sec. 10 to a Labour Court or Tribunal or National
Tribunal, by a written agreement, refer the dispute to arbitration and the reference
shall be to such person or persons (including the presiding officer of a Labour Court
or Tribunal or National Tribunal) as an arbitrator or arbi- trators as may be specified
in the arbitration agreement.
2. An arbitration agreement referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall be in such form and
shall be signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed.
3. A copy of the arbitration agreement shall be forwarded to the appropriate Government
and the conciliation officer and the appropriate Government shall, within (one month)
from the date of the receipt of such copy, publish the same in the Official Gazette.
4. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall inves- tigate the dispute and submit to the appropri-
ate Government the arbitration award signed by the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as
the case may be.
This is with regard to advantages of voluntary arbitration. There is another aspect which was
perhaps not realised by the State Government when it referred the dispute under section
10(1). Section 10 and 10-A of the Act are the alter- native remedies to settle an industrial
dispute. An industrial dispute can either be referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication
under section 10, or the parties can enter into an arbitration agreement and refer it to an
arbitrator under section 10-A. But once the parties have chosen their remedy under section
10-A the Government cannot refer that dispute for adjudication under section 10. The said
reference made by the Government under section 10(1) cannot, therefore, be sustained.
(i) The State Government shall publish condition No. '3' in the arbitration agreement
in the Government Gazette within four weeks from today.
(ii) The agreement containing condition No. '3' stands referred to the Industrial
Tribunal, Haryana at Ambala for passing arbitration award in accordance with
law;
(iii) The reference made under section 10(1) of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal is
quashed; and
(iv) The management shall with- draw the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal and the
Writ Petition pending in the High Court within three weeks from today failing
which the High Court shall dispose them of as having become infructuous.
CONCLUSION:
The principle in this case regarding collective bargaining is that Collective bargaining is a
technique by which dispute as to conditions of employment is resolved amicably by
agreement rather than coercion