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Arthur W. Burks
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 9, No. 4. (Jun., 1949), pp. 673-689.
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Tue Nov 13 21:30:00 2007
ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL
This paper is divided into two sections. The first makes a critical ex-
amination of Peirce's classification of signs into icon, index, and symbol.
The second offers an analysis of the nature of indexical signs which goes
considerably beyond what Peirce has said on the subject.
I. Peirce's Classification of Signs into Icon, Index, and Symbol
Charles 5. Peirce's division of signs into icon, index, and symbol is the
simplest of his many classifications of signs, and is, moreover, the most im-
portant of them all, for it contains the essence of even the most compli-
cated of them without sharing their repetitive and unwieldy character.
Historically, the more complicated classifications developed as expansions
of the simpler one, in recognition of distinctions that can and should be
made. Peirce made these distinctions, however, in a way which is too
bound up with his system of categories to be of use outside his philosophy,
and without adding anything novel to his original trichotomy.'
In this section, then, we shall attempt to provide a critical exposition of
Pierce's earliest and most basic classification. Let us begin with a prelimi-
nary explanation of the three kinds of signs, the symbol, the index, and the
icon, to be taken in that order. We can best do this in terms of the follow-
ing examples: (1) the word 'red', as used in the English sentence, 'The
book is red'; (2) an act of pointing, used to call attention to some particular
object, e.g., a tree; (3) a scale drawing, used to communicate to a machinist
the structure of a piece of machinery. All of these are signs in the general
sense in which this term is used by Peirce: each satisfies his definition of a
sign2as something which represents or signifies an object to some interpretant
(1.346, 2.228, 4.531).3 In the above examples the objects are: the color
red, the tree, and the structure of the machine, respectively; the interpre-
tants are, in each case, the minds understanding the sign. But there are
1 For a brief discussion of the entire hierarchy of Peirce's classifications,
see "Peirce's Sixty-Six Signs," by Paul Weiss and Arthur Burks, The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. X L I I (1945)' pp. 383-388.
2 The use of Peirce's definitions of 'sign', 'icon', 'index', and 'symbol' here and
throughout the rest of this section is not intended to imply that the author regards
them as satisfactory for the theory of signs. I n particular, we find Peirce's definition
of an index inadequate for a number of reasons (see footnotes 8, 14, and 18) and so
replace i t in the second section with a new analysis of indices.
3 These and the following numerical references are to the Collected Papers of Charles
Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss.
673
some important differences in the way in which these signs signify or repre-
sent their objects, and it is on the basis of these differences that the clas-
sification is made. A sign represents its object to its interpretant sym-
bolically, indexically, or iconically according to whether it does so (1) by
being associated with its object by a conventional rule used by the interpre-
tant (as in the case of 'red'); (2) by being in existential relation with its
object (as in the case of the act of pointing); or (3) by exhibiting its object
(as in the case of the diagram).
Let us examine further the application of these criteria to our three
examples. Consider first the word 'red'. The word 'red' is a symbol
because it stands for the quality red to an interpretant4 who interprets it in
virtue of the conventional linguistic rule of English establishing the mean-
ing of this word. Thus any word is a symbol, including words that are
indexical (e.g., 'this') and words that are iconic (e.g., an onomatopoetic
word).
Consider next the act of pointing. Its object is whatever is pointed to,
that is, whatever is in a certain physical relation to the sign. Here the
tree is selected or indicated by virtue of its being in the direction of the
pointed finger, only a few yards away from it, etc. Hence the act of point-
ing is an index, i.e., a sign which determines its object on the basis of an
existential connection. The symbol 'this' is also an index, because (apart
from the conventional element by virtue of which it is a symbol) it may
function very much the same as the act of pointing; i.e., instead of pointing
to a tree one may use the phrase 'this tree'. The object of a specific occur-
rence or token of 'this' is determined or selected by virtue of its being in
some existential relation to the occurrence of the sign itself.
Consider, finally, the diagram. The diagram is an icon because it repre-
sents the structure of the machine by exemplifying or exhibiting the same
structure in some respects. The draftsman communicates to the machinist
the fact that one wheel of the machine has twice the diameter of another
by drawing the first wheel with twice the diameter of the second, and so on.
I n the same way, an onomatopoetic word when used orally is an icon (as
well as a symbol) because the sound of the word suggests or exhibits the
sense. I n his unpublished writings Peirce gives us an example of a written
analogue of onomatopoetic words, a kind of iconic handwriting that he
calls art chirography. He wrote out Poe's "The Raven" in such a hand
as to convey the poetic ideas by means of the handwriting as well as the
words.
This concludes our preliminary explanation of icons, indices, and sym-
In the interest of brevity this reference to an interpretant will not usually be
made explicit hereafter.
bols. We are now ready to take up in greater detail the two which have
more novel aspects, the icon and the index; what Peirce has to say about
the symbol we can best treat in connection with these.
The indexical element of this remark is implied in the speaker's use of the
present tense, as well as in his bodily orientation, both of which give the
meaning here and now; the sentence 'It is raining' uttered under these cir-
cumstances is equivalent in meaning to the sentence 'It is raining here and
now'. Such time and place references as 'here', 'now', 'there', 'then', 'yes-
terday', 'tomorrow', etc., are all indexical symbols. The pronouns '1',
'YOU','he', 'this', 'that7, etc., and such expressions as 'this city', 'that
bridge', are also indexical symbols. The following quotation explains why
pronouns are indices in a typically Peircean manner:
Modern grammars define a pronoun as a word used in place of a noun. That
is an ancient doctrine which, exploded early in the thirteenth century, dis-
appeared fiom the grammars for several hundred years. But the substitute
employed was not very clear; and when a barbarous rage against medieval
thought broke out, it was swept away. .. . There is no reason for saying
that I, thou, that, this, stand in place of nouns; they indicate Bhings in the
directest possible way. ... A pronoun is an index. A noun, on the other
hand, does not indicate the object it denotes; and when a noun is used to
l o Or rather, of a given word in one of its meanings. There are three different types
in the three sentences involving 'fast' cited in the last footnote.
11 We are assuming here and hereafter t h a t ambiguity has been eliminated. This
restriction is necessary, for if a nonlindexical symbol is ambiguous its meaning is
specified by its neighboring signs and hence in some sense depends on its spatio-
temporal location. Cf. footnote 12.
12 This phenomenon might be regarded as a kind of ambiguity, i.e., we could say
that the spatiotemporal context specifies the meaning of the ambiguous word 'now'.
However, we prefer not to use the word 'ambiguity' for this kind of phenomenon,
but t o reserve it for those situations where the meaning of a sign is specified by its
neighboring signs, a s in the examples of footnote 9. This being our usage of 'am-
biguity', we can say t h a t the ambiguity of a symbol is theoretically eliminable;
whereas if the other usage were adopted, we could not say t h a t ambiguity is elimina-
ble (for, as we shall show, indexical symbols are indispensable).
of a token of a non-indexical symbol is also its symbolic-meaning. But
the symbolic-meaning of a token of an indexical symbol is only part
of its full meaning: we shall refer to its full meaning as its indexical-meaning.
For example, every token of the type 'now' has the same symbolic-meaning:
'now' means the time at which 'now' is uttered. But in order to know the
indexical-meaning of a token of the type 'now', one must know not only
its symbolic-meaning but its temporal location as well.
To summarize the distinction between indexical and non-indexical sym-
bols: Any two tokens of a given type of symbol have the same symbolic-
meaning, but two tokens of a given type of indexical symbol may have
(and generally do have) different indexical-meanings.
pression may not indicate that all such expressions are meaningless except in context;
Russell seems to follow this line of argument in his theory that definite descriptions
are incomplete symbols. That this conclusion does not follow has been pointed out
by Alonzo Church, who showed that a definite description need not be construed as
an incomplete symbol since it can have a sense (Frege's 'Sinn') even if i t lacks a
denotation (Frege's 'Bedeutung'); see The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. V (1940),
pp. 162-163 and VII (1942)' p. 47. We have been arguing the same point but with
regard to a restricted class of definite descriptions, namely, those involving indices,
such as 'the chair in the next room'.
20 Langford, op. cit., p. 10. See also in this connection the controversy between
Langford [Mind N.S. Vol. XXXVI (1927), pp. 342-346, Vol. XXXVII (1928), pp. 73-81,
and, Vol. XXXVIII (1929), pp. 219-2251 and J. A. Chadwick [Ibid., Vol. XXXVI
(1927), pp. 347-353 and Vol. XXXVII (1928), pp. 471-4841 on the contradictories of
certain singular propositions; and a recent continuation of this discussion by E. J.
Nelson [Ibid., Vol. LV (1946), pp. 319-3271, A. Pap [Ibid.,Vol. LVI (1947), pp. 72-76],
and W. V. Quine [The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. X I 1 (1947), pp. 52-551.
ditions under which 'This A is B' is false: (1) 'this A' does not indicate,
and (2) 'this A' does indicate but the A indicated is not a B, i. e., 'This
A is non-B' is true. By disjoining these two conditions we get the sentence
that we are looking for, but it must be recognized that since these conditions
include a statement of the relation of a sign to its object, it is not possible
to formulate the sentence in the language containing 'this A'; rather, it
is necessary to formulate it in the metalanguage of that language. The
desired contradictory of "This A is B)' is therefore "Either 'this A' does
not indicate or this A is non-B." I t is interesting to note that as a con-
sequence "This A is B" is equivalent to "'This A' indicates and it is not
the case that this A is non-B." Similarly, "This A is non-B" is equivalent
to "'This A' indicates and it is not the case that thisA is B," and "Either
'this A' does not indicate or this A is B" is its contradictory.
ARTHUR W. BURRS.