Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1984 by the

1984, Vol. 46, No. 4, 839-852 American Psychological Association, Inc.

Personal Control and Stress and Coping Processes:

A Theoretical Analysis
Susan Folkman
University of California, Berkeley

Laboratory and field research indicates that the relationships between personal
control and stress, coping, and adaptational outcomes are more complex than was
once assumed. Believing that an event is controllable does not always lead, to a
reduction in stress or to a positive outcome, and believing that an event is uncon-
trollable does not always lead to an increase in stress or to a negative outcome.
These complex relationships involving control are examined in the context of
Lazarus's cognitive theory of stress and coping. The first part of the article elaborates
this theory and shows how two forms of control, generalized beliefs about control
and situational appraisals of control, fit into the overall model. Situational appraisals
of control are explored in this section, including the question, Control over what?
which must be addressed in order to explain some of the perplexing findings. The
second part of the article draws on the theoretical formulation of stress and .coping
to examine three important issues: (a) how believing one has control in a stressful
transaction can heighten threat, (b) the relationship between control and coping,
and (c) pathways through which control can affect the adaptational outcomes of
stressful encounters.

In recent years there has been growing con-
viction that beliefs about personal control are
heavily implicated in stress and coping. Yet,
just how these beliefs influence stress and cop-
ing is not clear. In early research it was assumed
that believing one has control over aversive
outcomes is stress-reducing and that believing
one has little or no control over them is stress
inducing. However, as experiments were re-
peated and extended it became clear that the
relationships between control and stress were
not as simple as was expected. Believing that
an event is controllable does not always lead
to a reduction in stress, and believing that an
event is uncontrollable does not always lead
to an increase in stress (for reviews, see Averill,
1973; Thompson, 1981). Similar findings have
been reported in field studies of the relation-
ship between personal control and adaptational
The writing of this article was supported by a research
grant from the MacArthur Foundation.
I wish to thank Christine Dunkel-Schetter, Richard S.
Lazarus, and Carolyn Aldwin for their helpful comments
on an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence should be sent to Susan Folkman, De-
partment of Psychology, Stress and Coping Project, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, California 94720. No re-
prints are available from the author.
839
outcomes, such as morale or recovery from
illness (for reviews, see Cohen & Lazarus,
1979; Strickland, 1978).
The purpose of this article is to analyze the
role of personal control in stress and coping
processes from the perspective of a cognitively
oriented theory of stress and coping developed
by Lazarus and his colleagues (e.g., Coyne &
Lazarus, 1980; Folkman, Schaefer, & Lazarus,
1979; Lazarus, 1966, 1981; Lazarus & Folk-
man, in press; Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman,
1980; Lazarus & Launier, 1978). This theory
posits two processes, cognitive appraisal and
coping, as mediators of stress and stress-related
adaptational outcomes. Control will be con-
sidered in the context of this theory in two
ways: as a generalized belief of an individual
concerning the extent to which he or she can
control outcomes of importance and as a sit-
uational appraisal of the possibilities for con-
trol in a specific stressful encounter. When
these forms of personal control are viewed in
relation to cognitive appraisal and coping,
many of the findings that have perplexed re-
searchers become more understandable, and
the pathways through which control influences
stress and adaptational outcomes become more
discernible. The basic tenets of this theory are
presented in the next section; in the following
840 SUSAN FOLKMAN

section specific questions concerning the re- Cognitive Appraisal

lationships among control beliefs and apprais-
als and threat, coping, and adaptational out- A theme that has emerged in recent years
come are discussed. is that to understand how believing one has
personal control affects stress, it is necessary
to know the significance or the meaning of the
Cognitive Theory of Stress and Coping event to the individual (e.g., Averill, 1973;
Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Thompson, 1981;
The cognitive theory of stress and coping Wortman
on which this discussion is based is relational & Brehm, 1975). Averill (1973), for
and process oriented. The relational charac- example, made the following statement:
teristic is evident in the definition of stress as It is evident that no simple relationship exists between
a relationship between the person and the en- personal control and stress. About the only general state-
vironment that is appraised by the person as ment which can be made with confidence is that the stress-
taxing or exceeding his or her resources and depend inducing or stress-reducing properties of personal control
upon the meaning of the control response to the
as endangering his or her well-being. This re- individual; and what lends a response meaning is largely
lational definition distinguishes this theory the context in which it is embedded, (p. 301)
from those approaches in which stress is de-
fined as a stimulus (i.e., a stressor), such as Within the theoretical formulation offered
an exam, a shock, or a noxious medical pro- here, the meaning of an event is determined
cedure; as a product of intrapsychic conflict by cognitive appraisal processes. There are two
centering on the person's needs, motives, im- major forms of appraisal: primary appraisal,
pulses, or beliefs; or as a response, such as through which the person evaluates the sig-
physiological arousal or subjective distress. In nificance of a specific transaction with respect
the definition offered here, stress is not a prop- to well-being, and secondary appraisal,
erty of the person or the environment, nor is through which the person evaluates coping re-
it a stimulus or a response. Stress is a particular sources and options. Primary and secondary
relationship between the person and the en- appraisal converge to shape the meaning of
vironment. (For other relational approaches every encounter.
to stress, see French, Rodgers, & Cobb, 1974; Primary appraisals. Judgments that a
McGrath, 1970.) Process'oriented has two transaction is irrelevant, benign-positive, or
meanings in relation to the cognitive theory stressful are referred to as primary appraisals.
of stress: first, that the person and the envi- An appraisal that a transaction is irrelevant is
ronment are in a dynamic relationship that is a judgment that it has no significance for well-
constantly changing and, second, that this re- being, and a benign-positive appraisal indi-
lationship is bidirectional, with the person and cates that a transaction does not tax or exceed
the environment each acting on the other. the person's resources and signals only positive
The relational and process-oriented aspects consequences. Of particular interest here are
of this formulation have important implica- the stressful appraisals: harm/loss, threat, or
tions regarding the manner in which beliefs challenge. Harm/loss refers to injury or dam-
about and appraisals of personal control are age already done, as in loss of a limb, damage
to be considered. The relational perspective to a friendship, or loss of self-esteem. Threat
means that control must be viewed in the par- refers to a potential for harm or loss, and chal-
ticular person-environment relationship in lenge to an opportunity for growth, mastery,
which it is embedded. This conclusion has or gain. Harm/loss and threat appraisals are
been reached by others who have grappled with characterized by negative emotions, such as
questions concerning the relationship between anger, fear, or resentment, whereas challenge
personal control and outcomes (e.g., Averill, appraisals are characterized by pleasurable
1973; Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Lefcourt, emotions, such as excitement and eagerness.
1976; Mills &Krantz, 1979; Thompson, 1981; A primary appraisal, whether harm/loss,
Wortman & Brehm, 1975). The process ori- threat, or challenge, is shaped by an array of
entation means that appraisals of personal person and situation factors. Among the most
control are likely to change throughout a important person factors are beliefs and com-
stressful encounter as a result of shifts in the mitments. Beliefs are preexisting notions about
person-environment relationship. reality that serve as a perceptual lens, or a set,
 PERSONAL CONTROL
to use the term preferred by perception psy-
chologists (Wrubel, Benner, & Lazarus, 1981).
They determine how things are in a given per-
son-environment transaction. A wide range
of general beliefs (e.g., religious) and specific
beliefs (e.g., in a particular person) are un-
doubtedly relevant to primary appraisal.
Generalized beliefs about control, which
concern the extent to which individuals assume
they can control outcomes of importance, are
among those beliefs that influence primary
appraisal. The best known formulation is Rot-
ter's (1966) concept of internal versus external
locus of control. An internal locus of control
refers to the conviction that events are con-
tingent upon one's own behavior, and an ex-
ternal locus of control refers to the conviction
that events are not contingent upon one's ac-
tions but upon luck, chance, fate, or powerful
others.
Rotter (1966,1975) conceived of generalized
control expectancies as having their greatest
influence when a situation is ambiguous or
novel. Under conditions of ambiguity, which
is used here to refer to lack of clarity in the
environment, situational cues regarding the
nature of the outcome and/or the extent to
which it can be controlled are minimal. In the
absence of clear information, the situation is
like a projective test, and the person makes
inferences based on general experience and
personality dispositions, which include beliefs,
to understand what is happening. The greater
the ambiguity, the more inference is required
and, consequently, the more influence person
factors have in determining the meaning of
the environmental configuration (cf. Lazarus,
Eriksen, & Fonda, 1951; Schank & Abelson,
1977).
A study by Archer (1979) illustrates this
principle. Archer studied the interaction of
trait anxiety and expectancy of control in a
shock-avoidance experiment. He used three
conditions; two were clearly denned (unam-
biguous) as to the method and degree of control
subjects could exercise over shock, and the
other was an ambiguous condition that pro-
vided few cues to subjects regarding the nature
of their shock-avoidance task. The dependent
variable was the subject's expectancy of con-
trol. Under clearly denned conditions, subjects
with high trait anxiety and subjects with low
trait anxiety did not differ with respect to their
expectancies of control. However, there were
841
differences in the ambiguous condition; per-
sons with low trait anxiety reported a signif-
icantly greater expectancy of avoiding shock
than did those with high trait anxiety. In other
words, a personality trait variable (trait anx-
iety) was found to be influential in the am-
biguously structured condition but not in con-
ditions that contained clear and explicit sit-
uational cues.
If this principle were applied to generalized
beliefs about control, it would be expected that
under conditions of ambiguity, a generalized
belief about control would be translated into
an appraisal of controllability with respect to
the specific situation. Thus when a situation
is highly ambiguous, a person with an internal
locus of control might be expected to appraise
the situation as controllable, whereas a person
with an external locus of control might ap-
praise it as uncontrollable. However, when a
situation is not highly ambiguous, it would be
expected, as noted by Rotter (1966, 1975),
that judgments about controllability would be
influenced more by situational characteristics
than by generalized beliefs.
Commitments also are important deter-
minants of primary appraisals of threat, chal-
lenge, and harm/loss. Commitments reveal
what is important to the person, what has
meaning to him or her. They can be defined
at many levels of abstraction, ranging from
values and ideals (e.g., parenthood) to specific
goals (e.g., having two children; Wrubel et al.,
1981). Any encounter that involves a strongly
held commitment will be evaluated as signif-
icant with respect to well-being to the extent
that the expected outcome harms or threatens
that commitment.
Another way of understanding the role of
commitments in primary appraisal is to think
of commitments as determining the stakes that
are involved in a specific encounter. What is
at stake for the individual is a reflection of his
or her commitments. For instance, an exam
may be stressful for a student because it
threatens a short-term commitment to getting
into graduate school and a long-term com-
mitment to a professional goal. The student
may perceive that his or her whole career is
at stake. A conflict between friends may pose
a threat to a commitment to a valued friend-
ship. Here the friendship is at stake, which is
what makes the conflict stressful for the par-
ticipants.
842 SUSAN FOLKMAN
As determinants of primary appraisal,
commitments also affect the significance of
beliefs about control in a specific encounter.
Theoretically, the more serious or extensive
the commitments involved in an encounter
are, or the more at stake these commitments
are for the person, the more important it may
be for the person to believe that he or she can
control the outcome of the encounter. Con-
versely, in situations in which little is at stake,
not having control over the outcome may be
of little consequence to the person in terms
of stress. In more general terms, the greater
the appraised threat in a situation, the more
meaningful controllability will be.
Primary appraisal is also influenced by sit-
uational factors, including the nature of the
harm or threat, whether or not the event is
familiar or novel, how likely it is to occur,
when it is likely to occur, and how clear or
ambiguous the expected outcome is. Several
of these factors, especially the likelihood of
occurrence and timing, have been considered
in numerous studies on personal control and
stress (for reviews, see Averill, 1973; Epstein
& Roupenian, 1970; Lazarus, 1966; Miller,
1979; Thompson, 1981; also see Janis &
Mann, 1977, for a review of these variables
in the context of decision making.)
The primary appraisals of harm/loss, threat,
and challenge are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. The loss of a limb, for example, en-
genders its own series of harms and potential
threats, such as those having to do with re-
covery, rehabilitation, restoration of normal
functioning, growth, and commitments to
long-standing activities and goals.
Threat and challenge also are not mutually
exclusive. A job promotion, for example, is
likely to be appraised as holding the potential
for gains in knowledge and skills, responsi-
bility, recognition, and financial reward. At
the same time, it entails the risk of not per-
forming as well as expected or required. The
promotion, therefore, is likely to be appraised
as both a challenge and a threat. Thus, al-
though threat and challenge appraisals are dis-
tinguished from one another by their cognitive
component (the judgment with respect to the
potential for harm or loss vs. the potential for
mastery or gain) and their affective component
(negative emotions vs. positive emotions), they
can occur simultaneously.
Findings from a recent study (Folkman &
Lazarus, in press) about examination stress
support these ideas about threat and challenge.
As part of the study, students were asked to
indicate the extent to which they experienced
each of a number of threat emotions, such as
fear, worry, and anxiety, and challenge emo-
tions, such as hopefulness, eagerness, and con-
fidence, 2 days before a midterm examination.
Ninety-four percent of the students reported
feeling both threat and challenge emotions.
Furthermore, threat and challenge emotions
were not correlated (r = -.05). The same pat-
tern was observed in a preliminary pilot study
with a different sample in which students were
asked to report their emotions in relation to
the most stressful event that they were antic-
ipating during the next month. Virtually every
subject in the pilot study reported feeling both
threat and challenge emotions, and threat and
challenge emotions were again uncorrelated
(r = -.06). These findings suggest that threat
and challenge appraisals are independent and
likely to occur simultaneously during the an-
ticipatory stage of a stressful event.
Secondary appraisal. The evaluation of
coping resources and options is called second-
ary appraisal. It addresses the question, What
can I do? and becomes critical when there is
a primary appraisal of harm, loss, threat, or
challenge. In secondary appraisal, coping re-
sources, which include physical, social, psy-
chological, and material assets, are evaluated
with respect to the demands of the situation.
Examples of physical resources are the person's
health, energy, and stamina. Social resources
represent the individual's social network and
support systems, from which can be drawn
information, tangible assistance, and emo-
tional support (Schaefer, Coyne, & Lazarus,
1982). Psychological resources include beliefs
that can be drawn upon to sustain hope, skills
for problem solving, self-esteem, and morale.
Material resources refer to tangibles, such as
money, tools, and equipment. (For discussions
of these resources, see Folkman et al., 1979;
Schaefer et al., 1982; see also Antonovsky,
1979, for a related discussion of resistance re-
sources.)
Situational appraisals of control are part of
secondary appraisal. As noted earlier, they refer
to the person's judgment or belief about the
possibilities for control in a specific encounter.
They are products of the individual's evalu-
ations of the demands of the situation, on the
 PERSONAL CONTROL
one hand, and his or her coping resources and
options and ability to implement the needed
coping strategies, on the other. In the latter
respects, situational appraisals of control par-
allel Bandura's (1977) concepts of "outcome
expectancy," which is one's estimate that a
given strategy will lead to a particular outcome,
and "efficacy expectancy," which is the con-
viction that one can successfully execute the
strategy required to produce the outcome.
Situational appraisals of control are difficult
to evaluate. Part of the problem has to do with
the question, Control over what? In experi-
mental studies the object of control is usually
posited as a simple and clear aversive stimulus,
such as shock, noise, or phobic object. What
is not acknowledged is that even in experi-
mental settings there is often more than one
possibility for control. For example, Roth-
baum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) point out
that in studies that manipulate controllability
(e.g., Frankel & Snyder, 1978; Glass & Singer,
1972; Mettee, 1971), subjects who appear to
be giving up may in fact be controlling dis-
appointment. The possibilities for control in
real life situations are generally more complex
and therefore even more difficult to evaluate.
The complexity of control appraisals in real
life situations is especially evident in health-
related contexts. Cohen and Lazarus (1979)
cite the following common coping tasks in re-
covery from illness, each of which refers to an
outcome or target of control: "(1) to reduce
harmful environmental conditions and en-
hance prospects of recovery, (2) to tolerate or
adjust to negative events and realities, (3) to
maintain a positive self-image, (4) to maintain
emotional equilibrium, and (5) to continue
satisfying relationships with others" (p. 232).
A good overall outcome in a health-related
source of stress thus involves numerous sub-
outcomes, which vary in clarity and impor-
tance. Some pertain to changing environmen-
tal conditions, for example, installing wheel-
chair ramps, and others pertain to inner issues,
such as tolerating discomfort or maintaining
a sense of adequacy or lovableness. The same
type of complexity can be found in a wide
range of real life harms, threats, and challenges.
In real life situations, then, the answer to the
question, Control over what? is likely to be
multifaceted.
Outcomes also vary in appraised control-
lability. An individual might be expected to
843
control one aspect of a situation but not an-
other. With respect to patients with spinal cord
injuries, for example, Silver and Wortman
(1980b) pointed out that a "person may believe
that learning to get in and out of a bed to a
wheelchair is in his control. However, he may
feel that being able to walk again is only in
the hands of God" (p. 4). That the targets of
control or outcomes in a stressful encounter
can vary in appraised controllability adds to
the complexity of the secondary appraisal of
coping options and to the overall appraisal of
an event as threatening, challenging, or both.
Moreover, appraisals of control can shift as
an encounter unfolds. Indeed, this is what the
word process implies. Changes in appraisals
of control can come about as a result of new
information from the environment and/or as
a result of coping efforts. Bandura (1982), for
example, noted the following in his studies of
efficacy expectancies in phobics:
People register notable increases in self-efficacy when their
experiences disconfirra misbeliefs about what they fear
and when they gain new skills to manage threatening ac-
tivities. . . . If in the course of completing a task, they
discover something that appears intimidating about the
undertaking, or suggests limitations to their mode of coping,
they register a decline in self-efficaciousness despite their
successful performance, (pp. 125-126)
Coping
Coping refers to cognitive and behavioral
efforts to master, reduce, or tolerate the in-
ternal and/or external demands that are cre-
ated by the stressful transaction (Folkman &
Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus & Launier, 1978). An
important feature of this definition is that cop-
ing is denned independently of its outcome.
That is, coping refers to efforts to manage de-
mands, regardless of the success of those ef-
forts. The effectiveness of any given coping
strategy is not inherent in the strategy. This
approach differs from psychodynamic con-
ceptualizations (e.g., Menninger, 1963), in
which certain intrapsychic defense processes,
such as denial, are considered inherently
poorer than others, such as suppression, or in
which a strategy is labeled coping only if it
satisfies certain criteria, such as adhering to
reality (e.g., Haan, 1977). This definition also
differs from popular conceptualizations of
coping in which coping implies managing or
succeeding, whereas not coping implies failure.
The theoretical separation of coping efforts
844 SUSAN FOLKMAN
from their outcomes is necessary if the coping
construct is to be used to predict outcome,
because when coping is confounded with out-
come, any use of coping as a predictor is tau-
tological and meaningless (Folkman & La-
zarus, 1980).
Functions of coping. Coping is viewed in
this formulation as having two major func-
tions: the regulation of emotions or distress
(emotion-focused coping) and the manage-
ment of the problem mat is causing the distress
(problem-focused coping). These two functions
of coping have been recognized by numerous
investigators (e.g., Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, &
Snoek, 1964; Mechanic, 1962), and have long
been implicitly recognized by clinicians. Folk-
man and Lazarus (1980) have shown that both
forms of coping are used in most stressful en-
counters and that the relative proportions of
each form vary according to how the encounter
is appraised (e.g., as holding the potential for
control or as not amenable to control; see also
Aldwin, Folkman, Schaefer, Coyne, & Lazarus,
1980).
In the study by Folkman and Lazarus
(1980), 100 men and women who were 45-
64 years of age indicated on a 68-item checklist
how they coped with a wide variety of real life
events over the course of 7 months. The check-
list contained problem-focused and emotion-
focused strategies. Examples of problem-fo-
cused strategies included "got the person re-
sponsible to change his or her mind," "made
a plan of action and followed it," and "stood
your ground and fought for what you wanted."
The emotion-focused category included such
items as "looked for the silver lining, tried to
look on the bright side of things," "accepted
sympathy and understanding from someone,"
and "tried to forget the whole thing." The
events people reported ranged from minor
problems, such as car trouble or a balky cus-
tomer at work, to major problems, such as job
loss or life-threatening illness. Over 1,300
stressful episodes were analyzed, and the find-
ings showed that both problem- and emotion-
focused coping were used in over 98% of the
episodes. Moreover, problem-focused forms of
coping increased in situations that were ap-
praised as changeable, thereby holding the po-
tential for control, and emotion-focused forms
of coping increased in situations appraised as
not amenable to change.
Control beliefs and appraisals versus control
as a coping process. An important distinction
must be made between beliefs about control
and control appraisals, on the one hand, and
control as a coping process, on the other. Gen-
eralized beliefs about control and control ap-
praisals are cognitive factors that influence the
appraisal of threat or challenge in a particular
stressful encounter; control as a coping process
refers to cognitive and/or behavioral efforts to
exercise or seek control in that same encounter
(see also Wong & Sproule, 1983).
Emotion-focused coping, for example, can
be used to alter the meaning of a situation and
thereby enhance the individual's sense of con-
trol over his or her distress (cf. Averill, 1973;
Silver & Wortman, 1980a). Strategies used for
this purpose include devaluing the stakes that
are at risk in an encounter (e.g., "Passing that
exam really doesn't matter much"), focusing
on the positive aspects of negative outcomes
(e.g., "I'm a stronger person for having gone
through this"), and engaging in positive com-
parisons (e.g., "It could have been much
worse" or "I'm a lot better off than the other
guy" (cf. Moos, 1977; Pearlin & Schooler,
1978; Silver & Wortman, 1980a; Taylor, Wood,
& Lichtman, 1983).
From this perspective, what Rothbaum et
al. (1982) call "secondary control"—attempts
to "flow with the current" or efforts to ac-
commodate oneself to uncontrollable events—
is a form of emotion-focused coping that en-
hances perceptions of control in ostensibly
uncontrollable circumstances. Examples of
secondary control processes include illusory
control, through which people "align them-
selves with the force of chance so that they
may share in the control exerted by that pow-
erful force" (p. 17); vicarious control, with
which people achieve control by association
with powerful others; and interpretive control,
which refers to the search for meaning and
understanding.
This type of emotion-focused coping can
be difficult to distinguish from appraisal, and
in fact it is referred to elsewhere as a specific
type of appraisal, namely, "defensive reap-
praisal" (Lazarus, 1966) or simply "reap-
praisal" (Lazarus & Launier, 1978). There is
no completely satisfactory way, for example,
to differentiate an initial benign appraisal from
an emotion-focused coping technique. There
is also no easy way to distinguish between cop-
ing and reappraisal when a positive evaluation
 PERSONAL CONTROL 845

of an outcome is made. In short, many coping and coping processes. Three issues are high-
strategies can have an appraisal function in lighted: The first deals with the relationship
that they shape the meaning or significance of between situational appraisals of control (sec-
an event, and, conversely, many forms of ap- ondary appraisal) and the primary appraisal
praisal can have a coping function in that they of threat and addresses the question of how
help regulate distress (Lazarus & Folkman, in believing one has control over an outcome in
press). Although this area of overlap between a specific encounter can sometimes heighten
appraisal and coping must be recognized, it is rather than reduce threat; the second deals
useful for purposes of analysis to consider the with the relationship between beliefs about and
control-related cognitive processes involved in appraisals of control and coping processes; and
appraisal and.coping as having separate though the third concerns appraisals of control and
related functions. adaptational outcomes.
Problem-focused coping and emotion-fo-
cusing coping differ in the facets of a stressful When Control Appraisals Heighten Threat
encounter they are used to gain control over.
Emotion-focused coping, as noted earlier, is Most theory and research on the relation-
used to control distressing emotion, sometimes ship between control and stress is based on
by altering the meaning of an outcome. Prob- the assumption that having control is stress
lem-focusing coping is used to control the reducing and not having control is stress in-
troubled person-environment relationship ducing. Yet, as pointed out earlier, some studies
through problem solving, decision making, indicate that the obverse is sometimes true
and/or direct action. These problem-focused (for examples, see reviews by Averill, 1973;
strategies, which are qualitatively different Thompson, 1981). Why might this be so?
from emotion-focused strategies, can be di- The relationship between control and stress
is often examined in a context in which the
rected at the environment as well as at oneself.
For example, if a person has a disagreement focal event is treated apart from other personal
with his or her supervisor over a particular and environmental concerns. This character-
goal, the person can attempt to get the su- istic is clearly evident in laboratory studies, in
pervisor to change the goal and/or can change which the aversive event is treated as an iso-
his or her own behavior in an effort to achievelated and discrete instance. In real life, events
a favorable outcome. are usually connected to other events, be they
Theoretically, the effectiveness of problem-internal or external, psychological, physical,
focused efforts depends largely on the success or social. The interrelated nature of events
of emotion-focused efforts. Otherwise, height- helps explain why the potential for control,
ened emotions will interfere with the cognitivewhich is so often viewed as threat reducing,
activity necessary for problem-focused coping can be threat inducing.
(e.g., Easterbrook, 1959; Kahn, 1964; Kahne- For example, control can be a mixed bless-
man, 1973; Klinger, 1975;Korchin, 1964; La- ing when exercising it exacts costs in other'
zarus, 1966; Sarason, 1972;Spence&Spence, areas. Consider the patient who is told that
1966; Vroom, 1964). The importance of hav- there is the potential for controlling his or her
ing at least some control over one's emotions malignancy through chemotherapy, The ex-
when trying to manage or alter a troubling ercise of this control option, that is, having
situation is one reason why we expect, and chemotherapy, may result in the malignancy
have found (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980, in being contained but at additional cost to the
press), that problem-focused coping will be patient's physical and psychological well-being
accompanied by emotion-focused coping in (e.g., nausea, hair loss, and depression). A per-
most stressful encounters. son with a coronary-prone Type A behavior
pattern may be counseled to control his or her
Control and Appraisal, Coping, and behavior by becoming less driven and com-
Adaptational Outcome petitive in order to reduce the risk of illness.
But to do so may cause the person to act against
The theoretical formulation described in the strongly held values, with a consequent loss
previous section provides a framework for dis- of self-esteem and productivity. In each of these
cussing the role of personal control in stress examples the potential for control presents a
846 SUSAN FOLKMAN
difficult choice. A person may value controlling
a malignancy or the risk of a heart attack, yet
the potential for control can generate distress
because of its costs.
The same principle applies when having
control is antagonistic to a preferred style, such
as avoidance (as opposed to confrontation) or
dependence (as opposed to independence). A
study by Averill, O'Brien, and DeWitt (1977)
illustrates this point. In this shock-avoidance
experiment, each subject could choose whether
or not to listen for a warning that signaled an
upcoming shock. The warning gave the sub-
jects potential control over the aversive stim-
ulus in that it allowed them to try to avoid
the shock with a switch. In each of 12 trials,
the subject was informed as to how effective
the switch was likely to be in preventing the
shock; response effectiveness ranged from 0%
to 100%. Those subjects who preferred to listen
for the warning (i.e., who preferred having
control) showed less evidence of distress as
response effectiveness increased, whereas sub-
jects who preferred not to listen for the warning
showed increased distress as effectiveness in-
creased.
A study by Mills and Krantz (1979) also
illustrates this point. These investigators found
that blood donors who were given information
that would allow them to prepare for blood
drawing (thereby giving them the option for
self-control) and behavioral control (in the
form of a choice as to which arm would be
used) were more distressed than subjects who
were allowed just one form of control. Mills
and Krantz speculated that the combination
of informational and behavioral control gave
donors more of a role in the blood-drawing
procedures than they would have preferred.
Citing Houston (1972), Mills and Krantz also
suggested that when the individual prefers not
to have control, increased choice or partici-
pation may heighten stress. In studies by Ship-
ley, Butt, and Horwitz (1979) and Shipley,
Butt, Horwitz, and Farbry (1978) that ex-
amined the relationship between repression-
sensitization and stress, subjects were given
information that allowed them to exercise self-
control in response to an intrusive procedure
(endoscopy). Repressers were more anxious
than sensitizers when given this information.
Presumably, those with a repressive style would
have been less anxious if they had not been
urged to think about the procedure. From
these and earlier studies (e.g., Andrew, 1970;
Delong, 1970), a clear pattern emerges that
indicates that control can .be stress inducing
when it opposes a preferred style.
Control can also have negative social con-
sequences. Perhaps a person has the skills with
which to exercise control over an aversive con-
dition, but to exercise those skills might result
in damage to an important interpersonal re-
lationship or in an embarrassing social inter-
action. In a study of the coping efforts of low-
income mothers, for example, Dill, Feld, Mar-
tin, Beukema, and Belle (1980) described how
a woman was inhibited from doing something
about her child's behavior problems because
to do so would likely involve "humiliating in-
trusions" from the school system, health and
mental health services, or social workers.
The possibility of heightened threat also ex-
ists when the exercise of control requires ma-
terial resources that are needed elsewhere.
Thus, cutting down the aversive noise in the
work environment may require money that is
needed to buy new equipment. The potential
practical, mundane consequences of control
are too often overlooked in both laboratory
and field settings (see Antonovsky, 1979; Dill
et al., 1980).
Control and Coping
Two approaches are used to explore the re-
lationships between personal control and cop-
ing. The first considers several ways in which
control might directly affect coping. The sec-
ond, in line with the theoretical framework of
this analysis, introduces threat and challenge
as mediators of this relationship.
Several writers have suggested that both
generalized beliefs about control and situa-
tional control appraisals are related to coping
effort and persistence. For example, general-
ized expectancies of internal control are as-
sociated with exertion and persistence in
achievement situations (for a review, see Lef-
court, 1976). Likewise, according to Bandura
(1977), efficacy expectancies—part of what are
referred to here as situational appraisals of
control—"determine how much effort people
will expend, and how long they will persist in
the face of obstacles and aversive experiences.
The stronger the efficacy or mastery expec-
 PERSONAL CONTROL
tations, the more active the efforts" (p. 80).
(See also Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Brown &
Inouye, 1978; Schunk, 1981; Weinberg,
Gould, & Jackson, 1979.)
The relationship between controllability and
coping effort has also been linked to biochem-
ical response. Frankenhaeuser (1983) found
that the controllability of a task is a major
determinant of the balance between sympa-
thetic adrenal arousal and pituitary adrenal
arousal, as measured by catecholamine and
cortisol excretion. Catecholamines and cortisol
were both elevated in subjects in a low-control
situation, but only cortisol, which is usually
associated with distress, decreased relative to
baselines in subjects in a high-control situation.
The meaning of the biochemical response pat-
tern in terms of the relationship between con-
trollability and coping effort was suggested by
subjective reports that subjects experienced ef-
fort under conditions of high control and dis-
tress under conditions of low control.
Several studies also suggest that control is
related to the type of coping activity. In her
review of research on internal-external locus
of control expectancies and health attitudes
and behaviors, Strickland (1978) noted studies
that indicated that people with an internal lo-
cus of control are more likely than people with
an external locus of control to engage in an
information search about disease and health
maintenance when it is relevant to their well-
being and in preventive behaviors, such as
wearing seat belts and going to the dentist for
checkups. These behaviors would be classified
as problem focused within the theoretical
framework of stress and coping adopted here.
Furthermore, Anderson (1977) found that, in
comparison with externals, internals were
likely to employ more task-centered (problem-
focused) coping behaviors and fewer emotion-
centered coping behaviors. Data about the re-
lationship between locus of control and coping
from the field study of men an^Twomen age
45-64 mentioned earlier in relation" to coping
provide mixed though relevant findings (Folk-
man, Aldwin, & Lazarus, 1981). Generalized
control expectancies (measured on the Rotter
Internal-External Locus of Control Scale) in
this sample were not related to coping. Con-
trary to what might be expected, the 15 most
internal subjects did not use more problem-
focused coping behaviors than did the 15 most
847
external subjects; nor did the externals use
more emotion-focused coping behaviors than
did the internals. In contrast, as noted earlier,
situational appraisals of control were strongly
related to coping behavior.
Situational control appraisals, moreover,
also affect primary appraisals of threat and
challenge, which in turn influence coping. A
full understanding of the relationship between
control and coping, therefore, should take these
primary appraisals of threat and challenge into
account. Although the relationships among
control, threat, challenge, and coping have not
yet been explored in a systematic program of
research, certain relationships seem reasonable
to predict. Threat appraisals seem likely when
the desire for control is not matched by ex-
pectations for control or when the exercise of
control can generate additional distress. Chal-
lenge appraisals, on the other hand, seem likely
when encounters that are appraised as relevant
to well-being hold a potential for control, either
of one's emotions or the environment, and the
exercise of control creates little if any addi-
tional distress.
With respect to coping, the negative emo-
tions that accompany threat appraisals, such
as anxiety or fear, require regulation to keep
them from interfering with problem-focused
forms of coping and to preserve a tolerable
internal state, as noted earlier/Under condi-
tions of challenge, positive emotions, such as
excitement, eagerness, and hopefulness, pre-
dominate; these are affective states that need
little if any regulation. Indeed, positive emo-
tions may actually facilitate effective problem-
focused forms of coping (Lazarus et al., 1980).
Threat-related emotions that accompany
challenge, although they should be less prom-
inent than positive emotions, may also require
emotion-focused coping. However, if these
emotions are at an optimal level for creating
adaptive vigilance (i.e., not too strong and dis-
ruptive), they too may facilitate rather than
impede problem-focused efforts (Miller, 1980).
A study by Anderson (1977) lends support
to these ideas. In an investigation of busi-
nessmen who were restoring their businesses,
which had been damaged by a flood, Anderson
found that at the outset of the ordeal, externals
were more stressed than internals. Externals
also used more of what Anderson calls "emo-
tion-directed" coping than did internals, and
848 SUSAN FOLKMAN
less "task-oriented," or problem-focused, cop-
ing in dealing with the consequences of the
flood. In a follow-up study 2Vi years later, An-
derson (1977) found that those who had been
less stressed at the time of the first assessment
were more successful in restoring their busi-
nesses than were those who had been more
stressed. These findings support the ideas of-
fered here, which suggest that (a) control ex-
pectancies are related to primary appraisal,
and (b) the more threat and threat-related
emotion there is, the more that coping efforts
have to be directed toward emotion regulation
and diverted from problem-focused coping.
Of interest also is Anderson's finding that
internals whose performance improved be-
came even more internal, whereas externals
who gave a poorer performance became more
external. These findings suggest that beliefs
about control are reinforced by experience, as
is assumed by social learning theory (cf. Ban-
dura, 1977; Rotter, 1966, 1975). The pattern
seems to be self-fulfilling: The person who feels
challenged generates fewer negative emotions
that require attention and is therefore in a
position to engage in problem-focused coping
efficiently. If the outcome is perceived as pos-
itive, it reinforces the appraisal of challenge.
The threatened person, on the other hand, ex-
periences much negative emotion, the regu-
lation of which impedes problem-focused
coping. The adaptational outcome is poorer,
and the basis for feeling threatened is rein-
forced. When viewed this way, control expec-
tancies are outcomes as well as antecedents.
Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan, and Mullan
(1981), for example, have treated control ex-
pectancies (which they call "mastery") em-
pirically as both an outcome and a mediator
of the relationship between job disruption and
reactive depression.
However, even when experience does not
reinforce internal control beliefs, an illusion
of control (Langer, 1975) can be created
through cognitive coping or reappraisal. For
example, sometimes people take on respon-
sibility or blame themselves for an event, re-
gardless of the circumstances. Such reapprais-
als let them believe that similar events can be
prevented in the future (Bulman & Wortman,
1977), thereby enabling them to feel more in
control of future events and less threatened.
Control and Adaptational Outcome
Based on these complex relationships among
control beliefs and appraisals, threat, challenge,
and coping, what can be said about how control
affects the adaptational outcomes of stressful
encounters? Under what circumstances does
believing one has control lead to positive out-
comes and under what circumstances to neg-
ative outcomes? And how do the concepts of
threat, challenge, and coping help answer these
questions?
The match between the person's appraisal
of controllability in a stressful encounter and
the extent to which the outcome is actually
controllable provides one key to understand-
ing. An adaptive appraisal should fit reality
reasonably well, so that there is a comfortable
match between an objective and subjective es-
timate of controllability, although findings that
indicate that a certain amount of illusion
seems to color the appraisal of nondepressed
people suggest that under some circumstances
a little distortion may be of value (e.g., Golin,
Terrell, Weitz, & Drost, 1979; Lewinsohn,
Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980; Mischel,
1979; see also Wortman, 1976).
Consider first a situation in which a stressful
encounter is realistically appraised as con-
trollable. Two different appraisals of the en-
counter are possible: threat and challenge. A
challenge appraisal should produce the more
positive outcome because it facilitates effective
problem-focused coping and promotes good
morale. In contrast, a threat appraisal, with
its distressing emotions, may impede problem-
focused coping efforts, thereby increasing the
possibility of poor problem resolution.
Consider next a situation in which a stressful
encounter is realistically appraised as uncon-
trollable. This is the condition employed by
learned-helplessness researchers to predict
helplessness and depression (Seligman, 1975).
Although helplessness, depression, or both can
occur in response to an uncontrollable event,
according to the theory of stress and coping
presented here, these negative outcomes will
occur only if reappraisal and cognitive coping
do not alter the meaning of the situation to
the person or ameliorate the distress (cf. Coyne,
Aldwin, & Lazarus, 1981). Recent studies on
the relationship between controllability and
 PERSONAL CONTROL
depression, for example, indicate that depres-
sion is less likely when the person attributes
responsibility for the event to unstable person
factors, such as behavior or effort, as opposed
to stable factors, such as character or ability
(cf. Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Peterson, Schwartz,
& Seligman, 1981), These attributions lead to
different evaluations of the significance of the
event, for example, with respect to self-esteem.
Similarly, Lipowski (1970-1971) identifies
certain meanings that people attribute to ill-
ness that encourage active coping efforts as
opposed to helplessness and passivity. Ex-
amples include viewing illness as a challenge
or as an opportunity to expand personality
through growth. In their excellent review of
studies on coping with uncontrollable events,
Silver and Wortman (1980a) found that people
who discover something positive in a negative
situation show less distress than those who do
not (e.g., Natterson & Knudson, 1960; Weis-
man & Worden, 1976-1977); Goodhart (1980)
obtained a similar finding. In the language of
stress and coping theory, all of these attribu-
tions or interpretations constitute reappraisals
or emotion-focused forms of cognitive coping
that affect the significance of the encounter
with respect to well-being.
Another way to transform the meaning of
an uncontrollable encounter with respect to
its significance for well-being (e.g., self-esteem,
recovery) is to abandon old goals and create
new ones. A patient with a spinal cord injury
might realize that there is little that can be
done to regain the use of his or her legs but
may generate a new goal of learning how to
get around in a wheelchair. Such changes in
goals or commitments may not alter the loss
itself, but they establish new definitions of the
conditions and outcomes the individual can
control. The creation of new long-range and
intermediate goals promotes positive morale
and preserves the person's general sense of
control and self-esteem, which, in turn, should
facilitate realistic efforts to function (cf. Rodin
& Langer, 1977; Schulz, 1976). Thus, reap-
praisal and cognitive coping processes can
prevent or reduce feelings of helplessness or
depression and possibly encourage feelings of
challenge and hope, even in the face of new
demands and difficulties and a considerable
degree of uncontrollability.
849
The risk of maladaptive outcomes should
be greater when the appraisal of control does
not match reality. If an event is appraised as
uncontrollable when in fact it is controllable,
the person is likely not to engage in necessary
problem-focused coping. As a consequence,
harm or loss is even more likely. For instance,
a patient who appraises his or her condition
as uncontrollable and therefore decides not to
participate in important treatment programs
is likely to do additional harm. Similarly, a
student who appraises the outcome of an exam
as beyond control may not study. The reso-
lution of these problems is apt to be poor, and
in the absence of successful emotion-focused
coping activity, morale may also be poor.
Yet another form of mismatch between ap-
praisal and reality occurs when an uncon-
trollable event is appraised as controllable.
Here the person is likely to engage in problem-
focused coping activity that gets nowhere and,
as a consequence, becomes frustrated and dis-
appointed. A recent study by Collins, Baum,
and Singer (1983) of residents of Three Mile
Island suggests that people who engaged in
problem-focused coping in dealing with
chronic, uncontrollable conditions associated
with the nuclear accident reported more psy-
chological symptoms than did people who used
less problem-focused coping. Those who used
more emotion-focused coping, on the other
hand, reported fewer symptoms. An interesting
finding was that residents who used greater
amounts of problem-focused coping also en-
gaged in more denial-like or avoidant strate-
giesl which suggests that they were actually
distorting reality and maladaptively exagger-
ating their sense of personal control. A time-
honored principle of effective coping is to know
when to appraise a situation as uncontrollable
and hence abandon efforts directed at altering
that situation (cf. Janoff-Bulman & Brickman,
1982; Silver & Wortman, 1980a) and turn to
emotion-focused processes in order to tolerate
or accept the situation.
The four ways of appraising a stressful sit-
uation presented represent an overly simplified
scheme for predicting adaptational outcomes.
Because few situations are clearly controllable
or uncontrollable, many permutations and
combinations of these appraisals are possible,
depending on the context of stress. The im-
850 SUSAN FOLKMAN
portant point is that the concepts of appraisal aware of these multiple functions and know
and problem- and emotion-focused coping which one is being considered.
make it possible to consider a rich pattern of
dynamics in any given event that holds the
potential for being simultaneously controllable
Aldwin, C., Folkman, S., Schaefer, C., Coyne, J. C, &
and uncontrollable.
Conclusion
Many facets of the relationships between
personal control, appraisal, coping, and out-
come have been considered here. Two general
points should be emphasized that are espe-
cially important for those people involved in
conducting or evaluating research on the gen-
eral concept of control and its relationship to
stress and stress-related adaptational out-
comes.
First, perceptions of control, whether they
are shaped by generalized beliefs or by situ-
ational contingencies, need to be examined in
the context of specific stressful encounters.
Only such encounters can allow one to (a)
determine the personal meaning or significance
of control in relation to what is at stake for
the individual in that encounter and what the
costs as well as benefits of exercising control
might be; (b) explore the question, Control
over what? in order to understand which facets
of the encounter are viewed as targets of con-
trol; and (c) evaluate the fit between appraisals
of controllability and actual characteristics of
the situation and between appraisals of con-
trollability and coping. These steps are nec-
essary if investigators are to understand how
personal control ultimately influences stress-
related adaptational outcomes.
Second, it is important to recognize that
personal control can have multiple functions
in any given stressful encounter. Generalized
beliefs about control and situational appraisals
of control can alter the extent to which an
encounter is appraised as threatening and/or
challenging and can influence coping. In these
situations, control functions as an antecedent
variable. Control beliefs and appraisals can
also be influenced by a single stressful trans-
action or a succession of transactions; in this
situation, control functions as an outcome
variable. Finally, when a larger perspective is
adopted, control can be viewed as a cognitive
mediator of a stressful transaction and its ad-
aptational outcome. Investigators need to be
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