Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 8
Camp Kangleon, Palo, Leyte

OROPD- December 4, 2001

SUBJECT: LOI 40/2001 “SANDUGO MASTER PLAN-WARAY”

(THE PNP ISO MASTER PLAN)

TO: See Distribution

I. REFERENCES:

a. A Compendium of Master Plans for Police Operations by Mendoza/Aglipay.

b. Memorandum from The Director for Operations dated October 18, 2001, subject:
Compendium of the Six (6) Master Plans for Police Operations.

II. INTRODUCTION

The insurgency problem, whether of the communist or the secessionist type, has
social, economic, political and security dimensions. The security part, as manifested by
armed guerilla activities, is the most visible sign or symptom of the problem. The
security acts only because of the political organization that provides the leadership and
the direction. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction and grievances of the people
resulting from the socio-economic and political conditions in the area provide the
insurgency movement the reason for its being. Thus, insurgency may not be solved by
police/military solution alone (although police/military action is vital and an important
part), but by a package of government policies and programs that can effectively and
simultaneously address the socio-economic, the political and the military aspects of the
situation. Accordingly, the whole government machinery and instrumentalities must
strongly and coordinately be made to bear on the problem.

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

This serves as the long-range and holistic master plan of the PNP in
waging an internal security support operations nationwide. Premised on the estimate of
the national situation and other considerations, it prescribes the counter-insurgency
support strategy, operational concept, scheme of implementation, service support and
coordinating instructions in order to accomplish the PNP's internal security support
mission.

All subsequent and supplemental Programs of Action, LOIs, and other

related issuances to be prescribed and executed by PNP units and personnel at all levels
which would have a bearing on internal security, must therefore conform with the
intent/spirit and strategic and operational guidelines embodied herein. This is to ensure
the continuity, unity, consistency and synergy of all internal security efforts at all times.

B. NATIONAL SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS:

1. General
 The Government, through the AFP and the PNP, had launched
various campaigns and pacification drives in the past decades to resolve the continuing
communist insurgency threat. As a result, the communist insurgent movement
experienced a downtrend in its party building, army building and alliance work. This
downtrend was attributed among others to the vigorous implementation of the series of
the PNP's Sandugo COIN campaign plans and the AFP Campaign Plan Lambat-Bitag.

These developments, however, did not lead to the downfall of the

Communist Movement. The CPP/NPA, instead, staged a strategic withdrawal to avoid
decisive defeat by the government forces. Subsequently, the CPP/NPA launched a
rectification campaign to regain control of LCM lost areas and restore its influence in the
rural areas. Additionally, the CPP, having experienced a regression in the Yearly sub-
stages of the Strategic Defensive Stage focused its activities on ideological, political and
organization (IPO) work to rebuild the party, its army and mass organizations.

During the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police

(PC/INP) era, internal and external securities were tasks relegated to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP). The PC/INP then, as one of the four major services of the AFP
had played an indispensable role in counter-insurgency until its deactivation in 1991,
with the passage of RA 6975, which resulted in the birth of the PNP. RA 6975 further
placed the PNP as the lead agency in the maintenance of internal security although it
took until 1995, for the PNP to fully assume its primary role in internal security.
However, when RA 8551 was passed into law in 1998, internal security was once again
given to the aegis of the AFP. Moreover, Executive Order No. 110 issued on June 15,
1999 mandated the PNP to support the AFP in ISO for the suppression of insurgency
and other serious threats to national security.

The military and police counter-insurgency campaigns and other

complementing efforts by concerned civil government agencies LGUs and NGOs, may
be classified into three major operations or activities, namely: (1) Internal Security
Operations (ISO) by the AFP and the PNP to provide security to the people and the
government; (2) National Development operations by the civil government agencies to
address the root causes of insurgency; and (3) Peace Process by the Office of the
Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process (OPAPP) to complement the overall
government effort to attract rebels back to the mainstream of society, in the spirit of
equality, peace reconciliation and unification. Essentially, these three mutually
complementing efforts are the government's three-pronged strategy in addressing the
country's insurgency problem.

In line with the government's three-pronged strategy in addressing

the insurgency problem, the PNP and the AFP have expanded their roles and actively
participated in the civil government's development activities that strike at the root
causes of insurgency. As one recognized weakness of this undertaking is the lack of
coordination and unity efforts among the military/police and civil government agencies,
thus the National Peace and Development Plan (NPDP) was formulated.

Amidst these changes in the operational environment, coupled with

the recent political events in our country, the PNP has to formulate and adopt a
comprehensive plan that would define the general guidelines/concepts of operations
and tasks to be observed and followed by all PNP units/offices in supporting the AFP in
the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security in
conjunction with the NDPP and Executive Order No. 110.

2. Strategic Guidance
 a. The National Peace and Development Plan

This Plan sets forth the government's overall plan for

addressing insurgency. It recognizes insurgency as a multi-dimensional problem
requiring a holistic and collaborative response and involvement of all sectors of
government and of the citizenry. It prescribes the Clear - Hold - Consolidate - Develop
(CHCD) operational methodology and envisions to launch a concerted, integrated and
collaborative campaign to address insurgency and its root causes through the "left-
hand" and the "right-hand" responses. The "left-hand" response involves the conduct
of political and socio-economic reforms to address the root causes of insurgency and
win the hearts and minds of the people, while the "right-hand" response involves the
conduct of offensive operations that directly contribute to the decisive defeat of the
insurgents and the dismantling of their politico-military infrastructures. These offensive
operations include diplomatic, political, intelligence, psychological and military offensive.

b. Strategy of "Total Approach"

The National Peace and Development Plan has adopted the

Strategy of "Total Approach". Its holistic approach to effectively address armed
conflicts in the country consists of a security component, a political component and a
socio-economic component. The security component directly addresses violent
conflicts, the political component seeks to tap the full cooperation of local government
units and civil society to promote good governance and local peace initiatives, while the
socio-economic component focuses on ways and means to eradicate/alleviate poverty.

c. AFP ISO Campaign Plan "BALANGAI"

This is the implementation of the National Peace and

Development Plan and consistent with the National Strategy of "Total Approach" and
the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop Methodology prescribed in the national plan. It
envisions the clearing of barangays one after the other by simultaneously and decisively
defeating CPP/NPA armed groups, dismantling LCM politico-military infrastructures and
more importantly Winning the Hears and Minds of the People. The SOT concept is
applied in dismantling the politico-military structure of the enemy and employs the
TRIAD of intelligence, combat and psychological operations as separate weapons
system to decisively defeat its armed groups.

III. COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY

A. RD's INTENT:

The primary intent of the PRO 8 leadership is to have all the PNP Offices and
units consistently and vigorously perform our tasks as mandated by RA 8551 and
further provided in EO 110. The Police Provincial Offices and other tasked PNP Units
shall be employed accordingly to help support the AFP neutralize the LCM region wide.
This way, the armed components, the infrastructures, and the political machinery of the
CPP/NPA/NDF will be dismantled by the government. PRO 8 likewise intend to have the
organization help Local Government Units (LGUs) re-establish or strengthen
government authority and control over insurgency-affected barangays, and have
linkages with other security and development agencies and organizations to help attain
the aims of the National Peace and Development Plan of the government. In so doing
the PNP PRO 8 would be able to effectively implement and succeed in this campaign
plan as the PNP will be greatly involved in harnessing all government resources in the
fight against insurgency and its root causes.

B. OBJECTIVES:

1. Broad Objective

The PNP PRO 8, in strengthening its participation and involvement

in the government's peace and development machinery and concurrent with its
statutory functions and mandate through Executive Order 110, shall support the AFP in
ISO for the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security and
to perform its tasks in the National Peace and Development Plan.

2. Specific Objectives

a. To develop the capability of field units to fully operationalize

this ISO support plan for the government and the AFP in particular.

b. To support the AFP in the isolation of the underground

infrastructure and front organizations of the insurgents in the towns and cities form the
general population.

c. To enhance intelligence activities against threat groups.

d. To enhance the conduct of legal offensive against the

insurgents.

e. To support the governments' National Peace and

Development Plan to include the Peace and Reconciliation plan.

C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

1. Strategic Concept

a. The PNP shall basically support the AFP's ISO Campaign Plan
"Balangai" through the conduct of limited internal security operations, sustained law
enforcement and PCR activities, intensive information gathering and the conduct of
investigation and prosecution of ISO related cases.

b. The PNP campaign plan shall also follow the Clear-Hold-

Support operational methodology as herein indicated in support to the integration
efforts of the military and other civilian agencies of the government as envisioned in the
NPDP and the strategy of "Total Approach".

 The CLEAR Stage shall involve the conduct of

combat, Intelligence and Psychological operations as separate weapons systems to
directly lead to the destruction of the insurgent armed groups. The end state of this
phase is dismantled LCM politico-military infrastructure in the affected barangays and
the decisive defeat of the main enemy armed groups in the targeted guerilla fronts.
The PNP will support the AFP who is primarily responsible for the Clear Stage.

 The HOLD Stage shall involve the utilization of the

territorial defense forces to limit the freedom of action and movement of the CPP/NPA,
limit its access to resources and reduce mass base support to the CPP/NPA/NDF. This
phase shall have the following end state. Integrated Area/Community Public Safety
Plan (IA/CPSP) is organized and established, in order to protect the people, defend
communities and secure vital assets and installations. The PNP will be primarily
responsible for the Hold Stage in areas which are turned over to the PNP or where
there are no AFP units assigned. However, other areas, especially in those areas where
AFP units are present or where AFP supervises CAFGU then the IA/CPSP is responsible.

 The SUPPORT Stage is a "work in progress:. It

shall involve police support to consolidation and development activities of other
agencies of government. The PNP within its capability shall play a supportive role in
these activities, including but not limited to the conduct of medical and dental civic
action, adult literacy programs and providing security in support and in coordination
with AFP to civil government agencies in their delivery of basic services in far-flung and
strife-torn area.

 The Consolidation Stage aims to strengthen

government control and authority in contested barangays and develop the capability of
local officials to effectively govern their barangays. This stage has the following end-
state:

1) Government authority and control in contested

areas reestablished or strengthened.

2) Government services delivered.

3) Counter-organizations further expanded and

consolidated; and

4) Mass support for the government is enhanced.

 The Development Stage has the following for its

end state:

1) Root causes of insurgency effectively

addressed, and

2) Political and socio-economic reforms planned

at the beginning of the campaign are sustained.

c. The overlapping and interrelated phases of this methodology

may be conducted simultaneously or sequentially depending on the prevailing situation
in the targeted area. The efforts of the PNP shall focus in supporting the AFP on the
Clearing and Holding phases, and within the local unit capability they shall provide
appropriate support to local government units and other concerned agencies in the
Consolidation and Development Phase.

d. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to

accomplish an ISO-related mission. This principal thrust requires the PNP, military and
the civil government agencies to work cohesively, and to unify efforts to ensure a
focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing insurgency. The role of the police
aside from supporting the AFP in neutralizing the insurgent politico-military
infrastructure is to help create a physically and psychologically secured environment
conducive for socio-economic development.
 2. Operational Concept

a. PNP PRO 8, through its directorial staff, shall supervise and

support the Police Provincial Offices in implementing the strategic agenda and
operational concept of this counter-insurgency strategy. The PRO 8 leadership, through
the RLECC, the RDCC and the RPOC, shall coordinate and cooperate with other regional
government agencies in the realization of the intent of this counter-insurgency strategy.

b. The Police Provincial Offices, through city/municipal police

stations and PMGs shall implement their localized counter insurgency plans based on
this master plan. Their plan shall be focused towards the implementation of localized
activities to attain: (1) development of the capabilities of field units to support the AFT
in the resolution of ISO problem; (2) isolation of the underground infrastructure and
front organizations of insurgents in towns and cities from the general population; (3)
enhancement of intelligence activities against threat groups; and (4) enhancement of
legal offensive against the insurgents.

c. The Police Regional Mobile Group 8 (PRMG 8) is designated

as the reserve mobile/strike unit of PRO 8. It shall be deployed/committed to support
the PPOs as situation warrants and/or upon request.

d. The PNP National Support Units (NSUs), through their

specialized operating units and various regional/provincial offices, shall assist/support
the local police units in the conduct of ISO related activities in accordance with their
mandated mission and functions.

e. Role of PNP and AFP on Enemy Affected Barangays

particularly in areas with guerilla fronts.

Influenced Infiltrated Threatened

AFP (Diminishing Scope)

PNP (Expanding Scope)

As shown in the above schematic diagram, the AFP takes the

primary responsibility in responding to affected areas, particularly in areas with very
active and active guerilla fronts. In these areas, the AFP will seek to
dismantle/neutralize the insurgent political and armed components by mobile battalions
of a tasked unit applying the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept and the TRIAD
concept of Intelligence. In built-up areas not affected by insurgency, including cities
and urban center, the PNP takes the lead role. It shall continue its normal police
functions, such as the enhancement of law enforcement activities, maintenance of
peace and order to ensure public safety intensified intelligence, police community
relation activities and other related police operations.

f. In areas where the AFP due to its limited resources, cannot

physically occupy or adequately secure an area, and where PNP units are present or
available, the PNP within its capability shall initially provide security in the area until AFP
reinforcements shall have arrived. However, in areas where there is preponderance of
AFP forces or where it is declared by MOA/policy that they are the OPR, the PNP shall,
through the conduct of limited combat support operations assist the AFP mainly
because the police personnel to be committed on this aspect are the same personnel
that are performing law enforcement functions.

On the ground, the Provincial Directors and Chiefs of Police

are enjoined to enter into memorandum of understanding with their AFP counterparts
purposely to delineate and define their respective responsibilities/tasks and command
relationship based on their capabilities, limitations and the prevailing threat situation
and within the limits of the MOA set by DILG/PNP and DND AFP.

g. PNP PRO 8 through the PPOs/CPO and MPS shall undertake

the following specific activities during the Clearing and Holding Phases of the
operational Methodology.

1) Operations - This shall focus on the following:

1.1) Conduct of population and resource control/

denial measures depending upon the prevailing situation and legal consideration, such
as but not limited to the establishment of checkpoints and roadblock, employment of
overt and covert population surveillance, screening and controlling of displaced persons
in the affected areas.

1.2) Deployment of police visibility patrols in rear

areas to prevent the entry/incursion of the enemy in threatened/conflict areas.

1.3) Conduct of limited police operations such as

ambush, raid, clearing and other similar operations depending upon the capability and
limitation of forces and threat situation on the ground.

1.4) Implementation of the crime prevention and

suppression programs provided for in LOI Sandigan-Milenyo.

1.5) Intensification of the preventive and pro-active

measures and guidelines set forth in LOI AGAP dated October 16, 2000.

1.6) Provision of appropriate security measures to

government vital installations/facilities, defense of communities and protection of the
people from insurgent terroristic actions.

1.7) Conduct holding operations in areas cleared by

the AFP forces to protect the community from possible enemy depredations and
terroristic activities, with the support of CAFGUs, CVOs and the local government units
upon request of, or in coordination with local AFP.

1.8) Operationalization of the Integrated Area/

Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) through close coordination with the Local
Government Units, Local Peace and Order Councils, Law Enforcement and Disaster
Coordinating Councils, in order that it shall appropriate serve as the unified and
integrated direction of the local public safety programs and create an active shield
against the problems associated with internal security.
 1.9) Strengthen the various programs for public
safety and internal security.

2) Intelligence Operations: This shall focus on the

following:

2.1) Conduct intensive and sustained intelligence

gathering to identify threat groups and monitor their movements, plans/activities etc.

2.2) Conduct of special projects and case

operations to neutralize or negate insurgent leadership, logistics fund support, plans
and terroristic activities, safe houses and other support facilities.

2.3) Intensify counter intelligence operations to

detect and neutralize enemy infiltration, sabotage and subversion, in coordination with
the intelligence units of the AFP and other law enforcement agencies.

3) Police Community Relations - This shall focus on

the following:

3.1) Conduct public information campaign that

would reduce the influence of the insurgent on the populace through the tri-media.

3.2) Implement measures to gain, preserve and

strengthen civilian support for the programs of the government in counter-insurgency.

3.3) Support the comprehensive, integrated and

holistic peace process of the Government pursuant to Executive Order No. 3 issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on February 28, 2001.

3.4) Maintain a databank of issues against the

insurgents and develop positive issues for the PNP and AFP for media exploitation.

3.5) Conduct civic action, information drives,

dialogues, livelihood projects, civil assistance and development, and other allied PCR
activities designed to win back the enemy mass base.

4) Legal Offensive Activities: This shall involve the

following:

4.1) Provide efficient and well-coordinated

investigation documentation and prosecution of all ISO related cases, in coordination
with the DND/AFP, DOJ and the Commission on Human Rights.

4.2) Sustain the filing of ISO related cases and

follow-up the prosecution of cases in court against the insurgents.

h. In the Consolidation and Development Phases, the

activities are as follows:

1) Assist the Local Government Units (LGUs) and

concerned civil government agencies in the strengthening and consolidating control and
authority over targeted barangays/areas pursuant to the strategic concept laid down in
the NPDP.
 2) Provide/extend appropriate security coverage to civil
government agencies, local government units, NGA, NGOs and Gos in the delivery of
basic services and development projects to the community during the consolidation and
development phases.

3) Participate in, and support the Local Chief Executives

(LCEs) in the selection process of the Civilian Volunteer Organizations (Bantay
Bayan/Kababayan).

4) Intensify intelligence gathering.

5) Ensure that the Integrated Area/Community Public

Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) is fully operationalize in coordination with the local government
units.

i. Counter-organization effort against insurgents/secessionists

above ground organizations.

Counter-organization such as the CVOs/Bantay

Bayan/Kababayan and CAFGUs are organized in barangays that have been de-
influenced or cleared from enemy control.

The CAFGUs and CVOs/Bantay Bayan/Kababayan shall,

during the holding phase, augment the PNP for territorial defense in order to free the
AFP maneuver forces to go on all offensive. The CVOs shall help mobilize the people to
support the government, the police and the military against the insurgents.

Another important element of counter-organization is the

setting-up of people's organizations and cooperatives in the cleared barangays for
various livelihood projects and community-based reforestation (when appropriate). The
people's organization (POs) and Cooperatives can also serve as the nuclei for rural
economic development and environmental protection to be orchestrated by concerned
government agencies under the baton of the governor or mayor.

j. Organization of CVOs for ISO Support

The CVO is an overt but unarmed component of the Local

Defense Organization. They are directly under the control and supervision of the local
chief executives who shall be assisted by the local police and/or military elements in the
community.

The PCR elements of PNP units/offices in collaboration with

the local officials, recruit volunteers to become members of the CVOs from all sectors of
society such as peasants, workers, students, professionals, businessman, religious
sectors, out of school youth and others.

The CVOs shall among others perform the following tasks in

support of the police and the military in the area:

1) Collect intelligence reports.

2) Conduct ronda and similar neighborhood watch

activities.
 3) Assist in the dissemination of public information.

4) Assist in providing safety and security services in

cases of emergency.

5) Support and assist in the identification and

implementation of community development projects, and

6) Perform other related tasks.

k. Conduct of regular meetings of Coordinating Councils to

plan, monitor, supervise and revitalize ISO government efforts.

Government fora such as the peace and order councils,

development councils, and the disaster coordinating centers and area coordinating
centers are excellent venues or facilities through which various government programs
are discussed and facilitated.

Concerned PNP units are therefore directed to actively

participate in the activities of these bodies for the attainment of a revitalized internal
security support operations to the AFP and the government as a whole.

l. The operationalization of the DILG/PNP and DND/AFP Joint

IRR to EO 110

The core objective of the Joint IRR is to delineate the roles

and responsibilities of the PNP and AFP in the implementation of the provisions of EO
110 in the areas of Operations, Intelligence, Police Community Relations and
Investigation of ISO related cases and other related activities. Likewise, it set forth the
concept in Internal Security Operations to be conducted jointly by the AFP with the PNP
in the support role in order to preserve the internal security of the State against
insurgents and other serious threats to national security.

Relatedly, the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop operational

methodology shall be applied to carry out the integrated and focused effort of the
military, police, the entire government machinery and the NGOs, Gos, POs in addressing
insurgency as outlined in the National Peace and Development Plan and the Strategy of
Total Approach.

D. TASKS:

In furtherance of the intent and purpose of this Plan the following shall
also be undertaken by offices/units concerned:

1. DRDO - Command Group Supervisor, responsible in the successful

implementation of this Master Plan.

2. ROPD -

a) Monitor the progress and development of this campaign

plan.
 b) Coordinate/work closely with the Joint AFP-PNP Secretariat
on Internal Security Coordinating System (ISCS) for the continuous evaluation and
assessment of internal security condition of the region.

c) Prioritize the deployment of PRMG operating units to critical

areas, especially when there are more critical areas than the available operating units.

d) Monitor the operationalization of the Integrated

Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP).

e) Generate and maintain additional reserve elements from

available personnel at PRO 8 Headquarters.

f) Perform other tasks as directed.

3. RPHRDD -

a) Fill-up personnel strength of all mobile forces in accordance

with the staffing pattern.

b) Recommend the replacement and/or reshuffle of field

commanders when necessary.

c) Prioritize the distribution of recruitment quota to areas

where the AFP is not present.

d) Come-up with policies and guidelines on the proper selection

of key positions in insurgency affected areas.

e) Supervise and monitor the training activities of tasked units.

f) Supervise the SCOUT Training of all mobile forces.

g) Direct and supervise the training to improve police

investigative techniques.

h) Continue to conduct SCOUT Training until all personnel of

the mobile forces are trained.

i) Perform other tasks as directed.

4. RIID -

a) Provide policy direction to PPOs in their intelligence efforts.

b) Intensify the conduct of intelligence and CI operations in

support of the AFP.

c) Provide timely and relevant intelligence and estimates of the

situation to all tasked units.

d) Assess continuously the intelligence priority requirements.

 e) Supervise the PPOs in their investigation efforts and in the
service of warrants of arrest against DT personalities.

f) Monitor and follow-up the cases filed against the insurgents

in the proper court and/or at the Commission on Human Rights.

g) Supervise the PPOs and other tasked PNP units/offices in the

implementation of the legal offensive.

h) Perform other tasks as directed.

5. RLD -

a) Allocate and re-allocate vehicles, firearms and

communication facilities based on criticality of the area and threat situation.

b) Plan for and support the additional logistical requirement of

tasked units.

c) Conduct continuous research on organizational and

individual equipment that may be appropriate for use in ISO.

d) Conduct continuous evaluation on the existing organizational

and individual equipment for usefulness, serviceability and applicability in ISO.

e) Perform other tasks as directed.

6. RPCRD -

a) Plan, develop and supervise the PCR activities of tasked

units.

b) Assist the PPOs in the establishment of effective inter-

agency linkages with concerned government units and NGOs.

c) Develop and pursue PCR activity design to gain the support

and cooperation of the populace on the government.

d) Conduct civic action, information drives, dialogues and

counter propaganda using the print and broadcast media to discredit and isolate the
threat group politico-military hierarchy.

e) Conduct series of coordination with other government

agencies and NGOs for possible support in conjunction with the implementation of this
plan.

f) Assist PPOs in the processing of the threat group's members

who will avail of the amnesty and balik-baril programs.

g) Perform other tasks as directed/requested.

7. RCD -

a) Provide additional fund requirements of tasked units.

 b) Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

8. All PDs & CD OCPO -

The main implementors of this Master Plan, thus you are directed
to perform the following subject of the MOA with the AFP, PNP priority for Anti-Crime,
available PNP resources, threat level and other local considerations:

a) Conduct limited internal security operations, gathering of

information and PCR activities in support to the AFP.

b) Re-deploy forces, firearms, vehicles and communication

equipment to address the enemy threat.

c) Determine own "force-mix" in the deployment of forces for

ISO and law enforcement, giving more emphasis to the identified primary thrust or local
areas.

d) Coordinate closely with the AFP Area Commanders within

your respective AORs in the conduct of internal security operations.

e) See to it that all MPS have IA/CPSP's and COPS Plans and
are fully implemented.

f) Strengthen the organization of COPs and/or organize new

ones in cleared areas in respective AORs to bolster the existing IA/CPSP.

g) Prepare to conduct ISO in areas where no AFP are present.

h) Coordinate closely with Peace and Order Council/

Development Coordinating Council (POCs/DCC) on other activities that require the
active participation of civilian agencies and the private sector.

i) Render quarterly report on the Internal Security Condition

(ISC) of cities/municipalities within your respective jurisdiction

j) Perform other tasks on orders.

9. PRMG 8 -

a) Act as the primary mobile force of PNP PRO 8.

b) Sustain training and retraining of personnel for ISO to

maintain the highest level of tactical proficiency.

c) Sustain and enhance the security of vital installations and

VIPs from atrocities.

d) Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

10. ASG 8 -
 a) Maintain and enhance the serviceability of primary air
assets.

b) Prioritize the allocation of flights for an efficient delivery of

air support to ISO.

c) Establish, maintain and improve air-to-ground

communications system.

d) Conduct a sustained training on the operation and

deployment of air assets as a measure to maintain the highest level of air tactical
proficiency in support to ISO.

e) Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

11. RMO 8 -

a) Maintain and enhance the serviceability of primary maritime

assets.

b) Prioritize the allocation of materials for an efficient delivery

of Maritime support to ISO.

c) Maintain and improve ship-to-ground communications

system.

d) Conduct a sustained training on the operation and

deployment of watercrafts.

e) Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

12. RIO 8 -

a) Intensify information gathering and intelligence operations

against CPP/NPA/NDF.

b) Provide timely intelligence information to tasked units.

c) Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

13. CIDG 8 -

a) Assist PPOs in the case build-up and other documentation

against CPP/NPA/NDF personalities.

b) Provide investigation teams to other tasked units.

c) Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

14. RCEO 8 -

a) Provide additional communication requirements to tasked

units.
 b) Perform other tasks as requested/directed.

15. All other NSUs -

a) Assist and support the ISO of PPOs in conformity with their

respective area of interest or field of expertise.

b) Continue to perform your respective missions.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Respect for human rights shall be paramount, and strict adherence

with the PNP Operational Procedures (Revised Rules of Engagement) shall always be
emphasized in all police operations.

2. All PNP units shall re-assess respective resources and capabilities.

All IMPLANs and SOPs, shall be updated to conform with this master plan.

3. Tasked units shall operate on the existing logistical and financial

allocations. PNP PRO 8 shall provide additional logistical and financial support on a
case-to-case basis.

4. Maximum coordination with local government agencies/units, non-

government organizations and all sectors of the community, for the success of the anti-
crime strategy, is authorized and highly encouraged.

5. In order to ensure uniformity in adopting/implementing the COPS

and IA/CPSP concepts, all chiefs of police/police supervisors implementing them must
always be guided by the "Community-Oriented Policing System (COPS) Manual for the
PNP" issued thru NAPOLCOM Resolution Nr 2000-157 dated October 31, 2000 and
IA/CPSP guidelines and requirements.

6. This Master Plan shall supersede PNP LOI 41/96 CAMPAIGN PLAN
SANDUGO III (PNP Counter Insurgency Strategy) . However, all applicable issuances,
MOUs/MOAs not in conflict with this Master Plan are still in effect.

7. All PDs, CD OCPO and Chiefs, NSUs shall submit IMPLANs to this Plan and
periodic reports on its implementation.

8. This Master Plan shall take effect upon approval.

F. COMMAND & SIGNAL:

a. Command: PRO 8 Operation Center: Regional Operations and

Plans Division, Camp Kangleon, Palo, Leyte. Tel. No. 323-3023 and Fax No. 323-7267 or
e-mail at ropd@moscom.com .

b. Signal: Current CEOI in effect.

NARDITO IBUOS YORO

Police Chief Superintendent
 Regional Director
Distribution:
All Tasked Units

LOI 40-2001 SANDUGO/Plans