GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

General Luna Road, Baguio City Philippines 2600

Website: www.ubaguio.edu
Telefax No.: (074) 442-3071 E-mail Address: ub@ubaguio.edu

Topic: Internal Security Operations/ Rule of Engagement

Facilitator: Marie joy Macli-ing Capdos PhD
Reporter: Marilyn M. Duan-Balo
Course Title: Crisis Intervention & Management/ 1400H to 1730H
Date: 03 March 2019
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Learning Objectives:
 To be able to define internal security, operations and rule of engagement
 To identify Abu Sayaff Group, Bangsomoro, Islamic Freedom Fighters and its
History
 To size-up its magnitude and cost to the public
 To appreciate application of laws to actual cases that resulted in conviction
and/or imposition of penalties.
Introduction:
The security of the country as manifested by armed communist activities is the most
visible sign of the insurgency problem. Insurgency may not be solved by police/military solution
alone (although police/military action is vital and an important part), but by a package of
government policies and programs that can effectively and simultaneously address the socio-
economic, the political and the military aspects of the situation. The whole government
machinery and instrumentalities must strongly and coordinately be made to bear on the
problem.
The Government, through the AFP and the PNP, had launched various campaigns and
pacification drives in the past decades to resolve the continuing communist insurgency threat.
As a result, the communist insurgent movement experienced a downtrend in its party building,
army building and alliance work. This downtrend was attributed among others to the vigorous
implementation of the series of the PNP's SANDUGO Master Plan and the AFP Internal Peace
and Security Plan (IPSP) “BAYANIHAN”. (Now, it is National Peace and Security Development
Plan).
The military and police counter-insurgency campaigns and other complementing efforts
by concerned civil government agencies LGUs and NGOs, may be classified into three (3)
major operations or activities, namely:
(1) Internal Security Operations (ISO) by the AFP and the PNP to provide security to the
people and the government;
(2) National Development operations by the civil government agencies to address the
root causes of insurgency; and
(3) Peace Process by the Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process
(OPAPP) to complement the overall government effort to attract rebels back to the mainstream
of society, in the spirit of equality, peace reconciliation and unification. (Government’s three-
pronged strategy in addressing the country's insurgency problem)

Definition of Terms:
 Support Operations (“to win the peace”)- A broad term that refers to the
AFP/PNP operations and activities conducted in support of the entire nation approach to
establish and maintain a just and lasting peace in the Philippines.
 Terrorism-An act sowing and creating a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand.
 National Security- Situation and/or environment where the nation’s fundamental
values and the way of life of Filipinos, its institutions, and its socio-political interests are
protected and enhanced.
 Internal Peace and Security-The state of peace within the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines achieved and sustained by upholding national and international laws,
respecting human rights and defending against armed internal security threats.
 Internal Security Operations (ISO)-Activities designed to preserve internal
security against insurgents, secessionists and terrorists. Among others, it includes territorial
defense operations, intelligence, combat, military and police civil relations, legal offensives,
police internal security operations and psychological operations.
 Insurgency-An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

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 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
General Luna Road, Baguio City Philippines 2600

Website: www.ubaguio.edu
Telefax No.: (074) 442-3071 E-mail Address: ub@ubaguio.edu

 Internally Displaced Person (IDP). Any person who has been forced or obliged to
flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order
to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or human-made
 Area of Operations-That portion of an area of conflict necessary for AFP/PNP
operations.
 Armed Struggle-The weapon for carrying out the central task of the revolution;
the destruction of enemy rule and the seizure of political power. It is principally launched in the
countryside and principally relies on the armed forces or the army focused on the objective of
defeating the military force of the government.

History:
For decades, the Philippines has been saddled with armed internal security threats
posed by groups motivated by ideology and motivated by self-determination;
1.) Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA)
2.) Muslim groups
a) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
b) Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
c) Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)
3.) Terrorist groups
a) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
b) Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
4.) Private armies of political clans.

The term "Bangsamoro" literally means “Moro Nation”. It has always referred to Muslims,
with the word “Moro” taken from the Spanish for Muslim (Moor). The Moro National Liberation
Front signed a peace pact with government in 1996 but some of the members later left the
group and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters is a breakaway group that has been disowned by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
The 300-strong Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters is headed by foreign-trained guerrilla
Omra Ameril Kato, a former MILF commander who is opposed to the peace negotiations
between government and the MILF. The BIFF broke away from the mainstream Moro Islamic
Liberation Front in 2008 after the botched signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).

Communist Party of the Philippines

The Abu Sayyaf is a Jihadist militant and pirate group that follow the Wahhabi doctrine of
Sunni Islam. It is based in and around Jolo and Basilan islands in the southwestern part of the
Country, where for more than four decades, Moro groups have been engaged in an insurgency
seeking to make the province independent. The group is considered violent and was
responsible for the worst terrorist attack, like the bombing of Super ferry 14 in 2004, which killed
116 people. The name of the group is derived from the Arabic abu means "father of", and sayyaf
means "swordsmith". As of 2012, the group was estimated to have between 200 and 400
members, down from 1,250 in 2000. They use mostly improvised explosive devices, mortars
and automatic rifles.

Since its inception in 1991, the group has carried out bombings, kidnappings,
assassinations and extortion. They have been involved in criminal activities, including
kidnapping, rape, child sexual assault, forced marriage, drive-by shootings, extortion and drug
trafficking. The goals of the group appear to have alternated over time between criminal
objectives and a more ideological intent. The group was founded by Abdurajak Abubakar
Janjalani, and led after his death in 1998 by his younger brother Khadaffy Janjalani until his
death in 2006. On 23 July 2014, Abu Sayyaf leader Isnilon Hapilon swore an oath of loyalty to
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL. In September 2014, the group began kidnapping
people for ransom, in the name of ISIL.

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 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
General Luna Road, Baguio City Philippines 2600

Website: www.ubaguio.edu
Telefax No.: (074) 442-3071 E-mail Address: ub@ubaguio.edu

2015 Samal Island kidnappings

On 21 September 2015, Robert Hall and John Ridsdel, Sekkingstad, and Marites Flor
(Hall's girlfriend) were abducted on Samal Island near Davao. Ridsdel was beheaded by Abu
Sayyaf on 25 April 2016 following a ransom deadline.

On 3 May 2016, a video of the Ridsdel execution was released, along with new
demands for the remaining hostages. On 15 May, Hall appeared in a new video and was
beheaded. On 24 June, Abu Sayyaf released Filipina Marites Flor. She was subsequently flown
to Davao to meet President-elect Rodrigo Duterte. On 17 September 2016, remaining hostage
Norwegian Kjartan Sekkingstad was released on Jolo Island. Abu Rami, an ASG spokesman,
claimed $638,000 was paid as ransom.

President Duterte said; I can bomb more if I want to. At the end of the day, what can I
say to the Filipino? That we have wiped out almost all of our Yakan, Sama, Tausūg brothers?
Even those not connected with the violence now? Either we talk, if you want autonomy or if you
want something else, federalism, I am ready. I am committed to federalism set-up to appease
the Moro.

Concept of Internal Security (IS)

Internal security is the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or
other self-governing territories by upholding the national law and defending against internal
security threats. Internal security is a responsibility of police the military forces. However,
security is everyone’s responsibility.

Threats to internal security may be directed at either the state's citizens, or the organs
and infrastructure of the state itself, and may range from petty crime, serious organized crime,
political or industrial unrest, or even domestic terrorism. Foreign powers may also act as a
threat to internal security, by either committing or sponsoring terrorism or rebellion, without
actually declaring war. Governmental responsibility for internal security will generally rest with
an interior ministry, as opposed to a defense ministry. Depending on the state, a state's internal
security will be maintained by either the ordinary police or law enforcement agencies or more
militarized police forces (literally, the Internal Troops.). Other specialized internal security
agencies may exist to augment these main forces, such as border guards, special police units,
or aspects of the state's intelligence agencies. In some states, internal security may be the
primary responsibility of a secret police force (Intel).

The level of authorized force used by agencies and forces responsible for maintaining
internal security might range from unarmed police to fully armed military organizations, or
employ some level of less-lethal weaponry in between. For violent situations, internal security
forces may contain some element of military type equipment such as non-military armored
vehicles.

As the concept of internal security refers to the entity of the state and its citizens,
persons who are threats to internal security may be designated as an enemy of the state or
enemy of the people. Persons detained by internal security forces may either be dealt with by
the normal criminal justice system, or for more serious crimes against internal security such as
treason. Often, military involvement in internal security is explicitly prohibited, or is restricted,
they are only allowed in counter terrorism operations.

Composition of AFP IPSP

The constitutional mandate of the AFP declares it as the protector of the people and the
state. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the national territory
(Art. II, Sec. 3). The premise of this constitutional dictum assumes possible external threats to
sovereignty, and hence, the protector role can be generally construed as protecting the people
from external aggressors. There is therefore a need for the military institution to re-imagine the
concept of security to one that embraces a broader view of human security. Representatives
from civil society groups, the academe, and civilian government agencies directly participated
and debated with members of the AFP in framing and broadening the definition of security. The

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 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
General Luna Road, Baguio City Philippines 2600

Website: www.ubaguio.edu
Telefax No.: (074) 442-3071 E-mail Address: ub@ubaguio.edu

discussion also problematized on the impasse that the military is currently embroiled in that is,
its primary assignment to address the internal armed security threats at the expense of
distancing itself from its inherent mandate of territorial defense and protector of sovereignty.

INTERNAL PEACE AND SECURITY THREATS

At present, challenges to Philippine national security emanate from a broad spectrum,

which can be grouped into three categories. These are internal peace and security threats,
external security threats and non-traditional security threats.

Armed threats to internal peace and security vary in their motivations and
methodologies. First on the list are ideology-based groups such as the New People’s Army, the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the rogue elements of the Moro National Liberation Front.

The New People’s Army (NPA) remains as the primary threat to the country’s internal
peace and security. It aims to supplant the country’s democracy with a totalitarian communist
state, primarily by waging a protracted war against the government. The Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) provides the general line and direction of the insurgency. It acts as political
force in tandem with the National Democratic Front (NDF) to try and influence government
policy with the latter wielding a well-built propaganda machinery that allows them to solicit
support. The CPP-NPA-NDF also establishes linkages with local and international
networks/organizations.

As of 1st semester 2010, the NPA was estimated to have wielding varying degrees of
influence in about 2.4% of the total barangays nationwide. The NPA draws strength from the
populace. With mass support, the NPA gains access to safe havens, intelligence information
and a pool of recruits and resources. Each guerilla unit has the ability to arouse, organize, and
mobilize communities, conduct ideological, political, and organizational works, launch tactical
offensives and acquire resources through criminal acts.

As of 1st semester 2010, the presence of about 10,500 Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) members is felt in 18% of the total 9,962 barangays in Mindanao. They are concentrated
mainly in the provinces of Central Mindanao, specifically in the provinces of Maguindanao and
Lanao del Sur. At present, the secessionist movement has shown its willingness to reach a
negotiated political agreement with the national government through the conduct of peace talks.

The group has attained modest success by posturing itself as the rallying point for
aspirations of Bangsamoro nationhood, in response to both real and perceived marginalization
and minoritization in Muslim Mindanao. This popular support provides the MILF the semblance
of legitimacy it needs to organize and wield control over its armed wing, the Bangsamoro
Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). Their movement is supplemented by the use of ethnic and familial
ties to attain freedom of movement and access safe havens in their areas of operations.

A faction of the mainstream Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), estimated to have a
strength of 650 members with around 300 firearms, is motivated by what they perceive as the
inability of the Philippine government to deliver the promises of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final
Peace Agreement (FPA). The group operates mainly in the areas of Zamboanga, Basilan and
Sulu and affects 23 barangays in the said areas. The group, through its leaders and key
personalities, fosters links with international and local networks. It is also capable of launching
small-scale offensives and acquiring resources through criminal acts such as extortion activities.
Similar to the MILF, the rogue elements of the MNLF are able to leverage and exploit
familial/kinship ties for support.

The Terrorist Groups/Abu Sayyaf Group’s (ASG) objective is to establish a

fundamentalist Islamic society in Mindanao through violent jihad. As of the 1st semester of
2010, it was estimated that they have around 400 members with a little over 300 firearms. At
present, the ASG has been constricted in the hinterlands of Basilan and Sulu, though it retains a
modicum of presence in some urban centers in Mindanao where it draws logistics and other
forms of support. The group has repeatedly shifted its orientation from being a fundamentalist
terror group to something akin to an organized crime group.

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 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
General Luna Road, Baguio City Philippines 2600

Website: www.ubaguio.edu
Telefax No.: (074) 442-3071 E-mail Address: ub@ubaguio.edu

The group has alliances with the MILF, MNLF, the Jemaah Islamiyah and other foreign
terrorist organizations (FTOs). Their capability to stage kidnap- for-ransom and extortion
activities provides the group funds for survival, sustenance and recruitment of members. More
troubling are their reported linkages/ties with local politicians, providing increased fluidity in
movement and various sources in the procurement of firearms.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Other Foreign Terrorist Organizations have a degree of threat
posed by foreign terrorist organizations. Based on latest intelligence reports for the first
semester 2010, there are about 50 foreign terrorists in the country, most of them with
connections to Al Qaeda. Twenty eight (28) are members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The JI
traces its roots to Indonesia, notably from the teachings of the radical Islamist cleric, Abu Bakar
Bashir. The group aims to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate in Southeast Asia, purged of any
Western influence.

Their primary impact to internal peace and security is their transfer of terrorist knowledge
(i.e. assembly and use of improvised explosive devices) to local groups. Foreign terrorists
however, have limited capability to launch attacks, relying on the support of local armed threat
groups. The AFP remains vigilant against these groups, in close cooperation with the Philippine
National Police (PNP).

The AFP also actively supports civilian law enforcement agencies in defeating other
armed threats to internal peace and security such as the Pentagon Group, which is involved in
kidnap-for-ransom activities, and the extortionist Al Khobar Group. In addition to these
organized crime groups, partisan armed groups (PAGs)/Auxiliary Threat Groups also threaten
peace and development in local communities. Estimates from the PNP count 107 private armies
in the country.10 PAGs are organized to consolidate influence and propagate power over a
locality through armed coercion. Impunity ascribed to PAGs is rooted in their ability to corrupt
government institutions and their leaders’ ability to leverage on their status as wielders of
political power.

Once isolation is achieved, the AFP is in a better position to defeat terrorist groups such
as the ASG through intelligence-driven combat operations. Cooperative measures with law
enforcement agencies shall likewise be sustained in the pursuit of terrorist groups. At the same
time, links with other government agencies tasked to address socio-economic conditions that
contribute to the resiliency of terror groups shall also be pursued.

LOI 40/2001 "SANDUGO MASTER PLAN" (The PNP ISO Master Plan) dated 04December
2001
This serves as the long-range and holistic master plan of the PNP in waging an internal
security support operations nationwide. Premised on the estimate of the national situation and
other considerations, it prescribes the counter-insurgency support strategy, operational concept,
scheme of implementation, service support and coordinating instructions in order to accomplish
the PNP's internal security support mission.

All subsequent and supplemental Programs of Action, LOIs, and other related issuances
to be prescribed and executed by PNP units and personnel at all levels which would have a
bearing on internal security, must therefore conform with the intent/spirit and strategic and
operational guidelines embodied herein

The Government, through the AFP and the PNP, had launched various campaigns and
pacification drives in the past decades to resolve the continuing communist insurgency threat.
As a result, the communist insurgent movement experienced a downtrend in its party building,
army building and alliance work

The National Peace and Development Plan has adopted the Strategy of "Total
Approach". Its holistic approach to effectively address armed conflicts in the country consists of
a security component, a political component and a socio-economic component. The security
component directly addresses violent conflicts, the political component seeks to tap the full
cooperation of local government units and civil society to promote good governance and local

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 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
General Luna Road, Baguio City Philippines 2600

Website: www.ubaguio.edu
Telefax No.: (074) 442-3071 E-mail Address: ub@ubaguio.edu

peace initiatives, while the socio-economic component focuses on ways and means to
eradicate/alleviate poverty

Objectives of SANDUGO MASTER PLAN

a. To develop the capability of field units to fully operationalize this ISO support plan
for the government and the AFP in particular.

b. To support the AFP in the isolation of the underground infrastructure and front
organizations of the insurgents in the towns and cities form the general population.

c. To enhance intelligence activities against threat groups.

d. To enhance the conduct of legal offensive against the insurgents.

e. To support the governments' National Peace and Development Plan to include

the Peace and Reconciliation plan.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

The PNP campaign plan shall also follow the Clear-Hold-Support operational
methodology as herein indicated in support to the integration efforts of the military and other
civilian agencies of the government as envisioned in the NPDP and the strategy of "Total
Approach".

 The CLEAR Stage shall involve the conduct of combat, Intelligence and
Psychological operations as separate weapons systems to directly lead to the destruction of
the insurgent armed groups. The end state of this phase is dismantled LCM politico-military
infrastructure in the affected barangays and the decisive defeat of the main enemy armed
groups in the targeted guerilla fronts. The PNP will support the AFP who is primarily
responsible for the Clear Stage.
 The HOLD Stage shall involve the utilization of the territorial defense forces to
limit the freedom of action and movement of the CPP/NPA, limit its access to resources and
reduce mass base support to the CPP/NPA/NDF. This phase shall have the following end
state. Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) is organized and established,
in order to protect the people, defend communities and secure vital assets and installations.
The PNP will be primarily responsible for the Hold Stage in areas which are turned over to the
PNP or where there are no AFP units assigned. However, other areas, especially in those
areas where AFP units are present or where AFP supervises CAFGU then the IA/CPSP is
responsible.
 The SUPPORT Stage is a "work in progress:. It shall involve police support to
consolidation and development activities of other agencies of government. The PNP within its
capability shall play a supportive role in these activities, including but not limited to the conduct
of medical and dental civic action, adult literacy programs and providing security in support and
in coordination with AFP to civil government agencies in their delivery of basic services in far-
flung and strife-torn area.
 The Consolidation Stage aims to strengthen government control and authority in
contested barangays and develop the capability of local officials to effectively govern their
barangays.
 The overlapping and interrelated phases of this methodology may be conducted
simultaneously or sequentially depending on the prevailing situation in the targeted area. The
efforts of the PNP shall focus in supporting the AFP on the Clearing and Holding phases, and
within the local unit capability they shall provide appropriate support to local government units
and other concerned agencies in the Consolidation and Development Phase.
 The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to accomplish an ISO-
related mission. This principal thrust requires the PNP, military and the civil government
agencies to work cohesively, and to unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic
approach in addressing insurgency. The role of the police aside from supporting the AFP in
neutralizing the insurgent politico-military infrastructure is to help create a physically and
psychologically secured environment conducive for socio-economic development.

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 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
General Luna Road, Baguio City Philippines 2600

Website: www.ubaguio.edu
Telefax No.: (074) 442-3071 E-mail Address: ub@ubaguio.edu

Rule of Engagement:
The AFP takes the primary responsibility in responding to affected areas, particularly in
areas with very active and active guerilla fronts. In these areas, the AFP will seek to
dismantle/neutralize the insurgent political and armed components by mobile battalions of a
tasked unit applying the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept and the TRIAD concept of
Intelligence. In built-up areas not affected by insurgency, including cities and urban center, the
PNP takes the lead role. It shall continue its normal police functions, such as the enhancement
of law enforcement activities, maintenance of peace and order to ensure public safety
intensified intelligence, police community relation activities and other related police operations.

Rule of engagement means internal rules or directives among military forces (including
civilians) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of
force, or actions which might be construed as provocative. They provide authorization for and/or
limit on, among other things, the use of force and the employment of certain specific
capabilities.

Summary:

The operationalization of the DILG/PNP and DND/AFP is based on Joint Implementing

rules and regulations (IRR) called Executive Order 110. The core objective of the Joint IRR is to
delineate the roles and responsibilities of the PNP and AFP in the implementation of the
provisions of EO 110 in the areas of Operations, Intelligence, Police Community Relations and
Investigation of ISO related cases and other related activities. Likewise, it set forth the concept
in Internal Security Operations to be conducted jointly by the AFP with the PNP in the support
role in order to preserve the internal security of the State against insurgents and other serious
threats to national security.

Insight:
The AFP & PNP have been valiantly addressed these threats for more than four
decades through its various campaigns. Yet, while it succeeded in diminishing the capacity (and
consequently, the number) of these groups, still armed internal security threats continue to this
day. This is because insurgency is largely driven by structural problems in Philippine society,
such as unequal development, non-delivery of basic services, injustice, and poor governance—
all of which are beyond the uniformed personnel purview. Insurgency and armed conflict
threatens the way of life, safety, and security of Filipinos. Addressing the insurgency problem,
therefore, is something that cannot be done by the military alone.

Conclusion:

We, the Filipino people are the ultimate beneficiaries of internal peace and security
efforts where that peace and security is fostered and sustained. The success of the
government’s peace and security efforts is dependent on the participation and support of the
entire Filipino citizenry. It is therefore imperative that the national government and the AFP/PNP
in particular, are able to form a common understanding of security with its constituents. Only
when a shared concept of security is formed, also that responsibilities can be shared. Let us
SUPPORT the uniform personnel OPERATIONS TO WIN THE PEACE IN ORDER for us to
HELP THE Filipino nation create an environment conducive for sustainable development and a
just and lasting peace. That shared responsibilities starts with you. Your choice, our future.

References:
 Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces.―DCAF Backgrounder May
2008
 http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISFPub/55845/ipublicationdocument_singledocumen
t/153432CC-7C90-482A-9077-EC205986219E/en/17_bg_dem_control_armedforces.pdf retrieved on 19
February 2019.
 http://bulatlat.com/main/2010/03/12/15-soldiers-not-11-killed-in-mindoro-ambush-reds-
claim/. Retrieved 12/04/2010. http://rustychain.wordpress.com/. Retrieved 12/03/2010.
http://penerang.com/2010/10/11/para-pejuang-bangsamoro/. Retrieved 12/04/2010.
 http://article.wn.com/view/2010/11/03/Australia_US_warn_of_terror_threat_in_Manila/.
Retrieved 12/06/2010. http://marxistleninist.wordpress.com. Retrieved 12/05/2010.
http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/science/page/2/. Retrieved 12/06/2010.

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