DSWD VS.

BELEN

FACTS:

Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both naturalized American

citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece Zhedell Bernardo Ibea before
RTC of Lingayen Pangasinan. After finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified
to adopt the child as their own, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition. He
based his decree on the findings and recommendation of the DSWD prepared by Elma
P. Vedaña. Belen decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody.

However, when Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain a travel clearance from the
DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the US, the department uncovered what it
considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that
the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was
never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a report.
Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer
of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for
said minor’s adoption.

Belen claimed that he directed Vedaña to conduct the home and case study, and
thereafter submit a report. Since these functions were so provided to be performed by
her, there was no need for him to order Vedana to coordinate with the DSWD as he
assumed that it was routine procedure for her to do so. He also contends that no
approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports and it need
not be furnished therewith. Because of this, OCA recommended that Belen be
administratively punished for violating SC Circular No. 12-1986, and Article 33 of PD 603.
On the other hand, respondent Vedaña pointed out that there never was any directive
from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD concerning the adoption in
question. She was only ordered to conduct the case study and submit her report
thereon to the court. She denied that she ever asked for money from Spouses Soriano.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not Judge Belen and Vedana guilty for violation of PD 603 and SC
Circular No. 12?
 What is the proper recourse that Judge Belen should take on the
commencement of the Adoption Proceedings

RULING: Yes.

Under Art 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, “No petition for adoption shall be
granted unless the DSWD, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be
adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has
submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such
petition. The DSWD shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study,
that the petition should be denied.”

Circular No. 12 was issued by the SC to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by
judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in
accordance with Article 33 of PD 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It directs the RTCs hearing
adoption cases to:

"(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local
agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to
those cases already filed;

(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree.

The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the RTCs, if any, shall coordinate with the
Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation
and submittal of such case study. x x x”

The proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at
the outset about the commencement of Special Proceedings so that the corresponding
case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which
undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court
social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent
judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare
officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his
duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the
adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate should be the embodiment of,
among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence. It need not be stressed
here that among the prime duties to which a judge of the law must ever be faithful is
that of being abreast with the law and jurisprudence, since, as has so often been
advanced, the administration of justice requires the continuous study of law and
jurisprudence. Respondent judge has obviously not been able to achieve the level of
this expectation.

In like manner, respondent Elma P. Vedaña should have been well aware not only of
the scope of her duties and responsibilities but that she should have likewise been
familiar with current laws, rules and regulations pertinent to her position as such social
welfare officer. By her misfeasance, she has compromised the prescribed process in
the administration of justice in proceedings such as the one under consideration.

ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M.
Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby
CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of
this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for
violating Circular No. 12.

ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176102. November 26, 2014

Note: The focus of the case is on the penalty imposed to the accused

Facts:

Rosal Hubille was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed Jayson Espinola
with a knife. He was charged with Homicide.

RTC - convicted him of homicide and imposed the penalty of indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment of four years and one day of prision correcional as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

CA – Rosal’s sentence was modified in that he was sentenced to six months and one
day of prision correctional as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. The civil aspect was also modified

On motion for reconsideration, the CA partially granted the appeal and imposed on
him the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

Issue:
WON the CA should have suspended Rosal’s sentence in accordance with RA 9344;
that he is entitled to probation or suspension of sentence

Held:

Article 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. His
minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision
mayor.

In Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be

within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision
correccional. So the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
Petitioner insists that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence should be reduced to
only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under PD 968.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC - the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited
to the minimum

Sec. 38 of RA 9344 which allows the suspension of the sentence is available only until
the child offender turns 21 years of age.

Since he is over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction in the RTC, suspension was
no longer feasible.

RA 9344 reveals that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means
prohibited. Restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment:
(a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and
(b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time

Imprisonment was imposed on the petitioner as a last recourse after holding him to be
disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008

JOEMAR ORTEGA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS: At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only 13 years old, while the
victim AAA was 6, both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on
three different occasions in 1996. The lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal
and civil liability imposed. The case was pending when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No.
9344) or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted amending the age
of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. Said law took effect on
May 20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that
petitioner is not exempt from criminal liability because he is not anymore a child as
defined by R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of said
law is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by reason of minority
HELD: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of
any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete
absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act,
no criminal liability arises. Hence, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability
attaches.

By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at
the time of the commission of the alleged rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. The
Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony.
While the law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he is not exempt
from civil liability. For this reason, petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA civil
indemnity.

MICHAEL PADUA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESGR 168546 (July 23, 2008)

Facts:

Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, wasinvolved in selling illegal drugs. Initially in his
arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-enteredhis plea of guilty to avail the benefits of firs
timeoffenders. Subsequently, he applied for probationbut was denied. In his petition for
certiorari, thecourt said that probation and suspension of sentence are different and
provisions in PD 603 orRA 9344 cannot be invoked to avail probation. It isspecifically
stated that in drug trafficking,application for probation should be denied. As aside
issue, the court discussed the availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.

ISSUE

Whether suspension of sentence under RA9344 can still be invoked given the fact that
theaccused is now 21 years old.

HELD

NO. The suspension of sentence underSection 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer
beretroactively applied for petitioner s benefit.Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that
oncea child under 18 years of age is found guilty of theoffense charged, instead of
pronouncing thejudgment of conviction, the court shall place thechild in conflict with
the law under suspendedsentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however,provides
that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether
to dischargethe child, order execution of sentence, or extendthe suspended sentence
for a certain specifiedperiod
or until the child reaches the maximumage of 21 years
. Petitioner has already reached 21years of age or over and thus, could no longer
beconsidered a child for purposes of applying Rep.Act 9344. Thus, the application of
Sections 38 and40 appears moot and academic as far as his case isconcerned.

VALCESAR ESTIOCA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 173876 (JUNE 27, 2008)

Facts

A number of persons were accused of conspiring and robbing an elementary school.

One of which is Boniao who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime. They were found guilty by the lower court. When the case was appealed to the
CA, RA 9344 took effect and Boniao was acquitted since he was a minor at the time of
the crime but without prejudice to his civil liability. Custody was given to his parents.

ISSUE

Whether RA 9344 can retroact to Boniao’s case.sierra

HELD.

Yes, the reckoning point in considering minority is the time of the commission of the
crime.In this case Boniao is 14 years old hence exempted from criminal liability without
prejudice to his civil liability. Art 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws
may be given retroactive effect if they are in favor of the accused.
 ROBERT SIERRA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 182941 (JULY 3, 2009)
Facts
Petitioner was 15 years old when he raped a minor. He was convicted of rape
and was imposed a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and a fine. He
elevated the case to CA and during the pendence of the case, RA 9344 took effect.
CA affirmed the conviction and denied the defense of minority since the age was not
established by presenting the birth certificate but only alleged in the testimonial of the
petitioner and his mother. According to them the burden of proof of age is upon the
prosecution.

ISSUES
Who has the burden of proof in establishing the age of the accused?
Whether the law be given retroactive application.
HELD:
The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the prosecution but on the
accused. Age can be established by birth certificate. Sec. 7 provides that in the
absence of such document, age may be based from the information of the child,
testimonies of other persons, physical appearance and other relevant evidence. Also in
case of doubt, minority should be in favour of the child. In the case at bar, minority was
established by the testimonies of the petitioner and his mother. This was not objected by
the prosecution and did not even presented contrary evidence. Thus, minority is
established.
The law should be given retroactive application since this favors the accused as
provided for in the Revised Penal Code – penal laws favouring the accused should be
given retroactive effect. Hence the accused is considered a minor with an age of not
above 15 years old. The case is dismissed and the petitioner is referred to the
appropriate local social welfare.

SANCHEZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information[6]
dated August 29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo
Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province
of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a
Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year old minor,
by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the
child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to
the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during
the trial.

The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it is not
prejudicial to the child-victim’s development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not
applicable and he should be charged under the Revised Penal Code for slight physical
injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case at hand.

HELD:

In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A.
No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but
not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated
under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child
abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned
statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to
show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial
to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be
prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if
he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts
of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the
child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the
former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or” is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
“or” in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase “be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development” supposes that there are four
punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child
exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests,
as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire
context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse
but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened,
VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by
the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the
child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this
definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
 Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and
Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children
were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-
married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer
communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the
paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner
and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed
to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptee’s biological mother.

Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological
parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the
legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time
of adoption.

JOJIT GARINGARAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, EDGAR JUMAWAN,

Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
 In case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused. A child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the
victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. It is inconsequential that sexual
abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3 (b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual
or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold the accused liable for acts of
lasciviousness under RA 7610.

FACTS:
 AAA, 16 years of age, was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and mother
CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. AAA was admitted at the hospital for further observation. The next
day, her father and mother left the hospital to process AAA’s Medicare papers and to attend to their store,
respectively, leaving AAA alone in her room. When her father returned to the hospital, AAA told him that
she wanted to go home. The doctor allowed them due to AAA’s insistence but instructed her that she
should continue her medications. At home, AAA told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her.
They went back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses’
station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.

 An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. During the
trial, AAA testified that, Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and if she was still
experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her left breast and insisted that he was only
examining her. Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAA’s private part and only stopped when he saw that
AAA really had her monthly period.

 In his defense, the accused testified that he went inside AAA’s room to administer her medicines and
check
her vital signs. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the argument he had with
AAA’s father about the administering of medicines. He was supported by the testimony of the nursing
aide, Tamayo. Garingarao further alleged that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only one
incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of acts of
lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. The RTC found Garingarao guilty as charged and gave
credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingarao’s denial, which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the single incident of act of lasciviousness would suffice to hold the accused liable under RA
7610,

HELD:

 YES. The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party,
if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. It is a settled rule that denial is a weak defense
as against the positive identification by the victim. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and
constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
positive declaration by a credible witness.
 Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
 The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
 Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious
conduct
is defined as follows:
o The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.
 In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAA’s breasts and inserted his finger
into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that
his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing
despite AAA’s objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was
just examining her.
 The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues
the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to
his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.
 Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, he should
not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only once. Garingarao alleges that
the single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA 7610. This argument has no legal basis.
The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once.
Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense
occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610. The
Court finds Jojit Garingarao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610.