Caltex Inc. vs. Ma.

Flora Singzon-Aguirre
G.R. No. 170746-47 March 9, 2016

Facts:

On December 20, 1987, MV Doña Paz operated by Sulpicio Lines collided with M/T
Vector which was chartered by Caltex thus resulting to 4,000 casualties.

In 1988, the heirs of the victims of the tragedy initiated a class action with the
Louisiana Court. It was however dismissed on ground of forum non conveniens on
November 30, 2000.

Another action was filed before the RTC of Catbalogan Samar but it was motu propio
dismissed on the ground that their cause of action has already prescribed. Caltex, the
defendants in the action filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are waiving
their defense of prescription. It was however denied by the RTC.

The respondents again filed before the Louisiana Court but it was again dismissed
on the same ground. This prompted the respondents to file a motion for intervention
with the pending consolidated case before the court of Manila. The RTC of Manila denied
the said motion on the ground of bar by prior judgment finding no merit on the
petitioner’s waiver of their defense of prescription.

Issue:

Whether the dismissal was correct despite the waiver of defense sof prescription

Held:

Yes. Under Art. 1106 of the Civil Code, this case falls under the extinctive type of
prescription where rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. Art. 1139 further
provides that actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time.

The respondents only filed their claim before a Philippine court 13 years after the
collision. It is settled that prescription may be considered by courts motu proprio if it is
supported by facts and evidence.

Further, the unconditional waiver of defense of prescription cannot be considered

by the court as the dismissal had already become final and executory.
PCIB VS ESCOLIN
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen, died in Iloilo City leaving a will which
provides that Charles Newton Hodges, his husband, was appointed as her special
administrator having the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties
of the deceased. Also, she allows Charles, through the court's approval, the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie.
However, it was also stipulated that the residue and remainder of my estate, both real
and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among Linnie's
brothers and sisters.

Issue:

Whether the distribution of Linnie's estate should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines or those of Texas.

Held:

Philippine laws will apply. Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that
"intestate and testamentary successions both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges
spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules, provides
that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal properties, while the law
of the situs (in this case also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located
in the Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and applying
therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the
case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no
question that Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last
Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional
rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to immovables situated in
the Philippines.

The estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one- fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is no legal
impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her
brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same constitutes
an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position
that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions,
namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules
on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of
the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already finally and
irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the
exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere
in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the
laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything
under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually
constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to
rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a
position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.