DEFENSES
In fixing said one meter width for the “media agua” the
A. PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
MANILA ELECTRIC VS REMONQUILO
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the
house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a
galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into
contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila
Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media
agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and
died as a result thereof. In an action for damages
brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric
Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and
that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence
because although the electric wire had been installed
long before the construction of the house the electric
company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion
by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occassion.
After a careful study and discussion of the case and the
circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to
agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the
death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence and in some measure by the too close
proximity of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the
electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of
the original permit given by the city and the subsequent
approval of said illegal construction of the “media
agua”. We fail to see how the Company could be held
guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence.
Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3
feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a
distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the
side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said
regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of
a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as a
“media agua”, had the house owner followed the terms
of the permit given him by the city for the construction
of his “media agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches
wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said
“media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches.
city authorities must have wanted to preserve the
distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any
portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house
owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter
fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a
distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as
illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added
to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was
its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an
inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations
of a city ordinance and permit at the door of the
Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be
always on the lookout for any illegal construction which
reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet
had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation
of its wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be
much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be
ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are
strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or
disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the
present case, the violation of the permit for the
construction of the “media agua” was not the direct
cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had
said “media agua” been only one meter wide as allowed
by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively
have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in
order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the
“media agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or
height from the ground, and possibly if not probably
avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the
iron sheet and the wires.
PLDT VS. CA
FACTS
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane
of Lacson Street where they resided [at 25km/hr as
Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the
jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have
been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly
swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a mound
of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice
the open trench which was left uncovered because of the
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The
spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs
and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while
Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also
shattered.
PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries
sustained by the spouses were due to their own
negligence, and that it should be the independent
contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held
liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte,
alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT
should not be answerable for any accident or injuries
arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees.
Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified
of the accident, and that it complied with its contract
with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate
signs.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed
RTC and dismissed the spouses’ complaint, saying that
the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier
decision and affirmed in totoRTC’s decision. (SC
declared this later decision null and void. The first
decision already became final and executory because no
appeal was taken seasonably.)
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps.
Esteban. NO
RATIO
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the
lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not imputable to
the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the
accident did not happen because thejeep was running
quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other
it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb
over the accident mound, then Antonio had not
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have
run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular
lights which should have made him see the accident
mound in time. The mound was relatively big and
visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew
of the existence and location of the mound, having seen
it many previous times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only
contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to
thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of
its determining factors, and therebyprecludes their right
to recover damages. The perils of the road were known
to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and
prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that
there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the
placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of
the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. As
a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence
and location of the excavations there; hence, the
presence of warning signs could not have completely
prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the
last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding
the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his
action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was
presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio
and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene
of the accident. The absence of a police report and the
non-submission of a medical report from the hospital
where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even
been explained.
B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages
that he may recover.
GENOBIAGON VS. CA
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
decision in CA-G.R. No. 09949-CR, dated October 10,
1974, affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the
crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this
case are:
On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped an old
woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City,
at the right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's
rig was following another at a distance of two
meters. The old woman started to cross when the
first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's
vehicle was going so fast not only because of the
steep down-grade of the road, but also because he
was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the
appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a
consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The
appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander,
one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store in
market in order to celebrate the coming of the New
Year, and who saw the incident right before him,
shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after
appellant when the latter refused to stop.
Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why
he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it
was the old woman that bumped him.' The
appellant went back to the place where the old
woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was
unconscious, and the food and viands she was
carrying were scattered on her body. The victim was
then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital
where she died three hours later (Exh. C). The
findings after an autopsy are as follows:
Contusion with Hematoma Left, Frontal and
Occipito-Parietal Regionas Fracture Occipito-Parietal
Bne Cerebral Hemorrhage.
The deceased was an eighty-one-year old woman
named Rita B. Cabrera. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Crim. Case No. V7855). The trial court found
petitioner guilty of the felony charged and sentenced
him to "suffer an indeterminate penalty of three (3)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1)
year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of
Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not
to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty and to pay the
costs" (p. 3, Appellant's Brief, p. 56, Rollo).
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. 09949-CR)which,on October
10,1974,conviction of the accused but increased his
civil liability to P12,000. The dispositive portion of
its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment
appealed from except in the amount of indemnity to
be paid to the heirs of the deceased, Rita B. Cabrera,
which is the sum of P6,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency which should be
raised to P12,000.00 (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-
18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468) but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the
same should be, as it is hereby affirmed in all other
respects with costs. (P. 37, Rollo.)
After his motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' decision was denied, he filed a petition for
review in this Court, alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred:
1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the
victim was the proximate cause of the accident
which led to her death;
2. in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of
reasonable doUBt; and
3. in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the
petitioner from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, although the
circumstances of the victim and the accused
(petitioner) do not warrant such increase.
It is quite evident that all the issues raised in the
petition for review are factual. Well-entrenched in
our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of fact of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding
upon us (Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 101 SCRA 351; Vda.
De Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC,
144 SCRA 705).
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if
any, does not exonerate the accused. "The defense of
contributory negligence does not apply in criminal
cases committed through reckless imprudence, since
one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade
the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta,
CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,1947)." (People vs.
Quinones, 44 O.G. 1520).
The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals
unjustly increased his civil liability to P12,000, is
devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact
provides that indemnity for death in homicide or
murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente,
[1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno, 130 SCRA
198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner
is increased to P30,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed
with modification as to the civil liability of the
petitioner which is hereby increased to P30,000.
Costs against petitioner.
RAKES VS ATLANTIC
FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in
the employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to
the company's yard near the malecon in Manila.
Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in
this work. The defendant has proved that there were
two immediately following one another, upon which
were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560
pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without
side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping
off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the
men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides.
According to that defendant, some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or
near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke,
the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and
caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to
the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and
what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars
is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track
he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the
side of the car instead of along the boards, either
before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in
continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as
to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under
the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his
witnesses swear that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly
directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of
the company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all the gang against walking by the side of
the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger
contributed in some degree to the injury as a
proximate, although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the
injury, between the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and those acts of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of
the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this
produced the event giving occasion for damages —
 that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the
iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to
enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his
employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action
be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the
accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken,
the civil action may proeed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. —
The responsibility of an employer to his employee of
a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not
adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa
nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant
rule," exonerating the employer where the injury
was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-
servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in
Philippine jurisprudence.
C. FORTUITOUS EVENT
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall
be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
GOTTESCO VS. CHATTO
FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto,
and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E.
Chatto went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama
I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment
Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then
were unable to find seats considering the number of
people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes
after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony
collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs
managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as
they were able to get out to the street they walked to the
nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and
treated for one (1) day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital.
Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from
June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from
June 5 to 11. Due to continuing pain in the neck,
headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in
July 1982 for further treatment (Exh. "E") She was treated
at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She
stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during
which time she had to return to the Cook County
Hospital five (5) or six (6) times.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: ordered the defendant, herein petitioner,
to pay the plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto
ISSUE:
Whether Gotesco is liable
RULING:
Yes Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of
the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not
even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus
Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason
why the ceiling collapsed."
Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation
conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on
the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. Jesus
Lim Ong is not an engineer, he is a graduate of
architecture from the St. Louie (sic) University in Baguio
City. It does not appear he has passed the government
examination for architects. (TSN, June 14, 1985, p. 4) In
fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the
collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated
as an act of God. To sustain that proposition is to
introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence."
Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to
prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force
majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause.
That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not
imply force majeure.
Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be
considered as material to the present proceedings. What
is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by
the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to
construction defects. There was no evidence offered to
overturn this finding. The building was constructed
barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It
was no shown that any of the causes denominated as
force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time
of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have
been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due
diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the
premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong,
there was no adequate inspection of the premises before
the date of the accident. His answers to the leading
questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates
of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same.
That the structural designs and plans of the building
were duly approved by the City Engineer and the
building permits and certificate of occupancy were
issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in
the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that
it was ever inspected at all. It is settled that: "The owner
or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly
warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement
devices are safe for the purpose for which they are
designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract
against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary
or reasonable means." This implied warranty has given
rise to the rule that: "Where a patron of a theater or other
place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that
caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the
control and management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of events
would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits
of an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant." That presumption or inference was not
overcome by the petitioner.
As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's
elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt from
any liability because of it, he must have exercised care,
i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE VS CA
Facts: after a typhoon a complaint of culpa aquiliana was
filed against the School for the reason that one of their
buildings was considered a structural hazard and the
reason of inhabitability of the nearby houses .The
complaint is rooted to the claim that the school has a
defective roofing structure and that they have been
remiss on the maintenance of such building. The school
(petitioner) averred that subject school building had
withstood several devastating typhoons and other
calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion
thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its
responsibility to see to it that said school building, which
houses school children, faculty members, and
employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and furthermore,
typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore
beyond human control" such that petitioner cannot be
answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent
any negligence on its part.
Issue:
Whether or not the destruction of the nearby houses was
caused by a fortuitous event.
Held:
It was held that petitioner has not been shown negligent
or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance
of its school building in question and that typhoon
"Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered
by private respondents' house.
SERVANDO BICO VS. PHIL STEAM
Facts: Bico and Servando loaded on board the FS-176 the
following cargoes: 1.528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of
colored paper, toys and general merchandise. Upon the
arrival of the vessel, the cargoes were discharged,
complete and in good order to the warehouse of the
Bureau of Customs. At 2:00 pm of the same day, a fire of
unknown reasons razed the warehouse. Before the fire,
Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice. The
petitioners are now claiming for the value of the
destroyed goods from the common carrier.
The Trial Court ordered the respondent to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of their lost goods on the basis that
the delivery of the shipment to the warehouse is not the
delivery contemplated by Article 1736 of the New Civil
Code, since the loss occurred before actual or
constructive delivery. The petitioners argued that the
stipulation in the bills of lading does not bind them
because they did not sign the same. The stipulation
states that the carrier shall not be responsible for loss
unless such loss was due to the carrier’s negligence.
Neither shall it be liable for loss due to fortuitous events
such as dangers of the sea and war.
Issue: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable
for the destruction of the goods
Held: No. There is nothing on record to show that the
carrier incurred in delay in the performance of its
obligation. Since the carrier even notified the plaintiffs of
the arrival of their shipments and had demanded that
they be withdrawn.
The carrier also cannot be charged with negligence since
the storage of the goods was in the Customs warehouse
and was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and
consent. Since the warehouse belonged and maintained
by the Government, it would be unfair to impute
negligence to the appellant since it has no control over
the same.
D. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
FACTS: A strong typhoon engulfed the province of
Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and flooding in
its wake. The deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called
Nana Belen, ventured out of the house towards the
direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, a
commercial establishment. While wading in waist-
deep flood, Nana Belen, in an unfortunate accident,
had suffered and died in a circulatory shock
electrocution. An action for damages was instituted
by the heirs of the deceased. Petitioner, on the other
hand, contended that the deceased could have died
either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to the
electric company. That the deceased installed an
electrical wire enclosing the iron gate and fence to
deter the area from burglars.
ISSUES: Whether petitioner may be held liable for
the deceased’s death.
HELD: While it is true that typhoons and floods are
considered Acts of God for which no person may be
held responsible, however, it was through the
intervention of petitioner’s negligence that death
took place.
Under the circumstances, petitioner was negligent in
seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public “… considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising
this high degree of diligence and care extends to
every place where persons have a right to be“. “The
negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may
not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that
the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous
event.” When an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of the defendant to produce an
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not
have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission
 Hence, the heirs of Nana Belen, may not be barred
from recovering damages caused by petitioner’s
negligence.
E. DUE DILIGENCE
RAMOS VS., PEPSI
On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.[1] and Andres
Bonifa-cio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a
con-sequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving
the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer
of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision
driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of
Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by
its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment
on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio negligent and
declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved
its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and
Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs
P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages;
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00
attorney's fees, with costs.
Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants
ap-pealed to the Court of Appeals.
Said Court, on January 15, 1964, affirmed the trial court's
judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio
negligent, but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-
COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to the
plain-tiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved
due di-ligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.
Plaintiffs thereupon appealed to Us through this petition
for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. And
appellants would argue before this Court that
de-fendant PEPSI-COLA's evidence failed to show that it
had exercised due diligence in the selection of its dri-ver
in question.
Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court of
Appeals in PEPSI-COLA's favor, thus:
"The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Añasco,
personnel manager of defendant company, was to the
effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member
of the bottle crop in the production department; that
when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by
looking into his background, asking him to submit
clearances, previous experience, physical examination
and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the
usual driver's examination; con-sisting of: "First,
theoretical examination and second, the practical driving
examina-tion,' all of which he had undergone, and that
the defendant company was a member of the Safety
Council. In view hereof, we are of the sense that
defendant company had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver. In the case of Campo vs. Camarote,
G.R. No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's
brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as
a rule that 'In order that the defendant may be
consi-dered as having exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere posses-sion of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the
appli-cant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service.' Defendant Company
has taken all these steps."[2]
Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing por-tion of
the decision under review by taking issue with the
testimony of Añasco upon which the findings of due
diligence afore-stated are rested. Thus, it is now
con-tended that Añasco, being PEPSI-COLA's employee,
is a biased and interested witness; and that his testimony
is not believable.
It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise
herein an issue of fact and credibility, something as to
which this Court has consistently respected the findings
of the Court of Appeals, with some few excep-tions,
which do not obtain herein.[3]
Stated differently, Añasco's credibility is not for this
Court now to re-examine. And said witness having been
found credible by the Court of Appeals, his testi-mony,
as accepted by said Court, cannot at this stage be
assailed. As We said in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L--9194, April 25, 1957, assignments of error
involving the credibility of witnesses and which in effect
dispute the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals,
cannot be re-viewed in these proceedings. For a
question to be one of law it must involve no examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them.[4] And the distinction is well-
known: There is a question of law in a given case when
the doubt or dif-ference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood
of alleged facts.[5]
From all this it follows that for the purposes of this
appeal, it must be taken as established that, as testified
to by Añasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine
the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his quali-fications,
experiences and record of service, taking all steps
mentioned by the Court of Appeals in its decision
already quoted.
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-
COLA exercised the required due diligence in the
selec-tion of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo
v. Camarote, 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order that the
defen-dant may be considered as having exercised all
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the
applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experience and record of service."
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no
question is raised as to due diligence in the supervi-sion
by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of the Ci-vil
Code provides inter alia:
"x x x The owners and managers of an es-tablishment or
enterprise are likewise res-ponsible for damages caused
by their emplo-yees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
x x x x
"The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage."
And construing a similar provision of the old Civil
Code, this Court said in Bahia v. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624,
627:
"From this article two things are appa-rent: (1) That
when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant
or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the mas-ter or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection,
or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently may he rebutted.
It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability."
As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not
duly proved by PEPSI-COLA is only due diligence in the
selection of its driver. And, parenthetically, it is not
surprising that appellants thus confine their argu-ments
to this aspect of due diligence, since the record - as even
appellants' brief (pp. 13-17) reflects in quoting in part the
testimony of PEPSI-COLA's witness - would show
sufficient evidence to establish due diligence in the
supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, includ-ing
Bonifacio.
Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise
outside the purview of this Court's reviewing power.
Thus, the question of whether PEPSI-COLA violated the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law and rules and regulations
re-lated thereto, not having been raised and argued in
the Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the
first time.[6] And the matter of whether or not PEPSI-
COLA did acts to ratify the negligent act of its driver is a
factual issue not proper herein.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
METRO MANILA VS. CA
F. PRESCRIPTION
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced
within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted
within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act,
activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
KRAMER VS. CA
The principal issue in this Petition for Review is whether
or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the
petitioners against the private respondent arising from a
marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.
The record of the case discloses that in the early morning
of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned
by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer,
was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.
Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago,
the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel,
the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private
respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a
consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank,
taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their
respective marine protests with the Board of Marine
Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board
conducted an investigation for the purpose of
determining the proximate cause of the maritime
collision.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss
of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to
the negligence of the employees of the private
respondent who were on board the M/V Asia
Philippines during the collision. The findings made by
the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of
the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated
April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia
Philippines was suspended from pursuing his
profession as a marine officer.[1]
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint
for damages against the private respondent before
Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.[2]
The uit was docketed as Civil Case No. 2907-P.
The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the
dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code,[3] the prescriptive period for instituting a
Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a
maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the
petitioners should have filed their Complaint within
four years from the date when their cause of action
accrued, i. e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime
collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint
filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-
year prescriptive period.
For their part, the petitioners contended that maritime
collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which
only persons with special skill, training and experience
like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can
properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued
that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by
the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of
action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the
Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the
M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the
four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code should be computed from the said date. The
petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint
was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably
filed.
In an Order dated September 25, 1986,[4] the trial court
denied the Motion filed by the private respondent. The
trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence
relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on
highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and
that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted
pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and
Regulations, which took effect on January 1, 1975 by
virtue of Letter of Instructions No. 208 issued on August
12, 1974 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
precisely to answer the need. The trial court went on to
say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in
Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only
from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the
crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally
ascertained. The pertinent portions of the Order of the
trial court are as follows --
"Considering that the action concerns an incident
involving a collision at sea of two vehicles and to
determine negligence for that incident there is an
absolute need to rely on highly technical aspects
attendant to such collisions. It is obviously to answer
such a need that the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic) was
constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine
Rules and Regulations which became effective January 1,
1975 under Letter of Instruction(s) No. 208 dated August
12, 1974. The relevant section of that law (Art. XVI /b/
provided as follow(s):
'1. Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI). -- Shall have the
jurisdiction to investigate marine accidents or casualties
relative to the liability of shipowners and officers,
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate cases/complaints
against the marine officers; and to review all
proceedings or investigation conducted by the Special
Boards of Marine Inquiry.
'2. Special Board of Marine Inquiry. -- Shall have original
jurisdiction to investigate marine casualties and disasters
which occur or are committed within the limits of the
Coast Guard District concerned or those referred by the
Commandant.'
The Court finds reason in the argument of the plaintiff
that marine incidents have those 'peculiarities which
only persons of special skill, training and exposure can
rightfully decipher and resolve' on the matter of the
negligence and liabilities of parties involved and
inasmuch as the report of the Board of Inquiry (sic)
admittedly came out only on April 29, 1982, the
prescriptive period provided xxx under Art. 1146 of the
Civil Code should begin to run only from that date. The
complaint was filed with this Court on May 10, 1985,
hence the statute of limitations can not constitute a bar to
the filing of this case."[5]
The private respondent elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, alleging therein that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Complaint filed by the petitioners. The case
was assigned to the Second Division of the appellate
court and was docketed as Case No. CA-G.R. SP No.
12032.[6]
In a Decision dated November 27, 1987,[7] and clarified
in a Resolution dated January 12, 1988,[8] the Court of
Appeals granted the Petition filed by the private
respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
Complaint. The pertinent portions of the Decision of the
appellate court are as follows --
"It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent
(the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta
Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap
because that is the precise time when damages were
inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and
from which relief from the court is presently sought.
Private respondents should have immediately instituted
a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within
four years from the said marine incident because its
cause of action had already definitely ripened at the
onset of the collision. For this reason, he (sic) could cite
the negligence on the part of the personnel of the
petitioner to exercise due care and lack of (sic) diligence
to prevent the collision that resulted in the total loss of
their xxx boat.
"We can only extend scant consideration to respondent
judge's reasoning that in view of the nature of the
marine collision that allegedly involves highly technical
aspects, the running of the prescriptive period should
only commence from the finality of the investigation
conducted by the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic) and the
decision of the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard,
who has original jurisdiction over the mishap. For one,
while it is true that the findings and recommendation of
the Board and the decision of the Commandant may be
helpful to the court in ascertaining which of the parties
are at fault, still the former (court) is not bound by said
findings and decision. Indeed, the same findings and
decision could be entirely or partially admitted,
modified, amended, or disregarded by the court
according to its lights and judicial discretion. For
another, if the accrual of a cause of action will be made
to depend on the action to be taken by certain
government agencies, then necessarily, the tolling of the
prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of
such agencies. Said alternative it is easy to foresee would
be fraught with hazards. Their investigations might be
delayed and lag, and then witnesses in the meantime
might not be available or disappear, or certain
documents may no longer be available or might be
mislaid. xxx."[9]
The petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration of
the said Decision but the same was denied by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 27, 1988.[10]
Hence, the instant Petition wherein the arguments raised
by the petitioner before the trial court are reiterated.[11]
In addition thereto, the petitioner contends that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals runs against the
pronouncement of this Court in Vasquez v. Court of
Appeals.[12]
The private respondent filed its Comment on the
Petition seeking therein the dismissal of the same.[13] It
is also contended by the private respondent that the
ruling of the Court in Vasquez is not applicable to the
case at bar because the said case involves a maritime
collision attributable to a fortuitous event. In a
subsequent pleading, the private respondent argues that
the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations
cannot have the effect of repealing the provisions of the
Civil Code on prescription of actions.[14]
On September 19, 1988, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition.[15] After the parties filed their
respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period
begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In
Paulan vs. Sarabia,[16] this Court ruled that in an action
for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks,
the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision.
In Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration,[17] this Court held as follows -
"The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of
action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on
the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff xxx. It is only when the last
element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law
that a cause of action has arisen xxx."
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive
period must be counted when the last element occurs or
takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act
or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is
the time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising
from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of
Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault
or negligence of the other party before he can file an
action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not
apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the
aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by
alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or
personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the
action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision
occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages
was filed in court only on May 30, 1985, way beyond the
four (4) year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
G. DOUBLE RECOVERY Art. 2177. Responsibility
for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
FLORESCA VS PHILEX
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in
the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased
claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular
courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing
out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the
protection of the lives of its employees working
underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be
sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions
for remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of
selection between availing themselves of the worker’s
right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had
received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from
bringing an action before the regular court because they
became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss
in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government
rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence,
they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded
a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first
remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact,
which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. However, should
the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.