ASIA PACIFIC INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT

A PROJECT REPORT ON
DOHA ROUND OF WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION AND INDIA’S STANCE

SUBMITTED TO:
SUBMITTED BY
MR. JITENDER BHANDARI Priyesh
Narain(IB/35)
Prosh
oon Sikdar(IB/36)
Pulin
d Malhotra(IB/37)
Ragh
vendra Narayan(IB/38)

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 INDEX

INTRODUCTION TO WTO Page 04

URUGUAY ROUND Page 06
SINGAPORE ISSUES Page 09
DOHA ROUND OF WTO Page 11
ISSUES UNDER DOHA ROUND Page 12
INDIA’S STAND ON DOHA ROUND OF WTO Page
19
REFERENCES Page 24

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We would like to express our gratitude to all those who

gave us the possibility to complete this project . We are
deeply indebted to our faculty Prof. Jitender Bhandari
from Asia Pacific Institute of Management whose help,
stimulating suggestions and encouragement helped us in
all the time of preparation. Our former colleagues
supported us in our project work. We want to thank them
for all their help, support, interest and valuable hints.

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INTRODUCTION TO WTO.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization

designed by its founders to supervise and liberalize international capital
trade. The organization officially commenced on January 1, 1995 under the
Marrakesh Agreement, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which commenced in 1947. The World Trade Organization deals with
regulation of trade between participating countries; it provides a framework
for negotiating and formalising trade agreements, and a dispute resolution
process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO agreements
which are signed by representatives of member governments and ratified by
their parliaments. Most of the issues that the WTO focuses on derive from
previous trade negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round (1986-1994).
The organization is currently endeavouring to persist with a trade negotiation
called the Doha Development Agenda (or Doha Round), which was launched
in 2001 to enhance equitable participation of poorer countries which
represent a majority of the world's population. However, the negotiation has
been dogged by "disagreement between exporters of agricultural bulk
commodities and countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers on the
precise terms of a 'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from
surges in imports. At this time, the future of the Doha Round is uncertain."

The WTO has 153 members, representing more than 95% of total world trade
and 30 observers, most seeking membership. The WTO is governed by a
ministerial conference, meeting every two years; a general council, which
implements the conference's policy decisions and is responsible for day-to-
day administration; and a director-general, who is appointed by the
ministerial conference. The WTO's headquarters is at the Centre William
Rappard, Geneva, Switzerland.

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 Functions OF WTO as follows:
• Administering WTO trade agreements
• Forum for trade negotiations
• Handling trade disputes
• Monitoring national trade policies
• Technical assistance and training for developing countries
• Cooperation with other international organizations

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URUGUAY ROUND
It took seven and a half years, almost twice the original schedule. By the
end, 123 countries were taking part. It covered almost all trade, from
toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from
the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatments. It was quite simply the largest
trade negotiation ever, and most probably the largest negotiation of any kind
in history.At times it seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay
Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system since
GATT was created at the end of the Second World War. And yet, despite its
troubled progress, the Uruguay Round did see some early results. Within only
two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in import duties on
tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They
had also revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures
implemented on the spot. And they called for regular reports on GATT
members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade
regimes transparent around the world.

The seeds of the Uruguay Round were sown in November 1982 at a

ministerial meeting of GATT members in Geneva. Although the ministers
intended to launch a major new negotiation, the conference stalled on
agriculture and was widely regarded as a failure. In fact, the work
programme that the ministers agreed formed the basis for what was to
become the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda.

Nevertheless, it took four more years of exploring, clarifying issues and

painstaking consensus-building, before ministers agreed to launch the new
round. They did so in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. They

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eventually accepted a negotiating agenda that covered virtually every
outstanding trade policy issue. The talks were going to extend the trading
system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual
property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and
textiles. All the original GATT articles were up for review. It was the biggest
negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed, and the ministers gave
themselves four years to complete it.

Two years later, in December 1988, ministers met again in Montreal, Canada,
for what was supposed to be an assessment of progress at the round’s half-
way point. The purpose was to clarify the agenda for the remaining two
years, but the talks ended in a deadlock that was not resolved until officials
met more quietly in Geneva the following April.

Despite the difficulty, during the Montreal meeting, ministers did agree a
package of early results. These included some concessions on market access
for tropical products — aimed at assisting developing countries — as well as
a streamlined dispute settlement system, and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism which provided for the first comprehensive, systematic and
regular reviews of national trade policies and practices of GATT members.
The round was supposed to end when ministers met once more in Brussels,
in December 1990. But they disagreed on how to reform agricultural trade
and decided to extend the talks. The Uruguay Round entered its bleakest
period.

Despite the poor political outlook, a considerable amount of technical work

continued, leading to the first draft of a final legal agreement. This draft
“Final Act” was compiled by the then GATT director-general, Arthur Dunkel,
who chaired the negotiations at officials’ level. It was put on the table in
Geneva in December 1991. The text fulfilled every part of the Punta del Este
mandate, with one exception — it did not contain the participating countries’

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lists of commitments for cutting import duties and opening their services
markets. The draft became the basis for the final agreement.

Over the following two years, the negotiations lurched between impending
failure, to predictions of imminent success. Several deadlines came and
went. New points of major conflict emerged to join agriculture: services,
market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation of a new
institution. Differences between the United States and European Union
became central to hopes for a final, successful conclusion.

In November 1992, the US and EU settled most of their differences on

agriculture in a deal known informally as the “Blair House accord”. By July
1993 the “Quad” (US, EU, Japan and Canada) announced significant progress
in negotiations on tariffs and related subjects (“market access”). It took until
15 December 1993 for every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations
on market access for goods and services to be concluded (although some
final touches were completed in talks on market access a few weeks later).
On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by ministers from most of the 123
participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.

The delay had some merits. It allowed some negotiations to progress further
than would have been possible in 1990: for example some aspects of
services and intellectual property, and the creation of the WTO itself. But the
task had been immense, and negotiation-fatigue was felt in trade
bureaucracies around the world. The difficulty of reaching agreement on a
complete package containing almost the entire range of current trade issues
led some to conclude that a negotiation on this scale would never again be
possible. Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new
negotiations on a number of topics. And by 1996, some countries were
openly calling for a new round early in the next century. The response was
mixed; but the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to
reopen negotiations on agriculture and services at the turn of the century.

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These began in early 2000 and were incorporated into the Doha
Development Agenda in late 2001.

SINGAPORE ISSUES
Work in the WTO on investment and competition policy issues originally took
the form of specific responses to specific trade policy issues, rather than a
look at the broad picture.

Decisions reached at the 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore changed

the perspective. The ministers decided to set up two working groups to
look more generally at how trade relates to investment and competition
policies.

The working groups’ tasks were analytical and exploratory. They would not
negotiate new rules or commitments without a clear consensus decision.

The ministers also recognized the work underway in the UN Conference on

Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other international organizations. The

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working groups were to cooperate with these organizations so as to make
best use of available resources and to ensure that development issues are
fully taken into account.

An indication of how closely trade is linked with investment is the fact that
about one third of the $6.1 trillion total for world trade in goods and services
in 1995 was trade within companies — for example between subsidiaries in
different countries or between a subsidiary and its headquarters.

The close relationships between trade and investment and competition policy
have long been recognized. One of the intentions, when GATT was drafted in
the late 1940s, was for rules on investment and competition policy to exist
alongside those for trade in goods. (The other two agreements were not
completed because the attempt to create an International Trade
Organization failed.)

Over the years, GATT and the WTO have increasingly dealt with specific
aspects of the relationships. For example, one type of trade covered by the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the supply of services by a
foreign company setting up operations in a host country — i.e. through
foreign investment. The Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement says
investors’ right to use imported goods as inputs should not depend on their
export performance.

The same goes for competition policy. GATT and GATS contain rules on
monopolies and exclusive service suppliers. The principles have been
elaborated considerably in the rules and commitments on
telecommunications. The agreements on intellectual property and services
both recognize governments’ rights to act against anti-competitive practices,
and their rights to work together to limit these practices.

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DOHA ROUND OF WTO

At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001 WTO

member governments agreed to launch new negotiations. They also agreed
to work on other issues, in particular the implementation of the present
agreements. The entire package is called the Doha Development Agenda
(DDA).The negotiations take place in the Trade Negotiations Committee and
its subsidiaries, which are usually, either regular councils and committees
meeting in
“special sessions”, or specially-created negotiating groups. Other work under
the work programme takes place in other WTO councils and committees. The

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Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003, was
intented as a stock-taking meeting where members would agree on how to
complete the rest of the negotiations. But the meeting was soured by discord
on agricultural issues, including cotton, and ended in deadlock on the
“Singapore issues” (see below). Real progress on the Singapore issues and
agriculture was not evident until the early hours of 1 August 2004 with a set
of decisions in the General Council (sometines called the July 2004 package).
The original 1 January 2005 deadline was missed. After that, members
unofficially aimed to finish the negotiations by the end of 2006, again
unsuccessfully. Further progress in narrowing members’ differences was
made at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005, but some
gaps remained unbridgeable and Director-General Pascal Lamy suspended
the negotiations in July 2006. Efforts then focused on trying to achieve a
breakthrough in early 2007. There are 19–21 subjects listed in the Doha
Declaration, depending on whether to count the “rules” subjects as one or
three. Most of them involve negotiations; other work includes actions under
“implementation”, analysis and monitoring.

ISSUES UNDER DOHA ROUND

AGRICULTURE
• Rural development and food security for developing countries.
• Least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.
• Export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes.
• Tariff rate quotas.

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SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY (SPS) MEASURES
• More time for developing countries to comply with other countries’ new SPS
measures.
• Reasonable interval” between publication of a country’s new SPS measure
and its
entry into force.
• Equivalence: putting into practice the principle that governments should
accept that
different measures used by other governments can be equivalent to their
own measures
for providing the same level of health protection for food, animals and plants.
• Review of the SPS Agreement.
• Developing countries’ participation in setting international SPS standards.
• Financial and technical assistance.

TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE

• Technical assistance for least-developed countries, and reviews of technical
assistance
in general.
• When possible, a six-month “reasonable interval” for developing countries
to
adapt to new measures.
• The WTO director-general encouraged to continue efforts to help
developing
countries participate in setting international standards.

TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES (TRIMS)

• The Goods Council is “to consider positively” requests from least-developed
countries

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to extend the seven-year transition period for eliminating measures that are
inconsistent with the agreement.

ANTI-DUMPING (GATT ARTICLE 6)

• No second anti-dumping investigation within a year unless circumstances
have
changed.
• How to put into operation a special provision for developing countries
(Article 15 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement), which recognizes that developed countries
must
give “special regard” to the situation of developing countries when
considering applying
anti-dumping measures.
• Clarification sought on the time period for determining whether the volume
of
dumped imported products is negligible, and therefore no anti-dumping
action
should be taken.
• Annual reviews of the agreement’s implementation to be improved.

SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

• Sorting out how to determine whether some developing countries meet the
test of
being below US$1,000 per capita GNP allowing them to pay subsidies that
require
the recipient to export.

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• Noting proposed new rules allowing developing countries to subsidize
under programmes
that have “legitimate development goals” without having to face
countervailing
or other action.
• Review of provisions on countervailing duty investigations.
• Reaffirming that least-developed countries are exempt from the ban on
export subsidies.
• Directing the Subsidies Committee to extend the transition period for
certain developing
countries.

TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS)
• “Non-violation” complaints: the unresolved question of how to deal with
possible
TRIPS disputes involving loss of an expected benefit even if the TRIPS
Agreement
has not actually been violated.
• Technology transfer to least-developed countries.

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AGRICULTURE (PARS 13, 14)
Negotiations on agriculture began in early 2000, under Article 20 of the WTO
Agriculture Agreement. By November 2001 and the Doha Ministerial
Conference, 121 governments had submitted a large number of negotiating
proposals. These negotiations have continued, but now with the mandate
given by the Doha Declaration, which also includes a series of deadlines. The
declaration builds on the work already undertaken, confirms and elaborates
the objectives, and sets a timetable. Agriculture is now part of the single
undertaking in which virtually all the
linked negotiations were to end by 1 January 2005, now with the unofficial
target of the end of 2006. The declaration reconfirms the long-term objective
already agreed in the present
WTO Agreement: to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system
through a programme of fundamental reform. The programme encompasses
strengthened rules, and specific commitments on government support and
protection for agriculture. The purpose is to correct and prevent restrictions
and distortions in world agricultural markets. Without prejudging the
outcome, member governments commit themselves to comprehensive
negotiations aimed at:

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• Market access: substantial reductions
• Exports subsidies: reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of
these (in the
1 August 2004 “framework” members agreed to eliminate export subsidies
by a date to
be negotiated)
• Domestic support: substantial reductions for supports that distort trade (in
the 1 August
2004 “framework”, developed countries pledged to slash trade-distorting
domestic subsidies
by 20% from the first day any Doha Agenda agreement is implemented).
The declaration makes special and differential treatment for developing
countries integral throughout the negotiations, both in countries’ new
commitments and in any relevant new or revised rules and disciplines. It says
the outcome should be effective in practice and should enable developing
countries to meet their needs, in particular in food security and rural
development. The ministers also take note of the non-trade concerns (such
as environmental
protection, food security, rural development, etc) reflected in the negotiating
proposals already submitted. They confirm that the negotiations will take
these into account, as provided for in the Agriculture Agreement. A first step
along the road to final agreement was reached on 1 August 2004 when
members agreed on a “framework” (Annex A of the General Council
decision).The negotiations take place in “special sessions” of the
Agriculture Committee.

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SERVICES (PAR 15)
Negotiations on services were already almost two years old when they were
incorporated into the new Doha agenda. The WTO General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) commits member governments to undertake
negotiations on specific issues and to enter into successive
rounds of negotiations to progressively liberalize trade in services. The first
round had to start no later than five years from 1995. Accordingly, the
services negotiations started officially in early 2000 under the Council for
Trade in Services. In March 2001, the Services Council fulfilled a key element

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in the negotiating mandate by establishing the negotiating guidelines and
procedures. The Doha Declaration endorses the work already done, reaffirms
the negotiating
guidelines and procedures, and establishes some key elements of the
timetable including, most importantly, the deadline for concluding the
negotiations as part of a single undertaking.
The negotiations take place in “special sessions” of the Services Council and
regular
meetings of its relevant subsidiary committees or working parties.

TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS) (PARS 17–19)
TRIPS and public health. In the declaration, ministers stress that it is
important to implement and interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a way that
supports public health — by promoting both access to existing medicines and

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the creation of new medicines. They refer to their separate declaration on
this subject. This separate declaration on TRIPS and public health is designed
to respond to concerns about the possible implications of the TRIPS
Agreement for access to medicines. It emphasizes that the TRIPS Agreement
does not and should not prevent member
governments from acting to protect public health. It affirms governments’
right to use the agreement’s flexibilities in order to avoid any reticence the
governments may feel.The separate declaration clarifies some of the forms
of flexibility available, in particular compulsory licensing and parallel
importing. (For an explanation of these issues, go to the main TRIPS pages on
the WTO website) For the Doha agenda, this separate declaration sets two
specific task. The TRIPS
Council has to find a solution to the problems countries may face in making
use of compulsory licensing if they have too little or no pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity, reporting to the General Council on this by the end
of 2002 (this was achieved in August, 2003, see intellectual property section
of the “Agreements” chapter). The declaration also extends the deadline for
least-developed countries to apply provisions on pharmaceutical patents
until 1 January 2016.
Geographical indications — the registration system. Geographical indications
are place names (in some countries also words associated with a place) used
to identify products with particular characteristics because they come from
specific places. The WTO TRIPS Council has already started work on a
multilateral registration system for geographical indications for wines and
spirits. The Doha Declaration sets a deadline for completing the negotiations:
the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003. These negotiations take place in
“special sessions” of the TRIPS Council.

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INDIA’S STAND ON DOHA ROUND OF WTO

The failure of the Mini-Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation

(WTO) in July 2008 to finalise the “modalities” in agriculture and Non
Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), and the inability of the WTO Director
General to take another jibe in December 2008 has put question a mark on
the future of Doha Round. The intention behind these efforts in 2008 was to:
agree on the commitments to be made by Members on these two main
issues so that fairly elaborate exercise of preparing schedules of
commitments could be completed by 2009; and wrap up negotiations in all
the other areas to conclude the Doha Round. It has been reported in the
press that lack of convergence between the US and India on certain issues
was the reason for shelving this time-table. While that may not be entirely
true, and we still have to wait for some time to know the new US
administration’s stance on trade negotiations, it will be useful to examine the
background and the current state of Indian position to assess the possibility
of any such convergence arising in the event that the US really wants to
conclude the Doha Round.First, India did not ask for the Doha Round. Without
going into the history and reasons behind the launch of the Round in 2001,
one can safely state that India went along with the then emerging consensus
because it supported a rule-based multilateral trading system. Second, at
that time, India had not emerged as an important player in the realm of
regional trade agreements (RTAs) but it had benefited from the predictability
of the GATT/WTO framework. Third, India engaged constructively and carried
a twin responsibility: protecting its own core negotiating interests and joining
other like-minded developing countries in formulating a coordinated position
of the developing world. 1/2009 The August 2003 joint proposal of the US
and the EC on agriculture and NAMA was a watershed because developing
countries realised that unless they joined hands to support a more
development-friendly agenda, the repeated affirmations about the Round

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being a Development Round would stay affirmations and would not translate
into reality.
To actualise this, India played a role in creating the G-20 group of developing
countries with a common position on agriculture negotiations to thwart the
US-EC proposal. The African group, too, played a crucial role in edging out
certain issues from the negotiating agenda, i.e. investment, competition and
government procurement, which India supported. As the US and the EC did
not want a Round with little marketaccess commitments from countries like
India whose vast markets are attractive to them they preferred to return
emptyhanded from Cancun. Failure of the 2003 Cancun Ministerial had one
more structural paradigm shift: QUAD faded away and the G-4 comprising
US, EC, India and Brazil became the new inner circle of WTO, while G-7
(Australia, Brazil, China, EU, India, Japan and US) became the next level of
inner circle for negotiations followed by the Green Room meetings and the
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) meetings. This pattern was followed in
the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial. Based on its stand in these meetings, issue
specific positions of India are discussed below.

• AGRICULTURE:
Disagreements on issues of agriculture have been contentious and
intractable, which include cuts in overall trade distorting support
(OTDS), percentage of products to be declared as sensitive products,
tariff rate quota expansion for such products, tariff capping,
specialproducts, and the Special Safeguards Mechanism (SSM). On a
number of these issues, the G-7 was able to narrow down its
differences. For India, it appears that OTDS, quota expansion and tariff
capping were not deal-breaking issues, and with some

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intelligent negotiations, issues relating to sensitive products and
special products of interest to India could also be secured with the give
and take policy with developed
countries. The issue of SSM, however, became the dealbreaker .India
argues that since agriculture is associated with poverty and
subsistence in the country, market opening
has to be calibrated to protect the livelihoods of the poor farmers and
their families. The proposed SSM would enable developing countries
like India to take remedial action through higher tariffs in case of
import surges or importinduced price declines.
Due to India’s efforts, SSM remained an integral part of the mandate
throughout the Doha negotiations, as reiterated in the Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration. Differences
between India and the US are about the level of increase in import
volume (i.e. the trigger) required to cross the Uruguay Round (UR)
bound levels of tariffs and the extent by which the UR bound tariffs can
be exceeded. India’s position, like that of most developing countries,
was that there should be no difference in the triggers leading to
increase of tariffs up to and above the UR levels. For the bound rate
trigger, the so-called Lamy Text put a figure of 140 percent, i.e. import
volumes to rise by more than 40 percent to enable increase of tariffs
beyond the UR bound levels. India was flexible enough to consider
different options around that number, and suggested a figure of 115
percent. But the US continued to insist on a trigger of 140 percent.
India expressed its inability to accept this trigger, citing studies
purportedly proving that substantial injury
can occur at level above 110 percent. In the face of differences on this
issue, Lamy tried to broker a compromise through an alternative
proposal involving defining substantial injury and inserting a strict
monitoring mechanism. India agreed to negotiate on this proposal but
the US turned it down. With the efforts of the EC, the G-7 senior

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 officials worked out an alternative proposal. India was again ready to
use this as a basis for negotiations but the US again turned it down.
Clearly, the US has shown no flexibility on this issue.

• NAMA
In NAMA (industrial goods but including fisheries), discussions focused
on three issues – “coefficients” for tariff reduction by developed and
developing countries, the anti-concentration clause and “sectorals.” On
coefficients, the depth of India’s autonomous liberalisation provided it
with an adequate cushion based on which it appeared to
accept the proposals in the NAMA text albeit developing countries
were being asked to cut tariffs more than those of developed
countries. Under the mandate for NAMA negotiations, developing
countries have some flexibility in tariff reduction for a
negotiated percentage of tariff lines. On such tariff lines, they can
either take zero cuts for a smaller number or 50 percent of the formula
cuts for a higher number.However, developed countries wanted to
restrict this flexibility through the so-called anti-concentration clause to
ensure that developing countries would not use it to block
liberalisation in sectors important to them, for example, automobiles.
India did not accept a blanket restriction on this flexibility, but was
willing to consider a via media, which did not effectively restrict its
ability to protect important sectors. Having failed to secure that India
reverted to its original negotiating position that infant and vulnerable
industries of developing countries needed to be protected. It is
apparent that India would not have blocked a deal on these issues. In
essence, the issue of sectorals was very sensitive. That was clear from
the presence of relevant industry associations in Geneva mounting

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 delegations to the Indian Mission there.Under the mandate,
negotiations on sectorals are to be pushed forward on a voluntary basis
wherein some Members
may agree to undertake deeper tariff reduction commitments,
preferably zero tariffs, in selected sectors. India had not committed
itself to participate in these negotiations in the run up to the July 2008
Mini-Ministerial. The US asked for commitments from important
countries like India and China. India refused on the ground that
negotiations on this issue were not mandatory. This issue remained
undecided. After the July 2008 meeting, India’s Commerce Minister,
Kamal Nath stated that India and other developing countries strongly
opposed these negotiations and that there was an attempt by
developed countries to make these negotiations mandatory despite the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration having reaffirmed them to be non-
mandatory. In December
2008, India’s Minister of State for Commerce, Jairam Ramesh reiterated
India’s negotiating position that participation must be on a non-
mandatory and good faith basis without prejudging the outcome.

• SERVICES
Services liberalisation is another important issue for India due to its
interest in the movement of natural persons in the category of experts
and skilled persons. There was a
Signalling Conference on Services during the July 2008 meeting with
the idea that Members with an important interest in services could
provide clear signals to each other

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 regarding their intentions to open their markets. India signalled a
liberal offer in important areas of interest to developed countries
including telecommunications,
distribution, financial services , energy and environment services, and
courier services.
In the areas of its interest like Mode 1 and Mode 4, India received
positive signals from, among others, EU, Canada, Norway and Japan.
However, the US response on Mode 4
did not cover new ground; though it talked of increasing H-1B visas and
that too in consultation with the Congress, but it did not mention
anything on liberal entry norms for contractual service suppliers (CSS)
and independent professionals which is India’s main demand.

REFERENCES
• WEBSITES

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 o http://www.wto.org/
o http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organiz
ation
• E-BOOKS
o BP09-WTO-01.pdf
o Doha.pdf
o Guide-075Ch1.pdf
o utw_chap1_e.pdf

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