CIVIL LAW REVIEW CASES (2)
gazette must be in full.
Tanada vs. Tuvera
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et.
al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication
was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were
to become effective immediately upon
approval. The court decided on April 24,
1985 in affirming the necessity for
publication of some of the decrees. The
court ordered the respondents to publish in
the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general
force and effect. The petitioners suggest that
there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are
not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be
made in the official gazette. In a comment
required by the solicitor general, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed.
And on the clause “unless otherwise
provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein
was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to
be made in the official gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether all laws shall be published in
the official gazette.
Whether publication in the official
Held:
The clause “unless it is otherwise
provided” refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and
not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid
as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest eve if it
might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all, since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides
that publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
Baksh vs. CA
Facts:
Private respondent, Marilou
Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October
27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner
for the alleged breach of their agreement to
get married. She met the petitioner in
Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian
medical exchange student who later courted
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner
even went to Marilou’s house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then
forced the respondent to leave with him in
his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before
she lived with him. After a week, she filed a
complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even
tied the respondent in the apartment while
he was in school and drugged her. Marilou
at one time became pregnant but the
petitioner administered a drug to abort the
baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage
agreement and told Marilou to not live with
him since he is already married to someone
in Bacolod. He claimed that he never
proposed marriage or agreed to be married
neither sought consent nor approval of
Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since
the latter deceived him by stealing money
and his passport. The private respondent
prayed for damages and reimbursements of
actual expenses.
Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry
can give rise to cause for damages.
Held:
The existing rule is that breach of
promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. The court held that when a man uses
his promise of marriage to deceive a woman
to consent to his malicious desires, he
commits fraud and willfully injures the
woman. In that instance, the court found
that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry
led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when
such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy
to have carnal knowledge with the woman
and actual damages should be paid for the
wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in disregard
of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision
of CA awarding damages to the respondent.
Consunji vs. CA
Facts:
Jose A. Juego was crushed to death
when the platform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the
platform was due to the removal or getting
loose of the pin which was merely inserted
to the connecting points of the chain block
and platform but without a safety lock.
 Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the
deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses,
the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow
Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji,
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji
now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.
Issue:
Whether Maria Juergo can still claim
damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the
death benefits she claimed in the State
Insurance Fund.
Held:
Yes. The respondent is not precluded
from recovering damages under the civil
code.
As a general rule a claimant has a
choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tort fees or for higher damages but he cannot
pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. But There is an exception is
where a claimant who has already been paid
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
may still sue for damages under the Civil
Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for
the first remedy. The choice of the first
remedy based on ignorance or a mistake of
fact, nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice.
Here, the CA held that private
respondent’s case came under the exception
because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her
claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the
civil complaint for damages using the police
investigation report to support her complaint
may just be an afterthought after receiving a
copy of the Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
This court is more inclined to believe
appellee’s allegation that she learned about
appellant’s negligence only after she applied
for and received the benefits under ECC.
This is a mistake of fact that will make this
case fall under the exception
Payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall
be deducted therefrom. In all other respects,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Wassmer vs. Velez
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz
Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love decided to get married on September 4,
1954. On the day of the supposed marriage,
Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day
to postpone their wedding because his
mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not
appear and was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and
Velez failed to answer and was declared in
default. Judgement was rendered ordering
the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as
actual damages P25,000 as moral and
exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s
fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for
amicable settlement was given chance but
failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this
appeal.
In support of his “motion for new
trial and reconsideration,” defendant asserts
that the judgment is contrary to law. The
reason given is that “there is no provision of
the Civil Code authorizing” an action for
breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our
ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals
(L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in
Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30,
1960), is that “mere breach of a promise to
marry” is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil
Code the provisions that would have it so.
Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry
is an actionable wrong in this case.
Held:
YES. The Court admitted that under
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. However,
it said that “the extent to which acts not
contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, was not limitless” because of
Article 21 of the NCC.
“Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage.”
The Court found that on August 23,
1954, Wassmer and Velez applied for a
license to contract marriage, the wedding
was set for September 4, 1954 and
invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances.
In addition, the bride-to-be’s
trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for
the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received. And then,
with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old,:
simply left a note for plaintiff stating: “Will
have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it … ” He enplaned to his home city
in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
before the wedding, he wired plaintiff:
“Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon.” But he never returned and was never
heard from again.
The Court ruled that this was not a
case of mere breach to marry.
As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all
the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.

Hence, although Velez did not

violate any law in abandoning his fiancée,
he was ordered to pay damages because he
exhibited behavior that was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. It
may also argued that the Court awarded
damages because of the public humiliation
suffered by Wassmer and her family.