March 28,2019

Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications

301 SW Tenth Ave., Room 115

Topeka, Ks 66612

Case Number: 13CV32P Wells Fargo vs. Julie Brunskill in Crawford County

This is a complaint against Senior judge Richard Smith of Linn County District Court, p.o. Box
350, Mound City, KS 66056 who is hearing cases in Crawford County.

Greetings Ethic Committee:

I am making a complaint because Judge Smith has retaliated against my daughter-in-law Julie
King because she and I had previously sued judge Smith in a class action suit in the case of Eric
Muathe, et al, vs. Honorable Kurtis Loy, et al in 15cv79p in Crawford County where my son
Kasey King received filing restrictions from Richard Smith because he was mad because we all
sued him. Judge Smith retaliated against Julie which violates code of judicial conduct Rule
2.16(B)Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities for making an ethic complaint against him
with the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications on May 19, 2018. He also was mad at
her because she filed a motion for change of judge with affidavit against him. Judge Smith has
made (SEVERALETHICAL ERRORS)in this case starting with the hearing in December 11,
2018 when he was suppose to sign a journal entry within 30 days under Kansas Supreme Court
Rule 170 but it took him until January 15,2019 to sign the order which he admits on page 2 line
1-5 on the March 24, 2019 ORDER when he states "All though the journal entnj from the December
11 hearing was not filed until January 15, the court ordered from the bench and it was memorialized in
the journal enirf", All though means he made an error.

He then didn't even remember what he put in the order because he signed another order on
March 24, 2019 on a Sunday on a motion to vacate a void judgment that Julie filed that did not
even have a hearing!!! He then scheduled a pre-trial conference after the ORDER on March 4,
2018 for March 28,2019 on the telephone but did not give enough proper time for the hearing
under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 131(a)(b)(c)Notice of hearings and trial settings. Judge
Smith then stated in his ORDER on March 24, 2019 on page 7 line 8 and page 4 line 12-13 that
my wife was cavalier, frankly nai"ve, and nefarious!!! He used 3 different demeaning nicknames
for Tulie.

I can not believe that he called Julie those demeaning nicknames which clearly violate CANON
2 Rule 2.3 Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment(A)(B)(C) including COMMENT(2)" Examples of
manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning
nicknames" .

This is the 2nd time that I have been in a Crawford County Court and been in a hearing where
the judge uses an inappropriate word choice because I was in my divorce case of Deborah King
vs. Michael King 09DM341Pin Crawford County and Judge Wachter told my son Kasey King to
go sit in the "peanut gallery". Kasey, myself, and Julie Stover who is my daughter-in-law now
all previously got Judge A.J. Wachter a reprimand for his inappropriate use of the word (peanut
gallery) in docket numbers 114, 1115, and 116 in the matter of A.J. Wachter in June of 2011.

Judge Smith on his ORDER March 24, 2019 had the nerve to state in his record 'The defendant's
cavalier attitude regarding the upcoming trial and her decisions to engage in other activities rather than
trial preparation concern the court greatly from the standpoint that it appears she fails to understand the
severity of the circumstances reinforcing the courts PRIOR ADMONIDON that she would be better off
represented by counsel." The definition of Cavalier is ARROGANT and she is not Arrogant.

Judge Smith supposedly admonished Julie at the hearing in December 11, 2018 but at the
telephone conference on March 28,2019 he did not remember admonishing Julie. I have
included the recording from that hearing to show that he is completely incompetent and does
not remember admonishing Julie and maybe the reason he is a Senior judge is he can't
remember and that's why he retired and he should retire permanently.

You can tell as Judge Smith attempts to speak after Julie asks him is she was admonished and
he studders and the long pauses he uses when he doesn't know how to answer after she asks
him if she was admonished at the last hearing. The reason he can't remember admonishing her
is because he did not admonish her at the December 11, 2018 hearing and he just put it in the
order as a retaliation for her filing an ethic complaint against him. This would seem to violate
Rule 2.5 competence, diligent, and cooperation and Rule 2.16 Cooperation with Disciplinary
Authorities for retaliation.

Judge Smith also did not have a court record with a court reporter at the hearing on March 24,
2019 and the recording I am sending in shows that he did not have a court reporter which also
wasted everyone's time at the hearing on March 28,2019 because we had no court record other
than the one we recorded just in case judge Smith tried to lie and change the court of record
because we don't TRUSTHIM!!!!
THE REORT OF SUPREME COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE- GENERAL PRINCIPLES

AND GUIDELIENS FOR THE DISTRICTCOURTS states under Justice is effective when it is:

(A) Fairly Administered Without Delay and (B) By Competent Judges

How could Julie possibly have received Due Process of Law in this case when Judge Wachter

violated the code of conduct and received a cease and desist for (Delay) and received a violation

of the code of conduct for Rules 1.1 Compliance with Law, 1.2 Promoting Confidence in the

judiciary, and 2.5 Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation? He delayed the court and officially

violated a rule for not being competent and did not promote confidence in the judiciary because

he violated the code of judicial conduct yet Judge Smith says on the recording I have included

that "it doesn't matter if a judge violates the code of conduct"!!!

Really????? The code of judicial conduct has no relevance huh?? Then why do we complain to

your office for ethical violations of judges?? Why do judges get letters of private and public

cease and desist and hearings in front of the Supreme Court if violations of the code of conduct

do not matter? Why do you issue letters of informal advice and caution if your office has no

relevance?

I think Judge Smith needs a serious review ofthe rules ofthe code ofiudicial conduct and needs

reminded oOhe importance o.fbeing ethical when 1{OU are a judge in Kansas.

I disagree with all the signed orders/judgments of this court that Judge Smith has signed and

Judge Wachter when judge Wachter was in this case that he took under advisement for over 3 1/2

years, and the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications agrees that Judge A.I. Wachter

violated Rule 1.1, 1.2, and 2.5 of the code of judicial conduct and I feel that Judge Wachter

lacked authority to hear and decide the issues in this case because he violated the code of
judicial conduct because he delayed the case, was incompetent, and therefore Julie never

received due process of law in this case because justice was not effective!

I have included the example of the VIOLATION from the 2017 annual report which shows that

judge Wachter violated 2 different Canons and three rules of the code of judicial conduct and I

feel the court should set aside and or vacate all previous orders in this case that were signed by

judge Wachter since he did not comply with the law, did not promote confidence in the

judiciary, and was not competent, diligent, or cooperative and therefore my wife did not receive

due process because justice was not etfective.

Judge Wachter should have never been in the case to begin with because he had previously

gotten a reprimand for his inappropriate use of the word (peanut gallery) in docket numbers

114,1115, and 116 in the matter of A.J. Wachter in June of 2011 and he was used as an example

for misconduct in the 2011 annual report for the commission on judicial qualifications.

Judge Wachter and Judge Smith both seem to have made huge mistakes in this case and

violated the code of judicial conduct for similar reasons in the case of In re Handy, 254 Kan. 581,

867 P.2d 341 (1996) and I would like to cite the Appendices for Reported Judicial Disciplinary

Cases Under Rule 601 the case law of In re Hand1{, 254 Kan. 581, 867 P.2d 341 (1996) which states

that a Judge of the district court was found to have violated Canons of the Code of Judicial
II

Conduct in the following particulars: ignoring a conflict ofinterest by handling cases that

involved the city which employed him as a municipal judge; creating an appearance ofimpropriety

in purchasing property involved in pending litigation; and lacking sensitivity to conflict of

interest, creating an appearance of impropriety, and being less than candid in a real estate

transaction. The Supreme Court found violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3C(1)(c), and 5C(1). The court

ordered public censure.

Please investigate Judge Smith for his incompetency, bias, prejudice, retaliation, conflicts of

interest, and inappropriate word choices and for him to disqualify himself under Ru1e 2.7 and

Rule 2.11(A) for his obvious prejudice against Julie King by calling her frankly naive, cavalier,

and nefarious which she is not arrogant, not wicked and not a criminal, does not lack

knowledge since she was smart enough to make a complaint with your office which resu1ted in

a cease and desist on Judge Wachter and violations of 1.1,1.2, and 2.5 of code of judicial conduct

and attorney Linda Tarpley never made the complaint which shows she did not follow KRPC

8.3(b) Reporting Professional Misconduct and Ru1e 8.4 Misconduct and therefore Judge Smith

has violated Ru1e 2.1S(B(D) Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct need investigated

on Judge Smith as well since he never reported attorney Linda Tarpley for misconduct when

she was incompetent and failed to report Judge Wacther for his delay on a matter taken under

advisement which shou1d have taken up to 90 days and instead to over 3 Y2 years yet Julie is

getting rushed to Discovery when the court has not established jurisdiction for over 6 years as

this was filed in April of 2013 and 2 judges recused after the case sat for over 3 Y2 years.

Please investigate what is going on here as there are (NUMEROUS ERRORS, OMISSIONS,

VIOAL nONS OF CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS" ON THE

COURT.

Thanks

Sincerely,

Michael King

r.o. Box 101

Opolis, Ks 66760
 CONDUCT EXAMPLES
The Commission has many dispositional avenues available after investigation, including

• but not limited to: Finding of No Violation resulting in dismissal or a letter of informal
advice to the judge OR Finding of Violation resulting in a letter of caution; cease and desist
order; or notice of formal proceedings. The following are examples of conduct found to
be advisory or a violation of the judicial code.
+
I~I iiiiiiAiiiiiiDiiiiiiViiiiiiISiiiiiiO RiiiiiiYiiiiiiiiiiiii;i11

No violation was found when it was alleged a judge posted an inappropriate comment on
Facebook. The judge was informally advised to use caution when posting information to social media
sites that could be misinterpreted or misleading and noted it was important to recognize that social
media posts are seen by a broad audience.

No violation was found when it was alleged a judge made inappropriate comments to a
defendant to stop acting like a child and did not allow witnesses to testify. The judge was informally
advised to be more diligent about future word choices.

I~I iiiiiiiiViiiiiiiiIOiiiiiiiiLAiiiiiiiiTiiiiiiiiIOiiiiiiiiN iiiiiiiiiiil.11

Ajudge, who was found to have violated Rule 2.S(A) by failing to timely rule on a matter taken
under advisement for approximately 18 months, was cautioned on the issue of delay.

A judge, who was found to have violated Rules 1.2 and 2.5 by filing an inaccurate report with
the Office of Judicial Administration, was cautioned to perform judicial duties competently and
diligently.

Ajudge, who was found to be in violation of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.3(B), and 2.8(B) by engaging in
workplace harassment, was publicly ordered to cease and desist from verbal and/or physical conduct
which was offensive and demeaning to female court reporters and judges. The judge agreed to continue
with retirement and not seek election or accept appointment to any judicial office in the future.

A judge, who was found to have violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 2.5(A) by failing to timely rule
on a matter taken under advisement for approximately 3 ~ years, was privately ordered to cease and
desist from failing to dispose of matters promptly and efficiently.

A judge, who was found to be in violation of Rule 1.2 by garnering media attention for sleeping
during a criminal proceeding with said conduct being mentioned in a Court of Appeals opinion, was
cautioned to avoid conduct that would compromise or appear to compromise the judge's integrity or
impartiality.

A judge, who was found to be in violation of Rules 1.2 and 4.1(A)(4) by misrepresenting the
facts of a disciplinary matter to the media at a judicial candidate forum, was publicly ordered to cease
and desist from making false or misleading statements.

Ajudge, who was found to be in violation of Rule 2.9(A) by initiating ex parte communications
both by phone and letter with a sitting Supreme Court Justice, was cautioned to avoid ex parte
communications.
 Linda Tarpley
Managing Attorney
913-831-3000 ext. 7100 Office
Itarpley@LOGS.com I www.logs.com

Shapiro & Kreisman, LLC 16811 Shawnee Mission Parkway, Suite 309 I Overland Park, KS 66202
Shapiro & Kreisman, LLC 113801 Riverport Drive, Suite 502 I Maryland Heights, MO 63043

Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, you are advised that this office is deemed to be a debt collector
and any information obtained may be used for that purpose.

[Quoted text hidden]

Response to Motion for Continuance signed.pdf

1242K

Richard Smith <smithr@kscourts.org> Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 1:01 PM

To: Linda Tarpley <ltarpley@logs.com>, Julie Stover-King <sweetjulz33@gmail.com>
Cc: Elaine Bradshaw <ebradshaw@11thjd.org>, Ijennifer@11thjd.org" <jennifer@11thjd.org>

Greetings

The pretrial conference is continued. The plaintiff's objections to the

remainder of the defendant's requests will be taken up at a telephone
conference to be scheduled at a later date. The scheduling of this telephone
conference will take place sometime next week since I am unable to attend
to an exact date and time today.

Sincerely yours

Judge Smith

---------- Forwarded message ----------

 Gmail Julie Stover-King <sweetjulz33@gmail.com>

Wells Fargo Bank v. Brunskill, Case No. 2013-CV-OOO-32-P

6 messages

Julie Stover-King <sweetjulz33@gmail.com> Thu, Feb 28,2019 at 10:10 AM

To: Linda Tarpley <ltarpley@logs.com>, smithr@kscourts.org

Good Morning Ms. Tarpley and Judge Smith,

I'm emailing to let you both know that I will be filing a Motion for Continuance in regards to the
pre-trial conference on Monday and an extension on Discovery.

When we had the last hearing, I did not know what a dispositive pleading was and was told
"Summary Judgement", I was unaware that other filings I have been working on could be
classified as dispositive pleadings. I'm not law-trained so in my research, it appears that the
following motions that I will be filing could possibly fall under dispositive pleadings and I apologize
for that. This case has been quite mind-boggling for me with Judge Wachter sitting on it for 3-1/2
years and then coming back to it and trying to gather all paperwork that has been tucked here or
there for safe-keeping and get all my ducks in a row and work a full-time job and take care of my
family is taking on toll on me.

I will be filing within a week or so a Motion to Vacate all Court Orders in this case that were signed
by Judge Wachter because I feel the court lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction to sign those orders.

I am also working on a Motion to Dismiss this case for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
because I feel Judge Wachter didn't have subject matter jurisdiction to sign orders in this case
due to Conflicts of Interests with me and that is why he was recused from the case after I filed my
Motion for Change of Judge with Affidavit.

I'm sorry to file this Continuance so close to the court date, but I am needing more time to finish
up some of the paperwork and I will also be traveling to Iowa tomorrow afternoon for a family
situation that arose suddenly that I am needed for and won't be back until Monday night. We are
supposed to get anywhere from 4 - 8" of snow all day Sunday in this area so hopefully I will make
it there and back safely. My sister flew in to Des Moines yesterday and they have a foot of snow
up there so fingers are crossed.

I have never used a Continuance in this case but I do believe after researching that I am allowed
to have one Continuance. Thank you kindly.

Judge Smith, I hope you are recuperating nicely from your surgery and Ms. Tarpley I appreciate
your patience.

Thank you,

Julie King
Linda Tarpley <ltarpley@logs.com> Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 5:06 PM
To: Julie Stover-King <sweetjulz33@gmail.com>, "smithr@kscourts.org" <smithr@kscourts.org>
Cc: Elaine Bradshaw <ebradshaw@11thjd.org>

Judge,

I will be preparing a response to the Motion for Continuance however my opposition is not to the
continuance of the Pretrial assuming Ms. Stover-King submits her Pretrial Questionnaire by
tomorrow as the court order requires. Family emergencies happen and if we simply continue that
hearing to a date in the near future, I am not opposed.

I am opposed to any modification of the prior court orders including the court's order setting the
discovery deadline, the pretrial and the trial date.

Linda Tarpley
Managing Attorney
913-831-3000 ext. 7100 Office
Itarpley@LOGS.com I www.logs.com

Shapiro & Kreisman, LLC 16811 Shawnee Mission Parkway, Suite 309 I Overland Park. KS 66202
Shapiro & Kreisman, LLC 113801 Riverport Drive, Suite 502 I Maryland Heights. MO 63043

Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, you are advised that this office is deemed to be a debt collector
and any information obtained may be used for that purpose.

[Quoted text hidden]

Linda Tarpley <ltarpley@logs.com> Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:21 AM

To: Julie Stover-King <sweetjulz33@gmail.com>, "smithr@kscourts.org" <smithr@kscourts.org>
Cc: Elaine Bradshaw <ebradshaw@11thjd.org>

Julie and Judge,

I just filed the attached. I believe both Julie and I will be looking for some response from the court
as to the Pretrial set for Monday afternoon. If I do not hear from the court by Monday morning, I
will be driving down.

Thank you!
 • WORDS AT PLAY
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cavalier
adjective
cav-a-lier I \ .ka-vo-Tir 0_\
Definition of cavalier
(Entry 1 of 2)

1 : marked by or given to offhand and often disdainful (see disdain entry-.l) dismissal of
important matters a cavalier attitude toward money has a cavalier disregard for the rights of
others
2 : debonair
3a capitalized: of or relating to the party of Charles I of England in his struggles with the
Puritans and Parliament
b : aristocratic portrayed the plantation owner as a cavalier fop
c capitalized: of or relating to the English Cavalier poets of the mid-17th century

cavalier

Definition of cavalier (Entry 2 of 2)

1 : a gentleman trained in arms and horsemanship

2 : a mounted soldier: knight
3 capitalized: an adherent of Charles I of England
4 : a lady's escort or dancing partner: gallant
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D
'If Other Words from cavalier '" ~y'nony'ms &
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Adjective
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OSIGNIN

DICTIONARY nefarious

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Home British & World English nefarious

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nefarious 0000
ADJECTIVE

(typically of an action or activity) wicked or

criminal.
'the nefarious activities of the organized-
crime syndicates' Try our interactive feature to learn

More example sentences Synonyms

how words enter the OED!
------- ------

Origin
Early 17th century: from Latin nefarius, from
nefas, nefar- 'wrong' (from ne- 'not' + fas 'divine
law') + -ous.

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Pronunciation . just £90 / $90
L .. ... .... ..
nefarious 1m'fe.nes/

It's takina the mickey. it's

DICTIONARY nefarious timvQ MENU

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naive
adjective
0_, nI-\
na·ive I \ na-1ev
variants: or naive
naiver; naivest

Definition of naive
1 : marked by unaffected simplicity: artless, ingenuous the experienced man speaks simply
and wisely to the naive girl- Gilbert Highet
2a : deficient in worldly wisdom or informed judgment their naive ignorance of life ... when
they were first married- Arnold Bennett especially: credulous ... tells tall tales of the West
to tweak naive city slickers. - Miriam Horn
b : not previously subjected to experimentation or a particular experimental situation made
the test with naive rats also: not having previously used a particular drug (such as
marijuana)
c : not having been exposed previously to an antigen naive T cells
3a : self-taught, p-rimitive
b : produced by or as if by a self-taught artist naive murals
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naively or naively adverb
nai veness noun

Synonyms & Antonyms for na

Synonyms
cavalierism \ .ka-vc-Tir-j-zcm 0\noun
cavalierly adverb

Synonyms & Antonyms for cavalier

Synonyms: Adjective

arrogant, assumptive, bumptious, chestY..,haughty", high-and-mightY.., high-handed, high-hat,

highfalutin (also hifalutin), huffish, huffy", imp-erious, imp-ortant, lofty', lordly', masterful,
overweening, p-eremptory', pompous, presuming, presumptuous, pretentious, self-asserting,
self-assertive, sniffy", stiff-necked, sup-ercilious, sup-erior, top-lofty.(also top-Ioftical) , yp-p-ish,
yp-p-ity.

Synonyms: Noun

gentleman

Antonyms: Adjective

humble, lowly', modest, unarrogant, unp-retentious

Visit the Thesaurus for More 0

The Evolution of Cavalier
Noun

According to a dictionary prepared by Thomas Blount in 1656, a cavalier was "a knight or
gentleman, serving on horseback, a man of arms." That meaning is true to the history of the
noun, which traces back to the Late Latin word caballarius, meaning "horseman." By around
1600, it had also come to denote "a roistering, swaggering fellow." In the 1640s, English
Puritans applied it disdainfully to their adversaries, the swashbuckling ROy"alistfollowers of
Charles I, who sported longish hair and swords. Although some thought those cavaliers
"several sorts of Malignant Men ready to corrr i; _11 --- ----- --- _c r'\ •••.•._ -- _.__ r: _1
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others saw them as quite suave-which may exp
complimentary or a bit insulting.

Examples of cavalier in a Sentr

Adjective

They are too cavalier in their treatment of others. She has a cavalier attitude about spending
money.
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CRAWFORD COUNTY, KANSAS
AT PITTSBURG

Wells Fargo Bank, NA PLAINTIFF

vs. Case No. 13CV32-P

Div. No.
K.S.A.60
Mortgage Foreclosure

Julie S. Stover-King fka Brunskill, et al. DEFENDANTS

JOURNAL ENTRY

At this time, the above matter comes on before the Court for the purpose of a status

conference, to hear all currently pending matters and to set dates for final resolution of this

matter. Plaintiff appears by its counsel of record, Linda S. Tarpley; the Defendant Julie S.

Stover-King fka Julie Brunskill appears in person. There are no other appearances.

The Court first takes up the pending Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution filed

herein by defendant and after considering the issues raised in the motion and responses filed, the

court denies the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution.

The Court proceeds with Case Management and sets the following deadlines and dates.

The deadline for Defendant to submit her discovery requests to Plaintiff is January 11,

2019

Wells Fargo v. Brunskill, et al. 2013-CV32P JE from hearing 12 11 2018 Page 1 of3
 The Parties shall exchange their respective Lists of Witness and Exhibits (including

complete copies of all exhibits to be submitted at trial) by February 15,2019.

The Pretrial Conference is set for March 4,2019 at 3:45 pm and the parties shall submit

to the court and to opposing counsel their Pretrial Questionnaires no later than Friday, March 1,

2019. Each party is provided a copy of the form Pretrial Questionnaire at this time.

A half day bench trial of this case is set for Tuesday, April 2, 2019 to begin at 1:15 pm.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

This Order is effective as of the date and time on the electronic file stamp.

APPROVED:

SHAPIRO & KREISMAN, LLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
6801 Shawnee Mission Parkway - Suite 309
Overland Park, KS 66202
(913)831-3000
Fax No. (913)831-3320
Our File No. 13-005875

by: _
LINDA TARPLEY, #22357
ltarpley@logs.com

And by:

Julie Stover-King fka Brunskill

303 S. Jefferson Street
Frontenac, KS 66763
(620) 674-1471
Sweeetjulz33@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 170

Wells Fargo v. Brunskill, et al. 2013-CV32P JE from hearing 12 11 2018 Page 2 of3
 The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Journal Entry was submitted to Julie S.
Stover-King fka Brunshilll under Supreme Court Rule 170 on the 12th day of Decemberl, 2018, by
email to the following address:

Julie S. Stover-King fka Brunskill

Sweetjulz33@gmail.com

With a copy to the Honorable Richard Smith

smithr@kscourts.org

and that:
o no written objections thereto have been received
o the approval of said party has been received as indicated above.

Linda S. Tarpley Ks #22357

Wells Fargo v. Brunskill, et al. 2013-CV32P JE from hearing 12 11 2018 Page 3 of3
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CRAWFORD COUNTY, KANSAS
Sitting in Pittsburg

Wells Fargo.,
Plaintiff,

Vs. Case No. 2013-CV-000032-P

Julie Brunskill, et. al.

Defendants

DECISION RULING ON DEFENDANTS PRETRIAL MOTIONS

AND
JOURNAL ENTRY REGARDING SAME

The defendant Julie Brunskill King has filed 2 motions and propounded

written discovery in the form of request to produce documents, interrogatories and

requests for admissions which are styled and captioned as a motion. For the reasons set

forth below the court denies the defendant's request for a continuance filed February 2,

2019, denies the defendant's motion to vacate and void judgments filed on March 8,2019

and the court further enters orders regarding the "motion for ... " discovery which was

propounded after the deadline for such had expired.

As concerns the request for continuance the defendant filed a motion requesting

additional time to propound written discovery. The granting of this motion would

necessitate a continuance of the trial scheduled for April 2. The good cause demonstrated

by the defendant is that she did not comprehend the amount of time that might be
necessary in preparing the written discovery. All though the journal entry from the

December 11 hearing was not filed until January 15, the court ordered from the bench

and it was memorialized in the journal entry, that plaintiff had until January 11 to

propound written discovery. The record will reflect that this state was effectively

determined by the court asking the plaintiff how much time she required.

The court had inquired of the defendant of what kind of discovery she anticipated

and written discovery was the only type she felt necessary. Therefore, the January 11

deadline operated as the discovery cut off for the propounding of any discovery. K. S. A.

60-216 (b)(3) sets forth the statutory requirements that in order to extend a. To conduct

discovery and the party requesting that extension must comply with certain rules:

(3) If discovery cannot be completed within the time originally prescribed by the court,
the party not able to complete discovery may file a motion for additional time to
complete discovery. The motion must be filed prior to the expiration of the original
period, contain a discovery plan and state the reason why discovery cannot be completed
within the original period. If additional time is allowed, the court must grant only that
amount of time reasonably necessary to complete discovery.

The defendant has failed to file her motion prior to the expiration of the original., She has failed to set

forth a discovery plan and her purported excuse is suspect as more than 2 months have elapsed since the

expiration of the discovery cut off period and the request is now made on the eve of trial. The request for

an extension of discovery time (described by the defendant as a motion for continuance) is hereby

denied.

The next motion filed by the defendant is a motion wherein she seeks to assert that this court

does not have subject matter jurisdiction. The analysis seems to be that the decisions Chief Judge
Wachter rendered are void and should thus be vacated. This would include the order assigning judge

Dan Creitz. Hence all orders by Judge Crettz are void. Unless and until the matters determined by these

judges have been reconsidered by other judges without the "issues" suffered by these judges the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. While the defendants understanding of subject matter jurisdiction

seems to be flawed and while the analysis leading to the conclusion the court might not have subject

matter jurisdiction requires is at least equally flawed the defendant's motion is burdened with an

inordinate amount of irrelevant legal authorities.

Attempting to avoid unnecessary digressions or chasing tangential arguments the fundamental

question presented is whether Chief Judge Walker's decision dismissing the defendant's counterclaim

should be set aside considering he later acquiesced in and a request for a change in judge.

The 1st important observation is that the defendant spends a great deal of time a sailing the

character of Chief Judge Wachter with criticisms, whether valid or invalid, that are irrelevant to the

ultimate question at hand. She also generously uses the terminology centered around the concept of a

judge who is "disqualified," while that term is one of art and its implications differ based upon the

factual basis upon which a "change of judge" is granted.

The applicable case law suggests "bias" refers to the judge's mental attitude toward a party to the

lawsuit, and bias and prejudice exist, in context of motion to change judge, if a judge harbors a hostile

feeling or spirit of ill will against one of the litigants or a feeling of undue friendship or favoritism

toward one (State v. Reed,2006, 144 P.3d 677, 282 Kan. 272). For some unknown reason the defendant

finds relevance in a ruling by Judge Mark Ward regarding the granting of a change of judge in a separate

case with a separate defendant having no nexus with the instant matter what so ever. This court was
confronted with the question of whether or not Judge Russell's decisions made before the granting of the

motion for change of judge were necessarily presumptively void. Judge Ward, correctly, applied the

reasonable mind standard from Smith v. Printup, 1997,262 Kan. 587, 938 P.2d 1261. Reasonable minds

might differ on whether or not the mere fact that Defendant named the Judge in a "class action" suit that

was summarily dismissed in favor of all defendants on July 31st, 2013 (see 2013 CV 47 P, Crawford

County, Kansas) would cause " ... reasonable doubt concerning the court's impartiality, not in the mind of

the court itself, or even necessarily in the mind of the litigant filing the motion, but rather in the mind of

a reasonable person with knowledge of all the circumstances." Smith v. Printup, 262 Kan. 587, Sly'[ 8,

938 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1997).

The arbitrary imposition of a standard which suggests anytime any action, regardless of merit, is

brought against a judge that judge is subsequently disqualified from hearing any action involving the

person who brought said action is an impractical, unrealistic, and frankly naive standard that would

subject the judicial process to systematic abuse by nefarious litigants. This is not intended to suggest this

is what necessarily happened in the case the defendant directs her attention to. It is not at all suggested

that that is the intention of this defendant. The problem is that the door is open for people who might

abuse the system whether or not that's going on here.

Of particular concern in the case the defendant wishes to use as an example was the fact that

there did not appear to be any evidence of "a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will against one of the

litigants or a feeling of undue friendship or favoritism toward one" of the parties or attorneys as is

required under State v. Reed. It is very important to remember that express in the statute and repeated in

a multitude of cases is the rule that "the recital of previous rulings or decisions by the judge on legal
issues or concerning the legal sufficiency of any prior affidavits filed by counsel for a party in any

judicial proceeding, or filed by such counsel's law firm, pursuant to this section, shall not be deemed

legally sufficient for any belief that bias or prejudice exists." K.S.A. 20-311d (d) (emphasis

supplied). Antagonism and animosity toward affiant or his counselor favoritism towards adverse party

or his counsel is required to show personal bias, prejudice, or interest as ground for disqualification of

judge. State v. Fay, 1980,227 Kan. 405, 607 P.2d 481 (1980).

Appreciation for the applicable standard should be gleaned from the ancient axiom "Previous

adverse rulings of a trial judge, although numerous and erroneous, where they are subject to review, are

not ordinarily alone sufficient to show such bias or prejudice as would disqualify the district judge." See

Hulme v. Waleslagel, 208 Kan. 385,493 P.2d 541 (1972).

Even though the facts are different regarding the granting of the motion filed against Judge

Russell by a different judge and judge Walker apparently voluntarily granting the request for the sake of

brevity this court will presume the same standard applicable as if judge walked or had been removed by

a in adverse ruling by another judge. The question then is whether his prior rulings are void. There

appear to be no Kansas cases directly on point answering this question and the Kansas decisions

regarding criminal actions that might be considered somewhat analogous have differing due process

implications further segregating them from applicability. Caution is required when looking to other

states as there is a wide variant in both statutory and even constitutional provisions that apply m

differing jurisdictions (e.g. Texas as compared to California).

In this court's view the most analogous situation where the court has been called upon to make

such a determination is in North Dakota. The North Dakota Supreme Court has held, "Prior orders of a
disqualified judge generally are not void where the judge was not personally biased or prejudiced

against a party, the disqualification was based on only a possible appearance of impropriety, and the

challenged rulings were correct. Citing Hull and Smith Horse Vans, Inc. v. Carras, 144 Mich. App. 712,

376 N.W.2d 392,395 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822, 107 S.Ct. 91,93 L.Ed.2d 43 (1986)." Sargent

Cnty. Bank v. Wentworth, 547 N.W.2d 753, 760 (N.D. 1996) (Emphasis supplied).

The determination in Sargent County Bank closely parallels the instant action. Chief Judge

Wachter denied the existence of of bias or prejudice as his decision is silent concerning the concept. His

decision appears to rely solely on what might be termed a "comfort level and possible appearance"

standard even though it might be correctly asserted more is required to compel a change of judge.

Applying the rule as articulated by the North Dakota courts, to void Judge Wachter's order requires the

defendant affirmatively demonstrate the dismissal of her counterclaim was the result of bias or prejudice

and the rulings were incorrect.

Chief Judge Wachter's analysis appears to be lawfully sound and legally correct in all regards.

The defendant attempted to counterclaim against the plaintiff with theories not recognized in Kansas or

with red cognizable theories in sufficiently pled in order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim. This is even being generous towards the defendant and allowing the leeway that is

sometimes offered litigants who are in self-representation.

The court is focused on the dismissal of the counterclaim because that is the only order which

conceivably might lead to a prejudice of the defendant's rights entered by either judge she complains of.
 'Obviously, couching a discovery request in the form of a motion does not change the nature of

the pleading. As stated above the defendant is way out of time to propound written discovery. The court

has reviewed in detail and finds most of it to be irrelevant and immaterial to the issues at hand. The

request to view original exhibits which will be necessary in order for the plaintiff to prove its case is

granted but under the circumstances that it is at a time convenient to counsel for the plaintiff and the

defendant and the location will be counsel's office.

The court intends to proceed with a pretrial conference in this matter and it intends to do so on the

afternoon of Thursday the 28th. The defendant's cavalier attitude regarding the upcoming trial and her

decisions to engage in other activities rather than trial preparation concern the court greatly from the

standpoint that it appears she fails to understand the severity of the circumstances reinforcing the courts

prior admonition that she would be better off represented by counsel. In any event in order to

accommodate her schedule the court anticipates that this will be scheduled late in the afternoon of the 28

by counsel and the defendant with the attorney for the plaintiffs and initiating the telephone conference

call where in a pretrial conference will be held and a pretrial order will result. The trial will proceed as

scheduled absent a demonstration of good cause and an order of this court.

IT IS SO ORDERED
Richard M Smith, senior judge assigned,

THIS ELECTRONIC ORDER SHALL BE EFFECTIVE UPON THE

FILING THERE OF