Professional Documents
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Tome 8
La philo sophie en Amerique latine
Contemporary philosophy
A new survey
edited by
GUTTORM FL0ISTAD
University of Oslo
Volume 8
Philosophy of Latin America
Published under the auspices of the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic
Studies and of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, with the support of
UNESCO.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
&ae4t
TABLE DES MATIERES
LEON OLIVE, Truth and Realism: A Current Debate in Latin America ...... 229
Does Latin America have a philosophy of its own? From the point of view of
the often assumed universal character of philosophy, the question appears to
be senseless. Not so to many, perhaps to most, Latin American philosophers.
The question is raised, in a variety of ways, in several chronicles. The
explanation easily comes to mind. It lies in the socio-economical and cultural
history of the continent. For hundreds of years the Latin American countries
were victims of European colonialism. The European powers, Portugal and
Spain in particular, not only dominated their socio-economic life, their
political system and to some extent also their cultural expressions. The
Europeans also imposed upon them their languages and their religious
beliefs. From the middle of the 16th century, Christian philosophy dominated
the scene.
No wonder then, that in the wake of colonialism questions of the
development of an independent economy, a just political system, the relief
from poverty and of a specific Latin American cultural identity were raised.
These questions also go to philosophy inasmuch as philosophical reflection is
part and parcel of most cultures.
An overview of some of the position is given by Ricardo Vetez Rodriguez in
his chronicle La Philosophie contemporaine en Amerique latine. Under the
heading method he outlines three main answers:
• Latin American philosophy has no originality. This is simply a
consequence of the mentality of the colonial powers. European schools of
thought determine all our philosophical thoughts.
The other extreme,
• Although there may be no genuine Latin American philosophy at
present, it is perfectly possible to work it out. The two world wars clearly
show the decadence of Europe and of its capitalist economic system.
European philosophy is therefore suffering a crisis (a thought that may have
been inspired by Husserl's work on The Crisis and more recently by the
American moral and social philosophers Alastair McIntyre and Ricardo
Sennet). Philosophy has become a discipline on its own, disconnected from
the socio-economic and cultural processes (R. Gomes). We are, on the
contrary, as held by Palacios and others, the native people with immense
possibilities and vast horizons before us. The mixture of the races has given
us a new soul. Within our frontiers "humanity is emerging". And a genuine
philosophy should incorporate the native culture.
alongside the European intruders from 1492 and especially in the 16th
century, initiated a Christian philosophy. A Dominican school of philosophy
was founded already in 1538 (in Santo Domingo) and became a university
discipline at the first universities founded in Mexico and Lima in 1553.
Scholasticism now and then supported by a revival of Thomism inspired by
the universities of Louvain and Freiburg, has been a strong tenet of Latin
American philosophy ever since.
Colonialism lead to the extinction and suppression of large ethnic groups,
economic exploitation and poverty, which prepared the ground for the
emergence of radical and conservative political movements and parties.
Marxism played a significant role in Latin America in the 19th and 20th
century, and served as a basis for a number of revolutions (f. inst. Cuba
1959). The philosophy and pedagogical theories of liberation, especially in
the 20th century, is intimately related to the historical situation. The
destruction of the rainforests inspired ecological movements as well as eco-
philosophy and ethics, especially outside Latin America.
The influence from European and American philosophy often lifted, as it
were, the Latin American philosophy out of their historical context and made
philosophy "universal". A number of Latin American philosophers have
given important contributions to a more general philosophy.
They (the philosophers) "lived in a non-European world, but they reflected out
of a philosophy for which reality was what was European". That made their
philosophical reflection ambiguous. They lacked "a focus". (Mir6 Quesada)
and party politics, to the law system and the military in Chile, to international
politics and to the ecological crisis, and a host of other topics engaging the
public.
Ricardo Maliandi makes the curious observation that, in discussing the
possible authenticity of Latin American philosophy and its cultural identity
the philosophers make extensive use of a vocabulary imported from the
European philosophy. To what extent the vocabulary, "the conceptual
schemes", determine the expositions and discussions is hard to determine.
However, the Latin American reality in all its aspects - historical, social,
political, economic, and cultural - certainly also influences the use of the
vocabulary. The philosophical problems raised by the historical reality, the
problem of identity, may after all, in different ways be common to all
nations. It is just the application that differs.
The difference between the European and Latin American reality and
identity is obvious. In Europe philosophy has all along been based on an
already established identity, whereas in Latin America there is a constant
search for one. The difference in the historical reality expresses itself,
according to Maliandi, in different styles of thinking.
Maliandi illustrates the issue by referring to the discussion between
Enrique Dussel and Karl-Otto ApeJ. The discussion is between two positions
in moral philosophy, between the "ethics of liberation" and the "ethics of
discourse".
Apel developed his ethics of discourse on the basis of "a transcendental
pragmatics of language", being a synthesis of Kant's transcendental
philosophy and the linguistic turn of modern philosophy in Peirce,
Wittgenstein, and others. A main point in transcendental pragmatics and the
ethics of discourse is to overcome the subjectivity in European philosophy in
f. inst. Descartes, Kant, and Heidegger. The way to do it is to transform the
monological philosophy into a dialogue, that is, to work out the dialogical
character of language itself. This is parallel to the Kantian question of "the
condition for the possibility and validity of .... ".
This ethics of discourse is itself a philosophy of liberation. It purports to
establish a dialogical community the world over. This process has started
already. The numerous international meetings of philosophers is a case in
point.
Dussel, in view of the situation in Latin America, questions the power of
reason and the ethics of discourse in solving the ethics of liberation. One of
his arguments is very simple: there can be no rational discourse between the
suppressors and the suppressed, between rich and poor countries. The long
history of suppression of the Latin American countries by colonial powers
has left traces in the Latin American mind that does not function in a free
8 PHILOSOPHY OF LATIN AMERICA
Philosophy of art
Processes such as these are well known almost the world over. Some call it
the decline of the public sphere (Habermas). There are many ways of
illustrating and analyzing the process. Javier Sanjines uses the visual art and
literature in Bolivia and a phenomenological analysis to make his point.
The process may be conceived as a movement from an ordered universe to
chaos. "The ordered universe" has a double meaning. It denotes the
traditional social and political order dominated by the mestizos, the highcr
classes of citizens whose mixture of blood is closer to the Spaniards than to
the indigenous population, and, symbolically order stands for the way we
order the world in our perception.
Sanjines takes as a starting point Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of
perception. The perceptual organ is our body. The body perceives objects in
our surroundings intentionally, and our intention gives the objects
significance in space. In addition our intentions brings with them the Gestalt
INTRODUCTION 9
Analysis andfonnallogic
Analytical philosophy is a method. It is almost a universally applicable
method, or as Fernando Salmeron puts it, it is "open to all tendencies of
contemporary thought". Quite a few of those philosophers mentioned in the
present volume is also listed in Salmeron's article on analytical philosophy.
Most of them were educated at European universities. Analysis is, however,
a very productive method with a view to discovering new philosophical
problems. Salmeron was himself lead to (analytical) philosophy of language
upon studying Husserl and Heidegger. Two other eminent Latin American
philosophers, Miro Quesada and Salazar Bondy, followed much the same
path.
They both started out studying continental philosophy and published
articles and books on phenomenology. Immediately after Miro Quesada
delved into issues of logic and mathematics. He afterwards extended his
interests to the field of political thought, and to a humanism based on ethics.
Based on his humanism Miro Quesada also joined political movements.
Salazar Bondy developed a double inclination towards the history of ideas
and towards phenomenology as a method. He remarked on the philosophy of
culture and on education, proposing a humanist socialist solution to the
problems of his country (Peru) closer to Sartre than to Marx. From the 1960s
he wrote on British moral philosophy and translated Moore and Wittgenstein.
It followed a series of analytical articles on "valorative languages" published
in Santiago de Chile.
Miro Quesada and Salazar Bondy have much in common. Starting from
studies in continental phenomenology they both published in a broad specter
of philosophical disciplines, and they both thought that philosophy should
not be separated from political activity and from science on the other. There
are numerous philosophers in Latin America who held such an integrative
view on philosophy.
Studies in epistemology, history of science, logical analysis and formal
logic flourished in the latter half of the 20th century in most Latin American
universities. The eminent philosophers Carlos Alchourron and Eugenio
Bulygin made extensive use of formal logic in their philosophy of law. A
most prominent figure in formal logic is Newton C. A. da Costa at Sao Paulo
in Brazil. Together with F. A. Doria he contributed to the present volume on
INTRODUCTION 11
a topic in the axiomatized sciences. The aim is to give "a few recent results
on the incompleteness of elementary real analysis and its consequences to the
axiomatized sciences, from chaos theory to the dynamics of population".
They also discuss the old controversy of the essential difference between the
world of nature and of culture. If the main purpose of the social sciences is to
predict the future, their methodical approach, some philosophers hold, cannot
be taken from the natural sciences. Others think that the difference between
them lies in the way time is perceived. Attempts have been made to reconcile
the two systems. With tasks from the theory of chemical kinetics A. Latka
and associates stated that the behavior of biological and social systems is
very similar, and consequently that there are no reason to upheld the
controversy.
Another prominent philosopher of the analytical bent is Hector Neri
Castaiieda from Guatemala. He has published extensively on a number of
topics, on the nature of philosophical problems and on the philosophy of
arithmetic, on consciousness, where the relation between "universes of
mental concepts is ordinary language" is essential. One of Castafieda's main
publications is A general system of normative logic published in a Mexican
journal.
Characteristics of analysis and analytical methods in Latin America,
Salmeron observes, is the link Latin American philosophers have established
between themselves and their active participation in international
discussions. They have long since proved the fruitfulness of philosophical
analysis in nearly all areas of philosophy, phenomenology and philosophical
hermeneutics included.
The classical epistemological problem of the rationality of beliefs is still a
current debate among Latin American philosophers. The question is whether
it is possible to say something objective and true about reality. Leading Latin
American philosophers are Mario Bunge and Luis Villoro.
Leon Olive takes as a starting point Villoro's definition of knowledge:
"knowledge is the best justified belief that a community can have at a given
time, according to the intellectual and conceptual resources they have".
The definition presupposes that "there is a world, the existence of which is
not derived from subjectivity", and that truth is defined as correspondence
between language and reality.
This metaphysical assumption has been criticized by a number of
philosophers. Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigms allows for
incommensurable theories of the world. There may moreover be semantic
differences between the languages of each community. The idea that there
must be a unique world cannot be upheld.
12 PHILOSOPHY OF LATIN AMERICA
Olive, quoting both the intemalist or pragmatic realism (held by Kuhn and
Putnam) and the extemalist position (held by Villoro and Bunge), tries to sort
out the difficulties by distinguishing between adequacy and correspondence.
A fact is that "confluence between what is stated and what is given", and
consequently that to which proposition refers "when they are true". It should
just be added, according to Olive, that each conceptual framework "cuts"
reality in such a way that there are facts that make certain propositions true.
A new system
Hardly any topic in philosophy and the historical, social and natural sciences
are left untouched by Mario Bunge, probably the most prolific writer of
today. He sets out to build an exact and scientific system of philosophy,
culminating in his Treatise on Basic Philosophy in eight volumes. In some
way or another themes from his numerous books and articles have found
their way into his system. Whatever the future evaluation of the system will
be, it is based on a very sound principle, rarely found in any of the
specializations in present-day philosophy. The principle is, that no
philosophical topic or problem should be studied in isolation from others.
They are all interconnected and should be studied as a component in the
system of philosophy. Or, as Bunge himself puts it in his Personal Report: in
his view, "philosophy of science is a mansion of many rooms". The
philosophy of science is composed of the logic of science, the semantics of
science, the epistemology of science, the methodology of science, the
ontology of science, and finally the ethics of scientific research. Each of
these areas is on their part connected within a broader framework. Thus,
ontology of science is part of a broader ontology. Another example is from
the study of economics: a purely economic approach to social problems, with
neglect of their political and cultural components, is bound to fail - a
warning already issued by Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill.
The titles of the eight volumes composing the Treatise on Basic
Philosophy give an indication of his system:
Vol. 1: Sense and Reference
Vol. 2: Interpretation and Truth
Vol. 3: The Furniture of the World
Vol. 4: A World of Systems
Vol. 5: Exploring the World
Vol. 6: Understanding the World
Vol. 7: Philosophy of Science and Technology
Vol. 8: Ethics
To envision future states of society and humanity and even of the individual
is a central feature of classical philosophy. The notion of liberation,
INTRODUCTION 13
itinerarium mentis in Deum and Utopia are all parts of this mode of thinking.
Western philosophy appears to have lost much of its interest in such big
questions. Habermas even adds that we have lost much of our "utopian
energy". Philosophy of Latin America certainly has not. Liberation with a
view to work out a cultural identity of our own is still a key issue. The same
applies, mutatis mutandis, to Africa, Asia, and to the Arab world.
In Meta-technics as the philosophical expression of the New World, a
Latin American philosopher, E. Mayz Vallenilla, focus on the challenge
gradually facing all nations and cultures, the technical development.
ValleniIla argues that the technical development has reached a point where it
transforms itself into meta-technics. It is difficult, as yet, to see the
consequences of this transformation. The author points to some of the effects
already visible.
The purpose of technical innovation is to increase man's mastery of nature
- the otherness. So far the mode of technics prevailing until now is
anthropomorphic, anthropocentric, and geocentric in style and limits. Out of
this mode of technics emerges a new logos, modifying the style of technical
activity. The ultimate aim is to increase the amount of power available to
man beyond the boundaries set by his innate psychosomatic constitution and
the cognitive capacity that it sustains.
Vallenilla illustrates his point by pointing to changes in our concepts of
space and time. Traditionally space is a substance that can be referred to in a
variety of ways. He shows how traditional languages, even the ancient Greek
language, are immersed in the spatio-temporal dimension. The latest
technical developments tum space into functions only, which can no longer
be referred to in the usual way. Thus the technical development points to a
new reality, a trans-reality that cannot be referred to by our anthropomorphic
senses.
Instead of the classical microscopes and telescopes, to quote an example,
man "sees" with the aid of sound waves, invisible to the human eye. The
same happens to missiles that pursue and locate their objectives using
thermic services - similar to some reptiles. Thus the amount of energy
available to man far surpasses the usual resources. Changes such as these are
part of the new logos.
It is likewise hard to see how we can avoid using the traditional manuals,
customs, rituals, and celebrations. They are areas for social and cultural
training in different ways known to all cultures and religions.
In Africa they say - as they also would way in Latin America, in the Arab
world, and in Asia: As human beings we have two needs, the small need and
the big need. The small need is our need for living under a roof, having
something to eat and some money to pay our bills. The big need is our need
to get an answer to the question why.
A cultural identity is supposed to provide an answer.
PmLOSOPHY IN LATIN AMERICA
ENRIQUE DUSSEL
UNAM-I (Mexico)
Mexican revolution of 1910 or Cardenas from 1934 on, that of the radical
party of Hip6lito Irigoyen in Argentina in 1918, or that of Per6n from 1946
on, or Getulio Vargas' nationalism in Brazil from 1930 on, etc.).
Their consciousness were sundered by a "lack of focus" - in Mir6
Quesada' S3 expression:
It is thus that the vision of a de-latinized America by its own will, without the
extortion of the conquest, and regenerated later to the image and resemblance
of the archetype of the North, floats already on the dreams of many who are
sincerely interested for our future. 9
The Cuba of the end of the 19th century would appear to be the same as that
of the end of the 20th century, as we can read in Jose Marti:
Concerning our history there is another more sinister plan than that which up
to now we have known and it is the iniquity of forcing the island, of
precipitating it into war, in order to have the pretext to intervene in it [ ... ].
Nothing more cowardly exists in the annals of free peoples. 10
In concordance with his attitude in the Peruvian politics and its social
perspective, Deustua's pedagogical reflection culminates thus in aristocratism.
Since its confidence in this selection of the spirit was complete, it believed that
the salvific formula of national life was moralized education, mdiating from
the elite and only from it. 13
Economic freedom, domination over the objective world, and ethical freedom,
domination over oneself, constitute, united human freedom [ ... ]. Struggle for
existence is not the eminent principle, but the struggle for freedom. 20
The mechanism of the universe maintains itself through hunger and love, as
Schiller sang [ ... ]. According to Bergson, instead of saying homo sapiens, one
oUght to say homo faber. Intelligence, elegant solution to the problem of life, is
the faculty of the creation of tools, instruments of action. 21
In short, the table of values of humanity is this: the more it is sacrificed and the
more difficulty it is carried out the sacrifice of the solely animal life [Porfirist
positivism] with disinterested ends, until arriving - from the aesthetic
contemplation and simple good actions - at heroic action, the more noble one
is. 22
20 Kom, 1944.
21 A.Caso, 1972, 1II, p. 9.
22 Ibid., p. 16.
23 Ibid., p. 17.
22 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
Well seen - writes Vasconcelos - and speaking the truth, the European almost
does not recognize us, and we do not recognize ourselves in him. Neither
would it be legitimate to talk of a return to the native [ ... J because we do not
recognize ourselves in the native nor does the Indian recognize us. Spanish
America is by this fate the new par excellence; novelty not only of territory,
but also of the soul. 24
29 Astrada, 1936, p. 6. The bibliography appended at the end calls attention to the fact that
Astrada had achieved a high technical level in the use of sources.
30 On the Latin American "contemporary ontologies" see Roig, 1981, pp. 138 tT.
31 This distinction, however, should not be fixed, since J. Gaos, republican and anti-francista,
was Heideggerian and will advocate the study of that which is Mexican. Carlos Astrada
himself will end up adhering to Marxism after the fall of Peroni sm.
32 "Ariel or the agony of an ohstinate illusion", in Anfbal Ponce, 1970, pp. 94 1'1'.
24 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
[In BoliviaJ The earth makes the man [ ... J colossal steep mountains that like
natural fortresses and also like natural prisons [ ... J the soul of the earth has
gone through it with all of its greatness, its solitude, that sometimes seem its
desolation and its fundamental suffering [ ... J. The Diaz, the Melgarejos, the
Guzman Blanco, the Castro, the Rosas and others more [ ... J all dominators,
vanquishers and hegemonies, they all have the mestiza mark in the forehead,
and the energy that they represent is of Indian origin - it is the blood of the
Indian that surges up in the adventurous and young blood. 35
On the strictly philosophical plane, some Latin American students who had
studied in Germany or Switzerland (for the first time superseding the French
horizon) between the two wars, with Heidegger (Carlos Astrada or Alberto
Wagner de Reyna), with Cassirer (Nimio de Anqufn), or in Zurich (Luis Juan
Guerrero), originated a Latin American ontological reflection. We could say
that they adopted two different attitudes.
Among the ontological interpretation, some will opt for an affirmative
attitude, an assumptive, positive vision of that which is American, which will
have a long history. I would like to remember Carlos Astrada with his work
The Gaucho Myth. Related to the nationalism of 1946 - since it is this
philosopher who replaces Romero, who was in turned replaced by him in
195636 - recuperates the figure of the "gaucho Martin Fierro',37, as ancestral,
33 In Latin America the peripheral bourgeoisie, as in the case of the popUlist governments,
instead, search for national emancipation; the German or Japanese bourgeoisie search,
instead, global hegemony, in competition with the Anglo-Saxon domination of the global
market.
34 Think here of Franz Tamayo, Creaci6n de la pedagogia nacional, La Paz, 1910; Roberto
Prudencio, "Sentido y proyecci6n del KoJlasuyo", en Kollasuyo, La Paz, 1939; Ezequiel
Martfnez Estrada, Radiogra/fa de la Pampa, Losada, Buenos Aires, 1961; Gilberto Freyre,
Casa-grande y senzala, Biblioteca de Autores Brasilenos, Buenos Aires, 1942; Samuel
Ramos, El perfil del hombre y la cultura en Mexico.
35 Cited in G. Francovich, 1966, p. 229. See A. Villegas, 1963, pp. 74-92. Rodolfo Kusch
belonged, with belated appearance, to this generation.
36 Only if the history of Europe is taken into account and its ehange of "sense" in the periphery
of capitalism, can be understood this division: in 1930, captain Romero took over the chair
of philosophy in Buenos Aires, with the anti-nationalist "military coup" of this year; in 1946
it was taken by Astrada, with the military coup that later gives power to Peronism; in 1956
Romero returned with the "liberating revolution" that organizes the independence from
North American expansion; in 1966, with the military eoup of Unganfa some go in exile; in
1976, with the neoliberal military coup some of us go in exile. One has to be extremely
careful not to confuse the "sense" of each one of these divisions, and of situating them in the
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 25
The criollo (white, child of immigrants) does not recognize now the
Amerindian, colonial world, of the "inward land"; she negates a millenary
history. In the same line we ought to situate Edmundo O'Gorman, who spoke
of the "dis-covery" of 1492 as the "invention of America" by Western
culture - not noticing the interpretation of the "discovery" by the indigenous
as an "invasion" of Cemanahuac ("the whole world" in Aztec)42 -; or
Alberto Caturelli43 , where the American is "to be a brute", without history,
the "immature,,44.
periphery. Hitler is not the same thing as Adenauer, but Getulio Vargas or Cardenas are not
simply Hitler, and Frondizi or Chilean Christian Democracy are not simply Adenauer.
Therefore, Astrada is not Heidegger (although he has a lot of him), and Romero does not
have their philosophical-political analogue in Europe.
37 The Argentinian "gaucho" [cowboy], like the Colombian or Venezuelan "\Ianero", is the
prototype of the "barbarian" for Sarmiento. Astrada recuperates this prototype in its
positivity.
38 El sentimiento de lo humano en America, 1950.
39 America como problema, 1959.
40 "Lugones y el ser americano", 1964.
41 El pecado original de America, 1954.
42 La invenci6n de America, 1958. See my critic in my work, Dussel, 1992, lecture two.
43 America Bifronte, 1961.
44 I believe that Caturelli does not know that he has used the same expression that Kant used in
his dcfinition of Aujk/iirung: "Unmundigkeit" (see my work, Dussel, 1992, lecture one).
26 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
45 See Sobrevilla, 1989, I, pp. 203 ff; Miro Quesada, 1981, 52 ff; Salazar Bondy, 1967, II, p.
413 ff.
46 Gredos, Madrid, 1976.
47 See Daniel Herrera Restrepo, "La filosoffa en Colombia eontemponinea (1930-1988)", in
Marqufnez Argote, 1988, pp. 381 ff.
48 See Salomon Lipp, "Francisco Romero", in Three Argentine Thinkers, Philosophical
Library. New York, 1969, pp. 113-167.
49 See Romero, 1944 and 1952.
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 27
53 With his dissertation Transzendenz und Differenz: ein Beitrag zum Problem der
ontologischen Differenz beimfruhen Heidegger, Nijhoff, La Haye, 1971.
54 See at the end, the bibliography 3.3.
55 See Walter Redmond, Bibliography oj the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America,
Nijhoff, La Haye, 1972.
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 29
56 See Ardao, 1956, pp. 163 ff. In his work La iglesia y la civilizacfon (1905) he demonstrates
an open, liberal, anti-positivist spirit. Enrique Legrand, astronomer, in his Divagaciones
.filos6ficas (1906) showed the coherence of a believing scientist in the mutual autonomy of
science and faith.
57 See Leonardo Tovar Gonzales, "Tradicionalismo y neoescolastica", in Marqufnez Argote,
1988, pp. 320 ff.
58 The 1st World Congress of Christian Philosophy of 1979, organized in C6rdoba (Arg.),
which published three volumes entitled Lafilosoffa cristiana, fwy [Universidad Nacional de
C6rdoba, 19801, was presided by the dictator General Videla, with a speech prepared by
Alberto Caturelli, is the limit expression ofthis attitute.
30 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
with political attitudes of the right -. The same can be said of Guido Soaje
Ramos, a specialist in ethics. Gonzalo Casas was instead a distinguished
critical teacher of young philosophical generations. Alceu de Amoroso Lima
or Leonel France in Brazil; Victor A. Belaunde in Peru59 , Ignacio Bravo
Betancourt, Jose M. Gallegos Rocafull or Antonio Gomez Robledo - noted
translator of Aristotle - in Mexico; Clarence Finlayson Elliot of Chile, to
which one would have to add many of the already mentioned thinkers like
Jose Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Wagner de Reyna and Nimio de Anqufn,
philosophers who declared themselves Christian; they all constitute a
significant group of Latin American thinkers in the 20th century.
Manuel Dominguez Camargo divides, to conclude, the thinkers who are
Christian in Latin America at the end of the 20th century into three groups: a)
those who professed a thinking that gathers them in the Inter-American
Society of Catholic philosophers (A. Caturelli, Stanislaus Ladusans, O.
Derisi), who must protect a true tradition and attempt to refute Marx,
Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, etc.; b) those who thought that philosophy and faith
do not mix with or negate each other (in the sense of the work of Blondel:
The Philosophical Exigencies of Christianity, who are the majority of those
already named), and who manifested an autonomous rationality; c) those
who departing from the second position, still "make an effort to find a new
point of departure, to elaborate a new language or to construct a new type of
philosophical discourse that is at the level of contemporary rationality,,60
critical, and Latin American.
Like Julio Antonio Mella, who died very young in 1929, founder of the
Communist Party of Cuba in 1925, they ought to be considered as belonging
to the generation of founders of Marxist critical thought in the continent. It is
known that once founded the ill International in 1919, the communist parties
rapidly repeated the soviet formulations and fell into eurocentrism in their
diagnoses, and later with Stalin, into an ideological ontological materialist
dogmatism. This did not prevent the appearance of great thinkers who knew
how to think in adverse situations. Jose Carlos Mariategui is the main of
them, who without doubt integrates the thinking of Marx, theses extracted
from the vitalism of Bergson and mainly from the mythical-political thought
of Sorel. He discovered, in tum, that the "Indian problem" is central to Peru
and other Latin American peoples, and he does not fear to contradict with
that an ideology which had already began to fossilize into a "classism"
without attenuations, a La Europe. When in 1928 there appeared in his
editorial Amauta the Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, he could
be greeted as the most original and the least dogmatic of Latin American
Marxism in the first part of the 20th century. He was harshly criticized during
his life and after his death he was stigmatized as having been a "reformist
populist" by the already triumphant Stalinism of the Party in Peru. In a
famous text of political philosophy, he wrote:
Those phases of the economic process that Marx did not anticipate [ ... ] do not
affect in the most minimum the foundations of the Marxist economy.65
So great is the determination to separate intelligence from life that one would
say that in this there is some hidden fear, some usurpation to defend, some
great crime to hide. Societies have never stemmed the thinker. They have
considered him, and with reason, as a heretic. 67
With the Cuban revolution of 1959, the impact of Marxist thinking extended
throughout the entire continent, especially in the faculties of philosophy. The
ethical and voluntaristic focism of Emesto Guevara and Fidel Castro won for
a time the opinion of the youth of the left. I want to cite a text in which
Guevara expresses the same intuition that Antonio Caso had at the beginning
of the century:
The large estate [ ... J that results in the low salary, the under-employment, an
unemployment: the hunger of the people. All of these existed in Cuba. Here
there was hunger [ ... ]. The objective conditions for the strug~le are given by
the hunger of the people, the reaction before this hunger. 6 Our vanguard
revolutionaries have to idealize this love of the people, to the sacred causes and
to make it unique, indivisible [ ... J. Every day one has to struggle because this
living love of humanity is transformed in concrete events. 69
seeing the popular in the proletariat, and that of the others in not seeing the
proletariat in the popular.71
The philosophy of each epoch and of each country has been commonly the
reason, the principle, or the most dominant and general sentiment that has
governed the acts of its life and its conduct. And this reason has emanated
from the most imperious needs of each period and each country. It is thus that
there has been a Greek, Roman, German, English, and French philosophy, and
as is necessary that there exist an American philosophy [ ... ]. There is, then, no
philosophy in this century; there are only systems of philosophy, that is, more
or less partial attempts, contradictory among themselves?6
I imagine the smile of the reader before the epigraph. Since when do we have
Argentinean philosophy? Do we indeed have philosophy? [ ... ]. Us
Argentineans, would say the reader, belong to the realm of Western Culture
and up to this moment we have only assimilated important ideas [ ... however,]
our struggles were no mere brawls. Argentinean positivism is of
autochthonous origin; only this fact explains its deep-rootedness. It was
expression of a collective will [ ... ].77
Even Jose Carlos Mariategui asked himself years later: is there a philosophy
in Peru?
It is thus that within the pan-American organizations, with headquarters in
Washington, Anfbal Sanchez Reulet in 1936 published an article on
"Panorama of ideas in Hispanic America,,78. Rizieri Frondizi collaborated in
1940 with the inclusion in the Handbook of Latin American Studies a section
on the history of ideas. Leopoldo Zea, student of Jose Gaos, published in
1949 a work where he adopted a continental horizon: Two Stages of Hispanic
American Thought. F. Romero himself, distanced from the faculty of
philosophy because of Peronism, published in 1952 his work Concerning
Philosophy in America. In Ecuador, in Guyayaquil, Ramon Insua Rodriguez
also dealt with the theme in 1945. Shortly thereafter in Washington, under
the direction of Sanchez Reulet, supported by Romero and Zea, a collection
of the histories of thinking by countries is launched. Suddenly there began to
profile a panorama never before known. Now there could emerge before the
eyes of a new generation the critical horizon that the philosophies practiced
by the "normalizers" was alienating, "unauthentic", inasmuch as it had not
taken charge of the antecedent reality of Latin American philosophy. The
affirmation of a forgotten identity, the negation of the mere repetition of what
is European, required a return to what is Latin American as object (what has
to be thought) and a<; subject (to know who thinks and from where they
think) of philosophical reflection. It is in this fashion that with the resources
of the ontological current the question of the "Latin American being" is
problematized (#3.a). The philosophers that I will denominate
If the written work of Zea is immense, the "work not written" is even greater.
Like no other Latin American philosopher of the 20th century, he has
propelled the study of Latin American philosophy not only in the continent
79 See Mir6 Quesada, 1974, pp. 208 ff; 1981, pp. 136-180.
80 See L. Zea, 1949, 1955, 1963.
81 See my work: "EI proyecto de una Filosoffa de la historia latinoamericana de Leopoldo
Zea", in Cuadernos Americanos (Mexico) 35, sept.-oct. (1992), pp. 203-218.
82 See L. Zea, 1969 or 1978.
83 To a certain extent Emilio Uranga in Andlysis del ser del me.xicano (porma, Mexico, 1952),
which he defined by its "radical ontological insufficiency", closed already the path of the
ontological analysis of the American being. Luis Villoro, 1950, in tum, following the
negative tradition, showed that given that the Indian is "the other", the only way of
overcoming its discrimination is by integrating him into the Mexican as such, thus
disappearing as Indian.
84 Mir6Quesada, 1981,p.149.
85 Ibid., p. 183.
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 37
(including the United States), but also in Europe and the world. From his
centre (CECYDEL), founded in Mexico, Zea has for decades radiated the
Latinamericanist passion.
F. Mir6 Quesada, on the other hand, from out of his project of a historical
rationality86 has drawn a suggestive interpretation of the recent Latin
American philosophical transformation.
Arturo Ardao, for instance, is the prototype of the historian of ideas, with
his own philosophical style. The same ought to be said of Arturo Roig who
reflects creatively from out Hegel, what he called the "anthropological a
priori,,87, "to want to hold oneself as valid (fUr sich gelten will) from out of a
universal horizon and with reference to "the concrete figure of a people (die
konkrete Gestalt eines Volkes)". The subject that affirms itself is an "us"
(Latin America) before the "ours" (not only territory) that has as "legacy" the
cultural inheritance of tradition, in the dialectic civilization-barbarity. Thus,
when we ask after the "beginning (Anfang)", that is no mere "point of
departure (Ausgang)", of American philosophy we must think it as "self-
consciousness", as a thinking about ourselves, but in reality as permanent re-
starts. In tum, the "philosophies of accusation,,88 are not to be left to the side.
Abelardo Villegas made known notorious works in his time89 . With a very
purified dialectical methodology, relating the philosophical text with
historical economic, political and social structures. Villegas diagnosed that
the central problem of the Latin American conflict is the contradiction
between traditional and modem society. Revolution is the action that makes
the answer emerge, which is simultaneously (in the case of the Mexican
revolution, Batlista in Uruguay or the Cuban revolution) anti-traditional and
anti-imperialist. The reformed (radial Argentineans or Peronists, Vargistas in
Brazil, etc.) remain included. The Villegas' project, however, has not
received in the last years new contributions, unfortunately. We ought to
mention here a whole group of Latinamericanists such as Weinberg, Horacio
90 See at the end bibliography 3.6, especially the whole work of Gracia, 1985.
91 Note that rigour is desired in the linguistic apparatus but not in the socio-historical (which is
another epistemological horizon that they do not attempt to improve).
92 See D. Sobrevilla, 1989, pp. 607-854.
PHll.DSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 39
There lies its value and its limit: formalizing theoretical rationalism. Leaving
the side logic and mathematics, Bunge began through a semantics96 ,
continues through an ontology97, and an epistemolog/8 • Finally, his ethics
are developed from an axiological, Aristotelian teleological model. "Values"
as evaluative horizon that takes over the utilitarian position; morality as the
set of moral norms; ethics as the theories on values, morality and action; the
theory of action as a praxiology:
Thus Morality builds, upon the connection between the moral value of sets of
actions and happiness, the basis of a special complex and pervasive network of
duties (obligations, oughts, or requirements). I 02
99 VIII, p. 398. But it is there, precisely, when the difficultics begin. How is the fact thought
philosophically, that the majority of humanity, in misery, in the peripheral world, can
accomplish this objective? Bunge indicates that this would be more concrete levels of
reflection of application that depart from the presented.
100 He has had students like Ricardo Gomez, excellent Argentinean epistemologist in Los
Angeles, Jorge Graeia, Hispanic-American in Buffalo, who carries out an extremely
relevant work since he is a true "inter-cultural bridge" between the United States and Latin
America.
101 See his works: Castaneda, 1974, 1975, 1989.
102 Castaneda, 1974, p. 175.
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 41
Critique departs from beliefs105. Every rational being has beliefs for reasons,
when they are sufficient they are enough; when they are insufficient, its
causes and better reasons are looked for. When sufficient reasons are
objectively justified as valid, it can be said that s has knowledge of pl06. To
learn adds to knowledge the "personal experience,,107, which is judged
specifically in discoveries, in empirical application, and in wisdom.
Criticizing with vehemence the scepticism of scientism that measures
everything according to the disproportionately rigorous degree of
justification of some sciences, he concludes:
focuses on social life often attempt to disguise themselves with a scientistic posture." (Ibid.),
p.296.
109 Ibid., p. 227. Here the "second" Villoro could follow the "first" (the phenomenological and
historian of ideology Villoro), and to meet up with the "third" (his present political
philosophy).
110 From within the current. Gracia writes: "A more serious weakness from the philosophical
standpoint that I see in the work of Latin American analysts is their lack of interest and
competence in the history of philosophy in general and particularly in the history of Latin
American thought [ ... J. At a time when the analytic tradition in the Anglo-American world
is opening up to other philosophical traditions and trying to engage in dialogue with them,
some Latin American analysts seem to be going in exactly the opposite direction" ("The
impact of philosophical Analysis", in Gracia, 1988, pp. 138-139).
111 See at the end bibliography 3.7.
112 It would be the "fourth" of Mira Quesada (l981, p. 184). The term "generation" is not
meant here as a category, but as an approximate indication of a double membership: a) to a
certain problematic, and b) to a certain time (where the age of the philosopher is an
ambiguous term, which ncvcltheless indicates a certain historicity).
113 Lafilosofia en el Peru, p. 118.
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 43
Philosophical thinking oUght to become, as far as the human energies that are
empowered allow it, an instrument of radical critique with the goal of
achieving, through analysis and rational illumination, a fully realistic
consciousness of our situation. 114
To the side of the philosophies linked with the great contemporary blocks or
the immediate future, it is necessary, then, to forge a thinking that, at the same
time that it takes root in the socio-historical reality of our communities and
translates their needs and goals, serves to cancel the underdevelopment and the
domination that typify our historical situation. It is necessary that, within the
general frame of the Third World, the Hispanic American countries,
challenged to construct their development and to achieve their independence,
encounter the support of a philosophical reflection conscious of the historical
crossroad and decided to construct itself as a rigorous, realist and transforming
thinking. 115
But there is still no possibility of liberation, and, to the extent that there is, we
are obliged to opt decidedly for a line of action that materializes this possibility
and evades its frustration. Hispanic American philosophy has before itself also
the option, that, its own constitution depends on its being an authentic
thinking,u6
When philosophy set out historically to liberate itself, it did not even achieve
the liberation of the philosopher, because no one who dominates another can
be liberated. Thus, taking matters in truth, the only possibility of liberation
opens itself for the first time in history with the Third World, to the world of
the oppressed and underdeveloped, who are liberating themselves and at the
same time liberate the other, the dominator. Then, for the first time can there
be philosophy of liberation. In the concrete case of the struggle of classes,
groups, nations there is another who is the dominator, who unfortunately I
have to remove from the structure of domination: I have to dismantle their
machinery of oppression. And philosophy has to be in this struggle, because if
not, it becomes abstract thought that with the intention that we are to liberate
others, as philosophers, not even we are liberated. 1I?
114 Ibid.
115 Op. cit., p. 127.
116 Ibid., p. 133.
II? "Dhilogo con los expositores", in Stromata (Buenos Aires), XXIX, Oct.-Dec., 4 (1973), pp.
441-442. I must testify here that Bondy was pleasantly surprised to encounter a
44 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
[a] a critical work to the extent that historical reality allows it, [b] a work of
reformulation to the extent that we emerge towards a new optic, and [c] a
reconstruction of philosophy to the extent that this optic gives us a way to
produce a thinking already oriented in the sense of the philosophy of
liberationY8
119 As much in Lafllosofia Americana como fllosofia sin nulS, Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1969, and
the critique he made of Salazar Bondy (and myself) in San Miguel (see "La filosoffa
latinoamericana como filosoffa de la liberaci6n", in Stromata already cited p. 406: "Enrique
Dussel, in tum, has formulated a similar need and, with Salazar Bondy, he has asked: is an
authentic philosophy possible in our underdeveloped, dependent, and oppressed continent,
even culturally and philosophically?")
120 See L. Zea, 1974.
121 Leopoldo Zea himself wrote: "Not to want to take consciousness of our own situation
explains partly that we have not been able to have our philosophy" ("La filosoffa como
compromido", in La fllosofia como compromiso y otros ensayos, Mexico, 1952, p. 33). Note
that here Zea coincides with Bondy and myself.
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 45
60s added validly that it was not sufficiently rigorous -. We admitted also
that for philosophy to be such, it ought to depart from concrete (or particular)
reality and ought to elevate itself to universality, when it is rigorous
philosophy - and in this there was concordance with the analytic and
epistemological current -. It is in such a way that all philosophy (Aristotle's
departed from a political reality of slavery, and Hegel's global-historical
philosophy was germanocentric) departs from the concrete and raises itself to
universality (Aristotle's and Hegel's logics are good examples). Every
philosophy is originally particular (and because of that it strictly deserved the
name of Greek, Roman, Muslim, Medieval, German, Anglo-Saxon, and even
North American, since Charles S. Peirce, philosophy), as point of departure,
and at the same time they are "philosophy as such" (jilosofia sin mas), as
point of arrival - since they can learn/teach something "universal" of/to all
others I22 -. The discussion does not reside here. The problem is located
somewhere else: Zea thinks that "Latinamericanist philosophy" suffices;
Salazar Bondy advocates a new philosophy which is more rigorous,
illuminative with respect to the question of "negativity", and that is more
linked to praxis in the question of social "transformation". In order to attain
this, the social sciences, the political economy of dependence (today we
would say the horizon of the "world-system") must be assimilated. The
original group of the philosophy of liberation, it is my personal opinion, was
in agreement with Salazar Bondy on this issue. I believe that there are four
possible positions before this problem: a) that which admits the validity of
historiographical "Latinamericanist philosophy" or as hermeneutics of the
"life world"; b) that which discovers the degree of prostration of our
academic-normalized philosophy; c) that which indicates similarly the
possibility of a Latin American philosophy as historiography, and that
dialogues with the best of the hegemonic Euro-American philosophical
community; d) that which attempts the development of a philosophy of
liberation as differentiated from the prior project, although it ought to be
articulated in conjunction with them - that is, supporting itself in
historiography, in epistemological rigour and in dialogue or clarifying
debaters with the other recognized and hegemonic philosophical positions.
Salazar Bondy's project, and that of a philosophy of liberation in a strict
senseI23, distinguishes itself from "Latinamericanist philosophy" (a) (#4 of
122 See the volume that emerged from a meeting where the question "whether there is a Latin
American philosophy? was discussed: Antonio Sidekum, ed. 1994, Etica do Discurso e
Filosofia da Ubertar;ao. Modelos Complementares, Sao Leopoldo, RS, Editora Unisinos.
123 Salazar Bondy advanced to the moment (a) he called attention to (b), and also attempted (c),
position that in an independent way we practiced in Argentina since 1969-1970. In (d) we
46 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
are in agreement personally in 1973. Bondy lived the entire process of development of the
philosophy of liberation (d) that he ignored, but that he "recognized" immediately.
124 For a general panorama see my article "Filosoffa de la liberaci6n desde la praxis de los
oprirnidos", in Dussel, 1993, pp. 13-31.
125 This concerns the military dictatorships of dependence, which began with Castello Branco
in Brazil (1964) or Unganfa in Argentina (1966), and that are generalized later (Banzer in
Bolivia, Pinochet in Chile in 1973, Videla in Argentina in 1976, etc.). These historical
"ruptures", until in 1983 the return to formal democracy takes place in Argentina, produced
deep fissures in the philosophical development, as we have seen. The European "fissures"
(the irruption of Nazism and Fascism, from the end of the 20s, and the return to democracy
in 1945) will be equally acute and produced important "philosophical" effects. One has to
know how to analyse them analogically with Latin America, where they have not yet ended.
In Latin America there were many expUlsions of philosophers like the Frankfurt school,
many like Walter Benjamin (think of the philosopher Mauricio Lopez, tortured and
assassinated in Argentina in 1976), many Marcuses (we were more than ten professors who
shared our commitment to the philosophy of liberation who were expulsed from the
university and the country), and many collaborationist Heideggers (without for that no
longer being philosophers). The historical analysis of the global periphery is more complex
than that of Europe or the United States.
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 47
126 See the article by Luis Sanehez, "Dussel, Enrique" in F. Maffe, (Ed.), Dictionnaire des
(Euvres Philosophiques, PDF, Paris, Vol. 2, 1992, col. 3196.
127 See Scannone, 1990, where he announces a new beginning.
128 His work in three volumes (Cullen, 1986) has to be taken into account from the perspective
of Rodolfo Kusch.
129 His work is of great interest, particularly in view of the debate with K.-O. Apel in
September of 1993 in Sao Leopoldo (Brazil).
130 In Razon y Liberacion, Casalla does not arrive at an overcoming of the horizon of the
totality. The alterity of the oppressed class, of the poor, of the marginalized (different levels)
are not clarified: the national is identified as the popular.
1:\ 1 For Zea the "assumptive moment" (Zca, 1978) supersedes and subsumes the emancipatory
project of independence, whether liberal or conservative, but, like in Vasconcelos' cosmic
race, only a national liberation is proposed, which is not the same as popular liberation.
48 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
132 Mir6 Quesada's commitment to liberation philosophy does not come from the level of what
he calls "pure philosophy", but from the level of the "ideological character" of certain
rational discourses. His work Humanismo y Revoluci6n is not a practice of liberation
philosophy, but it indicates the way in which Mir6 Quesada fonnulated the political
problem. For him "ideology" - theoretical justification at the practical level - can be
fonnulated rationally departing from teleological principles: "Political problems can be
faced through theoretical principles, through rational rules that allow the achievement of
objective and valid conclusions from all humans" (Quesada, 1969, p. 21). In this whole
analysis, Quesada shows himself to be following the Aristotelian model of rationalist style.
Here Quesada has not fonnulated himself the difference between theoretical and practical
rationality. He thinks that the first operates in ideology with the same rules as practical
reason (question which in a different manner has not been solved by the rationalism of Apel
and Habennas). Compare Mir6 Quesada's Republic (with analogy to Plato) and my volume
IV of Towards an Ethics of Latin American Liberation ("Politics", USTA, Bogota, 1980).
When Mir6 Quesada got to know of the existence of liberation philosophy, in the 70s, he
understood its importance since it allowed him to fonnulate the theoretical-ideological
principle that he needed. I think that the question is far more complex, and I will show this
in an Ethics of Liberation presently under elaboration. For me, practical reason is the first
reason (and not simply ideological reason), just like ethics is prima philosophia.
133 The very worthy analysis of the Cuban team, like that of H. Cerutti, tend to confuse the
planes, since: a) they pretend to analyze everything through the criteria of a universalist,
humanist "Engelsian materialist" Marxism (Guadarrama, 1993), b) or from out of a
"c1assism" where the category of "people" is populist (see Cerutti, 1983; there is a response
to his objections in Dussel, 1985, pp. 400-413; and 1990, pp. 243-293).
134 See, for instance, my work Women's liberation and Latin American Erotics, Nueva
America, Bogota, 1980, with retractions and clarifications in "Philosophy of Liberation:
From out of the Praxis of the Oppressed", (Chapt. One of The Underside of Modernity,
Humanities Press, New York, 1995).
PHll..OSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 49
INDICATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
The bibliography on our theme, by itself, could take up hundreds of pages. I
only wish to "indicate" part of it in order to inform our colleagues of other
cultural horizons. This is a minimal, but reasoned, bibliography.
1. General Bibliography
I include in this section a bibliography that touches the whole Latin
American continent and not countries or currents.
Abellan, Jose Luis, 1967, Filosofia espanola en America (1936-1966), Guadarrama, Madrid.
Baggini, Hugo, 1989, Filosofia Americana e identidad, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires.
Crawford, W. R., 1961, A Century of Latin American Thought, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
David, H. E., 1972, Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction, The Free Press, New
York.
Dussel, E., 1994, "Hip6tesis para una Historia de la Filosoffa en America Latina", in Historia
de la Filosofia latinoamericana y Filosofia de la Liberaci6n, Nueva America, Bogota, pp.
13-54.
Fomet-Betancourt, Raul, 1985, Kommentierte Bibliographie zur Philosophie in Lateinamerika,
Peter Lang, Frankfurt.
Fomet-Betancourt, R., 1985b, Problemas actuales de lafilosfia en Hispanoamerica, FEPAI,
Buenos Aires.
Gaos, Jose, 1944, El pensamiento hispanoamericano, Colegio de Mexico, Mexico.
Gracia, Jorge (Eel.), 1975, El hombre y los valores en lafilosofia latinoamericana en el Siglo
XX, FCE, Mexico.
Gracia, J., 1986, Latin American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Man, Values and the
Search for Philosophical Identity, Prometheus Books, Buffalo.
Gracia, J., (Ed.), 1988, "Latin American Philosophy Today", in The Philosophical Forum
(New York), XX, 1-2 (1988-89).
Gracia, J., 1988a, Directory of Latin American philosophers, State University of New York,
Buffalo (CISP, Buenos Aires).
Handbook of Latin American Studies (Harvard University Press, Cambridge), dedica en los
ultimos afios secciones sobre temas filos6ficos. Cfr. Gracia, 1988a.
Tnsua Rodriguez, Ram6n, 1945, Historia de la filosoffa en Hispanoamerica, Editorial
Universitaria, Guayaquil.
Kempff Mercado, Manfredo, 1958, Historia de la filosoffa en Latinoamerica, Zig-Sag,
Santiago de Chile.
Kmmpel, Heinz, 1992, Philosophie in Lateinamerika. Grundziige ihrer Entwicklung,
Akademie Verlag, Berlin.
Larroyo, Francisco, 1958, Lafilosofia latinoamericana, UNAM, Mexico.
Marqufnez Argote, German (Ed.), 1993, La Filosofia en America Latina, EI Buho, Bogota.
Mir6 Quesada, Francisco, 1974, Despertar y proyecto del filosofar latinoamericano, FCE,
Mexico.
PHll.,OSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 51
Mir6 Quesada, F., 1981, Proyecto y realizaci6n delfilosofar latinoamericano, FCE, Mexico.
Roig, Arturo, 1981, Teoria y critica del pensamiento latinoamericano, FCE, Mexico.
Roig, A., 1993, Rostro y filosofia de America Latina, EDIUNC, Mendoza.
Romero, Francisco, 1952, Sobre lafilosofia en america, Raigal, Buenos Aires.
Sanchez Reulet, Anibal, 1954, Contemporary Latin American Philosophy, University of New
Mexico Press, Albuquerque (hay un trabajo anterior publicado en Tierra Firme (1936), 2:
"Panorama de la ideas filosoficas en Hispanoamerica", pp. 181-209).
Saarti, Sergio, 1976, Panorama della filosofia ispanoamericana contemporanea, Cisalpino-
Goliardica, Milan.
Stabb, M., 1967, In Quest of Identity, University of North Carolina, Chapell Hill.
Villegas, Abelardo, 1963, Panorama de lafilosofia iberoamericana actual, EUDEBA, Buenos
Aires.
Wagner de Reyna, Alberto, 1949, Lafilosofia en Iberoamerica, Sociedad Peruana de Filosoffa,
Lima.
Zea, Leopoldo, 1949, Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamerica: del romanticismo al
positivismo, Colegio de Mexico, Mexico.
Zea, L., 1963, The Latin American Mind, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.
2. Bibliography by country
In this section we only indicate the works that touch on nations as a whole,
although they study authors who belong, as it is evident, to some current.
2.1 Argentina
Alberini, Coriolano, 1930, Die deutsche Philosophie in Argentinien, H. W. Hendriock, Berlin.
Alberini, C., 1966, Problemas de la historia de las ideas filos6ficas en la Argentina,
Universidad de La Plata, La Plata.
Biagini, Hugo, 1985, Panorama filos6fico argentino, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires.
CatureIli, Alberto, 1962, La filosofia en la Argentina actual, Universidad de Cordoba, Cordoba
(Arg.).
Farre, Luis, 1958, Cinquenta arios de filosofia en Argentina, Penser, Buenos Aires.
Ingenieros, J., 1961, La evoluci6n de las ideas argentinas, Futuro, Buenos Aires.
Korn, Alejandro, 1961, El pensamiento argentino, Nova, Buenos Aires.
Pro, Diego, 1973, Historia del pensamiento argentino, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo,
Mendoza.
Roig, Arturo, 1993, La Argentina del 80 a180. Balance social y cultural, UNAM, Mexico.
Romero, Francisco, 1965, El desarrollo de las ideas en la sociedad argentina del Siglo XX,
FCE, Mexico.
Torchia Estrada, Juan C., 1961, La Filosofia en Argentina, Union Panamericana, Washington.
2.2 Mexico
Cordoba, Arnaldo, 1974, La ideologfa de la revoluci6n mexicana, UNAM, Mexico.
Cueva, Mariano de la, 1966, Major Trends in Mexican Philosophy, University of Notre Dame
Press, South Bent.
Gaos, Jose, 1952, En lorno a lafilosofia mexicana, Porma, Mexico.
Salmeron, Fernando, 1980, "Los filosofos mexicanos del siglo XX", en Cuestiones educalivas
y pdginas sobre Mexico, Universidad Veracruzana, Mexico, pp. 138-181.
Vargas Lozano, Gabriel, 1980, "Notas sobre la funcion actual de la filosofia en Mexico. La
decada de los setenta", in DiaLectica (Pucbla), V, 9, pp. 81-102.
Villegas, Abelardo, 1960, La Filosoffa de lo mexicano, FCE, Mexico.
52 ENRIQUE DUSSEL
Villegas, A., et alia, 1988, La Filosofia en Mexico Siglo XX, Universidad Aut6noma de
Tlaxcala, Tlaxcala.
Zea, Leopoldo, 1955, Lafilosofia en Mexico, Libro Mexicano, Mexico.
2.3 Brazil
Costa, Cruz, 1956, ContribUfM it historia das ideias no Brasil, Jose Olimpio, Rio (trad. esp.
en FCE, Mexico, 1957; trad. inglesa A History of Ideas in Brazil, University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1964).
G6mez Robledo, Antonio, 1946, Lafilosofia en Brasil, Imprenta Universitaria, Mexico.
Lima Vaz, Henrique Claudio, 1961, "0 Pensamento Filos6fico no Brasil de hoje", en revista
Portuguesa de Filosofia, pp. 267ss.
Paim, Antonio, 1984, Historia das Ideias filosoficas no Brasil, Editora Convivio, Sao Paulo.
2.4 Peru
Salazar Bondy, Augusto, 1954, La filosofia en el PerU. Panorama historico, Uni6n
Panamericana, Washington.
Salazar Bondy, A., 1967, Historia de las ideas en el PerU contemporaneo, Moncloa, Lima, I-
II.
Sobrevilla, David, 1989, Repensando la tradicion nacionol I, I-II (1989), Editorial Hipatia,
Lima.
Ramos, Samuel, 1934, EI perfil del hombre y la cultura de Mexico, Imprenta Mundial,
Mexico.
Romero, Francisco, 1944, Filosofia de la persona, Losada, Buenos Aires.
Romero, F., 1952, Teoria del hombre, Losada, Buenos Aires (Theory of Man, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1964).
Schwartzmann, Felix, 1950, EI sentimiento de 10 humano en America, Universidad de Chile,
Santiago.
Sobrevilla, David, 1988, "Phenomenology and existentialism in Latin America", in Gracia,
1988, pp. 85-113.
Wagner de Reyna, Alberto, 1939, La ontologfaJundamental de y Heidegger, Losada, Buenos
Aires, 1939.
Xirau, Joaquin, 1941, Lafilosofia de Husserl, Losada, Buenos Aires.
MINIMAL CHRONOLOGY
The abbreviations of some of the countries cited in this chronology are the
following: Germany: Ale, Argentina: Ar, Bolivia: Bo, Brazil: Br, Canada:
Can, Chile: Ch, Colombia: Col., Cuba: Cu, Ecuador: Ec, Spain: Esp, United
States: USA, Guatemala, Gut, Hispanic in the United States: HUS, Mexico:
PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 57
LATIN AMERICA
FERNANDO SALMERON
Institute for Philosophical Research
National Autonomous University of Mexico
In spite of the fact that the journal had a brief life and that it opened its
doors to authors of the most diverse philosophical trends, its general
orientation reflected an obvious willingness to distance itself from the
dominant tradition of Latin American universities during the 1940s, i.e., that
of Ortega and philosophy in German. It also published, in one of its ftrst
numbers, an article on the Vienna circle by Hans A. Lindemann. Lindemann,
at the time residing in Buenos Aires, had pursued his studies in Austria and
had a first hand view of the activities of the circle, and of its internal
controversies. These anecdotes call to mind the example of Schajowicz: on
his arrival to the University of Puerto Rico, Ludwig Schajowicz, coming
from a similar philosophical experience in Vienna, had to modify the nature
of his research in the face of the solidity of the dominant tradition, and
neither his teaching nor his written work reflected his initial interests.
In Buenos Aires, though, matters took a different course. Bunge, who
came from a scientiftc background and worked in theoretical physics, began
to concentrate exclusively on philosophical questions. In 1956, he was even
appointed to the chair of philosophy of science, and there established a broad
programme of activities, not limited to his own country, for almost a decade,
until the political situation led him to pursue his career abroad. In 1959,
Harvard University published his book Causality: The Place of the Causal
Principle in Modern Science in English, the first work written in Latin
America on this subject from a point of view that can be called analytical
(Bunge, 1959). The next year Antologfa Semantica was published in Spanish;
edited by Bunge himself, it included texts by Russell, Carnap, Hempel,
Tarski, Quine, Goodman and Max Black, amongst others (Bunge, 1960). It
was an opportunity for the editor to distinguish between the various currents
of philosophical analysis and to identify himself with a neopositivist and
neopragmatic source. At the same time, it reflected his lack of interest in the
analysis of ordinary language. In any case, it defended a position that was
open to all the traditional concerns of logic, the theory of knowledge and
ontology.
Frondizi's background was different, as was his influence also. He had
studied in the United States, first in Harvard (with Whitehead, C. I. Lewis,
and R. B. Perry) and then in Michigan (with Sellars). He always considered
himself an empiricist, the defender of a "humanist empiricism", and he was
in fact a severe critic of the more scienticist and technical tendencies in
analytical philosophy. But his work represents, in both subject matter and
style, a rejection of the dominant tradition, influenced by the literature in
German. Frondizi taught in Venezuela and Puerto Rico, and finally, during
his last political exile, in the United States, where he died in 1983. The years
he worked in Argentina (nearly a decade between 1956 and 1966) constitute
64 FERNANDO SALMERON
a period of recovery for the academic life of that country, and they coincide
with the arrival of analytical philosophers.
4. It is by no means an exaggeration to claim that in the years following
the appearance of Minerva, just before the decade mentioned above,
Argentinians interested in analytical philosophy had to work in circles and
associations outside the public universities. By way of examples of
institutions and personalities, one may cite the Argentinian Group of the
International Academy of the History and Philosophy of Science, to which
Julio Rey Pastro belonged; the Free Institute of Advanced Studies, in which
Gregorio Klimovsky worked,and the Philosophical Circle of Buenos Aires,
presided over by Bunge at that time. The only exception seems to have been
Carlos Cossio, a philosopher of law with a background in phenomenology,
also critical of analytical philosophy, who organised studies on modal logic
and the methodology of the deductive sciences in his seminar at the
University of Buenos Aires.
Ambrosio Gioja, one of Cossio's disciples, succeeded him in the chair in
1956. Although his published work was less important than that of his
mentor, he exercised greater influence of the younger students interested in
the philosophy of law. Gioja was also a phenomenologist, but his dedication
to the classics, especially to Kant, and his interest in contemporaries,
especially Kelsen and Wittgenstein, made the Institute of Philosophy of Law
and the journal Notas de Filosoffa del Derecho centres of great philosophical
activity. The journal survived for a short time (from 1964 to 1969) and Gioja
dies prematurely, but in those years the Institute was visited by various
foreign philosophers: Alf Ross, Strawson, von Wright, ChaYm Perelman, and
Ulrich Klug, apart from the Latin Americans Eduardo Garda Maynez and
Hector Neri Castaneda. The group of young men associated with the Institute
became the so-called "first generation" of Argentinian philosophers of law,
all of them with an analytical bent. They were Carlos Alchourron, Eugenio
Bulygin, Jorge A. Bacque, Genario Carrio, Ernesto Garzon Valdes, Eduardo
Rabossi, Roberto Bernengo, Marfa Isabel Azaretto and Jose Manuel
Vilanova. Subsequently, the "second generation", no less numerous, counted
amongst its members Carlos Nino, Martfn Farrel, Antonio Martino, Ricardo
Caracciolo and Ricardo Guibourg. All of them, from both generations, did
remarkable work, recognised beyond the borders of their own country. Their
joint reputation, on the other hand, does not imply a complete unity of theme
and procedure: some of them preferred the techniques of ordinary language
analysis, such as Carrio from his very first book (Carrio, 1965). Up until
recently, Carrio, also the translator of Alf Ross and of Hart, has been a
regular contributor to specialised journals, in open debate with Dworkin from
the end of the sixties (Carrio, 1970). Some others chose logical-formal
THE RECEPTION OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 65
Hector Neri Castaneda taught philosophy after 1954 at the University of San
Carlos, in Guatemala, from the time he returned from his studies in the
United States and England until his transfer to Wayne State University, and
later on to Indiana, where he has conducted all his philosophical work.
Rigoberto Juarez-Paz, an old colleague of Castaneda and disciple of W.
Sellars, remained in Guatemala City, associated with the Francisco
Marroquin University, where he has published some of his works (Juarez-
Paz, 1977).
Castaneda had several publications in Guatemala: from his essay on the
nature of philosophical problems and his studies on the philosophy of
arithmetic, to his small book La DiaLectica de La Conciencia de Sf Mismo,
edited by the University of San Carlos in 1960, when he was already a
professor at Wayne State (Castaneda, 1960). This small book on
consciousness of the self presents a coherent proposal, not incompatible with
the facts, of how to view the relations between universes of mental concepts
in ordinary language. It contains much of the subject matter and style of
argumentation of Castaneda's later work and, of course, all the relevant
bibliographical references in English. For this reason our attention is drawn
to the fact that the initial statement of the problem makes use of works and
authors which were common reading in Brazil and in other Latin American
countries: Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre. As late as 1957, Castaneda
published "A general system of normative logic" in a Mexican journal,
giving as his affiliation the University of San Carlos. It is a long essay in
which he emphasizes the distance between his own position and that of
Scheler and Hartmann, and other Latin American philosophers in the Kantian
tradition, with the sole exception of Garda Maynez, who, despite
recognizing an ontology of what ought to be, is interested also in
systematizing normative logic (Castaneda, 1957).
12. Mention has already been made of some aspects of the antecedents of
analysis in Mexico. At this point, it is useful to take up the issue again by
referring to another paper by Gaos, presented at a conference at EI Colegio
de Mexico on 15 th October 1965 and published two years later in a collection
of essays edited by the author himself (Gaos, 1967). By 1965 the
philosophical panorama had changed in Mexico (as well as in the rest of
Latin America), and Gaos stated publicly (and for the first time in a direct
manner) what he considered the essential contents of private discussions with
his own disciples. His style is certainly forthright and not devoid of irony. He
starts by anticipating in a different context the observation that "the rebellion
of the disciples" has always been a motor in the history of philosophy. But
what is important is not only his lack of appreciation for what he calls
philosophies of logical empiricism, logical positivism and scientific and
THE RECEPTION OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 75
analytical philosophy; but also the recognition of their notorious rise, his own
explanation of this fact, and the central point towards which he directs his
main argument.
Gaos thinks that the rise of these philosophies is due, most decisively, and
inexplicably, to the vacuum existing in German philosophy and in its French
and Italian dependencies. After Heidegger, Jaspers and Marcel, at that time
already sterile (only Sartre seems to him still to be productive), Gaos has the
impression that there is no follower of their stature. And the gap has been
closed by philosophies that seek support in the scientificism of modem
thought. According to him, this same concern for science is related in these
booming philosophies to the conviction that it is enough for philosophy to
stop being systematic and become mere conceptual analysis in order for it to
become scientific. The error lies not so much in the conviction itself as in the
supposition that philosophy can stop being systematic. For mere analysis,
Gaos insists, discovers immediately that concepts truly important to
philosophy are themselves systematic; in the sense that they necessarily
imply systematicity and lead to it. To pretend that philosophy is not
systematic is, therefore, a nonsense - no less serious than assuming a
scientific philosophy, or a purely objective one. The system itself (precisely
because it is a system) has to be subjective, in the sense that it cannot be
authentically accepted as true by anyone except the author himself.
Without being paradoxical, Gaos' defense of a feature of classical and
traditional philosophy (which identifies philosophy, system and conception
of the world) could not be but disappointing, and it represented for his
disciples a cuI de sac. Gaos had always recognized a substantial number of
elements within personal systems that were beneficial to all (and therefore
separable from the whole and bearing intersubjective value). These were
precisely the phenomenological aspects: descriptions and analyses of
concepts and of the other phenomena of the world. We are not in a position
to comment on the entire scope of Gaos' written work and teaching in this
essay, but it seems indispensable to acknowledge at least two points related
to his interest in logic and his idea of philosophical method.
At the beginning of the fifties, even when Garda Maynez had started to
deal with problems of logic and its application to the structure of the legal
norm, this discipline was taught (at least at the level of higher education)
using Pfander's book, except when it dealt with scholastic or so-called
dialectical logic. The first book published in Mexico that contributed to
changing this tradition was that of Ferrater Mora and Leblanc; and according
to the authors, the manuscript was seen by Gaos (Ferrater and Leblanc,
1962). Gaos had striven for that change, attempting to introduce manuals of
modern logic in the Faculty of Philosophy at the National University. He
76 FERNANDO SALMERON
Berlin with Nicolai Hartmann. He never abandoned his initial leanings, but
for slightly more than twenty years (from 1939), he worked on the formal
ontology of law and the logic of norms. Even though his starting point was
the valorative axiomatic of Scheler and Brentano, Garda Maynez did not try
to establish principles of axiological order, but rather logical laws on the
validity or invalidity of legal norms. His first book on legal logic follows
Husserl and Pfander; but his later work on the subject (the last book was
published in 1964), betrays a command of modem logic that goes far beyond
his early studies focusing on formal ontology, and the prestige of this work
was a decisive factor for younger generations. Garda Maynez' writings were
reviewed by Gaos and Castaneda in Mexico and, abroad, by Bobbio and
Kalinowsky. He himself had discussed the modal logic of von Wright in
1953 and, afterwards, that of Klug and Kalinowsky (Garda Maynez, 1953,
1964).
Later Garda Maynez returned to systematic issues in the philosophy of
law, to the history of Greek philosophy and to the metaphysical convictions
of his youth, but he always remained an example of discipline in the
fulfilment of a philosophical programme which contributed in its time to the
identification of a new branch of study. At the National University he
founded a research centre, which later became the Institute of Philosophical
Research, and in 1955 he started up the publication Dianoia. More
information on this author (as well as on others to be mentioned below), can
be found in the introduction to Philosophie und Rechtstheorie in Mexico
(edited by L. Olive and F. Salmeron, 1989).
In order to cover the elements that we want to stress in this outline of
philosophy in Mexico towards the second half of the fifties, we should
mention Robert S. Hartman, a researcher of the Institute of Philosophical
Research who was also the Institute's editorial advisor in those years.
Hartman, of German origin, had started his education in his own country,
where he had the opportunity to hear Husserl and Max Scheler. Later he
moved to the United States where he studied logic and philosophy of science.
Thus he was able to develop a programme of research which maintained a
certain parallelism with that initially undertaken by Garda Maynez, but this
time in the field of axiology. Hartman decided to construct a formal-logical
system of axiological statements, which he never fully developed, but which
constituted an attempt to axiomatise G. E. Moore's formulae (Hartman,
1964a). He was by no account an analytical philosopher; indeed, in 1964 he
wrote a long essay against ethical theories, which he identified as the
"Oxford School". He was, though, very well-read, and part of his work is a
polemical dialogue with contemporary philosophy in the English language
(Hartman, 1959, 1964b).
78 FERNANDO SALMERON
14. This should suffice for antecedents. For, in fact, if we put aside the
isolated case mentioned above of Molina Flores, we cannot talk of analytical
philosophy in Mexico until 1959, a year in which, on occasion of Husserl's
centenary, the Seminar of Modem Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy of
the National University held a public session on the Husserlian text
Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft. That same year, Adolfo Garda Dfaz'
translation into Spanish of Moore's Principia Ethica appeared. Discussion of
the connection between these two events is, however, beyond the scope of
this study.
The seminar on modem philosophy was coordinated by Jose Gaos and was
exclusively for professors of the Faculty. Two years later, the Faculty itself
published the papers presented at the public session, with some notes on
Husserl that were written after the session by Gaos (Facultad de Filosoffa y
Letras, 1963). These notes and the texts by Rossi, Emilio Uranga and
Villoro, all of them members of the seminar, are worthy of comment.
Rossi's text characterises Husserl's essay as a philosophical manifesto: a
confrontation with philosophies that view themselves as conceptions of the
world, and a defence of the ideal of a discipline as strict science. It is more an
exposition of the motives for this philosophical attitude than the balanced
description of a real historical situation. Whereas a conception of the world
obeys the specific and immediate demands of total explanation and of
personal salvation, scientific philosophy requires a different theoretical base,
and a way of conceiving its own task as a long-term enterprise. An
enterprise, furthermore, linked to the possibility of an ideal realm of
concepts, susceptible to analysis made with all the rigour required by
scientific canons. Thus, Rossi defends the contemporary relevance of Husserl
and ends up producing a personal philosophical manifesto in which he
announces a dilemma which is not subordinated to immediate spiritual
demands. The names of Moore, Reichenbach, Wittgenstein and Feigl are
conspicuous. Uranga's contribution to the seminar recalls also Husserl's
claim to have distinguished science from wisdom, even though he implies a
belief in the practical possibility of eclecticism. But his intention seems to be
directed above all to declare his rejection of phenomenology as method, a
rejection which, in fact, is no less than that of any form of historicism in the
history of ideas. This line was one he would take up in his later years of
rapprochement with the philosophy of Russell and Wittgenstein. Luis
Villoro, also concerned with Husserl's distinction, seeks another alternative
between wisdom and impersonal knowledge in science: a wisdom that gives
science meaning, as opposed to a science that guarantees the validity of all
wisdom.
THE RECEPTION OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 79
Gaos' notes do not constitute a direct response to Rossi, and they hardly
mention Villoro, another member of the seminar. They do constitute an
indirect response, insofar as they present an apposite reading of Husserl's
text, introducing subtle distinctions to make the point and ultimately
establishing ranks of scientificity for each one of the philosophical
disciplines. He rejects the idea of the possible scientificity of classical
metaphysics, which he considers the ultimate nucleus of philosophy, and
presents it literally as a monster of contradictions. He concludes nevertheless
by accepting the methods of current scientific philosophy, since it seems to
proceed from the analysis of scientific theorems, and of philosophemes
themselves. This is, beyond discussion, the best method. He immediately
warns, however, that this method leads not to classical metaphysical
philosophy, but rather to its condemnation.
I have dwelt on these texts, not so much to demonstrate what might be
called the Mexican line of continuity between phenomenology and analysis
(i.e. reception and conflict), but rather to strengthen the conjecture made at
the outset of this essay, which, in general terms, should be valid for most
Latin American countries.
For further proof, I could relate the circumstances that conspired towards
the foundation of Critica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofta, and in the
adjustment of its goals. But I dealt with this in my report on twelve years of
the Institute of Philosophical Research (Salmeron, 1978), which excuses me
from repetition of this information here. It would also be useful to review the
contents of Dianoia, in order to follow the gradual steps of the transition
from phenomenology to analysis. This is particularly so, given that since the
presentation of the first issue of Critica, in January 1967, it no longer keeps
track of this process, even though it declares a preference for explanations
"appealing to description and analysis". On the contrary, it tries to give
weight to features which are characteristic of a philosophy that conceives of
itself as conceptual analysis and as critique; that attempts to achieve more
precision and clarity in its arguments; to fall into step with contemporary
science and to concern itself more with methodology. It attempts all this
without pretending to represent any particular school or thought.
15. The written works of all three members of Critica's first board of
directors, starting in the sixties, fully confirms this continuity. The first of
five essays collected by Rossi in Lenguaje y Significado (Rossi, 1969) deals
with Husserl's logical research. Another deals with Wittgenstein's discussion
of the possibility of private language and the last three with questions relating
to defined descriptions, in one of which Russell's theory and Strawson's
approach are addressed.
80 FERNANDO SALMERON
Villoro's major work of the sixties is, without doubt, his book on
Descartes. But reading his two essay collections can be considered the next
item on the itinerary: Paginas Filos6ficas (Villoro, 1962) includes, amongst
other topics, his ideas on Dilthey, Marcel and Husserl; but it concludes with
an essay entitled ''The logical positivist critique of metaphysics". His book
Estudios sobre Husser! (Villoro, 1975) ends with a review entitled
"Phenomenology and analytical philosophy". In Villoro's essays there is an
attempt to integrate apparently contradictory elements, which Gaos had
already reproached in 1959, and which seems to maintain alive some aspects
of his original training. His most relevant book, Creer, Saber, Conocer
(Villoro, 1982), tries to solve this dilemma. It consolidates the labour of
many years of teaching, constituting a model of analytical research which,
without confining its sources to a single philosophical tradition, pursues a
network of fundamental concepts, and reveals their systematic connectivity.
The whole analysis revolves around various kinds of knowledge and their
relationships with practical reason.
The third member of that first editorial committee of Critica, the author of
the present essay, arrived at analytical philosophy shortly after the first two,
but by the same route. My articles on Husserl, Nicolai Hartmann and
Heidegger appeared in Dianoia in the 1960s. The essay on Heidegger
marked the beginning of my concern with the philosophy of language
(Salmeron, 1968). In 1967 appeared the first of the texts included later in the
collection La Filosofia y las Actitudes Morales (Salmeron, 1971). The book
brings together the approaches of Brentano and Husserl, taking them in the
direction of analytical philosophy. It reaffirms the moral function of
conceptions of the world, maintaining its independence from the
philosophical task of conceptual analysis. This led to a discussion with
Salazar Bondy, which was published by the University of Kansas (Salazar
Bondy, 1969) and which endures, even if less visibly, in other papers in
Ensayos Filos6ficos (Salmeron, 1988) and Ensefianza y Filosoffa (Salmeron,
1991). In 1985, Rabossi and I published a volume of Etica y Analisis, a
collection of studies on language and moral justification, including texts from
Moore, Strawson, Stevenson, Hare, Searle, Foot, Baier and Gilbert Harman,
amongst others (Rabossi and Salmeron, 1985).
It could be said that the generation immediately following the first editors
of Critica followed a similar pattern of training and intellectual development.
Roberto Caso Bercho, Hugo Padilla and Wonfilio Trejo all attended courses
by Gaos and Robert S. Hartman, and also by Villoro and Rossi. Roberto
Caso's first publications were on value theory, but later he concentrated on
logic, mainly at the Metropolitan Autonomous University following a stay at
Berkeley with Tarski's group. Roberto Caso created a Master's degree
THE RECEPTION OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 81
Austin, Texas for several years. In spite of his links at one time with the
University of Buenos Aires, Angelelli does not belong to any of the groups
or generations specified here. We have mentioned neither Jorge Gracia nor
Ernesto Sosa, both Cubans, but whose education and professional activity
have always been based in Canada and the United States. Finally, we have
also excluded Mark Platts, who became associated with the Institute for
Philosophical Research shortly after the period we are considering, despite
the fact that many essays and his last book (1991) have been written here.
It must be acknowledged that, without these people, the overview of
philosophical analysis in Latin America traced so far would be incomplete.
Without exception, all have maintained a permanent relationship with Latin
American philosophical activity - and not only with their native countries.
Their presence in periodical publications, their participation at academic
meetings, and their own philosophical influence, are essential elements in the
normal activities of our countries. Indeed, a way of doing philosophy that, in
principle, is understood as a collective task, leaves little room for local and
personal idiosyncrasies, and thus facilitates communication and international
life.
In this context, a characteristic of analysis in Latin America (if one were to
compare it with other philosophical currents) has been the major links that
Latin American philosophers have established between themselves and their
more active participation in international philosophical life. It is true that the
times we live in have helped, not so much due to the ease of mass
communication as to the presence of economic and political crises.
But it may well be that we should not deal with philosophical analysis in
Latin America as one school or philosophical current amongst others,
notwithstanding the fact that at one point it had drawn its own boundaries
with determination and had designated certain subjects and traditions as of
privileged status. In the forties and fifties, and even into the first years of the
following decade, the initial contacts with empiricism and modern logic
favoured this disposition. We have seen, nonetheless, that there was never an
attempt to resurrect or return to a forgotten tradition, even when in the 19th
century we had an empiricist philosopher such as Andres Bello. Rather, what
was involved was a claim at the level of exigencies of methodology and
style; it was a reaction against extreme historicist positions, and a way of
dramatising metaphysical problems, without returning, of course, to
dogmatism. It was an effort to express propositions in concrete terms, to
refine the description of concepts and to abide by the rules of fair play in
argumentation. That is, to pay attention to the weight each argument has in
itself and with regard to the proposition - and not to the weight it may derive
from its place in a chain of systematic connections.
84 FERNANDOSALMER6N
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Garda Bacca, J. D., 1941, Filosofia de las ciencias. Teorfa de la relatividad, Arbol, Editorial
Seneca, Mexico.
Garda Bacca, J. D., 1942, Invitacifon afilosofar II. El conocimiento cienti.fico. Parte primera.
Los tres nwdelos heLenicos de Ciencia, EI Colegio de Mexico, Mexico.
Garda Bacca, J. D., 1961, Vol. Primero y 1968, Vol. Segundo, Textos dasicos para fa historia
de las ciencias, Instituto de Filosoffa, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas.
Garda Baeca, .I. D., 1963, Historia.filos6flca de la ciencia, Problemas cientfficos y filos6ficas,
UNAM, Mexico.
Garda Bacca, J. D., 1967, Elementos de .filoso.f[a de las ciencias, Direcci6n de Cultura,
Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas.
Garda Maynez, E., 1953, "La 16gica de6ntica de G. H. von Wright y la onto1ogia fonnal del
derecho", Revisla de la Facultad de derecho de Mexico, Torno III, No.9, enero-marzo,
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Filos6ficas, UNAM-Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, Mexico.
86 FERNANDO SALMERON
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Isegorfa 3, Madrid, pp. 119-137. Reproducida en Salmer6n, F., 1992, "Nota sobra la
recepci6n del anaIisis ftlos6fico en America Latina": America Latina, historia y destino.
Homenaje a Leopoldo Zea, Vol. II, pp. 305-322.
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Universidad de los Andes, Vol. 4, Numeros 1-2, enero-junio, de Cuadernos de Filosofia y
Letras, Bogota.
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Colombia, Centro editorial, Bogota.
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Simpson, T. M., (compilador), 1973, Serrui.ntica filos6fica: problemas y discusiones, Siglo
XXI, Argentina Editores, Buenos Aires.
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Eudeba, Buenos Aires.
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Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile.
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Didlogos, Revista de Filosoffa, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Ano V, No. 10, enero-marzo,
pp.35-59.
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Madrid.
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LA PIDLOSOPIDE CONTEMPORAINE EN AMERIQUE
LATINE
Introduction
Ce travail analyse trois problemes fondamentaux abordes par la philosophie
contemporaine en Amerique latine: celui qui concerne la methode d'etude,
celui de l'arcMtype de la totalite et finalement celui de I' integration.
Au cours du developpement du premier des problemes mentionnes ci-
dessus, on analysera trois tendances soutenues par les penseurs latino-
americains : celle qui nie toute originalite a la philosophie con<;;ue dans cette
partie du monde, celle qui affirme l'existence d'une originalite totale et enfin
celle qui defend l'idee d'une originalite relative. On exposera brievement la
methode utilisee pour l' etude de la philosophie latino-americaine, methode
qui a ete forrnulee dans Ie contexte de la troisieme tendance.
Au cours du developpement du deuxieme probleme, on abordera les deux
voies ou s'engagent les penseurs latino-americains: celIe qui envisage la
culture ibero-americaine com me totalite archetypique dans un contexte
herrneneutique ; et celle qui etale une attitude critique par rapport a cette
approche totalisante.
Quant au developpement du troisieme probleme, on exposera quatre
conceptions de I' integration, elaborees par des penseurs latino-americains.
1) Questions methodologiques
Le probleme de I'originalite constitue la premiere controverse, lorsqu'il
s'agit de la philosophie en Amerique latine. La meditation philosophique
latino-americaine, represente-t-elle quelque chose de nouveau dans Ie
domaine plus vaste de la philosophie occidentale? En face de cette question,
deux reponses radicales emergent: il n'y aucune originalite, ou alors, il est
possible d'avoir une totale originalite. Exemple de la premiere alternative,
c' est l' opinion du philosophe du droit bresilien C. Bevilacqua, pour qui "la
speculation philosophique suppose une base de meditation etendue et
profonde dans les divers domaines du savoir humain, surgissant comme une
f1eur mysterieuse C... ) de cette vegetation mentale, de la meme fa<;;on que la
celIe qui "attend des nSvelations extraordinaires, des nouvelles inou"ies, des
creations ex nihilo". Romero [1986: 69] rejette donc l'une et l'autre. "La
premiere suppose Ie decret de la radicale sterilite du present et de I'avenir,
leur nier, sans raisons valables, la capacite innovatrice qui fremit dans toutes
les epoques, et se refugier dans une tranquille contemplation de Ia richesse
ramassee par les ancetres". C'est l'attitude commode de l'Mritier, qui a
l'extreme arrive au stupide gaspillage des biens. Quant a l'attente de Ia
demande de revelations colossales, residu de I' attitude mythique, elle revele
l'ignorance, car l'histoire de la philo sophie temoigne, a chacun de ses
instants, la continuite et l' articulation de la pen see philosophique, qui meme
dans ses grandes tendances et caracteristiques, fait appel aux acquis et s'y
appuie pour Ies perfectionner ou alars pour Ies contredire.
Romero souligne, ensuite, Ie pMnomene de Ia "normalite philosophique",
qui constitue Ie climat de la philo sophie en Amerique latine actuellement et
qui est ainsi definie: "I'exercice de Ia philosophie en tant que fonction
ordinaire de la culture, a cote d'autres soucis de I'intelligence" [Romero,
1986 : 68]. Ce climat ouvre Ia porte au murissement de Ia conscience de soi
et a la formulation, dans un proche avenir, d'une authentique philosophie
latino-americaine. A ce propos ecrit Romero [1986: 71] : "Ce qui existe est
beaucoup plus modeste, mais c'est aussi solide et permet tout espoir, puisque
c'est une presupposition indispensable pour que surgisse et se developpe a un
moment une philosophie originale. La veine philosophique affleure de tous
les cotes; ce serait betise ou malveillance d'exiger que les eaux surgissent,
au depart, abondantes et cristallines, tandis que dans des pays de civilisation
beaucoup plus mures, il n'y a eu que des filets precaires. La philosophie
naissante doit frequenter encore beaucoup I'ecole, et doit etre stimulee a
pro longer sa scolarite, car toutes les precocites, et surtout celles de
l'intelligence, sont dangereuses, et dans les cas moins graves, aboutissent a
de deplorables pertes de temps. L'essentiel, en definitif, c'est cela: que dans
notre spiritualite, la vocation philosophique a reussi a acquerir Ia conscience
de soi et cherche son expression".
Le philosophe venezuelien E. Mayz Vallenilla [1959 et 1986] pense qu'il
est possible d'avoir une philosophie latino-americaine, dans Ia mesure OU,
suivant Ia methode heideggerienne de l'hermeneutique existentielle (de nette
inspiration phenomenologique), les hommes de cette partie du monde
decouvrent leur origine, c'est-a-dire, leur apprehension primordiale de I'etre.
L'originalite, en philosophie, presuppose, en principe, deux choses: d'un
cote, Ia connaissance approfondie du patrimoine philosophique de
)'humanite, et d'un autre cote, l'explication de mode particulier ou, au cours
de I'histoire, I'homme latino-americain a vecu son experience d'etre, qui,
etant Iimitee, est caracterisee par quelques aspects singuliers. Ces
LA PHILOSOPHIE CONTEMPORAINE 93
2) Le probleme de la totalite
C'est un des themes, qui, tout au long du XXe siecle a exerce la plus grande
attraction parmi les penseurs latino-americains, soit en ce qui conceme
l'abordage hermeneutique, soit en ce qui conceme une analyse critique. Le
premier type d' analyse sera illustre a partir de la pensee de deux auteurs: Ie
mexicain O. paz et Ie bresilien V. F. da Silva. Le deuxieme type sera analyse
dans l' reuvre des bresiliens R. M. Barros et M. Penna.
L'approche hermeneutique remonte a un archetype qui transmet l'idee
d'unite primordiale. Le monde ibero-americain est apprehende, dans cette
perspective, comme realite proto-historique qui attribue du sens au present
[cf. Velez Rodriguez, 1993a].
Une version actuelle de cette conception se trouve dans l'reuvre essayiste
de O. Paz [1983, 1986, 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1992a et 1992b]. Pour avancer
sur Ie chemin qui conduit a l'identite ibero-americaine, Ie poete-philosophe
mexicain suit, dans son essai "Nueva Espana: orfandad y legitimidad" [in
Paz, 1983: 38 suiv.], les pas de l'ethnologue franc;ais J. Lafaye [1974], qui
approfondit l'analyse des croyances sur lesquelles se dresse la structure de la
culture mexicaine. Paz s'inspire aussi d'Ortega y Gasset, pour lequel "la
substance de l'histoire, son noyau, ce ne sont pas les idees, mais ce qu'il y a
au-dessous : les croyances. Un homme se definit plutat par ce en quoi il croit
qu'en ce qu'il pense" [in Paz, 1983: 39].
Les mythes qui inspirent le peuple mexicain proviennent de deux
syncretismes : Ie catholicisme peninsulaire et la religion amerindienne. "Le
premier, souligne Paz [1983 : 39], marque par sa coexistence de plusieurs
siecles avec l'IsHi, religion de croisade et de fin de siecle; Ie second aussi
religion militante de peuple elu". On pourrait affirmer quelque chose
d' analogue dans les autres cultures ibero-americaines. Ce sont ces mythes,
selon Paz, qui ont permis aux Mexicains de rencontrer leur identite, tout au
long des siecles d' exploitation et de frustrations. "Les deux mythes - ecrit
I' essayiste mexicain [Paz, 1983 : 40] - surtout celui de Guadalupe, se sont
convertis en symboles et bannieres de la guerre d'Independance et arrivent
jusqu'a nos jours, non comme des images collectives. Le peuple mexicain,
apres plus de deux siecles d' experiences et de detresses, ne croit plus qu' en la
Vierge de Guadalupe et qu'a la Loterie nationale".
Ces mythes trouvent leur expression originelle au XVIIlc siecle, dans Ie
double processus d'identification de QuetzaIc6atl a l' Apatre Saint Thomas et
de Tonantzin ala Vierge de Guadalupe. C' est celle la, dit Paz [1983 : 48], "Ia
creation la plus complexe et singuliere de la Nouvelle Espagne". Le mythe
98 RICARDO VELEZ RODRIGUEZ
3) Le probleme de l'integration
L'idee de l'integration constitue un leitmotiv de la pensee philosophique
latino-americaine. Quoique I' origine de la thematique se situe dans la periode
coloniale, a partir de l'recumenisme de la deuxieme scolastique iberique [cf.
Morse, 1982], on fera remarquer ici seulement la fac;on dont cette idee a ete
traitee par les penseurs latino-americains tout au long de ce siecle.
TI faut, d'abord, mentionner la repercussion qu'a eue, en Amerique latine,
la conception des hispanistes. Ceux-Ia, c'etaient des penseurs espagnols du
debut du siecle: ils defendaient l'idee que l'Espagne, par rapport a
l' Amerique latine, devrait avoir l'attitude d'une mere qui veille a la
preservation des ideaux iberiques, dont fait partie une conception organique
de la societe; cette conception s'oppose au "laissez-faire" du liberalisme
classique et retablit les principes d'une "selectocratie", contre l'idee d'une
democratie de masses. Les hispanistes affirment, d'autre part, que la societe
materialiste frustre les valeurs spirituelles de la personne. La democratie
capitaliste etait, pour eux, etroitement attachee au marerialisme.
En outre, les hispanistes reconnaissaient qu'il etait necessaire de donner
quelque participation aux masses dans la gestion des affaires publiques, afin
de compenser les desirs revolutionnaires, mais seulement en ce qui concerne
des interets plus immediats, garantissant l'independance et la capacite de
decision des elites dans les affaires plus importantes. D'autre part, les
hispanistes croyaient que 1'Espagne devrait surveiller pour eviter la
penetration, dans Ie monde ibero-americain, de cultures etrangeres a l'esprit
iberique, notamment les cultures anglo-saxonne et franc;aise. TIs croyaient a
I'exemple, dans la mesure oil ils reconnaissaient I'importance de I'education
pour la citoyennete, comme moyen de combattre les vices de l' absolutisme
politique et du dogmatisme. On pourrait dire, en un mot, qu'ils etaient
liberaux moderes, animes par I'idee de reconstruire, dans Ie terrain culturel,
1'univers iberique.
Les hispanistes se sont inspires du "rationalisme harmonique" du
philosophe allemand K. C. F. Krause [178111832]. Le plus important
representant de cette ecole dans ce siecle est Ie penseur espagnol F. Giner de
Los Rios. D'autres hispanistes importants sont M. Rodriguez Navas, F.
Rahola, A. Gonzalez Posada, R. M. de Labra, L. Alas et R. Altamira. Parmi
les auteurs latino-americains, c'est l'uruguayien J. E. Rodo, celui qui d'une
fac;on plus directe s'est inspire des idees des hispanistes. Rodo montre la
necessite de fortifier les liens entre l'Espagne et l' Amerique espagnole, afin
que, moyennant un effort conjoint des peuples ibero-americains, on eloigne
LA PHILOSOPHIE CONTEMPORAINE 105
toutes les sciences et les techniques doivent lui etre soumises, pour qu'il
puisse s' accomplir pleinement sur les plans individuel et social, tout en
preservant sa liberte et sa dignite. Le progres humain, selon LOpez de Mesa,
doit se fonder sur quatre principes: la vigueur de la race, la vigueur de
l' economie, la vigueur de l' education et la vigueur de la volonte creatrice.
, Fonde sur ces quatre principes, l' etre humain est I' artisan de sa propre vie et
createur de cultures.
En ce qui concerne la realite latino-americaine - que LOpez de Mesa
prefere appeler ibero-americaine - Ie penseur colombien considere que la
civilisation europeenne est decadente (suivant, sur ce point, I'idee de
Spengler) et qu'il s'agit maintenant d'epanouir Ie monde ibero-americain, La
force provient de I'universalite de ses origines. A propos de cela, L6pez de
Mesa ecrit dans son livre La civilizaci6n contemporanea [1936: 51]:
"L'histoire ne repete pas ses faits, cela n'est qu'une illusion de penseurs
imaginatifs. L' Amerique sera fondamentalement I' Amerique. Etendu d'un
pole it l'autre entre les oceans majeurs, etant orient d'une civilisation et
ponant de l'autre, l'Amerique pense et pensera en fonction de l'universalite.
Nos races sont venues des quatre points cardinaux et notre pensee se nourrit
de la tente asiatique, de la jungle africaine, de l'urbs europeenne, mais Ie
sous-sol est toujours Ie granit des Andes".
Pourtant, Ie role que l'histoire a reserve pour l'Ibero-Amerique, dans Ie
sens d'etre la civilisation de l'avenir, n'est pas un absolu determinisme. Les
Latino-americains doivent construire leur propre destin, qui est varie, mais
uni en une grande fraternite. Dans cet effort commun, doivent etre exploites
leurs propres richesses et, en meme temps, assimilee la technique
occidentale. A ce sujet, ecrit L6pez de Mesa [1936: 57]: "La mission
culturelle ibero-americaine ne sera peut-etre pas parfaitement pareille pour
tous les pays ou elle se developpe. Des influences sociales, ethniques et
geographiques nous obligeront it une prudente distribution de cet effort
commun ; il y aura, pourtant, Ie sceau de la fraternite du debut et de la finalite
meme qu'on poursuit. Elle sera devant I'histoire, qualifiee de fac;on univoque
de culture ibero-americaine, et fleurira quand on aura parcouru les etapes de
preparation necessaires: developpement de notre richesse, fusion de nos
races et assimilation de la technique occidentale".
Dans cet effort de construction de la realite latino-americaine, L6pez de
Mesa - qui a ete, dans son pays, Ministre de I'Education - attribue une
enorme importance it l'education pour la formation du citoyen. II part
d'abord de I'affirmation que Ie concept de "peuple" est plus proche de
Volksgeist, et non celui d'une realite seulement physique. Le peuple, affirme
Ie penseur colombien, "n' est pas une masse ignorante et sale des basses
couches, ce n'est pas non plus l'elegante societe de clubs; c'est l'esprit
LA PHILOSOPHIE CONTEMPORAINE 107
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LA PHILOSOPHIE CONTEMPORAINE 113
La version de ce travail a ete executee par Maria Lucia Viana. L' Auteur
consigne ici ses remerciements. Juiz de Fora, (Minas Gerais - Bresil).
Decembre 1994.
LA PHILOSOPHIE ARGENTINE AU XXE SlEeLE
SARA A. JAFELLA
Professeur titulaire ordinaire de la "Filosoffa de la Educaci6n" et
de la "Teorfa de la Educaci6n", Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentine.
I. Introduction
Tous les peuples, a partir de leurs contextes historico-culturels, ont montre
des preoccupations et des inquietudes philosophiques. La systematisation de
tels sujets permit l'incorporation du savoir philosophique comme une
discipline methodique, structuree et d'une signification speciale dans les
autres creations de I'homme : la science, l' art, la religion, la technologie, etc.
L' Amerique latine ne fut pas exc1ue de ce procede de formalisation et de
systematisation pbilosopbiques. A partir de l' entree des pays latino-
americains dans leur vie independante (la plupart d' entre eux au
commencement du 1ge siecle), les etudes philosophiques s'incorporerent
progressivement au probleme de la formation culturelle dans differents
espaces intellectuels de ces pays.
L' Argentine est un pays qui a maintenu et continue a maintenir une
communication fluide et des relations reciproques avec la culture
europeenne. Des Ie debut du 20e siecle, avec l'etablissement du projet de
modernisation du pays, les influences de quelques nations europeennes
reussirent a obtenir une plus forte expression dans Ie domaine de la pensee
philosophique.
Dans la configuration socio-politique et culturelle du pays, a partir de la
colonisationjusqu'au 1ge siec1e, les influences les plus decisives furent celles
qui provenaient de I'Espagne : ses apports culturels et son influence ethnique
constituent encore la base de la configuration nationale. Dans cette meme
periode, un autre pays qui influen~a intellectuellement l' Argentine fut la
France, surtout sur les sujets philosophico-politiques, et sur l' esprit de liberte
des idees. D'une fa~on speciale, l'influence des ideologues de la Revolution
Fran~aise ou des philosophes des Lumieres (Voltaire, Montesquieu,
Rousseau et les Encyc1opedistes) contribuerent avec leurs ecrits a consolider
les idees de liberte et d'independance politique dans les pays du Rio de la
Plata. En plus, comme nous le remarquerons, I'influence des courants
migratoires europeens fut importante, a partir de la deuxieme moitie du 1ge
siecle et pendant les premieres annees du 20e siec1e. Parmi celles-ci, une des
plus significatives fut I'immigration italienne.
Afin d'etablir un schema orientateur des principales peri odes du
mouvement des idees philosophiques en Argentine, nous allons decrire la
presentation proposee par Ie philosophe argentin connu Coriolano Alberini
dans son livre Problemas de la historia de las ideas filos6ficas en la
Argentina (La Plata, Departamento de Filosoffa, Facultad de Humanidades y
LA PHILOSOPHIE ARGENTINE AU XXE SrECLE 117
A la fin du 1ge siecle et pendant les premieres decennies du 20c siecle, les
courants migratoires s'intensifierent, comme consequence des projets
politiques qui favorisaient la formation d'un pays avec une population
europeenne. La phrase "gouvemer, c'est peupler" de Juan Bautista Alberdi
(1810-1884) - auteur de Bases y puntos de partida para la organizaci6n
nacional de la Republica Argentina (1852) - se transforma en "gouvemer,
c' est enseigner" chez Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811-1888), Ie principal
ideologue de la politique de l'enseignement, qui est utilisee dans Ie pays a
partir de cette cpoque et pendant les premieres decennies du 20e siecle.
La promulgation de la Loi 1420 de l'annee 1884 etablit que tous les
habitants du pays auront le droit de finir I'ecole primaire, laquelle sera
gratuite, la'ique et obligatoire. A cette epoque-Ia, la loi d'enseignement
universitaire, plus connue comme Loi Avellaneda, organisa et structura, d'un
point de vue institutionnel, l'enseignement superieur universitaire pris en
charge par l'Etat.
Ces importantes mesures du gourvemement contribuerent a consolider le
sentiment d'unite nationale dans un pays OU, comme consequence des
immigrations, i1 y avait en 1864 une population formee par 15% d'etrangers,
tandis qu'en 1914 Ie pourcentage d'etrangers atteignit 30%, dont 50%
habitaient a Buenos Aires.
Les flux migratoires procederent de differents pays: des Franc;ais (emigres
pour des raisons politiques dans les annees 1830 et 1851), des Nordiques et
des Anglais ; des Italiens et des Espagnols aussi ; plus tard, des Polonais et
d'autres petits groupes de Slaves; des Arabes (Syrie et Liban) ; des Juifs;
des Allemands, etc. Parmi ceux-ci, I'immigration espagnole et italienne fut la
plus nombreuse.
Parfois, on indique une phrase comme representative de la politique
economique, sociale, culturelle et educative des representants de la
"generation de 1880" : "europeaniser Ie pays et argentiniser les immigrants".
A cause de I' importance atteinte par I' enseignement, cette etape fut nommee
"normalismo" par quelques pedagogues argentins, grace a la grande
repercussion qui fut la creation de la premiere Ecole Normale de Sarmiento,
a Parana, en 1870. Les plus remarquables professeurs ayant une forte
formation positiviste firent partie de cette ecole.
Le modele du gouvemement s'inscrit dans Ie type du liberalisme politi que
et economique ayant com me base I'Europe. L' Argentine fut connue sur Ie
plan international comme "Ie grenier du monde" et a cette epoque-lii, elle
etablit des relations commerciaJes avec des pays europeens, mais
I' Angleterre fut le pays qui fit les echanges Jes plus importants.
120 SARA A. JAFELLA
1. Presentation
D'apres Risieri Frondizi, Ie positivisme eut des caracteristiques differentes
dans les pays d'Amerique latine, ou les idees d'Auguste Comte (1798-1857)
et de Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) eurent beaucoup d'adeptes, mais avec une
proportion inegale. "D'une maniere generale, on peut affirmer que les idees
de Comte eurent un plus grand poids au Bresil, au Mexique et au Chili,
tandis que Spencer eut une plus grande influence en Argentine, en Uruguay
et a Cuba". (Frondizi Risieri et Gracia Jorge: El hombre y los valores en la
filosofia latinoamericana de siglo XX, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura
Econ6mica, 1974). n faut signaler que, apres les influences de Comte et de
Spencer, arriverent les theories philosophico-politiques de J. Stuart Mill. En
Argentine, apres 1900, il y eut aussi des influences du positivisme italien.
Le mot "positiviste" est employe dans un sens large. Pourtant, ses axes
referentiels sont l' agnosticisme de Spencer et de Comte. Ricaurte Soler
affirme que Ie positivisme argentin ne fut pas influence par Ie positivisme
sociologique de Durkheim. Ses themes fondamentaux sont en rapport avec
une orientation "naturaliste", denomination la plus adequate, d'apres ce
critere. Pourtant, il existe une forte tradition terminologique qui soutient Ie
nom "positivisme" dans l'historiographie hispano-americaine et argentine
(Ricaurte Soler: El positivismo argentino. Buenos Aires, Paid6s, 1968). Le
positivisme eut des expressions dans plusieurs domaines scientifiques
argentins: les sciences juridiques, la sociologie, la psychologie, la
paleontologie, la pedagogie, les sciences naturelles, l'historiographie, la
philosophie, etc.
Ce mouvement scientiste donna lieu a un phenomene complexe, apparu
dans differents domaines epistemologiques, avec des propositions originales
chez la plupart de ses representants. Ainsi, par exemple, dans Ie domaine de
la paleontologie, un des scientifiques les plus reconnus fut Florentino
Ameghino (1854-1911) qui fit connaitre sa propre theorie sur I' origine de
l'homme americain. En 1884 fut fonde Ie Museo de Ciencias Naturales de Ia
Plata (actuellement, Facultad de Ciencias Naturales et Museo de
l'Universidad Nacional) OU il Y a de precieux specimens sur l'origine dc la
vie, dont leur importance montre, a ce moment-la, I'influence de I'orientation
de la pen see de Darwin. Le rapport entre les sciences naturelles - surtout la
biologie - et les sciences sociales, constitue un evenement cle dans la pensee
positiviste argentine.
En outre, l'Universidad Nacional de La Plata, creee en 1906, demontre
l'influence de cette pensee philosophique d' origine scientifique avec la
LA PHILOSOPHIE ARGENTINE AU XXE SIECLE 121
3. L'orientation pedagogique
Elle fut representee par un grand nombre d'intellectuels de I'enseignement,
lesquels partagerent les sujets centraux du positivisme avec des positions
moins extremes dans Ie domaine scientifique.
Dans cette orientation, on peut citer : Jose Marfa Torres (en rapport avec
l'ec1ectisme), Pedro Scalabrini, Francisco Berra, Alejandro Carb6, Rodolfo
Senet, Rodolfo Rivarola (plus pres du positivisme "spiritualiste" : en 1900, il
introduisit Critica de la razon pura de Kant a la Facultad de Filosoffa y
122 SARA A. JAFELLA
une precieuse recherche sur les moments qui interviennent dans la realisation
des valeurs de la beaute. En plus, son enquete philosophique releve des sujets
anthropologiques et historico-culturels.
• Emilio Estiu (1914-1984)
Meme si son travail de recherche et d' enseignement universitaire deborde Ie
sujet estMtique, c' est ce dernier qui definit sa production philosophique.
Ses recherches sur l'a:uvre des dramaturges contemporains (parmi lesquels
no us citons Pirandello et Ionesco) revelent les caracteres significatifs de sa
conception esthetique. En plus, c' est l' auteur de deux ouvrages reconnus au
plan historique de la philosophie: Del arte a la historia en la filosofia
moderna et De la vida a la existencia en la filosofia contemporanea. En
outre, il fut un eminent traducteur en espagnol des ouvrages des philosophes
allemands contemporains. Sa tache d' enseignant et de chercheur eut lieu en
tant que professeur et directeur du Departamento de Filosoffa de la Facultad
de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educaci6n de l'Universidad Nacional de
La Plata.
5. Sujets de metaphysique
• Anfbal Sanchez Reulet
n eut une longue trajectoire aux Etats-Unis. Son activire philosophique
commenc;a a I'Universidad Nacional de Tucuman ou il publia Rafz y destino
de la filosofia (1942). n etudia l'histoire de la pensee de l' Amerique
hispanophone, de meme que d'autres textes sur Korn, Unamuno et Ortega y
Gasset. Sa position philosophique a de tres nettes orientations
metaphysiques: des themes de l'etre, de la valeur, de l'existence et de la
transcendance.
• Rafael Virasoro
La pensee allemande representee par HusserI, N. Hartmann et Scheler exerc;a
une profonde influence sur sa formation philosophique, penchee vers les
problemes ethiques et metaphysiques. n fut professeur a I'Universidad
Nacional del Litoral (Santa Fe) ou il publia ses reuvres principales.
• Angel Vassallo
Professeur aux universites de Buenos Aires et de La Plata. Sa formation
metaphysique rec;ut non seulement l'influence allemande, mais aussi celle
des penseurs franc;ais de differentes periodes (Descartes, Pascal, Blondel,
Marcel). Ses reuvres principales sont Elogio de la vigilia (1939, edition
augmenree en 1950) et ~Que es lafilosofia ? (1954)
• Luis Farre
n fut professeur aux universites de Tucuman et de La Plata. Applique aux
problemes d' anthropologie philosophique, il consacra aussi ses recherches a
la philosophie de la religion et a la pensee argentine actuelle. Parmi ses
reuvres, nous trouvons : Hombre y libertad (1972); Antropologfa filos6fica
(1974) et La filosofia en Argentina (1981), cette derniere en collaboration.
• Eugenio Pucciarelli
Professeur aux universites de Tucuman, de La Plata et de Buenos Aires. Les
sujets concernant l'etre, la valeur et, d'une maniere particuliere, Ie temps,
constituent les aspects les plus significatifs de sa production philosophique.
Ses premiers ecrits furent publies en 1938. A partir de ce moment-la, ses
recherches se poursuivent en une pleiade d'etudes qui s'interessent a la
probIematique de l'histoire de la philosophie a travers les theories et les
philosophes les plus brillants.
128 SARA A. JAFELLA
7. Philosophie et existence
• Vicente Fatone (1903-1962)
Meme si ce penseur excella aussi par ses recherches sur la philosophie de
l'Inde (El budismo nihilista. Introduccion al conocimiento de la filosofta de
la India (1942)), ses reuvres sur la philo sophie de l'existence Ie placent parmi
les premiers chercheurs sur ce sujet dans notre pays. li realisa plusieurs
recherches sur cette pensee: El existencialismo y la libertad creadora (1948)
et La existencia humana y sus filosofos (1953) ou il evoque Sartre. li fut
professeur dans quelques universites nationales.
• Miguel Angel Virasoro (1900-1966)
Professeur a l'Universidad de Buenos Aires, ses idees porterent sur differents
aspects de l'existence humaine, sous l'influence d'autres philosophes
existentiels, la plupart de formation chretienne (La libertad, la existencia y el
ser, 1932).
• Carlos Astrada ( 1874-1970)
Trois sujets tres importants constituent la problematique de sa production
philosophique: la pensee existentielle de Heidegger; la philosophie
dialectique dans les propositions de Hegel et de Marx et l'optique historico-
culturelle qui configura un style dans Ie traitement des sujets sociaux,
exprimes dans Ie contexte historique et dans sa preoccupation pour l'homme
argentino Penseur actif, il forge a une proposition philosophique preoccupee
par l'origine existentielle et dynamisee par Ie jeu dialectique de ses idees. En
correspondance avec les horizons signales, nous pouvons citer trois livres de
LA PHILOSOPHIE ARGENTINE AU XXE SrECLE 129
(1939). Dans la premiere, il fait une analyse de l'education argentine dans ses
perspectives culturelles, sociales, politiques et regionales.
Un autre penseur sur l' education fut Alfredo Calcagno, disciple et
continuateur de l'reuvre pedagogiques de Victor Mercante, avec qui il se
forma dans Ie courant positiviste ci-dessus mentionne. n accomplit des
activites academiques et d' enseignant et en tant que directeur del
Departamento de Ciencias de la Educaci6n. Plus tard, il fut doyen de la
Facultad de Humanidades et, en plus, recteur de l'Universidad Nacional de
La Plata (1945).
L'reuvre pedagogique de Juan Mantovani (1898-1962) se caracterisa par
sa centralisation au plan spiritualiste. n fut professeur a Buenos Aires et a
I'Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Ses reuvres les plus representatives
sont : Educaci6n y vida et La educaci6n y sus tres problemas.
Juan Cassani subit l'influence de la pedagogie italienne (Gentile) tandis
que Juan P. Ramos continue la pensee culturelle des pedagogues allemands
(Diltheyet Spranger).
• Gregorio Klimovsky
Les sujets de logique, de philosopbie du langage, de methodologie des
sciences et d' epistemologie sont developpes chez ce philosophe, un des plus
remarquables representants, avec une longue et prestigieuse trajectoire dans
ces problematiques. Chercheur et professeur universitaire a La Plata et a
Buenos Aires, directeur des cours de specialisation, son cruvre ecrite est
publiee dans des revues nationales et intemationales specialisees.
• Eduardo Rabossi
Representant de la philosopbie analytique, membre fondateur de la Sociedad
Argentina de Amilisis Filosofico, professeur universitaire a La Plata, a
Buenos Aires et a Caracas (Venezuela), ses travaux comme chercheur
portent sur des sujets de son domaine. Dne de ses cruvres la plus connue:
Analisis filos6fico, 16gica y metafisica (1975).
• Felix Gustavo Schuster
Chercheur, professeur universitaire a La Plata et a Buenos Aires, son travail
epistemologique est connu dans la communaute scientifique de notre pays et
de l' etranger. Parmi ses cruvres les plus recentes : Explicaci6n y predicci6n
(1986) et El metodo en las ciencias sociales (1992).
• Conrado Eggers-Lan
Professeur a l'universite de Buenos Aires. Son travail philosophique se
projeta vers differents themes: philosophie de l' Antiquite, sujets religieux et
philosophie politique.
• Ezequiel de Olaso
Chercheur et professeur aux universites de La Plata et de Buenos Aires. n se
specialisa en gnoseologie et en philosophie modeme. n mena des recherches
sur la philo sophie de Leibniz.
• Arturo Garda Astrada
Professeur a l'universite de Cordoba n excella dans Ie do maine de la
metaphysique et dans l'anthropologie philosophique.
• Andres Mercado Vera
Professeur a l'universite de Buenos Aires, il se fit remarquer par son activit6
d'enseignant et de chercheur.
• Narciso Pousa
Professeur a l'universite de La Plata, sa formation dans des sujets
metaphysiques et anthropologiques s'est orientee ensuite vers la philosophie
contemporaine, aussi bien que vers des problemes esthetico-litteraires.
• Orlando Pugliese
Professeur aux universites de La Plata et de Buenos Aires. n travaille comme
chercheur dans Ie domaine de la philosophie hispano-americaine a Berlin.
Son activite philosophique s' oriente vers des themes de la philosophie
modeme.
• Hernan Zucchi
Professeur a l'universite de Tucuman. n se specialisa dans des sujets de
philosophie de l' Antiquite et d'anthropologie philosophique.
• Mario A. Presas
Chercheur et professeur universitaire a La Plata et a Buenos Aires. Son
reuvre philosophique peut etre envisagee sous deux angles de specialisation :
d'une part, ses recherches sur la philosophie de HusserI dans ses differentes
periodes et perspectives; d'autre part, ses travaux sur l'estMtique et
l'approfondissement dans ce domaine. n publia, en plus, des etudes sur des
philosophes de l'existence (Marcel et Jaspers).
Dans une probIematique de recherche concernant aussi la pen see d' Apel,
nous trouvons Ie penseur Julio de Zan.
En philo sophie du droit, les penseurs les plus representatifs sont : Carlos
Alchourr6n, Eugenio Bulygin et Carlos S. Nino, professeurs et chercheurs a
l'Universidad de Buenos Aires.
En philosophie de l'histoire nous citons Victor Massuh, professeur a
l'Universidad Nacional de Tucuman (Sentido y fin de la historia, 1963; La
Argentina como sentimiento, 1982).
1. Associations philosophiques
Asociaci6n Filos6fica de la Republica Argentina. Buenos Aires.
Sociedad Argentina de Amilisis Filos6fico (SADAF). Buenos Aires.
Sociedad Argentina de Filosoffa. C6rdoba.
Sociedad Argentina de Profesores de Filosoffa (SAPFI). Buenos Aires.
2. Congres
Le premier Congres National de Philosophie eut lieu a Mendoza en 1949.
Durant les dix dernieres annees eurent lieu les Congres Nationaux suivants :
Seme Congres National: La Plata, 1985.
6eme Congres National: Cosquln (C6rdoba), 1992.
?"me Congres National: Rio Cuarto (C6rdoba), 1993.
En plus, se tiennent regulierement des Journees, des Rencontres, des Tables
rondes et d'autres fa~ons d'inter-communication dans les differentes
universites du pays.
En 1987 eut lieu a C6rdoba Ie 1er Congres International Extraordinaire de
Philosophie, ou participerent de celebres philosophes.
En 1989 eut lieu a Buenos Aires Ie 11 e Congres Hispano-americain de
Philosophie avec la pruticipation de philosophes latino-americains,
europeens, des Etats-Unis et du Canada.
3. Revues philosophiques
Depuis la publication de la premiere "Revista de Filosoffa", dirigee par Ie
Docteur Jose Ingenieros, en 1914, un nombre croissant de publications a ete
edite, sous les auspices de differents centres d'etudes philosophiques, surtout
universitaires.
Dans cette breve reference, nous citerons les revues qui maintiennent leur
actualite:
I. Analisis Filos6.fico. Sociedad Argentina de AnaIisis filos6fico (SADAF).
Buenos Aires.
LA PHILOSOPHIE ARGENTINE AU XXE SrECLE 139
proclaiming the need for a return to Saint Thomas and Suarez as the sources
necessary to discover and secure our cultural identity and to make possible
our own "Mediaeval Epoch", as appropriate to our "juvenile organic age".
The thought of this author can be read in Espiritu y camino de
Hispanoamerica (The spirit and the course of Hispano-America, 1953).
The new situation made way, however, for two positive facts. On the one
hand, a considerable number of Colombians, among them some of the
teachers of the Institute of Philosophy, travelled abroad, which allowed them
to acquire more direct knowledge and domination over contemporary
thought. Equally, philosophical enquiry emerged from the dominions of
acadaemia to conquer broader spaces, which led to a social recognition of
philosophical thought. This was the significance of the group of thinkers
which formed around the journal Mito (Myth, 1955), inspired by Jorge
Gaitan Duran and Hernando Valencia: "The decision to publish dangerous
texts, if their intellectual value so justified, lent a special dimension to the
journal. To a large extent, this decision explains the orientation of the journal
towards Sartre. From Sartre they learned to assume critical stances before the
diverse problems, with freedom of thought and determination; from him they
also learned to make the apparently unimportant occurrences of our culture
an object of analysis. Many were the pages of the journal dedicated to
Husserl, Heidegger and, of course, Sartre".
1.4 With the fall of the dictatorship in 1957, philosophical activity
normalised and grew gradually in quantity and quality. Numerous centres of
philosophical studies were created throughout the country. This phenomenon
permitted an increase in the number of teachers with a better academic
background, the publication of a large number of specialised journals and,
finally, the frequent holding of events, some of which have become
permanent institutions. These events have, in tum, promoted the rigorous
discussion of ideas and problems.
Among the regular events, the following should be mentioned: the
National Philosophical Forum, begun in 1975 and of which eight have been
held in different Colombian cities; the Discourses of the Colombian Society
of Philosophy; the International Latin American Philosophy Congresses
organised by Santo Tomas Univcrsity cvery two years since 1980.
The publishing activity of the present decade, which is the result of the
maturity achieved in philosophical activity, must be highlighted. Over the
last six years, Santo Tomas University alone has published, as part of its
Biblioteca Colombiana de Filosofla (Colombian Library of Philosophy)
collection, seventeen titles which form part of a programme which is
intended to gather together the most outstanding works of the last two
centuries, which will permit the writing of the history of philosophical ideas
PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA 147
The way of being appropriate to the sphere of life reveals itself as the unity
and division of opposites. In this sense, it is dialectic and opposed to the way
of being of natural reality. The unity and division of man's way of being
arises between: liberty and necessity, rationality and irrationality, objectivity
and subjectivity, matter and spirit, immanence and transcendence, wealth and
privation, historicity and inhistoricity, finitude and infinity. Man is all of
these at the same time. But these diverse oppositions overcome one another
dialectically in one unit. Man, for example, is not pure liberty as Sartre would
wish, nor pure necessity, as certain materialists maintain. He is subject to the
need to decide, but is free as far as what is decided is concerned. This
necessity, however, is not causal- as occurs in nature - and by not being so
does not eliminate liberty. Moreover, liberty is only possible thanks to the
need to decide. A liberty that does not decide is not liberty. Consequently,
liberty and necessity are opposites reconciled in one unit. This unit and this
opposition permit an understanding of the phenomenon of human anxiety:
man has to take decisions constantly, but what is decided is irreparable, since
time is irreversible.
The unity and division of opposites cited thus define man's way of being.
It must be added, however, that this way of being is expressed in very
different ways in the course of history: there are historical epochs in which
rationality prevails over irrationality, or the contrary, just as there are epochs
dominated by matter or by the spirit. Finally, the internal connections
between each of such units and divisions of opposites and the others are also
varied. The irrationality of life, for example, is linked to necessity - the
'having' to decide - as is necessity with liberty: man decides rationally even
when he does not approach motives rationally, since he has necessarily to
decide.
Equally, Ontologfa social (Social ontology) reveals the dialectic nature of
the social way of being. In this sphere, unity and opposition refer to being
and must be, to the fact and the value, to the tension between means and ends
as a relationship. Society is the result of the relationships which men
establish between ends and means to satisfy his necessities. These
relationships, insofar as they are the fruit of human decisions, are
impregnated with an "objective meaning" which is expressed in the values
shared by the individuals who form a particular society in a certain historical
moment. The meaning of social facts, by not being immediately perceptible
in the way that the meaning of natural realities is, must be reached through an
understanding of the experiences of individuals. This comprehension reveals
that there is no radical separation between value and reality, between being
and must be.
PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA 149
goes beyond nature and binds himself to a world projected by him". For
Cruz, as for Heidegger, man is not a self which can detach itself from
transcendence to become a pure subject. The self reveals itself to him like
Dasein by analysing the dual relationship of man with being and of being
with man: it appears to him as existence when he considers man as being
static within this relationship; it is revealed as transcendence when he
considers the movement of man from the entities to his being: and a being-in-
the-world when he thinks in terms of transcendence and of the concrete
dimension in which man finds himself in relation to his being. Finally, man is
seen as freedom, when he thinks of the opportunity given to him to liberate
himself from the entities to transcend in the direction of the being.
From the foregoing perspective, the origin of culture lies in the freedom of
man to transcend himself towards a world as a horizon of the possibilities of
the project or "having to be". Culture thus responds to the structure of man as
an open opportunity for the being. On this basis, man makes things "be", in
order for the entities to acquire a meaning. The sum of meanings, as a
horizon of possibilities of man's transcending, constitutes, precisely, culture
and in this sense it is man's only home.
Consequently man cannot exist outside this home. But this home is subject
to transitoriness. Cultural worlds change. With Nietzsche the death of one
world - that subject to Logos - was announced, as well as the birth of
another dominated by the "will for power" incarnated in technical
possibilities. The technical world is the present home of man. As a world of
possibilities, it includes the same possibility of the death of man. Does his
submission to the technical perhaps constitute the greatest of his alienations?
Does the evaporation of the being from the entities which occurs in the
technical world, not perhaps imply a "more radical nihilism" than that which
Nietzsche wanted to overcome? These questions are the food of our
philosopher's reflection; a metaphysical, but at the same time ethical
reflection.
Wherever the being of man is committed there is an ethical problem. The
nihilism which accompanies the technical world, urgently requires new
reflection on the essence of man and his relationship with the essence of the
technical world itself, in view of the creation of a humanism which at the
same time saves man's being and the being of the technical world.
The "problematic world is the area within which philosophy moves. This
is a science which only goes into motion when problems arise on the human
horizon". The present problem for man is man's salvation and at the same
time the salvation of the technical dimension from nihilism. This problem is
essentially ethical and, as such, determines the ethical orientation of the
PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA 151
present reflection of Cruz Velez, who, from the beginning, has thought only
about man and his world.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Las tendencias actuates de la Filosofia en Colombia. N Congreso Intemacional de Filosofia
Latinoamericana. Universidad Santo Tomas, Bogota, 1987,616 pp.
La Filosofia en Colombia. Bibliografia del Siglo XX. Universidad Santo Tomas, Bogota, 1986,
230 pp.
La Filosofia en Colombia. (Siglo XX). Compilacion de Ruben Sierra, Procultura, Bogota,
1986,254 pp. Text of: Nieto Arteta, Danilo Cruz, Rafael Carrillo, Jaime Velez, Daniel
Herrera, Guillermo Hoyos, Estanislao Zuleta, Cayetano Betancur, Francisco Posada,
Rafael Gutierrez.
Herrera, R., Daniel et al.: La Filosofia en Colombia. Historia de las Ideas. Ed. EI Buho,
Bogota, 1988,470 pp.
Herrera, R., Daniel: Filosofia en Colombia. Bibliografia 1627-1873, Universidad del Valle,
Cali, 1975,248 pp.
LA PHILOSOPHIE AU CruLl
JORGE ESTRELLA
Universidad de Chile
I3R Au Chili, cette poh~mique a ete formulee particulierement c1airement par deux professeurs
de la Universidad de Chile: Joaquin Barcelo et Humberto Giannini. Voir Revista de
Filosofla, volumes XVI et XVII, annces 1978 et 1979.
139 Revis/a de FUosof/a, volume XVI, 1979.
140 Voir Ie travail de Joaquin Barcel6, "Ernesto Grassi y su experiencia sudamericana", Revista
de Filo.w~r[a, volume XLIII-XLIV, 1994.
141 Voir Felix Schwartzmann, El sentimiento de 10 humano en America, deux tomcs, Santiago.
1950- 1952. Reedite cn 1992 par Editorial Universitaria (EI libra de fa revoluciones - El
sentimiento de 10 humano en America).
LA PHILOSOPHIE AU CHILI 157
dirait deux amoureux de la meme femme qui, a force d' etre tellement
attaches a l'image de leur bien-aimee, ont fini par l' oublier. Car la conviction
premiere de la philo sophie consiste a atteindre la connaissance du reel. Ceci
s'est transforme en connaissance (quelquefois minutieuse, complexe et
meme eblouissante) de la connaissance atteinte dans Ie passe par des
hommes illustres. Plutot que d'observer Ie monde et l'homme, la philosophie
actuelle observe son passe.
D'une part, la philo sophie analytique (cultivee particulierement en
Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis) a resolu de confiner la tache philosophique a
une "analyse du langage", et non pas de la realite. D'autre part, la
philosophie europeenne continentale traine interminablement avec elle la
vision du monde des classiques (des pre-socratiques a Heidegger) comme s'il
n'y avait rien de nouveau a dire sur l'univers et sur l'homme.
Pendant ce temps, cet univers et cette humanite font l'objet d'etudes
diligentes de la part des disciplines scientifiques (cosmologie, paleobiologie,
ethologie, genetique, pour n'en citer que quelques-unes). Le degre de
connaissance atteint par ces disciplines est tel qu'il a mis en crise de
nombreuses croyances charriees par les sciences humaines traditionnelles.
Ainsi, des themes tels que la place de l'homme dans l'univers, la recherche
d'un sens au deroulement du reel, Ie temps, l' espace, la causalite, les
conditions et les limites de la connaissance, Ie phenomene moral (quelques
exemples parmi d'autres), ne peuvent etre etudies serieusement a l'insu de
ces sciences. Cependant, la philosophie et les sciences humaines, aveuglees
par Ie souvenir de son passe, ne semblent pas s'en rendre compte. De nos
jours, il ya peu de philosophes assumes comme a pu l'etre Emile Meyerson
au debut de ce siecle. Et il est notable que cette maniere de faire de la
philosophie depuis la science soit en train de renaltre sur tous les fronts de la
meilleure science: Monod, Prigogine, Reeves, Hawking, chacun a leur
maniere et avec un succes different, sont des exemples d'une pensee resolue
a refiechir sur les vieilles questions philosophiques a partir d'aujourd'hui, et
non pas d'hier.
La philosophie et les sciences sociales humaines traditionnelles ont etabli
leur domicile conservateur au sein des universites. De la, elles peuvent
exercer presque dans l'impunite leur "reve dogmatique", toute confiantes
qu'elles sont d'accomplir leur devoir. La philosophie cultivee dans les
universites latinoamericaines en ce sens ne difrere pas de l'europeenne. 142
142 J'ai developpe plus amplement ce point de vue dans mes livres Ciencia y filosoffa (Editorial
Universitaria, 1982), Teoria de la acci6n (Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, 1987), La
filosofla y sus formas an6malas (Editorial Hachette, 1991), Conocimientos y biologla
(Editorial Hachette, 1991), et;, Tiempo 0 etemidad? (Dolmen Ediciones, 1994).
LA PHILOSOPHIE AU CHILI 159
1 - Revista de Filosofia
La Revista de Filosofia est la plus ancienne revue periodique dediee a la
philosophie du Chili. C'est aussi la plus reguliere et celIe qui jouit du plus
grand prestige. Elle vit Ie jour en aout 1949 sous les auspices de la Sociedad
Chilena de Filosoffa et de la Universidad de Chile. Une annee plus tard, elle
passa sous la dependance unique de la Universidad de Chile. A sa direction
se succederent les professeurs du departement de philosophie de la
Universidad de Chile, Messieurs Mario Ciudad, Felix Schwartzmann, Carlos
Miranda et Jorge Estrella, de 1949 a 1993 respectivement. Son rythme de
publication est de deux numeros par an en moyenne. Elle cessa de paraitre en
1951, 1954, 1967, 1968 et pendant la periode 1970-1976. Entre 1949 et
1993, 46 numeros vi rent Ie jour. L' ouvrage Indice de La Revista de Filosofta,
elabore par deux specialistes de la Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile,
Elena Sanchez c. et M6nica Cagelmacher V.I44, fait mention pour la periode
comprise entre 1949 et 1990 de 199 auteurs, 259 articles, 51 textes, cours et
travaux divers, 153 notes et commentaires et 53 chroniques.
La Revista de Filosofta, depuis ses origines, est en fait I' organe
d'expression de l'activite philosophique realisee par les universitaires du
Chili. Son point fort est la publication d'etudes portant sur des auteurs
143 Je cite ici les quelques textes suivants concernant egalernent la philosophie au Chili:
Roberto Escobar: La fllosojia en Chile, Ediciones de la Universidad Tecnica del Estado,
Santiago, 1976.
Fernando Astorquiza Pizarro (Directeur): Bio-bibliograffa de la jilosofia en Chile desde el
sigfo XVI hasta 1980, editc par la Universidad de Chile et I'Instituto Profesional de
Santiago, Santiago, 1982.
Fernando Astorquiza Pizarro (Directeur): Bio-bibliograffa de fa .filosaffa en Chile desde
1980 hasta 1985, idem, Santiago, 1985 (les deux tomes totalisent 400 pages).
Jaime Caiceo Escudero: Principales etapas de la fllosa.fia en Chile a traves de su historia,
Ediciones de la Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile, Santiago, 1988.
144 Voir Revista dejilosojia, volumes XXXVII-XXXVIII, 1991.
160 JORGE ESTRELLA
2 - Seminarios de Filosofia
La Faculte de Philosophie de la Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile,
situee a Santiago, a deploye un important travail editorial a partir de l'annee
1982. Sous la conduite du philosophe Juan de Dios Vial Larrafn et dans Ie
cadre du Plan basico defilosofia mis en place par cette faculte, eUe a edite un
materiel bibliographique de soutien portant notamment sur la metaphysique
J 45 Pour une approche plus detaillee des auteurs et de leurs travaux, consulter la Revista de
FilosoJfa de 1991 et la Bio-bibliografia de La filosoJia en Chile desde el siglo XVI hasta
1980.
LA PHILOSOPHIE AU CHILI 161
platonicienne et sur celle de Saint Thomas d' Aquin (Sofista, par Juan de Dios
Vial Larrafn, El Banquete, par Jorge Eduardo Rivera, Parmenides, par
Amoal Edwards. La trascendentalidad de la metafisica - Saint Thomas - par
Jose Luis Fernandez).
La meme faculte de philosophie initia en 1982 une seconde ligne de
publications - Ensayos e investigaciones - dans le but de faire connaitre
certains travaux de longue haleine realises par ses chercheurs plus
specialises. Anima Mundi (1982) d'Oscar Velasquez, Una ciencia del ser
(1987) de Juan de Dios Vial Larrafn, Imaginadon, sfmbolo y realidad (1987)
de Jorge Pena Vial, Una teoria de la inteligencia (1992) de Juan de Dios Vial
Larrafn, Filosofia, poesfa y mito a la luz de Eros en el symposio de Plat6n
(1993) de Ana Marfa Vicuna, sont quelques-uns des titres edites dans cette
collection.
Dans les annees 80 egalement et dans un format sembI able au precedent,
furent edites des textes monographiques (sur Ortega y Gasset et Kant
notamment) ecrits par des specialistes de la Faculte de Philo sophie de la
Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile elle-meme. A partir de 1988 et sous
la conduite du professeur Oscar Velasquez, une nouvelle ligne editoriale
s' affirme dans Ie prolongement de I' anterieure : elle regroupe des travaux de
differents specialistes autour d'un meme theme ou auteur. La publication se
nomme Seminarios de Filosofia. Elle paral't regulierement tous les ans.
Unamuno, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Filosofla y cultura en el Renacimiento,
Karl Popper, sont quelques exemples des titres publies. n s'agit d'un style de
production philosophique periodique qui, contrairement a d'autres, convoque
ses collaborateurs autour de I' analyse d'un meme sujet.
3 - Teorfa
Le premier numero de Teoria, date de I'annee 1973, parut au sein de
I' ancienne Faculte Nord de la Universidad de Chile a Santiago (dans un
campus dedie aux sciences), sous la direction du philosophe Humberto
Giannini. La revue pretendait creer un moyen de reflexion centre sur les
relations contemporaines avec les sciences (Ies sciences humaines en
particulier) plutot que sur I'histoire de la philosophie.
Elle parut de fac;;on irreguliere jusqu' en 1977, totalisant six numeros.
Depuis 1977 etjusqu'en 1979, elle rec;;ut Ie soutien financier de la Fondation
Ford. Pour cette raison, et comme elle n'appartenait plus ala Universidad de
Chile, son titre original fut remplace par celui de Escritos de Teoria. Elle
sortit trois numeros de plus, toujours sous la direction de Humberto Giannini.
Le style de travail applique par cette revue merite qu'on en fasse mention.
Les collaborateurs formaient un groupe qui discutait les collaborations
presentees. De cette fac;;on, chaque numero donnait I'impression d'un travail
162 JORGE ESTRELLA
5 - Philosophica
La revue Philosophica fit son apparition en 1978. Elle appartient a l'Institut
de Philosophie de la Universidad Cat6lica de Valparaiso. Son directeur, Juan
Antonio Widow, affirme dans le premier numero que la revue "est Ie fruit de
l'activite academique gravitant autour de l'Institut de Philosophie de la
Universidad Cat6lica de Valparaiso. Le rythme de publication, Dieu aidant,
sera annuel". n declare egalement que la revue "recueillera tout resultat
emanant d'une activite intellectuelle ordonnee visant, comme but ultime, la
connaissance de la verite universelle". D'ou la decision d'incorporer "des
themes theologiques dont l'intention est d'etre le intellectus .fidei de la
tradition chretienne". Dans sa presentation, Ie directeur affirme explicitement
que c'est la raison pour laqueUe la revue "exclut un pluralisme pris en raison
de principe". Selon lui, la publication vient combler un vide: "I'absence,
depuis tres longtemps, de publication periodique destinee a traiter,
principalement, les questions philosophiques selon les criteres fondamentaux
LA PHILOSOPHIE AU CHILI 163
8 - Estudios Ptiblicos
La revue Estudios Publicos est nee en 1980. Elle est dirigee par un
specialiste en philosophie, Arturo Fontaine Talavera, depuis 1982. J usqu' en
1993, on comptait cinquante numeros parus. Un index des themes et auteurs
couvrant ces cinquante premiers numeros (1980-1993) fait mention de 410
auteurs et d'un nombre encore superieur de travaux, ce qui donne une idee de
l'ampleur de l'effort intellectuel deploye par cette publication pendant la
peri ode consideree.
Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas d'une revue purement philosophique, elle est
devenue un organe de debats d'idees. Elle a rapidement acquis une
importance decisive au sein de la culture chilienne. Bien que Ie spectre de ses
interets reste principalement centre sur les aspects politiques, economiques et
sociaux, elle n'a neanmoins jamais cesse d'aborder les problemes
philosophiques lies aux theories politiques et economiques. Des specialistes
en philosophie tels que Juan de Dios Vial Larrafn, Humberto Giannini ou
Joaquin Barcel6 y ont pub lie des travaux originaux ou des selections de
classiques de la philo sophie comme Tocqueville ou Kant pour n'en citer que
quelques-uns.
La revue Estudios Publicos accomplit un travail intellectuel sur plusieurs
fronts. En premier lieu, elle remit a I' ordre du jour les themes centraux de la
philosophie liberale et leur confrontation avec les idees totalitaires. Pour ce
faire, elle diffusa - au moyen de textes choisis et d' exposes concis - la
philosophie d' auteurs classiques tels qu' Aristote, J. Locke, T. Hobbes, A.
Smith, Stuart Mill, H. Spencer, L. von Mises, K. Popper ou F. A. Hayek. Ce
demier - prix Nobel d'economie 1974 - fut, jusqu'a sa mort, President
honoraire du Centro de Estudios Publicos, institution editrice de la revue.
Cependant, Estudios Publicos entreprit une tache plus difficile et plus
decisive encore, depassant Ie cadre du travail pedagogique de diffusion et de
debat des idees liberales: elle materialisa une pen see consacree a la
recherche des problemes concrets du Chili, de leur diagnostic technique, des
solutions realistes et de leur coUt. Le systeme judiciaire chilien, les forces
armees, la transition a la democratie, les partis politiques, la politique
intemationale, les problemes ecologiques du developpement et nombre
d'autres sujets d'interet pour Ie pays re<;urent dans ses pages un traitement
opportun, juste et orientateur.
LA PHILOSOPHIE AU CHILI 165
pour enseigner votre matiere comme il vous plaira. Aucun courant de pensee
ne vous sera jamais interdit ni impose.
n en fut ainsi. Jamais je n'avais eu l'occasion d'exercer l'enseignement de
la philosophie, la recherche et l'expression d'idees avec autant de liberte que
pendant ces dix-neuf dernieres annees.
Evidemment, tres peu de professeurs partageaient mon opinion. Et ceci
m' amene a reconnaitre mon second prejuge qui illustre, sans doute possible,
ce qui m' a ete donne de vivre au Chili pendant cette periode : je ne ressens
pas La moindre sympathie pour quelque forme de totaLitarisme que ce soit.
Ceux qui ont noirci ce siecIe, Ie nazisme, Ie fascisme et Ie communisme, ont
brandi des bannieres salutaires qui se sont implacablement terminees en
camps de concentration, en exterminations massives, en xenophobie et en
pratiques aberrantes contre les personnes.
Le Chili est un pays Ionguement travaille par l'ideologie marxiste. rnfus,
omnipresent, Ie communisme a impregne l'ame des chiliens au point de se
convertir en veritable pole d'imaginaire collectif. Vu par moi, ce qui aux
yeux des Chiliens etait parfaitement normal, devenait un fait notable:
democrates-chretiens, radicaux, libre-penseurs ou se reclamant tels (et, bien
sur, socialistes et communistes), tous parlaient un langage commun, Ie
langage du marxisme, de la theorie de la dependance, de la theologie de la
liberation.
Un observateur exteme comme moi etait incapable de distinguer l'origine
heterogene des participants de ce langage commun. Et, sans doute, je
commettais l'erreur de prendre leurs affirmations et leurs negations au pied
de la lettre.
Je mentionnerai ici un incident illustrant ce que j'entends par
denominateur commun du credo socialisant. En 1980, un professeur adjoint a
rna chaire organisa un seminaire sur Ie theme "Qu'est-ce que la
philosophie ?". Furent invites a participer tous les membres du departement
de philosophie de ce qui etait alors la Faculte de Philosophie et d'Education
(sur Ie fameux campus Pedag6gico), ainsi que des professeurs d'autres
universites. Plusieurs exposants mirent I'accent sur la "fonction Iiberatrice de
la philosophie", sur sa condition de "pen see engagee" afin de "demasquer les
ideologies", etc. L'un d'entre eux, en particulier, attira mon attention par son
severe jugement contre l' "etat de prostration de la philosophie chilienne".
Selon lui, les professeurs de philosophie "etaient des laquais de la dictature",
"des porte-paroles de I'ideologie opprimante". C'etait un langage tres proche
de celui que j'avais entendu a Vincennes en 1972. Apres chaque expose
s' ouvrait Ie debat. Je fis remarquer au professeur en question que sa
description du professeur de philosophie soumis a la dictature correspondait
beaucoup plus a la situation cubaine qu'a celie que nous vivions au Chili.
LA PHU,OSOPHIE AU CHu,r 169
JAVIER SANJINES C.
Rockefeller Fellow
Chicago Humanities Institute
1Angel Rama, La ciudad letrada, (Hanover, New Hampshire: Ediciones del Norte, 1984).
2John Beverley, Against literature, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
3 Particularly my book Literatura contempordnea y grotesco social en Bolivia, (La Paz:
ILDIS/BHN,1992).
Britain, I have studied the limits of testimonial discourse4 within the political
and economic reforms introduced by neoliberalism, and the upsurge of post-
testimonial forms of popular culture. Thus the importance of recent Andean
paintings, among other expressions of the visual arts, in the cultural
imaginary of contemporary Latin America.
Following this line of thought, my article situates the cultural construct of
the contemporary Bolivian "cholo" within the breakdown of a political
culture that can no longer interpellate convincingly the entirety of the socius
on the basis of the traditional homogeneous master discourses of "mestizaje"
and "nationalism". I assume in this paper that there is no point in attempting
to understand only the limitations of past ideologies, but to discern the new
cultural spaces in which oppositional practices ("civilization" vs.
"barbarism"; "nation vs. anti-nation") are no longer very well defined.
To elucidate what contemporary Bolivian paintings on "cholos" are
nowadays trying to express, I start this article with a general reflection on
phenomenology and on its limited capacity to understand the manifestations
of what can be called the postmodern sublime. I then proceed to trace the
distinctions between "cholos" and "mestizos". This distinction allows me to
return, in the last part of the paper, to a particular watercolor painting in order
to explain "cholaje" as a social expression of desublimation and resistance to
(seigneurial) authority.
4 See my article ''Testimonial Discourse and New Popular Trends in Bolivia", in Mediations,
Vol. 17, No.1 (December 1992) 50-59.
5 I follow here Alphonso Lingis' "Bodies That Touch Us", in Thesis Eleven, No. 36 (1993)
159-167.
6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL READING OF THE ANDES 173
7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 131-132.
174 JAVIER SAN.JINES
legal marriages between Indian nobility and Spaniards, they only tolerated
illicit unions between male Spaniards and low-status indigenous females.
The offspring of marriages between peninsular Spaniards and Indians was
alternatively called mestizo or "cholo", depending upon how much non-
Indian blood they could claim. Biological distinctions between Indian and
non-Indian becarne impossible to maintain, and "cholos", who belonged
neither to a pure Indian nor to a pure Spanish caste, constituted a thorny
problem for colonial bureaucrats.
It is in this ill-assorted universe of the mestizo strata of society that cultural
identities were articulated as either linked to the Indian, on the one hand, or
to the European, on the other. A distinction between mestizos and "cholos"
was then established: mestizo would be the strata closest to the Spaniards,
while "cholo" would designate those segments of the population closest to
the Indian component of society!!. This distinction, which gives an idea of
the concealed violence that runs within Bolivian society, was retained by 19th
century economic and political liberalism. Thus the mestizo-creole
"civilization" would eventually triumph over the "barbarian" and
"uncivilized" "cholo"-Indian sectors of Bolivian society. Since then, the
mestizo-creole component looks down upon the "cholo", reinforcing the
caste system through complex mechanisms of segregation and exclusion that
keep the urban "cholos" subjugated under the political system.
As helpful as this opposition between "cholos" and mestizos may be in
understanding the intricacies of a social situation inherited from the colonial
past, reality has found its way to confuse matters even further. This
complexity has to do with the fact the "cholos" have also learned to fight
back by shrewdly combining two competing ways of living, that of the
Indian peasants, who live close to the land and to a cosmology from which
they obtain and to which they attribute all their energy (mountains, rivers,
rocks, earth, stars, sun, and moon), and that of the mestizos, who live the
power myth of capitalism and attribute all their energy to commodity
fetishism. Brutally rejected by the social system, the "cholos" have thus
found their way to enter the cities through "populistic" means that combine
the support to mestizo-enlightened political figures with their increasing
economic power, something they are proud to show in rites and urban patron
festivals. Migrating from the countryside, "cholos" have become necessary
to the mestizo economy, providing ties with the rural agricultural producers.
In recent years, local political sociology has had to adapt its Marxian
11 See Silvia Rivera, "La Rafz: Colonizadores y Colonizados" in Xavier Alb6 and Raul
Barrios, editors, Violencias encubiertas en Bolivia, Vol. I (La Paz: CIPCA/Aruwiyiri,
1993),27-139.
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL READING OF THE ANDES 177
terminology and label these steadily growing new social sectors as "cholo"
bourgeoisie 12 •
As I indicated, it would be too simplistic to place "cholaje" within
capitalism and forget its complexity, its cultural "mess" (I think that this
complexity could be further explored through a chaos-theory model that
Cultural Studies should develop). Behind this ambiguous social category lies
the clashing combination of economic, ethnic, and cultural factors that make
it impossible to treat this new bourgeoisie in a linear way. In economic terms,
for example, this "cholo" bourgeoisie shows a modality of accumulation of
capital that is quite different from that of the traditional creole-mestizo
bourgeoisie. Indeed, this growing and powerful new sector was not
considered by the modernizing revolution of 1952 and was not born under
the protection of the nationalist state. Furthermore, the "cholos" nowadays
re-invest their capital gains within Bolivia, and have shunned away from the
manifestations of high culture. "Cholos" participate in ritual ceremonies and
festivals such as "ch' allas", baptisms, marriages and "presterios". "Cholos"
have also generated their independent media, an alternative media for
communication within and between marginalities, with strategies that defy
the upper sectors of society. How is this so?
Early in the ' 50s Indian peasants took one road to secure their neglected
communication rights: peasant broadcasts through commercial stations. Little
known and to date, unresearched, peasant broadcasting is a format in which
communicators do not own or run the stations - urban and commercial for
the most part - but have gained access to them at the earliest hours of the
day, when Aymara migrants listen while city dwellers continue to sleep.
Peasant communicators rent this "dead time" from the station owners, using
it either on a profit-sharing basis with them or by being paid to do
programming that targets the Aymara-speaking audience in the marginal
suburbs of La Paz and the outlying rural areas. The main objective is to
create communication ties between the Aymaras living in the city and their
communities of origin. This audience is not small at all: at the very least one
million people, in a country with a total population of seven million. Half of
them are located in La Paz and in its satellite city of EI Alto. The other half is
in thc ficld arcas of the northwestern region of La Paz, close to the borders
with Peru. La Paz has some eight hundred thousand people, of which easily
two thirds are Aymara migrants, and the neighboring EI Alto counts on
another four hundred thousand people, of which easily two thirds are also
such migrants. Together they constitute a strong "cholo"-Indian subaltern
12 A notion that Carlos Toranzo explores in his introduction to Fernando Mayorga's Max
Fernandez: fa politica del silencio (La Paz, Cochabamba: ILDIS/uMSS, 1991).
178 JAVIER SANJINES
culture in the country's main urban center and seat of government. The
growing political importance of this community is considerable, becoming
most evident in times of elections. Carlos Palenque, one of the key mestizo
political figures, understood this reality long ago.
Affectionately named "el compadre" (the godfather) by the migrant and
the dispossessed, Palenque set the foundation for a new form of political
action that included two women in his talk-shows. He then proceeded to buy
television and radio networks to consolidate his "Popular Radio and
Television Network". This network system rapidly became an "alternative"
institution of important micro-political signification. Indeed, when his talk-
show was closed, in 1988, by state authorities because Palenque had
interviewed a well-known narcotrafficker, the popular protest was
overwhelming. With popular backing, Palenque next moved swiftly to create
his own political party: "Conciencia de Patria"ICONDEPA (Awareness of
Fatherland). CONDEPA now plays a key role in national politics using
micro-political tactics that have been extremely successful - Palenque was
elected mayor of the city of La paz in the '80s, a position his wife,
"comadre" Monica, currently holds (Time Newsmagazine has recently
selected her as one of the most important young political figures of Latin
America).
CONDEPA, closely linked to television and radio talk-shows, is a new
political party that expresses the crisis of legitimation of the traditionally
dominant political system. CONDEPA comes from "below", representing
the "cholo"-Indian population that was never truly accepted by the upper-
class and its organic intellectuals. By means of a form of communication
increasingly based on emotionally charged images, "palenquismo" re-
articulates the political sphere at the same time as it desublimates the
mestizo-creole image that the national revolutionary elites created in order to
conform a homogeneous, rational, and progressively modern society. The
mestizo as a symbol is thus counteracted with the "cholo" as an expression of
the post-revolutionary sublime. Do contemporary Bolivian painters express
this new social situation?
13 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Leon S. Roudicz, trans. (New
York: Colombia University Press. 1982).
14 Jacques Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis", in Ecrits: A Selection, Alan Sheridan,
trans. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & co., 1977),11.
15 Simon Taylor, "The Phobic Object: Abjection in Contemporary Art", in Abject Art.
Repulsion and Desire in American Art. (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art,
1933),59-60.
180 JAVIER SANJINES
... La ropa que lleva en realidad no existe. Es para quedarse perplejo. El saco
ha existido como tal en tiempos preteritos, ha ido desapareciendo poco a poco,
segiin los remiendos que han cundido para conformar un saco, el verdadero,
pues no es obra de sastre, es obra de la vida un saco verdadero. Los primeros
remiendos han recibido algunos otros remiendos: estos a su vez han recibido
todavfa otros, y estos otros, todavfa muchos otros mIs, y asf, espesor de una
prenda, tanto mas verdadera cuanto mas pes ada y gruesa ...
(... The jacket really does not exist. It existed a long time ago, but it has been
disappearing little by little, being replaced by the patches which have been
forming a new jacket, the real one, which is not tailor made. The new jacket is
the product of time, something that can only be proved by its weight. The
value of the garment is in strict relation to its thickness. The more its weight,
the more its worth ... )
21 Robert Maria Dianotto, "The excremental sublime", in Essays in Postmodern Culture, Eyal
Amiran & John Unsworth, cds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), J41-142.
184 JAVIER SAN.JINES
aim to the unification of the subject with a transcendent totality, nor do they
express the postural schema of phenomenological thought. Both "cholos"
and "aparapitas" are moments of unsolved blockage, trying to escape the
grand narratives built by the nationalist state, whose overpowering force
blocks and paralyzes. By advocating the need for rupture, they may be
rejecting the improper use of hierarchy and opening the new "camp vision"
of an asocial sublime that is the ironic inversion of the totalizing
aestheticizations of the upper-classes, resisting unity and locating the force of
the postmodern sublime within the realm of an anti-aesthetic "difference".
This sublime strategy of ingestion and consumption of alcohol is the
privileged strategy of what Robert Dianotto has defined as "excremental
culture". This ironic release of annihilation is a surplus that cannot be
codified and inscribed in the imaginary community fabricated by
revolutionary nationalism. Its resistance to codification institutes at the same
time its absolute superfluity in relation to the symbolic order. Though hard to
predict, the "cholos" may be the "locus" of consciousness of the fictional
nature of overpowering structures that hinder the new subjects from
imagining new plots, new stories, new lives to be told. In Dario Antezana's
watercolor, the "cholos" are anal-retentive characters who survive a
repressive society by disrupting its order, and by transforming its Law into
pleasurable signs of oral ingestion.
But, can signification be reduced to porous bodies exhaling pollutions and
toxins? Will digestion resist the commodification of our lives? Should we
surrender to the ultimate impossibility of reconstructing radical politics other
than through digestive practices? If I am not mistaken, cultures can only be
sustained today as a critical practice if they assume an "arriere-garde"
position, that is to say, one which recognizes that different systems of
thought and ways of life coexist in Latin America and, obviously, in Bolivia.
Some complement modernity, others, as I have tried to show in this paper,
develop a disturbing postmodernity, and others maintain premodernity. All
of them are mixed in a "messy" culture. Following Fernando Calderon's
study on Latin American identities22 , I cannot think of a better mapping of
Bolivia's mixed temporalities than astronomy. Seen from the point of view
of modernity, social movements and traditional political parties have lost
their vital impulse, and their former order has been replaced by the big bang
of the "cholo" bourgeoisie; those subjects and actors who constructed history
are today fragmented and dispersed, and the new social practices and actors
are more expressive and festive than political. The social universe is like a
RICARDO MALIANDI
question cette identite; en tout etat de cause, il s'agit d'une pensee posee
autour du probleme identitaire et qui trouve en lui son soutien et, peut-etre,
ses propres voies qu' elle cherche depuis toujours.
Celui qui se pose Ie probleme de sa propre identite Ie fait, probablement,
parce qu'il n'est pas entierement sur de la detenir. Dans un sens
synchronique, on ali mente des doutes sur la specificite du phenomene latino-
americain, sur Ie fait qu'il soit "different" du "reste", de ce qui se trouve en
dehors de l' Amerique latine. Dans un sens diachronique, on Msite a croire si
"on est toujours" ce qu'''on a ete"!. L'identite synchronique represente
l' unite de l' Amerique latine (elle viendrait designer les traits partages par
l'ensemble des pays ou des peuples latino-americains par-dela une multitude
de differences). La dimension diachronique fait davantage allusion a
}'existence d'une histoire commune, au lien temporel qui persiste parmi les
changements operes depuis l' epoque de la conquete dans des endroits
differents du territoire latino-americain ; cette dimension evoque l'existence
de certains aspects invariants a travers les changements. Dans les deux sens
evoques, sans distinctions, les do utes sur l'identite latino-americaine sont lies
a une autoconscience indubitable de soi de I'homme latino-americain, une
conscience de soi au creur de laquelle s' entrecroisent I' arrogance et la
timidite. n y a une grande fierte d' etre latino-americain et, en meme temps de
maniere paradoxale, une certaine humilite exageree, voisin ant presque la
pudeur. Les peuples latino-americains ont fait la revolution et se sont liberes
de I'Europe. Or, il s'agit la d'une revolution inachevee car l'Europe et
I' Amerique du Nord ont continue a exercer des modalites de colonialisme
plus ou moins cacMes. La conscience de soi s'est donc structuree sous la
forme d'une conscience d'etre victime de I'injustice, comme une perception
renouvelee sans cesse du besoin de se liberer de ces chaInes. Dans les annees
cinquante, Ie versant intellectuel de cette conscience a produit ce que I'on
connalt aujourd'hui sous Ie nom de "tMologie de la liberation", d'ou est
issue tres rapidement une "philosophie de la liberation" a I'interieur de
laquelle s'est developpee, a son tour, une "ethique de la liberation". La
naissance de cette pen see ne veut pas dire qu'en Amerique latine d'autres
courants philosophiques plus ou moins "europeens" - meme avec des
innovations tres originales - ne se soient pas developpes. Ga ne veut pas dire
non plus que les representants de ces courants soient entierement depourvus
de to ute "autoconscience latino-americaine,,2, mais que les differentes
linguistique", veut dire qu'il est repris dans une perspective pour laquelle
l'intersubjectivite est assuree des Ie depart. Le "no us argumentons" se
substitue au 'Je pense": Ie "rationnel" echappe a la monadologie et se
transforme en dialogique.
Apel trouve Ie point de depart de sa reflexion dans une decouverte de
Peirce, developpee plus tard dans les theories semiotiques de Morris et de
Carnap: Ia "tridimensionalite" du Iangage (ou celle de sa "fonction de
signe"). Morris et Carnap avaient developpe une "semiotique" empirique
qu'ils divisaient deja en "semantique" (etude de la relation entre Ie signe et sa
reference objective), "syntaxe" (etude des relations des signes Ies uns aux
autres) et, finalement, "pragmatique" (etude de Ia relation entre Ie signe et
I'utilisateur ou l'interprete). Pour la pragmatique Ie Iangage etait une "action"
(pragma); mais puisque son point de vue etait purement empirique, ce
caractere pratique perdait sa veritable importance aux yeux de Ia semiotique,
restant limitee a s'interroger sur des questions purement psychologiques.
C'est cette perspective qu' Apel corrige. Selon lui, c'est dans Ia pragmatique
que l' on doit chercher Ies "conditions de possiblite et de validite"
fondamentales pour toute connaissance exprimee dans un langage. On
retrouve ici un deuxieme toumant connu sous la denomination de "toumant
pragmatique". Encore une fois, il ne s'agit pas de refouler la semantique et la
syntaxe mais de signaler qu'une semiotique reduite a ces deux volets reste
insuffisante. Apel - qui, sur ce point accompagne une orientation tres forte
de la semiotique postcarnapienne - remet a sa juste place la pragmatique. En
soulevant I'importance de la pragmatique, il nous montre une de de sa
pensee: des questions com me celIe de la verite ne peuvent se resoudre
exdusivement sur Ie plan semantique mais font appel a la relation
communicative et, done, au consensus 3 •
La notion de "pragmatique transcendantale" explique ainsi Ie titre du
principal ouvrage philosophique de Apel, La transformation de La
philosophie. L' application des deux toumants, Ie "toumant linguistique" et, a
son interieur, Ie "toumant pragmatique", a la philosophie transcendantale
issue de la tradition kantienne determine une "transformation semiotique".
Apel a signale que cette "transformation" represente la "reconstruction"
d'une transformation qui s'est produite dans la philosophie depuis les annees
60, d'une part, et de I'autre, elle represente un "programme" qu'il developpe
depuis Ie debut des annees 704 . Ce programme est un renouvellement de la
philosophie transcendantale grace a l'application des deux "tournants"
evoques precedemment. Dans ce parcours, i1 a pris part a plusieurs
la part des deux interlocuteurs, aussi bien d' Apel que de Dussel, pour
chercher des points en commun ou peut-etre une compIementarite. Et ils ne
sont pas seuls dans cette tache. Arturo Roig, par exemple, pour definir la
morale latino-americaine propose l' expression de "morale emergente" qui
prend appui dans la valeur de la "dignire humaine". n declare egalement que
cette morale se penche aussi sur Ie "toumant linguistique" si repandu, mais
avec un style different a l' ethique discursive qui voudrait proposer un
principe ethique. Selon Roig, cette morale se doit de reconstruire Ie "monde
des voix que tout discours nous transmet lorsqu'il integre 'un univers
discursif duquel il est son expression incontoumable"; en meme temps, elle
se doit de reconstruire "Ie regime categoriel en vigueur dans un univers
discursif comme c'est Ie cas, par exemple, dans l'opposition entre
'civilisation' et 'barbarie', ainsi que dans les successives resemantisations
que les categories signalent dans Ie processus historique,,12. Roig ne conteste
pas Ie fait que, apartir de cette perspective, on puisse postuler une "condition
ideale pour Ie dialogue", mais il signale egalement que cette premiere
condition en ferait appel a une deuxieme, une "condition ideale de travail".
En tout cas, il accepte clairement la compatibilite de la tradition latino-
americaine - qu'il synthetise avec Ie terme "morale de l'urgence" - et de
l'ethique discursive d'Apel 13 • Les deux partagent, a l'encontre du ''pensiero
debole" de Vattimo, par exemple, ou de l"'incertitude normative" proposee
par Derrida et Baudrillard, ou encore a l'encontre d'autres "faiblesses"
postmodemes du meme style, un "penser fort". Le terme evoque la "force"
en tant qu'une reference universaliste qu'implique en meme temps un
engagement social. Bien qu'il admette la cloture de la foi dans Ie "progres",
Roig partage avec Apel la croyance que l' ancien ideal kantien cosmopolite
ne se serait pas encore efface et il souligne Ie fait que cet ideal, dans la
mesure ou il ne nierait pas la relation dialectique avec l'univers latino-
americain, est une fac;on de Ie renforcer dans Ie cadre d'une reconnaissance
de la "dignite humaine,,14. n partage aussi la critique d' Apel a
I' ethnocentrisme du common sense propose par Rorty.
ApeI, de son cote, evoque Ies essais de Dussel pour demontrer qu'il y a des
relations entre l'ethique du discours et l'ethique de la liberation. Un de ces
essais suppose une relation de complementarite entre Ia "communaute ideale
de communication" et Ia "communaute ideale de vie", postulee par une
"philosophie transcendantale de Ia liberation". Une autre tentative essaye de
rapprocher I'interpellation de Ia "raison de I'autre", propre au discours
17 Cf. Ibid., p. 26. Au passage, Apel nous dit que dans cette ressemblance on retrouve encore
une fois la "dependance" de la phiolosophie latino-americaine par rapport 11 la philosophie
europeenne. Mais il signale. cgalement, qu'il ne veut pas faire valoir cette ohservation un
peu "malicieuse" commc argumcnt contre I'ethique de la liberation.
18 Cf.Ibid., pp. 28-29.
L'ETHIQUE DU DISCOURS ET DE LA LID ERAnON 199
19 Cf. Ibid., p. 31. Apel adhere a la these que, de nos jours, la fonction methodologique de la
prima phitosophia n'est plus assuree par I'ontologie (au sens aristotelicien du tenne) ni par
une philosophie transcendantale de la conscience (au sens donne par Kant ou par Husserl),
mais par une semiotique transcendantale qui pennet de comprendre de quelle fa<;on il est
possible de mettre en cause la "comprenension de I'autre" par Ie biais de "]'interpretation de
I'autre" dans Ie discours. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'une forme de vie differente, l'''autre'' est Ie sujet
d'une constitution de sens de monde differente a soi. Mais cette difference ne veut pas dire
que la comprehension de l'etre de l'autre soit differente de la comprehension de son propre
etre. L'interrogation sur les conditions de possibilite d'une comprehension valide n'a de
sens que si on presuppose I'identite d'une et la meme raison en nous et en les "autres". (cf.
ibid., p. 32).
20 Cf. Ibid., pp, 33-34.
21 Pour rna patt, je pense que, ala rigueur, Ie sceptique se refuse toujours a argumenter, soit
parce qu'il propose - et pratique - une "ahstention de tout jugement" (epochej d'une fa<;on
explicite, et par la meme il commet une "autocontradiction performative" (d'apres laquelJe,
je pense, qu'it n'afJirme rien); soit parce qu'il ridiculise son interloeuteur (ce qui constitue
une autre 1'a<;on de se soustraire au dialob'Ue). Je me suis deja oecupe de ce probleme que j'ai
evoque sous Ie nom de "trilemme d' Aristophane" (cf. Maliandi, R., 1990). J' ajouterai que Ie
"cynique", au sens defini par I'ethique de la liheration, est aussi une variante du sceptique:
c'est un sceptique qui dissimule son vrai caraetere parce qu'il fait semblanr de recourir a
I'm·gumentation.
200 RICARDO MALIANDI
c' est-a-dire, quelqu'un qui a des raisons pour fuir la refutation discursive, des
inten~ts economiques et politiques, par exemple. Mais tant qu'il ne participe
pas de l' argumentation il ne peut pas non plus mettre en cause la fondation
de l' ethique discursive; Ie probleme est alors de savoir si I' applicabilite
pratique de cette ethique peut etre remise en cause. Apel pense que la
difference principale avec I'ethique de la liberation se trouve dans la fac;on
d'aborder ce probleme. Le "defi" que l'ethique de la liberation pose a
l'ethique de la communication apparal't deja dans la these de Dussel selon
laquelle 10rsque Ie representant de l' ethique discursive commence a
argumenter avec Ie sceptique il se trouve concretement dans un systeme ou
regne la "raison cynique". Cette raison cynique est, d'apres Dussel, Ie pire
adversaire de l'ethique du discours, car tant que la discussion se tient a
I'interieur d'un registre academique, l'ethique reste impuissante pour deceler
ce cynisme.
Apel retorque que, si I' objection de Dussel etait juste, toute personne
faisant recours au disc ours philosophique pour parler, tel que nous Ie faisons,
de la relation entre l' ethique du discours et I' ethique de la liberation, tout
interlocuteur participant a ce deb at, ne sera qu'un "idiot utile" du systeme
capitaliste dominant. Ainsi, la violence devrait etre la seule pratique de
liberation valable. Dussel n'est pas trop precis ace sujet, puisque parfois il
encourage la revolution par les armes et parfois il s'incline sur des
"reformes" possibles aupres desquelles I'ethique du discours pourrait jouer
un rOle important sur Ie plan de la "prise de conscience", au sens donne par
Paulo Freire22 .
Du point de vue de la "partie B" de I'ethique du discours et par rapport a la
transition du "sceptique" au "cynique", Apel introduit deux remarques tres
importantes pour Ie debat que nous sommes en train d'analyser 23 .
En premier terme, il n'accepte pas que I'argumentation de l'ethique du
discours ait une fonction a I'interieur du systeme capitaliste. Les
argumentations sur lesquelles repose cette denonciation (qui vient de Dussel
mais aussi d'autres, par exemple d'Anton Leist avec quelques modifications)
ont des presuppositions qui ne peuvent pas etre supprimees: d' abord elles
doivent etre prises com me appartenant a un niveau de reflexion "superieur"
aux argumentations de la "raison cynique", un niveau qui permettrait de
distinguer, par exemple, la raison strategique (ou "cynique") de la raison
communicative, ou Ie "sceptique" du "cynique". Elle permettrait de
distinguer ceux avec qui on peut et on doit discuter de ceux sur qui on peut et
on doit discuter. Et bien, Ie discours argumentatif de l'ethique discursive est
Pour rna part, je crois en effet qu'une telle raison existe, qu'il y a une
limpide "rationalite de la raison", necessairement pre-argumentative ou, au
dire de Dussel, "prealable a tout exercice de la raison". Mais je ne crois pas
qu'elle soit essentiellement ou d'une fac;on primaire l"'experience de l'autre"
ni notre responsabilite a priori aupres de lui. La raison ethique originaire est,
a mon avis, pure et simplement opposition a la dimension conflictive.
L' exigence de resoudre ou d' attenuer toute situation de conflit met en
evidence un type d' attitude pratique (plus qu'une "experience"). Cette
attitude precede necessairement tout raffinement de I' argumentation. On peut
aller plus loin encore: c' est la condition de possiblite necessaire de
I' argumentation en general. Sur ce point je m' ecarte d' Apel. n pense que Ie
simple recours a I'argumentation presuppose que l'on ait reconnu et accepte
"depuis toujours" la "norme de base" selon Iaquelle tout conflit d'interets
do it etre surmonte a I'aide d'arguments. Je pense que I'exigence rationnelle
limpide ne porte pas encore sur les arguments mais seulement sur Ie besoin
d' eviter, resoudre ou attenuer Ie conflit. La sauvegarde, resolution ou
attenuation argumentatives ajoutent, pour ainsi dire, une "difference
specifique", tandis que Ie "genre" constitue Ie moment sans distinction de
cette exigence. La violence, comme appel aI'irrationnel, s'oppose sans doute
a se servir de I'argumentation. Mais Ia violence n'''evite'', ne "resout", ni
n'''attenue'' les conflits: simplement elle les dissout; et avec ce procede
I'harmonie est loin d'etre retrouvee. Je pense que la "raison ethique
originaire" est Me etroitement aI'exigence d'equilibre, d'equite, d'harmonie.
Le conflit et I'injustice brisent I'harmonie et cet attentat repugne a la
rationalite. Dans cette repugnance resident les racines les plus profondes de
I' exigence de "liberation".
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1973, Tran~formation der Philosophie (2 voL), Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1986, Estudios eticos, Barcelona, Alfa.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987, "Falibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit und Letztbegriindung", in
VVAA, 1987,pp. 116-211.
Apc!, Karl-Otto, 1990, Una etica de fa responsabilidad en fa era de La ciencia, Buenos Aires,
Almagesto, 1994, pp. 19-39.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1994, "A ctiea do discurso em face do desafio da filosofia da liberta;;:ao
latino-americana", en VV AA, 1994, pp. 19-39.
Dussel, Enrique, 1973, Para una hica de La liberacidn fatinoamericana, Buenos Aires, Siglo
XXI.
Dussel, Emique, I 994a, "Etica de la liberaci6n", en VVAA, 1994, pp. 145-170.
Dussel, Enrique, 1994b, Rica!ur, TayLor, Apel, Rorty and the Philosophy of Liberation, New
York, Humanities Press.
204 RICARDO MALIANDI
Maliandi, Ricardo, 1990, "El trilema de Arist6fanes y los presupuestos normativos del dialogo
cntico", in Critica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia, Mexico, XXII, 65 (aoiit
1990), pp. 43-55.
Maliandi, Ricardo, 1991, Transformaci6n y sintesis, Buenos Aires, Almagesto.
Maliandi, Ricardo, 1993a, Dejar la posmodemidad. La eticafrente al irracionalismo actual,
Buenos Aires, Almagesto.
Maliandi, Ricardo, 1993b, "Identidad, diferencia y universalidad en el contexto de America
Latina", Rio Cuarto (Argentina), ediciones del ICALA.
Roig, Arturo A., 1994, "La 'dignidad humana' y la 'moral de la emergencia' en America
Latina", en VV AA, 1994, pp. 171-186.
Scannone, Juan Carlos, 1990, Nuevo punto de partida de lafilosofia latinoamericana, Buenos
Aires, Guadalupe.
Ouvrages collectifs:
1987, Philosophie und Begrundung (Hrsg. von Forum fUr Philosophie bad Homburg),
Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.
1990, Ethik und Befreiung (Hrsg. von Raul Fomet-Betancourt), Aachen, Verlag der
Augustinus-Buchhandlung (Concordia, Reihe Monographien Nr. 4).
1992, Diskursethik oder Befreiungsethik? (Hrsg. von Raul Fomet-Betancourt), Verlag
der Augustinus-Buchhandlung (Concordia, Reihe Monographien Nr. 6).
1994, Etica do Discurso e Filosofia da Libertafoo. Modelos complementares, Sao
Leopoldo (Bresil), UNISlNOS.
;,MUERE 0 SOBREVIVE LA FILOSOFIA EN EL
CARLOS PALADINES
1. Introducci6n
La "crisis" y hasta la "muerte" de la filosoffa se ha anunciado en forma
rei terada, 10 cual a su vez es ejemplo elocuente de su persistencia a pesar de
sus limitaciones y los pronosticos sobre su fallecimiento en un futuro
proximo. Como pocas instituciones probadas por el tiempo ella ha logrado
vencer, tras reiteradas batallas, al polvo de los siglos y de modo similar a
Sfsifo, Rey de Corinto, parece condenada a levantar su legado desde la faldas
de la montana hasta su cima, y una vez coronada esta verlo caer, para
reiniciar la tarea de modo reiterado y etemo, con igual 0 mayor optimismo.
En este etemo renacimiento 10 importante es preguntarse por el momento
del desarrollo filosofico al que nos ha tocado asistir: el de una temible
glaciacion 0 anquilosamiento 0 el de una brill ante primavera: aunque
tam bien es posible que estemos asistiendo en el Ecuador a la confluencia de
uno y otro momento, transitando por el verticie 0 gozne de un momenta
historico en el que se descomponen y entierran algunas de la antiguas
formulas y se abren pasos nuevos y mas vigorosas altemativas, sobre todo en
el area de la ensenanza de la filosoffa, ese campo de marte, donde a nuestro
entender se librara en Ecuador la batalla por la renovacion de la filosoffa en
las proximas dccadas.
En efecto, la ensenanza de la filosoffa, tanto la que se imparte en los
centros de la educacion media como en las universidades, ha constitufdo en
Ecuador la principal yen mas de un caso la unica puerta de entrada de que se
disponfa para aeceder al templo de Minerva. En clara diferencia con otros
siglos, baste reeordar el XIX, en que la puerta de entrada a la filosoffa
dependio basicamente del interes individual y el espfritu autodidacta; hoy en
dfa el canal de comunieacion con la filosoffa esta sujeto, nos guste 0 no, a las
I Cfr. IX Congreso Interamericano de Filosoffa, Caracas, 1977. Vol. 1, tema 1, dedicado a "Ia
ensenanza de la filosoffa en America Latina"; el ecuatoriano Manual Augustin Aguirre
expuso una poncncia sobre "La Filosoffa de los Planes". Tambien puede consultarse el XI
Congreso Interamericano realizado en Guadalajara cuyos trabajos fueron publicados en
Filosofia del Lenguaje, de la ciencia, y de los derechos humanos y problcmas de su
ensenanza, Edt. Unam, 1985. Del autor consultar: "Los programas de filosofia del
bachillcrato", en: Rev. de la Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica del Ecuador, p. 185, Ano XV,
Nro. 47, Agosto 1987. Quito-Ecuador; este analisis fue ampliado en la poncncia sustentada
en Guayaquil, Nov. 1987, V Congreso Nacional de Filosofia. Tambien puede consultarse:
Abelardo Villegas, "Sobre el Estudio de la Filosofia Latinoamericana", en: Rev. de Historia
de la Idcas, Nro. 10, pp. 207-88. CELA, 1990; Y Gregor Sauerwald, "Los programas de
ensenanza de la filosoffa cn el Ecuador", en: Rev. de Historia de la Ideas, del Centro de
Estudios Latinoamericanos, CELA, de la Universidad Cat6lica de Quito, Nro. 11-12, 1991-
92.
LA FILosoFfA EN EL ECUADOR 207
2 Cfr. mi ensayo: "C6mo redistribuir el capital educativo?: debate sobre la equidad del sistema
educativo en los afios noventa", en: Rev. Ecuador Debate. Nro. 29. Quito, Agosto 1992.
208 CARLOS PALADINES
2.2.2 Las condiciones objetivas son tanto 0 mas deprimentes que las
actitudes y valores que se pueden descubrir en el ejercicio docente. Factores
de indole economic a y social que no es el momenta para desbrozar: la
disminucion de las asignaciones del Presupueto General del Estado para el
area de la educaci6n, el deterioro de los sueldos del magisterio, el desface
entre el area rural y la urbana, entre el mundo del trabajo y el de la
ensefianza, el analfabetismo y la injusta distribucion de recursos y
oportunidades educativas, ... configuran un cuadro en el que se destaca no
solo el aumento de los pobres y los indigentes sino tambien la disminuci6n
de su capital educativo y sus posibilidades profesionales, con la
4 Cfr. Eduardo Rabossi, "Ensefiar filosoffa y aprender a filosofar", en: Filosoffa del lenguaje,
de la ciencia y de los derechos humanos, p. 201, XI Congreso Interamericano de Filosoffa,
Guadalajara, Edt. Unam, 1985. Jorge Gracia, "Problemas en la ensefianza de la filosoffa en
Ibero-America", en: Filosoffa del Lenguaje, de la cicncia y de los derechos humanos, p. 219.
210 CARLOS PALADINES
5 Paulo Freire ha resumido las principales Iimitaciones que estimula tal tipo de ensefianza en
las siguientes: -EI cducador es sicmpre quien cduca; el educando, cI que es cducado. -EI
educador es quien sabe; los cducandos quienes no saben. -EI educador es quien piensa; los
educandos son los objetos pensados. -EI cducador es quien habla; los cducandos quienes
escuchan d6cilmente. -EI cducador es quien disciplina; los educandos los indisciplinados. -
EI educador es quien opla y prescribe su opci6n; los educandos quienes siguen la
prescipci6n. -EI educador es quien acrna, los educandos son aquellos que tiene la ilusi6n de
que actuan, en la actuaci6n del cducador. -EI cducador es quien escoge el contenido
programitico, los cducandos a quienes jamas se escucha, se acomodan a cl. -EI cducador
identifica la autoridad del saber con su aUloridad funcional, la que opone anlag6nicamente a
la libertad de los educandos. Son estos quienes deben adaptarse a las delerminaciones de
aque!. -Finalmente, el educador es el sujelo del proceso; los educandos, meros objetos. efT.
Pcdagogfa del Oprimido, p. 78, Lima, Edt. Universidad Nacional de San Marcos, 1971.
LA FILOSOFiA EN EL ECUADOR 211
R Cfr. Arturo Andres Roig, "La 'Historia de la Ideas' cinco lustros despues", en: Rev. Historia
de las Ideas, Nros. I y 2, reedici6n, Quito, Edt. Banco Central del Ecuador, 1984.
9 Cfr. Ministerio de Educaci6n y Cultura, Plan y Program as para cl Bachillerato en
Humanidades, p. 5, Quito, 1978.
218 CARLOS PALADINES
10 Asistieron a las reuniones de trabajo presididas por Heman Malo: Rodolfo Agoglia, Emilio
Cerezo, Samuel Guerra, Carlos Paladines, Nelson Reascos, Arturo Roig, entre otros.
LA FILOSOFiA EN EL ECUADOR 219
12 crr. Informe del Lcdo. Napoleon H. Lara, Director de la Escuela de Filosoffa y Ciencias
Socio-Econ6micas, al Dr. Galo Cantos Oviedo, Decano de la Facultad de Filosoffa y
Ciencias de la Educacion, Quito, 1984.
13 Cfr. Gregor Sauerwald, "Los programas de ensefianza de la filosoffa en el Ecuador", en:
Rev. de Historia de la Ideas, del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, CELA. de Ia
Universidad Cat6lica de Quito, Nro. 11-12, pp. 211-212. Quito, 1991-92.
222 CARLOS PALADINES
3.3 Autocritica
Al igual que los programas de afios anteriores, los del 84 pecan por la escasa
participacion de los docentes de Filosoffa en las fases de elaboracion,
divulgacion y aplicacion, aspecto este recurrente en la programacion
curricular ecuatoriana, y uno de cuyos efectos es que muy poco personal esta
capacitado para poner en practica los ofrecido como alternativa.
Este desface entre las "loables y buenas intenciones" y la praxis educativa,
entre 10 que preven los programas y 10 que se hace en las aulas, descansa en
condiciones objetivas y subjetivas que nuestro "reforrnismo verbal" no logra
cambiar. Este desajuste entre la teona y la realidad, entre el "deber ser" y el
"ser", si bien para su correccion depende del empefio puesto por el hombre
para trazar su propio destino, descansa tambien en condiciones materiales
minimas, cuya reforma no se ve factible en un futuro inmediato, 10 cual nos
obliga a preyer para el Ecuador una fase de glaciacion en el desarrollo de la
filosoffa en los proximos alios.
14 Idem, p. 209.
LA FILOSOFiA EN EL ECUADOR 223
16 Cfr. mi ensayo sobre "Filosoffa e historia de las ideas en la dccada de los 70: el caso
Ecuador", en: Rev. Cuitura, Quito, Edt. Banco Central del Ecuador, Nro. II, Sept.- Die.
1981.
LA FILOSOFiA EN EL ECUADOR 227
intelectual con bases suficientes para comenzar a reelaborar toda una teona
de la cultural ecuatoriana.
IN LATIN AMERICA
LEONOLNE
National Autonomous University of Mexico
One interesting debate that has been taking place in Latin America in recent
years has been around the classical epistemological problem of the rationality
of beliefs, especially the rationality of belief choice, and how it is possible
for us to consider that some of our beliefs are objective anellor true, that is to
say how it is possible for us to say something objective anellor true about
reality. Thus, one of the main issues in this debate hinges around the
elucidation of terms such as 'objectivity', 'truth' and 'rationality'.
The work of leading Latin-American figures such as Mario Bunge
(Argentinean, resident in Canada) and Luis Villoro (Mexican) has set up
good grounds for such a debate. I will not, and cannot deal with all major
recent proposals, so I will restrict myself to argue on behalf of the view I
myself endorse.
Ezequiel de Olaso - another leading authority in epistemological matters
in our part of the world - has correctly stated that Luis Villoro has written the
most important and complete theory of knowledge, not only in Latin
America, but in the Spanish-speaking world (XITI Interamerican Congress of
Philosophy, Bogota, Colombia, July 1994). My discussion is based upon a
critical appraisal of that work (Villoro 1982) and the ensuing debate that has
taken place since the publishing of this book (for some criticism of it, see for
instance Cabrera and Dfaz 1987; Moulines, Olive, Pereda, Perez Ransanz
and Salmer6n, in Garz6n Valdes and Salmer6n (eds.) 1993; as well as Olive
1984 and 1988a, and Perez Ransanz).
Knowledge
One of the main contributions of Villoro has been to argue for the
elimination of the condition of truth in the analysis of knowledge, that is in
the analysis of the proposition "S knows that p". Let us recall that the
traditional analysis of "S knows that p" is as follows:
A person S knows that p if and only if
a) S believes that p;
b) 'p' is true; and
truth "independent of the reasons a subject has", but then "nobody can assert
it and thus nobody can judge whether S knows" (idem., p. 183).
Ulises Moulines has summarized this problem very well: "the condition of
truth seems to block any attempt whatsoever to use [the traditional
definition], not as definition, but as a general criterion of knowing. The
reason is simple: we do not have any adequate criterion of truth, but such a
criterion must be presupposed if we want to introduce a criterion of
knowing" according to the traditional definition (Moulines 1993, p. 13).
Moulines demands that what he calls "the platonic theory of knowledge" -
the traditional definition - be not only a nominal definition, but also a theory,
and "that means that it claims to have application cases with respect to which
the theory itself decides whether or not they are genuine. In other words,
besides offering a definition which is formally correct and compatible with
the current uses of language, it is a matter of offering a criterion of
knowledge, that is, to give standards of universal applicability to decide
whether a person does or does not know" (idem., p. 12).
Thus Villoro abandons the condition of truth in the analysis of knowledge
and redefines the notion of knowledge without such a condition. This step
can have just a limited scope or it can be very ambitious intending to
eliminate the problem of the elucidation of truth as an important one within a
theory of knowledge. In the first, restricted sense, this move certainly helps
to avoid the sort of problems Villoro and Moulines have shown for the
traditional definition of truth. In the second sense, it would suppose that
nothing more is to be said about truth within the perspective of the theory of
knowledge.
I claim that the first one is the correct stance. As a matter of fact, it seems
to me that the theory of knowledge, in recent years, has been widely
concerned with this issue, even if the condition of truth is removed from the
definition of knowledge. Nonetheless it must be said that several authors do
not agree with this move. Once again, in the Latin-American context see for
instance Moulines in the above mentioned paper, or Carlos Pereda (1993).
If we acknowledge that a theory of knowledge must deal with problems of
generation and explanation of knowledge, as much as it must deal with
problems of justification of beliefs, then it can be easily seen that the
elucidation of truth must continue to be a central problem.
This much was clearly acknowledged by Luis Villoro himself in his book,
when he granted that although the condition of truth had to be removed from
the definition of knowledge, truth - understood according to Tarski's theory
of truth, and construed by Villoro in terms of correspondence - had to be
admitted as the right elucidation of truth, and the one useful for his theory of
knowledge (cf. Villoro 1982, p. 76 and ss., and Villoro 1990, p. 74).
232 LEONOLNE
In his more recent participation in this debate, Villoro made it clear that an
elucidation of truth is necessary for a theory of knowledge, but also that that
elucidation is required when we want to go beyond the epistemological
problem proper, namely - according to him - the problem of the justification
of our beliefs. According to Villoro a distinction must clearly be drawn
between two kinds of questions, since they demand answers at different
levels: "One question is epistemological, 'what can we know?' the other is
ontological, 'what really exists?"'. Villoro adds: ''The analysis of the
conditions of justified beliefs does not necessarily imply an answer to the
latter. In order to answer it we must pass from the justification of knowledge
to the explanation of knowledge. Since there are justified beliefs, what must
exist to explain them? This is a metaphysical question ... Ontological realism
is the most reasonable explanation of the existence of justified beliefs"
(Villoro 1993, p. 340).
Thus, in order to explain knowledge, Villoro thinks that truth must be
construed in terms of a correspondence theory, and this view goes hand in
hand with the metaphysical conception known as "ontological realism".
According to Villoro, ontological realism says: ''There is a real world, the
existence of which does not derive from subjectivity. Thus, the independent
reality - independent with respect to subjects - must be put forward as the
explanation of intersubjectivity" (idem.). In turn, since "every knowledge is
subjectively conditioned ... objectivity must be linked to intersubjectivity".
Objectivity is understood in terms of intersubjective agreement; and this kind
of agreement is possible due to the independent existence of reality with
respect to the subjects; thus the independent reality explains intersubjective
agreement, that is to say, it explains objectivity.
To sum up, truth was eliminated as a condition in the definition of
knowledge, but it now reappears to account for the possibility of knowledge.
For, in order for there to be knowledge at all, there must be objectively
sufficient reasons. But there can be objective reasons only if there is an
independent reality - independent of subjects and of conceptual schemes -
and furthermore, we must assume that truth is correspondence between our
judgments and reality, and that, Villoro says, is "the only rational and
sufficient explanation of the objectivity of our reasons" (Villoro 1982, p.
181).
As a matter of fact, as we have just seen, for a position such as Villoro's,
truth cannot be understood but as correspondence between judgments and
reality, since this conception of truth, alongside his ontological realism, is
what he needs to avoid an ontological relativist position. A position he is
most willing to avoid due to his explicit acceptance of an epistemological
relativist position, and the need to counterbalance it.
TRUTH AND REALISM 233
Xl X2 X3
X I +X2 X 2+X3 XJ+X3
X I +X 2+X 3
TRUTH AND REALISM 235
The crucial point is that there is nothing in that world that in itself decides
the question as to how many objects there are. The question cannot be settled
by direct comparison with that world. Rather, we have to have a specific
notion of an object, which is provided by specific conceptual frameworks,
before we can answer the question of how many objects there are. It should
be clear that according to this conception there are real objects existing in the
real world. It is not that objects are creations of the mind. But in tum, objects
are not independent of conceptual schemes. Thus, in this respect this position
is similar to that of Kuhn's: ontology, what there is in the world, is not
independent of the conceptual schemes human beings use to know reality
and to transform it.
If people like Kuhn or Putnam are right in this respect, then truth as
correspondence between language and an objective reality (in the sense of
the platonic tradition, that is as completely independent of rational beings
and their conceptual resources - cf. Sosa 1988, pp. 351-52), can no longer be
accepted. Because of this, Putnam suggests that truth "is some sort of
(idealized) rational acceptability - some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs
with each other and with our experiences as tlwse experiences are
themselves represented in our belief system - and not correspondence with
mind-independent or discourse-independent 'states of affairs'" (Putnam
1981, pp. 49-50).
Conceptions such as Kuhn's or Putnam's are compatible, and very useful,
for a theory of knowledge that takes seriously the idea that knowledge is
something that is socially constructed according to human interests. Putnam
for instance, claims that "There is no God's Eye point of view that we can
know or usefully imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual
persons reflecting interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories
subserve" (Putnam 1981, p. 50).
Thus far we have seen positions such as Villoro's, which are externalists
(this is also Bunge's position, cf. Bunge 1977, 1979, and 1985), as opposed
to that of Putnam's and Kuhn's, which are internalists (to use Putnam's own
characterization; cf. 1981 chapter 3). For the externalist a belief is true or
false by virtue of something distinct of and external to the web of beliefs
itself, something that is out there in the real world. Thus the externalist draws
a clear distinction between truth and justification, and construes truth as a
sort of correspondence between beliefs and states of affairs. The internalist
on the other hand, believes that all our concepts, including our basic
ontological categories, depend on our conceptual resources by means of
which we interact with the world. What we take the world to be, is at least
partially constituted by our knowledge of it. Thus truth should be analyzed in
terms of the reasons we have to believe. There is thus, according to this view,
236 LEON OLIVE
Truth
Let us now move on to see how truth can be conceived from the perspective I
am defending here. As it was remarked previously, truth will be understood
both as rational acceptability under optimal epistemic conditions, as well as
adequacy to reality. What this amounts to, we shall see in a moment; for the
time being, I want to distinguish between "adequacy" to reality and
"correspondence" with reality.
"Correspondence" between language and reality is usually understood in
the sense of propositions "corresponding" to, or stating, a state of affairs
which is taken to be objective in the sense assumed by the platonic tradition.
That is to say, it is assumed that propositions correspond to a world of facts
TRUTH AND REALISM 237
and objects that has a built-in structure, and thus objects and facts are given
independently of conceptual schemes or frameworks.
"Adequacy" in the sense that will be put forward in the following section,
is understood as adequacy between propositions - which can be stated, and
exist, because there are conceptual frameworks where they can be formulated
meaningfully -, and facts and objects the existence of which is likewise
dependent on conceptual frameworks. The difference thus between
"correspondence" and "adequacy" has to do more with the conception as to
the way in which reality exists and is constituted, and therefore with what it
is that propositions correspond to, or are adequate to, than with the kind of
relationship involved between propositions and reality.
Let us then turn to examine the proposal that truth should be understood
both in terms of rational acceptability and adequacy to reality. By means of
the conception here proposed it is claimed that we can overcome the
objection quite often raised against epistemic conceptions of truth, such as
Putnam's or Habermas', namely that it is a problem for them to explain why
a rational consensus guarantees an epistemic access to reality (cf. Habermas
1973b; for criticism of this position as stated by Putnam, see Perez Ransanz
1992 and forthcoming).
reality. But we can still claim that this is the case only by reference to the
conceptual frameworks where the proposition is meaningful and can be
understood.
This is to say that if we admit that facts are not independent of conceptual
frameworks, and furthermore that conceptual frameworks are determinant in
the constitution of facts, then, that p is a fact is not independent of the good
reasons there are in the relevant conceptual framework to accept the
proposition 'p'.
Once again, this is the core thesis of internal realism: true sentences (or
propositions) are adequate to reality, for the facts they describe really exist.
But their existence depends on the conceptual frameworks where 'p' is
meaningful. There is no entity in reality, independently of the conceptual
framework, that is the fact that makes the relevant proposition true (that
corresponds to that proposition). Each conceptual framework "cuts" reality in
such a way that there are facts that make certain propositions true. Thus, if
'p' is true, then there is a double implication:
i) that p is a fact,
and since p is a fact, p really exists, but only by reference to the conceptual
frameworks where 'p' is meaningful. Thus, since the existence of p is not
independent of its relationship with the relevant conceptual frameworks, it
follows that:
ii) within the relevant conceptual frameworks it is possible to adduce
reasons to accept 'p' and there cannot be good reasons to doubt that p is a
fact.
To sum up, if 'p' is true, p is a fact. But if p is a fact, it is not so
independently of the relevant conceptual frameworks. Thus it is always
possible - at least in principle - to find good reasons within those relevant
frameworks to accept 'p' under optimal epistemic and dialogical conditions.
Optimal epistemic conditions can be understood Ii la Putnam in the preface
to Realism with a Human Face (1990): "By an ideal epistemic situation I
mean something like this: If I say 'there is a chair in my study', an ideal
epistemic situation would be to be in my study with the lights on or with day-
light streaming through the window, with nothing wrong with my eyesight,
with an unconfused mind, without having taken drugs, or being subjected to
hypnosis, and so forth, and to look and see if there is a chair there. Or, to
drop the notion of 'ideal' altogether, since that is only a metaphor, I think
there are better and worse epistemic situations with respect to particular
statements" (p. viii).
By optimal dialogical conditions I mean those Habermas has widely
defended as highly relevant for epistemological purposes, and for the
elucidation of truth (cf. Habermas 1973a, I 973b): those conditions where
TRUTH AND REALISM 239
there is no other interest except the interest in mutual understanding, and
where there is no power exercise except the power of the best argument.
Academic life, fortunately, sometimes offers instances of situations where
these conditions are met, say in seminar rooms.
Thus, the claim here is that an adequate elucidation of truth is as follows:
and ')ustification" are different, and that they answer different questions,
these questions nonetheless are intimately connected.
Villoro claims that the proposition "'p' is true although it is not acceptable
by every rational being under optimal epistemic and dialogical conditions"
may be false, or may be not sufficiently justified, but it cannot be
contradictory. From the point of view here defended, it is a contradiction.
To see that this is so, we can recall that, according to (T), if 'p' is true,
then p is a fact, and it is so not only by reference to my conceptual
framework but by reference to any other conceptual framework where 'p'
can be stated with the same meaning. Thus, under optimal epistemic and
dialogical conditions, no one can rationally reject 'p'.
Now the question can be raised: what do we need for the elucidation of
truth analyzed here? Furthermore, it can be claimed that we do not need the
distinction between "objectivity" and "truth" argued for here (as a matter of
fact this has been claimed both by Cristina di Gregori,1990, and Ana Rosa
Perez Ransanz, 1988 and 1993a).
The central answer to these objections is that our elucidation of truth is
important from the perspective of a theory of knowledge to understand how
it is possible for knowledge - defined as Villoro has done, that is in terms of
beliefs and objectively sufficient reasons, and thus knowledge being fallible
and corrigible - to be nonetheless genuine knowledge of the real world. But
where the notion of the "real world" following Kuhn and Putnam is not
understood in the platonic tradition, but in terms of internal realism.
In order to understand this we have had to analyze the concepts of
"objectivity", "truth" and "knowledge". Furthermore, we have shown that it
is necessary to be clear as to what reality we are talking about and what it
means to have epistemic access to reality.
The key to genuine epistemic access to reality can be found in the link
between the notions of "knowledge" and "truth" as we have analyzed them.
The notion linking these two is "rational acceptability" - although it should
be stressed that none of the former reduces to the latter -. Knowledge,
through objectively sufficient reasons, offers guarantees of rational
acceptability under optimal epistemic conditions. This is to say, when there
are objectively sufficient reasons to accept 'p', it is reasonable to believe that
'p' is acceptable under optimal epistemic conditions. But this kind of
acceptability is already - as we have seen - one of the conditions of truth.
This is then the crucial link between knowledge and truth. But in tum, truth
is also adequacy to reality. So we have here the passage from knowledge to
reality.
Let us remember that according to (T), the truth of a proposition 'p'
depends on the conceptual framework where 'p' is formulated, but it does
242 LEONOLNE
December 13,1994.
TRUTH AND REALISM 243
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Bunge, Mario 1977, The Furniture of the World, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Bunge, Mario 1979, A World of Systems, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Bunge, Mario 1985, Racionalidad y Realismo, Alianza Universidad, Madrid.
Cabrera, Isabel and Diaz, Jose 1987, "Del saber y la sabiduria", Revista Latinoamericana de
Filosoffa, Vol. XIII, No.2 (July 1987), pp. 195-212.
Garz6n Valdes, Emesto and Salmer6n, Fernando (eds.) 1993, Epistemologfa y Cultura, En
torno a la obra de Luis Villoro, UNAM, Mexico.
Gettier, Edmund 1963, "Is justified true belief knowledge?" in Analysis, Vol. 23, pp. 121-123.
Gregori di, Cristina (ed.) 1990, "Sobre Conocimiento, Sociedad y Realidad de Le6n Olive",
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia, Vol. XVI, No.3, November 1990, pp. 319-337.
Habermas, Jiirgen 1973a, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests", Philosophy of
the Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No.2, June 1973, pp. 157-189.
Habermas, Jiirgen 1973b, "Wahrheitstheorien", in H. Fahrenbach (ed.), Wirklichkeit und
Reflexion, Pfullingen, 1973, pp. 211-265.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1983, "Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability", PSA, Vol. 2,
pp. 669-88, Philosophy of Science Association.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1991, "The road since Structure", PSA 1990, Vol. 2, pp. 3-13, Philosophy of
Science Association, 1991.
Moulines, Ulises 1982. Exploraciones Metacientificas, Alianza Universidad, Madrid.
Moulines, Ulises 1991, Pluralidad y Recursion, Alianza Universidad, Madrid.
Moulines, Ulises 1993, "Platonismo vs relativismo en la teoria del saber", in Garz6n Valdes y
Salmer6n (eds.) 1993, pp. 11-22.
Olive, Leon 1984, "ViIIoro: sobre objetividad, verdad y saber", Critica 48, December 1984,
pp.53-78.
Olive, Leon 1988a, Conocimiento, Sociedad y Realidad, Problemas del aruilisis social del
conocimiento y del realismo cientifico, Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, Mexico.
Olive, Leon (ed.) J988b, Racionalidad, Siglo XXIfUNAM, Mexico.
Olive, Le6n 1993a "Respuesta a "Verdad y realidad" de Ana Rosa Perez Ransanz", Revista
Latinoamericana de Filosojfa, Vol. XIX, No.2, November 1993, pp. 339-352.
Olive, Le6n 1993b, "Sobre verdad y realismo", in Garzon Valdes y Salmeron (eds.) 1993, pp.
63-85.
Pereda, Carlos 1993, "Del saber y de la servidumbre", in Garz6n Valdes y Salmeron (cds.)
1993, pp. 153-168.
Perez Ransanz, Ana Rosa 1988, "Presentacion de Conocimiento, Sociedad y Realidad de Leon
Olive", Dianoia 1988, pp. 233-37.
Perez Ransanz, Ana Rosa 1992, "Verdad y justificacion", Dianoia 1992, pp. 85-93.
Perez Ransanz, Ana Rosa 1993a, "Verdad y realidad: comentarios a la propuesta de Leon
Olive", Revista Latinoamericana de Filosoffa" Vol. XIX, No.2, Noviembre de 1993, pp.
327-337.
Perez Ransanz, Ana Rosa 1993b, "EI realismo de Villoro", in Garzon Valdes y Salmeron
(eds.) 1993, pp. 39-62.
Perez Ransanz, Ana Rosa (forthcoming), Kuhn y e! Cambio Cient(fico, Fondo de Cultura
Economica, Mexico.
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Putnam, Hilary 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press.
244 LEONOLNE
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Putnam, Hilary 1990, Realism with a Human Face, Harvard University Press.
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Vol. XXII, Mexico, 1990, pp. 73-92.
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(eds.) 1993, pp. 331-350.
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY:
A PERSONAL REpORT
MARIO BUNGE
Introduction
What follows is a summary of my work in the general philosophy and
methodology of science and technology, as well as in the philosophy of some
of their various branches. There is also a glance at my work in value theory
and ethics insofar as it relates to science and technology. Finally all these
various pieces are shown to be components of a new philosophical system
hoped to be in harmony with contemporary science and technology and
moreover one capable of stimulating their advancement.
1. Apprenticeship
My philosophical apprenticeship was unusually lengthy and unorthodox: it
took two decades and did not involve attending any philosophy courses. In
fact, I taught myself philosophy between 1936 and 1956. My teachers were
books, journals, and a few amateurs like myself. On the other hand I was a
regular physics student between 1938 and 1944. My first papers and my
doctoral dissertation were in theoretical atomic and nuclear physics. I was
lucky to work under the supervision of Dr. Guido Beck (1903-1988) from the
moment he landed in Buenos Aires in 1943. He was an Austrian exile who
had been an assistant to Werner Heisenberg in Leipzig, and had produced a
large number of original papers and long review articles in a variety of
subjects.
However, my earliest intellectual love was philosophy. So much so, that
my first philosophy paper was published in 1939, whereas my first physics
paper appeared five years later, and my latest in 1983. I went into physics for
the love of philosophy, for I wished to refute the influential idealist doctrines,
now nearly forgotten, expounded in the 1930s by the astrophysicists Sir
Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans. The aim of my doctoral dissertation
(1952) was to find out whether relativistic quantum mechanics preserved
anything resembling Bohr's orbits: alas, it turned out that it does not.
Quantons, as I call the things that "obey" the quantum theory, are quite
different from classons.
Thus, from the start I studied science for philosophical reasons. But, once I
thought that I had acquired a scientific frame of mind and background, I
began to approach philosophy in a scientific way. So, I was a philosopher
among scientists and a scientist among philosophers - which, I am afraid,
endeared me to neither.
My first work in the philosophy of science was a book-length criticism of
Reuben Osborn and Wilhelm Reich's combination of Freud with Marx. My
thesis - inspired in my readings of Russell's Problems of Philosophy and
some Marxist works - was that psychoanalysis is neither scientific nor
compatible with Marxism. I wrote that essay in the summer of 1938, shortly
before being admitted into the Facultad de Ciencias Flsicomatematicas of the
Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Fearing a police requisition of my home -
which eventually came to pass - I gave the typescript for safekeeping to a
physician-philosopher friend who, in tum, lost it. Good riddance.
My first published philosophical essay was "Introducci6n al estudio de los
grandes pensadores" (1939), a long and pretentious commentary on a number
of philosophical doctrines. In 1943 I published a criticism of classical
positivism inspired in Emile Meyerson, and two philosophico-historical
booklets, one on Newton's work and the other on Maxwell's theory of the
electromagnetic field. Nature and Beck published short favorable reviews of
both booklets. That same year I conducted a private seminar on the problem
of causality at the Universidad Obrera Argentina, which I had founded five
years earlier, and which was closed down by the military dictatorship at the
end of 1943, when it had a total of 1,000 students and 50 teachers.
In 1944 I launched Minerva, a philosophical journal devoted to the defense
of rationalism (in the broad sense) in the face of the Nazi onslaught on
reason. In this endeavor I was helped by the philosopher Risieri Frondizi -
who much later was elected rector of the Universidad de Buenos Aires - as
well as by my lifelong friend Heman Rodriguez. There I published "l,Que es
la epistemologia?", perhaps the first general discussion in Spanish on the
nature of the philosophy of science, and one that was to be often quoted.
Presumably the only noteworthy ideas of this paper were that (a) philosophy
is nothing but the theory of science, (b) philosophy is unique among all the
disciplines in that its own study is philosophical, and (c) these ideas can be
elucidated with the help of certain algebraic notions. Half a century later I
still subscribe to (b) and (c) but reject (a) most vehemently if only because it
leaves out ontology and ethics - as I noted gleefully in the paper.
In a note on "Precursores, predecesores y predictores" (1944) I criticized
the histories of ideas limited to the search for precursors, in denying the
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 247
2. Methodology of Science
My main contribution to the methodology of science is my two-volume work
Scientific Research (1967). This is a systematic treatise that starts by
describing the scientific approach and goes on to discuss concept,
classification, definition, problem, hypothesis, law, theory (statics and
dynamics), explanation, prediction, rational action, observation,
measurement, experiment, and scientific inference. Some of the salient points
of this work follow.
Psychoanalysis and parapsychology are just as pseudoscientific as
dowsing. It is not only that some of their hypotheses are irrefutable, as
Popper had pointed out. Others are refutable and as a matter of fact have
been refuted - as Grlinbaum was to note later on in his Foundations of
Psychoanalysis (1984). What is wrong with those disciplines is that they are
groundless and non-naturalistic; they propose no explanatory mechanisms
and have not added a single law to psychology; and they make no precise
predictions. They are groundless in that they are not based on any body of
scientific knowledge; moreover, they explicitly reject experimental
psychology and neuroscience. They are non-naturalistic in the sense that they
postulate the existence of the immaterial soul. To top it all, the
parapsychological experiments are methodologically flawed (they lack
adequate controls and suffer from suitable statistical sampling); and
psychoanalists make no experiments at all. I have returned several times to
the fascinating problem of pseudoscience, e.g., in Vol. 6 of my Treatise
(1983), Seudociencia e ideologfa (1985), "A skeptic's beliefs and disbeliefs"
(1991), and in the replies to the critics of this paper - in particular P. K.
Feyerabend and R. Thom. The examination of pseudoscience serves various
purposes: it helps define the concept of science, evaluate philosophies of
science (by the number of pseudosciences that they admit), and disabuse the
gullible. Besides, it is fun.
Contrary to the positivist textbooks, which start at the end, namely with
data, I started with problems, to which I devoted an entire long chapter. (I
had learned this from my physics teacher, who often began his presentations
by listing half a dozen topical open problems which he urged us to tackle.) In
particular, I sketched a formal logic of problems. But every problem is
introduced against some background knowledge: one never starts from
250 MARlO BUNGE
Moreover, the facts a theory refers to are not to be mistaken for the empirical
evidence relevant to the theory. This distinction is particularly important in
the case of theories that purport to represent things - such as electrons and
nations - that are inaccessible to the senses. The standard interpretation of
the quantum theory rests on this confusion between reference and test, by
holding that every formula of the theory refers to some experimental
situation. (More on this in Sect. 6.)
There are shallow (or black box) theories and deep theories. The former
concern a single level and make no reference to any mechanisms. (See also
my papers "Causality, chance, and law" [1961], "A general black box
theory" [1963], "Phenomenological theories" [1964], "The maturation of
science" [1968], and "Explanation and mechanism" [1997].)
Correspondingly two kinds of explanation of facts must be distinguished:
subsumptive and interpretive (or mechanismic). The former is identical with
the so-called "covering law model". On the other hand interpretive
explanation involves reference to mechanism(s). (I like to think that Aristotle
would have been pleased with this partial vindication of his theory of
explanation.) For example, the doubling of the internal pressure in a gas
caused by halving its volume can be accounted for either as an instance of
Boyle's law, or, more profoundly, as a result of the doubling of the number
of molecular impacts on the container wall. Besides, I proposed quantitative
measures of the explanatory and predictive power of a theory, as well as of
its accuracy and degree of originality.
Finally, empirical confirmation and refutation were evaluated. I argued
that refutability in principle is desirable, but positive evidence is necessary to
regard a theory as at least partially true. However, confirmation, though
necessary, is insufficient for that purpose. The theory must also be externally
consistent: i.e., it must cohere with the bulk (not the totality) of the
background knowledge. And it must not go against the grain of the dominant
scientific world view. (Surely the 17C Scientific Revolution did collide head-
on with the then dominant world view, but the latter was more theological
than scientific. Yet all this proves is that that was the only global scientific
revolution: all the subsequent major innovations were partial, i.e., regional
breakthroughs.) In sum, a theory is subjected to a whole battery of tests.
Consequently deductivism is as inadequate as inductivism. (Not surprisingly,
Popper told me that he disliked this book as much as he liked my
Foundations of Physics.)
Metascientific Queries (1959), Intuition and Science (1962), The Myth of
Simplicity (1963), Method, Model and Matter (1973), and a number of
articles, made additional contributions to the general methodology and
philosophy of science. One of the chapters of the former book deals with
252 MARIO BUNGE
emergence and reduction, and is titled "Do the levels of science reflect the
levels of being?". The answer is in the negative: whereas the ontic levels are
stable, the cognitive levels are fluid. Besides, scientific knowledge includes
fictions and conventions. Hence the mirror theory of knowledge (or
language), held by both Lenin and Wittgenstein, is false.
The central theses of Intuition and Science are that (a) the word 'intuition'
designates many different concepts; (b) some kinds of intuition are involved
in scientific research; but (c) all varieties of intuitionism are inimical to
science for opposing both reason and experiment. The second Spanish
edition of that book, titled Intuicion y razon (1986), is a revised and
considerably expanded version of the original.
In The Myth of Simplicity I distinguished several kinds of simplicity (or its
dual, complexity), and criticized the conventionalist view, originating in late
scholasticism and held by P. Frank, N. Goodman and others, that simplicity
is the seal of truth. I showed that the history of science has been one of
successive complications, so that simple theories should be held in suspicion:
Simplex sigillum falsi. The same book contains my first mathematical theory
of partial truth, where I note - contrary to Reichenbach and Popper - that the
concept of partial truth is independent of and moreover prior to that of
probability. Another chapter deals with induction. I hold that, while induction
plays only a modest role in the genesis of hypotheses and theories, it is
indispensable in confronting them with empirical data. However, this does
not entail that there is an inductive logic parallel to deductive logic: this I
learned from Popper.
Method, Model, and Matter is a collection of essays. One of them
criticizes the artificiality of many problems in contemporary philosophy,
such as Goodman's "grue" puzzle, which would never have occurred to a
scientifically infonned scholar. Another chapter introduces the notion of
degree of testability of a hypothesis or theory corresponding to its degree of
generality. It argues that only specific theories (models) can be empirically
refutable: extremely general theories, such as lagrangian dynamics and
automata theory, are confirmable but irrefutable. A third elucidates the
various significations of the word 'model', and asserts that models in the
factual sciences are just specific theories. A fourth distinguishes analogies of
various kinds and notes their roles in science. A fifth points out that there is a
difference between an axiomatic theory in pure mathematics and one in
science: the latter contains interpretation (or semantic) assumptions that
relate some of the mathematical concepts to physical entities or properties
thereof. Though obvious to physicists, this point is ignored by the economists
who, like G. Debreu, believe that the axiomatization of an economic theory
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 253
3. Ontology
My first book in this field was Causality (1959), which was reissued thrice
and translated into seven languages. One of its main theses is that, Hume
notwithstanding, efficient causation is a mode of production or
determination. Another is that causation is only one of the categories of
determination: there are others, such as self-determination, randomness, and
teleology. A third thesis is that, in view of this multiplicity of modes of
254 MARIO BUNGE
energy - which are coextensive. A whole has both resultant and emergent
properties. (For example, the total mass of a cell is a resultant property,
whereas life is an emergent property of the cell.) An emergent property of a
whole is one that is not possessed by everyone of its components - and this
regardless of whether we are capable of explaining how the thing came to
acquire it. (Emergence renders radical reduction problematic in most cases.
Still, it is possible, at least in principle, to explain emergence in terms of parts
and their interactions - e.g., as an outcome of a self-assembly process.) The
emergence of qualitative novelty occurs in the course of certain processes
and it gives rise to the organization of reality into different levels - physical,
chemical, biological, social, and technical. Every one of these levels is a
collection of concrete things and can be divided into sublevels. The most
intriguing of these is constituted by animals with mental experiences.
(Minding animals, though not minds in themselves, may be made into a
distinguished sublevel of the life level.)
The Mind-Body Problem (1980) and Scientific Materialism (1981) pursue
some of the themes tackled in the former two volumes. In particular, the
former adduces considerable experimental evidence for psychoneural
monism. And the latter volume includes, among other items, severe
criticisms of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, and of Popper's "three worlds"
speculation, as well as a materialist theory of culture. The materialism in
question is not of the vulgar, physicalist or eliminative kind: it is emergentist.
That is, it emphasizes the emergence of qualitative novelty in all realms of
nature and society, and it assumes that there is an uncounted number of
emergence mechanism. (For a history of the concept see D. Blitz's Emergent
Evolution [1992].) But, far from regarding emergence as mysterious, it
fosters a moderate kind of epistemological (not ontological) reductionism.
For example, it identifies mental processes, such as perception, ideation, and
decision, with neurophysiological processes occurring in the plastic regions
ofthe brains of highly evolved animals. We shall come back to this subject in
Section 8.
4. Semantics
Philosophical semantics is of course concerned with meaning, truth, and their
kin. The semantics of science is the branch of philosophical semantics
dealing with the semantic problems raised by science. "A program for the
semantics of science" (1972) sketches my approach to the field, until then
either neglected or cultivated either by operationists or by logicians who
failed to note that scientific constructs happen to refer to real, or allegedly
real, entities.
256 MARIO BUNGE
The first full treatment of the subject occurs in my books Sense and
Reference (1974) and Interpretation and Truth (1974). These were initially
motivated by my work in physical axiomatics. Here such questions as the
following appear naturally: "What does such and such theory refer to?", and
"What is the meaning of 'mass' [an undefined term in mechanics]?"
To tackle these questions I start by elucidating a predicate in a non-
Fregean way, namely as a function from individuals (or n-tuples of such) to
statements (P : A x B x ... x N ---7 S). Incidentally, like Frege and Russell,
and contrary to the nominalists, I distinguish statements or propositions,
which are conceptual objects, from their linguistic wrappings, namely
sentences. Whereas the latter are language-dependent the former are not.
(Hence 'sentential calculus' is a misnomer for the prepositional calculus. If a
sentential calculus could exist, it would belong in linguistics or in computer
science, not in logic.)
The reference class of a predicate is next defined as the union of the sets
occurring in its domain. For example, the reference of "mass" is the set of
bodies (or of bodies and reference systems in the case of relativistic physics).
Reference is thus quite different from extension or truth domain. Unlike the
latter, the former does not involve the concept of truth. Which is only natural
for, before undertaking to find out the truth-value of p, one must ascertain
what p is about.
The sense of a defined predicate is defined as the set of its definiens. For
undefined predicates a more general definition is proposed, namely the set of
entailing and entailed. Finally, the meaning of a predicate is defined as its
reference together with its sense. What holds for predicates holds, mutatis
mutandis, for propositions too. In general, the meaning of construct c is
defined as M(c) = <S(c), R(c». Thus meaning precedes truth - contrary to
the verification (or operationist) "theory" of meaning introduced by the
Vienna Circle and still held by Donald Davidson.
As for truth, following Leibniz - hence contrary to Tarski, Popper, Quine,
Putnam, and many others - I draw a radical distinction between formal and
factual truth. (I also admit artistic, moral and philosophical truths.) Model
theory, which is about abstract theories and their interpretation inside
mathematics, only tackles the former. Factual truth, which is often only
partial or approximate, is elucidated by the correspondence "theory" (thesis)
- which, pace Tarski, has nothing to do with model theory. Incidentally, I
hold that, if only because of this reason, the "semantic" or "structuralist"
view of scientific theories, which relies on model theory, is wrong-headed.
A new theory or partial truth is proposed in Interpretation and Truth. But
in Vol. 6 of the Treatise I show with a counterexample that the truth-value of
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 257
5. Philosophy of Mathematics
I first dealt with this subject in my Intuition and Science (1962), where I
noted the virtues of flaws of mathematical intuitionism. In Scientific
Research (1967) I discussed abstract theories and their intramathematical and
extramathematical interpretations, as well as the functions and limitations of
mathematization in science. This discussion was influenced by Camap's
formalism - not by his conventionalism, though, because not everything is
convention in mathematics.
Volumes 1 and 2 of my Treatise contain a number of reflections upon the
nature of mathematical objects and mathematical truth. I emphasize the
purely formal (or ideal) character of mathematical constructs, and
consequently their (conceptual, not historical) independence with respect to
experience. Volume 7, Part I, Chapter 1 of the same work (1985) contains a
lengthy critical examination of the main philosophies of mathematics, as well
as my own alternative, which I now call 'moderate fictionism'.
I argue that all mathematical concepts and theories are fictions, just as
those of art and myth. But, unlike artistic and mythological fictions,
258 MARIO BUNGE
6. Philosophy of Physics
My work in the philosophy of science took a new turn when I realized, in the
early 1960s, that the only way to settle controversies of the rival inter-
pretations of relativistic and quantum theories was to axiomatize them. For
example, the subjectivistic interpretations of Heisenberg's famous
"unceltainty" inequalities are conclusively refuted upon showing that those
formulas derive from assumptions that make no reference whatsoever to any
observations, such as the Schrodinger equation (which contains no observer
coordinates) and the Schwartz inequality (a purely mathematical formula).
I then proceeded to axiomatizing some of the most basic physical theories:
classical mechanics (both particle and continuum), classical electrodynamics,
the two relativities and quantum mechanics. This work, as well as its
philosophical motivations and offshoots, is contained in my Foundations of
Physics (1967). "The structure and content of a physical theory" (1967)
supplements that book. So does "Physical time: the objective and relational
theory" (1968), which presents an axiomatic theory of time as well as
criticisms of Adolf Griinbaum's view on time, of the "arrow of time"
metaphor, and of the common confusion between reversibility and invariance
under time reversal. Additional material in the same vein, though on a more
elementary level, is found in my Philosophy of Physics (1973), and in Ch. 2,
Vol. 7, Part I of my Treatise (1985). Recently Perez-Bergliaffa, Vucetich,
and Romero (1993) have updated my axiomatization of quantum mechanics,
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 259
while Covarrubias (1993) has done the same with my work in general
relativity.
These results reinforce philosophical realism, if only because relativity and
quanta had been the only scientific footholds of subjectivism. Incidentally,
the experimental refutation of Bell's theorem was hailed as a defeat of
realism, when actually all it refuted was the family of hidden (or
neoclassical) variables theories, such as Bohm's. The initial motivation
behind these theories evaporates upon realizing that realism can be salvaged
by just reinterpreting good old quantum mechanics. Bell's theorem is
irrelevant to the realism question: realism is now as defensible as before Bell.
What Bell did was to give classicism (definite trajectories and separability)
the coup de grace.
Further philosophical spin-offs of the above-mentioned work are the
following. First, quantum logic is a purely academic toy: the axiomatization
of quantum mechanics shows clearly that it employs classical mathematics,
which in turn is based on ordinary logic. Second, the quantum theory of
measurement is a similar academic industry, for there can be no general
measuring instrument: all the theories of measurement actually used in
physics are magnitude and instrument-specific. (Moreover, von Neumann's
assumptions about measurement are unrealistic: see Bunge & Kalnay
1983b). Third, some of the quantum paradoxes can be dissolved by adopting
a realistic interpretation of the superposition principle (Bunge & Kalnay
1983a). Others are dissolved by refusing to employ the principle altogether
when it involves undefined state functions (i.e. non-denoting symbols), such
as those purported to describe the live and dead states of Schrbdinger's cat.
Work in physical axiomatics led me naturally to both formal semantics and
mathematical ontology. The former is needed to clarify the notion of
semantic assumption or hypothesis that confers a factual (e.g., physical)
meaning upon a mathematical formalism. I say 'factual', not 'empirical',
because to realists human experience is a tiny subset of the totality of facts.
My semantic assumption replaces the "correspondence rule" of R. Carnap, C.
Hempel and H. Margenau, which was supposed to pair off mathematical
symbols to empirical items. One first interprets, then worries about empirical
tests.
The need for some ontology compatible with science, in particular physics,
becomes obvious upon ret1ecting on the pervasiveness of the part-whole
relation and the associated notion of physical addition or juxtaposition - as it
occurs, for instance, in the axiom that the electric charge of the (physical)
addition (or juxtaposition) of two bodies equals the sum of their charges. In
sum, my formal semantics and ontology were motivated by my work in the
foundations of physics, and in turn served to advance it.
260 MARIO BUNGE
7. Philosophy of Biology
My main contributions to this field are the elucidations of the concepts of
species, biopopulation, ecosystem, biodiversity, and life, contained mainly in
Vol. 4 (1979) and Vol. 7, Part II (1985) of my Treatise. They were
influenced by years of discussions with my friend the late biologist Osvaldi
Reig, as well as by own work on "A model for processes combining
competition with cooperation" (1976) and "A model of evolution" (1978),
both published in the journal Applied Mathematical Modelling. The paper
''Two controversies in evolutionary biology: Saltationism and cladism"
(1989) discusses further issues in biophilosophy.
My views on biological systematics - which were subscribed to by George
Gaylord Simpson but disputed by Reig - are already found in my Scientific
Research. Contrary to the view proposed by A. Dobzhansky and E. Mayr,
and popularized by M. Ghiselin and D. Hull, I regard all taxa as sets. This
allows one to use set theory throughout biological systematics. (Thus the
species Homo sapiens is the set of all humans living, dead, and to be born.)
Being a set, a taxon is a concept, not a thing - though of course not an
arbitrary concept. And the taxonomic relation among sets is that of inclusion.
(Thus the species Homo sapiens is included in the primate genus.) On the
other hand a biopopulation is a thing and, more particularly, a system. (An
organism is a member of a species and a part of a population.) The
consequences of this idea for the concepts of selection and evolution are the
following. Selection acts primarily on individual organisms: after all, it is a
euphemism for death. And what evolve are biopopulations, not individuals or
species. As for the technical concept of biodiversity in an ecosystem, it is
defined with the help of the set-theoretic concept of symmetric difference.
Coming to life, either individually or in the course of evolution, is a
process involving the self-assembly of systems endowed with emergent
properties. Consequently it fits neither mechanistic reductionism nor
vitalistic holism. In particular, the view of organisms as machines is
mistaken, if only because machines, unlike organisms, are designed by
people and built according to specification and with some purpose. Hence the
"artificial life" fad is wrong-headed. The view of life consistent with
evolutionary biology and modern studies on the origin of life is materialist
(as opposed to spiritualist), emergentist (as opposed to reductionist), and
systemist (as opposed to both individualism and holism).
Another pair of items belonging in the intersection of biology with
philosophy is the nature of genetic "information" and the thesis of genetic
determinism. Both are discussed in volumes 4 and 7 of my Treatise. I take
the view that talk of genetic information (and translation and transcription) is
metaphorical. Moreover it is misleading, for it hampers progress by
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 261
producing the illusion that it constitutes a theory that has solved the problem
of protein synthesis. Genetic "information", as Lwoff held, is nothing but the
structure of a system made up of nuc1eotides. A particular molecular
structure is not an "instruction" . As for genetic determinism - the
contemporary version of ancient preformationism, revived by R. Dawkins -
it is nothing but a wild exaggeration of the role of the genome. Most
geneticists, embryologists, neuroscientists and psychologists agree that
development results from both genes and the environment: nature and
nurture intertwine. For example, certain genes are not expressed at all in the
absence of the suitable environmental stimuli. And no environmental forces
can make up for the lack of certain genes.
All of the above views, and then some - as Kurt Vonnegut would say -
have been revised, expanded, and deepened in collaboration with the German
evolutionary zoologist Dr. Martin Mahner, in our book Foundations of
Biophilosophy (1997).
processes are brain processes, and went so far as to declare that psychology
and linguistics are biological sciences - which ignores the social context.
My philosophy of psychology derives from my philosophy of mind and
my general philosophy of science. From a realist viewpoint behaviorism is
narrow-minded in refusing to investigate the mental; and information-
processing psychology is shallow for ignoring that which - according to
physiological psychology - does the minding, i.e., the central nervous
system. Obviously, whoever understands and defends the scientific method
must reject the psychoanalytic and parapsychological fantasies. The
requirement of emergentist materialism leads to the same result: all of the
above mentioned schools fail this test for ignoring the nervous system. Only
biopsychology (or neuropsychology) is materialist on top of being realist and
abiding by the scientific method.
However, in the case of humans and other gregarious higher animals
neuroscience is not enough to explain emotion, cognition and action: to do so
it must be supplemented with sociology. Hence although the mental is
neurophysiological (ontological reduction), psychology straddles biology and
sociology rather than being included in the former. This exemplifies the
combination of ontological reduction with epistemological merger. These
views are expounded in my book with R. Ardila, Philosophy of Psychology
(1987), as well as in my articles "Reduktion und Integration, Systeme und
Niveaus, Monismus und Dualismus" (1989) in "What kind of discipline is
psychology?" (1990).
tum, this suggests drawing a list of rights and duties regulated by the
maximal imperative "Enjoy life and help live". This maxim is selftuist, for
joining selfishness with altruism. It is offered as a sort of synthesis of
deontologism and utilitarianism. Another offshoot of the science-ethics
connection is moral realism, or the view that there are moral facts and,
consequently, moral truths and falsities, such as "Poverty is bad" and "There
are no just wars". Because of its underlying scientism, this kind of moral
realism is quite different from the one associated with linguistic philosophy:
see "A new look at moral realism" (1997).
that they should examine and denounce publicly the most dangerous bogus
sciences and fake philosophies. I single out not only such classics as
psychoanalysis, but also feminist philosophy and all the rational choice
theories that involve undefined utility functions and subjective probabilities.
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ON SOME RECENT UNDECIDABILITY AND
SCIENCES
N.C.ADACOSTA
F.A. DORIA
Abstract
We summarize in an intuitive vein a few recent results by the authors on
the incompleteness of elementary real analysis and its consequences to the
axiomatized sciences, from chaos theory to the dynamics of populations.
1. Introduction
We begin with a well-known quotation ([4], p. 133):
Kurt Godel of Vienna seems to have proved that a specific contradiction could
be derived from any proof of the impossibility of the occurrence of
contradictions in mathematics.
Max Black wrote that slightly doubtful remark in 1933, two years after the
appearance of Godel' s results on the incompleteness of formalized
arithmetic. The existence of unprovable sentences in fonnal systems strong
enough to cover sizable portions of mathematics had already been expected
(at least in some quarters) since the mid 20's, when Finsler [33] discussed
that possibility in a sketchy, informal vein. One can go farther in the past and
return to the early 19 th century discovery of the independence of the parallel
postulate from Euclid's axioms. Sure, the Euclidian system is very far from
our present concept of a formal axiomatic system, but nevertheless that first
independence result provided an example of an "intuitively true" sentence
which however cannot be derived from the remaining traditional axioms of
geometry.
equations that describe the process and out of them to check whether the
process satisfies some of the established mathematical criteria for chaos and
randomness. However those equations are in most cases intractable nonlinear
differential equations as they cannot in general be given explicit analytical
solutions. Therefore, chaos theorists tum to computer simulations and for
most nonlinear systems one sees a confusing, tangled pattern of trajectories
on the screen. The system looks random, and there are statistical tests such as
the Grassberger-Proccacia criterion that guarantee the existence of
randomness in computer-simulated systems, modulo some error. Yet
statistical tests furnish no mathematical proof of the existence of chaos in a
dynamical system. There is always the chance that the system is undergoing
a very long and complicated transient state, before it settles down to a nice
and regular behavior. Therefore how can we prove that a dynamical system
that looks chaotic is, in fact, chaotic?
This problem had been around since Morris Hirsch stated in a 1983
conference (published in 1985) that time was ripe for a marriage between the
"experimental" and "theoretical" sides of chaos research and posed the
decision problem for chaotic systems [30]. Hirsch asks for a decision
procedure to test for chaos in a system. We showed [7] that no such a
decision method exists. Moreover, for any nontrivial characterization of
chaos in a dynamical system there will always be systems where proving the
existence of chaos is unattainable within standard axiomatizations. Chaos
theory and dynamical systems theory are both undecidable - there is no
general algorithm to test for chaos in an arbitrary dynamical system - and
incomplete - there are infinitely many dynamical systems that will look
chaotic on a computer screen, for they are chaotic in an adequate class of
standard models for axiomatized mathematics, but such that no proof of that
fact will be found within the usual formalizations of dynamical systems
theory. That result applies to any nontrivial characterization for chaos in
dynamical systems. You conceive a nontrivial definition for chaos, and it will
be undecidable.
So, Hirsch's query on the existence of an algorithmic criterion for proving
chaos in dynamical systems has a negative answer.
chaos is equivalent to the proof of Fermat's last theorem (or, say, the
proof of Riemann's hypothesis). We also proved that (given some
conditions) those 'nasty' problems are dense in the space of all
dynamical systems [19].
5. Problems worse than any number-theoretic problem. The language of
analysis is much richer than the language of arithmetic, as we can
express the halting function in analysis. Also we can explicitly
construct "natural" -looking problems which lie beyond the
arithmetical hierarchy with our techniques [l3].
6. Faceless objects. One of the features of the main set-theoretic forcing
constructions is that we add "generic", faceless sets to our formal
theories. However, there are no explicit expressions for those objects.
With the help of our techniques we exhibited an expression for a
"faceless" Hamiltonian [l3]: the only thing we can prove about it is
that it definitely is a Hamiltonian, and nothing more, as shown above.
7. A free particle that looks chaotic. Consider the following situation:
let's go through the usual nonstandard description of the canard ([1],
p. 33; see also [5]) in a dynamic system. A nonstandard model may be
seen as arising out of the following setting: we are given an axiomatic
formulation for arithmetic which we then extend to our theory T,
supposed consistent. We add to T an undecidable arithmetic statement;
out of that statement we can concoct a Diophantine equation
P(Xl," .. ,xn) = 0 which has no roots in any standard models for T but
which has roots in some nonstandard model. We thus get our
nonstandard model: it is one of the models where p = 0 for some
(infinite, nonstandard) numbers.
Again out of p we can obtain a function B (P) such that B = 1 if P has
roots, and B= 0 if P has no roots. Let X represent a single free particle
over an adequate Rn and let Y represent a chaotic system on the same
domain [7]. Then
Z = B(P)X + (1 - B(P))Y
is chaotic in all standard models. Yet it equals a single free particle in
our nonstandard model! When we simulate the expression for Z on a
computer screen, we get a tangled system which will pass the usual
statistical tests for randomness. For the elementary arithmetic portion
of a standard model is recursive, so that it will be simulated on a
computer screen.
UNDECIDABILITY AND INCOMPLETENESS 279
°
where it cannot be decided in T whether f3 equals or 1. Then the
assertion "3* describes two sets of oscillating, nonchaotic, uncoupled
populations" and "3* describes four coupled, chaotic populations" are
both undecidable in our formal theory T.
We can also formulate a beautiful model for the interaction of three
coupled populations, x, y, Z, where Z is a small-sized 'upper' or
'warrior' class, y is a 'lower' or 'working' class, and x is a 'middle
class'. The model predicts two stable equilibria: in the first, the
'middle class' vanishes; in the second, the 'warrior' class vanishes
while 'workers' and the 'middle class' thrive. The 'middle class' will
grow to a steady state value if:
s. Conclusion
The point seems to be: our current conceptions about formalized
mathematics do not fully capture the inner wealth of intuitive mathematics.
Formal languages made up of a finite number of discrete symbols that add up
to sentences with a finite length are too coarse an instrument to capture our
mathematical intuitions about a world that is sometimes best described by
continuous, 'infinite' -sized objects.
Our viewpoint, which is an almost pedestrian one, directly stems from the
results described above, which show the omnipresence of undecidable
sentences in the formal counterpart to our everyday kind of mathematics. Just
by adding new axioms to those formal theories won't be of much help, since
the underlying machinery remains incomplete.
There are only two possibilities here, the authors think. Either one starts
the search for stronger proof techniques (or, perhaps, for a concept of
'computation' strictly stronger than Turing computation), so that previously
unprovable stuff will become provable, or one tries to understand (as we
have suggested above) undecidable sentences as bifurcation points in
formalized theories. Perhaps that kind of diversity should be accepted as a
fact of mathematical life, a reflection of the deep freedom that seems to lie in
the heart of any abstract construction.
6. Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge support from CNPq and FAPESP (Brazilian
funding agencies). Topics exposed here were presented and discussed by the
second author during the workshop on "limits to scientific knowledge" at the
Santa Fe Institute in May 1994; he wishes to thank John Casti, Joe Traub and
the Santa Fe Institute for the invitation to attend that workshop, and the Sloan
Foundation for support. The second author also acknowledges fascinating
discussions with Otto Rossler on the continuum and on heterodoxical
epistemologies for mathematics. The authors wish to thank the Research
Center on Mathematical Theories of Communication (CETMC-UFRJ) for
support in the preparation of this paper, which was computer-formatted with
the help of Project Griffo, School of Communications, Federal University at
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).
February 1995.
UNDECIDABILITY AND INCOMPLETENESS 283
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284 N.C.A. DA COSTA AND F.A. DORIA
ERNESTO MA YZ V ALLENILLA
I
To the extent that it is possible to make a forecast without falling into a naive
prophesizing, the present and future of humanity depend on the development
of technics. But technical work as it shows itself today, namely as an
activity aimed at the mastery of otherness in general - does not have in our
day an unequivocal meaning, or a single and exclusive functioning mode,
unanimously accepted by all.
Insofar as a human activity, technical activity is eminently historical. As
such it is liable to suffer or provoke the transformation which man himself
promotes through the products of his freedom. This determines that its
direction and its goals are bound together to the changes experienced by the
epistemology and ontology of its time. Conscious of such a fact, the main
thesis of this book sets out to show that we live a decisive moment in the
historical evolution of ratio technical, the features of which will have a
parallel influence over the present and the future of humanity. In that regard,
and without exaggerating the importance of the most recent developments, it
is possible to discern that we find ourselves in an exceptional juncture, where
such a transition is taking place. We, the men and women of this time, are
protagonists and witnesses of a revolution that we are still unable to
understand or predict in all its complexity and transcendence.
Indeed, placed before the mode of technics that has prevailed until now-
i.e., anthropomorphic, anthropocentric and geocentric in style and limits - a
new project and model of technics begins to suggest itself in our own days.
Its logos seeks to transfonn and go beyond those limits - modifying eo ipso
the style of technical activity with the aim of increasing the amount of
power available to man beyond the boundaries set by his innate psycho-
somatic constitution and the cognitive capacity which it sustains.
But it is not easy to notice, and much less to explain, not just the details,
but also even the contours and the general sense of this struggle. My perhaps
overly ambitious attempt has been to approach it from its very foundations.
To that effect, I have attempted to sketch the trans-formation and trans-
mutation which is exerted by that logos - which I call meta-technical
because of its mode and limits - upon the innate constitution of the two great
sensorials that order otherness, by tracing the principles that make possible
its appearance and development.
Without intending to anticipate in this essay the results that we may have
obtained - a task which, because of its complexity, requires a thorough and
careful analysis - we have deemed it convenient, nonetheless, to choose the
example of space in order to familiarize him with the general nature of the
work. My aim is to show how, when the technical and/or meta-technical
logos affects the spatiomorphic otherness, radical differences are projected
which cause parallel variations in the corresponding notions of space. This
affects eo ipso all human (linguistic, ontological, ethical, political, etc.)
institutions where the very process of in-stituting is based on a spatiomorphic
matter or content.
Nevertheless, what I will present here has only the above-mentioned
purpose. Although there are preeminent and fundamental reasons for the
choice of space as an illustrative example - given the essential importance it
has as a constituting element of the optical-luminic logos insofar as it is itself
a privileged representative of the technical logos - what is said about it
should be parallely applied to time (and therefore, to the corresponding
chronomorphic otherness). Indeed the modifying action of the meta-technical
logos is exercised with equal intensity and with similar projections through
all its intelligibilizing action upon otherness.
II
One of the fundamental features that distinguish the ratio technica - as it
manifests itself in our time and in contrast to that which was made possible
by the original technical model that prevailed until not long ago - is the
radical change introduced by its action and its products in the notion or
concept of space. Indeed: insofar as that space is visualized, organized and
constructed on the basis of the category of function (in sharp opposition to its
ordering by means of the category of substance and the array of criteria based
on it), it is not only possible to detect a basic innovation in its conceptual
meaning, but also a concomitant variation that is reflected in the concrete and
real spatiality of the phenomena where this notion is exhibited and
incorporated.
Thus, instead of being represented as an aggregate of juxtaposed or
contiguous points, elements or atoms, today space is conceived and handled
as a functional or systemic structure, that forms a field or dynamic whole, the
META-TECHNICS AND THE NEW WORLD 287
synergy of which determines its eventual forms and limits. Lacking all
foundation or substantial residue, the characteristics possessed by spatiality
in our time are radically different - and sometimes even opposed - to those
exhibited by space when it was thought or established on the basis of its
previous (substantialist) basis.
But the transformation undergone by the notion of space is not reducible to
this simple change of categories. On a deeper and more decisive level, what
has begun to change in our days is the very nature of the intelligibilizing and
ordering logos which underlies the spacing made possible by technics. In this
way, parallel and radical modifications and transmutations are introduced in
the epistemic and onto logic structure of its traditional notion.
One of the most peculiar features of meta-technics, in that sense, is found
in its attempt to create or produce a mode of non human - trans-human,
meta-human - logos or thought. Its forms, laws and principles, are neither
identical nor similar to those which inform and sustain human discourse. In
order to achieve that end, it has recourse not just to the variation,
modification or alteration of the innate constitution and functioning of man's
cognitive sensorials, but also to their substitution with instruments or
equipments, in the mechanisms of which such sensorials can be eliminated
(or replaced by others). Thus is produced a logos or meta-human thought-
not anthropomorphic, or anthropocentric or geocentric - the correlates of
which shape a trans-human and trans-finite otherness.
Such otherness, for that very reason, instead of being ordered according to
the spatio-temporal standards of the human logos (metrical extension)
embodies and expresses a trans-reality in which the spatio-temporal (optical
and metric) characteristics projected upon otherness by the innate human
sensorials may be substituted or abolished. In that trans-reality, the ordering
imposed by a de-anthropomorphized instrument or equipment that replaces
the classical "subject" of the traditional epistemological scheme acts as its
constitutive logos.
Instead of such characteristics - substituting, modifying, transforming
them - there then appear on the profile of otherness, other aspects, stemming
from tactile, olphactory, auditory, etc., ordering sources that are not
necessarily anthropomorphic. At the same time that thcy broaden the
traditional epistemic spectrum, they introduce radical changes in the texture
and meaning of otherness.
What we express in this way is not just a fancy or a mere science-fiction
dream but the simple description of the meta-technical conquests which man
already employs in some of the instruments constructed to broaden and
deepen his control over otherness. Indeed, instead of the classic microscopes
and telescopes - designed to make use of light waves and enhance the
288 ERNESTO MAYZ V ALLENILLA
III
It is easy to see that everything we have said above follows from the
transformation and overcoming of the optical (and therefore metric)
foundation that prevails until now in the spatiomorphic ordering and
organization of otherness. Its modification or substitution by a meta-
technical spatiality means, eo ipso, a radical change in the meaning and
scope of the epistemological and ontological determinations of such
otherness.
META-TECHNICS AND THE NEW WORLD 289
But the consequences that follow from this are neither harmless nor trivial.
Indeed, if we attempt to systematically revise those human institutions where
such a revolution is reflected, it is necessary to acknowledge that its imprint
affects and must be exercised, first of all in a primary way, upon the very
etymology, structure and syntax of language. Through this language, and
almost automatically, its influence reaches and modifies the fundamental
ontological concepts as much as the foundations of epistemology. It
subsequently projects itself upon the categorical systems that sustain the
diverse (although compatible) cultures with shared spatio-optical base.
Whatever these cultures may be, the modification of their surreptitious
spatiomorphic foundations extends and equally affects their moral, political
and juridical institutions, at the same time as the practices, customs and
everyday commerce, which are sustained by an optical interpretation of
otherness.
To say this in the simplest and most direct manner possible, the
transformation of the optical and spatial basis of otherness involves a parallel
and radical change in its doxic support base. This change makes it urgently
necessary to coin a repertoire of categories and principles (absolutely
different from the current ones) with which to face, gain access to, and
interpret this new and virgin world that unfolds before us.
Given the purposely limited aims and scope of this essay, it is not possible
to even attempt to illustrate here the vast panorama of problems that I have
suggested. As this work will make obvious, each one of these themes - in
order to be elucidated - requires complex and extensive research as well as
subtle linguistic and conceptual analyses to illustrate convincingly what has
been merely suggested here. With the sole purpose of providing some of the
most notable aspects which have served as stimuli and clues to reach the
main insight that grounds my thesis, I would like to point out the following:
1) With regards to language as such, it is possible to note and to prove
easily that, from a semantical point of view, the majority of the linguistic
meanings - as much in ordinary as in techno-scientific and even
metaphysical language - stem from optical and spatial (or, derivatively,
temporal) determinations which are later only tacitly referred to.
Furthermore, the syntactic rules that language have as their logical and
ideal horizon, as their rational foundation, a ratio or logos which is itself
nurtured by a conception of space and time that is presupposed and taken as
evident. In fact, all logico-syntactical principles have as their horizon of
meaning, support and intelligibility, the substantialist conception of the
spatio-temporal otherness found in Aristotle.
Think, for instance, of the meaning of affirmation and negation. These are
- as Husserl calls them - positions ("Setzungen", "Positionen"). Now, every
290 ERNESTO MAYZ V ALLENILLA
abbreviate the examples I will mention only the famous opposition between
phenomenon and noumenon. Just as in the former the presence of the Greek
verb <pai vo - and, of course, the intervention of light (<pwe;;) as the agent that
brings forth the visible - is evident, the term noumenon originates from voDe;;
and the latter from VOe1.V, upon which we have commented above.
Referring to this last term - as an expression of seeing in general - it was
Husser!, in our own time, who vindicated its supreme condition as that which
bears and legitimizes all rational affirmations. It is thus asserted in Ideen (1,
19): "Das unmittelbare 'Sehen' (voeiv), nicht bloss das sinnliche Sehen,
sondem das Sehen iiberhaupt als originar gebendes Bewusstsein welcher Art
immer, ist die letzte Rechquelle aller vemiinftigen Behauptungen".
3) If the spatio-optical elements vitiate the highest ontological and
epistemological concepts of philosophical work, it is easy to infer that their
influence must be present not just in the design of the social (political,
juridical, and cultural) man-made institutions, but also in the very values that
sustain them.
3a) This is indeed what occurs. Be it in the etymological roots that define
the phenomenon of possession and/or property in legal terms (possideo is
synonym of occupo and this is derived from capia to seize, to hold, to keep
something inside the closed space of a fist); or in the territorial notion of
sovereignty insofar as spatial basis of the State; or in the common space of
meeting and reunion of the faithful that is announced in the term eKKATJoia
or ecclesia (contionis locus); even the physical presence of the claustrum - in
the sense of an occluded or closed space - which reflects not merely the
monastic lifestyle but also determines the epistemic architectonics of the
institution of the University, by dividing knowledge into spheres or parcels
which are, presumably, autonomous and isolated from each another. No
matter where we look, we will always find the trace or imprint that reveals
and attests to the presence of such spatio-optical elements in the design of
institutions.
3b) But even beyond the simple design and profile of institutions, the
preeminence of the spatio-optical projects itself over the very values which -
tacitly or explicitly - act as normative support for them. If we want to link
such inheritance in any way to the founding of values - we must mention in
that regard the Platonic Doctrine, as its origin or primitive source. According
to its standards, values were ideas (daoe;;, iOta) and the ideas were the
correlates of seeing (lOtW): aspects, images, or visible torsos (species) of
them made available to the sense of sight.
This explains why when Plato refers to the Good - the highest of all values
- he compares it with the sun ... whose light, aiding the eye, allows the
META-TECHNICS AND THE NEW WORLD 293
seeing organ to realize and fulfill its primordial purpose. In similar manner,
the Good, whose light is necessary for the soul to know the intelligible, is
that which illuminates the realm where the ideas dwell, making them bright
and visible.
It is due to the Good (co')'ro 1:0 <xya8ov) - understood under the simile of
this intelligible and illuminating light - that the remaining values are
glimpsed and visualized: the Beautiful (1:0 KaA,Ov), the Just (1:0 otKawv),
and even the True (1:0 <XA,T)8e<;) ... since it is precisely the Good "which
imparts truth to the known and power of knowing to the knower". (1:oiho
1:o(vuv 1:0 1:ilv <XA,1)8etav napexov 1:01<; yt YVWOKof.LeVOt<; Kat 1:W
ytYVWOKovn 1:ilv ODVaf.Ltv <xnootOOV 1:ilv 1:0U <xya80u toeav <p&8t
dvat). Plato, Republic, book VI, 508 e.
It would be almost impossible to find in the whole history of philosophy,
more revealing passages than those cited to illustrate and verify the
preeminence of the optical-luminical ingredients in the constitution of
metaphysical thinking. From such preeminence, as is natural, follows
likewise the spatiomorphic texture that permeates the meaning and sense of
its foundations, principle and concepts, as well as of everything which,
mediately or immediately, is based upon them.
Now, on the basis of what has been said, which already goes beyond the
natural limits of an essay, one may simply ask one question. Indeed, what
destiny awaits such form of thought - and, on its basis, language and the
human institutions and values themselves - if such spatio-optical elements
are questioned and surpassed by the progress of the meta-technical logos?
IV
Our time lives and struggles in such a crossroad. It is my belief that the
present and the future of humanity depend on the course that we take in the
face of this. We are embarked upon a period of deep and unexpected changes
whose significance and scope - as is natural - cannot yet be apprehended
with total and clear awareness.
Moreover, we find ourselves in a similar situation to that of the sailors
who, at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries, had not yet
perceived the significance of their own 'discoveries'. Uncertain and confused
they believed that the new territories they were visiting were part of their
known world, without realizing that their presence embodied an emerging
reality which would decree the inevitable breakdown of their own vision and
conception of the world.
It happens this way with meta-technics. It is not just a matter of a new
stage of technics that can be inserted normally into its own development as
294 ERNESTO MAYZ V ALLENILLA
MARX Karl, 2, 4, 10, 25, 30, 31, 32, 34, MERLEAU-PONTY Maurice, 8, 27, 81,
47,54,57,95,128,130,134,141, 172,173,174,178,183
157,196,198,208,246 MERQUIOR J.G., 104, 110
Marxism, 3, 23, 25, 32, 34, 48, 49, 69, MERTON R.K., 265
71,72,84,147,153,246 Mestiza, 22, 24
Latin American marxism, 31, 33 Mestizaje, 172
marxist critical thought, 31 Mestizo, 28,175,176,177,178,180,
marxist economy, 32 182
marxist philosophy, 30 Mestizos, 8,9, 172, 174, 175, 176, 183
marxist thesis, 263 Metanorme, 191, 193
neo-marxism, 5, 152 Metaphysics, 3,19,23,27,29,72,79,
orthodox marxism, 69 80,153,247
Marxisme, 118, 136, 166 scientific metaphysics, 254
langage du marxisme, 168 Metaphysique, 95,121,122,127,132,
MASSUH Victor, 136 133,198
Materialism, 179,255,262 metaphysique platonicienne, 161
Matt~rialisme, 104 Methodology, 253
materialisme historique, 95 Metodologfa, 210
Materialismo,213 Mexican revolution, 16,21,37
Mathematics, 10,20,39,249,252,253, MEYERSON Emile, 158,246
256,257,264,273,274,275,279, MILL,267
282,283 MILL John Stuart, 12, 19, 62, 67, 120,
axiomatized mathematics, 276 123,164
classical mathematics, 259 MILLAS Jorge, 160, 163
formalized mathematics, 282 MILNER Peter, 261
intuitive mathematics, 282 Mind
philosophy of mathematics, 69, 257, philosophy of mind, 248, 262, 267
258 MIRANDA Carlos, 159, 160
Mathematization, 257 MIRO QUESADA Francisco, 2, 3,4, 10,
MATIENZO Jose Nicohis, 123 16,17,26,27,34,36,37,38,39,42,
MAXWELL, 246, 248 48,50,51,55,56,57,58,59,68,69,
MAYORGA Fernando, 177 70, 86, 93, 11 0, 111, 188, 225
MAYORGA Guardia, 17,57 MISES L. von, 164
MAYRE., 260 MISES Richard von, 248
MA YZ V ALLENILLA Ernesto, 2, 13, MITCHAM C., 264
25,53,58,92,93,107,110,285 Mito
McGOUCH J., 271 mundo mitico-magico, 215
MclNTYRE Alastair, 1 Sisifo, 205
MEDIN Tzvi, 142 MITRE, 117
MELLA Julio Antonio, 31 Model
MELLO M.V. de, 104, 110 model theory, 256
MEND lET A Eduardo, 50 Modernidad
MENEZES D., 94 post-modernidad, 228
MENVIELLE J., 137 Modernism
MERCADO VERA Andres, 133 postmodernism, 183
MERCANTE Victor, 122, 130 Modernite, I 18, 131
MERCIER Desiderio, 28 post-modernite, I 18, 13 I
Modernity, 5, 8, 49,181,184
308 INDEX