Mount Everest—1996

Summary
The case is about the expedition of Mount Everest and the mishaps that took place during that expedition
in 1996. Out of 30 expeditions that took place that year the two largest expeditions were led by Hall
(Adventure Consultants) and Fischer (Mountain Madness) and the case focus on these two.
Both adventure consultants and Mountain madness were firms that provided guided expeditions. In 1996
they both took teams to climb the Great Mount Everest.
Adventure Consultants consisted of Rob Hall (expedition leader), Mike Groom (Guide), Andy
Harris (Guide), Frank Fischbeck (attempted Everest three times), Doug Hansen (previously attempted
Everest with Hall's team in 1995), Stuart Hutchison (previous 8,000m experiences), Lou Kasischke
(had climbed six of the Seven Summits), Jon Krakauer (journalist on assignment
from Outside magazine; an accomplished technical climber, but had no experience in climbing peaks over
8,000m ) ,Yasuko Namba (had climbed the Seven Summits), John Taske (oldest climber on the
Adventure Consultants team; no 8,000m experience), Beck Weathers ( had been climbing for 10 years;
he was also making a bid for the Seven Summits, but had no 8,000 m experience)
Whereas Mountain Madness had Scott Fischer (lead climbing guide), Neal Beidleman (Guide), Anatoli
Boukreev (Guide), Martin Adams (Wall Street trader, had some climbing experience, though he had not
ventured higher than 7,400 meters), Charlotte Fox (had two 8,000-meter peaks under her belt and years
of climbing experience), Lene Gammelgaard (accomplished mountaineer) , Dale Kruse (long-term
personal friend of Fischer's; first to sign up), Tim Madsen (climbed extensively but no 8,000 m
experience), Sandy Hill Pittman (New York socialite who wrote for Allure and Conde Nast Traveler
magazines and had climbed 6 of 7 summits) , Pete Schoening ( known for single-handedly saving the
lives of six team members during a mass fall in the Himalaya expedition of 1953) , Klev Schoening
(Pete's nephew, downhill ski racer; no 8,000 m experience)
The journey started with few member of Hall’s team getting respiratory and digestive ailments due to
polluted atmosphere and Fischer dealt with a series of unexpected logistical problems during his team’s
trek to Base Camp (custom clearance and transportation issues). Fischer’s team arrived at Base Camp on
April 8, and Hall’s group followed one day later.

Despite many challenges (Hansen discovered early stages of frostbite on several toes, Pete Schoening also
experienced a setback during the acclimatization exercises; his breathing difficulties forced him to begin
using bottled oxygen while still at Base Camp) the expeditions completed their acclimatization exercises
and returned to Base Camp in the final days of April. They remained there for one week before beginning
their push to the summit.

The expeditions planned to depart from Base Camp on May 6 to begin the push to the summit. Before
departing from Base Camp, Hall and Fischer reminded their teams of the importance of sticking to the
schedule on summit day. The final push to the top was meant to take place on May 10, and it required a
very difficult 18-hour round trip from Camp IV to the summit. Individuals faced enormous danger if they
did not reach the top by midday because then the descent would last into the night and they would run out
of supplemental oxygen. Climbers needed to turn around if they realized that they would not reach the
summit until mid-afternoon or later.

Both the teams reached Base Camp II, with Hall’s team making it safely while Fischer had to escort
Kruse Base Camp because of his ill health.
The teams spent the next day at Camp II and departed for Camp III on May 8. They met few teams
descending down to the base as the weather was not suitable for climb, yet they chose to keep the
expedition going.

Both teams climbed to Camp IV on May 9, where the weather was so harsh and windy that it they were
not even to erect the tents. Hall made a judgment call from his experience that the wind may stop after
sometime and then they would continue the summit climb. When the wind pressure broke both Hall and
Fischer announced their plans to proceed with the summit bid. The teams would depart from Camp IV
slightly before midnight. They would arrive at the summit by early afternoon and descend to Camp IV
before nightfall. Hall and Fischer again stressed the importance of turning back if climbers fell behind
schedule, but neither guide settled on an exact turnaround time.

The two expeditions departed from Camp IV at 11:30 p.m. on May 9. Hall and Fischer climbed at the
rear, serving as the “sweeps” for each group. Each client carried two bottles of oxygen (that would last
maximum for 18hours). During the climb, four clients (Taske, Hutchison, Kasischke, and Fischbeck)
chose to turn back before reaching the summit. The others continued their trek to the summit. They
encountered a hurdle when ropes were not affixed and they had to wait a long time for everyone to gather
who were already tired and it caused a delay. Around 1:00 p.m after all the delays, Krakauer, Harris, and
Boukreev became the first climbers to reach the summit. Beidleman and Adams soon followed. While
the others chose to descend quickly, Beidleman remained behind to wait for his team’s clients. Hall and
Groom arrived at the summit at 2:30 p.m. along with several clients from the two expeditions. The clients
rested and enjoyed their achievement for 40 minutes. At that time, the weather did not give anyone cause
for concern. Fischer reached the summit at 3:45 p.m. and discovered Hall still waiting there for Hansen
to arrive. Hansen reached the summit shortly after 4:00 p.m.

The clients then started to descend to the South Summit, they noticed the weather take a turn for the
worse. Storm clouds began to move into the area, the winds picked up, and snow began to fall. Only
Boukreev arrived at Camp IV before darkness fell upon the mountain. Meanwhile, as the others
descended, Hall remained above the Hillary Step with an ailing Hansen, who desperately needed more
oxygen. Hall radioed Harris for assistance, but the disoriented guide again reported erroneously that no
oxygen remained at the South Summit. Fischer too began to falter badly just below the South Summit and
pleaded with Sherpa descend to Camp IV and send Boukreev back to help him.

By 9:00 p.m., only Krakauer and Adams had joined the Russian guide at Camp IV. Later that night, a
group of climbers converged on the slopes above Camp IV and hurdled together. When the weather
became little better Beidleman, Groom, Schoening, and Gammelgaard from the group managed to find
their way back to Camp IV shortly before midnight. They provided detailed directions to Boukreev, who
set out to rescue the others. He noticed Madsen’s headlamp through the storm and located the huddle.
He helped Pittman, Fox, and Madsen return to the camp at approximately 4:30 a.m. Reluctantly, they left
Namba and Weathers behind, assuming that the dying climbers could not be saved at that point.

At 4:43 a.m., Hall contacted Base Camp personnel by radio. He told them that Hansen had died and
Harris had disappeared. Hall eventually climbed down to the South Summit, but he could not proceed
beyond that point. Meanwhile Sherpas provided ill Fischer with oxygen, but soon they concluded that
they could not assist him. They left him and returned to Camp IV. Dr. Weathers also made it Camp IV
but Hall couldn’t make it.

There is still and argument among people that the incident of 1996 was due to human errors and mistake
rather than the nature itself. It was the decisions of Hall and Fischer that led to the death of 5 people. If
they had been careful with the timelines and would’ve been less selfish they would’ve saved everyone
from the demise, but instead of asking the clients to turn back and descend after the delay they continued
the expedition just to prove their success which cost them their lives as well as the lives of 3 others.
 Notes
1. The previous year Hall had turned back at the same spot for safety reasons, but on seeing rival
Fischer heading on to the summit, this time he ignored that strict schedule. The climbing plan was
to go down at that point. No one would have died if the plan had been followed.

2. Hall had made the summit of Everest four times and led more than 39 people to the summit,
leading him to believe that he could not fail. In fact, Hall is recorded by Krakauer expressing his
belief that some future team would experience disaster on Everest, but did not believe that
disaster would befall his team. He was only worried that his team would be the one called on to
rescue the hypothetical struggling team. Hall’s overconfidence blinded him. He couldn't see that
he could be the one who failed.

3. This critical error played out on Everest in Hall and Fischer’s incorrect assumption that the
weather would be calm and agreeable. They both led expeditions on Everest for several previous
seasons that experienced only agreeable weather, however, this was the outlier, not the norm. For
many seasons prior to Hall and Fischer’s expeditions, storms were the norm. In fact, there were
three consecutive years in the mid-eighties where no one made the summit due to terrible winds.
Both guides failed to look at past weather patterns and did not realize that they had experienced
strangely calm weather. Effective leaders must take all information, not just recent results, into
account when making high-pressure decisions. They both lacked cognitive biases, else they may
have been able to avert the disaster.

4. Bottlenecks at the Balcony and Hillary Step caused an hour-and-a-half delay in summiting. These
delays were in themselves caused by delays in securing fixed ropes and the sheer number of
people arriving at the bottlenecks at the same time

5. Poor radio communication