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On the definition and function of emotions


Keith Oatley
Social Science Information 2007 46: 415
DOI: 10.1177/05390184070460030108

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What is This?

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Collected comments Klaus Scherer’s “What are Emotions?” 415

Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence, pp. 89–130. Washington, DC:


American Psychological Association.
Markus, H.R. and Kitayama, S. (2003) “Models of Agency: Sociocultural Diversity in the
Construction of Action”, in J.J. Berman and V. Murphy-Berman (eds) Cross-Cultural
Differences in Perspectives on the Self, vol. 49, pp. 18–74. Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press.
Mesquita, B. (2003) “Emotions as Dynamic Cultural Phenomena”, in R. Davidson, H.
Goldsmith and K.R. Scherer (eds) The Handbook of the Affective Sciences, pp. 871–90.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Mesquita, B. and Albert, D. (2006) “The Cultural Regulation of Emotions”, in J.J. Gross
(ed.) The Handbook of Emotion Regulation. New York: Guilford Press.
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Scherer and A. Schorr (eds) Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods,
Research, pp. 233–48. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mesquita, B. and Karasawa, M. (2002) “Different Emotional Lives”, Cognition and
Emotion 16(1): 127–41.
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and D. Cohen (eds) The Handbook of Cultural Psychology. New York: Guilford Press.
Mesquita, B., Karasawa, M., Haire, A., Izumi, S., Hayashi, A., Idzelis, M., Kobata, H., Durham,
M. and Kashiwagi, K. (2006) “What Do I Feel? The Role of Cultural Models in Emotion
Representations”, unpublished manuscript, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC.
Scherer, K.R., Matsumoto, D., Wallbott, H.G. and Kudoh, T. (1988) “Emotional
Experience in Cultural Context: A Comparison between Europe, Japan, and the US”, in
K.R. Scherer (ed.) Facets of Emotions, pp. 5–30. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Shweder, R.A. (1991) “Cultural Psychology: What Is It?”, in R.A. Shweder (ed.) Thinking
through Cultures, pp. 73–110. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Triandis, H.C. (1995) Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Trends and developments: research on emotions


Courants et tendances: recherche sur les émotions

Keith Oatley

On the definition and function of emotions

On definition

Klaus Scherer’s article “What are Emotions?” is a useful reminder of the


stage we have reached in our understanding. Nico Frijda’s invitation to

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416 Social Science Information Vol 46 – no 3

comment upon it in the hope of moving towards agreement about how


we should advance to the next stage is appealing, but daunting.
On page 697, Scherer offers a definition of emotions. I think its sec-
ond part (which starts with “the evaluation…”) is of wide significance
(see below), although its first part, as Scherer himself implies, may serve
principally to demarcate from other phenomena the kinds of emotions
on which he has fruitfully undertaken the research he summarizes in his
article. In science, as it seems to me, we do not proceed by way of def-
initions towards empirical observations and thence to theory. It is the
other way round. Someone offers an enlightening piece of theory – a
mental model – or a telling empirical observation. Then a definition may
be possible. Let me therefore annotate three pieces of research from our
field, which bear on definitional issues in different ways.
1. The central proposal of Charles Darwin’s 1872 book is that emo-
tional expressions can occur even when they are of no use. He would
have enjoyed seeing people smile and gesture as they talk on the tele-
phone. Darwin offers the idea that emotional expressions (and by infer-
ence emotions) derive from our evolutionary history and from our
individual developmental history (see Oatley, 2004). This is a deep and
fundamental insight.
Definitions depend on timing. Before Newton no good definition of
celestial motions would have been possible. After Darwin a fairly good
definition of “emotional expressions” can be offered, partly because
these expressions help to identify us as members of a primate species
and as individuals who once were infants. Perhaps such definitions as
the one Scherer offers of the collective noun “emotions” are more diffi-
cult. Or perhaps we need to wait a few years.
2. In his book Child Care and the Growth of Love, John Bowlby
(1951) offered observations and theory that the system of emotion-based
attachment between an infant and a mother (or other caregiver) was crit-
ically important for the child’s development. So important has the con-
cept of attachment become that it has not only transformed the fields of
developmental psychology and child psychiatry, but it has found its way
into legal systems. Whereas previously issues of child custody were
regarded as having to do largely with physical wellbeing, now the emo-
tional issues of attachment are seen as just as important.
Bowlby offered us a mental model of a fundamental emotion-based
relationship. With it we have enlarged our understanding of emotional
relationships more generally. Given this insight, is it not a mistake to
omit the interpersonal from any definition of emotions? Scherer wants
to conceptualize love as an “interpersonal attitude” (p. 703) rather than

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Collected comments Klaus Scherer’s “What are Emotions?” 417

an emotion; no doubt he has the same view of attachment. But to take


that position would not only cut us off from everyday intuitions about
what emotions are, it would sever the field of emotion research from one
of its most productive and most societally important advances.
3. Helen Mayberg et al. (1999) used Positron Emission Tomography
(PET) to study the relation of an emotion to an emotional disorder. First
normal volunteers were asked to write autobiographically about two
events that had made them sad. Reading the passages made them sad
again; PET scans were made during this time and compared with scans
during neutral periods. During sadness there was increased activity in
the limbic region of the subgenual cingulate and decreased activity in the
prefrontal cortex. A different set of participants had been clinically
depressed and treated for six weeks with a Specific Serotonin Reuptake
Inhibitor (SSRI) drug that increased brain serotonin. For those whose
depression improved on this drug, PET scans showed the opposite pat-
tern to that found with the induction of event-related sadness: activity in
the subgenual cingulate was decreased and activity in the prefrontal cor-
tex was increased.
Definitions are relevant in the research of Mayberg et al. because until
about thirty years ago there was no agreed definition of depression or
any other emotional disorder, and therefore no reliable way to diagnose
such conditions. This problem was acute, because, from the point of
view of delivering health services, it was unclear to whom psychiatric
care should be offered, and, from the point of view of research, there was
no epidemiology of emotional disorders. The problem was solved by
constructing diagnostic procedures of demonstrable reliability, which
include definitions of each kind of psychiatric disorder. A question for
those who press for definitions of emotions at this time is: “What is the
important practical or research problem that cannot be solved without
agreed definitions of ‘emotions’ and reliable measures?”

On function

Part of the issue about definition is that, until the 1950s, research inter-
est in emotions had been intermittent and patchy. It is no longer inter-
mittent, but I think a concern for Scherer is that it remains patchy. He
makes the excellent proposal that, to help solve this problem, we con-
sider design features (a concept derived from engineering). Thus an
important design feature of a communication system is semanticity. I
suggest we make explicit an issue that in Scherer’s account is implicit.

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418 Social Science Information Vol 46 – no 3

This issue is function. For a really effective definition, and to frame


critical design features, one needs to have a firm grasp of function. It is
clear that the function of a communication system is to communicate. So
what is the function of emotions?
Scherer’s Table 1 (p. 698; and reproduced on p. 382 of this collection
of comments) is helpful, and offers partial answers to this question. The
five subsystems listed by Scherer as being involved in emotion
processes are involved in five subfunctions, which are (reading down
the table’s list): (1) evaluation or appraisal, (2) bodily-physiological
support, (3) motivation and preparation for action, (4) action, including
communicative action, (5) monitoring and interpretation of effects. I
suggest these five need to be put in the context of a more inclusive func-
tion of emotions.
To accomplish this, let us slightly rework Scherer’s first design fea-
ture, “Event focus”, in terms of function, and in terms of the idea that
appears in Scherer’s definition of an emotion as an “evaluation of an
external or internal … event as relevant to a major concern” (p. 697; I
omit Scherer’s terms “stimulus” and “organism” because of their deri-
vation from the quaint theoretical position of behaviorism). We can
agree to emotions as evaluations because, since Aristotle proposed the
idea some 2300 years ago, thinkers have pondered it and researchers
have shown its usefulness. I believe that, for those interested in the mind,
it needs to be put at the top of any list of features of emotions for the fol-
lowing reason. A venerable part of the study of mind is perception,
which deals with the outer world and how it is conceptualized in terms
of possibilities for action. Other aspects of the study of mind concern
inner dispositions (such as personality) and abilities (such as memory).
The proper place of emotions is in the space that had previously been left
vacant in the study of mind between outer and inner. Emotions mediate
transactions between outer events and inner concerns. Emotions are not
the only processes by which to undertake such mediation but – we may
assert – they are primary in such transactions. That is why “evaluation
of an external or internal … event as relevant to a major concern” is the
most important part of Scherer’s definition.
I believe we can read Scherer’s paragraph on “Event focus” (p. 700) with
a functional emphasis. Yes, many emotions are focused on events. What
events? Scherer says: events that are important for major concerns. What
are the major concerns for humans? They are interpersonal (see e.g. Oatley,
Keltner and Jenkins, 2006). (Thus Darwin’s research was on expressions,
otherwise known as communications with others, Bowlby’s was on a fun-
damental relational system, Mayberg’s was about losses of relationships.)

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Collected comments Klaus Scherer’s “What are Emotions?” 419

If we take the design stance seriously, the principal design function of


emotions in human beings is to mediate relationships. Thus the events
that are the focus of emotions are predominantly social. The concerns
with which they connect are primarily with others: those with whom we
conflict, those to whom we are attached, those whom we love.
Author’s address: Keith Oatley, Director, Cognitive Science Program, University of
Toronto, University College, 15 Kings College Circle, Toronto, Canada M5S 3H7.
[email: koatley@oise.utoronto.ca]

References
Bowlby, J. (1951) Child Care and the Growth of Love. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Darwin, C. (1889 [1872]) The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. London:
Murray.
Mayberg, H.S., Liotti, M., Brannan, S.K., McGinnis, S., Maharin, R.K., Jerabek, P.A.,
Silva, J.A., Tekell, J.L., Martin, C.C., Lancaster, J.L. and Fox, P.T. (1999) “Reciprocal
Limbic Cortical Function and Negative Mood: Converging PET Findings in Depression
and Normal Sadness”, American Journal of Psychiatry 156: 675–82.
Oatley, K. (2004) Emotions: A Brief History. Oxford: Blackwell.
Oatley, K., Keltner, D. and Jenkins, J. M. (2006) Understanding Emotions. Malden, MA:
Blackwell (2nd edn).

Trends and developments: research on emotions


Courants et tendances: recherche sur les émotions

W. Gerrod Parrott

Components and the definition of emotion

Any consideration of modern researchers’ definition of emotion must


include the work of Klaus Scherer. Certain ideas from his component-
process model have been so widely adopted as to become part of the
field’s basic assumptions. Scherer’s most recent proposals on matters of
definition and conceptualization (Scherer, 2005) constitute an opportunity

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