only five copies of the written argument in support of its motion for reconsideration.
1.) Universal Textile v. CIR
G.R. No. L-31287 | December 29, 1970 | Judicial Notice of Records
FACTS:
1. In a decision the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, through one of its
judges, found both of the two petitioners, the Union and the Utex, guilty of
unfair labor practice in having caused the unjustified dismissal of the
respondent Macario Umali from his employment at the Utex mills. Among
other things, the respondent CIR ordered the reinstatement of Umali with
backwages, to be borne solidarily by the two petitioners.
2. The Union and the Utex each filed its pro forma motion for reconsideration
on November 18, 1968, within the five-day period prescribed by the rules of
the CIR, with notice that each would submit its respective memorandum
containing the arguments in support of its motion within ten days thereafter.
3. According to the Utex, its memorandum of arguments was filed (by
messenger) on November 28,1968. The Union for its part claims having filed
a separate memorandum by registered mail on November 27, 1968.
4. In a hearing, in the course of the session of the respondent CIR en banc,
counsel for the Union was barred from arguing his client's case, the
reason given being that the Union's memorandum of arguments was filed
out of time. Counsel attempted to brush off this ruling by exhibiting registry
receipt 2013 which indicates that the post office had received the mail cover
for the respondent CIR on November 27, 1968, well within the reglementary
period for its filing. He also produced a registry return card showing that one
D. Cervantes had acknowledged receipt of the same mail cover for the CIR
on December 2, 1968.
5. The respondent CIR instituted a search of its own records for the
pertinent mail envelope which would show the exact date of receipt, but
the latter was nowhere to be found. Since the respondent CIR en banc was
apparently not impressed by the Union's evidence of filing, it held the latter's
arguments, including those of the Utex, in abeyance pending investigation
and determination of the true mailing date of the Union's memorandum.
6. To the complete amazement of the two petitioners (Utex and Union), the
respondent CIR en banc, on March 25, 1969, issued a resolution:
a. "The oral arguments scheduled for February 6,1969 was suspended in order to verify
whether or not the written memorandum by the respondent [Universal] Textile Mills
Workers Union in support of its motion for reconsideration, dated November 27,
1968, was filed with the Court by registered mail or personally to guide the Court as
to the date of filing.
b. "Incident to the query, however, the records of the case reveal that the original copy
of said written memorandum is with the notation that only three copies thereof were
filed with the Court by the respondent union. Said notation is affirmed by the
receiving clerk to be his own handwriting. The records also show and likewise
confirmed by the receiving clerk that the respondent company has filed with the Court
c. Without passing on whether or not the argument of movant union was filed on time,
the written arguments and/or memoranda filed by either or both the respondent union,
UTMWU, and the respondent Universal Textile Mills, following the rule and
precedents that at least six (6) copies of the written argument in support of the motion
for reconsideration must be filed with the Court, should be, as they are hereby,
DISMISSED."
7. MR denied. Hence these certiorari suits by the two petitioners.
ISSUES:
1. W/N JN can be taken of the insufficient copies of memorandum. Yes.
RATIO:
1. The petitioner Union points out that the unresolved issue last pending
before the respondent CIR en banc had to do with the timeliness of the
filing of the Union's memorandum of arguments, and argues that the
outright dismissal of the Union's motion for reconsideration on an entirely
different ground, namely, insufficiency of copies of the memorandum filed,
was a complete surprise and in effect underhanded, amounting to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CIR.
2. We disagree. It is a settled rule that a tribunal may at any time take
judicial notice of the records of a case pending before it, [1] and satisfy
itself that copies of the pleadings filed by the parties are in the numbers
required by its rules.
3. The failure of a pleading to comply with such procedural imperative set by
the court, leaves the latter the discretion either to reject that pleading or order
completion of the number of copies thereof.
4. Where, however, the party whose pleading has been shunted aside offers to
show that it has fully complied with the requirements of the rules and that the
records kept by the tribunal contain inaccurate entries, the latter body should
pause and listen, and give that party a day in court.
5. In its motion for reconsideration of the resolution of March 25, 1969, the Utex
offered to produce before the respondent CIR ten (10) extra copies kept by it
of its memorandum of arguments duly stamped "received" by the CIR.
6. This would indicate that the Utex memorandum was filed in the required
number for it would be highly improbable that the CIR would impress its
receipt on so many extra copies without retaining the copies it needed.
7. For its part, the Union offered to prove that it had filed by registered mail the
six copies required of it. The respondent CIR skirted all these offers by taking
refuge behind its supposed rule that its resolutions can no longer be the
subject of any motion for reconsideration, thus depriving the petitioners
Union and Utex their right to be heard on the matter. As the records stand,
there is no way of determining the veracity of the averments of the two
petitioners.
8. The rule, moreover, that resolutions of the respondent CIR en banc cannot be the subject of
motions for reconsideration is principally addressed to resolutions reviewing the decisions of the
individual judges of that court. This delay-saving scheme finds justification in that the court
would have, in principle, passed upon the issues a second time. The rule could not have been
intended, however, to apply to resolutions en banc which deal with matters not previously passed
upon by the court.
9. In denying the two petitioners the opportunity to be heard on the matter
of the sufficiency of copies of the pleadings filed by them, the respondent
CIR en banc clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
resolution of June 14, 1969. The court's strict adherence to the letter of
its procedural rules may have been imbued with laudable intention
bearing upon the discouragement of unwarranted delay in labor cases.
10. The respondent CIR should remember, however, that the adjudication of
substantial justice remains the paramount consideration in every litigation
before it. As it is, the delay in the disposition of the principal case has been
compounded by these two suits brought by the petitioners to correct the
precipitate actuations of that tribunal.
11. The first case, L-31287, while denominated as a special civil action for certiorari, contains the
opposing views of the parties regarding the decision of the respondent CIR on the merits. It
would indeed be ideal for us not to have to remand these cases to the CIR for further proceedings,
and instead proceed with a review on the merits, were it not that in the other case, L-31332, the
petitioner Union, which erroneously denominated its petition as one for review by certiorari,
stuck close to the issues relating to the resolutions of the CIR en banc and did not dwell at all
on the merits of the respondent court's decision. For us now to adjudicate the principal
controversy on the merits would result in denial to the petitioner Union its right to be heard on
the issues involved therein.
12. The only just course left open to us is to see to the speedy disposition of the principal case
pending below. To this end, and without in any manner downgrading the respect that parties-
litigant before the respondent CIR must accord to procedural rules of that tribunal, we deem it
best, under the environmental circumstances, to direct the respondent CIR to order the two
petitioners Utex and Union, each to file, without delay, the' requisite number of copies of its
motion for reconsideration, immediately after which the CIR en banc shall proceed to resolve
the said two motions for reconsideration.
13. ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions of the CIR en banc of March 25 and June
14, 1969 are hereby annulled and set aside, and the said Court en banc,
subject to our observations made in the immediately preceding paragraph, is
hereby ordered to give due course to the petitioners' separate motions for
reconsideration of the decision of November 4, 1968, and forthwith proceed
to the consideration and resolution thereof. No costs.
2.) Baguio v. De Jalagat
G.R. No. L-28100 | November 29, 1971 | Judicial Notice Res Judicata
FACTS:
1. The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real
property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February,
14, 1966.
2. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now
appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment.
3. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides
being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil
Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening
Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the
very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639.
4. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of
Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio,
plaintiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving
practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants
are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of
the deceased Melecio Jalagat.
5. That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the
instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear
from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated December 6, 1965]." 1
6. There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on
the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for
dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then
alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion
may be inferred.
7. Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus:
"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under
date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action
is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded as
it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against
Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from
whom they have derived their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965,
which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as
prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed].
8. The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent action
against the same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. W/N on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause of
 action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice
of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied
upon. Yes.
RATIO:
1. An affirmance is thus called for. The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset,
must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.
2. 1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in
a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on the face of the
complaint. What immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and
inconclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that there was
no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that
there was a previous dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the
predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by
appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest.
3. There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of the
finality of the decision in the previous case which would show that appellant's
claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile for the
court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior judgment
certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower court to do?
Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless,
endeavor as the outcome was predictable?
4. Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules
of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its
futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the
circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the
finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and
thereafter decided by it.
5. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal.
Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments
of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken
judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending
is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case
under consideration."3
6. 2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a
remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of
justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to
which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable
time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has,
ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should
not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to
law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal
system in mind.
7. Affirmed.
3.) Land Bank v. Yatco
G.R. No.172551 | January 15, 2014 | Judicial Notice in CARP Valuation
FACTS:
1. Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner
of a 27.5730-hectare parcel of agricultural land (property) in Barangay
Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
49465.5 On April 30, 1999,6 the government placed the property under the
coverage of its (CARP).
2. Pursuant to (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89.
Yatco did not find this valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to
the (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo
City, which then conducted summary administrative proceedings for the
determination of just compensation.9
3. The PARAD computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00;10 it used
the property’s current market value (as shown in the tax declaration11 that
Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted that
the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to back up its
computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s valuation.
4. The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed
with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation.12
5. The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at ₱200.00 per square meter.13 The
RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City,
Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in turn, adopted the valuation that
the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-
C15 (collectively, civil cases). The CA dismissed the LBP’s appeal. First, according to the CA,
the parcels of land in the civil cases were the very same properties in the appealed agrarian case.
Second, Branch 36’s valuation was based on the report of the duly appointed commissioners and
was arrived at after proper land inspection. As the determination of just compensation is
essentially a judicial function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s valuation which was
founded on factual and legal bases. MR denied. Hence this petition.
6. The LBP argues in the present petition that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC-SAC’s ruling
that fixed the just compensation for the property based on the valuation set by Branches 35 and
36.22 The LBP pointed out that the property in the present case was expropriated pursuant to its
agrarian reform program; in contrast, the land subject of the civil cases was expropriated by the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for industrial purposes.
7. The LBP added that in adopting the valuation fixed by Branches 35 and 36, the RTC-SAC
completely disregarded the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the guidelines
and procedure laid out in DAR AO 5-98.
8. Yatco argues that the RTC-SAC correctly fixed the just compensation for its property at ₱200.00
per square meter.23It points to several reasons for its position. First, the RTC-SAC’s valuation
was not only based on the valuation fixed by Branch 36 (as adopted by Branch 35); it was also
based on the property’s market value as stated in the current tax declaration that it presented in
evidence before the RTC-SAC. And third, the RTC-SAC considered all of the factors
enumerated in Section 17 when it set the property’s value at ₱200.00 per square meter.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property
was proper.
RATIO:
1. The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial
function.26 Section 57 of R.A. No. 665727 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the
original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for lands under
CARP coverage.
2. To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to correctly
determine just compensation. The law (under Section 49 of R.A. No. 665728)
likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its implementation. The DAR
thus issued DAR AO 5-98 incorporating the law’s listed factors in
determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains the details
that take these factors into account.
3. That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law (and
consequently the DAR’s implementing formula) is not a novel concept.
4. In other words, in the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just
compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply
the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors.
5. When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly
bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that
do not warrant the formula’s strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion,
relax the formula’s application to fit38 the factual situations before them.39 They must,
however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law
and the rules have provided.40
6. The situation where a deviation is made in the exercise of judicial discretion
should at all times be distinguished from a situation where there is utter and
blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and by the implementing
rules. For in such a case, the RTC-SAC’s action already amounts to grave
abuse of discretion for having been taken outside of the contemplation of the
law.41
7. This use of considerations that were completely outside the contemplation of
the law is the precise situation we find in the present case, as fully explained
below.
8. The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the
RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous
9. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience
for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in
this sense, it is equivalent to proof.43 Generally, courts are not authorized
to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge."44
10. They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts
prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties
present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or
(2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so.45 In either case, the courts
must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court.
11. We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil
cases,46 which offer the LBP opposed.47These were duly noted by the
court.48 Even assuming, however, that the April 21, 2004 order49 of the RTC-
SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it)
constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on
Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally erroneous.
12. 1. The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR
AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law.
13. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 reads:
a. Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
14. While DAR AO 5-9850 pertinently provides:
a. A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or
CA:
b. LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
15. After considering these factors and formula, we are convinced that the
RTC-SAC completely disregarded them and simply relied on Branch
36’s valuation.
16. For one, the RTC-SAC did not point to any specific evidence or cite the
values and amounts it used in arriving at the ₱200.00 per square meter
valuation. It did not even consider the property’s market value based on the
current tax declaration that Yatco insists the RTC-SAC considered in addition
to Branch 36’s valuation. Assuming that the RTC-SAC considered the
property’s market value (which, again, we find that it did not), this alone will
not suffice as basis, unless justified under Item II.A.3 of DAR AO 5-98 (as
provided above). Then too, it did not indicate the formula that it used in
arriving at its valuation or which led it to believe that Branch 36’s
valuation was applicable to this case. Lastly, the RTC-SAC did not conduct
an independent assessment and computation using the considerations
required by the law and the rules.
17. To be exact, the RTC-SAC merely relied on Branch 36’s valuation as it
found the LBP’s evidence on the matter of just compensation inadequate.
While indeed we agree that the evidence presented by the LBP was
inadequate and did not also consider the legally prescribed factors and
 formula, the RTC-SAC still legally erred in solely relying on Yatco’s RTC-SAC may appoint one or more Commissioners to ascertain and report to it the facts
necessary for the determination of the just compensation for the property. Unfortunately, the
evidence51 which we find equally irrelevant and off-tangent to the factors
RTC-SAC did not avail of this opportunity, with disastrous results for the parties in light of the
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. time gap between now and the time the RTC-SAC decision was made in 2004.
18. 2. The valuation fixed by Branches 35 and 36 was inapplicable to the property 29. We cannot help but highlight the attendant delay as the RTC-SAC obviously erred in a manner
19. Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,52 decided by Branch 35, and Civil Case No. 2259-95-C,53 decided by that we cannot now remedy at our level. The RTC-SAC erred and effectively abused its
Branch 36, were both eminent domain cases initiated by the NAPOCOR under the power discretion by fixing the just compensation for the property based solely on the valuation fixed
granted to it by (C.A.) No. 120,54 as amended by R.A. No. 6395,55 i.e., to acquire property or by Branches 35 and 36 – considerations that we find were completely irrelevant and misplaced.
easement of right of way. This is an error that now requires fresh determination of just compensation again at the RTC-
SAC level.
20. In its decision in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C, Branch 36 accordingly recognized the NAPOCOR’s
authority to enter the property of the defendant GP Development Corporation and to acquire the 30. As a final note and clarificatory reminder, we agree that the LBP is primarily charged with
"easement of right of way" in the exercise of its powers. Thus, in disposing of the case, Branch determining land valuation and compensation for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform
36 adopted the recommendation of the appointed commissioners and ordered the NAPOCOR to purposes.64 But this determination is only preliminary. The landowner may still take the matter
pay easement fee of ₱20.00 per square meter. Similarly recognizing this authority of NAPOCOR, of just compensation to the court for final adjudication. 65 Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the
Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C likewise ordered NAPOCOR to pay easement fee of original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation
₱20.00 per square meter. under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-SAC.66 But, in its determination the RTC-SAC must
take into consideration the factors laid down by law and the pertinent DAR regulations.
21. Evidently, the civil cases were not made under the provisions of the CARL nor for agrarian
reform purposes, as enunciated under R.A. No. 6657. 57 In exercising the power vested in it by 31. Remand of the case. Considering that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the
the provisions of C.A. No. 120 (as amended), the NAPOCOR did not seek to acquire and property s value at the time of taking, we deem it premature to make a final determination of the
distribute lands to farmers and regular farmworkers; the NAPOCOR sought easement of right of matter in controversy. We are not a trier of facts and we cannot receive new evidence from the
way to transmit electric power as it was tasked to. parties to aid them in the prompt resolution of this case. We are thus compelled to remand the
case to the RTC-SAC for the reception of evidence and the determination of just compensation,
22. We need not delve into the factors that Branches 35 and 36 considered in the civil cases. By with a cautionary reminder for the proper observance of the factors under Section 17 of R.A. No.
simply looking at the expropriating body (NAPOCOR) and the law governing the expropriations 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. In its determination, the RTC-SAC may exercise the
made, we are convinced that the valuation fixed by Branch 36 is inapplicable to the present case. authority granted to it by Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657.
A comparison of the required parameters and guidelines used alone demonstrates the disparity.
32. CA Reversed. Remanded to RTC for its determination of just compensation
23. Also, we point out that the RTC-SAC adopted Branch 36’s valuation without any qualification under the terms of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of
or condition. Yet, in disposing of the present case, the just compensation that it fixed for the
property largely differed from the former. Note that Branch 36 fixed a valuation of ₱20.00 per Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, as amended.
square meter;58 while the RTC-SAC, in the present case, valued the property at ₱200.00 per
square meter.59 Strangely, the RTC-SAC did not offer any explanation nor point to any evidence,
fact or particular that justified the obvious discrepancy between these amounts.
24. Lastly, in ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the expropriated property is
determined as of the time of taking.60 The "time of taking" refers to that time when the State
deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to
the property61 or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.62
25. The decision in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C, which pegged the valuation at ₱20.00 per square
meter, was made in 1997. The record did not disclose when title to the land subject of that case
was transferred to the State. We can safely assume, however, that the "taking" was made in 1997
(the date Branch 36 issued its decision) or at the time of the filing of the complaint, which
logically was prior to 1997.
26. The RTC-SAC, in the present case, rendered its decision in 2004; the LBP filed the petition for
judicial determination of just compensation in 2002. Obviously, the "taking" of the property
could not have been made any earlier than 2002; otherwise, the parties would have pointed these
out.
27. Between 1997 in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C and the earliest taking in 2002 in this case is a
difference of 5 years – a significant gap in the matter of valuation since the lands involved are
not in the hinterlands, but in the rapidly industrializing Calamba, Laguna.
28. Under these circumstances – i.e., the insufficiency of the evidence presented by both the LBP
and Yatco on the issue of just compensation - the more judicious approach that the RTC-SAC 4.) Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading
could have taken was to exercise the authority granted to it by Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657,
rather than simply adopt Branch 36’s valuation. Under Section 5863 of R.A. No. 6657, the
G.R. No. L-24318 | August 29, 1969 | Judicial Notice Contracts With Government
 Invariably in Writing
FACTS:
1. On August 15, 1962, plaintiff-appellee Board of Liquidators, as trustee of the
defunct Land Settlement & Development Corporation (LASEDECO), filed a
complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila, to recover from the defendants
Ricma Trading Corporation and its President and General Manager,
Ricardo Maipid, the sum of P2,800.00 as unpaid balance of the purchase
price of certain personal properties consisting of equipment, tools, engine
blocks, spare parts, supplies, junk and others located in its Bodega No. 2, on
Sta. Mesa Boulevard, Manila, which are described in the said complaint as
"Lots Nos. 1 and 2, Bodega 2, Sta. Mesa Compound," with interest thereon
at the legal rate from the date of the filing thereof.
2. On September 29, 1962, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on two
grounds, namely: (1) that appellee's cause of action is barred by the statute
of limitations; and (2) that the complaint states no cause of action in so far
as defendant Ricardo Maipid 1 is concerned. With regard to the first
ground, the contention was that inasmuch as there was no written
contract evidencing the sale between the appellee and the defendants nor
any written promise or commitment on the part of the latter to pay the alleged
unpaid balance of P2,800.00, the former's cause of action was merely based
on an oral contract, which, pursuant to Art. 1139 of the Civil Code, should
have been filed within six (6) years from the accrual of the cause of action,
i.e., from October 24, 1955, the date when the last partial payment was made,
to the same day in 1961. So, according to the motion, prescription had already
set in on August 15, 1962, the date when the complaint of appellee was filed.
3. Case dismissed. Appellee appealed.
4. 1. That the Board of Liquidators which is the
The stipulation of facts is as follows:
agency designated under Republic Act No. 1160, to liquidate the assets of the
Land Settlement & Development Corporation, and is acting as trustee of said
LASEDECO, has offered for bidding certain personal properties consisting
of equipment, tools, engine blocks, spare parts, supplies and other junk at its
Bodega No. 2 at Sta. Mesa, Manila, which are designated as Lots Nos. 1 and
2 and defendant corporation through its President, defendant Ricardo Maipid
submitted its bid thereon on September 7, 1955, but which is not acceptable
to plaintiff;
5. 2. That subsequently the defendant corporation through defendant Maipid
negotiated with the plaintiff for the purchase of the aforementioned personal
properties, and which was awarded to said corporation in the amount of
P10,800.00 as per Resolution No. 7173, dated October 14, 1955, as evidenced
by a certified true copy of the extract of the minutes of the meeting of the
Board of Liquidators, which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A";
6. 3. That in pursuance to said Resolution No. 7173, defendant corporation
through defendant Maipid received on October 15, 1955, the above-
mentioned properties as evidenced by Memorandum Receipts which are
attached hereto and marked as Exhibits "B" and "B-1";
7. 4. That defendant corporation paid the plaintiff the sums of P5,000.00 and
P3,000.00 only on October 15, and 24, 1955, respectively, as evidenced by
Official Receipts Nos. A-0266790 and A-0263397, respectively, and which
are attached hereto and marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-1";
8. 5. That actual delivery and receipt of Lot No. 2 in Bodega 2 was effected on
October 24, 1955, as evidenced by an Invoice Receipt No. 61 which is
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "D";
9. 6. That there is still an unpaid balance of P2,800.00 due the plaintiff from
the defendant corporation, and to secure payment thereof the latter
posted a surety bond executed with the Manila Underwriters Insurance
Co., Inc., on December 28, 1956, copy of which bond is hereto attached
and marked as Exhibit "E-1";
10. 7. That upon demands made by plaintiff, defendant corporation through
defendant Maipid renewed said bond extending the same for another year
expiring on December 28, 1957, copies of the letter of said defendant and the
renewal slip are attached hereto and marked as Exhibits "F" and "F-1";
11. 8. That another renewal of said bond (Exh. "E") was made on November
20, 1957, copies of which renewal and letter of transmittal are attached hereto
and marked as Exhibits "G" and "G-1";
12. 9. That as said balance of P2,800.00 is still outstanding, plaintiff sent a letter
demanding payment thereof to defendant corporation on May 25, 1962, and
which was duly received by the latter, a copy of which letter is attached hereto
and marked as Exhibit "H".
13. On December 23, 1964, the CFI rendered its decision subject of the present
appeal.
a. In the opinion of the Court, this letter is a manifest acknowledgment on the part of
the defendant corporation to pay said balance of P2,800.00 for it is certainly difficult
to understand why the defendants should renew the bond precisely to secure the
payment of said balance of P2,800.00 if it was not willing any more to recognize it
as its legitimate obligation and to pay the same. It is true that the execution of said
bond was for the purpose of securing the verbal obligation of the defendant within
the Land Settlement & Development Corporation but when it renewed said bond,
especially upon the request of the plaintiff, Board of Liquidators, as trustee of the
Land Settlement & Development Corporation, the defendant expressly
acknowledged that it was still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,800.00.
According to Article 1155 of the New Civil Code: "The prescription of action is
interrupted ... when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor."
Consequently, the contention of the defendants that plaintiff's cause of action has
already expired is devoid of any legal merit.
14. And, accordingly, rendered judgment thus: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant, Ricma Trading Corporation, to pay to the
plaintiff, Board of Liquidators, as trustee of the Land Settlement & development Corporation,
the sum of P2,800.00, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, until fully
 paid, and the costs of the suit. included, provided the property is withdrawn immediately upon payment
of the agreed price and proper advice given to the NDC that the bodega is
15. Not satisfied with this decision, defendant Ricma Trading Corporation has vacated thereby eliminating payment of monthly rental and dispensing
interposed the present appeal posing for our consideration three issues, to wit: with the services of the three guards in the premises."

ISSUES: 7. and the invoice receipt signed in two parts by defendant Maipid on behalf of
appellant, which is copied on pages 22-25 of the Record on Appeal thus:
1. whether or not appellee's action had already prescribed under the statute of
limitations. No. a. ANNEX "A"

RATIO:
1. Again, this assignment of error is without merit.
2. The main thesis of appellant in regard to this alleged error is that the
transaction upon which appellee's action is based was not evidenced by any
written agreement and, being verbal, said action prescribes in six years, and,
therefore, appellee's complaint should have been dismissed, considering that
it was filed only on August 15, 1962 whereas the said transaction took place
in October, 1955.
3. Overruling this contention, the court a quo sustained the claim of appellee
that even if the said transaction was verbal "the renewal of the bond (in 1957)
executed by the Manila Underwriters Insurance Co., Inc., on December 28,
1955, to secure the payment of said balance of P2,800.00, has interrupted the
running of said period of limitation."
8. not to speak of the official receipts issued for the payment of the articles in
question, constitute written evidence of the agreement because these
documents, although actually separate ones, if taken together, embody
not only all the elements of a contract but even all the terms and
conditions of the agreement of purchase and sale between the appellant
and appellee.
9. ***Besides, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that contractual
transactions with government or any of its instrumentalities are
invariably in writing.
a. Bidding; COA Requirements, etc. need a contract So that the DBM
will empower any government entity to obligate the funds the
purposes for that particular project
10. We hold in the case at bar that appellee's action is based on a written contract.

4. This ruling is on the whole correct, but the truth of the matter is that although, 11. The reference to an action "upon a written contract" in Article 1144 of the
according to His Honor, "it is admitted that the transaction is not evidenced Civil Code does not preclude instances when the agreement may not be found
by any written contract of purchase and sale, and, therefore, it is verbal," it is in one single document but in two or more separate writings related to, each
clear from the record that by this statement, His Honor must have meant other, which when taken together contain all the elements of a contract.
only that there was no formal contract executed in due form by the parties. 12. Affirmed.
For in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, which this court may
not disregard, it is clearly stated: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
5. Thus, while there was no formal written contract signed by the parties, it
cannot be denied that the Resolution 7173 of appellee Board, signed by all
its members, a transcript of which is quoted on pp. 45-46 of the Record on
Appeal as follows:
6. 1. The meeting was called to order at 4:05 o'clock p.m.
a. 13. Mr. Ricardo Maipid, for and in behalf of RICMA Trading Corporation, appeared
before the Board in connection with the award in his favor of Lots 1 and 2, Bodega
2, Sta. Mesa Compound. He informed the Board that he is accepting the price of the
Board for Lot 1 at P4,500.00 but requests that Lot 2 in the same bodega be awarded
to him at P5,500.00. Inasmuch as the property had been advertised for sale thru public
bidding three times already and that the immediate disposal thereof would redound
to the best interest of the government as the monthly rental of P500.00 would be saved
as well as the salaries of the three guards guarding the premises, the Board, upon
motion duly seconded and carried, approved Resolution No. 7173, as follows:
i. "RESOLVED, in view of the reasons above-cited, to award to the RICMA
Trading Corporation, Lot 1, except the "Farmal" tractor, under tag No. 5.) People v. Mapa
BL-120, and Lot 2, both at the Sta. Mesa Compound for P10,800.00 tax
G.R. No. 91014 | March 31, 1993 | Presence, Teabag/Sticks, Carreon/Lucero brought
to NBI, Replacement for Duenas, No Drugs in Body
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant Elmer Mapa y de Gula and Serapio de Gula y Tongco were both charged with
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act, under an information1which reads:…, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously possessed and sell and gave away twelve (12) sticks of marijuana treated cigarettes…
2. After a trial on the merits, Serapio de Gula was acquitted on reasonable doubt while accused
Elmer Mapa was found guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced accordingly to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
3. The People's version of the facts is as follows:
4. Acting upon a confidential information that a certain "Elmer" was engaged
in drug pushing Major Elias Casimiro, Chief of the Valenzuela Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit dispatched a team composed of Valenzuela policemen to
conduct a surveillance operation in the area.
5. On July 16, 1986, at around 8 o'clock in the evening, the team launched a
buy-bust operation against accused-appellant at T. de Gula St., Marulas,
Valenzuela using two (2) P10.00 marked bills.4 Pat. Mario Capangyarihan,
who then acted as a poseur-buyer together with the confidential informant
proceeded to appellant's address at T. de Gula Street. Upon reaching the
place, the confidential informant introduced Pat. Capangyarihan to accused-
appellant as a "scorer" of "damo." Pat. Capangyarihan asked for P20.00 worth
of marijuana and then handed to appellant the two (2) marked P10.00 bills.
After receipt of the money, appellant left for a while to get the "marijuana."
Later, appellant entered the yard of the house with a wooden fence and talked
briefly to a certain person (later identified as accused Serapio de Gula) who
was seen by Pat. Capangyarihan handing over something to appellant.
6. Thereafter, accused-appellant returned and handed over to the poseur-buyer
a plastic bag containing twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Pat.
Capangyarihan identified himself as a policeman and grabbed appellant by
the arms. Pat. Capangyarihan then signalled his companions to come and help
him subdue the suspect.
7. At this juncture, Serapio de Gula approached the police team and told
them that appellant Mapa is his nephew. The policemen told Serapio that
appellant was placed under arrest for selling "marijuana". Since Pat.
Capangyarihan recognized Serapio as the person with whom appellant talked
after receiving the marked bills, Serapio was also arrested. The two (2)
marked bills were retrieved from the accused-appellant.
8. Appellant and Serapio were brought to the Valenzuela Police Headquarters for further
investigation. The plastic bag containing the twelve (12) sticks of suspected marijuana were
forwarded to the NBI for examination. Microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests was
conducted on the seized articles and all yielded "positive results" for "marijuana".
9. Accused-appellant Elmer Mapa however, disputes the foregoing facts.
Instead, the defense maintains that the facts are as follows:
10. At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1986, while accused Elmer
Mapa was inside their house with his co-accused/uncle Serapio de Gula and
their chess club members playing chess, two men with drawn guns entered
the premises of the accused's house without permission, calling for accused
Elmer Mapa, prompting accused Serapio de Gula to tell them, "pare, anong
problema, trespassing kayo."5
11. In answer, the men identified themselves as policemen and told Serapio not
to interfere. However, Serapio de Gula insisted that even if they were police
officers they should nevertheless ask permission from the owner of the house
before entering. In reply the police officers allegedly manhandled him while
one of them entered the house where accused Elmer Mapa was, pulled him
out and brought him to a waiting jeep. Serapio further testified that the four
police officers who manhandled him were Patrolman Puchero, Patrolman
Inciong, Patrolman Capangyarihan and Patrolman Protestante. 6 Serapio
threatened to file charges against these police officers for mauling him so
much so that said officers likewise arrested him.
12. This was corroborated by a defense witness, Antonio Trinidad. In his testimony, Antonio
revealed that one unidentified man entered the house and when questioned by Serapio de Gula,
the man hit the latter with gun. He could not do anything, much less the other chess players
present because guns were poked at them.8
13. Both the accused were brought to the sub-station where they were mauled
and forced to admit the charges against them.
14. Serapio remembered Patrolman Inciong going to his cell and showing (14)
tea bags and jestingly said, "Never will you be able to get out of this jail
because we will charge you with drug pushing and we will use these as
evidence against you."9
15. Tarried in jail during the early months of their apprehension, Elmer Mapa
learned that a policeman talked to a certain Dueñas who was earlier detained
for illegal possession of marijuana, that if he wanted to be released, he must
give a substitute or "palit-ulo" in jail lingo. That upon his apprehension,
he learned that Eduardo Dueñas was later released by the police.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Mapa is guilty. No, there are glaring inconsistences in prosecution's
case.
RATIO:
1. From the foregoing facts, We hold the accused-appellant innocent. The
conflicting and contradictory evidence of the prosecution affirms the
weakness of its case thereby creating reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
2. We find several glaring inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to engender doubt on the
moral certainty of accused-appellant's guilt.
3. The prosecution presented only two of the members of the buy-bust 11. Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered but also on who
operation, whose testimonies unfortunately did not impress this Court. On the requested for the seized articles to be examined by the NBI. Pat.
contrary, it weakens the prosecution's case. Capangyarihan testified that it was police aide Carreon who brought the
seized articles to the NBI for examination, whereas Pat. Lucero testified
4. Take for instance the testimony of Pat. Capangyarihan who testified that
that it was he who forwarded the marijuana to the NBI.
Serapio was arrested some 9 to 10 meters away from where Elmer Mapa was
standing and that he was not present during the arrest of Serapio de Gula. 12. The foregoing contradictory testimony of two prosecution witnesses on who
brought the marijuana to the NBI for laboratory examination is significant. Is
5. Contrary to his testimony however, Pat. Lucero testified that when Serapio
it police aide Carreon or Pat. Lucero?
was apprehended by him Pat. Capangyarihan was present and saw him
effect the arrest. Thus —Pat. Capangyarihan: 13. Carreon never testified on the matter or that the specimen submitted to the
a. Q And when Pat. Lucero effected the arrest (on Serapio), you were not actually
NBI for examination was the same specimen allegedly taken from the
present? accused.
b. A I was not there, but I saw that it was Pat. Lucero who first took hold of Serapio de 14. Neither was Pat. Lucero's testimony clear on the matter. Obviously, one of
Gula. them is lying, Pat. Capangyarihan or Pat. Lucero. On such kind of shaky
6. Patrolman Lucero on the other hand, testified differently on this matter testimony conviction cannot be had.
a. Q Did Serapio de Gula succeed in pulling out Elmer Mapa from the hands of Pat. 15. The inconsistencies were never explained by the prosecution. Irreconcilable
Capangyarihan? and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution
b. A. No, sir. witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of the appellant and his guilt for
the crime charged. 19
7. Another glaring inconsistency lies in the seized articles. Pat. Capangyarihan
testifies: 16. As it is, the bungled testimonies of the police officers cannot be given
credence. We are more inclined to believe the testimony of accused-
a. Q And after Elmer had approached you, what did he do?
appellant that he was a "target" to be arrested not for selling marijuana
b. A He handed me a plastic container containing twelve (12) handrolled suspected but as a replacement for Eduardo Dueñas who was at the time detained in
marijuana cigarettes. the Municipal Jail, with accused-appellant as the substitute or "palit-ulo" in
8. On the other hand, Pat. Lucero testified that what Elmer was holding is a tea jail lingo, so that the detainee could be released.
bag of marijuana and not a plastic container containing twelve (12) 17. It would be noteworthy to mention though, that accused-appellant was
handrolled marijuana cigarettes. subjected to a drug test to find out whether he was likewise a drug user. It is
a. Q What was that? often observed that a drug pusher usually, if not all the time is also a drug
b. A One tea bag of marijuana. user. The act of pushing drugs is a means to support his being a drug
dependent. For whatever its worth, accused-appellant was found to be drug
9. Realizing probably his mistake, Pat. Capangyarihan later on changed his free. In the NBI Toxicology Report No. TDD-86-646, 20 blood and urine
testimony by stating that he could not remember whether it was a plastic specimens of Elmer Mapa showed negative results for the presence of
container that was given to him or not. Thus — prohibited and or regulated drugs. Though this report was not presented
a. Q Meaning this was not contained in any container? during trial, such is made part of the records.
b. A I cannot remember anymore if it was contained in any container or not. 15 18. The evident falsehood spread on the records before Us creates a nagging
doubt on the culpability of the accused-appellant. It is sad to state that many innocent
10. The trial court observed the strange testimony of Pat. Lucero on a material people become victims of physical violence and/or harassment from police officers who are
point on cross examination wherein he admitted that a tea bag cannot be supposed to be the protectors of the citizenry.
cigarette sticks. This shows that the prosecution cannot even determine what
19. Reversed. Elmer is Acquitted.
was really taken from accused-appellant, a tea bag or cigarettes sticks. Thus,
the Court inquired:
6.) Heirs of Canque v. CA
a. Q And also you will agree with me that a tea bag cannot be a cigarette stick.
G.R. No. 119184 | July 21, 1997 | 2 Years/5 Years, Judicial Notice of SC Cases
b. A Yes, Ma'am.16
FACTS:
1. In deciding this appeal, this Court reiterates the dictum that the mortgagor of titled real estate
acquired under the Public Land Act but foreclosed by a rural bank, may redeem said
property within two (2) years from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale; and if the
said mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the land within five
years from the expiration of the two-year redemption period.
2. Spouses Marcelino Canque and Felicidad Canque were the registered owners
of a parcel of land under Original Certificate of Title No. P-(20559)-3409, of
the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur issued by virtue of Free Patent No.
40336, with an area of 2 hectares, 43 ares, and 58 centares. On May 21, 1976,
said spouses sold a portion of the parcel of land to the Iglesia ni Kristo Church
to the extent of 750 square meters.
3. A new Transfer of Title No. T-8730 was issued to said spouses by the
Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur. On October 12, 1977, said spouses
obtained a loan of (P15,000.00) from defendant bank secured by a real estate
mortgage over the parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
8730 with an area of 23,608 square meters.
4. The spouses' loan of P15,000.00 with the defendant bank was duly paid.
5. On February 2, 1980, Felicidad Canque passed away. More than a month
later, on March 7, 1980, widower Marcelino Canque obtained by himself,
another loan with defendant bank in the amount of P25,000.00 with the
same conjugal property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8730 as
collateral.
6. The defendant bank allegedly considered this second loan as an extension of
the first loan as the real estate mortgage of the first loan had remained
uncancelled, despite the earlier payment of the first loan by the said spouses.
7. For failure of Marcelino Canque to pay the second loan, defendant bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and sold the property to
itself as the highest bidder in a public sale.
8. On September 9, 1983, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered.
On October 18, 1985, defendants executed an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership and deed of absolute sale. On December 23, 1985, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18357 was issued in the name of defendant bank by
the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur.
9. After seven years from the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale,
plaintiffs Marcelino Canque and his children offered to redeem the property
in question but defendant bank refused. Hence, the complaint filed before the
lower court on September 7, 1990.
10. After hearing on the merits, the lower court first issued a partial judgment on
January 8, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, partial
judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the real estate mortgage between the plaintiffs and
defendants valid; and 2. Allowing the plaintiffs to exercise their right of redemption and/or
repurchase pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 119, of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.
11. Dissatisfied with the verdict of the lower court plaintiffs appealed to the CA
12. The respondent appellate court disagreed with the trial court's decision, viz:
a. Clearly, the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellees' redemption period
commenced on October 18, 1985, date of defendants-appellants execution of an
affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. The correct date to
reckon with the start of the plaintiffs-appellees' prescriptive period of five years is
September 9, 1983, the date of the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale.
Plaintiffs-appellees' instant suit to compel defendants-appellees to allow them to
redeem the property was only filed on September 7, 1990, or almost seven (7) years
from the registration of the Sheriff's certificate of sale, or beyond the five-year
prescriptive period as provided under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act 141. Thus,
plaintiffs-appellees' right of redemption had already prescribed.
b. All is not lost, however for the plaintiffs-appellees as heirs of Felicidad Canque for
the lost right of redemption of the parcel of land in question only applies to the
conjugal share of 50% of plaintiff Marcelino Canque considering that at the time the
second loan of P25,000.00 was entered by said plaintiff with defendant bank, his
spouse Felicidad Canque, who had a share of the other 50% of the conjugal property,
had already passed away (Art. 185, New Civil Code). Thus, when plaintiff Mario
Canque entered into the said loan agreement with defendant bank giving the parcel
of land in question as security in the form of real estate mortgage, it was only valid
insofar as his 50% of the conjugal property share from the said parcel of land is
concerned. Defendant-appellant bank had acquired, therefore, no right over the other
50% of the conjugal property pertaining to the late Felicidad Canque which share of
50% automatically passed to her heirs, herein plaintiffs-appellees from the moment
of her (Felicidad Canque) death (Art. 777, New Civil Code). 7
13. Hence, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which
reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 2688 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE:
a. 1. Plaintiff-appellee Mario Canque's right of redemption insofar as 50% of the
property in question has already prescribed, and defendant-appellant bank's title and
ownership of the said 50% of the property are declared incontrovertible.
b. 2. Declaring the second deed of real estate mortgage over the parcel of land in
question insofar as 50% of it is concerned as void as it pertained to the conjugal share
of the late Felicidad Canque which share of 50% should rightfully pass to her heirs,
herein plaintiffs-appellees.
c. 3. Heirs of Felicidad Canque and Rural Bank of Matanao are co-owners of the
property in question at 50% each.
14. Not satisfied with the above, petitioner filed this recourse to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N CA erred. Yes.
RATIO:
1. The petition is meritorious.
2. First Issue: Prescriptive Period to Repurchase
3. In Rural Bank of Davao City vs. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court through Mr.
 Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. explicitly and cogently ruled: loans from defendants. Besides, the alleged full payment of the first loan of
P15,000.00 was not clearly shown to have caused the discharge and/or cancellation
a. . . . If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under R.A. No. 720, as amended, the of the real estate mortgage constituted therefor. The (trial court) believes that the full
mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure payment alleged is a situation obtaining in a continuing credit secured by mortgage
or form the registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale at such foreclosure if the whereby the payment on a particular day equalled the amount of the mortgage. In
property is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens title. such a situation, the mortgage is not discharged as long as subsequent loans and/or
advancements may be demanded, as plaintiff actually did in this case by obtaining
b. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the
the second loan of P25,000.00
property within five (5) years from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption
period pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If the land is c. The argument of plaintiffs that the surviving spouse, Marcelino Canque cannot
mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property mortgage the property to secure the loan of P25,000.00 because his wife had died and
within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. therefore he was not the absolute owner of the mortgaged property, must fall as it was
3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) not convincingly shown that the defendants had knowledge of the wife's death at the
years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Sec. 119 of the time the loan of P25,000.00 was obtained.
Public Land Act.
d. Lastly, it is indeed absurd for the defendant bank, considering the nature of its
4. In the case at bar, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered on September business, not to require collateral for the loan of P25,000.00 when it did for the lesser
9, 1983. Thus, based on the foregoing dictum, the petitioners, whose land was loan of P15,000.00.
mortgaged to and foreclosed by a rural bank, had a period of two years or e. The fact is, and this the (trial court) believes, plaintiffs and defendants had agreed to
until September 9, 1985 to exercise their right of redemption. have a continuing credit arrangement secured by a real estate mortgage. With this
arrangement, plaintiffs first secured the loan of P15,000.00 and after liquidation
5. And in line with the mandate of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, they had an thereof, they obtained another loan of P25,000.00 with the same property as
additional period of five years from the latter date or until September 9, collateral. 12
1990 to exercise their right to repurchase. Thus, the petitioners' right to 10. In this issue, we "defer to the well-entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court shall
redeem their land had not expired on September 7, 1990 when they filed not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some fact or
circumstance of sufficient weight or significance which, if considered, would alter the
suit against private respondent to compel the latter to allow the former situation." 13 Hence, their factual finding as to the parties' intention in entering into a real
to repurchase their land. mortgage under a continuing credit/mortgage arrangement is binding upon this Court.
6. Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error because it 11. In sum, we rule that the disposition of the Regional Trial Court allowing the redemption is correct
palpably failed to consider in its August 25, 1994 Decision the although for a different reason, and that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to add the two-year
redemption period to the five-year repurchase right granted by the Public Land Act.
aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court promulgated twenty months
earlier on January 27, 1993. 12. Granted. CA Set Aside. RTC Reinstated. Right of Redemption Subsist.
7. ****Unfortunately, this is not the first time for this Court to come upon such
a slip. Peltan Development vs. Court of Appeals 11 ruled that "every court
must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they
are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice . . . [and] more
importantly from part of the legal system." We stress that members of
the bench have a responsibility to know and to apply the latest holdings
of the Supreme Court. The nature of their calling requires no less.
8. Second Issue: Factual Finding of Continuing Mortgage
9. Whether the mortgage which the Canque spouses contracted with private respondent bank was
intended by the parties to be a continuing one, a factual issue passed upon sub-silencio by the
Court of Appeals, had been threshed out by the trial court. Finding that the parties did
contemplate a continuing credit arrangement, the trial court aptly reasoned:
a. If it were not indeed the intention of the parties that (the property) mortgaged shall
serve as a continuing security not only for the first loan of P15,000.00 but also for
subsequent loans, the natural thing for the mortgagor to have done under the premises
was to ask for the return of the title covering the property mortgaged to the defendant
and consequently ask for the discharge and/or cancellation of the annotation on the 7.) People v. Bersamin
title.
G.R. No. L-3097 | March 5, 1951 | Notice of Other Murder Cases  Death
b. These the plaintiff did not do, as then, it was their intention to avail of subsequent
FACTS:
1. This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for robbery with homicide sentencing the herein
appellant, Casimiro Bersamin, to reclusion perpetua. Convicted with the appellant was
Saturnino de la Vega, who did not appeal, and prosecuted with these two were Pablo Calugay,
Isabelo Gusto and Alfredo Arellano who were acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
2. It appears that on the night of October 24, 1948, Dalmacio Caguing slept
alone in his home in barrio Malabobo, municipality of Mangatarem, Province
of Pangasinan, his wife having spent the night with her parents in another
barrio of the same municipality two kilometers away. When Macaria Dalag,
the wife, came home the next morning her husband was dead with two
gunshot wounds, and she found household articles scattered all over the house
and merchandise missing. The deceased and his wife had been running a
small business, and the missing goods were salted fish, canned sardines,
canned salmon, Chinese wine, threads, glass jars with biscuits, and one Bible,
the total value of which was calculated at P80.
3. There were no eye-witnesses to the crime, and the main evidence for the
prosecution was furnished by alleged companions of the defendants in the
robbery—Emiliano Tolentino and Francisco Bulatao.
4. Briefly, Emiliano Tolentino testified that: on the night of October 24, 1948,
about eight o'clock, he was "taken or asked" by Francisco Bulatao and
Casimiro Bersamin to accompany them. From his house, they set out for the
place of Dalmacio Caguing, and on the way, at the "junction," they were
joined by other people among whom he recognized Saturnino de la Vega.
Arriving at Dalmacio Caguing's house, Bersamin and De la Vega went
upstairs, Bersamin with a .45 caliber "rifle", which seemed to be Exhibit C,
and De la Vega a carbine. Thereafter he heard two shots from the house while
he was standing about six meters away, and noted a commotion although he
could not tell what they were doing inside the house. Those who remained
downstairs were around the house. A few moments after the shots Saturino
de la Vega and Casimiro Bersamin came down, the former with a knapsack
and the latter with a sack. He did not know what the sack contained but he
saw some of the contents of the knapsack, and they were bottled sarsaparilla,
bottled orange and a box of gaffs. Exhibit A, a Bible, seemed to him one of
the things Bersamin brought down. On the way from Caguing's house, they
stopped at the "junction" and were handed a bottle of soft drink, each.
5. Francisco Bulatao's testimony runs substantially as follows: He was left
at the road by Casimiro Bersamin and Saturnino de la Vega while these
walked toward the house of Dalmacio Caguing, Bersamin carrying a revolver
and De la Vega a carbine. It was about eight o'clock, rather dark, and he could
not see Bersamin and De la Vega when they climbed up the stairs. Afterward
shots rang out inside the house. By and by Bersamin and De la Vega came
down bringing with them a sack and a knapsack respectively, the latter of
which contained bottled soft drinks. When the band arrived at the "junction"
after the crime they were given a bottle each by Bersamin. A book, Exhibit
A, was also taken from the house and was given to him (witness) by Bersamin
when they were returning home.
6. Explaining how he came to be with the band, Bulatao said that Casimiro Bersamin came to his
house and requested him to come along to Emiliano Tolentino's house; that with Tolentino they
proceeded to Caguing's house; that on the way they were joined by Saturnino de la Vega and
others whom he did not know.
7. On minor matters other witnesses were called. Deogracias C. Andaya, PC T/SGT, identified
Exhibit C, a pistol, which he said had been "mortgaged" by Casimiro Bersamin to one Jacinto
Visperas in barrio Caturay, Bayambang. Andaya also identified the bible and said it had been
turned over to him by Pfc Pedro Sison of his company.
8. For the defense, Saturnino de la Vega, Alfredo Arellano, Casimiro Bersamin,
Felisa Dalag (Arellano's wife) and Francisco Cuaresma took the
stand. Saying nothing about his part in the crime, De la Vega confined his
testimony to the alleged conversation in the provincial jail between Bulatao
and Bersamin, by which, it will be seen later, Bersamin undertook to impeach
Bulatao's testimony.
9. Casimiro Bersamin testified substantially as follows: On October 24, 1948,
he was in his house in barrio Galarin, Urbiztondo, about eight or nine
kilometers from Mangatarem. Between his house and Mangatarem there are
unbridged rivers and houses. On foot, the trip from one place to the other
would take three and one-half hours. About six o'clock in the afternoon he
went with Domingo Palisoc to Caturay, Mangatarem, near the barrio school,
which was about ten or twelve kilometers from barrio Malabobo, the place of
the robbery. He had never been to barrio Malabobo, not even once.
Francisco Bulatao's testimony was untrue, and Exhibit C was not his pistol.
Bulatao "has a reason against me or that he is mad with me" because the Chief
of Police showed Bulatao an affidavit "wherein he (Bulatao) was imputed (by
me) to be the person who has committed the crime."
10. The chief of police informed Bulatao that the affidavit was Bersamin's.
Furthermore, the chief of police told Bulatao: "If you will not say that it was
Bersamin who has committed the killing in the vicinity, he will testify against
you in Court." He said he learned of this conversation because while he was
still in jail he asked Bulatao; "Brother, why did you testify something false
against me?" and Bulatao answered, "why should I not do that when you are
trying to implicate me." He proceeded to repeat what he said was a dialogue
between him and Bulatao in jail.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Bulatao and Tolentino spoke the truth. Yes.
RATIO:
1. We agree with counsel for appellant that Arellano's confession was inadmissible against
Bersamin. We also agree that the pistol identified by Andaya as having been pawned by
Bersamin has not been shown to have any bearing on the perpetration of the crime in question.
Besides, the testimony is hearsay. And it must be admitted that the probative value of the bible
which Bulatao said had been handed to him by Bersamin can be no greater than Bulatao's
credibility.But the lower court did not take Arellano's confession, the pistol and the bible into
account.
 2. The court below rested its findings solely on Bulatao's and Tolentino's
testimony given in open court. The question thus is reduced to whether
Bulatao and Tolentino spoke the truth.
3. There is no sufficient justification for reversing the trial court's findings on
the appellant's guilt on the basis of the two principal witnesses' evidence. The
record discloses no ground for doubting the veracity of these witnesses. Their
testimony rings true in all its material aspects, while Casimiro
Bersamin's testimony and his attempt to discredit Bulatao sounds
irrational and is conflicting. In our opinion, the said witnesses' statements
are as convincing as the appellant's are unconvincing. It is noteworthy that
Bersamin did not impeach Emiliano Tolentino's testimony, nor did he call
any witness to corroborate him in his alleged alibi, easy as it was even to
fabricate this kind of evidence.
4. That none of the witnesses saw who killed the aggrieved party is absolutely
immaterial. There is no gainsaying that there was not only conspiracy to rob,
but Casimiro Bersamin was the moving and directing spirit behind it, and that
the killing was a part and the direct result of the robbery. Conspiracy being
established, each and every one of the conspirators who took active part in
its execution is equally responsible for the ensuing crime embraced in the
plan.
5. There is one other proof of moral perversity which, added to the
circumstances already mentioned, compels the Court to deal with the
appellant with utmost severity. When Bersamin perpetrated the crime at
bar, he had been the ringleader in a case for murder and another case
for double murder and was in hiding to avoid arrest and prosecution in
those cases. In the case for double murder, docketed in this Court on appeal
as G. R. No. L-3098, he has been found guilty in a decision which affirms
that of the Court of First Instance sentencing him to life imprisonment, and
which is being promulgated with this decision.
6. In the other case, one of the defendants, Crispin Licuanan, was found
guilty and sentenced to prison for life by the Court of First Instance and by
this Court (G. R. No. L-2960). As far as can be gathered from the record of
the present appeal, that case was pending preliminary investigation with
reference to Casimiro Bersamin at the time of the trial of the instant case for
robbery with homicide.
7. The decision of the lower court is reversed as to the principal penalty, and the
appellant, Casimiro Bersamin, is hereby sentenced to death to be carried out
in the manner provided by law. The appealed judgment is affirmed as to the
rest of the sentence.
8.) G Holdings v. National Mines
G.R. No. 160236 | October 16, 2009 | Notice of NAMAWU's Labor Claims and
GHI's purchase of MMC shares
FACTS:
1. The petitioner, "G" Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation primarily
engaged in the business of owning and holding shares of stock of different
companies.2 Private respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union
Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and
file employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC),3 an entity
operating a copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay, Negros Occidental. 4
2. MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on October 19, 1984, on account of
their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation’s assets.
MMC started its commercial operations in August 1985. Later, DBP and PNB
transferred it to the National Government for disposition or privatization
because it had become a non-performing asset.5
3. On October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale
Agreement6 executed between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT),
the former bought (90%) of MMC’s shares and financial claims. 7
4. These financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes8 issued
by MMC in favor of GHI totaling ₱500M and secured by mortgages over
MMC’s properties. The notes, which were similarly worded except for their
amounts, read as follows: PROMISSORY NOTE
5. AMOUNT - Php114,715,360.00 [Php186,550,560.00 in the second note, and
Php248,734,080.00 in the third note.]
6. As collateral security, MMC hereby establishes and constitutes in favor of
"G" HOLDINGS, INC., its successors and/or assigns: mortgage over parcels
of land; chattel mortgage over personal properties;
7. Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full
satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI immediately took physical
possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took full control of the
management and operation of MMC.10
8. Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute (refusal to bargain
collectively and unfair labor practice) arose between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter
eventually filing with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice
of strike.11 Then Labor Secretary, now Associate Justice of this Court, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
later assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of NAMAWU. In his July 30, 1997
Order in OS-AJ-10-96-014 (Quisumbing Order), Secretary Quisumbing declared that the lay-off
(of workers) implemented on May 7, 1996 and October 7, 1996 was illegal and that MMC
committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with
payment of full backwages and benefits.
9. On May 11, 2001, then Acting Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary, now
also an Associate Justice of this Court, Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the
issuance of a partial writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to proceed
to the MMC premises for the execution of the same.14
10. The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMC’s resident manager resisted its
enforcement.16 On motion of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered
the issuance of the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas
Writ).17 On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs, the members of the union, and
several armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the properties of MMC
 located at its compound in Sipalay, Negros Occidental. 18
11. On October 14, 2002, GHI filed with the (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, Special
Civil Action (SCA) No. 1127 for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a (TRO) and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriff’s Levy on Properties. 19 GHI contended that
the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, dated
September 5, 199620 executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the aforesaid ₱550M
promissory notes; that this deed was registered on February 24, 2000;21 and that the mortgaged
properties were already extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest
bidder on December 3, 2001, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated December 4, 2001.
Injunction was issued. MR of injunction denied.
12. After due proceedings, on October 14, 2003, the appellate court rendered a Decision setting aside
the RTC issuances and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ. The CA ruled,
among others, that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the September 5, 1996 Deed
of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed was sham, fictitious
and fraudulent; that it was executed two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but
surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately after the Court affirmed
with finality the Quisumbing Order. CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the
mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment against
MMC. It noted that the foreclosure proceedings were initiated in July 2001, shortly after the
issuance of the Brion Writ.
13. Dissatisfied, GHI elevated the case to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari, raising the following
ISSUES:
1. W/N judicial notice can be taken of the other cases. Yes.
RATIO:
1. Before we delve into an extended discussion of the foregoing issues, it is
essential to take judicial cognizance of cases intimately linked to the present
controversy which had earlier been elevated to and decided by this Court.
2. Judicial Notice
3. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum
Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU,[34] in which we
upheld the right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor
claims.
4. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision
in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization
Trust v. "G" Holdings, Inc.,[35] in which GHI was recognized as the rightful
purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the
delivery of the company notes accompanying the said purchase. These
company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the
documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains
stipulations "establishing and constituting in favor of GHI" mortgages
over MMC's real and personal properties. The stipulations were
subsequently formalized in a separate document denominated Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed was
registered on February 4, 2000.[36]
5. We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they
should have guided the courts below in the disposition of the controversy at
their respective levels. To repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the
right of NAMAWU to its labor claims[37] and affirm the right of GHI to its
financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal properties of
MMC, as will be explained below.
6. The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of
these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it timely to reiterate
that: "courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or
not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration." [38]
7. However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to
issue the challenged writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third
party's (GHI's) claim of ownership over the property subject of the writ of
execution issued by the labor department. Accordingly, the main inquiry
addressed by the CA decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third
party or a stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties were beyond the
reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001. [39]
8. In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice
of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to
determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid ownership claim
over the properties subject of the writ of execution.
9. In Juaban v. Espina,[40] we held that "in some instances, courts have also
taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely
connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial
notice." The two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such
character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings
and conclusions therein.
10. Mortgage not a Sham; GHI bought MMC from APT (government agency);
GHI as mortgager creditor has superior rights of NAMAWU.
9.) Pilipinas Shell v. Fredeluces
G.R. No. 174333 | April 20, 2016 | LEONEN | MtD  Notice of Falsity (Ownership)
FACTS:
1. When a motion to dismiss is filed, only allegations of ultimate facts are
hypothetically admitted. Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of
 law, as well as allegations whose falsity is subject to judicial notice, those
which are legally impossible, inadmissible in evidence, or unfounded, are
disregarded.
2. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 87, otherwise known as the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972, the Republic of the Philippines
entered into Service Contract No. 38 and engaged the services of Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. "for the exploration, development[,] and
production of petroleum resources in an . . . area offshore northwest of . . .
Palawan[.]"[8] The service contractors eventually discovered in offshore
Malampaya-Camago at least 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas deposits.[9]
3. Exploration and development of the Malampaya-Camago natural gas
reservoir required the construction and operation of a shallow water platform
off the coast of Palawan. The water platform further required a concrete
gravity structure that would sit on the seabed.
4. As for the concrete gravity structure, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.
searched for possible construction sites here in the Philippines. Subsequently
identified as a possible construction site was Subic, Zambales, and Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. met with representatives of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority.[11]
5. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority proposed a 40-hectare site in Sitio
Agusuhin as a possible construction site for the concrete gravity
structure.[12] The site formed part of the military reservation of the former
naval base of the United States in Subic, which, under Republic Act No.
7227,[13] became part of the Subic Special Economic Zone.[14]
6. Results of a socio-economic survey commissioned by Shell Philippines
Exploration B.V. showed that there were about 200 households living at or
near the proposed construction site. Together with the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc., Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. established contact with the occupants of Sitio
Agusuhin. It was ultimately determined that 80 households would have to be
relocated to nearby areas within the Subic Seaport Economic Free Zone to
carry out the project.[15]
7. In May 1998, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Shell Philippines
Exploration B.V. entered into a Lease and Development Agreement for the
construction of the concrete gravity structure in Sitio Agusuhin. The Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority undertook to relocate the affected households,
while Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. undertook to give financial
assistance to them.[16]
8. The undertakings of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. were implemented
through Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. By the end of May 1998, Pilipinas
Shell Foundation, Inc. concluded agreements with some of the affected
households. In exchange for financial assistance, some of the claimants
voluntarily dismantled their houses and relocated to nearby areas within the
Subic Seaport Economic Free Zone. Other claims, however, were denied by
Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. for the claimant's failure to show that he
or she resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the construction project. [17]
9. Upon completion, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. turned over Sitio Agusuhin to the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority.]
10. On December 1, 2000, a Complaint for damages was filed against Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. before the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. Respondents alleged that having
resided in the area even prior to 1998, they were lawful residents of Sitio
Agusuhin.[
11. However, "[f]or the direct benefit of the defendants [Shell Philippines
Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.]," [24] Fredeluces, et al.
were "effectively evicted"[25]from their homes in "total disregard" [26] of their
rights. The actions of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. were allegedly contrary to law, for which they should pay
Fredeluces, et al. the following amounts representing actual damages:
12. Instead of answering the Complaint, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and
Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. moved to dismiss[34] the complaint based on
the grounds of litis pendentia, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of
cause of action.[35]
13. According to Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc., Fredeluces, et al. were praying for payment of damages
corresponding to the value of the land they previously occupied, a right that
did not belong to them because they never owned the land in Sitio
Agusuhin.[40] Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. emphasized that Sitio Agusuhin belonged to the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, lands in
Sitio Agusuhin are government property not subject to private
ownership. Consequently, the Complaint for damages failed to state a cause
of action.[43]
14. Fredeluces, et al. opposed the Motion to Dismiss and prayed for its
denial.[46] In their Opposition,[47] Fredeluces, et al. argued that Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc., in filing
their Motion to Dismiss, hypothetically admitted the factual allegations in
their Complaint. Corollarily, the trial court may not inquire into the truth of
the allegations and may only resolve the Motion to Dismiss based on the facts
as alleged in the Complaint.[48]
15. Fredeluces, et al. expressly admitted that they never owned Sitio Agusuhin.[50] Nevertheless, they
contended that they "were peacefully settled in the area and [had] introduced
improvements"[51] when Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.
"summarily evicted"[52] them. It is for their "unlawful eviction"[53] from, not ownership of, Sitio
Agusuhin for which Fredeluces, et al. demand payment of damages.[54]
16. Subsequently, in the Order[59] dated June 7, 2001, Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City granted the Motion to Dismiss and ruled in favor of Shell Philippines
 Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. [60]
17. The trial court likewise held that the Complaint for damages failed to state a cause of action.
According to the trial court, Fredeluces, et al. effectively prayed for payment of just
compensation, a relief they cannot avail themselves of because they do not own the land in Sitio
Agusuhin. But CA Reversed. --> Remanded for further hearing.
ISSUES:
1. whether the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action
RATIO:
1. We grant the Petition. The Complaint for damages should have been
dismissed as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground of litis
pendentia. As for the rest of respondents, their Complaint failed to state a
cause of action.
2. The ground of failure to state a cause of action is based on Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of
Court:
a. SECTION 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:
b. . . . .(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action[.]
3. Failure to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the allegation of the cause of action
in the complaint.
4. In this respect, a pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it "contain[s]
in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise[,] and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his [or her]
claim[.]"[149] Ultimate facts are the "important and substantial facts which
either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly
make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant." [150] Allegations of
evidentiary facts[151] and conclusions of law[152] in a pleading are omitted for they are unnecessary
in determining whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action.
5. In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,
a defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint."[153] Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law
are omitted in pleadings, "[t]he hypothetical admission is . . . limited to the
relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deducible therefrom."[154] However, it is mandatory[155] that courts
"consider other facts within the range of judicial notice, as well as
relevant laws and jurisprudence"[156] in resolving motions to dismiss.
6. There are exceptions to the rule on hypothetical admission. In Dabuco v.
Court of Appeals:[157]
a. There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity is
subject to judicial notice, or if such allegations are legally impossible, or if these
refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document
included in the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not
confined to the complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court
by stipulation of the parties, or in the course of hearings related to the case. [
7. ***One matter of judicial notice is that the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority, not Fredeluces, et al., own Sitio Agusuhin,[102] pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7227. Not being owners, Fredeluces, et al. may not
demand compensation based on the value of the properties they formerly
occupied.[103] They were possessors in bad faith who, under Article 449[104]of
the Civil Code, are not entitled to any indemnity with respect to
improvements they have introduced in Sitio Agusuhin
8. Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for
damages, the Complaint states no cause of action. Respondents may have
resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed their houses, and planted fruit trees in
the area. However, they failed to allege any circumstance showing that they
had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under claim of ownership for the required
number of years. In their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, respondents
admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin.[159]
9. The property belongs to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7227; hence, it is a government property the possession of
which, however long, "never confers title [to] the possessor[.]" [160]
10. It follows that respondents may not ask compensation equivalent to the
value of the parcels of land they previously occupied in Sitio Agusuhin.
The right to demand compensation for deprivation of property belongs
to the owner.[161]
11. Moreover, respondents may not claim damages equivalent to the value of the
structures they built and the improvements they introduced in Sitio Agusuhin.
Having admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin, they were possessors
in bad faith[162] who lose whatever they built, planted, or sown on the land
of another without right to indemnity.[163]
12. Specifically with respect to respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico
F. Bon, the allegation that they resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the
construction of the concrete gravity structure may not be hypothetically
admitted. Based on the evidence available during the hearing of the
Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2001, respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and
Ludivico F. Bon were indeed non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin prior to the
construction of the concrete gravity structure.
13. Respondents' own evidence—the Report of the Compensation Community Relations Study
Group attached to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss—declared respondent Tomas M.
Fredeluces a non-resident of Sitio Agusuhin.[164] Moreover, as certified by the Punong Barangay
of Barangay Cawag, none of the other residents of Sitio Agusuhin recognized respondent Tomas
M. Fredeluces as a fellow resident.[165]
14. As for respondent Ludivico F. Bon, the Office of the Punong Barangay of
Barangay Matain, Subic, Zambales certified that he was a resident of
Barangay Matain, not of Sitio Agusuhin.[166] This was corroborated by Hadji,
Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.'s Community Coordinator, in his
 Affidavit.[167]
15. These pieces of evidence were never controverted by respondents Tomas M.
Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon in their Opposition to or during the hearing
of the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and
Ludivico F. Bon should be deemed to have admitted that they never resided
in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete gravity structure.
16. Respondents nevertheless argue that they are entitled to damages because of their unlawful and
summary eviction from Sitio Agusuhin. Their own allegations, however, belie their claim that
they were unlawfully and summarily evicted. As alleged in their Complaint, petitioners "tried to
work out an acceptable compensation package for the [respondents.]"[168] Also alleged in the
Complaint[169] and as evidenced by quitclaims and the Final Report on the Compensation Claims,
some of the respondents received the following amounts as compensation from petitioners:
[187]
17. As for the allegation that respondents were "pressured, coerced[,] or . . . 'sweet-talked'" into
receiving compensation, this is a conclusion of law that may not be hypothetically admitted. The
circumstances of fraud and mistake must be stated with particularity. [188] Nothing in the
Complaint for damages show how respondents were particularly "pressured, coerced[,] or . . .
'sweet-talked'" by petitioners into receiving compensation. As found by the trial court,
respondents voluntarily vacated Sitio Agusuhin.[189]
18. All told, the Motion to Dismiss was correctly granted on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action. Granted. CA Reversed. Case Dismissed.
10.) Sps. Enriquez v. Isarog Line Transport
G.R. No. 212008 | November 16, 2016 | Exception to Loss of Earning Capacity 
Notice Line of Work no Documentary Evidence Available
FACTS:
1. Sonny Enriquez was a passenger of a bus owned and operated by
respondent Isarog Line Express Transport, Inc. (Isarog Line) driven by
Victor Sedenio on July 7, 1998.
2. While traversing the diversion road at Silangang Malicboy, Pagbilao,
Quezon, said bus collided with another bus owned by Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) which was being driven by Primitivo Aya-ay.
3. As a result of the impact between the two (2) buses, several passengers died,
including Sonny, who was twenty-six (26) years old at that time.
4. On September 7, 1999, Sonny's parents, petitioners William Enriquez and
Nelia Vela-Enriquez (the Spouses Enriquez), filed a complaint for damages
against Isarog Line and Philtranco as well as their drivers before the (RTC)
of Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
5. On February 24, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Isarog Line,
Sedenio, Philtranco, and Aya-ay solidarity liable for Sonny's death, thus:
a. a) PHP 50,000.00 - as civil indemnity for the death of Sonny Enriquez; b) PHP
1,038,960.00 - for unrealized income;
b. c) PHP 100,000.00 - for moral damages; d) PHP 25,000.00 - for exemplary damages;
e) PHP 25,000.00 - for attorney's fees.
6. Isarog Line then appealed before the CA. On June 13, 2013, the appellate
court affirmed the RTC Decision, with modification, thus:
a. in that the monetary award in the amount of P1,038,960.00 by way of unrealized
income is DELETED; and that Appellant is ordered to pay Appellees the amount of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
7. The Spouses Enriquez then filed a MR, which the CA denied. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Spouses Enriquez are entitled to the amount of P1,038,960.00 as
damages for their son's loss of earning capacity.
RATIO:
1. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
indemnity for loss of earning capacity, thus:
a. Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
b. (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity
at the time of his death;
2. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss
of capacity to earn. The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes
of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by competent
proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity.
3. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased was
self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
the deceased was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
'minimum wage under current labor laws.
4. Here, contrary to the CA's pronouncement, the Spouses Enriquez were able
to present competent proof and the best obtainable evidence of their departed
son's income. There is no showing that the defense objected when they
presented the certification from ASLAN Security Systems, Inc. (ASLAN)
during the trial. In People v. Lopez,7 the Court ruled that documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning
capacity. The claimant presented a similar certification from Tanod
 Publishing, showing that the deceased was a photo correspondent for
Tanod Newspaper and that his monthly salary ranges from P1,780.00 to
P3,570.00 on per story basis. The Court noted that since the defense did not
object when the prosecution presented said document, it was deemed
admitted and could be validly utilized by the trial court.
5. In the case at bar, while the CA itself ruled that the certification from ASLAN
stating that Sonny was earning P185.00 per day as a security guard is
admissible in evidence, it held that the same has no probative value since the
signatory was never presented to testify. However, the rule is that evidence
not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the
court in arriving at its judgment,8as what the RTC in this case aptly did, since
it was indubitably in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during trial.
6. Serra v. Mumar,10 as relied upon by the appellate court, does not apply because in said case they
only presented testimonial evidence to prove damages for loss of earning capacity. No
documentary evidence was submitted. The Court ruled that damages for loss of earning capacity
is in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven by documentary evidence, not
merely by the widow's self-serving testimony. Also, in People v. Villar,11 the prosecution merely
relied on the widow's self-serving statement on her deceased husband's monthly earning.
7. Here, however, there is actual documentary evidence to support the claim.
The Spouses Enriquez presented a certification from Sonny's employer to
duly prove his income.
8. Using the settled formula,12 the amount of damages for loss of earning
capacity is P1,038,960.00, thus:
a. Net Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income13 - Living Expenses
b. = [2/3 (80 - age at death)] x GAI - [50% of GAI]
c. = [2/3 (80 - 26)] x P57,720.00 - P28,860.00
d. = [2/3 (54)] x P28,860.00
e. = 36 x P28,860.00
f. Net Earning Capacity = P1,038,960.00
9. Granted. CA Set Aside RTC Reinstated.
11.) PITC v. COA
November 21, 2017 | G.R. No. 205837 | Retirement Benefits, Decisions Interpreting
a Law Retroact to the time the Law is Passed unless overturning an old doctrine
FACTS:
1
1. This treats of the petition for certiorari filed by Philippine International Trading Corporation
(PITC), which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 2 No. 2013-016 dated January 30, 2013
of the Commission on Audit (COA). In the assailed decision, the COA denied PITC's request for
the amendment of certain provisions of the 2010 Annual Audit Report (AAR)3 of PITC, which
relate to the payment and accrual of liability for retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 756.
2. On December 28, 1981, President Marcos issued Executive Order No.
756,6 which authorized the reorganization of PITC. Section 6 thereof states:
a. SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. - In recognition of the special nature of its
operations, the Corporation shall continue to be exempt from the application of the
rules and regulations of the Office of the Compensation and Position Classification
or any other similar agencies that may be established hereafter as provided under
Presidential Decree No. 1071. Likewise, any officer or employee who retires, resigns,
or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month pay for every year of
service computed at highest salary received including all allowances, in addition to
the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or regulations
to the contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have served in the Corporation
continuously for at least two years: Provided, further, That in case of separated
employees, the separation or dismissal is not due to conviction for any offense the
penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided, finally, That in the
commutation of leave credits earned, the employees who resigned, retired or is
separated shall be entitled to the full payment therefor computed with all the
allowance then being enjoined at the time of resignation, retirement of separation
regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws, rules or
regulations.
3. On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 877 that
further authorized the reorganization of PITC. Section I thereof reads:
a. 1. Reorganization. - The Minister of Trade and Industry is hereby designated Chief
Executive Officer of the Corporation with full powers to restructure and reorganize
the Corporation and to determine or fix its staffing pattern, compensation structure
and related organizational requirements. The Chairman shall complete such
restructuring and reorganization within six (6) months from the date of this Executive
Order. All personnel of the Corporation who are not reappointed by the Chairman
under the new reorganized structure of the Corporation shall be deemed laid off;
provided, that personnel so laid off shall be entitled to the benefits accruing to
separated employees under Executive Order No. 756 amending the Revised Charter
of the Corporation.
4. Apparently, PITC continued to grant the benefits provided under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 to its qualified employees even after
the lapse of the six-month period specified in Executive Order No. 877.
5. The legality of such policy was put in issue and directly resolved by this Court
in the Decision dated June 22, 2010 in G.R. No. 183517, entitled Philippine
International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit7 (hereinafter, the
Decision in G.R. No. 183517). In said case, the COA disapproved the claim
of a retired PITC employee for the payment of retirement differentials based
on Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. PITC's bid to oppugn the COA's
disallowance via a petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Court, ruling
in this wise:
a. As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, we
find that [Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756] cannot be interpreted independent
of the purpose or intent of the law. Rather than the permanent retirement law for its
employees that [PITC] now characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of
 gratuities equivalent to "one month pay for every year of service computed at highest
salary received including all allowances" was clearly meant as an incentive for
employees who retire, resign or are separated from service during or as a
consequence of the reorganization [PITC's] Board of Directors was tasked to
implement. As a temporary measure, it cannot be interpreted as an exception to the
general prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance and/or retirement or
pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,
amended. Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 4968 which was approved on
June 17, 1967, said latter provision was amended to read as follows:
i. (b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees
shall be created by any employer. All supplementary retirement or pension
plans heretofore in force in any government office, agency, or
instrumentality or corporation owned or controlled by the government, are
hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the rights of
those who are already eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected.
b. The dearth of merit in [PITC's] position is rendered even more evident when it is
borne in mind that Executive Order No. 756 was subsequently repealed by
Executive Order No. 877 which was issued on February 18, 1983 to hasten the
reorganization of [PITC], in light of changing circumstances and developments in the
world market.
c. Specifically mandated to be accomplished within the limited timeframe of six months
from the issuance of the law, the reorganization under Executive Order No. 877
clearly supplanted that which was provided ·under Executive Order No. 756. In
utilizing the computation of the benefits provided under Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 756 for employees considered laid off for not being reappointed under [PITC's]
new reorganized structure, Executive Order No. 877 was correctly interpreted by [the
COA] to evince an intent not to extend said gratuity beyond the six-month period
within which the reorganization is to be accomplished.
6. MR denied. The Decision in G.R. No. 183517 became final on September
27, 2010.
7. Pending the resolution of the above motion, PITC still allocated part of its
Corporate Operating Budget for retirement benefits pursuant to Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756. The amount allocated therefor was ₱46.36 million.
8. On September 30, 2010, PITC resident COA Auditor Elizabeth Liberato
informed PITC that the accrual of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756 was bereft of legal basis, in accordance with the
Decision in G.R. No. 183517. PITC was advised to stop the payment of such
benefits or reverse the amount already accrued. PITC, on the other hand,
argued that it could continue to allocate part of its budget for the aforesaid
benefits while its motion for reconsideration was still pending. Should the
Court deny its motion, PITC believed that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
should be applied prospectively. 2nd MR of G.R. No. 183517 denied on Nov.
23, 2010. It was only then that PITC allegedly stopped the monthly accrual
of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
9. On November 14, 2011, COA Director IV Jose R. Rocha, Jr., Cluster C,
Corporate Government Sector, transmitted to PITC a copy of the 2010 AAR.
Paragraphs 1 and 1.7 of the Comments and Observations portion state:
a. 1. Estimated liability for employees' benefits account balance of 1!52.70 million was
misstated by P46.36 million because management erroneously accrued retirement
benefits provided under Section 6 of EO 756. Payments' of such benefits to
employees retiring after the 1983 reorganization were, likewise, without legal basis.
10. In a letter10 dated June 22, 2012 to the COA Commission Proper, PITC
sought the amendment of the 2010 AAR. PITC averred that the Decision in
G.R. No. 183517 must be applied prospectively, such that all qualified PITC
employees should be allowed to claim their vested rights to the benefits under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 upon retirement or resignation, and the
computation thereof must be from the time of their employment until
September 27, 2010 when the Decision became final. This was denied. 2010
AAR maintained. PITC, thus, filed the present petition for certiorari.
11. The Arguments of PITC
12. According to PITC, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively from the
time it became final on September 27, 2010. To apply said decision retroactively would allegedly
unjustly divest qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to receive the benefits under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The six-month period in Executive Order No. 877 was
only for the purpose of implementing reorganization, but not for the purpose of amending Section
6 of Executive Order No. 756.
13. The Arguments of the COA
14. In praying for the dismissal of the petition, the COA asserts that when the
Court renders a decision that merely interprets a particular provision of
law - one that neither establishes a new doctrine nor supplants an old
doctrine - the interpretation takes effect and becomes part of the law as
of the date when the law was originally passed. The COA points out that
the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 did not overrule an old doctrine nor adopt a
new one. The Decision simply interpreted Section 6 of Executive Order No.
756 and clarified that the provision was effective in a temporary and limited
application when it was correlated with other laws.
15. The COA also posits that no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions that are
against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. In the Decision in G .R. No. 183 51
7, the Court already declared the illegality of the disbursements and payments of the retirement
benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 that were granted beyond the period of the
reorganization of PITC.
ISSUES:
1. whether the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively
upon its finality. No.
RATIO:
2. Article 8 of the Civil Code declares that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." While decisions
of the Court are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the laws'
meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding force as the laws
themselves.13
3. Article 4 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, enunciates the rule on non-retroactivity of laws,
in that ''(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."
4. In respectively arguing for and against the prospective application of the Decision in G.R. No.
 183517, both PITC and the COA invoke Co v. Court of Appeals14 that cited, among others, the
following ruling in People v. Jabinal15 :
a. The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as
of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends
to effectuate. x x
5. PITC argues, however, that the COA erred in relying on the second sentence in the above
excerption from Jabinal, which PITC dismissed as a "simple statement" that was "just an obiter
dictum or an incidental remark that this Honorable Court made in passing."16
6. PITC's misinformed argument deserves scant consideration.
7. It was in the 1956 case of Senarillos v. Hermosisima17 that the above pronouncement first came
to light. The Court declared in Senarillos: That the decision of the Municipal Council
of Sibonga was issued before the decision in Festejo v. Mayor of Nabua was rendered, would
be, at the most, proof of good faith on the part of the police committee, but can not sustain the
validity of their action. It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court upon
Republic Act [No.] 557 constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted law carried into effect.20
8. The above ruling had since become the established doctrine on the matter of
the effectivity of judicial interpretations of statutes.
9. In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA we expounded on the import of our ruling
in Senarillos in relation to the rule of nonretroactivity of laws. Thus:
a. Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an
independent source of law; it cannot create law. While it is true that judicial
decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the
legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though
not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason
that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.
b. The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima that judicial interpretation of a
statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the
Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does
not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or
interpretation of a pre-existing one, x x x.
c. It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of
the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when
there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good
faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.
10. Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court disagrees
with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied
prospectively.
11. As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither
reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. The Court merely
construed therein the meaning and application of Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 756 by taking into consideration the rationale behind the provision,
its interplay with pre-existing retirement laws, and the subsequent enactments
and statutes that eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R.
No. 183517, there was no other ruling from this Court that explained the
nature of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
Thus, the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date when Executive Order No.
756 was enacted.
12. PITC' s position cannot be legally supported by our decision in Co.22 In Co, the Court gave
prospective effect to its ruling in Que v. People23 - that even checks to guarantee the performance
of an obligation were covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - as the accused in Co relied on an
official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such checks were not within the ambit of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. In this instance, there is no previous administrative interpretation issued by a
competent body that PITC could claim to have relied on in good faith.
13. There is likewise no merit in PITC's contention that the retroactive application of the Decision
in G.R. No. 183517 would divest qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to receive the
retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
14. The fact that PITC continued to grant the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 756 from the time of the issuance of said executive order until the Court's Decision in G.R.
No. 183517 does not mean that said benefits ripened into a vested right. As held in Kapisanan
ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on
Audit24 :
a. The Court has previously held that practice, no matter how long continued, cannot
give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law. The erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from
making a subsequent correction of such errors. Where the law expressly limits the
grant of certain benefits to a specified class of persons, such limitation must be
enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to a previous mistake committed by
public officials in granting such benefit. (Citations omitted.)
15. In this case, the Court already ruled in G.R. No. 183517 that the grant of the retirement benefits
under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was temporary and limited in nature and the same
should have been restricted to the six-month period of the mandated reorganization of PITC.
16. All told, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the COA for refusing to amend the questioned
provisions of the 2010 AAR. Dismissed.
12.) Vi Ve Chemical Products v. Commissioner of Customs
G.R. No. L-28693 | September 30, 1974 | | Judicial Notice
DOCTRINE: The courts cannot take judicial notice of the similarity in the
chemical components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid because the
chemical components of these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are
technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required knowledge know
 their similarity or difference. Neither did appellant show that the chemistry
book show the chemical components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid
are the same. This being so, it cannot be said that these objects are of public
knowledge or of unquestionable demonstration to be the proper subject of
judicial notice by the Court
DOCTRINE: The courts cannot take judicial notice of something that is
technical in nature and that only experts in the particular field know.
FACTS:
1. On March 22, 1966, the petitioner Vi Ve imported from Taiwan 250 drums
of glutamic acid, an article used in the manufacture of a food seasoning
known as "vetsin", on which it was required to pay, as it did pay, the sum of
P27,274.00 as customs duty.
2. Contending that it is liable only for the amount of P3,519.00, and not
P27,274.00, it filed the necessary protest and requested the refund of the
difference in the sum of P23,656.00." 5
3. The sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty on 250 drums (11,340 kilos) of
glutamic acid was levied and collected pursuant to Section 104, par. 29.23,
of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 225,
dated December 13, 1965, which imposes an alternate customs, duty, i.e., a
specific duty of P2.40 per kilo of glutamic acid or an ad valorem duty of 40%,
whichever is higher.
4. The specific duty at the rate of P2.40 per kilo was applied to petitioner Vi
Ve's importation as the same is higher than the ad valorem duty of 40%. 40%
of P35,190.00 is P14,076.00. Prior to the amendment of Par. 29.23 of Section
104 of the Tariff and Customs Code by Executive Order No. 225, the customs
duty on glutamic acid was 10% ad valorem, which, if applied to petitioner's
importation of glutamic acid valued at P35,190.00, it would be liable to pay
only the sum of P3,519.00." 6
5. Petitioner Vi Ve contends that Executive Order No. 225 is invalid for failure
to comply with Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code authorizing the
President to increase or decrease tariff rates under the conditions specified
therein, hence, it filed the corresponding protest with the Collector of
Customs of Manila.
6. The Collector denied the protest solely on the ground that he has no power to
nullify an executive order issued by the President. On appeal to respondent
Commissioner of Customs, the Collector's decision was sustained also on the
same ground."
7. The grounds relied upon by petitioner in assailing the legality of Executive Order No. 225 may
be summarized as follows: (1) There was no prior investigation by the Tariff Commission and
recommendation by the National Economic Council in regard to the increase of the customs duty
on imported glutamic acid; (2) it has not been shown that the increase in the customs duty on
said article is necessary in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national
defense; and (3) the duty on said article was increased in said Executive Order by more than five
times the former rate of duty ... ." These were all rebutted.
8. Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the price should be based on the value of the
article in 1966. The CTA stated that the value of glutamic acid imported by
petitioner Vi Ve in 1966 could not have been considered in the computation
of the maximum increase in said duty because Executive Order No. 225 was
promulgated only on December 13, 1965. Thus the value of glutamic acid in
1966 cannot be used in the computation.
9. However, CTA based the price of the article in 1963, stating that petitioner
Vi Ve also failed to produce evidence of the value of glutamic acid in 1964
and 1965. In fact, according to the Tariff Commission, there is no record of
any importation of said article during those years.
10. But petitioner Vi Ve then presented the price of another chemical compound,
propionic glycine, in 1964 and 1965 and claimed that because glutamic acid
and propionic glycine are the same, the court should have taken judicial
notice of the similarity of the two, and thus the CTA should have attributed
the price of propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 as being the same price of
glutamic acid in the same years. Petitioner Vi Ve then claims that the price
of propionic glycine in 1964/1965 should have been used as the base for the
computation of the tax, instead of the price of glutamic acid in 1963.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the CTA should have taken judicial notice of the fact that propionic
glycine and glutamic acid are the same chemical compounds. No. The
chemical components of these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid]
are technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required knowledge
know their similarity or difference, and thus the chemical components of both
cannot be taken judicial notice by the court.
RATIO:
1. (1) The first error assigned would find fault with the Court of Tax Appeals, for its finding that
there was compliance with the statutory grant of authority to the President under Section 401 of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Thus the objection raised was that the required investigation was
not held. The Court of Tax Appeals, as shown above, considered such ground and found it
insubstantial. Then petitioner also claimed that the statutory limit of the increase not to exceed
five times was exceeded. Again, the Court of Tax Appeals, as made clear that it simply was not
so. This Court is bound by the finding of facts of the Court of Tax Appeals, especially so, where
as here, the evidence in support thereof is more than substantial.
2. (2) The second alleged error of the Court of Tax Appeals was that no judicial
notice was taken of the similarity in the chemical components of propionic
glycine and glutamic acid.
3. Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the CTA erred in concluding that petitioner
failed to produce evidence of the value of glutamic acid in 1964 and 1965
because importations of glutamic acid under the commercial name of
"propionic glycine had been made in the years 1964 and 1965."
4. Simplified Version: Petitioner Vi Ve presented the price for propionic glycine
 in 1964 and 1965, not for glutamic acid. But Petitioner Vi Ve is also claiming
that propionic glycine and glutamic acid are the same, thus the CTA should
treat the price of propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 as the same price for
glutamic acid in 1964 and 1965.
5. The Court of Tax Appeals, however, held that "the chemical components of
these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are technical in nature and
only persons possessed of the required knowledge know their similarity or
difference."
6. In other words, the CTA stated that it could NOT take judicial notice of the
price of propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 and attribute it as the price of
glutamic acid because it is not of judicial notice that the two chemical
components are actually the same
7. Petitioner Vi Ve claimed that the similarity in the chemical components of
propionic glycine and glutamic acid should have been taken judicial notice
of by the Court of Tax Appeals because it is a matter which is capable of
immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources
of indisputable accuracy. Petitioner further claims that there is already a
certification that propionic glycine is just another name for glutamic acid.
8. The above assigned error was refuted by the then Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice, Antonio B. Barredo, and the then Assistant Solicitor
General, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Pacifico P. de
Castro, thus: "Relative to appellants assertion that the decision is erroneous
as the Court of Tax Appeals did not take judicial notice of the fact that
"propionic glycine" is the same as glutamic acid, we maintain that the lower
court was correct in stating that the chemical components of these articles are
technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required knowledge
know their similarity or difference. Neither did appellant show that the
chemistry book show the chemical components of propionic glycine and
glutamic acid are the same. This being so, it cannot be said that these objects
are of public knowledge or of unquestionable demonstration to be the proper
subject of judicial notice by the Court."
9. Affirmed.
13.) Fluermer v. Hix
G.R. No. L-32636 | March 17, 1930 | No JNotice of Foreign Laws
FACTS:
1. The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from
a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the
document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased.
2. Appellee contends that the appellant as a mere special administrator is not authorized to carry on
this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party
in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a
Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the
disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. Be Leon
[1925], 47 Phil., 780).
3. It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins,
West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that
jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern.
4. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84
as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2,
1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the laws of West Virginia govern. No.
RATIO:
1. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign
jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts.
2. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union.
3. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil,
156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met.
4. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the
laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
6. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only
evidence on this point is to be found In the testimony of the petitioner. Aside
from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by
the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, or that these
witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other
as the law of West Virginia seems to require.
7. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine
Islands, it would then be the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some
other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633).
8. It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his
domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. The only
evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the
 alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning
administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner
violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in
the Philippine Islands.
9. While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented
an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of-the evidence the documents attached
to the petition.
10. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament
of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, was presented for probate on June S, 1929, to the clerk of
Randolph County, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana
Wamsley and Joseph L. Madden, the subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded
and filed.
11. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8,1929, the clerk of court of
Randolph County, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum
testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to
be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February
20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.
12. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal
administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt
has been made to comply with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved
and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any
property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West
Virginia.
13. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant.
14.) PCIB v. Escolin
a tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.
FACTS:
5. On
15.) Sy Joc Lieng v. Encarnacion
a Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
FACTS:
6. On
16.) CIR v. Fisher
G.R. No. L-11622 | January 28, 1961 | Foreign Lawyer can Testify as a Witness to
Prove a Foreign Law
FACTS:
1. This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate
left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto.
Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British
parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice
Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established
their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San
Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the Superior
Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice
as his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by
the spouses while residing in the Philippines, described and preliminary
assessed as follows:
a. Real Property — 2 parcels of land in Baguio, covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379 =
P43,500.00
b. Personal Property: (1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at P10.00 each =
1,770.00; (2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38
per share = 79,800.00
c. Total Gross Assets = P130,792.85
2. On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the
Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our
court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate,
who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return
with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally
appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.
3. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the
amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the
Collector assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance
4. On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax
return in pursuance of his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for
the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
5. In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson
assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and
6. On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended
estate and inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same
assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952,
except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction
to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of
the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal
Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was
allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax
Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14,
1952; and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance
 taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
7. In this last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of
P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a
consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of
P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The
Collector denied the claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the
Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, as assignees of Beatrice
Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount. CTA said:
a. In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (b) the intangible personal property
belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to
the provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the
California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption
of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax.
8. From this decision, both parties appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-
half (½) of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile
surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in
relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;
2. W/N reciprocity lies No.
RATIO:
1. TIn deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in
our civil law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the
contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal
partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage.
2. The application of this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, however,
by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to
Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses
Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the
national law of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England.
3. It is alleged by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal
partnership between spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction
is another regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired
during the marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband. In
further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code
(Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the
amount of successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the
national law of the decedent.
4. In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in
the Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the
old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became
effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called
nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one
of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the
administration disposition, and ownership of their conjugal properties. In
such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in
determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a
difference between the two articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code
expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the
marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article 1325 2 of
the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.
5. It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed
marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both
spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa, 3 in his
Commentaries, has this to say on this point:
6. If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property
relation of the Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English law even if
the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being foreigners.
7. But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law
that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of the
properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by
petitioner.
8. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the
record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law says on the matter.
In the absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in
what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in presuming that the
law of England on this matter is the same as our law. 4
9. Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil
Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is
the one applicable, shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to govern the question of
property relation between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of successional
rights and this term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property
that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be
pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their successional rights,
is governed differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new
Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court
correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by
the deceased Stevenson.
10. On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the
exempting the respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares
of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity
proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to
Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground
that: (1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven
by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a
 state in the United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the
state of California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes
on intangible personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
11. To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for
herein respondents, testified that as an active member of the California Bar
since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of
California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California
law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited
article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue
Code as published in Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-
Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the
cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.
12. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. 5 Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6
13. Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving
foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable
that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading
of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule
123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation
of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law."
14. In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil
Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law.
15. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax
Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by
respondents' witness.
16. However, no right of reciprocity. Reciprocity has to be TOTAL. In the Philippines, upon the
death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties therein, there are imposed upon
his estate and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of California,
only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes
an estate tax on non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not provide for any
exemption on the basis of reciprocity.
17.) Manufacturer Hanover Trust v. Guerrero
G.R. No. 136804 | February 19, 2003 | Walden Affidavit  Did Not Prove Foreign
Laws  Only Mere Conclusions  Lawyer did NOT Testify in Court
FACTS:
1. On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity)
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the RTC of
Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly
for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to
signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his
account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
2. On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by
stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law
does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
3. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal,
temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the
same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should
be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
4. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit ("Walden
affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account
stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all
of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office
in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
5. The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On
appeal, The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion
for partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden
affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence
relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals considered
the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section
19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
a. "SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
b. Public documents are:
c. (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
6. The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section
24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law:
a. "SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
 7. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of
summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to
prove the foreign law. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
3. W/N Walden Affidavit is proof of New York Laws.
RATIO:
1. The petition is devoid of merit.
2. The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section
2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
a. "Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all
or any part thereof."
3. In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the
pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion? A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not
to constitute a genuine issue for trial.6
4. A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are
genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s complaint
before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies
for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages for what he asserts as
"illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account
with the Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his account." In its
Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern
their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other than actual.
Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials
and affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.
5. True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based
merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the
court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Bank’s
motion for partial summary judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit
does not demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or contrived.
6. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material
allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial
triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
7. There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or
where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The resolution of
whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws
do not prove themselves in our courts.8
8. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. 9 Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to
whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present
a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial
on the merits.
9. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody
thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular
officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
10. Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court
of Appeals10 which held that:
a. Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule,
however, the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court) does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law.
b. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an
attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
said law.
c. Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal
Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of
California as proved by the respondents’ witness.
d. Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of
the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as
basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
"satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of
decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law."
11. The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause.
These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in
the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be
established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex
parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The Walden affidavit
cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only
because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific
New York law on damages. [UNAUTHENTICATED]
12. We reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
a. 5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Bank’s
relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs Guerrero’s claim arising out
of the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful
 dishonor. However, the UCC states that "justifiable refusal to pay or accept" as
opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a check for reasons such as
a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a forgery, § 3-510, Official
Comment 2. ….. to the Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no
signature card on …. and could not verify Guerrero’s signature. In my opinion,
consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
b. 6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable refusal
to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that "neither consequential or special or punitive
damages may be had except as specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of
law". UCC 4-103 further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only
where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than the New York common law,
which may allow consequential damages in a breach of contract case (as does the
UCC where there is a wrongful dishonor).
c. 7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and mental
distress are considered consequential damages. 8. As a matter of New York law, a
claim for emotional distress cannot be recovered for a breach of contract. Damage to
reputation is also not recoverable for a contract.
d. 10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they were
the type that would naturally arise from the breach and if they were "brought within
the contemplation of parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior
to contracting."
e. 12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract, even
where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted with malice.
f. 13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and
proven that the wrong supposedly committed by defendant amounts to a fraud aimed
at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability.
g. 14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary
damages are not available for a mere breach of contract for in such a case, as a matter
of law, only a private wrong and not a public right is involved.
13. The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal
interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws
and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the
Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of
the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached
copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these
copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records
or decisions of foreign courts.
14. The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York
law and jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign
courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York
law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved,
what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
15. There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the
Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment. There is a need to determine by presentation of
evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages
under the applicable laws.
16. AFFIRMED.
18.) Wildvalley Shipping v. CA
G.R. No. 119602 | October 6, 2000 | Expert Testimony on Foreign Law Not Enough
 Have to comply with Rule 132 Procedure
FACTS:
1. Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by
Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto
Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and
when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the
Orinoco River.1 He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11,
19882 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.3
2. The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was
at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then
the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port 4 at 1:40
a.m. on February 12, 1988.5 Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel
was under way.6
3. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San
Roque Channel at mile 172.7 The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot
assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness
of the channel.8
4. Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations.9 These occurred at 4:12 a.m.10 It was then that the watch officer
called the master to the bridge.11
5. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel12 and verified that it
was in the centre of the channel.13 He then went to confirm, or set down, the
position of the vessel on the chart.14 He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief
Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks. 15
6. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
River,16 thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
7. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein
petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of
Puerto Ordaz on that day.
8. Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President
Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of
Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest
thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and
expenses of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company
was dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988. 17
 9. At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
a. "6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage channel;
b. "7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas, was under the
command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano, assigned by the government thereat, but
plaintiff claims that it is under the command of the master;
10. The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley
Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:… ordering defendant
Philippine President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff damages.
11. Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the private
respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the case.
12. After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out with its questioned
decision dated June 14, 1994,20 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: reversed. PPL
not liable. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.
RATIO:
2. The petition is without merit.
3. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.24
4. A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where
the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of
expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to
be commonly admitted in such courts.25
5. The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence
of a written foreign law.26
6. In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal, it was held 27
that:
a. "… Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, since the
year 1918 under oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the California Civil Code and
stated that said section was in force at the time the obligations of defendant to the
plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This
evidence sufficiently established the fact that the section in question was the law of
the State of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
b. "`The foreign law is a matter of fact …You ask the witness what the law is; he may,
from his recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say what it is.'
7. We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, 28 to
testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)29 and the Reglamento Para la Zona de
Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco
River). Captain Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for eight
years.30 As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and
navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that come
into the office of the harbour masters.31
8. Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
9. The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta
Oficial32 of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta
Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic
of Venezuela.
10. The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a
book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.33 Only a
photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
11. Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be
public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers of Venezuela.34
12. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal
custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a
certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office.35 The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended
to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document
in a foreign country.36
13. It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section
24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain
Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody
of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and
authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the
public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the
case.
14. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the
written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority,
 when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be
proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute. 37
15. At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded
before the lower court.
16. A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the
pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.38
17. A review of the Complaint39 revealed that it was never alleged or invoked
despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
18. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and
proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same
as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual
presumption.40
19. Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the errors assigned by the
petitioner.
20. The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of the vessel even when
there is a pilot on board. However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides…
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who
was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. We
find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When the vibrations were first
felt the watch officer asked him what was going on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were
in the middle of the channel and that the vibration was as (sic) a result of the shallowness of the
channel."51 In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the portions which are
shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the said river and his decision
to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as
negligent and liable for its grounding.
21. In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that:
a. "x x x…if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is
bound to do so under penalty, then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner
will be liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot; for in such a
case the pilot cannot be deemed properly the servant of the master or the owner, but
is forced upon them, and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se does not apply."
22. AFFIRMED.
19.) ATCI Overseas v. Echin
G.R. No. 178551 | October 11, 2010 | Probationary; Saudi Laws Must be Proven;
MOA, Certificaton, Termination Letter Not Enough; Processual Presumption
FACTS:
1. Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist
under a two-year contract, denominated as a (MOA), with a monthly salary
of US$1,200.00.
2. Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period
of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment
Contract No. 2.
3. Respondent Echin was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated
from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the
probationary period.
4. As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned
to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
5. On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the (NLRC) a complaint 2 for illegal
dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the
foreign principal.
6. By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed
that there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a
regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered
petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired
portion of her contract. NLRC affirmed. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending
that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and,
as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure
to meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil
Service Laws. By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC
Resolution.
7. In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that
they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the
law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the
contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with
the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
8. As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
"Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a
recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency
for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers. MR denied. Hence this petition.
9. Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s
employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus
conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court
to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in
deciding the present case.
10. Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules
relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations)
accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the
host country."
11. Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given
that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not
sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot
likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined
 as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Kuwait laws should apply. No.
RATIO:
1. The petition fails.
2. Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money
claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency
of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit,
or that such foreign principal’s liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held
jointly and solidarily liable.
3. In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign
principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them
of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
Maguad8 explains:
a. . . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by
and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with
the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the
agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees
under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory
the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for
foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
4. The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the
immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign
principal’s liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary
liability inutile.
5. As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary
employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that
the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil
Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such
rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.
6. Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties
who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their
respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
7. It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of
a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of
processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
a. In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the
parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern
all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
b. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot
take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum
law.
c. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter;
thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded,
is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
8. The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must
not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
9. To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA
between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which
provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year
and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent
stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the
grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of
termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha
Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs
Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter 13 of
reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8)
months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it
changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
10. These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently
prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee
under Kuwaiti civil service laws.
11. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly
authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications
attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service
laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws,
respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
a. This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog
and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and
the same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no
responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
b. This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever
 legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)1
12. Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too
following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims:
a. SEC. 10. Money Claims.—….
b. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the
case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
13. Denied.
ISSUES:
20.) Jordan v. Mace
RATIO:
144 Me. 351 (Me. 1949) | Blood Test Excluding Paternity Conclusive; Defendant
Does Not Need to Prove That Someone Else is Father; Jury Cannot Counteract
Studies Done by Experts
FACTS:
1. The respondent in a bastardy action was found by a jury to be the father of
twins. His motion for a new trial is sustained.
2. On October 23, 1945 the complainant had sexual intercourse with the
respondent. On November 1 she told the respondent that she had missed her
monthly period and that she thought she was pregnant. The twins were born
on June 27, 1946.
3. When asked if she had accused anyone else of being the father, she replied,
"No, I haven't. There is no other one to accuse." The respondent discussed
marriage and other matters with the complainant in a manner consistent only
with a belief that he was responsible for her condition.
4. Pursuant to orders of court, blood specimens were taken and collected by two
local physicians, and submitted by them to Dr. Hooker of Boston "for said
blood grouping tests for the purpose of determining whether or not the
paternity of the respondent can be excluded." Blood specimens were taken on
July 31, 1947 for the first test and on February 25, 1948 for the second test.
5. The physicians testified about the manner in which the blood specimens were
taken and prepared for shipment, and one physician testified about mailing
the specimens to Dr. Hooker by registered mail.
6. Dr. Hooker, whose qualifications were admitted, and who, in the words of the court
in Jordan v. Davis, is "one of the leaders" in research work relating to the exclusion of paternity
by blood grouping tests, stated the results of the tests made by him or at least under his direction
and the conclusions he drew therefrom based upon biological law.
7. The tests to determine the group and type of the blood were performed eleven
times. The results in each instance were, as follows:
8. Group Type Complainant A M Child A A M Child B A MN Respondent A
N Dr. Hooker gave his opinion, based on the two following reasons, that
the respondent could not be the father of the twins:
9. First, by the operation of the biological law, sometimes called "the blood test
law," a parent with blood of type "N" can not have a child with blood of
type "M", and thus respondent's paternity of Child A was excluded.
10. Second, the father of twins must be one and the same man.
1. Is the verdict manifestly wrong in the light of biological law and of evidence
of exclusion of paternity based upon the blood grouping tests taken under R.
S., Chap. 153, Sec. 34?
1. It is not necessary for decision in this case that we accept, reject or consider Dr. Hooker's
testimony with respect to his second reason. The verdict that the respondent is the father of the
twins is indivisible. If paternity of one child is excluded, the verdict may not stand. We, therefore,
consider in reaching our decision only the biological law relating to exclusion of paternity by
blood grouping tests.
2. Our court has stated in Jordan v. Davis, supra, with reference to the blood
grouping tests:
a. "It is not here necessary to discuss the intricate details by which science has reached
 certain definite conclusions founded on biological laws. We are told that by the
examination of the blood of the mother, the child, and the putative father, non-
paternity may be conclusively proved in a certain proportion of cases. The statute in
question accepts this verdict of science, — that even though such tests cannot prove
paternity, they may in certain instances disprove it."
b. "We are not disposed to close our minds to conclusions which science tells us are
established. Nor do we propose to lay down as a rule of law that the triers of fact may
reject what science says is true; for to do so would be to invite at some future time a
conflict between scientific truth and stare decisis and in that contest the result could
never be in doubt."
3. Discussion of the scientific basis of the blood grouping tests, with charts
illustrating the blood groupings and types, may be found in 163 A. L. R., 939
n., 941, in 23 American Bar Association Journal, 472 (1937), and in 34
Cornell Law Quarterly, 72 (1948).
4. The three physicians named by the court to conduct the tests stated in detail
the manner in which their duties were performed from the taking of the blood
through the repeated tests to the making of the reports. Their testimony
discloses great care was taken at all stages. The possibility of error was
minimized by the making of two complete blood tests at intervals of time.
Eleven tests by or under the direction of Dr. Hooker produced identical
results.
5. What further safeguards could reasonably have been taken to protect the
integrity of the tests? If the jury may disregard the fact of non-paternity shown
here so clearly by men trained and skilled in science, the purpose and intent
of the Legislature, that the light of science be brought to bear upon a case
such as this, are given no practical effect.
6. Jordan v. Davis, supra, is not authority for the proposition that a jury may
give such weight as it may desire to biological law. Such a law goes beyond
the opinion of an expert. The jury has the duty to determine if the
conditions existed which made the biological law operative. That is to say,
were the tests properly made? If so made, the exclusion of the respondent as
father of one child follows irresistibly.
7. The basis of the decision in Jordan v. Davis, supra, is clearly set forth in the
last paragraph of the opinion, as follows:
a. "Believing as we do that the jury could in considering all the testimony have rejected
the accuracy of the blood grouping tests in this instance, we cannot say that their
finding is manifestly wrong."
8. The absence of evidence that anyone else could have been the father should
not react to the disadvantage of this respondent. He presented clear and
precise tests which excluded paternity under biological law.
9. By the very nature of such a case evidence excluding the possibility of
opportunity for another to be the father is limited to the statement of the
complainant. No corroboration of total lack of opportunity could well be
expected.
10. On the part of the respondent, chance alone would produce evidence tending
to show acts of intercourse by another with the complainant within the limited
period.
11. The blood grouping test statute was enacted to provide, in our view, for the
very situation in which a respondent, as a matter of ordinary proof without
the tests, can do no more than create a doubt about the paternity of a child.
12. Exclusion of paternity by blood grouping tests under biological law is
scientific proof that a respondent is not the father.
13. The skill and accuracy with which the blood grouping tests were here
conducted were clearly and convincingly demonstrated by the testimony
of disinterested witnesses. There is nothing in their testimony which even
casts suspicion upon the accuracy of the findings or the consequent
exclusion of the respondent as the father of Child A.
14. The statement by the complainant, "There is no other one to accuse," even if
interpreted as a denial of intercourse with any man other than the respondent,
is not sufficient to overcome the overwhelming effect of this positive
testimony by disinterested witnesses.
15. If the jury found that the results of the blood grouping tests were inaccurate,
such finding must have been based on mere conjecture or understandable
sympathy for the complainant and prejudice against the respondent. Such
finding is not supported by any believable evidence in the record. The motion
must be sustained.
16. Motion sustained. New trial granted.
21.) Janice Jao v. CA
G.R. No. L-49162 | July 28, 1987 | Conceived 1st Week Dec 1968 but Sex only Jan
1969; Blood Test only used Negatively, Not Positively; No Recognition Under 283,
Not Conceived during Co-habitation
FACTS:
1. Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 51078-R, dated 29 August
1978, which dismissed petitioner's action for recognition and support against private respondent.
2. On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented
 by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for
recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the
parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by
the (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test,
held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible
offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado. 1
3. The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff's (herein
petitioner's) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice
was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
4. Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court's failure to appreciate the result
of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity
or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have been
conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
5. The Court of Appeals upheld Jao's contentions and reversed the trial court's
decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
a. The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16, 1968, after
completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must have
conceived JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967. "Thus, one
issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE
had sexual intercourse and were already living with one another as husband and wife.
b. In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the third
or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after
several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Long beach,
Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started
to live with her at her dwelling after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their
cruise to Mindoro Island.
c. On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle and
Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967
because the day following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini
and Charlie Litonjua went to Mindoro by boat. He remembered he had carnal
knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968, because that was a week after
his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started cohabiting with her at the
Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
d. These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the paternity of
JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the NBI and which
resulted in the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could not be the
father of JANICE.
e. We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a position to
determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood grouping test,
considering the rulings of this Court ... where the blood grouping tests of the NBI
were admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who
conducted the test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico
approved the findings and report. ... In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188,
the Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping
test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood
grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950"s.
f. The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
i. Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood
samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the father of the child.
ii. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the father of a particular
child, but at least can show only a possibility that he is. Some of the
decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity
where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which
the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is
allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
iii. … But thus far this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as
generally accepted) can be used only negatively i.e. to evidence that a
particular man F is not the father of a particular child C.
6. The CA also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner's contention that
JAO's actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to
recognition. Said the respondent appellate court:
a. On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his own. In
fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the latter's certificate of
live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere
acts of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her
pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of
the blood grouping test. These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the
unborn JANICE as his own as the possession of such status cannot be founded on
conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said, JAO refused
to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.
b. JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of Article 283
in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which provides: "When the child is
in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter.
c. Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said article 283
which states:
d. (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father;
e. (4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
f. As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived from
November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first
sexual intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was
one week after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted,
JANICE must have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with
one another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started only after
December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during
this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be
had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her alleged
paternity.
g. Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of conception,
ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin
Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of
ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further
convinced of plaintiff's cause by ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight-
 forward and candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress
may have been overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by her acts,
whether she was lying or not.
h. RTC Set Aside.
7. The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the results of the blood test is admissible. Yes.
RATIO:
1. In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt
with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of filiation, support and damages.
In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and
types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant
contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he
can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other
facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that
appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel."3
2. Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests
to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their
conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of
disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure.
3. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to
paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the
child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the
possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father.4
4. In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results
to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin
v. Gilpin5 the positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown
that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on
the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result
of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with
the mother within the period of gestation. The Court said that the competent medical testimony
was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be tantamount
to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated, should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result was to deny
progress.7 Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several
states.
11
5. Tolentino, affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity, thus —
a. Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two
persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they
are of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the
other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood
group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today
regard a blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-
paternity. 12
6. Moreover,
a. The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception
of the child. This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside
of the period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests
that the child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the
cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
7. Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant case by
impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of
the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit. The NBI"s
forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had extensive practice in
this area for several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2)
scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System,14 under
witness and supervision.15
8. Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a
proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after
the first blood test, she, represented by her mother, declined to undergo the
same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing
to undergo such a test again.16
9. Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds
that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are
admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis
petitioner Janice.
10. No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods
employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of
the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reflecting a scientific fact.
11. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied.
22.) People v. Madera
G.R. No. L-35133 | May 31, 1974 | JNotice of Laws of Nature  Moon Shining
FACTS:
1. This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the Circuit
Criminal Court[1] finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the
early morning of April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the
house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of the
 house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was
then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot
wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him
on the abdominal region.
2. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for
his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The victim's
wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no
longer at home for he was already brought to the Municipal Building of
Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the
assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to
the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April
20, 1970.
3. Juanito Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the
gunfire and saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of
their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at
a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim,
declared that she saw Raymundo Madera as the one who shot her husband
with a foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres were then with Madera.
4. In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution
presented the dying declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the
house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building took only about thirty
minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from
Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano
Jurnadal of Ban tug to look into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the
Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would have
to take down his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the
latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the
morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and the
answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
ISSUES:
1. W/N judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the moon was still shining
at the time of the occurrence of the act. Yes
RATIO:
1. We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired
the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and
that appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with
Madera at the time.
2. The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman Feliciano
that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that he could
not identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the police
force since 1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration
in the Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But
Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but
also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
3. The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the
identities of the appellants to the victim himself and to their relatives Conrado
Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their
credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were asked by their
relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they
would have readily revealed appellants' identities as they did to the Chief of
Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful
incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief
of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn statements.
4. In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn on the same
date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernarda Bana and Juanito Bana categorically stated that
Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were
downstairs.
5. Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their
house. He testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their
house. On cross examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That
does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on further
questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their
house. Yes, he said that after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground
through the back portion of their house. The falsity of this statement has not
been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently show that there
was no such opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall; grasses could obscure the back
portion of the house where the kitchen door was located.
6. Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the
burst of gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the
appellants.
a. "An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise
have observed…."Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the
attention to a keen edge. x x x in some other cases, it has been observed, in effect,
that the emotion incident to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement
which confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize the
circumstance of the threatened danger in order to avoid it. [2]
7. The appellants asserted in their briefs[3] that "the evidence on record
does not show that there was a moon shining in the early morning of
April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was
then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanao Bana and Bernarda Bana could
not have recognized the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?
8. The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature" [4] and, under
this rule, of the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular
day.[5] This notwithstanding and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves
to get a certification from the Weather Bureau which shows that the
moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident. It reads:
 a. "This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following
astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:
b. That the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April
20, at 4:27 A.M.;
c. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees above
the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West;
d. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon
having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22, 1970.
9. The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant Raymundo
Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.
10. We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We agree. The fact that
these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at Elino
Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any
conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help
Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either
as co-principals or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice
Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
a. 'It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected with
the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be established a
logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed
conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and among
the latter, such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design.
b. "The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other
hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous
acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether
physical or moral. …Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive presence at
the scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-principal or an
accomplice in the commission of the offense."[7]
11. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect
to the appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo"; and it is hereby reversed
as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres
alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged.
23.) People v. Dumanon
G.R. No. 123096 | December 18, 2000 | JNotice of Features and Characters 
Mongoloid; No Need for Expert Testimony, Conviction was Rape with Use of Force
not based on lack of Mental Capacity, but Use of Force relative term
FACTS:
1. On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed a complaint for rape 2 against
MARIO and RICARDO on behalf of her mentally retarded daughter
ANACURITA before the (MCTC) of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte.
The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 993, alleged that
ANACURITA is a "retardate" and the crime was committed at midnight of 2
December 1993.
2. Instead of filing their counter-affidavits, MARIO and RICARDO filed a joint motion to dismiss
the case on the grounds that the crime of rape cannot be prosecuted de oficio and the complaint
was not signed by the offended party, there being no proof that the latter was incapacitated.
3. In its resolution5 of 10 January 1994, the MCTC ruled that the complaint was properly filed by
the mother of ANACURITA since the latter is a retarded woman and stated that "by merely
looking upon the victim, the Court finds that indeed Anacurita Anib is a retarded woman." It also
found probable cause that MARIO and RICARDO committed the crime charged and forwarded
the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the information.
4. On 24 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Surigao del Norte
filed with the RTC of Surigao del Norte a complaint6 for rape, bearing the
thumb mark of ANACURITA and approved by the Provincial Prosecutor.
The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4247 and assigned to Branch
30 thereof, alleges as follows: That on or about the 2nd day of December 1993, at 12:00
o’clock [sic] midnight, … … drag MISS ANACURITA ANIB y DUMANACAL inside the
vacant house of Jaime Batac and have carnal knowledge of herein complainant against her will.
5. The prosecution presented as witnesses ANACURITA, Dominga Anib,
Eduardo Dizon and Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon.
6. ANACURITA testified in court seven months after she was raped. She was
then thirty-eight years old. According to her she knew MARIO and
RICARDO as they were her friends and townmates. In the early evening of 2
December 1993, she was in the municipal gymnasium of Tagana-an, Surigao
del Norte, watching a parade of gays. At about 11:00 p.m. she left and headed
for her home in barangay Aurora, Tagana-an. As she was walking, she passed
by RICARDO who was then sitting on a bench, apparently drunk. Suddenly,
RICARDO blocked her way. She tried to break free but he continued to
obstruct her way. Then he pulled her and brought her to the deserted house
of Jaime Batac, which was just about nine meters away from her home. Inside
the house, RICARDO stripped off his clothes and immediately removed her
underwear. He then placed his penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his
lust, RICARDO ran away. Then she put on her underwear. After a few
minutes, MARIO, who was likewise drunk, entered Jaime’s house, pulled her
down and undressed her. Mario inserted his penis inside her vagina and just
like RICARDO ran away after the sexual intercourse. ANACURITA went
home and told her mother what had happened.8
7. Dominga Anib testified that MARIO and RICARDO are her neighbors and
that the former is even her relative. In the evening of 2 December 1993,
ANACURITA was out watching a show at the municipal gymnasium. At
about midnight she was awakened by her husband who told her that
ANACURITA had not yet arrived. When she turned on the light, she heard
the protesting voice of her daughter coming from the house of Jaime Batac.
She went to the house and dragged ANACURITA home. ANACURITA was
holding her underwear and her hair and dress were soiled. She asked
ANACURITA if any man did anything to her. ANACURITA told her that
 she had just been raped by RICARDO and MARIO inside Jaime’s house.
Accompanied by Eduardo Diaz, Dominga immediately reported the incident
to the barangay captain and then later, to the police. On 4 December 1993,
Dominga brought ANACURITA to the Provincial Hospital of Surigao del
Norte for examination.
8. According to Eduardo Diaz, he knew MARIO and RICARDO. MARIO is a close friend and
relative. He, MARIO and RICARDO and the Anibs reside along the same street. On 2 December
1993, Eduardo was in the municipal gymnasium to watch a show. He left for home at 10:00 p.m.
Along the way he saw MARIO and RICARDO. When he arrived home, he wanted to eat; but
when he found out that there was no more food, he decided to request some viand from MARIO.
On the road he saw MARIO going inside the house of Jaime Batac. So, he returned home. Later,
he heard the voice of Dominga Anib from her house berating her weeping daughter
ANACURITA. He overheard that ANACURITA came from the house of Jaime Batac, which
was near the house of the Anibs. Dominga ordered ANACURITA to stay upstairs while she went
out of their house. Dominga saw Eduardo and sought his help. Eduardo accompanied Dominga
to the barangay captain, Mr. Jaime Pelarco.10 The latter looked for RICARDO and MARIO, who
were eventually arrested and detained.
9. Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon physically examined ANACURITA on 4 December 1993 and
issued the corresponding medical certificate.11 She noted a fresh hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock
and a hematoma on the thigh.
10. Only MARIO testified for the defense while RICARDO opted not to take the
witness stand.
11. MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin, were
lovers. On the evening of 2 December 1993 he was also at the municipal
gymnasium to watch a coronation event. At about 10:15 p.m. he decided to
go home and along the way, he saw ANACURITA and they talked by the
fence of Jaime Batac’s house. He confessed his love for her and he suggested
if it was possible for them to have sexual intercourse. ANACURITA nodded
her head in consent and replied that she had yearned to bear a child at her age.
ANACURITA invited him inside the abandoned house of Jaime so that they
would not be seen by her mother. Inside Jaime’s house, he asked her again if
he could have sexual intercourse with her. She consented. ANACURITA had
no reaction at all during their sexual intimacy. After they were done, he
escorted her to her house and then he walked toward his house. He
immediately heard Dominga Anib scold ANACURITA. Dominga demanded
to know where she came from and why she arrived late. In the early morning
of the following day the police arrested and detained him.13
12. The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995. It specifically noted therein the trial judge’s
personal impression which he entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is "a mongoloid
(physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions." While
conceding that ANACURITA’s narration of how she was sexually abused by the accused-
appellants was not "detailed," it nevertheless concluded that it was "candidly told by one who is
mentally deficient." She was "able to show and convince the Court that she, in fact, was taken
advantage of by the two drunken neighbors." It gave full credence to her testimony, which was
supported by the medical findings. It held that MARIO and RICARDO, especially the former,
who is her cousin, knew of ANACURITA’s mental condition. It ruled that "(e)vidently, …
Anacurita Anib, in her retarded understanding, was overcome with shock, fear and, otherwise,
intimidated by her two drunken neighbors, who accosted her."
13. The trial court also considered RICARDO’s silence as an admission of the charge against him.
The trial court then decreed: Mario and Ricardo GUILTY. Hence this appeal.
14. MARIO and RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint filed with the court below alleges
that the rape was committed with the use of force and intimidation and hence they cannot be held
guilty of rape committed on a mental retardate since this circumstance was never alleged in the
Complaint. Neither can they be liable for rape committed with the use of force and intimidation
since the same was not sufficiently proven by the evidence for the prosecution.
15. MARIO and RICARDO emphasize that their conviction was based on the
trial court’s conclusion that ANACURITA is a mental retardate. Such a
conclusion has no basis since no medical or expert opinion categorically
affirming such condition was offered by the prosecution. Accordingly, they
pray for their acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
16. The OSG asserts that in this case the trial court found that ANACURITA was mentally deficient,
as revealed by its personal notes quoted in its decision, its forbearance in allowing the
prosecution to proceed with leading questions during her direct examination due to her difficulty
in comprehending and responsively answering the questions, and in acknowledging the
observation of the MCTC judge in his Resolution that ANACURITA was different from or less
than those of a fully functioning adult. Hence, the degree of force needed to overwhelm her is
less. The force which may not be sufficient for the rape of a normal person, may be more than
enough when employed in the rape of a mentally deficient person, like ANACURITA.
17. The OSG further asseverates that rape committed against a feeble-minded victim does not require
the use of physical force since the commission of the sexual act constitutes the force itself. There
was thus no need to establish that ANACURITA is a mental retardate since her rape was
attendant with force and intimidation. It also points out that the attempt of MARIO and
RICARDO to settle the case was an implied admission of their guilt.
ISSUES:
1. W/N judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Anacurita is a mental
retardate. Yes.
RATIO:
1. We sustain the conviction of MARIO and RICARDO.
2. On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA is a retardate, as correctly
pointed out by the defense, no expert testimony was offered to prove that,
indeed ANACURITA is a retardate. But, this matter gains importance if,
in fact, the trial court’s conviction for rape was based on a finding that her
retardation was of such an extent that she was deprived of reason or that she
had mental age of a child of less than 12 years old. As will be shown later,
such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar, for we agree with the
trial court’s finding that MARIO and RICARDO are guilty of rape by the use
of force and intimidation.
3. It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other
than medical evidence.14 Thus, it is our considered opinion that for
purposes of determining whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or
does not have the mental capacity of a normal person, the personal
observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of determining
the impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and
 RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal requirement to prove the commission of
the crime of rape.
4. The original complaint,15 filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte by Dominga Anib on behalf of
ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The translation of
the affidavit16 of Dominga Anib, which was submitted in support of the
original complaint, alleged that ANACURITA is "not mentally normal."
During the preliminary examination Dominga testified that ANACURITA is
mentally retarded.17 The Resolution18 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte categorically declared that "by merely
looking upon the victim," ANACURITA is indeed a "retarded woman."
5. The transcript of stenographic notes is also replete with particulars on
ANACURITA’s mental condition. When she first testified, the trial court
ordered to "make it on record the physical appearance of the witness
[ANACURITA] having [a] hard time in understanding the question of the
interpreter," and that she is "mentally deficient." As she continued with her
testimony, it further observed that she had difficulty answering the questions
and, under the circumstances, it allowed leading questions during her direct
examination.19
6. The appealed decision likewise bears the trial court’s personal
impression that ANACURITA "appears to be mongoloid (physically)
and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the
questions."20 We often call a person who is suffering from mongolism as
a mongoloid. Mongolism is a condition characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly flattened
skull, short, flat-bridged nose, epicanthus, short-phalanges, and widened space between the first
and second digits of hands and feet, with moderate to severe mental retardation and associated
with a chromosomal abnormality. It is known as mongolism because its physiognomic features
are suggestive of those normally exhibited by the Mongolian race. It is also known
as Down’s Syndrome.23
7. Hence, the courts can take judicial notice of the appearance and features of
those suffering from mongolism and based thereon, conclude that a victim,
like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid.
8. Having established that ANACURITA is a retardate even in the absence of an expert opinion
thereon, we shall now determine if MARIO and RICARDO were properly charged with rape by
means of force and intimidation. A thorough review of the assailed decision supports the findings
and conclusion of the trial court that ANACURITA was indeed raped by means of force and
intimidation. ANACURITA in her testimony declared that while she was on her way home,
RICARDO, then drunk, blocked her way, pulled her toward the uninhabited house of Jaime
Batac and once inside the house he undressed her and took off her panty and inserted his penis
FACTS:
into her vagina.24 After he was through, RICARDO ran away. Then later MARIO arrived.
MARIO pulled ANACURITA and also inserted his penis into her vagina. 25
9. The blocking, the holding of the hand, the pulling towards an uninhabited house, the
removal of the panty and the fact that both MARIO and RICARDO were in a state of
drunkenness, were enough force and intimidation considering the mental state of
ANACURITA.
10. The use of force or intimidation was further shown in the cross-examination
of ANACURITA by defense counsel, Atty. Medina, thus:
a. Q Let’s go to that testimony of yours that Ricardo Labrador grab [sic] you to the
house of Jaime Batac, how did Ricardo Labrador grab you?
b. A He pulled me.
c. Q Even if you were able to free your hand from the grab of Ric-Ric still you went
with Ric-Ric towards the house of Jaime?
d. A I try [sic] to run away but he blocked my way.
11. Furthermore, the hematoma found on the victim’s left thigh as shown by the
medical certificate issued by the examining physician27 is physical evidence
of the use of force in the consummation of the beastly act.
12. It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size
and strength of the parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed
in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. When the victim
is a retardate the force required to overcome her is of a lesser degree
than that used against a normal adult.28 Thus, the degree of force which
may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough
when employed against an imbecile.29
13. With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were correctly
convicted of rape under the first circumstance of Article 335, i.e. by the use
of force or intimidation. Once the elements of force and intimidation were
properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial, as in this
case, the conviction becomes a matter of course. As correctly assessed by the
OSG, the conviction for rape decreed by the trial court was not based on the
fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate, but on the use of force and
intimidation. The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a
circumstance which the trial court considered in evaluating the degree and
extent of the force and intimidation.
14. We also take note of the trial court’s pronouncement 30 that accused-appellants manifested a
possible settlement of the case. The offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 31
15. Affirmed.
24.) Gener v. Sps. de Leon
G.R. No. 130730 | October 19, 2001
1. The forcible entry case was initiated on April 30, 1990 before the Municipal
Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The respondents, as plaintiffs therein,
alleged that they are the original claimants and actual possessors in good faith
under a bona fide claim of ownership of a parcel of agricultural land situated
at Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of approximately (4,404)
square meters. The said parcel of land and the adjoining lots on the north and
south thereof were originally part of the course or bed of the Angat River
 which was formerly adjacent thereto and the boundary on the east or north-
east of Lot No. 1050, Cad-350, plan Ap-03-003056, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-1208 (M) of respondent Gregorio de Leon. COCO
2. During the big flood in 1978, the Angat River allegedly changed its course
by moving more than one hundred (100) meters far to the east or north-east,
leaving its former course or bed along the eastern or north-eastern boundary
of Lot No. 1050 which is elevated so that the said lot dried up.
3. Then, the respondents extended their occupation and cultivation to this
elevated and dried up land, planting and cultivating thereon coconuts,
bananas and vegetables until May 8, 1989 when petitioner allegedly through
force, threat and intimidation, unlawfully entered the property and deprived
respondents of the possession thereof, removing the barbed wire fence placed
by respondents on the northern boundary of the land in dispute and
transferred it to the eastern boundary. Since demands to vacate fell on deaf
ears and subsequent efforts toward amicably settling the dispute through the
Barangay Justice System proved futile, respondents instituted the complaint
for forcible entry against the petitioner.5
4. Petitioner, as defendant in the ejectment case, denied the material allegations
of the complaint. Instead, he alleged that he is the real owner and lawful
and actual possessor of the land in dispute evidenced by a notarized deed
of sale executed on October 10, 1988 by Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the
previous owner, Proceso Joaquin.
5. Upon acquisition of the land in dispute, he immediately caused the
declaration of the land for taxation purposes in the Office of the Municipal
Assessor of Norzagaray, Bulacan and paid realty taxes thereon.
6. Further, he claimed that the land is a private land which was previously
owned by Proceso Joaquin and that the said fact is admitted and recognized
by Gorgonio de Leon, the late father and predecessor-in-interest of
respondent Gregorio de Leon, in an affidavit he executed on November 13,
1961 in which he mentioned Proceso Joaquin as a neighboring landowner in
the east of his land.
7. Petitioner further averred that it was respondents who forcibly entered his lot in question as
evidenced by two (2) criminal cases which petitioner filed, namely, (a) Criminal Case No.
3998 for malicious mischief against Rosendo Buen and Ignacio Cadungcol alias Lolong, two
(2) alleged helpers of the land of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on
October 24, 1988 and destroyed coconut trees, papaya and langka trees which belonged to
petitioner, and (b) Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de Leon and Rolly de Leon, brothers
of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on March 12, 1989 and destroyed
mango trees and other plants belonging to the petitioner Gener. Thus, considering that his
occupation of the land in dispute allegedly started on October 10, 1988, the Municipal Trial
Court has no jurisdiction over the action since the forcible entry suit filed by respondents was
filed beyond the one year period.6
8. Thereafter, trial ensued with Ignacio Cadungol, Teodoro Mendoza, Andres
Palad, Balagtas P. San Pedro, Marcelino Samson, Norman Maclang and
respondent Zenaida Faustino testifying for the plaintiffs (respondents herein)
in the ejectment case, while petitioner Gener was the sole witness for his
defense. The MTC condensed their respective testimonies in this manner:7
a. Zenaida Faustino de Leon, plaintiff, testified that she and her husband had actually
been in possession of the land subject matter of this case since she got married to
Gregorio de Leon in 1950 as well as their titled lot; that the land is declared in their
name under Tax Declaration No. 13621 (Exh. "K") and under Property Index No.
020-13-001-04-037 (Exh."I") and had paid taxes therefor (Exh. "J")..
b. For his defense, Hernando Gener declared that he did not forcibly enter plaintiffs’ lot
on October 10, 1988 as alleged in the complaint but it is the plaintiffs who forcibly
entered his lot which he bought from Benjamin Joaquin, son of Proceso Joaquin,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed before Judge Filomeno Pascual (Exh. "I");
that the land he bought had not been possessed by Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida
Faustino as they are residing at Santos St., Norzagaray, Bulacan, which is five
hundred (500) meters away from the lot he bought. After buying the property, Ignacio
Cadungol together with others entered the property so he filed Criminal Case No.
4043 also before this Court (Exh. "E").
c. Thereafter, he caused the land to be declared under Tax Declaration No. 13400 (Exh.
"2") and paid taxes for the same (Exh. "3"): that Tax Declaration No. 1512 (Exh. "5")
for Gorgonio de Leon which he secured at the Municipal Assessor’s Office even
showed Proceso Joaquin, father of Benjamin Joaquin, as boundary owner of the small
portion on the east and abutting to that of Agapito Gener and Sinforosa Torres.
9. After weighing the conflicting evidence, the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan
rendered judgment8 dated February 19, 1993, in favor of Sps. De Leon. On appeal to the (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan, on April 3, 1995, the said court rendered a decision reversing the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, and thereby dismissed herein respondents’
complaint for forcible entry.9 In its decision, the RTC sustained petitioner’s claim of ownership
of the property in dispute by virtue of having bought such property from the heir of the former
owner thereof. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court. MR denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. Petitioner avers that the appellate court disregarded evidence showing his prior possession of the
disputed property which negate the alleged cause of action of the respondents for petitioner’s
ejectment….
2. It bears stress that in ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.
Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself.16 Ejectment does not depend on title
for relief; the criterion is the right to possession.17 Thus, priority in time
should be the pivotal point in resolving the issue of possession.
3. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court18 requires that in actions for forcible entry the
plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth and that the action shall be filed within one year from the time of such
unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed
land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquired possession thereof by
unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of
the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one year period
 within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual
entry by the defendant on the land.19
4. To support their allegation of prior possession, herein respondents, as
plaintiffs in the ejectment case, primarily relied upon the testimonies of
Ignacio Cadungol, Teodoro Mendoza, Andres Palad, Balagtas P. San Pedro,
Marcelino Samson, Norman Maclang and respondent Zenaida Faustino. The
appellate court made much of the testimony that it was petitioner who forcibly
excluded respondents from possession of the land on May 8, 1989. In the
words of the appellate court, the "ousting force came in the form of man and
machine: [petitioner’s] son Rolly Gener and his ramming jeep."
5. However, the Municipal Trial Court and Court of Appeals totally
overlooked the fact that while petitioner was his own sole witness, his
testimony of prior possession was substantiated by several documentary
evidence,20 which were quite damaging to the existence of respondents’
alleged cause of action for forcible entry. This Court noted that there
were two (2) incidents that occurred on October 24, 1988 and March 12,
1989 which resulted in the institution by herein petitioner of criminal
complaints for malicious mischief.
6. These two (2) incidents, are the subject of: (a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for
malicious mischief against Rosendo Buen and Ignacio Cadungol alias
Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers of the land of respondent Gregorio de Leon,
who allegedly entered the disputed land on October 24, 1988 and destroyed
coconut trees, papaya and langka trees which allegedly belonged to the
petitioner, and (b) Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de Leon and Rolly
de Leon, brothers of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the
disputed land on March 12, 1989 and destroyed mango trees and other plants
which allegedly belonged to the petitioner. These twin incidents, evidenced
by "Sinumpaang Salaysay" and Complaint21 show that prior to May 8, 1989,
the alleged date of forcible entry of petitioner, petitioner was already in
possession of the disputed land.
7. As against the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they
were forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the
documentary evidence of petitioner’s prior possession, more particularly
the evidence of the two (2) incidents of October 24, 1988 and March 12,
1989, must prevail.
G.R. No. 119288 | August 18, 1997 | Judicial Notice of Court Decisions | Cadastral |
8. Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as
reliable as written or documentary evidence,22 especially when said
FACTS:
documentary evidence is not opposed. As Judge Limkin of Georgia once said,
"I would rather trust the smallest slip of paper for truth than the strongest and
most retentive memory ever bestowed on mortal man." 23
9. The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken judicial
notice of the said criminal cases involving the subject parcel of land and
pending in its docket.
10. While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge,24 this rule is subject to the exception that "in the absence of
objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its
archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with
the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name
and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated."25
11. Respondents did not impugn nor object to the evidence of petitioner on the
existence of the said criminal cases of malicious mischief that sprung from
the alleged forcible entry of petitioner’s alleged property. Thus, the said
Municipal Trial Court should have taken judicial notice of these facts in
resolving the issue of prior possession.
12. In view of the evidence on the possession of petitioner prior to May 8,
1989, as shown by the incidents on October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989,
the cause of action of respondents for forcible entry against the petitioner has
already prescribed when they filed the complaint for ejectment on April 30,
1990. Because forcible entry cases must be filed within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land.26 Forcible entry is a quieting process and the
one year time bar to the ejectment suit is in pursuance of the summary nature
of the action.27 After the lapse of the one year period, the remedies of the
party dispossessed of a parcel of land is to file either an accion
publiciana which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession or
an accion reinvindicatoria which is an action to recover ownership as well as
for the recovery of possession.28 Consequently, since respondent’s cause of
action for forcible entry has prescribed, the Municipal Trial Court was
without jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject ejectment case.
13. Granted. CA Set Aside. The complaint for forcible entry is DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan.
25.) Republic v. CA & Gacot
Rehearing
1. The Republic represented by the Director of Lands, prays in the instant petition for review
on certiorari for the annulment of the decision, dated 22 February 1995, of the CA affirming the
12th August 1993 judgment of the RTC of Palawan which has adjudicated Lot No. 5367 in
Cadastral Case No. 13, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 1133, to herein private respondent, now
deceased Josefa Gacot, the claimant in the cadastral case.
2. The entire lot 5367 is being claimed by Josefa Gacot as per answer she filed
on June 7, 1971. It appears from the record that the lot is located in Barangay
 Los Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan but the area was not indicated. It also
appeared that Ceferino Sabenacio is her co-owner.
3. Before the scheduled hearing on August 13, 1990, the Court received a
report from the Land Registration Authority calling the Court's
attention of the decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on October
20, 1950 declaring this lot as property of the Republic of the Philippines.
Despite this declaration however, the petitioner nor the government did
not bar the claimant from filing her answer, possessing and occupying
the lot and in fact accepted her tax payments and issuing her tax
10. An appeal was taken by the Republic from the decision of the trial court. In
declaration on the same.
4. The claimant presented herself as witness and as her son, Vicente Dantic, Jr.
The witnesses testified that Josefa Gacot was married to Vicente Dantic, Sr.
in 1940 and were in actual possession of the property for more than 30 years,
having bought the same from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera as per deed of sale
dated April 22, 1955 in Cuyono dialect (Exhibit 1 and 1-A). Since she
acquired the property from Cipriana Llanera, she continued her occupation
and introduced improvements thereon as well as declared Lot 5367 for
taxation purposes in her name (Exhibit 2) and paid the corresponding taxes
thereon up to the present time (Exhibit 3). That claimant is now a widow and
has 5 children namely, Hernando Dantic, Antero Dantic, Felipe Dantic, Fe
Dantic and Vicente Dantic, Jr.
5. Cipriano Sabenacio, the alleged co-owner of claimant Josefa Gacot appeared in Court and
manifested that he is waiving his claim over Lot 5367 in favor of Josefa Gacot who is in actual
possession of the property as he is only a boundary owner.
6. During the hearing the petitioner thru counsel manifested that it is not
presenting controverting evidence and is submitting the case for resolution. 1
7. On 05 September 1990, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot
No. 5367 to Josefa Gacot, thus —Accordingly, Lot 5367 is hereby adjudicated to Josefa
Gacot-Dantic, widow and a resident of Barangay Los Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan with all the
improvements the, eon, subject to the estate tax as provided by law.
8. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the CA.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General was
able to verify that Lot 5367 was earlier declared to be the property of the
Republic in a decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on 20 October
1950 following an order of general default. The Solicitor General thus filed a
motion with the appellate court to have the case reopened and remanded to
the court a quo to allow the Republic of the Philippines to present the
decision of Judge Garlitos. In its resolution, dated 26 December 1991, the
Court of Appeals granted the motion.
9. What transpired thereafter was narrated by the trial court in its 12th August
1993 decision; viz:
a. The claimant submitted her memorandum while the government represented by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor assigned to this sala has not presented any witness
to support the government's claim, neither has he submitted any memorandum
to support the government's stand on this matter.
b. ….Besides, the government represented by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) for Puerto
Princesa City and Cuyo, Palawan have not made any protest nor interposed any
objection on the claim of Josefa Gacot during the hearings. And the sad part was
that the government had accepted without any protest all the taxes due the property
paid by the claimant religiously.
c. With this finding of the Court, it is its considered opinion and so holds, that there is
no reason to disturb its previous decision aforequoted.3
its now assailed decision of 22 February 1995, the CA affirmed in toto the
judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ratiocinated:
a. In its brief, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that "records of the re-hearing
show that on October 20, 1950, an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Lorenzo C.
Garlitos of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District, declaring that
Lot No. 5367 was among lots declared as property of the Republic of the Philippines."
It now invokes Republic Act No. 931, approved on June 30, 1953 and Republic Act
No. 2061, which took effect on June 30, 1958, both laws setting the time limits for
the filing of applications, among other things, for the reopening of judicial
proceedings on certain lands which were declared public land. Under R.A. 2061,
the time for filing an application shall not extend beyond December 31, 1968. Thus,
petitioner-appellant argues that since claimant-appellee Josefa Gacot filed her answer
only on 07 June 1971, the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant
claim since she did not file her answer within the period fixed by R.A. No. 2061.
b. This would be true, if the Order dated 20 October 1950 of Judge Lorenzo Garlitos
declaring Lot No. 5367 as property of the Republic of the Philippines, was presented
as evidence in the rehearing of this case. Unfortunately, the Republic of the
Philippines failed to offer as its exhibit the said order. There is no basis for the
appellant, therefore, to invoke R.A. 2061, to support its claim that claimant-appellee
Josefa Gacot filed her answer beyond the period fixed by said law and therefore the
court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
c. Precisely, the purpose of the rehearing was to enable the Republic of the Philippines,
thru the Office of the Solicitor General, to present in evidence the said order. The
Solicitor General, in its Motion dated 21 May 1991, prayed that with regards to Lot
No. 5367 "the proceedings therein be ordered reopened and the same be remanded
to the court a quo to enable the Republic of the Philippines to present the judgment
dated October 20, 1950 of Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring Lot No. 5367 as
government property."
d. This Court granted the motion and ordered the records of the case remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings "to enable the government to present in evidence
the judgment dated October 20, 1950,declaring Lot No. 5367 as government
property."
e. During the rehearing, however, the Government failed to present the said order of
Judge Garlitos in evidence. Thus, the court a quo said in its appealed decision:
i. This case was set for hearing several times for the government to present
its evidence and for the parties to submit their respective memoranda in
support of their respective stand on the matter. The claimant submitted her
memorandum while the government represented by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor has not presented any witness to present the
government's claim neither has he submitted any memorandum to support
the government's stand on this matter."
 f. It is the rule that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered." (Rule 132, Sec. 34) It is true that the Order of 20 October 1950 has been
appended to the records of this case (see p. 19, Rec.). But it is misleading on the
part of the SolGen to state that "Records of the rehearing show that on October 20,
1950, an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Lorenzo C. Garlitos . . . ." For, during
the rehearing, as reflected in the appealed decision, the government did not present
any evidence nor any memorandum despite having been ordered by the court a quo.
g. "Neither can We take judicial notice of the Order of Judge Garlitos. As a general rule,
courts are not authorized to take judicial knowledge of the contents of the record of
other cases, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, even though the trial
judge in fact knows or remembers the contents thereof, or even when said other cases
have been heard or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been heard or are really pending before the same judge. Indeed,
the Government missed its opportunity to have the claim of Josefa Gacot, the herein
appellee, declared as a nullity, considering that no evidence was presented by it in
opposition thereto.4
11. Hence the instant petition by the Republic.
ISSUES:
1. W/N judicial notice of Judge Garlitos' order should have been taken. Yes.
RATIO:
1. The Solicitor General explains that the records of the reopened case would
show that a certified copy of the decision, dated 20 October 1950, of Judge
Garlitos has been appended to page 19 thereof. It is not evident, however,
why the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer ("CENRO") for Puerto Princesa, representing
the government during the rehearing, did not present it. The Solicitor
General, nevertheless, invokes the rule that the Republic is not estopped by
the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
2. Let it initially be said that, indeed, the Court realizes the points observed by
the appellate court over which there should be no quarrel. Firstly, that the
rules of procedure6 and jurisprudence,7 do not sanction the grant of
evidentiary value,8 in ordinary trials,9 of evidence which is not formally
offered, and secondly, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly for, without
it, the enforcement of substantive law may not remain assured.
3. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are not
ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the
proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases,
therefore, the rules may have to be so construed10 liberally as to meet and
advance the cause of substantial justice.
4. Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court provides:
a. Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions.
5. Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras11 opined:
a. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own
records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice
will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between
the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of
another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be
taken of court personnel.12
6. The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable. The area of
Lot No. 5367 claimed and awarded to the late Josefa Gacot had not been
specified in the records.
7. Indeed, on the basis of the Certification of the Forest Management Services
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Lot No. 5367, per
Land Classification (LC) No. 1246 of 15 January 1936, would appear to
contain an area of 394,043 square meters, 300,000 square meters of which
were classified as Alienable and Disposable land and 94,043 square meters
as Timberland, which under Proclamation No. 2152, dated 29 December
1981, had been included to form part of the Mangrove Swamp Forest
Reserve, closed for entry, exploitation and settlement.13
8. It behooves all concerned that the above matters be carefully looked into,
albeit with reasonable dispatch, for the final resolution of this case.
9. WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings for it to ascertain and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties
conformably with the foregoing opinion of the Court.
26.) Marcelo Steel v. CA & Farin
G.R. No. L-35851 | October 8, 1974 | JNotice of Filing of Cash Bond
FACTS:
1. Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49342-R, denying the motion of (herein petitioners)
to dismiss the appeal of (herein private respondents) upon the ground that the
latter's record on appeal does not contain any statement to the effect that an
appeal bond has been filed by them, contrary to the requirement of Section 6
of Rule 41 and the consistent jurisprudence of this Court interpretative thereof
to the effect that such omission is a fatal jurisdictional defect.
2. In resolving herein petitioners' motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals held:
a. There is likewise no question that in her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
 appellant herein admits that there is no mention in the Record on Appeal regarding
fact that an appeal bond was filed on time.
b. But counsel for appellant argues that that fact appears on the face of the record
of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the City Treasurer of Quezon City
(copy attached to the opposition as Annex A) to the effect that petitioner-appellants'
cash bond was actually filed on October 30, 1970, simultaneously with the filing
of petitioners-appellants' Notice of Appeal. Appellants' counsel further contends
that "obviously, because said cash appeal bond was filed simultaneously with the
Notice of Appeal, the undersigned counsel, through oversight, failed to state or make
mention of the filing of the said cash appeal bond in the record.
c. Appellant also calls attention to petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
docketed with this Court as CA-G.R. NO. 47519-R entitled Petra R. Farin, et al., vs.
Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles, et al., in which a decision was promulgated by this
Court on August 20, 1971.
d. One of the reasons for Section 3, Rule 41 is to appraise the appellate court whether
an appeal is seasonably filed or not. The purpose of adding the clause "together with
such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time" was "to avoid disputes
in the appellate court concerning the fact of the perfection of the appeal." (Araneta
vs. Madrigal, G.R. No. 26227-28, Oct. 25, 1966).
e. Now, it is to be noted that in the petition for certiorari above-mentioned the private
parties were the same as appellants and appellees herein. Paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof
contained the following allegations:
f. "8) That on October 15, 1970, petitioner thru counsel, received a copy of the decision
of the respondent judge;
g. "9) That on October 30, 1970, petitioner filed their Notice of Appeal, from the
said decision, together with their Appeal Bond and Record on Appeal (Petition,
dated February 22, 1971, p. 3 emphasis supplied)
h. Respondents therein, Honorable Judge Walfrido de los Angeles, Sheriff Benito
Macrohon (now Leonidas F. Villasenor) and Marcelo Steel Corporation, in par. 1 of
their Answer, averred:
i. Admissions
j. 1. That, respondents admit ... the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 17, 18, of the petition."
k. There is no specific admission of petitioner's par. 8, but neither is there any specific
denial thereof.
l. In consonance with the petitioner's allegations and respondents "Admissions" (above)
this Court, in its statement of the case said:
m. "On Oct. 30, 1970, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal ... (p. 4, Decision, in CA-G.R. No. 47519-R)
n. Under the circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that this Court has no way of
determining whether the present appeal is seasonably filed inasmuch as it has not
only been appraised thereof in the petition for certiorari but it has even made a clear,
unequivocal pronouncement based on the admissions in the pleadings in that case,
that all the requisites of a valid have been complied with. Judicial admissions
contained in pleadings bind the parties and the principle of estoppel operates.
o. Hence, there would be no justification to dismiss this appeal for failure to state in the
Record on Appeal a fact about which there can no longer be any dispute inasmuch as
it has already been judicially admitted in the pleadings of C.A. G.R. No. 47519-R.
ISSUES:
1. W/N judicial notice can be taken of the fact that a cash bond was filed. Yes.
RATIO:
1. Under the facts thus found by the appellate court, We are more inclined to
hold that the present petition cannot prosper.
2. Indeed, the main purpose of the rules requiring that a record on appeal should
show on its face, by means of statements of the corresponding specific data,
that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the record itself have been filed
on time is to enable the appellate court to determine on the basis of the record
on appeal itself and without the need of any independent evidence, that the
appeal has been made on time.
3. To allow the parties to indulge in a controversy regarding the timeliness of
the appeal and to present their respective conflicting evidence on that point,
which could take much of the time of the court that it could otherwise devote
to the disposition of other cases demanding its attention, is detrimental to the
interests of justice and contrary to the public policy intended to be served by
the provision in question.
4. But, as illustrated in the circumstances of the case at bar, there could be
instances when the timeliness of an appeal is a matter which the court
can take judicial notice of and, consequently, it would be inconceivable
that any controversy between the parties in respect thereto could arise.
5. In such instances, the court is no longer supposed to receive any conflicting
evidence. It would be bound by what it has judicial notice of and none of
the parties may be permitted to prove the contrary.
6. In the words of Chief Justice Moran, "Where a fact is one of which the
court may judicially take notice, no proof thereof is necessary. The
maxim is "what is known need not be proved." Judicial notice takes the
place of proof and is of equal force. As a means of establishing facts it is
therefore superior to evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces
evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills the object which the
evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence unnecessary. Indeed,
it is frequently said that neither averment, nor proof or admission, will
prevail against matters which are judicially known to the court.
7. In the light of these considerations, the reason behind the subject rule is not
in any sense violated when, as in the case at bar, the appellate court relies on
what it has judicial notice of in determining whether or not appellants filed
an appeal bond on time. When a matter of fact supposed to be proven to
the court is one capable of being taken judicial notice of, being already
known to the court because it has already been proven or was undisputed
or judicially admitted in a related proceeding before it, it would be the
height of absurdity and contrary to one's sense of justice and propriety
to still require the parties to reopen the issue and litigate relative to the
 same matter all over again.
8. Both upon principle and pragmatic considerations, courts are not supposed to
ignore facts that the same parties have in a related case considered as beyond
dispute or no longer subject to proof. Any other ruling would only give
occasion to the court to arrive at contradictory findings on points which the
parties themselves may not controvert without being inconsistent and unfair.
In other words, Section 6 of Rule 41 and the jurisprudence cited by petitioners
have no application to the situation obtaining in this case. The view We have
taken here does not constitute a relaxation, much less a modification of the
standing rulings of this Court invoked by petitioners.
9. Before closing, it is necessary to state here that this case is related somehow to the other cases
pending in this Court between the same parties, namely, G. R. Nos. L-34317 and 34335. To
avoid any misconception or misunderstanding, it is here made clear that the result of the instant
case has no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of the case just mentioned and vise versa.
10. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioners.
27.) People v. Bernabe
G.R. No. 141881 | November 21, 2001
FACTS:
1. In an Information dated October 30, 1998, accused-appellant was charged
with the crime of rape allegedly committed as follows:
a. That on or about the 29th day of October, 1998 in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Virgilio Bernabe y Rafol, by means of force and intimidation, employed
upon the person of complainant Maria Esnelia Bernabe y Javier, his daughter, a 17
year old minor, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said private complainant, against her will and consent.
2. On October 29, 1998, around 1:30 o' clock in the morning, Maria Esnelia
Bernabe was sleeping with her sister in a room of their house located at No.
1919-D Leveriza St., Pasay City, when her father (herein appellant) came
home 'bangag' or very drunk
3. Appellant entered said room, approached Maria Esnelia and started kissing
her nape as well as other parts of her body. Then, appellant removed her panty
and inserted his penis into her vagina. She resisted by pushing him but to no
avail. Appellant succeeded in satisfying his beastly desires on his own
daughter just like what happened in the previous years starting 1994
4. Maria Esnelia could not take it anymore so she reported the incident to her
cousin, Cristina Martin. Later, she also told her aunts, Marcelina and Analyn
Bernabe, about it.
5. At 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, she was accompanied by her
aunts to the Pasay City police headquarters, where she lodged a complaint for
rape against appellant and executed a sworn statement.
6. At 4:00 o'clock in the morning, policemen came to Maria Esnelia's house and
arrested appellant.
7. Later that day, Maria Esnelia was examined by Dra. Anabelle Soliman. In her
testimony, Dra. Soliman revealed, thus:
a. Q. And based on your findings and conclusions on the victim stated when
interviewed by you that she was sexually abused sometime during the period 1995
up to 1998. Now, based on your findings, would it be compatible on the said
allegation?
b. A. My conclusions was that, I did not find any injuries on the hymen, as well as
on the outside genital parts of the victim, and the opening of the hymen is wide
enough to accommodate the average size of a male organ without producing a
hymenal injury.
8. Appellant, on the other hand, denied raping his own daughter. He testified
that Maria Esnelia charged him with rape because he resented her
boyfriend who for sometime slept in their house. He also depicted her
daughter as a rebel and an ingrate who played hooky in school and neglected
her studies despite the fact that he works hard to send her to school, and her
elder brother had to stop schooling just so she can continue with her studies.
9. Appellant also claimed that his two sisters assisted his daughter in filing the
rape case against him because of a land dispute between them. His sisters
allegedly wanted to get back at him by using his own daughter through this
case. It was also argued that no rape was committed as indicated in the finding
of the medico-legal officer whose examination of complainant showed that
her hymen has not been injured. Appellant pointed out too that his family
lives in a very congested place with complainant sharing her room with a
younger sister, for which cause it was impossible for him to have raped Maria
Esnelia without being detected.
10. On January 29, 2000, the trial court handed down its judgment of conviction,
disposing:
a. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has
proven the guilt of the accused Virgilio Bernabe y Rafol for the crime of Rape as
 defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by 6. Hackneyed and discredited too is the argument that the place where the
RA 7659 and the Court hereby sentences the accused Virgilio Bernabe y Rafol to
suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the complainant P75,000.00, moral and
rape was committed is so congested and packed with people that any
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00. untoward incident would be well-nigh impossible.
11. Hence, the instant automatic review. 7. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that among poor couples
with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be
ISSUES: a problem despite the presence of other persons around them. There is
1. W/N Bernabe is guilty. Yes. no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly
declared that "lust is no respecter of time and place"
RATIO:
8. However, before the death penalty can be properly imposed for the crime of rape in accordance
1. We have examined the record of the case, especially Maria Esnelia's with Republic Act No. 7659, an allegation of the complainant's age as well as filial relationship
testimony, and we find no reason to doubt that she was telling the truth with the accused is essential. Both minority and actual relationship between the parties must be
alleged and proved, otherwise, barred is any conviction for rape in its qualified form (People vs.
when she declared that her father had raped her. Labayne, supra). In the case at bar, while the Information alleged both the minority of the victim
and her relationship with appellant, the prosecution failed to prove the victim's age when it
2. Indeed, no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as presented only the baptismal certificate of Maria Esnelia and not her birth certificate. It is
sexual molestation at the hands of her own father, undergo gynecological elementary that a baptismal certificate only proves the fact of baptism but not the circumstances
examination, subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, of birth. Without essential proof on the matter of the date of birth of complainant, or other
if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. That Maria convincing evidence in the absence thereof, we cannot rule with certainty whether Maria Esnelia
was indeed a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, especially so because she does
Esnelia was only being used by her aunts to get back at her father is too flimsy not appear to be obviously a minor, as she allegedly was already 17 years old at the time of the
a reason to inspire belief. assault. Verily, with our young girls now looking, acting, and dressing up more maturely, one
would be hard put to conclude with any measure of certainty, that a budding lass is 13 or 18 years
3. It is also well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that when it comes to the issue of age. Withal, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court on appellant should be reduced
of credibility, this Court, as any other appellate court, would ordinarily defer to reclusion perpetua as provided for by law (Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code; People vs. del
to the assessment and evaluation given by the trial court, for only trial courts Mundo, Sr., G.R. No. 132065, April 3, 2001).
are in so unique a position as to be able to observe that elusive and 9. WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED with the
insurmountable evidence of the witness' deportment on the witness stand MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed on appellant is downgraded
while testifying to reclusion perpetua.
4. Only when such assessment is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence will the appellate courts depart
from the trial court's factual conclusions (People vs. Balgos, G.R. No.
126115, January 26,2000). No such arbitrariness or oversight appears in the
case at hand. As can be gleaned from the record of the case, Maria Esnelia
was candid and forthright in her narration of the harrowing experience she
underwent at the hands of her own father
5. Appellant harps on the fact that Maria Esnelia's hymen was intact after the
alleged rape. He further contends that there were no signs of injury that would
prove that he indeed raped his daughter. In People vs. de la Costa (G.R. No.
133904, October 5, 2000), we reiterated an old doctrine to the effect that the
absence of external injury does not necessarily negate the commission of
rape. Lack of lacerated wounds does not also negate sexual intercourse.
A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that
the medical report states that the hymen of the victim is still intact does not
negate rape (People vs. Bawang, G.R. No. 131942, October 5, 2000). It is
well-settled that full penetration is not even required, as proof of entrance
showing the slightest penetration of the male organ within the labia or
pudendum of the female organ is sufficient. (People vs. Tismo, 204 SC RA
535 [1991]; People vs. Clopino, 290 SC RA 432 [1998])