Article III Additional Limitations when exercised by delegate

Bill of Rights 1. Express grant by law;

BASIS PRINCIPLE OF POLICE POWER, EMINENT
DOMAIN AND TAXATION
FUNDAMENTAL INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
1. Police power
The power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use and enjoyment of liberty and property.
2. Power of Eminent Domain
The inherent right of the State to acquire private property for public use
upon payment of just compensation.
2. Within territorial limits;
3. Must not be contrary to law.
Requisites for exercise of eminent domain
1. There must be necessity for expropriation;
2. There must be taking of property;
3. The property taken must be a private property;
4. The property taken must be for public used; and
5. There must be payment of just compensation.
Just compensation – the full and fair equivalent of the property taken. It is
the fair market value of the property.

3. Power of Taxation CITY OF MANILA vs. JUDGE LAGUIO

The power to impose and collect taxes and charges on individuals, goods, GR No. 118127, April 12, 2005
services, and others to support the operations of the government.
An ordinance which prohibits the establishment or operation of business
POLICE POWER EMINENT DOMAIN TAXATION providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities
To regulate or govern To acquire private To impose and collect where women are used as tools in entertainment is not a valid exercise of police
certain activities or property for public use taxes and charges on power.
transactions. upon payment of just individuals, goods,
compensation. services, and others to For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
support the operations of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
of the government. procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
The power is inherently The power is inherently It may be exercised by requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
vested in the vested in the Congress, LGUs, and to must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
Legislature, but it may Legislature, but it may a limited extent, the must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
be delegated to the be delegated to the President when granted with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
President, President, LGUs, and delegated tariff powers.
administrative bodies even private To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
and lawmaking bodies enterprises performing enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
of LGUs. public services. constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
Property rights of The property interest is generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
individuals are appropriated and interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
subjected to restraints applied to some public necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
and burden in order to purpose. upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
secure the general accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
comfort, health and reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and
prosperity of the State. the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
There is no just There is just No just compensation. protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
compensation. compensation. property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence
of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
Limitations for tests for valid exercise of police power intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
1. Lawful subject – the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of the power. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly
2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly
the purpose, and not duly oppressive on individuals. operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying
nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and
motels. The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the
sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of
the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the
enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and
moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend
or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased
license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish
the desired end. It is readily apparent that the means employed by the
Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference
itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental
right to liberty and property.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE vs. VM REALTY
GR No. 127820, July 20, 1998
An appropriation of private property through resolution approved by municipal
council is not a valid exercise of eminent domain.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control
and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there
was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized
through an ordinance.
ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR 127876, December 17, 1999
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1)
the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent
to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries
and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and
(2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the
CARL.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of
invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated.
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due
process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police
power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived
of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking
under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process
of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process
be observed in the taking of private property.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to
the landowner by "personal delivery or registered mail." Whether the
landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may
be sent by personal delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish.
Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic
corporation before the DARAB and the regular courts are served on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These
persons are those through whom the private domestic corporation or
partnership is capable of action.
Service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and
know what he should do with any legal papers served on him, and bring home
to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. Petitioner's evidence does
not show the official duties of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of petitioner's
haciendas.
LTO vs. CITY OF BUTUAN
GR No. 131512, January 20, 2000

The LGU cannot issue license and permit and collect fees for the operation of
tricycle. LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of
tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. A franchise
is defined to be a special privilege to do certain things conferred by government
on an individual or corporation and which does not belong to citizens generally
of common right. On the other hand, to register means to record formally and
exactly, to enroll, or to enter precisely in a list or the like, and a driver’s license
is the certificate or license issued by the government which authorizes a person
to operate a motor vehicle. The devolution of the functions of the DOTC,
performed by the LTFRB, to the LGUs, as so aptly observed by the solicitor
general is aimed at curbing the alarming in on case of accidents in national
highways involving tricycles. It has been the perception that local governments
are in good position to achieve the end desired by the law making body because
of their proximity to the situation that can enable them to address that serious
concern better than the national government.
Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of
sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by
delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent
powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities
just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and welfare.
Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in
order to support its existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although
correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does not
necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition
and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective
concepts, character, scopes and limitations.
The power over tricycles granted under the Local Government Code to LGUs is
the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation
thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section
133(1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect
of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor
vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions
of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police
power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by
insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of
drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute
must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the
extant body of laws.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA
GR No. 199669, January 20, 2009
An ordinance which prohibits short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila is
not a valid exercise of police power.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align
with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.
The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights.
The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons
engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it
prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even
unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit
patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash
rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
SOURTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION vs. DSWD
GR No. 199669, April 25, 2017
A law granting 20% sales discount for senior citizens and PWDs is not an
exercise of eminent domain but of a police power. To begin with, the issue of
just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had already been
made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the State in
the imposition of senior citizen discount was its police power. Unlike in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in
wielding police power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved,
but only an imposition of burden.
There are five circumstances must be present in order to qualify "taking" as an
exercise of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private
property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant
or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Bill of Rights – the series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil
and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the powers
of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. It is
designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles. These provisions are generally self-executing.
Civil rights – rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country or, in a
wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization
or administration of government.
Political rights – refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of the government.
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW – A law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgement only after trial.
ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS
1. Substantive due process – this serves as a restriction of government laws
and rule-making powers. It has the following requisites:
a. the interest of the public, in general, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the intervention of the State.
b. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.
2. Procedural due process – this serves as a restriction on actions of judicial
and quasi-judicial agencies of the government. It has the following
requisites:
a. An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
b. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the
proceeding;
c. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
d. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
ADMINSTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision.
AMERICAN INTER FASHION CORPORATION vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
GR No. 92422, May 23, 1991
Issue: Whether the cancellation of export quotas of the private respondent
constitutes violation of the latter’s due process of law?
Ruling: YES. Contrary to the petitioner's posture, the record clearly manifests
that in cancelling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated
the private respondent's constitutional right to due process. Before the
cancellation in 1984, the private respondent had been enjoying export quotas
granted to it since 1977. In effect the private respondent's export quota
allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property
right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process
only to hurriedly confer it on another.
Thus, in the case of Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation v. Ongpin (141 SCRA
437, 450 [1986]), the Court stated:
In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side
before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended.
While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges
which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been
accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with
property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the
continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but
also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner
and their families.
CHAVEZ vs. ROMULO
GR No. 157036, June 9, 2004
Issue: Whether an act of cancelling existing permits for the guns to be carried
outside residences and banning the same violates the right to property of the
licensed gun owner?
Ruling: NO. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a
constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. In evaluating a due process
claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or
property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing
a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right.
Consequently, a Permit to Carry Firearms outside Residences, just like
ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does
not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A
licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit
to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might
be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract,
and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of
Rights. The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always
revocable.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 131719, May 25, 2004
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our
constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the
right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary
and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable
wrong. Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate
subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when
their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions,
the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course
be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property,
the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To
pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process
clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power,
of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.
Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical
exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required
to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional
Regulation Commission has begun to require previously licensed doctors and
other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-
trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for
renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an
unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So
long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards
no such deprivation exists.
DUNCAN vs. GLAXO
GR No. 162994, September 17, 2004
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying the employees of
competitor companies is valid. It is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from
competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry. The prohibition against personal or
marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down
the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against
the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and
procedures.
Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and
enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to
the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does
not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD
GR No. 197676, February 4, 2014
A law which requires property owners to engage the services of licensed real
estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their property is not violative
of due process clause.
There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment
of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as
property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services
of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their
properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory
measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid
exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their conduct affects
the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, public health and welfare and public morals. In any case, where the
liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore the
settled practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the
practice of various trades or professions.
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks
of real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical
standards as real property transactions are "susceptible to manipulation and
corruption, especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons working
under an ineffective regulatory system." The new regulatory regime aimed to
fully tap the vast potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to
our gross domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a vital role in
spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence,
and in promoting overall national progress." The Court, thus, found R.A. No.
9646 a valid exercise of the State’s police power.
BANCO ESPAÑOL FILIPINO vs. PALANCA
GR No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
The failure of the clerk of court to mail a copy of the summons and complaint
to the defendant is not violates the latter’s due process of law.
As applied to a judicial proceeding, the requirement of due process is
satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must
be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;
and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a non-resident, some notification
of the proceedings must be given to the defendant. Under statutes generally
prevailing, this notification commonly takes the form of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and the sending of notice, by mail, by which
means the owner is admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings. The provisions of law providing for notice of this character must
be complied with.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a non-resident defendant, the court is
required to make an order for the clerk to mail a copy of the summons and
complaint to the defendant at his last place of residence if known. In the
present case, an order was made directing the clerk to mail the required copy
to the defendant at Amoy China. No evidence appeared of record showing that
such notice had in fact been mailed by the clerk, but publication was regularly
made in a periodical as the law requires. The making of the order by the court
constituted a compliance with law, in so far as necessary to constitute due
process of law, and that if the clerk failed to send the notice, his dereliction in
the performance of his duty was an irregularity which did not constitute an
infringement of the provision of the Philippine Bill declaring that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
BAUTISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 157219, May 28, 2004
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings
but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due
process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard.
If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the
constitutional guarantee.
RURAL BANK OF BUHI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. L-61689, June 20, 1988
The act of Monetary Board of Central Bank to place a rural bank under
receivership without prior notice is not violative of due process.
It will be observed from the provision of Section 29 of RA No. 265 that there is
no requirement whether express or implied, that a hearing be first conducted
before a banking institution may be placed under receivership.
The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the appointment of a
receiver may be made by the Monetary Board without notice and hearing but
its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure the protection of the banking
institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a
prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent
to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing:
bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In
the process, fortunes may be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the
gamut of the entire banking community.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 93891, March 11, 1991
An ex parte order to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is
a prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater which exceeds the maximum level allowed by law does not violates
the due process clause.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous
discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland
waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over
the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course,
including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has
taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and
animal life, commonly designated as the police power.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The
Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled
Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in
any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting
its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not
constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses
and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to
its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the
requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
LAO GI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 81798, December 29, 1989
The due process of law is applicable to deportation proceedings. Although a
deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional
right of such person to due process should not be denied.
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must
be conducted to determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the
respondent for deportation. The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without
warrant and service of warrants should be in accordance likewise with Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; search warrants issued by the
CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure;
and so the matter of bail, motion to quash, and trial, among others. Fealty to
the prescribed rules of procedure in deportation cases shall insure a speedy,
fair and just dispensation of justice.
PEOPLE vs. DELA PIEDRA
GR No. 121777, January 24, 2001
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions, is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a
vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on
trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
However, the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
The Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by
applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent
of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose
obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched
in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void
for vagueness.
An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it
furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if
men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all
the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those
intrusted therewith.
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001
The Plunder Law does not violates the rights of the accused to due process for
being void-for-vagueness.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a
standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against
the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the
doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it
would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other
statutes.
The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute.
YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
GR No. 74457, March 20, 1987
An executive order which authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries violates the due
process of law.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. The Court have consistently declared
that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the
law of the land," which described as "the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to
be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials
who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process
clause into a worn and empty catchword.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police
power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power
is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and
property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now
invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the
basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the
reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand
that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small
farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need
for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government
would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
preserve them.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which
was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard
in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, the Court hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
OPLE vs. TORRES
GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998
Administrative Order No. 308 which adopts a National Computerized
Identification Reference System violates a person’s right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by
some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may
interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling
authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of
the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks
to prevent.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about
themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given
the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive
the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE – It means all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights and conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical persons are entitled to this
guarantee, but for the latter, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their
property is concerned.
REQUISITES OF A VALID CLASSIFICATION
1. The classification must have a substantial distinction which make for real
differences;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It must equally apply to all members of the same class.
PEOPLE vs. CAYAT
GR No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
An Act which makes unlawful for any person who is a member of non-Christian
tribe to buy, receive, possess or drink any beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors
other than the so-called native wines and liquors is not violative of equal
protection clause.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to
be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based
upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but
upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes'
refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the
peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases
of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural
equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the
classification thus established.
It is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to
buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer,
wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines
and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It
has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court
disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian
tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the
efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions
exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the
assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing
influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of
a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from
a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain
number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an
argument against the equality of its application.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS vs.
QUISUMBING
GR No. 128845, June 1, 2000
An act granting foreign-hires teachers certain benefits which are not accorded
to local-hires violates due process of law.
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The
School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to
rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of
equal work for equal pay.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore,
has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must
yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are
contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these
stipulations.
In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to
justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be
an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School
of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
 ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL vs. ORMOC CITY
GR No. L-23794, February 17, 1968
An ordinance imposing municipal tax on any and all products of centrifugal
sugar milled exported by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. violates equal protection
clause.
Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does
not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by
the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only
sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the
tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject
to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
LIM vs. PACQUING
GR No. 115044, January 27, 1995
A law which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local
governments is not violative of equal protection clause.
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the
decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification
or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply
because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out
by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were
revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged
violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as
early as 1975, almost twenty years ago.
DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC
GR No. 129118, July 19, 2000
A law which prohibits election officers to hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four years is not violative of equal protection clause.
The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions: (1) the classification must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) the classification must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) the classification must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated
requirements. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the
impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity
with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
In Lutz vs. Araneta, it was held that "the legislature is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none". This is so for under
inclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true
that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed
to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case,
it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law
would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under
Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized
representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that
without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the
registration of voters can hardly be carried out.
TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999
A law which limits the grants and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentive
under RA No. 7227 to the business enterprises and residents within the
fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone does not violate equal
protection clause.
The Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO
97-A. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it
discriminatory. Rather, the Court find real and substantive distinctions
between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval
Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.
It was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some
incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific
area which the government intends to transform and develop from its status
quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and
commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as
operational bases for their businesses and industries. Undeniably, big
investors are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic
growth in the country and to generate employment opportunities for the
Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. The
classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the
legal maxim goes, the intent of a statute is the law.
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are
being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured
area and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand,
we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the
other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic
impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this
time the business activities outside the secured area are not likely to have any
impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military
base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then,
hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives
accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will
be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the secured area, which
is already fenced off, to prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise or
smuggling.
The classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to
existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a
self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center in the
area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment
center and the areas outside it.
The classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses
within the secured area. The residents, being in like circumstances or
contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not
categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges
granted and in obligations required. All told, the Court holds that no undue
favor or privilege was extended. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was
not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. To repeat, it was based, rather,
on fair and substantive considerations that were germane to the legislative
purpose.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. BSP
GR No. 148208, December 15, 2004
Section 15(c), Article II of the New Central Bank Act which provides that the
compensation and wage structure of employees whose position fall under
salary grade 20 and above are exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law violates the equal protection clause of the law/
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not
prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable. Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification
must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption
of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs
lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the
end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and
the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely
arbitrary in the legislative sense.
However, while R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the
legislature’s power, the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-
file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by
a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one
set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time
may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a
statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity,
even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.
Courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in
determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute non-
discriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it
is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
The Court sees no difference between a law which denies equal protection and
a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination,
it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be
adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the
effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file
of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to
the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner’s injury, even
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket
exemption from the SSL in 2000. The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-
and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were
substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the
continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic
Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time,
the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made
indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the
rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not
only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class.
The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot
be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust
distinctions between persons who are without differences.
In fine, the policy determination argument may support the inequality of
treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot
justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs
who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the
second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the
oppressive results of Congress inconsistent and unequal policy towards the
BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second
challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No.
7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by
Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal
protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-
file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the
exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions
so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the
seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been
recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental
entities.
QUINTO vs. COMELEC
GR No. 189698, February 22, 2010
The different treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding
elective offices does not violate equal protection clause.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with,
namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
All the requisites are present. An election is the embodiment of the popular
will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit
of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for
which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to
preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also
thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
GR Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010
EO No. 1 violates equal protection clause as it singling out the previous
administration as its sole object of investigation.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are: in this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
GARCIA vs. DRILON
GR No.179267, June 25, 2013
The Anti-VAWC Law violates equal protection clause as it provides protection
against violence and abuse to women and children?
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread of
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law.
The enactment of RA No. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought
about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW,
addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on
women does not discriminate against men. Therefore, petitioner’s contention
that RA No. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-make,” “husband-
bushing” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party
to CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy – it is hereby declared that the State
values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for
human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to
address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which
the Philippines is a party.
The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and
security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse.
IMBONG vs. OCHOA
GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014
RH Law does not violate the equal protection clause as it discriminates against
the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(l) explains, the “promotion and stabilization of the population growth
rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.”
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge
couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly
humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks
to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it
to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate
attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial
distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand,
substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and
private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially
with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education.
BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
GR No. 192531, November 12, 2014
The ECC ruling that limits to legitimate parents the claim of death benefits
violates the equal protection clause.
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront
to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule,
as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits
under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To the Court’s
mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate
against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by
the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably
failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the
law being implemented. The Court see no pressing government concern or
interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of
unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other.
On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD
626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate
benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better
served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA
GR No. 83988, May 24, 1990
Checkpoints are constitutional. Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under
exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is
on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this
proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are
removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender
or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite
similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the
commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter.
REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT
1. There must be a probable cause;
2. The probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation by the complainant and the witness
he may produce; and
3. The warrant particularly described the place to be search or the person or
things to be seized.
PROBABLE CAUSE – such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.
ALVAREZ vs. CFI
GR No. L-45358, January 29, 1937
The search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance based upon the
affidavit of a person who had no personal knowledge of the facts which were
to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant is unconstitutional.
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to
a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it
before the court.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of
rights, provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not
issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized." It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not only
probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search
warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause.
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that
the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath
was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question
and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are
illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner
was subjected.
Moreover, a search warrant application may not be supported by affidavits
made by the witnesses to be presented. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58
provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine
under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application.
It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he
did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative
necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose
of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore,
if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of
the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the
judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. The Court conclude,
therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only
on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
PEOPLE vs. VELOSO
GR No. L-23051, October 20, 1925
A search warrant issued in the name of John Doe is valid. A search warrant
must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must
be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process known to the law,
the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none
which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify under it.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police
should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be
hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of
performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to
technicality or far-fetched judicial interference.
BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF
GR No. L-64261, December 26, 1984
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing
officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant.
This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant
on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge
who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, and it
has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the
official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched."
Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: (a)
property subject of the offense; (b) property stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (c) property used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense. This rule does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection b of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be
seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one
other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search
and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient
that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession
of the property sought to be seized was alleged to have in relation to the articles
and property seized under the warrants.
PEOPLE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 126379, June 26, 1998
For a search warrant to be valid, it does not suffice that it be based on probable
cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the
manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so
described.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated
in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or
had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons
or things to be seized.
CORRO vs. LISING
GR No. L-69899, July 15, 1985
No search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized (Sec. 3, Art. IV
of the 1973 Constitution). Under Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause may be defined as such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions,
and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper. Thus, an
application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged
subversive materials published or intended to be published by the publisher
and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. Mere generalization will not
suffice.
A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described
in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be committed.
SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR
 GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility
of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
LIM, SR. vs. JUDGE FELIX
GR Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991
A judge must not issue a warrant of arrest relying solely on the certification
and recommendation of the prosecutor that a probable cause exists.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case
where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes
depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has
to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested
in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He
should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's
probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is
not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible
officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses
that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of
arrest.
LAUD vs. PEOPLE
GR No. 199032, November 19, 2014
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that
no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search
warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him
nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law —
by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure;
or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued. If the articles desired to be
seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said
offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy
merely to strengthen such evidence.
PEOPLE vs. CASTILLO
GR No. 204419, November 7, 2016
A municipal trial court has the authority to issue a warrant involving an
offense in which it has no jurisdiction. The requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he
or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a motion to quash a
search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such
as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or
described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.
Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an application
for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) any court within whose
territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed; and (b) for compelling reasons
stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the
criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
GR: Search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid
warrant.
XPNs:
1. Consented search;
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee,
against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver,
it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
2. Stop and frisk;
Under a “stop-and-frisk” situation, the police officer should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check
the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapon. The
apprehending officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed
about him. Therefore, it should be emphasized that a search and seizure
should precede the arrest for the principle to apply.
3. Search incidental to lawful arrest;
Under Section 12, Rule 126 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The purpose of
allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within reach."
It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect
(1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person
they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the
arrestee.
Requisites: As a rule, the arrest must precede the search. The process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.
The warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
4. Search of vessels or aircraft;
It is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a
mobile ship, or an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles, since they can
quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must
be sought.
5. Search of moving vehicle;
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior
to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
6. Inspection of building and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations;
7. Searches under plain view
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest
outside the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate control.
This is so because objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to
supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure.
As a general rule, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a
warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object.
REQUISITES:
a. A prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are;
c. The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d. Plain view justified were seizure of evidence without further search.
8. Search and seizures under exingent and emergency circumstances.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE – Evidence illegally obtained shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. This is also called as the “fruits of the
poisonous tree”.
NOLASCO vs. PAÑO
GR No. L-69803, January 30, 1987
A search by virtue of a void warrant constitutes a warrantless search and
seizure. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.
It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure
of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It
is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general.
PEOPLE vs. CFI
GR No. L-41686, November 17, 1980
The seizure of the merchandise in a moving vehicle without search warrant
does not violates constitutional immunity against unreasonable search and
seizure.
The State holds on the proposition that the rules governing search and seizure
had been liberalized when a moving vehicle is the object of the search and the
necessity of a prior warrant has been relaxed on the ground of practicality,
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge — a requirement which borders on impossibility in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity.
Searches and seizures without warrant are valid if made upon probable cause,
that is, upon a belief reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law
is subject to seizure and destruction. In such a situation, what appears to the
measure of legality of the seizure was formulated in this sense: "that the seizing
officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the
automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is
being illegally transported."
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property
and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting
under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpation when attempted. The right to privacy is an essential condition to
the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual,
whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. The constitutional
inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and
seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than
the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any
interference allowable can only be for the best of causes and reasons.
PEOPLE vs. LO HO WING
GR No. 88017, January 21, 1991
The search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three well-recognized exceptions thereto: (1) a
search incidental to lawful arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view. The circumstances of the case clearly show
that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore,
a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-
accused.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
PEOPLE vs. EVARISTO
G.R. No. 93828, December 11, 1992
For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search
warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that
searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an
absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these exceptions is the
seizure of evidence in plain view. Thus, it is recognized that objects
inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence.
MALACAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 123595, December 12, 1997
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions such as (1) in
fraglante delicto; (2) hot pursuit; and (3) the person to be arrested is an escaped
prisoner.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a
"stop and frisk."
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines
the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in
a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for
a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or
that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with
the means of escaping or committing violence.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light
of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.
PEOPLE vs. GARCIA
GR No. 102009-10, July 6, 1994
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the
instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a
search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.
PEOPLE vs. JOHNSON
GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused appellant’s
passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures taken
during that time are also inadmissible, as are the. girdle taken from her, and
her signature thereon. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property, namely: (1) subject of the offense; (2) stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (3) used or intended
to be used as the means of committing an offense. Accordingly, the above items
seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.
David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
NO. The exercise of emergency powers (Art. VI, Sec. 23, par. 2), such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest (i.e. newspaper) requires a delegation from Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in
the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to
the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
 (1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.

The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Art. VI Section 17 states that the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it
refers to Congress, not the President.

Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional
provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of
our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits
his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks
wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.

officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street
where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened
door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-
mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized
are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since
the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.

The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest.