Professional Documents
Culture Documents
POWER,
AND WORLD
ORDER
SogialForces.
1n_
the Maklng
of Hlstory
ROBERTw. gox
Library of CongressCatalogingin-Publication
Data
PREFACE ix
THEME 1
Part 1:
The Social Relations of Production
CHAPTER 1: THE DIMENSIONS OF PRODUCTION
RELATIONS 17
Part 2:
States, World Orders, and Production Relations
CHAPTER 5: THE COMING OF THE LIBERAL ORDER 111
CHAPTER 6: THE ERA OF RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 151
CHAPTER 7: PAX AMERICANA 211
Part 3:
Production Relations in the Making of the Future
CHAPTER 8: THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS: IMPACT
ON STATE AND WORLD-ORDER STRUCTURES 273
CHAPTER 9: MUTATIONS IN THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF ACCUMULATION 309
viii CONTENTS
NOTES"
355
BIBLIOGRAPHY 399
INDEX
405
463
489
PREFACE
Theymaybenohappier
withit nowthantheywerethen,
but
theexperience
hasbeensalutory
forme.JohnGerard
Ruggie
has
excelledin his editorstaskof reinforcingValidcriticism of others,
adding
his own,andcajolinga sometimes
reluctantauthorto
exhaustthe full potentialitiesof a book.JessieRankinCoxnot
onlyassisted
in theresearch
forthisprojectovermoreyearsthan
either of us careto rememberand helped to translatemy prose
into morecomprehensible
English;shealsoat somecrucialmo-
ments made me see the virtue in some of my critics comments.
KateWittenbergandLeslieBiallerworkedoverthe manuscript
with aneditorssympatheticunderstanding of anauthorsauton-
omyandmadeit moreaccessible to thereader.
I owea specialdebtto thelateBernardGronert.Heit was
who rst encouragedmeto submitthebookprojectto Columbia
UniversityPressandwholatersuggested to Jeffrey
Harrodand
methattheprojectwastoobigfor a singlevolume.Withouthis
sponsorshipandunderstanding
it isdifficulttoseehowwecould
havesuccessfully
developed
andcompletedthejob.
Several
peoplewhohavehadnothingdirectlyto dowith
this book bear neverthelessa shareof responsibility for having
helpedanerstwhile
international
civil servant
alonganunortho-
dox routeinto academiclife and therebybroughtaboutthe con-
ditions in which such a book could be written. I would like to
mentionin particular
DavidA. Morse,
whoasdirector-general
of
the ILO, understoodthat freedomis beingableat the crucial
moment to act in accordance with an inner necessity; Jacques
FreymondandKennethThompson, who openedthe wayto my
rst f11ll-timeteachingexperienceat the GraduateInstituteof
International Studies,Geneva;William Fox, Leland Goodrich,
and HerbertDeane,who were my sponsorsat ColumbiaUniver-
sity;JohnHolmes,uponwhoseinitiativeI returnedto Canada
aftersomethirty yearsabroad;and,nally, HaroldK. Jacobson,
who has beenfriend, intellectual stimulus, and model of schol-
arlyconduct
thesemanyyears.
I wishto recordherethesense
of
obligationI bearto eachof them.
York University,
Toronto,
THEME
totheconditions
notchosen bythemselves
underwhichpeople
will makethehistoryofthefuture.Tendencies
in thestructural
transformation
of statesthat affectproductionrelationsarecon-
sidered
in relationto theweakening
ofahegemonic
worldorder.
Tendencies
in production
relations
thatsettheconditions
under
whichpolitical
poweris exercised
areconsidered
withinthe
frameworkof the changingstructureof accumulation.
Thesetendenciesare not unidirectional.They contain
theirowncontradictions.
Theworldeconomic
crisisthatbegan
in the1970sis examined
to seewhattransformations
in structures
ofproduction,
states,
andworldorder
theyportend.
Theworld
economiccrisisappears
asa thresholdaphaseof transition
between
thedenablestructures
oftherecentpastandtheasyet
unclearstructures
of theemerging
future.Thosefuturestructures
will bemade
bythehuman
material
ofhistory,
shaped
asit isby
itsownpast.
It istting,then,toendwithalookatthishuman
material
in itscollective
aspectat
classformation
andthepros-
pects
ofpoliticization
ofclass
toward
theformation
ofnewstate
structures.
To assertthe centralityof production,
indeed,leadsdi-
rectlyto thematter
of social
classes.
Production
organization
creates
thedistinctions
of powerbetween
employer
andworker,
lordandpeasant,
thatformthebasis
forclass
differences,
but
otherfactors
enterintotheformation
or nonformation
of real
historical
classes.
Salient
among
thesein recent
historyhavebeen
political
parties
andotheragencies
ofcollective
action
thatcan
evoke and channel class consciousness.
Nowtomakeclassanalysis
aprincipalfeature
ofthestudy
ofhistorical
change
mayseem
oldfashioned.
Most-favored
the-
oriesin thesocialscience
of advanced
capitalist
societies
elimi-
natedclasssometimeago;politics,it wasthought,wasabout
individualactorsandassociations
of individuals,theirpercep-
tionsandinteractions
in decision-making
processes
conditioned
bypolitical
cultures.Some non-Marxists
conceded
thatclass
mighthaveexplained
conflict
andchange
intheearly
industrial
pastbuthadbecome irrelevant
in morerecent
times.
Some
Marxists
haveevenjoinedin theconspiracy
toremove
classfrom
thepanoply
of contemporary
historical
explanation.
Rudolph
Bahro,
a radicalcriticfromwithinEastern
European
socialism,
THEME 3
Complexes
ofproduction
relations,
classes,
and
historic
blocs do not exist in isolated national compartments. They are
THEME 7
cooperation,
because
cooperation
carries
theconnotation
ofhar-
monywhereasthegroupsboundtogetherin the productionpro-
cessmanifestconict at leastas frequently as harmonyin their
relations.
Thethird aspectis the distributionof therewardsof pro-
duction.In part,thisis determined
bycustom, orin otherwords
bythestructureofsocialpower,i.e.,bythefirstaspectmentioned
above,which dictatesthat somerolesaremorerewardedthan
others.In part,thedistributionis determined
by thepowerstrug-
glewithin the productionprocess,
i.e.,by the secondaspect,
throughwhichsomegroups maybeabletoincreasetheirrewards
relative to others.Lookedat over time, both factorsarereducible
to thepowerstruggle,
sincethestructure
of socialpowercanbe
thoughtof asthe cumulativeconsequences,takenas a starting
point,of previousstruggles
amongsocialgroups.
The three aspectsanalytically distinguishedhereaccu-
mulatedsocialpowerthat determines the natureof production,
the structureof authorityasmoldedby the internaldynamicsof
the production process,and the distributive consequencesare
dialecticallyrelatedin a singlehistoricalwhole:the socialrela-
tions of production.Within this whole, contradictionsarise
amongthethreeaspects.A sense of deprivation
in rewardsby
onegroupof producers,
forinstance,
leadsthisgroupto struggle
effectively
forgreater
controloftheproduction process,
andthis
resultsover time in a changein the structureof socialpower.
The termsproductionrelations,socialrelationsof pro-
duction,andpowerrelationsof productionaredifferentwaysof
expressing
thesamerelationshipdifferent
wayseachof which
containsa differentemphasis.
Productionrelationsis thebroad-
estterm,includingtherelationshipbetweenthepeopleinvolved
and the world of nature,i.e., technology,aswell asthe relations
betweenthe variousgroupsof peopleandthe legalandinstitu-
tional formsto which theserelationsgiveriseandwhich structure
them. The term social relations of production focusesattention
morespecicallyon thepatternor congurationof socialgroups
engaged
in theprocess,
andthetermpowerrelations
of produc-
tion focuses on the dominant-subordinate nature of this pattern
of social relations. The three terms all refer essentially to the same
basicrelationshipand areusedin this studynot exactlyinter-
SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION 13
TI-IE DIMENSIONS
OF PRODUCTION
RELATIONS
POWER RELATIONS
Thesocialandpoliticalpowercontextof productiondetermines
the what and the how of production. In each mode there is a
dominant
andsubordinate
groupofpeople.
Thedominant
group
controlsproduction; the subordinateworksunder its control. To
explainthisbasiccleavage,
it is necessary
to referto factorswhose
18 SOCIAL
RELATIONS
OFPRODUCTION
origins
lieoutside
oftheimmediate
production
process
inthe
ambient society.
_Thedominant
andsubordinate
groups
in aproduction
process
are
drawn
from
thesocial
milieu,
which
includes
social
classes.
Production
takes
place
inapreexisting
context
ofsocial
power.
Thedominant
group
isusually
drawn
predominantly
fromoneclass
andthesubordinate
fromother
classes.
Thisstate-
ment
leads,
ofcourse,
toakindofcircular
reasoning,
because
the
production
process
itself
generates
class
distinctions
andclass
privileges
anddisadvantages.
Thepoint
isthatwhen
onerst
begins
tostudy
amode
ofsocial
relations
ofproduction,
it is
discovered
in anexisting
society
witha class
structure.
The
classes
inthatsociety
arehistorical
realities
produced
bycollec-
tiveexperiences.
Theyoriginated
inproduction
inprevious
his-
torybuttranscended
thespecic
activity
ofproduction
tobecome
human aggregates,
collective
waysoffeeling
andofacting.
The
social
powerofdominant
classes
maybethought
ofasoriginally
grounded
inthecontrol
ofproductionthe
material
basis
ofall
societiesand
asbeingtheaccumulation
of production
power
fromthepast.
Resources
derived
fromproduction
havebeen
translated
overtimeintopositions
ofsocial
inuence
andpres-
tige.
These
dominant
social
groups
draw
upon
resources
of
wealth,
status,
andprestige
thatarenotimmediately
derived
from
theproduction
process.
Thesubordinate
groups,
fortheirpart,
consist
ofmembers
ofclasses
formed
orinformation,
ortheyare
declassed
persons,
e.g.,
former
peasants
turned
wagelaborers.
A
working class
inprocess
offormation
hasagreater
powerpoten-
tialwithwhichtoconfront
thedominant
group
than
anatomized
assemblage
ofdeclassed
peasants
has.
Ontheother
hand,
awork-
ingclass
that
comprises
only
anelite
ofskilled
workers,
separated
intheir
unions
andworking
conditions
fromother
working
people
whohave lessemployment
security
andfromother
subaltern
groups
likeself-employed
farmers,
may
bemore
inclined
toseek
amodus
vivendi
withthedominant
groups.
Theclass
context
of
thesociety, accordingly,
affects
thepower
positions
withinpro-
duction relations.
Political power
isthepowertocontrol
themachinery
of
thestateortoinuence
government
policy.Political
power
may
bederived
directly
frompower
over
production
combined
with
DIMENSIONS OF RELATIONS 19
bytechnology.
The
means
ofallocating
labor
have
included
direct
coer-
20 SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
exactions
fromBalkanpeasants
thannearbyEuropean
feudalism
was,butby theseventeenthcentury,asthetideturnedagainst
the Ottomanempire,it hadbecomemuchmoreharsh.Force
remade custom.
Custominuences the notionsof relativereturnsto differ-
ent kinds of work underboth administrativedispositionand
markettransaction
systems.
Sophisticated
methods
maybede-
signedfor evaluating
jobcontents,
but peoplearestill much
inuencedby customary
differentials.
Thesecustoms
are,how-
ever,inuencedby differentculturalcontexts.Someentertainers
in present-day
America
andEurope
command
extremely
high
incomes.The market rewardsthem as stars. In China, opera
singers
incomesareverymodest
indeed;theyaremiddle-school
graduates,
situatedin anincomehierarchy
according
to their
educational attainment.
INTERSUBJECTIVEIDEAS:
ETHICS AND RATIONALITIES
OF PRODUCTION
Participants
in a modeofsocialrelations
ofproduction
share
a
mentalpictureofthemodein ideasofwhatisnormal,
expected
behaviorandin howpeoplearrange
theirliveswith regardto
work and income.Peasants
think of their lives differentlythan
wageworkersdo.Casualwagelaborers
thinkoftheirlivesdif-
ferently
fromskilled,
unionized
workers.
Middle-
andupperlevel
bureaucratsin bigpublicorprivatecorporations
haveyetanother
setoflifetimeexpectationsboundupwiththeirwork.Thesesets
of collectiveimagesconstitutethe intersubjective
meanings
of
the different modes.
Of morelimited focusbut closelyrelatedto thesedifferent
intersubjective
meanings
arecharacteristic
attitudes
toward
work
or the ethicsof production relations.
In discussing
this it is usefulto recallsomeof the distinc-
tions that havebeenmadein socialtheory.Onesuchdistinction
is that betweena communityin which socialbondsandobliga-
tionsareregarded
asnaturalandarisingoutofrelationships
that
transcendproduction,
e.g.,family,kinship,andtraditional
hier-
DIMENSIONS OF RELATIONS 23
INSTITUTIONS
strangers
to the factoryor the town in which it is located.In
Scandinavia,centralizednegotiationsare conductedwith such
sophisticationby union and managementtechniciansthat the
resultingcollectiveagreements
aresometimesscarcelyintellig-
ible to rank-and-le workers.
Self-management
is a form of institutionalizationthat re-
jectsbothexternalandinternalbureaucratization.
Individualself-
employmentof its verynatureis a nonbureaucraticformof self-
management. Syndicalism,an old tradition within the labor
movement, has in current times attracted renewed interest (most
commonly under the label of workers control) as a reaction
againstbureaucratizationanda demandfor moredirectpartici-
pationof workersin determining
theirownconditions.
Itscurrent
manifestationsvary from the shop stewardsrevolt againstthe
conventionalleadershipof the TradesUnion Congress(TUC)in
Britain, to the demandsfor a self-management
form of socialism
by the~Confédération
frangaisedemocratique
du travail (CFDT)
in France,and also to someof the demandsof Solidarnoscin
Poland.
A hiatus may developbetweenformal institutions and the
real structureof relations.For example,whereformal institutions
suggest
delegated
bargaining,
the realrelationshipcouldtakeon
the characterof corporatismif institutionalizationof union-man-
agementnegotiationbecamestabilizedand routine,if external
bureaucratization increasedwith the inclusion of union and man-
agement
personnelin government-appointed
economiccouncils
and other advisoryboards,and if the conictual elementin the
relationship becamesubordinatedto a doctrine of common or
publicinterest.Conversely,
in lateFrancoSpaintheformalstruc-
turesof corporatismhad begunto operatein sucha mannerasto
provideofcial coverfor unofcial negotiationscarriedon by
illegalworkersinternalfactorycommissions,in fact a form of
delegatedbargaining.In Yugoslavexperience, institutionsthat
are self-managingin form tend in substanceto cloak the reality
of enterprisecorporatism.The important thing is not to accept
institutional structures at their face value but to inquire into the
objective-subjective
natureof socialrelationsunderlyingformal
institutions.
DIMENSIONS OF RELATIONS 29
RECIPROCAL
RELATIONS
OF
FACTOR
Figure1 summarizesthe reciprocalrelationshipof the objective,
subjective,and institutional factorsin a mode of socialrelations
of production.Severalexamplesmayhelp to illustrate how these
relationships work dynamically to transform a mode.
One illustration can be provided in the transformation of
peasantproduction under Europeanfeudalism. The objective
powerof thedominantclasswasderivedfromits controlof land.
In theory, the rights in land of the lord were conditional; in
practice,becauseof the fragmentationof political authority,they
became virtually absolute, as they indeed later became in civil
law. Access by the peasantto land was conditional upon service
to the lord, though in practice it became a customary right.
Subjectively, arrangements consecrated by custom were
Institutional Forms
Direct domination
(absenceof institutions)
Corporatist
Delegated
bargaining
Selfmanagement
30 SOCIALRELATIONSOF PRODUCTION
overcast
by religion.Institutionally,
themodewasregulatedby
customarylaw,whichin principlewasto beinterpreted
in con-
formitywith divinelawbutin practice wasadministered
bythe
lord. -
A shift in the relationship of forces came from several
sources.
Demographic declinein thefourteenthcentury[e.g.,the
BlackDeath)reducedthe productivityof land andthusthe in-
come of the lord. Internecinewarfare [e.g.,the Hundred Years
War)weakened
thenobilityasaclassastheystruggled
witheach
other to control land. The growth of towns in westernEurope
offeredan avenueof escapefor peasantsfrom feudal exactions.
Correspondingly, the subjective
sanctionswerealsoweakened
particularly
in thewest.Religious movements incliningintoher-
esychallenged the authorityof the socialorderthe poverty
doctrinesof thespiritualFranciscans,
theDolciniansof northern
Italy,andlatertheAnabaptists
in Germany
andBohemia.
The
existenceof the towns and of free citizenswithin them provided
an alternativeimageof socialorder,displacingthe feudalorder
from the absolute to the relative.
Different results ensued in easternand western Europe. In
thewest,aweakening
of thepowerof thenobilityanda strength-
eningofthepowerofpeasants
ledtoaneasing offeudalexactions
anda growthoffreehold
landtenure,i.e.,in practice
to agrowth
of small-holderfarming.In the east,wheretowns offeredno
alternativelife for absconding
peasants,
the lords successfully
imposed
amoreonerous
serfdom.
In Germany,
midwaybetween
theseextremes,the ProtestantReformationtried to stemthe peas-
anttideby consecrating
thelordsasthescourge
of rebellion[in
thepeasantwarof 1525),butthoughthepeasants
weremilitarily
defeated,
thesubjective
legitimacy
ofthemodewasshattered.
Analogiescanbe drawnto the weakeningof otherland-
basedclassesin the Third World of the late twentieth century.
Theirplacein thestatehasbeenlessened
fromtheriseof other
commercial-industrialclasses,and the subjectivebeliefs under-
pinningtheir traditionalpowerhavewornthin, leavingthis
powerto restuponopenviolence towardwhichcivil authorities
may turn a blind eye.
DIMENSIONS OF RELATIONS 31
SIl\/[PLE
REPRODUCTION
Subsistence
The
subsistence
mode
isthe
oldest
formofsocial
produc-
tion.It comprised
theearliest
formsofhuntingandgathering
and
of settledcultivation in small self-sustainingcommunities.Work
in thesecommunitieswasorderedby kinship. In Polanyissense,
production relations
wereembedded in socialrelations
of a kin-
shipor lineage kind.In suchcommunities,
certainpeoplehave
authorityoverproduction andto anextentoverthedistribution
of the product,but thesepeoplecannotbe held to constitutea
dominantclass.Authority relationsare particularizedwithin
familiesandlineages. Thereareinequalitiesin that somefamily
unitsproducemoreor consume lessthanothers, buttheseine-
qualities
arenotthesystematic
distortions
ofdistribution
effected
byaclassstructure;
theyaretheconsequence ofagedistributions
or theincidenceof ill healthin particularfamiliesor suchcauses.
Themodemay,indeedvery oftendoes,producea surplusthat
is redistributed in some manner within the community, e.g., to
sustainthosewho do not produceenoughfor their ownfamilies
andasgiftsto symbolize
theauthorityofcommunity
leaders,
but
the surplusis not accumulation
for expansion.
The term natural economyhas often beenusedto desig-
nateproduction
systems
of antiquityandof someof themore
isolatedcommunitiesstudiedby anthropologistsin recenttimes.
Thereis little enoughof this naturaleconomyleft in the world
of the latetwentiethcentury.Indeed,a notedanthropologisthas
castigated
hisdisciplinefor contributing
to thenotionthatthere
existpeoples withouthistory,whereas fromthefteenthcen-
turyvirtuallyall peoples,
primitiveor otherwise, havebeenun-
ableto escape theimpactof expansive political,economic,
and
cultural forces?Thoughtouchedby theseglobal currents,some
SIMPLE REPRODUCTION 37
Peasant-Lord
The peasant-lord mode, by contrast with the subsistence,
is the result of a class structure. A dominant class extracts surplus
from a subordinate class of agricultural producers. This dominant
class looks after the reproduction of the social relations of the
mode but takes no part in agricultural production. The dominant
class acquires its position from military power, religious sanction,
or the power of money through peasant indebtedness. This pat-
tern of production relations was characteristic of precapitalist
civilizations, i.e., collectivities organized on a larger scale than
the small subsistence communities. The existence of some kind
of state is the principal feature distinguishing a class-ordered
from a kin-ordered production system.7
The historical origins of peasant-lord production were
many and various. Power relations in old-regime Chinese agri-
cultural production were basedon a combination of private prop-
erty in land and a state administration supported by taxation.
The Chinese gentry ofcial class had the dual base of land own-
ership plus tax revenues available to those who accededto ofcial
status through the examination system. Gentry-officials owned
most of the productive land closest to the main urban centers
and lived mainly as absentee landlords whose estates were
worked by peasanttenants. The ofcials were not, however, com-
pletely separated from the land but were linked through clan
connections with the rural areas.Tenant farmers working these
estatesconstituted a substantial proportion [perhaps one third)
of the population. More than half of the Chinese population was
composed of small-holding peasants, cultivating the less good
land farthest from the urban centers, and these bore the heaviest
tax burden. Usury was widespread, and so a nominal peasant
40 SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
peasants).
While
theterm
lord
has
aconnotation
suggestive
ofEu-
ropean or Japanesefeudalism, or of the agrarian bureaucracies of
other past civilizations, it is used here in a wider senseto cover
all forms of domination over peasant producers, many of which
in contemporary times lack any noble quality. It can refer, for
example, to a case where poor peasants deprived of sufcient
land and other resources to ensure their own survival fall under
the control of a large landowner, or of a moneylender, or of 2'
merchant trading at a distance in the peasantsproduce [e.g., ir.
the rice trade). The peasantthen works in conditions determined
by this new lord, who also determines the return the peasant
receives from his labor.
Like the subsistencemode, the peasant-lord mode has also
become vulnerable to external pressures. For long its mainstay
was the social and political power of the lords, which enabled
them to forge alliance with other powerful classes. During the
secondhalf of the twentieth century, this alliance has been weak-
ening and pressuresfrom the peasantry have been growing.
The traditional legitimacy of peasant-lord relations,
44 SOCIALRELATIONSOF PRODUCTION
vices,hasbeenundermined.
Theauthorityof thelordsandtheir
abilityto extractnowalmosteverywhererestsonviolenceand
repression of peasant
troublemakers
byillegalmethods tolerated
andoverlooked
by the state.Therehas,however,beena growth
of peasant-based
insurgency-latetwentieth-century
revolution-
arymovements havenearlyall beenin peasant
societies,
from
AlgeriathroughsouthernAfrica,to Indochinaand Central
Americawhich manifestly increasedthe coststo statesand
allied classesof supporting landlord dominance.Furthermore,
peasant-lord
cultivationhasbeenchallenged
by capitalistentre-
preneursas beingeconomically
inefcient.Agribusiness
and
commercialfarmerswant to clear lands of peasantsettlementto
cultivate with moderntechnologiesfor regionaland world mar-
kets.Former allies of the landlords havebecomemore inclined
to abandonlandlord claims or to facilitate buying the landlords
outandencouraging
themto investin other,moreefcientforms
of exploitation.
CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT
Capitalist development is a
process that was put together gradually over a period of some
ve centuries, beginning in western Europe from the fourteenth
century, before it became,in the nineteenth, a coherent expansive
force on a world scale. This expansive force at the mid-nine-
teenth-century point was in its competitive phase. From the late
nineteenth century, capitalist development entered a new, mo-
nopolistic phase. Each of these phaseswas associatedwith new
modes of social relations of production.
COMPETITIVE CAPITALISM
study.In part2,theemergence
ofanewformofstatetheliberal
state~willbe broughtto the fore as the critical factorin the
breakthroughof capitalistdevelopment.
Two modes of social relations of production becameof
specialimportance
in thetransition
fromtheoldregimeof trib-
ute-extracting
land-based
classpowerto an economydrivenfor-
wardby capitalaccumulationin the handsof expandingentre-
preneurs
andinvestors.
These
modes
wereself-employment
and
theenterpriselabormarket.Self-employmentis theconditionof
the independentsmall-scaleproducerusinghis own and his
familyslaborwith meansof productionin his own possession
forthepurpose
of marketing
hisproduce.
Self-employment
thus
went hand in hand with the early progressof commoditytrade.
In theenterprise-labor-market
mode,productionis by wagelabor
unprotected
orunregulated
eitherbythestateorbythecollective
actionof workers.It is productionby workerswho do not possess
the meansof productionandwhoselaborpoweris availableon
an open or pure labor market.
Self-Employment
Small,independentproducersexistedin all the old-re-
gimesocieties,
alongwith a degree
of commodity
tradein basic
necessities.
In old-regimeChinathereweresmallCultivators and
artisans,and in the old-regimeIslamicsocieties,a ourishing
artisanproduction.Merchants accumulatedwealthby tradingin
commoditiesproducedby artisansand farmers,althoughthey
did nothingto change
themethods
andorganization
of produc-
tion, but the accumulation
of mercantilewealthwasrecurrently
checkedby the dominantland-based military andbureaucratic
classesas a possiblerival to their power?It was in western
Europe,
however,
where
thegrowth
ofindependent
farming
and
artisanproduction
reached
a scalesufcienttobecome
thebasis
for an alternativeorganization
of economyandsociety.The de-
terminingfactorin thedevelopment of independentfarmingwas
thesuccess of peasant
resistance
to attempts bythefeudalnobility
to extract more and more of their produce.As a result of this
resistance,
obligations
of personalserviceby peasant
to lordwere
progressively
commuted
to payments
in kind,payments
in kind
to paymentsin cash,andtotal rent paidto the feudalclasswas
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 53
Bipartism
A third mode of social relations of production appeared
with the consolidation of the capitalist mode of development in
industrybipartite relations between organized workers and em-
ployers. Its emergence has to be situated in the context of the
changesin the nature of the labor force mentioned in connection
with the enterprise-labormarket mode-the differentiation be-
tween established and nonestablished workers.
Trade unions took root among the established workers,
basedusually upon the skilled occupations,and unions werebut
the centerpiecesof a broaderlabor movementthat included pol-
itical partiessupportedby workers in the main industrialized
countries. The new political importance of this upper layer
64 SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
Enterprise Corporatism
A primaryconditionfor the existenceof enterprisecor-
poratismwasthelarge-scale
undertaking.
Thelongdepression
beginning
in 1873broughtaboutthebankruptcy
of innumerable
smallenterprises
and setin motiona processof industrialcon-
centration in all the countries of advancedindustrialism. The
corporation
emerged
asthedominant
formoforganization
ofthe
meansof production.With the corporationwentthe bureaucra-
tizationof management,
thedevelopment of whatReinhardBen-
dix calls internal bureaucratizationto distinguish it from the
external bureaucratizationthat representsan extensionof state
controloverindustry. Internalbureaucratization
involveddel-
egationof authority,andtechnical
andadministrative
speciali-
zation of functions,the distinction of staff and line, and the
emergence
of what John KennethGalbraithcalled the
technostructure/29
The corporateform of organizationand its internalbu-
reaucracy
cameto adopta distinctiveformof ideology.Its essen-
tial feature is the social integration of the corporation as a pro-
ductive community. In its Japanese
form, this ideologyappears
asa continuousdevelopment
within a nonconictualconceptof
production relations.
In the1920s,thelargestcompaniesin the
heavyindustries, the zaibatsu,
offereda stableandprivileged
positionto theirpermanent employees,andthismodelof rela-
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 71
tions was reconstructed during the Korean War boom of the 1950s
to provide the bureaucratizedcorporatewelfareof lifetime com-
mitment employment to the established industrial workforce in
Japan.InitsAmerican-European
form,theideology
ofenterprise
corporatismappearedasan alternativeto bipartismissuingfrom
theinitiativeof employers.
Thescienticmanagement
of Taylor
was one critical step in a processof eliminating the workers
residualautonomyin productionand concentrating
controlof
workperformancewith management.Theindustrialpsychology
of Mayo, following Taylorism,attemptedto reconcilethe semi-
skilled workers to the diminished condition in which scientic
management had placed them.
Bipartismmoderatedandregulatedconict by institution-
alizingit. Enterprisecorporatismdeniedthe legitimacyof con-
ict, representingit as a meremisperceptionof interestson the
part of workers(who mistakenlythoughtthey wantedmore
money when what they really neededwas more satisfactionin
theirwork)anda deciencyof manipulativeskillson thepartof
management.The doctrine of Mayo and his followers has been
of practicalbenet to numerousexponentsof industrialpsy-
chologywho have becomeconsultantsto managements and or-
ganizersof training programsfor middle management;
asBendix
pointsout, it has foundonly limited acceptance in managerial
practice,but . . . its contributionto managerial
ideologyhasbeen
pervasive/31
The American-European
ideologyof enterprisecorpora-
tism, originating as an antiunion reactionto bipartism,moveda
stagefurtherin thelatertwentiethcenturytowardattractingtrade
unionsawayfrom bipartisminto a symbioticrelationshipwith
corporate management.The ability of largescaleenterprises,
publicor private,to granta privileged
positionto preferred
seg-
mentsof the workforceexertsa power of attractionon unions.A
tendencytoward plant-levelnegotiations,
reinforcedby tech-
niqueslike productivitybargaining,
wherebymanagement gains
backfromunionscontrolovertheproduction
process
in return
forwageconcessions,
andalsobyformsof workerparticipation
in management
that encourage
an enterprise
consciousness,
can
allattractworkers
awayfromsolidarities
based
onoccupation
or
industry or the labormovementasa whole,in orderto focustheir
72 SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
interestsandloyaltiesonthecorporation,
thesourceoftheirwell-
being.Thus,througha differenthistoricalroute,a structuresim-
ilar to the enterpriseunionismof Japantook shape.Both are
encompassed within the twentieth-century
modeof enterprise
corporatism.
Enterprise
corporatism
maintainsstableemployment
con-
ditions for establishedemployees.The central core of IBM em-
ployees,
civil servants
ofmodern
states
orinternational
agencies,
and lifetime employees
of big Japanese
industrialand banking
groupsarenotmuchconcerned oraffected
byuctuations
in the
supplyof anddemandfor laborontheopenmarket.Theircon-
cernsarecareerprospects,
seniorityrights,fringebenets,and
pensionentitlements.
In the enterprisecorporatistmode,the enterpriseis the
basicunit of employer-worker
relations,asin theenterprise
labor
market,but the employmentinstabilityof the enterpriselabor
markethasbeenreduced,and employmentsecurityand the wel-
fare of workers and their families is ensuredby the employer.
Thecorporatistconceptimpliesa contrivedharmonyof interests
between workers and managementor at least attitudes and
behavioron the part of boththat areconsistentwith this notion
of harmony.Management orientstheloyaltiesof established
em-
ployees
totheenterprise.
Ofcourse,
bigcorporations
alsoemploy
nonestablishedworkers who are excluded from the regime of
enterprise corporatism.
Theprimaryconditionfor enterprise-corporatist
relations
is a substantialconcentrationof industry into large-scaleunits
privateor publiccorporations.
Thequasimonopolistic
position
enjoyedby the corporationenablesthe employerto guarantee
securityof tenureto the employeeandto introducemeasures
to
gaintheemployees
personalidentication
withthegoalsof the
enterprise.
Thehighcostof capitalequipment
andrisk of loss
from stoppagesof work makeit in the employersinterestto
providethefavorableconditions.Thelargecorporationcanmas-
ter its own environmentand plan for a long time span,and this
allowsit to gaincontroloverproductmarkets
andoverits labor
force.
Enterprise corporatistmanagement is professional
in all
aspects.
In laborrelationsit establishes
animpersonal,bureau-
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 73
Tripartism
In the most industrially advancedcountries,wherebipar-
tism had already developedin the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centurieswith solidly organizedmovementsof estab-
lished workers,the increasedinterventionof the statein national
economicmanagementtendedto transformbipartite relationsin
the direction of tripartism. The statenow was not merely con-
cernedto providea frameworkfor orderlysettlementof issues
betweenemployersand workersbut alsotook a hand in shaping
these settlementsand bringing about more cooperativelabor-
management
relations.Tripartismwasa furtherdevelopment
in
the same hegemonythat had generatedbipartism. The states
denition of national economicpolicy conformedto the concep-
tions and interests of the dominant employer class while it en-
couraged
concessions
suchaswould retainthe acquiescence
of
the articulate class of established workers. But the increased
complexities
of nationaleconomicmanagement
afterWorldWar
I now required greaterstateintervention.Governmentswere no
longer preparedto leave wagesand employmentquestionsen-
tirely to the interactionof employersand unions.
As a consequence, corporatiststructuresgrew within the
state,and the line betweenstateand economy,stateand civil
society,becameblurred.Ministriesof industryencouraged
the
developmentof industry organizationsand establishedregular
links with them; ministries of labor did the same with trade
unions.Regularcontactsandthe performanceof functionswithin
an expandedstatemachinerybound employer and worker or-
ganizationsmore closelyinto the state.Suchdevelopmentswere
taking place in the industrialized countries of westernEurope
from the earlypostwarperiod. In the United States,initial tend-
encies can be observed in the Hoover administrations move to
CAPITALISTDEVELOPMENT 75
population,
thefutureclientele
ofNaziism,
lostout.Labors
rel-
ativestrength
wanedin thelate1920s,
to collapse
altogether
in
the 1930swith the arrivalof the Naziregime.Tripartismhad
servedto conne laborsdemandsto what was acceptable to
capitalduringthepostwar
crisiswhenlaborhadpoliticaland
economic
opportunity,
butit hadnotdelivered
anylastinggains
to labor.
In the United States,the early New Dealwas inspired by
thetripartite
concept.
General
HughJohnson,
President
Franklin
Roosevelts
NationalRecovery
Act administrator,
wasmuchin-
uencedby hisWorldWarI experiencein mobilizingindustry.
Schlesinger
(1960)cites]ohnsons
reectionafterthe war:If
cooperation
cando somuch,maybethereis something wrong
with the old competitivesystem.37
The NRA achieveda tem-
porarymobilization
ofAmericans
foreconomic
recovery
in the
élan of a new administrationduring the crisis years1933-34. Its
impactfaltered
before
thehostilityof employer
interests.
The
lastingstructuraleffectof theNewDealwastheerectionwith
governmental
support
oftradeunioncountervailing
power.A
transitory
tripartismrelapsed
intoa strengthened
bipartism.
Tri-
partismreceived
furtherimpetus
duringWorldWarII in the
Western
powers,
whereorganized
laborwasbroughtintoaVari-
etyofboards
andagencies
whose
aimswerethemaintenance
of
productionfortheeffective
prosecution
ofthewareffort.Wartime
experiencewasconsolidatedin thepost-World
WarII institutions
setup in WesternEuropean countries
to associate
theeconomic
interestswith national economicpolicymakingnational eco-
nomic and social councils advisory to governments,planning
commissions, and so forth.
When,duringthe 19603,concernto limit ination took
theplaceofanearlier
preoccupation
withreconstruction
in the
prioritiesof thesecountriesgovernments,
the incentiveto
strengthen
tripartite
structures
wasincreased.
EvenintheUnited
Statesand Canada,
whereorganizedlaborwaspoliticallyweak
relative to labor in northern Europeancountriesand free-enter-
priseideology
wasmoreresistant
to market-constricting
collab-
oration,tripartismwasinvokedas an instrument
for putting
incomespolicies into practice.
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 77
State
Corporatism
State
corporatism
was
the
other
new
mode
toappear
fol-
lowingWorldWarI, rst with fascismin Italy andsubsequently
in other countriesof relatively late industrial developmentin
Portugal,Brazil,and Spainduringthe 19303.Statecorporatism
is an attempt by political leadersto createthe organizationof a
modern industrial statein conditions where the organizational
baseamongemployersand workershasnot successfullyevolved
in the direction of bipartism. This has been characteristic of late
industrializingcountriesin whichthe dominantemployerclass
in industryhasnot beenableto achievea socialhegemony. In
such cases,workers organizationstypically are either weak or
areof the syndicalisttype. They representa prise de conscience
on the part of workers who in terms of their actual production
relations remain in the enterprise-labor-marketmode of social
relations.
The
Italian
case
was
the
rstand
illustrates
the
principa
characteristics of state corporatism. As Antonio Gramsci re-
ected, the northernItalian industrial bourgeoisiehad neverbeen
ableto establishits hegemonyoverthe whole of Italy. In placeof
hegemony,there was the trasformismoof Giolitti and the Liber-
als,the constructionof coalitionsof sociopoliticalforces.When
the bourgeoisorder was threatenedduring the aftermathof war
by factory occupationsin the north, land occupationsin the
south,andtherevoltof agriculturalwagelaborers in thePovalley,
trasformismo did bringaboutatemporizing trucebutonethrough
which the dominantclasseslost condencein the regime.In-
dustrialistsin particularsawin theviolenceof thefascistsquads
the meansof putting in placea statethat would discipline
the workers.The Liberalssharedthe aim but lackedthe means,
i.e., the ability to use force. Liberals and industrialists eased
Mussolinis way to power and sought to ensure that fascism
would in fact serve the goal they both had in mind. For this
Mussoliniwouldhaveto suppress
themoredisruptiveelements
80 SOCIALRELATIONSOF PRODUCTION
thecorporations
at thelowestlevel.In bothtripartiteandstate
formsof corporatism
the stateparticipates
directlyandthemore
favored segments
ofthelaborforcehaveaccess
to decisionmak-
ing-atthepeakin theonecasethroughpluralisticbargaining,
in the otherthrougha bureaucratically
imposedsubordination.
But neithertripartismnor statecorporatismtouchesthe whole
economy
directly.Botharesuperstructures
underwhichsubor-
dinatemodesenterpriselabormarket,selfemployment, house-
hold, in particularperformsubordinate
functions,transferring
surplus to the dominantmodes.
CHAPTER FOUR
REDISTRIBUTIVE
DEVELOPl\/[ENT
Theredistributive mode
ofdevelopment
cameintoexistence
throughthe secondRussianrevolution,duringthe 1930s.The
rst, or Bolshevik,Revolutionof 1917standshistoricallyin line
with the Europeanupheavalsbeginningwith the FrenchRevo-
lution of 1789that overthrewpolitical structuresof the old re-
gime.In the yearsfollowing 1917,the Bolsheviksstruggledto
maintain and consolidatetheir political hold over the territories
formerlyruled by the Czarsand to protecttheir powerfrom
foreign intervention. They had no clear programfor the recon-
struction of society and economy.They reactedto situations
createdby revolutionarydevelopments while carryingon a de-
bateabouttheproperpoliciesfor a socialistrevolution.Theyrst
supportedworkersovietsthat took controlof enterprises, then
broughtthemunderpartyand statecontrol.Theynationalized
industrial
propertytoforestall
speculative
transfers
ofownership
andthenplacedtheformerownersin charge.
Theytriedtosatisfy
peasantdemandsthroughredistributionof land,then imposed
compulsory
deliveriesof agriculturalproduceasa warmeasure,
andsubsequently,
whenthewarcrisisdiminished,
encouraged
privatefarming and marketingthrough the New Economic
Policy}
It was only in the late 1920sand during the 19303that the
newmodeof redistributivedevelopment
tookshapein the sec-
ond or Stalinist revolution. Its concertedfeatureswere collectiv-
84 SOCIAL
RELATIONS
OFPRODUCTION
ization
ofagriculture
andadriveforrapidindustrialization
di-
rectedand coordinated by centralplanning.Two distinctive
modesof socialrelations
of productionweregenerated
through
thisdevelopmental
effort:thecommunal
mode,
applied
in agri-
culturalproduction,
andthecentral
planning
modethrough
whichindustrial
production
wasorganized.
Central
planning,
in
this historicalcontext,hastwo meanings:
oneis the xing of
priorities
andproduction
strategies
andtheallocation
ofproduc-
tionmeans
forsociety
asawhole;theotherisawayoforganizing
production
through
a hierarchical
command structure
thatin
practice
applied
mainlyinlarge-scale
industry.
Intherstsense,
central
planning
istheformoforganization
oftheredistributive
mode
ofdevelopment.
I shallhenceforth
callthisaspect
redistrib-
utiveplanning.
Inthesecond
sense,
central
planning
isamode
of socialrelations
of production,
andI shallhenceforth
conne
the term to that meaning.
Themodeof development
pioneered
by the SovietUnion
in the19303
wassubsequently
appliedwithvariations in China,
whentheChinese CommunistPartyestablishedits controlover
themainlandafterWorldWarII, andin NorthKoreaandcoun-
triesof eastern
Europe
thatfellwithintheSoviet
sphere
in the
same
periodand
subsequently
in Cuba
andVietnam.
Where
redistributive
development
practices
havebeentransplanted,
it
is oftendifficultto distinguish
practices
thatareinherentin the
mode
ofdevelopment
persefromthose
thatarederived
speci-
callyfromthecircumstances
oftheSoviet
experiment
in the
1930s.
Thecoercive-repressive
features
associated
withthecol-
lectivization
driveandmobilization
against
perceived
military
threat,whichareto beranged
in thelattercategory,
lefttheir
imprintupontheinstitution
andpractices
ofredistribution
in
the SovietUnionandtherefore
upontheformin whichthese
institutions were exportedto other countries.
Theredistributive
modeofdevelopment
hasnotbeenlim-
ited to thetwo modesof socialrelationsof productionjustmen-
tionedthecommunal
andcentralplanningmodes.
At various
phases
andin different
countries,
other
social
relations
ofpro-
ductionhavebeeneithertolerated
orencouraged
asadjuncts
of
redistribution.
Self-employment
hascontinued
ona substantial
scale
in farming,
crafts,
anddistribution.
Georgian
farmers
bring
REDISTRIBUTIVE DEVELOPMENT 85
Communal
Communal forms of production in centuries past have
precededSoviet and Chineserevolutions.They resulted in en-
claveswithin societiesconstitutedin regardto their production
relationson quite differentbases.Communalexperimentsin
thesecontextstook the forms either of Withdrawal and antici-
pationof an alternativeform of societycontrastingto the ambient
88 SOCIALRELATIONSOF PRODUCTION
aboutideological
mobilization
thatisdisruptive
ofworkroutines.
The former,in line with their revolutionaryrole,havestressed
equalitarianism,
evenwhenit becamedetrimental
to incentives
toproduce.Maofoughttokeepthetendency
towardbureaucratic
stabilizationin checkand to maintainthe supremecontrolof
revolutionary
ideologues.
Underhis successors,
therevolution-
arymobilization
associated
with theCulturalRevolution
has
beencondemned,
andthe two components
of the centrallead-
ershippolitical
eliteandeconomic
managersachieved
abal-
ance in statusand inuence. Both componentsagreein main-
tainingthedirecting
function
ofcentral
planning
overthesocial
formationandthe long-termgoalof transforming
the communal
mode.
Duringthe19803,
thecommunal
modehasbeenin retreat
in all the redistributiveformations.In the SovietUnion and
countriesofEastern Europe,thestageoftranscendenceis athand.
Fewpractical
differences
remainbetween
agricultural
andin-
dustrialconditionsof employment, althoughagriculturalwork-
ersand their familiesstill generallyhavesomewhatfewerop-
portunitiesfor mobilityand advancement.
Production
is
increasingly
organized
on a largescalein agroindustrial
com-
plexes
encompassed
withinthecentral
planning
modeofsocial
relations.In China,wherelegaldistinctionsbetween
workersand
peasants
remainsignicant
[e.g.,workers
areentitled
to subsi-
dizedricewhilepeasants,
manyofwhomareworkingin rural
industriesandnot in the elds, arenot),agriculturalproduction
is now for the mostpart achievedundera systemof contracts
with individual households.The household-contract
systemis a
wayofincorporating
selfemployment
andsome formsofenter-
prise-labor-market
employment
withinredistributive
planning.
An individualmaycontractwith thelocaleconomic
unit [bri-
gade]to produce
a certain
quantity
of a croponlandprovided
bythebrigade.
Certaininputsandservices,eg, fertilizers,
har-
vestingequipment,
andhelp,maybeprovided bythebrigade.
The contractorbearsthe risk and can sell surplus product at a
preferentialrate.
The incidenceof the communalmodein Chinahasshifted
awayfrom agriculture(nowmainlyin the self-employment
mode)towardsomeformsof small-scale
industrialproduction
REDISTRIBUTIVE DEVELOPMENT 93
Central Planning
Central planning represented a transformation, not of the
evolved modes of production relations such as existed in north-
westernEurope and North America (bipartism and enterprise
labormarket],but of a quite distinctive patternthat still borethe
marks of eastern European manorial serfdom. The Russian in-
dustrial bourgeoisiewas a subordinateclass,dependenton the
supportof the Czaristadministrationand controlledby the Czar-
ist bureaucracy,a caseof what Bendix calls external bureaucra-
tization.5Peterthe Greathad allowed ascription of serfsto in-
dustrialenterprisesaspartof his policyof promotingindustries
usefulto thestate.Thistransplantingof serfdomfromagriculture
to industryhadbeendesigned to overcome a prevailingshortage
of labor.Althoughby the nineteenthcentury,factoryworkers
hadbecome nominallyfree,theycontinuedto existin conditions
reminiscentof the manor.Employersfrequentlybuilt barracksto
housethemandattemptedto regulateall aspectsof their life in
E1quasi-militarypattern~necessity
andtraditiongaveto labor
relationsthe character
of a householddiscipline."
94 SOCIAL
RELATIONS
OFPRODUCTION
Nothingliketheestablished
laborforceofwestern
Europe
hademerged
in Russia;
thefactory
workerremained
semirural,
movedto andfrobetween
townandcountry,andmaintained
a
familylinktotheruralscene
whilebeingin urbanemployment.
Thegovernment
wastheabsoluteauthority
overindustry,
and
government
used
thisposition
togrant
theemployer
withinthe
factoryanabsolute
controlovertheworker.
Whenamorepermanent category
ofworkers
began
totake
shapeinthe1880s,
andthusformedabody
receptive
todoctrines
ofprotest,
nascent
organizations
amongthese
permanent
workers
werepenetrated
byCzarist
policeagents
whosepolicesocial-
ismcompeted
withthesocialism
of opponents
of theregime,
though
it wasabletoattract
littlein thewayofconcession
from
thepolitical
authorities.
Thusexternal bureaucracy
controlled
or
attempted
to controlbothmanagement
andworkers
in Russian
industry.Centralplanningunder the Sovietstatecameas a
change
in external
bureaucracies
andin theaimsof external
bureaucracy
rather
thanasanovelimposition
ofexternal
control
over industry.
Central
planning
didbringaboutonemorefundamental
change,
andthiswasintheworkethic.
Thecoercedlabor
tradi-
tion derivedfrom manorialserfdomassumed
no positivemoti-
vationonthepartoftheworker,
whose
efforts
werethought
to
beprovoked
byfearofexternal
sanctions.
[Bycontrast,
thecon-
sciousness
of atleastthemoreestablished
segment
oftheBritish
working
class
wasinuenced
bythelegacies
ofcraftpride,
the
Puritannotionof individualresponsibility,
andthe prevailing
nineteenth-century
ideaofindividualstrivingforsuccess.)
Lenin
clearly
seized
thepointthatarequirement
forthesuccess
ofa
revolutionary
state
wouldbetoencourage
aninternalizing
ofthe
workethiconthepartof theRussian
massesthe
peoplemust
learnto work andthe Sovietgovernment
mustteachthem.
Hence
theapotheosis
of workin earlySovietliterature.7
The
people
wouldlearntoworkif theyunderstood
thatthegoalof
the externalbureaucracy
wastheirownwelfarethatthe bu-
reaucracy wasthevirtualagency of theircollective
self.This
ideological
revolution
joinedaninnerforcetotheexternaldirec-
tiveof planning
to make thisafundamentallynewformofpro-
duction relations.
REDISTRIBUTIVE DEVELOPMENT 95
temptedto hoardlabor.All-unionagencies
to organize
labor
allocation on the style of Westernnational employmentservices
werecreatedonlyin the1960s.
In China,thedispositionto regard
employmentaspermanent
fora lifetimeis evenmoreingrained,
thoughthepost-Mao
leadership
hasbeenconcerned tointroduce
moreexibility into laborallocation.The iron rice bowl or
permanency
of job tenurehasmetincreasing
criticismin the
officialmediaandyetendorsementofthegoalofgreaterexibility
in manningrecoilsbeforethe prospectof dismissals
for redun-
dancy.Workerscanstill be removedonlyfor gravefaultof a
Virtuallycriminalkind.Employees
in thestateenterprises
still
expectto enjoythe right to transmittheir job on retirementto a
suitably qualied family member.
Accumulationorganizedthroughredistributiveplanning
hasgonethroughtwohistorical
phases.
These
arecloselyrelated
to the external links of the redistributive social formation. The
rst phasewasthatof theindustrialization
drive,theStalinist
phaseofthe1930s,in whichthegoalofrapidaccumulation was
reinforced
bytheperceptionofimminentexternalmilitarythreat.
Heavyindustryanddefensewerethepriorities.
These werebuilt
on the only availablemodelexistingcapitalistindustry.Con-
sequently,
theorganization
of production
andthehierarchy
of
commandwithin capitalistproductionwerereproduced within
the socialrelationsof centralplanning,althoughtherewaslittle
directeconomicrelationshipthroughexchange of productsbe-
tween capitalist and redistributive economies.
The secondphasecamewhen the limits to the initial
accumulation
process
werereached,
i.e.,whencapital-broaden-
ingortheextensive
pattern
of adding
newproductive
unitsof
the samekind with the samelabor-outputratios ran up against
laborshortages
andtechnological
backwardness.
Fromthelate
1950sandearly1960s,the searchfor capital-deepening
or more
technology-intensive
development beganin the SovietUnion.
This has involved an increasein the scopeand volume of eco-
nomic links with the externalworld both to acquireandintroduce
new technologiesdevelopedin advancedcapitalistformations
andto earnthe foreignexchangerequiredto payfor thesetech-
nologies.
A furtherfactoraccentuating
theexpansion
ofexternal
economiclinks hasbeenthe inadequaciesof agriculture,in which
REDISTRIBUTIVE DEVELOPMENT 97
opinions,
butprobably
moreeffectively
soin formations
domi-
nated
byanideologically
sensitive
Party
leadership;
theother
is
theskewing
of educational
opportunity
in favorofthechildren
of the moreeducated
andhigherplaced,whichcomesabout
partlythrough
themotivation
andsupport
ofeducated
parents
andpartlyfromtheadvantages
highlyplaced
parents
canprocure
fortheirchildrenthroughtheinformalexchanging
offavorschar-
acteristic
of redistributive
systems.
Thusthereis a potentiality
forthereproduction
ofsocial
groups
having
different
degrees
of
social power.
Whatthesegroupsare,wherethe linesof cleavageare
drawnbetween
them,andwhatpossibilitiesof alliances
exist
amonggroupsaremoredifficultquestions
ofasubjective
kind
touching
attitudes
andbehaviors.It wouldseem
thatduring
the
mostrecent
phase
of development,
atechnological
andhuman-
isticelitewith astatuslegitimated
byeducation
hasachieved
an
identity
distinct
fromtheParty
political
elite.Withinindustry,
theofficialtradeunionshavepromoted
acorporative
association
ofmanagement
andskilled
workers
based
onenterprise-relate
benets
andloyalties.
Thelineofcleavage
hascome
between
the
skilledandunskilledworkerstheformermorecloselylinked
totheenterprise
bylength
oftenure,
fringe
benets,
andsocial
activities (including
participation
in tradeunionandrelated
ac-
tivities],andthelattermorefrequently changing
jobs,nonparti-
cipantinenterprise
andcommunity
activities,
andincluding
thoseofficiallyfrowned
uponassocialdeviants.
Thiscleavage
corresponds
tothatintheadvanced
capitalist
formations
between
establishedand nonestablishedworkers.
Thestrategy
ofthepoliticalelitehasbeen[1]toneutralize
thetechnological
elitebyaccordingit recognized
statusandpriv-
ileges,
(2)toobstruct
acoalescence
oftechnological
andhuman-
isticelitesandto marginalize
thoseelements
of thehumanistic
elitewhomanifest
dissidence,
and(3)to courttheloyaltyof
skilledworkersandthe intermediate
layerof supervisors
by
emphasizing
thecorporative
aspects
ofindustrial
organization
andextending
privileges
andbenets
to theupperstratumof
manual workers.
EPILOGUE TO PART I
Insummary,
part
1hasconsidered
the
characteris
of
EPILOGUE TO PART 1 103
States,
World Orders,
and Production
Relations
tion between the effort of a state to organize its society and its
effort to maintain itself and pursue its goals in the interstate
context.
Raison dé-tat and the modern state system emerged to-
getherin fteenth- and sixteenth-centuryEurope.Not that other
parts of the world at other times havenot known dispersionsof
power amongrival centers.Chinese,Islamic,and earlyAmerican
civilizations experienced alternating phasesof centralized power
and of fragmented contending powers. The fourteenth-century
Arabic Islamic philosopherstatesman Ibn Khaldunl reected on
this alternation in the congurations of power, as did his contem-
porary Chinesetheorists of politics. They could explain it in
terms of the relative weight of urban or nomadic elements or the
level of tolerance of the peasant base of society for exactions by
the dominant classes.The novelty of the European developments
of the fteenth and sixteenth centuries was the founding of a
state system in a context of economic changesthat accumulated
wealth in centers that ultimately were able to transform that
wealth into a capitalist development processa process that
spread from its points of origin in Europe over the whole world.
The state system provided a framework within which that
process engendered a world economy, developing and function-
ing according to its own dynamic. Initially, during the age of
mercantilism, that world economy was constrained within polit-
ical boundaries laid down by statesthrough national monopolies
and trade restrictions. By midnineteenth century, with the spon-
sorship and political support of the single most powerful state,
the world economy achieved autonomy, such that its own laws
began to constrain state policies, particularly through the work-
ings of international nance centered in the City of London. In
the mid-twentieth century, a further stagewas reached in which
production became organized on a transnational scale, and in-
ternational production, as well as international nance, pre-
sented constraints on and opportunities for states. During this
century, the relative weight of Europe receded,the center of world
power shifted from Atlantic rim to Pacic rim, and Europe, the
originator of the process,became a subplot in a global drama.
From the nineteenth century, world order has to be dened
in terms of the duality of interstate system and world economy.
108 STATES, WORLD ORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
THE COMING
OF THE LIBERAL
ORDER
AND
EIGHTEENTH-C
STATE
SYSTE
The fourteenthcentury inaugurateda long period of turbulence
in Europethat canbe tracedto a reversalof the economicand
demographicexpansionof the previoustwo centuries.As the
bioecological
currentebbed,punctuated by faminesandplagues,
the dominantfeudal classesstruggledover control of stagnantor
declining resources.Conflict betweenlords and peasantsinten-
sied, as did conflict amongthe lords themselves.The interclass
strugglemovedtowarddifferentoutcomes
in eastern
andwestern
Europe. In eastern Europe, peasantssuffered the increasing
repressionof the so-callednew serfdom.In the west, peasants
gainedsignicantlyin independence,
thoughtheyremainedthe
soleeconomicsupportof the dominantclass.Theintraclassstrug-
gleamongthenobilitywasgradually,throughthe sixteenthcen-
tury, brought under control by national monarchiesin western
and northernEurope.Thesemonarchiesformedthe nuclei of the
modernstates.In themlay the originsof the stateand statesystem
as we know it.
In the realm of ideology,the revival of modelsof classical
antiquitystrengthened
thesecularspiritagainst
thesupranational
claims of divine and natural law, and in art and architecture gave
expression
to theformof a newterritorialpower.In anagewhen
religious symbolism served to justify wars, religion was con-
verted from a principle of universal solidarity to becomethe
unifyingpublicceremonyof a singlestate.Thedoctrineof cujus
regio,ejusreligio wasenunciatedin the Peaceof Augsburgof
1555 and reiterated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The
revival of Roman law consecrated the authority of the state, an
authority proclaimedalso in the new political theory of
sovereignty.
THE LIBERAL ORDER 113
the world economy, but it was a rival to the Dutch for dominance
in that economy.United againstSpain,or againstFrance,when
these powers threatenedthe heart of commercial empire, the
Dutch and English fought each other at sea when the continent
wasquiescent.Duringthe secondhalf of the seventeenthcentury,
England displaced the Netherlands as the center of the world
economyand maintainedthat placethroughthe nineteenthcen-
tury. Mercantilism, by creating a national market that could sus-
tain the expansionof Englishtrade,gaveEnglandthe advantage
over Amsterdam, the last of the great city-basedcommercial
systems.
As in the Netherlands,mercantileinterestswere preemi-
nent in Englandin determiningstatepolicy from the time of the
civil war; they achieved osmosis with land-based wealth and
togethercreatedopportunity for the developmentof manufactur-
ing. Manufacturingin Englanddependedless on statesupport
and monopoly privilege than industry in Francedid and more
on the availability of accumulatedwealth for investment,the
availability of labor for employment,and the existenceof the
broadestnational market in which to realize gainsfrom sale of
product. In England, a peasantryhad been all but eliminated,
independentfarmingand largerscaleimprovedagricultureour-
ished, and occupational specialization or division of labor had
advanced further than on the continent.
The old-regimehistoric blocs engenderedcontradictions
thatultimatelybroughtaboutchanges
in formsof state,produc-
tion relations,and the interstatesystem.
First of all, through mercantilist policies, statesassisted
the accumulationof private wealth. At the sametime, the com-
mercial interests entrenched in mercantilism, as well as those of
thestateitself,wereresolutelyopposedto the furtherstepsnec-
essaryto emancipatewealth for capitalist development.These
furtherstepswould be to transformland and laborpowerinto
commodities and to remove mercantilist restrictions on the mar-
ket whentheybecamean impedimentto capitalaccumulation.
This contradiction was foremost in the insular-mercantile state.
In the secondplace,the production basisof the agrarian-
bureaucratic
statewasbecominglesssecure.Peasant-lord
rela-
tions had beenmuch eroded,but the surplus on which the state
118 STATES, WORLD ORDERS, AND PRODUCTION
THE ABORTIVE
RESTORATION HEGEMONY
THE EMERGENCE
OF THE LIBERAL ORDER
The liberal state and the liberal world order emerged together,
taking shape through the establishment of bourgeois hegemony
in Britain"and of British hegemony in the world economy. Brit-
ains ability to managethe balance of power was the link between
the one and the other. For the new form of state to become
consolidated, a period of security and freedom from external
intervention was required. The balance of power provided this
respite.
From at least the time of the Seven Years War [1756-
1763], British policy had not only recognized the balance of
power as a fact of diplomatic life but had also used it to keep the
European powers divided so as better to extend British commer-
cial and imperial interestsbeyondEurope. Napoleonhad de-
stroyed that balance and had organized the continent under
French suzerainty. Britains insular position and supremacy at
sea together with Russias expanse of land and abundant man-
power became the basis of a coalition that ultimately overturned
French dominance. In 1804, Pitt, responding to an overture from
the Czar, drew up a memorandum concerning postwar European
reconstruction that was founded on the idea of the reestablish-
ment of the balance of power. Castlereagh,sharing and continuing
Pitts conceptions of European order, pursued this goal in shaping
the postwar settlement. The victors were agreed to combine
against a revival of the threat of European domination by France,
yet in the interestsof balance,Frenchpowerhadto bemaintained
at a level of rough equality with the other great powers. Further-
124 STATES, WORLD ORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
of gold.Commercial
interestandsoundmoneyprevailed.It was
ayoungTory,RobertPeel,initially predisposed
to theagricultural
interests,who chairedthe commissionthat preparedthe return
tospecie
payments
in 1819[theyearin whichRicardo
purchased
for himself a seatin Parliament) This decisionmarkedthe limits
imposedon statepolicy by Britainsinternationalcommercial
position.
In the third place,by preventingHoly Alliance interven-
tionism, the British balance-of-powerpolicy removedexternal
obstructionsto the bourgeois-liberaltransformationsof western
Europeanstatesin the 18203and 18303,aswell asto the inde-
pendence(and commercialopening)of SouthAmericafrom
SpainandPortugal.Thebalanceof poweroperated in suchaway
asto allow emergingsocialforcesto developand to bring about
political changes.
Castlereagh conductedforeignpolicy asan aristocratcon-
sciousof servingthe interestsof the insular-mercantilestate.He
did not self-consciouslyservea classinterest.A class-based for-
eignpolicy was,however,articulatedin Englandby the doctri-
naires of laissez faire. Richard Cobden challenged the concept of
the balanceof power and favoreda cheapforeign policy based
on disarmament and free trade. The Manchester School saw the
world marketas the primary criterion of policy. The possibility
of commercial accessto the whole world took precedence in its
thinking overBritainsformalempire,and it perceivedsound
gold-exchangablecurrencyasthe linchpin of the world trading
system.Theseideaswerenaturallycombinedwith a sympathy
toward liberal and nationalist movements seeking to remake
statesabroad.As a consequence,British radicals espouseda
contradictionin foreignpolicy, favoringproliberal or pronation-
alist interventionismideologicallybut rejectingmilitary expend-
itures on economygrounds.The economyhorn of their dilemma
easilytook precedence
overthe ideological,and the issuewas
resolvedin the radicalconsciousness
by the myth of a free-trading
world in which force had ceased to be necessary. The aristo-
cratic managersof foreign policy maintained a more realistic
equilibrium.Theypracticeda policy of presencein Europe,but
onedesignedto preserve the balanceof power,not to dominate
politically.Thatbalancecouldbe preserved solongasthe con-
THE LIBERAL ORDER 127
policy.Thisled,heperceived,
to demands forspecial
privileges
andprotectionsthatwoulddistorttheproper
functioning
ofthe
market.He thusrejectedin advancethe instrumentalist view of
the liberalstate,in which the stateis the merevehiclethrough
whichvariousorganized
interestsof civil societyinteractand
reachcompromises
among theirdivergentgoals.Smiths analy-
sisenhances theview thatthecoincidence of politicalpluralism
with theliberalstateis fortuitous,a matterof circumstanceand
indeeda circumstance carryingwith it somerisksto the purity
of the liberal form. Enlightenedauthoritarianism might be an
equallyvalidandpossiblylessvulnerable
modeof government
for a liberal state.Historical experiencehas given both variants.
Here it becomesdesirableto abandonthe functionalist
perspective
soasto examine theprocessesof politicalstruggle
through
whichliberalformsofstate
came about.TheBritishcase
haslongbeenconsideredthemodelofliberaldevelopment. The
French
bonapartist
state,asamoreauthoritarian
instance
ofstate
autonomy,
andtheUnitedStates,
asaninstance ofamoreinstru-
mental liberal state,offer points of comparison.
Recentwork of British historianshasstressedthe political
character
ofpopularstruggles
duringthelateeighteenth
andearly
nineteenthcenturies.Thesestruggles
wereconcernedessentially
with the line betweenaccess
to andexclusionfrompowerin the
state.The agriculturaland manufacturing
laborers,and the
skilledartisansanddomesticputting-outworkerswere,of course,
excluded;but soalsowasthe middleclass,includingthe entre-
preneursin burgeoning
butpoliticallyunrepresented
manufac-
turingtowns.Theexisting
statewasperceivedbytheexcluded
asanagency through
whichthepower-holding groupscould
engrosslandthrough
enclosure
bills,protect
themselves
bypass-
ingcornlaws,andreward themselves asfundholders
through
suchmeasuresas the return to speciepaymentin 1819.The
conflictwaspicturedbytheopposition
asonebetween
thepro-
ducingclasses
(bothworkers
andmiddle-class
manufacturers
andthe idle classes
who drewincomebut did not wor .49
For the workers,the employerswere middlemen, inter-
mediatebetweenthemselves
andtheiroppressors
whocontrolled
thestate.
Upto the1830s,
thecriticalpointin theevolution
of
thestruggle
wasabouthowthemiddlemen
wouldalignthem-
THE LIBERAL ORDER 135
the
18408.
The
British
liberal
state
asconsolidated
under
SirRobert
Peel was autonomous; it brought order and regulation into busi-
nessactivity through the Bank Act and the CompaniesAct of
1844,and the income tax put state nances on a sound basis. It
138 STATES, WORLD ORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
CONSOLIDATION
OF THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER
foreign-controlled
enclaves
of miningandplantationsin partsof
Africa. Theseenclavesrequired a labor force, to securewhich
local state action was necessary.Sometimessuch state action
took the form of direct coercion, i.e., forced labor, and sometimes
the indirect method of imposinga headtax, which would make
it necessaryfor at leastsomemembersof a communityto earna
wagein orderto paythetax.Someareasof thepenetrated
regions
came to serve as catchment zones in which labor contractors
would recruita supplyof migrantwageworkers[mainlyyoung
males)while anotherpart of the population(women,children,
andelderly)continuedthroughsubsistence productionto repro-
duceawage-labor
forceavailable
fortemporary
export.
Thusthe penetratedareasof the liberalworld economy
were transformedin their production relations.In this process,
local statemachinery,both colonialandformallyindependent,
was likewise transformed. The state developed its capacity to
protectthegrowthoftheliberaleconomy
throughamixofdirect
coercion,tax policy,andpropertylaw. Thestatealsomobilized
nance for investmentin transport and communicationsfacili-
ties. Thus, the functions of the liberal statewere exportedfrom
theexpansive
countries
tothepenetrated
countries.
In penetrated
regions,
old hegemonieswerechallenged,
butrarelycouldit be
saidthat new socialhegemonies
wereestablished
underbour-
geoisleadership.
Typically,statemachines
intervened
to enforce
an orderthat would permit thesechangesin production,and
exchange
relations
to continue.
In penetrated
countries
fromthe
Mediterranean throughAsiaandLatinAmerica,localbourgeoi-
siesactedasagentsor intermediaries
for capitalfromtheexpan-
sive centers.Europeaneconomicpenetrationwas encouraged
andprotected
bylocalauthoritarian
regimes,
aswellaswelcomed
by thesecompradorgroups.
Toward the external world, the liberal state in the pene-
tratedcountryhadthefunctionofadjusting
thelocaltotheworld
economy.Sometimes
this functionwasfreelyaccepted,some-
timesforceduponit. Britishnavalpowerenforced
mercantile
accessand financial contractswhere necessary,but most fre-
quentlycoercionwasnot necessary.States weregladto have
access
to Britishcapitalandtechnology
for theircountriesand
werereadyto adopttherulesandpractices of theliberalorder
as their own guidelines.
THE LIBERAL ORDER 147
ANALYTICAL PROPOSITIONS
CONCERNING THE TRANSFORMATION
OF FORMS OF STATE AND WORLD ORDERS
of forces:one,thecongurationof socialclasses
within a historic
bloc;the other,the permissiveness
of theworld order.
The aristocratic British governingclass recognizedthat
Britainsworld power dependedon its commerceand manufac-
turingandwasthereforepreparedto governin sucha wayasto
allowthebourgeois economy to ourish andexpand.Themiddle
classwas sufficientlypolitically mobilizedto specifyand de-
mandpoliciesin its interestsand to takecontrolof municipal
governments in its particularareasof implantation.Aristocratic
paternalism,
togetherwith economicgrowth,madepossiblesuf-
cient concessionsto workersto keep the peaceso that repres-
sion, an ever-presentpossibility, wasrarely resortedto.
The economicand naval power of Britain enabledit to
lead an alliance to victory in the Napoleonicwars, thereby se-
curing the military-political conditionsfor continuing economic
supremacy. Britainsmanipulationof the Europeanbalanceof
powersecureda permissiveenvironmentfor westernEuropean
countriesto adoptliberalformswithoutrisk of interventionfrom
old-regime restorationist powers.
Second,classstrugglesleadingtoward a transformationof
statestakea political form,i.e.,they arestruggles
aboutthe in-
clusion or exclusion of social groups from accessto political
decisionmaking.Theoutcomes of suchstrugglesareinuenced
by a varietyof factors,includingrelativenumbers(determined
by the extentof development of particularmodesof socialrela-
tionsof production),self-awareness of groups,geographical
con-
centrationor dispersion,effectiveorganization and leadership,
and accessto existingformsof statepower (bothcarrotand stick,
services and coercion).
Third, classconict in the formationof new historic blocs
can lead either toward states that are autonomous in relation to
civil societyor towardstatesthat arethe mereinstrumentsof
divergentsocialforces;with regardto theformer,theautonomous
statemayreston a hegemonic society,or it maybind togethera
societyin which no hegemony hasbeenachieved.The British
caseshowed an autonomousstatein a hegemonicsociety;the
French,a powerful stateholding togethera nonhegemonic,po-
larizedsociety;the American,a weakstatestruggledoverand
usedin their respectiveinterestsby conflicting socialforces.
THE LIBERAL ORDER 149
THE ERA
OF RIVAL
IMPERALISMS
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY:
THE END OF HEGEMONY
in the North Sea, and thereby open Germanys way to the world
overseas.This action convinced Britain that Germany had be-
come its number-one enemy and that the full resources of diplo-
macy and military strength should be directed to circumscribing
that challenge.3Britain accordingly came to terms with Russia,
removing from contention Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry in
Asia; entered into alliance with France; and strengthened bonds
with the United States. It took two world wars nally to defeat
the German thrust to world-power status before the world polit-
ical system once again, after 1945, became restabilized in a new
conguration.
The logic of interstate power relations was but the outer
skin of the onion. The underlayers explained the rupture in world
politicsthe end of the Europeanbalanceof powerand of British
world hegemony, and the shift from a European to a world system
in which neither balance of power nor hegemony could be rees-
tablished. First of these underlayers was the continuing and un-
even spread of industrialization. Industry was the basis of mili-
tary and naval power. Britains lead had been overtaken by
Germany and the United States. France had developed more
slowly. Japan began a drive to industrialize after Commodore
Perrys squadron in Tokyo Bay had demonstrated ]apans Vul-
nerability to western intervention. The relative pace of industrial-
ization in different countries determined their military-political
potential. Weapons costs,reecting new technologies, becameso
expensive that only the front cluster of runners in the industrial-
ization race could afford power status, and positions within this
cluster were likely to changeasthe race went on. Britains launch-
ing of the Dreadnought in 1906 gave the Royal Navy an instan-
taneous advantageover the German eet, but it also, by rendering
virtually obsolete all warships built before 1905, wiped out Brit-
ains long-term lead and gave Germany, with its upto-date in-
dustrial capacity, the opportunity to compete on a more nearly
equal basis. Steel production was the best single indicator of
industrial power, and hence, of military potential. By 1893
Germany had passedBritain in steel production. As early as 1890,
the United Stateshad alreadytakenrst place.The monopolistic
position of Britain in industrial power during the midcentury
period gave place at the end of the century to a competition of
154 STATES, WORLD ORDERS, AND PRODUCTION
cycles.
Concern
to correct
themarkets
socialdefects
thusmoved
towarda projectfor regulatingthe marketitself,for makingthe
state into the markets tutor while at the same time preserving
the marketspreeminencein the economy.
Of all socialcontingencies,nonehasgreaterconsequence
for the mass of citizens than unemployment or the threat of
unemployment.
No factorhasbeenmorecentralto the design
anddevelopment
of thewelfare-nationalist
state.Understanding
of the various causesand types of unemploymentcameslowly
overtime.JosephChamberlain,
politicallyrootedin the indus-
trialist classof Birmingham,recognizedunemploymentas a so-
cialproblem
[rather
thananindividualfailing)duringthedepres-
sion of the mid-1880sand proposedmunicipal works asa means
of tidingoverhonestworkmen
whohadbeenaffected.
Sucha
measuretended,however,in practiceto help seasonalor casual
laborerswho had never had regular employment rather than
those for whom Chamberlainhad intended it. The British Un-
employed
WorkmenAct of 1905still conceived
the curefor
unemploymentas temporaryrelief works. Inadequate
as was
the prescription,
the actdid crossan ideological thresholdby
implicitlyrecognizingtherightof amanto expect workandthe
obligationof the stateto try to ensurethathe gotit. Still, the
meansof achievinga satisfactorylevel of employmentwas not
well understood.William Beveridge,in his 1909report, took a
forwardstepby distinguishingunderemployment
from unem-
ployment(theformerendemic,
the lattercyclical)andrecom-
mendeda complexof measures,
includingpublic works,labor
exchanges,
anda higherschool-leaving
age,combined
with in-
dustrialtraining,asmeasures
to dealwith thesedifferentkinds
of unutilized working capacity.
During the interwar period, when unemploymentre-
mainedan intractableproblem,a further aspectbeganto be
understood.One part of British society[in the midlandsand
south)wasrelativelyprosperous with newexpanding industries,
while anotherpart (the north and Wales)remaineddepressed
amiddecliningindustries.Long-termstructuralunemployment
requiredremedies
differentfromthosefor cyclicalunemploy-
mentresultingfrom uctuatingdemand.The depression
of the
1930sstimulated analysis of the phenomenonof massunem-
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 1 67
goals.
With
this
essential
qualication,
thestates
role
inthe
economywas considerable.It made a major investmentin the
materialinfrastructureof transportand communications.It made
evengreaterinvestmentin humanresourcesin health and
housingand in education.The right to a basicstandardof phys-
ical well-being and the right to learn, i.e., to equal opportunity,
becamerecognized
principlesof the state.Oneof the principal
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 169
had over Britain was the rapidity with which they built merito-
cratic, scientically orientedhigher educationalsystemsupon a
baseof universalliteracy. Furthermore,statescontributedheav-
ily to the growth of knowledge with industrial applications
throughfunding researchand development.
Nationalsecurity
considerations were the main stimulant here, but radar and elec-
tronics, nuclear energy,and spaceresearchhad civilian industrial
spinoffs.Statesalsosetup labor exchangesand otherservicesfor
the managementof manpower.In all theseways,statescontrib-
utedto the development
of the productiveforcesof societiesby
making investmentsthat market rationality alone would have
neglected.
The statesrole in accumulationextendedbeyond these
services. Tariffs and subsidies were time-honored methods of
stateaid to private accumulation,but many statesnow acquired
direct ownershipof substantialsegmentsof national economies.
The expansionof the statesectorwas more haphazardthan pre-
meditated. Frequently it happenedas the ultimate meansto
savean unprotable industry, especiallyif this could be justied
on national-interestor national-securitygrounds,and to protect
the jobs of its employees.In somecases,expropriationswerethe
political consequenceof war, e.g.,as in the Austrian statesac-
quisition of former German industries and industries taken over
by Sovietoccupation,or the acquisitionof Renaultby the French
state.In a few cases,stateshaveinvestedmoredeliberatelyin
advancedtechnologyin order to establisha position in the na-
tionalinterest.Whatever thehistoricalexplanation
forthegrowth
of the statesector,it hastakena placealongsidemonopolistic
and competitive sectors.
This threefold division of monopoly, competitive, and
statesectorsgavethe welfare-nationaliststateleverageto promote
the organizationof the economy.Stateand market are coordi-
nated by consensus,not by authority. The state provokesand
distillsconsensus
amongthemostpowerfulgroups[industryand
tradeunions) becausetheir acquiescence
is necessaryto the im-
plementation of policy.If theymustacquiesce
in orderthat pol-
iciesbe carriedout,theymustalsobeconsultedandparticipate
in someway in the formulationof thesesamepolicies. The
existence of a large state sector, combined with the economic
170 STATES,WORLDORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
expertise
available
to the stateandthe administrative
anden-
forcementservicesof the state,give the leveragenecessaryto set
the consensus-seeking processin motion. Despiteconstitution-
allyenshrined
principles
ofterritorialrepresentation
andparlia-
mentaryorlegislative
decision
making, welfare-nationalist
states
movedgraduallyin the directionof functionalrepresentation
andcorporatist
decision
making
asregards
thoseaspects
ofpolicy
mostcloselyrelatedto production.Corporatism
wasexpressed
througha varietyof institutional
experiments
andpractices,
all
havingtripartismastheir commonfeature.
Ideological
consensus isanecessary underpinningforcor-
poratism.
A certaintensionof conictinginterests
is inherentin
thepostliberal
pluralismof thewelfare-nationalist
state,butfor
Corporatism
to workthistensionmustbecontainable withina
commitmentto seeka modus vivendi amongthe rival interests.
Conict hasto be thoughtof in termsof the divisionof shares
andof distributingobligationsandresponsibilities
andnot asa
matter of fundamentalantagonism.This desirability of nding
groundfor agreement
arisesin a contextof constraints
imposed
by alienandimpersonal
forces:on the onehand,theexternal
constraints of the world economy;on the other, the internal
constraintsof ination, employmentlevels,ratesof profit and
propensity
toinvestwhenthese
arethought
ofastheoutcome
of
impersonal
economic laws.Theassumption isthattheparties
to
corporatist
decision
makingperceivetheseforcesin moreorless
thesameway.Theyaccept therationalityof themarketandthe
laws of economicsderived from it as part of the natural order.
Nationalism
bringsthemto coalesce
in dealing
withtheexternal
forces,andhegemonic
economics
is their basisfor consensus
in
dealingwith the internal constraints.
Public education,which in oneaspectis an investmentin
raisingthe levelof productive
forces,in anotheraspectis an
investment in conformism. One function of education is to
heighten
thecriticalfaculty,but this affectsa relativefew.For
themajority,
publiceducation
creates
a basisforacceptance
of
the establishedsocial order as a technically complex system
intelligibleto officiallycertiedspecialists.
Thisdisposition
is
reinforced by otheragencies formingopinionthepress,radio
and television,and advertising.Cumulatively,theseinuences
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 171
welfare-nationalist
statewastheoutcome
of struggle
amongso-
cialforces
in thecourse
ofwhichnewhistoric
blocstookshape.
Thehistories
of BritainandGermany
illustratetheprocess.
The rst measures
of socialprotectiontakenin the late
decades
ofthenineteenth
century
wereinitiated
fromabove
by
governments representative of ruling classescontinuous from the
old regime.Thesemeasures
responded
to a perceived
threatfrom
below.TheParisCommune
of1871madeaprofound
impression
on governmentsall over Europeasthe imageof what this threat
couldbecome: the peoplein armsengaged
in violentoverthrow
of established
order. Thisunforeseen
consequence of thePrus-
sian armiesquick victory over FranceunderscoredBismarcks
conviction
of theneedfor a preemptive
strokeof policyto give
some measureof satisfactionto workers so as to attach their
loyaltiesto thestateandto forestalltheappealof socialism.That
Bismarcks mind wasalreadyaliveto the problemwasdemon-
strated
bytheconversations
hehadinitiated
withLasalle
asearly
as1863.Concretemeasuresof socialinsurancewere not enacted
in Germanyfor another decade,but the rulers minds were al-
readyfully alertedto the problem.
In Britain,revolton thescaleof theParisCommune
ap-
pearedsomewhat
lessthreatening.
In 1867thefranchisehadbeen
extended
soasin practice
to bringskilledworkers
intopartici-
pationin the electoral
process.
Thedecisionwasanalogous
to
theinclusion
of themiddleclasses
in 1832,anexpression
of
condence
on thepartof therulinggroupsthattheseworkers
were now secureagainstrevolutionarytemptations. The 1880s
were,
however,
troubled
timesinBritishsociety.
Output
dropped
in the depressionand labordisputesincreased.In 1885there
wereriots in Londonand someof the provincialtowns.Bir-
mingham
wasparticularly
hardhit, andJoseph
Chamberlain,
a
leading
gureamong
theindustrialists
ofthatcity,articulated
a
new,radicalprogram.In the yearsthat followed,Chamberlain
cameto representthe tendenciesmakingfor the welfare-nation-
aliststateacombination
of imperialism,
protectionism,
and
socialreform.
Heleda breakaway
fromtheLiberalPartythat
linkedup with theDisraelian
traditionof socialreformin the
Toryparty.Chamberlainsimpactonpolicywasprofound, even
thoughhe wasneverableto breakthroughtheclassbarrierof
174 STATES,WORLDORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
Toryaristocratic
governance
toachieve
thestatus
offirstminister.
BismarckandGermanpolicywerestronginuencesin histhink-
ing at a time whenGerman
modelswereshapingthoughtin
Britain over a wide range.
As mayorof Birmingham,
Joseph
Chamberlain
camefor-
ward with measuresto counteractthe unemploymentof the mid-
1880s;he alsoundertookslum clearance
andworkershousing
construction.In Parliament,hewassuccessfulin securingawork-
manscompensation lawin 1897.Heraisedtheissueof oldage
pensions, inspiredbytheGerman old-age
insurancelawof 1889,
thoughthe enactment of this measure wasdeferredby his im-
perialistcommitment to Britainsinvolvementin theBoerwar.
Chamberlains
social-policyinitiativeswere,in the paradoxes
of
politics,broughtto fruitionbytheLiberalgovernment
thattook
ofce in 1905,culminatingin the old-agepensionact of 1908
and national health insuranceact of 1911.32
Iust asGermany,
duringtheseyears,wasstrivingto over-
take Britain in naval construction,so Britain was attemptingto
catchupwithGermany
in socialprotection.
Welfare
andwarfare
were the twin dominant concernsof the statein both countries,
andboth concernswerestructurallylinked in the evolvingraison
détatof therulinggroupswith theexistence
of a laborproblem.
The mannerin which that problemwasmanifestedamong
theworkingclasses
differedin thetwocountries.
It is probable
that the failureof bourgeois
revolutionin earlynineteenth-cen-
turyGermany
leftthewayopenforsocialdemocracy
to combine
thedemands
for politicalandsocialrightsintoasingleopposition
movement.The concern of the ruling groups to forestall this
oppositioncouldexplainwhy the construction
of thewelfare
statebegan
earlierin Germany
thanin Britaindespite
thelatters
muchlongerindustrialhistory.In Britain,politicalrightswere
extendedgraduallyto workers,but a political labormovement
wasslowerto developanddid notbecome therealparliamentary
opposition
until WorldWarI. Reforminitiativessprang
fromthe
mindsof perceptive
ruling-class
politiciansandwereshaped by
theresearches
andwritingsof civil servants
andof reformerslike
William Booth,Seebohm Rowntree,CharlesBooth,Sidneyand
BeatriceWebb,William Beveridge, andthe FabianSociety.The
phrase
Weareall socialists
now,attributed
to theLiberalpol-
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 1 75
sivesapproach,
butnostateoftheunionestablished
unemploy-
ment insuranceuntil the Wisconsinmeasureof 1932,and social
securitycameonthepoliticalagenda
onlywiththeNewDeal.
'
DuringtheyearsbeforeWorldWarI, theworkingclasses
in BritainandGermanyceased
to bepurelylatentforceswhose
autonomousaction ruling groupstried to forestallby preemptive
reform.Theybecame active,organized socialforcescapableof
changingexistingpoliticalstructures.
In Germany, thistransfor-
mationtookeffectthroughtherisingstrengthof the SocialDem-
ocraticParty,whichgavea rm organizational,
political,and
cultural identity to the working classand its affiliatedsocial
groups.In Britain,thetransformation waslessrmly anchored
in a singleorganization,
morediffuse;it foundexpression
partly
in thegrowingstrength of theLabourParty,butmostof all in a
worker movementthat challengedboth capital and the existing
tradeunion leadershipon the industrialfront.The greatstrike
waveof1911began
in theseaports
among
unorganized,
unskilled
workers. The movement radicalized the old centersof union
strengthcoal,cotton,engineering, shipbuilding,and rail-
waysandspreadto hithertononunionized industries.
It was
sparkedbythedeclinein realwages thathadfolloweduponthe
general
risein pricestouchedoff by theincreasing worldgold
supply,but the majorityof strikeswerelessaboutwagesthan
over issuesconnectedwith the right to organizeand conditions
of work.
Thegoalsof the movementwerehardlyprecise;it wasa
wellingup of protest,not a strategically
plannedcampaign;
yet
ideologically
it borea certainresemblance
to the syndicalism
whosepracticehadbeentheorizedin France
asadirectchallenge
to therule of capitalwithin industry.Syndicalism
had,however,
entereduponits historicalmomentof contradiction.
Looking
backward,syndicalismhadbeenthepractice
of skilledworkers,
seeking
tomaximize
theirowncontrol
overthelaborprocess
and
ultimatelyto supplant
theownersofthemeans ofproductionso
asto createproducers selfgovernmentwithoutbenetof the
state.Lookingforward,theunskilledworkerswhoweretaking
initiative in the labor movementworkers who had been re-
cruitedinto industryby capitalsrestructuringof the laborpro-
cessthroughthe longdepressionwouldcometo seektheir
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 177
salvationthroughindustrialunionsandpoliticalactiondirected
towardthe state.At this historicalmoment,however,the one
certaintywas the fact of workerrevolt. British industrialists,
alreadyconscious
of their decliningworld supremacy,
were
frightened.
Initially, the war resolvedthesefears.It generateda na-
tionalistunity transcending classstrugglesin both Britain and
Germany.World War I markeda transition from stateinterven-
tions in particularaspectsof economicactivitywith tariffs,
subsidies,
colonialexpansion,
andmeasures
of socialprotection
for workers, as instancesto state direction of whole national
economiesthrough the mediation of businessmenand with re-
current concernfor the loyalty of workers.
Germanytookthe leadin recognizing thatthewar would
in the lastanalysisproveto bea struggleof economies
andthat
therefore
theeconomy
mustbemanaged
anddirected
bythestate
towardthe prioritiesof war. In August1914a war materials
department wassetup to coordinateprivatebusiness
understate
direction,with the businessman WalterRathenauat its head.
Englandfollowed;in May 1915a ministry of munitionswas
created,
andby 1918it hadbecome
the countrys
largestem-
ployer.(A similarministrywascreatedaboutthe sametime in
Francewith the socialistpolitician Albert Thomasat its head-
atokenof concern
to consolidate
workerbacking
fortheproduc-
tion effort.)Furtherextensionand centralizationof economic
controls
in BritainfollowedthepoliticalcrisisofDecember
1916,
whenministries
of foodandshipping
tookoverall aspects
of
supply and imports, coordinatedwithin a small war cabinet.The
experience
of economicplanningof theseyearsleft a deep
impressionon many of the participants.Evenin the United
States,
a farlesscomprehensive
experience
withwarplanning
left an ideologicallegacyto theNewDeal.
Asthewarwenton,classtensions
reappeared.
Although
in August1914,the SocialDemocraticPartyrepresentation in
theGermanReichstag haddecidedto votewar credits,within a
yearthereexisteda vocalantiwaropposition
within theparty
evenat a time whenGermanarmiesseemed to be prevailingin
bothRussiaand France.In 1916,therewereseriousstrikeson
theClydeandin Walesandsporadic
disruptions
elsewhere,
less
178 STATES,WORLDORDERS,
ANDPRODUCTION
explicitlydirected
against
thewarthansignaling
workers
alien-
ationfromtheirrulerssenseof nationalgoals.Therevolutionin
Russia
aroused
panicin therulingcirclesof all thebelligerents,
a fearthattheir owntroopsandworkersmightalsopreferpeace
tothecontinuing
slaughter.
During1917, thereweremajorstrikes
in BerlinandLeipzig,and,followingtheBrest-Litovsk
diktatin
January
1918,
strikes
ofGerman
munitions
workers,
coinciding
with Ludendorffsnal offensivein France.Whenthe London
Metropolitan
Policewentonstrikeduringthesummer
of1918,
arumorspread
thattheBritisharmywasaffected."
If the GermanHigh Commandsoughtarmisticein the
autumnof 1918,it wasto preventits armyfromdisintegrating
as
theRussian
armyhadbeforeit, to forestallenemyoccupation
of
Germany,
tobeabletoobstruct
Bolshevik revolutionin Germany,
and to conservethe armedforcesasa factor in Germanysuncer-
tainpolitical
future.
Thespecter
ofBolshevism
sweeping
through
centralEuropewasequallyagitating
to theAlliedgovernments.
Whathadhappened in Russia
andmightwellhappen in central
andevenwesternEuroperemaineda persistentunderlyingcon-
cernof all partiesto theVersaillespeacenegotiations.
Theresurgence
of classtensions
undermining
nationalist
unityin thebelligerent
powers
was,however,
contained.
It was
contained
throughanewcoalitionof socialforces,
thegermof a
newhistoricbloc,aconflictualtripartiteententeof state,industry,
and trade union leadership.
In 1917,LabourPartyrepresentatives
werebroughtinto
Britainscoalitiongovernment.
Asthepriceof participation,
the
MinistryofLabourwascreated.Inresponse tothestrikewaveof
theprevious year,a committeeof Parliamentunderthechair-
manship ofJ.H.Whitley framedproposalsforanorganization
of
industryunderJointStanding IndustrialCouncils providing
equalrepresentationfor employersandtradeunionists.These
councilswere to be complementedby works committees,oneto
eachfactory.TheWhitleyCouncils
proposal
sought
to meetsev-
eral concerns.Onewasfor the perpetuation
and institutionali-
zationof wartimeexperience
in the settlement
of specicin-
dustrialization
issueswage
rates,workingconditions,
techno-
logical
change,
etc.Inthisrespect,
theWhitley
proposals
could
be seenas a recognition
by Parliament
of laborsright to
RIVALIMPERIALISMS 179
collective
bargainingrecognition,
in effect,
thattheworking
classhadattained
a collective
strength
sufficient
to compel
ac-
knowledgment of thisrightby employers
andthestate.A broader
goal of the Whitley proposalswas,however,to found a new
structureof productionrelationsuponclasscollaboration.
In this
concept,thecouncils wouldbecomea constitutional
starting
point for industrialgovernance
to be elaboratedby future
practice.
Whitleycouncilsweresetup by mutualagreement
in
industries
with newlyorganized tradeunions.Theywere
shunnedbyunionsin thealready
strongly
organized
industries,
e.g.,mining,railways,and transport.Only a small numberof
workscommittees
weresetup,andthesewerecreated
byem-
ployerinitiatives
aimingata worker-employer
community
in
whichunions wouldplayalessadversarial
role.When,
early
in 1919,
theBritishgovernment
faced
theprospect
ofaparalyzing
strikein thekeyindustries,
LloydGeorge calleda NationalIn-
dustrialConference
thatattemptedto dealbothwiththematerial
wages
andhoursissues
andwithlonger
terminstitutional
ques-
tions.Thepostwarslump,however,
disciplinedworkermili-
tancy,andthegovernment
largelyignoredtherecommendations
oftheconference.
In 1921,
thetradeunionmembersresigned.
InBritain,
thestate
tooktheleadinpromoting
acorporatist
structure
for industry.In Germany,
theemployers
tooktheiniti-
ative
atatimewhen
thestate
wasdisintegrating.
Intheimpending
chaos
ofdefeat,
industrialists
discounted
thediscredited
military
andcivilianbureaucraciesandtheinarticulate
middleclassesas
validallies.Perceptive
industrialleaders
sawtheirsalvation
in
alliance
withtradeunionleaders,
especially
those
in heavy
in-
dustry.Therewassomeobjective
basisforthealliance
in thefact
thatworkers
realwages
hadgrownalong
withcompanyprots
inwarproduction.
Bothwouldhave
astake
in maintaining
high
exports
andbothcouldturntheinationthathadbegun
with
warnancingto theirbenet.An alliancewith thetradeunions
wouldgiveindustrialists
someleverage
withaSocialDemocratic
Partystrengthened
byGermanys defeatandwith AlliedPowers
endorsingthenotionof democratization
oferstwhile monarchic-
military
political
structures.
Themining
industrys
Hugo
Stinnes
negotiatedan agreement
with CarlLegienof the SPD-afliated
180 STATES,WORLDORDERS,
ANDPRODUCTION
unionsto setupapyramidofjointlabor-management
arbitration
committeesknown asthe Arbeitsgemeinschaft.
This institution,
thoughsetup withoutstateparticipation,
wasrecognized
in the
earlydecree
legislation
oftherevolutionary
regime
thatassumed
political power in November1918.
Parallel with this employer-union initiative was the
growthof theworkscouncilsmovement, i.e.,organs
of worker
representation
withinparticular
factories.
Suchbodieshadbeen
recognizedasWorkerandEmployee Chambers undera war-
time law of 1916.Contraryto the British case,whereworks
councilshadbeenenvisagedin theoriginalWhitleyproposalbut
rarelysetup asa general
practice,
in Germany
[andalsoin Italy
afterthe defeat)workscouncilsbecamea modeof workerrep-
resentationdistinct from trade unions and, in the perceptionof
someunion leaders,rivals to the unions.
The increase in working-class strength brought about
throughthewarwasthuscountered in bothBritainandGermany
by initiativesfromthestatein onecaseandfromemployers in
the othertowarda corporativegovernance of industry.These
initiativeswereat leastpartiallysuccessful,
but they did not in
anywaymeetthedemands
foreconomic
reorganization
towhich
some elements of the labor and socialist movements were at-
tached.On the one hand were the advocatesof guild socialism
in England
andof theideasof KarlKorschin Germany.
These
had afnities with syndicalistthoughtand envisaged
the self-
government
of industries
byworkersorganized
ona corporative
basiscorporatisn1
withoutcapitalists
andwiththestateplaying
a minimal role. The works councilsmovementtted in with this
approach.
Ontheotherhandweretheadvocates
ofamoretechno-
cratic state socialism.The terms socialization and nationaliza-
tion confused both approaches.
In both countries,the issueof nationalizationwasdecided
in the coal industry. The provisional revolutionarygovernment
in Germany
proclaimed
theprincipleof coalindustrysocializa-
tion at the end of 1918and setup a committeeto examinehow
to goaboutit. Theproposalthatemerged
envisaged
a supervisory
organonwhichcompany
directors,
workers,
consumers,
andthe
statewould be represented.
Ultimatelya compulsoryCoalAs-
sociationwas set up on which worker and consumerrepresen-
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 18 1
tation was ineffective and real power rested with the employers.
It became little more than ofcially consecratedcartel.
In Britain, confronted by demands for worker control in
the mines, which had been taken over by the state during the
war, Lloyd George appointed a royal commission to study the
matter. The chairman of the commission,Mr. JusticeSankey,
rather unexpectedly sided with the workers and came out for
nationalization with worker control. Lloyd George, politically
aligned with capitals opposition to nationalization, at rst tem-
porized, then proposed an alternative to nationalization in which
the industry would be concentrated into large corporations with
vaguely empowered joint labormanagementconciliation boards.
Meanwhile, he tested the solidarity with the miners of other
sectors of the labor movement and the degreeof commitment of
the workers to nationalization. It developed that the miners were
not supported by the Trades Union Congressand that the workers
were more concerned about the bread-and-butter issue of wage
rates that would be paid once the mines reverted from state
control to private ownership. [Since 1917, when the mines were
unied under state control, all miners were paid on the samerate
scale where previously under fragmented private ownership,
small marginal mines had paid less than others.) The prospect of
a nationwide worker mobilization behind the demand for nation-
alization had passed.
The corporatist experiments of the late wartime and early
postwar periods in Britain and Germany were responsesby state
and employers to a worker offensive. The offensive was, however,
diverse in its objectivestorn between the aims of worker con-
trol, nationalization with planning, and immediate material
gainsand divided in its leadership. By late 1920 and early 1921
its force was spent and there was very little to show for it. No
nationalizations. Few signicant gains in material conditions. An
increase in unemployment. And the loss by the working classes
of the crucial political inuence they had possessedin the im-
mediate aftermath of war. In 1920-21, the working classes
snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Thenceforward, they
were on the defensive, in retreat. As the working classesweak-
ened,sodid the interestof stateandemployersin corporatism.
The Whitley councils all but fadedawayby 1921.43
In Germany,
182 STATES, WORLD ORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
levelsof welfareemerges:
at the top, thoseprotectedby enter-
prise-related
benetsadditionalto thosebenetsuniversally
availablethroughsocialsecurity;below,the dependentclients
of the welfare state.Someof the latter, like old-agepensioners,
are sufciently numerousto be courtedby politicians.Others
constitutea categoryof moreor lesspermanentlyunemployed
whomightposea threatto thesocialorder.Thecorporative state
avoidsthis dangerby ensuringthat thesegroupsremainfrag-
mentedand depoliticized.
RichardTitmuss,philosopherand analystof the post-
World War II British welfare state,expressedhis critical disillu-
sionment with the extent to which a welfare state had been
achievedwhenhe put the question:Who disposesof the social
surplus?
In theemergence
of a corporatist
pressure-group
polity
asthemanipulatorofwelfaresystems,
heperceived
thedistortion
of the idea of a societyorganizedto createsocialequity. He saw
that powerfuland very largelyunaccountable interestgroups
werecomingto havea preponderant inuenceoverthe disposi-
tion of the socialsurplus.Thealternativehe advocatedwasstate
ownershipandstateeconomicplanningby publiclyaccountable
representatives. Yetthepracticalprospectof achievingTitmuss
preferred
statehasbeennegated
by thepoliticsof thewelfare-
nationalist state.
The economicmanagementrecord of the welfare-nation-
alist form of state has not been notably successful. Its economic
interventionswereincapableof pulling the industrial nationsout
of theDepressionduringthe19303.Attemptsat incomespolicies
in the postwarperioda carryoverof welfare-nationalist
state
practices~werelikewiseineffective.Military Keynesianism
in
World War II worked better than civilian Keynesianism.The
welfarecomponentof the stateprovedto be dependenton the
nationalist component.This lack of successin peacetimeeco-
nomicmanagement mustbe perceivedas a counterpartto the
limitationstripartismplacedonthescopeof thestates economic
initiative. Beingrestrictedto a reactiverole in relationto the
market,the statelackedtheabilityto conceiveandcarrythrough
anorganization of productionanddistributionthatwouldreplace
themarket.It couldtinkeror ne tune; it couldnot design.
Finally,theaccumulation process wasthreatened bybeing
RIVALIMPERIALISMS 189
restricted
tothenational
economy.
Thiswastragically
apparent
in the beggarmy-neighbor
climateof the 1930s.Accumulation
couldbeextended,it seemed,
onlyby imperialistic
expansion
andwar,or else,possibly,
withina newworldhegemony in
which nationaleconomies
wereonceagain,asin the mid-nine-
teenthcentury,subordinated
to a worldeconomy
in whicha
world processof accumulation
couldproceed.The ineffective-
nessof welfare-nationalist
statepoliciesopenedthequestion
whetherKeynesianism,
whichhadbeentriedwithonlylimited
effecton the nationallevel,mightnot be moreeffectiveon the
worldlevelasa regulative
mechanism
fora worldeconomy.
But this speculationimplied a differentform of stateanda dif-
ferent world order.
THE F ASCIST
CORPORATIVE STATE
revaluing
thelirain 1926
mirrored
Winston
Churchills
reval-
uationof sterling
in theprevious
year.Later,following
theex-
amples
of BritainandtheUnitedStates,
NaziGermany
aban-
donedan international
monetary
standard
to construct
the
tightest
ofalltheeconomicblocs
intowhichtheworldeconomy
fragmented.
Fascist
Italyclungto thegoldblocwithFrance,
Belgium,
theNetherlands,
andSwitzerland
untilthatremnant
of
an earlierinternational
monetary
orderdissolved
in the later
19303.Both Italian and Germanfascistspracticedscal
conservatism.
Underfascism,
however,theseeconomic
policyobjectives
werepursued in acontextin whichbothparliamentary
account-
abilityandtheinstitutionalized
formsoflabor-management
con-
flict hadbrokendown.Theybrokedownasbothcauseand
consequence
oftheadvance
offascist
power
itself.
Thedominant
economic
classes
lostcondence
in theabilityof theirownpo-
liticalparties
tosecure
theindustrial
order
thatwasacondition
forprots.Fascistpreeminence
inthepractice
ofillegal
violence
convincedthemthatonlythefascists
couldrestore
andguarantee
thisorder.Fascism
accomplishedthisthroughanimposedstate-
corporatist
system
in industry.
Strikes
wereabolished
andstrict
labordiscipline
enforced.
Workers
weregivensomeaccess
to
political
power
asachannel
forresolving
grievances.
Anideology
of enterprise
community,
betriebsgemeinschaft
in its German
form,wasproclaimed.
Although
in theory
theworker-employe
community wasoneofreciprocal
obligationsubordinated
toan
overriding
common obligation
to nationor state,
in practice
it
wasbiasedin favorof the employer.Therightsof management
became
supremein theworkplace.
To achievetheir goals,the dominanteconomic
classes
connived
to create
a powertheycouldnotthemselves
control.
Thefascistrulershadtheirowngoals,andtheywouldusein-
dustry
instrumentally
topursue
these
goals.
They
didnothesitate
to intervene
in theeconomy by securing
thevoluntaryacquies-
cenceof businessmenif possible
butusingforceif necessary.
A
commandeconomywassuperimposeduponthe economy
dominated
bycorporate
monopolies.
Yetif thecapacity
toapply
directinstrumental
powerlaywiththefascist
rulers,structural
power
remained
withthedominant
economic
class.
Thefascist
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 191
in political
structures
fromtheemergence
ofa workingclass
challengein theimmediate
postwar
yearstotherecasting
and
restabilization
of thebourgeois
orderin the mid-1920s.
What
permitted
stability
after
1924
wasashiftinthefocalpoint
of decisionmaking.Fragmented
parliamentary
majorities
yielded
toministerial
bureaucracies,
orsometimes
directly
to
party
councils,
whereinterestgroup
representatives
could
more
easily
workoutsocial
burdens
andrewards.
Thisdisplacement
permitted
a newcompromise:
a corporatist
equilibrium
in
whichprivate
interests
assumed
thetasksthatparliamentary
coalitions
founddifficultto c0nfront.65
Fascism
played
a roleofmaintaining
bourgeois
orderin two
distinct
stages.
In therst stage,
fascism
wasdecisive
onlyin
Italy;inthesecond,inbothGermany andItaly.
In theearly1920s,theItalianbourgeoisie
wasunable
through
itsownmeans
(political
parties
andeconomic
power)
to
exorcise
the demonof popularrebellionandthe challenge
to
property.
Fascism
acted
inplace
ofthebourgeoisie
through
a
combination
ofstate
corporatist
industrial
structures
andliberal
economic
policies.
InGermanyduring
thesame
period,
thework-
ingclass
wasdivided
andtheindustrial
bourgeoisie
wasableto
cometo anunderstanding
withonesection
oftheworking
class
in ordertosuppress
theother.
Indicativeofthisunderstanding
wastheactiontakenbytheSocial
Democraticminister
ofdefense
GustavNoske in January
1919tocallin theanti-Bolshevik
Free
Corps
ofdemobilized
armyofcers,
tocrush
a left-wing
labor
movementin Berlin.The Germanindustrialbourgeoisie
wasnot
alonein itsefforttobuildabasis
forunderstanding
withmoderate
elements
ofthepolitical
andtrade-union
wingsoftheGerman
labormovement.
TheAlliedgovernments
werepreoccupied
that
Bolshevism
mightspread
in thewakeof Germanys military
defeat.
TheGermangeneral
staffremained
intactasa resultof
the armistice
and ableto backthis effort.FieldMarshalvon
Hindenberg
entered
intoa compact
withFriedrich
Ebert,
then
leaderoftheSocialDemocratic
Partyandlatertherst president
oftheRepublic,
tofight
Bolshevism.
Thus,
withthecollaboration
ofapartoftheGerman
working
class
through
itspolitical
and
trade-union
representatives,
anewinstitutional
structure
wasput
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 195
in political
structures
fromtheemergence
ofa working-class
challenge
in theimmediate
postwar
years
totherecasting
and
restabilization
ofthebourgeois
orderin themid1920s.
What
permitted
stability
after1924
wasashiftinthefocalpoint
of decisionmaking.Fragmented
parliamentary
majorities
yielded
toministerial
bureaucracies,
orsometimes
directly
to
party
councils,
whereinterestgroup
representatives
couldmore
easily
workoutsocial
burdens
andrewards.
Thisdisplacement
permitted
a newcompromise:
a corporatist
equilibrium
in
whichprivate
interests
assumed
thetasks
thatparliamentary
coalitionsfounddifficult to confront.
Fascism played
aroleofmaintainingbourgeois
orderin two
distinct
stages.
In thefirststage,
fascism
wasdecisive
onlyin
Italy;in thesecond,
in bothGermany
andItaly.
In theearly1920s,
theItalianbourgeoisie
wasunable
through
itsownmeans [political
parties
andeconomic
power)
to
exorcise
thedemon
of popularrebellion
andthechallenge
to
property.
Fascism
acted
in place
ofthebourgeoisie
through
a
combination
ofstatecorporatist
industrial
structures
andliberal
economic
policies.
InGermany
during
thesame
period,
thework-
ingclass
wasdivided
andtheindustrial
bourgeoisie
wasable
to
come
toanunderstanding
withonesection
oftheworking
class
in ordertosuppress
theother.
Indicative
ofthisunderstanding
wastheaction
takenbytheSocial
Democratic minister
ofdefense
GustavNoskein January
1919to callin theanti-Bolshevik
Free
Corps
ofdemobilized
armyofficers,
tocrush
aleftwing
labor
movement
in Berlin.TheGerman
industrialbourgeoisie
wasnot
aloneinitsefforttobuildabasisforunderstanding
withmoderate
elements of thepoliticalandtrade-union
wingsoftheGerman
labormovement. TheAlliedgovernments
werepreoccupied
that
Bolshevism
mightspread
in thewakeof Germanys military
defeat.
TheGermangeneral
staffremained
intactasaresultof
thearmistice
andableto backthiseffort.FieldMarshal
von
Hindenberg
entered
intoa compact
withFriedrich
Ebert,
then
leader
oftheSocial
Democratic
Partyandlatertherst president
oftheRepublic,
toghtBolshevism.
Thus,
withthecollaboration
ofapartoftheGerman
working
class
through
itspolitical
and
trade-union
representatives,
anewinstitutional
structure
wasput
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 195
aphase
ofrelative
truce.
Italyhasexemplied
bothmodels
in
thefascismo
ofMussolini andthetrasformismo
ofGiolitti.
In-
deed,fascism
whenit came topowerincorporated
thepraxisof
trasformismo.
Mussolinisfirstgovernment
wasasbroadly
com-
prehensive
a coalition
of existing
parliamentary
fragmentsas
Giolitti evercouldhavemustered.
Fascism
hascometo powerin situations
of acutepolari-
zation
ofanapparently
irreconcilable
kindsuchasarose
in the
agricultural
andindustrial
revolt
inItalyin1919-20,
during
the
Popular
Front
andcivilwarin Spain
inthe1930s,
andduring
theGreek
civilwarafterWorldWarII. Similarcrises
ofhegemony
havebeenrecurrent
in late-industrializing
countriesin thepost-
WorldWar11period,including
somein LatinAmerica,
where
capitalist
production
hadbecome
implanted
butthenational
bourgeoisie
hadbeen
nomoresuccessful
in establishing
hege-
mony
thantheItalian
hadinthepost-World
WarI era.Italian
fascismcreated
the prototype
of the authoritarian
fasciststate
andelaboratedandinstitutionalized
statecorporatist
socialre-
lationsin production.
TheArgentine,Chilean,andUruguayan
military-bureaucratic
states
ofthe1970s
and1980s
areitslatter-
daymanifestations,
FrancosSpain
andtheGreece
ofthecolonels
having
passed
in theinterim.TheItalyofChristian
Democracy,
postFranco
Spain,
theGreece
ofCaramanlis,
thePortugal
ofthe
post-carnation-revolution
period,
allexemplify
thecartel
state.
Fascist
authoritarianism
freezes
classantagonisms
under
acloakofpopulist
nationalism
backed
byrepression
ofdissent.
It gives
thepettybourgeoisie
possession
of state
jobs,turnsa
blindeyetolandlord
violence
andprotects
theagricultural
in-
terest,
continues
thestate
rolein capital
accumulation,
andcom-
pensates
repression
ofindustrial
labor
protest
byaccording
a
certain
statusin thestate
to ofcialorganizations
of established
industrialworkers.Thecartelstateallowsmorefreedom of
expression
andsome
mobility
in interclass
relations.
Struggles
canbemore
open
sothatthebalance
ofclass
forces
canbetested.
At thesametime,thisconflictis verylargelyinstitutionalized
andtakesplacewithinthestate, whichremains thestructure
throughwhichcontending
classes gettheirpayoffs.
Unionsmay
beableto demonstrate
anincrease
in strength
andin allegiance
among
workers
(asinItalyduring
thehotautumnof1969]
and
RIVALIMPERIALISMS 197
therebyclaimandsecurea strengthening
of theirinstitutional
positionwithinthestate[controlof thelaborministry,more
securestatuswithin enterprises).
But maintenance
of the cartel
statedepends
onmoderation
in thelevelof conict;anyreturn
to totalandirreconcilable
conictwouldthreaten
areversion
to
authoritarianism.
Thecartelstateappears
to effecta transformation
of state
corporatism
intotripartism.
Thedirecting
roleof thestateis,
indeed,dismantledandmoreinitiativeallowedto autonomous
labororganizations.
Thestate,however,maintains muchof the
mechanisms of controloverunionsthat couldbe invokedin
emergency,
andunionscontinueto directtheiractiontowardthe
state.
Strikes
aremorepoliticalthaneconomic,
leading
to state
intervention
in thenegotiating
process.
Thuscorporatism
atthe
national
levelremains,
though
thestates
rolein it maybemore
mutedthanin theauthoritarianphases.
Forthe criticaldifferentiation
betweenfascismandthe
morebenignformofcartelstate,
thedecisivefactormustbefound
infascisms
disposition
toviolence.
Petty-bourgeois
shock
troops
andstreet
gangs
furnished
thehuman
material
forviolence,
but
thedisposition
itselfseems
to lie deeper
thanclassstructure
in
thehumanpsyche. In thisrespect,
Gramsciseparated
himself
fromthelimitedclass
analysesoffascism
made byothermarxists
duringtheyearsmarxism wasdominated bytheComintern.
As
early as 1921he wrote in the OrdineNuovo:
It hasnowbecome
evident
thatfascism
canonlypartlybe
assumedto bea classphenomenon,
a movement of political
forceswhichareconscious
of havinga realgoal:. . . it has
become
anunleashing
ofelemental
forces
withinthebourgeois
systemof economicandpoliticalgovernment,
which cannotbe
braked:
fascism
is thenamefortheprofound
decay
of Italian
society. . . .71
THE REDISTRIBUTIVE
PARTY-COMMANDED STATE
Thefascistcorporative
statedeviatedfromthewelfare-nationalist
form of state in becominga frameworkfor the continuation of
capitalistdevelopmentwherebourgeoishegemonywas either
absentor had broken down. A quite different mode of develop-
ment was initiated by the state that took form following the
Russian revolution. This was a redistributive mode development
carried on under the leadershipof a revolutionaryparty with a
monopoly of state power.
The redistributiveParty-commanded
form of statedid not
evolve out of a transformation of the liberal state.In the two most
signicant casesthe Soviet Union and Chinathe form
emergedout of the crisis of old-regimeagrarian-bureaucratic
states.
In Czarist Russia,private industry was introduced and
encouragedunderstatetutelageandfor purposes ofthestate[e.g.,
producingmilitary supplies).In thatrespect,Czaristindustriali-
zationwas analogousto the mercantilismof the seventeenth-
centuryFrenchmonarchy.Thesocialrelationsof productionin
industrywereinitially adaptedfromthe peasant-lord patternof
serfdom,thoughfollowingthe endingof serfdomandthe initia-
tion of reformssuchasthoseof Stolypin in agriculture,the Czarist
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 199
of enterprises
andotherproductiveunitsandofthevariouslevels
of economic and social bureaucracies; the scientific-humanistic
elite; the much larger categoryof degree-holdingintelligentsia
who staff the middle levels of state,party, and economicorgan-
izations; the established skilled workers and technicians; non-
establishedworkers; richer and poorer peasants.As this new
structureof social categoriesbecomesa relatively stablecong-
uration, the party-statehas to take it into accountin its task of
directingthe developmentof the economy.The war of movement
must accordinglygive place to a war of position. The party, in
advancingits policies, will rely on the support of somesocial
groupsmorethan others.
The essence of Stalinism, the revolution from above,
was that the top party-political leadershipmonopolizedpower
and preventedthe other categoriesfrom acquiring any separate
senseof identity or any legitimacyof their own, distinct from the
legitimationof politicalorthodoxyconferredbythepoliticallead-
ership.Thepost-Stalinerasawthe emergence of boththe lead-
ing cadresandthe scientifichumanistic elite asdistinctsocial
forces. Some critical observersfrom within the system perceived
a historiccompromise"Z throughwhichthepoliticalleadership
recognized the existenceof thesesocialforces,andtheyin turn
acknowledgedthe hegemonyof the political leadership.
Hegemony is,of course,adifferentthingfromdictatorship.
The hegemonicpolitical leadershiphasto takeaccountof the
distinctive interests of the social forces on whose acquiescence
its exerciseof powerin a measure
depends.Onefactorfavoring
the continuedhegemonyof the Sovietpolitical leadershipgroup
is its ability to mobilizethe supportof the upperlevelof estab-
lishedworkers,the engineering-technical personnel(ITRs]who
have been the dominant element in the Soviet trade unions and
closeto management.
An ideologicalconsequence
of the lead-
ershipsreliance on this support has been a propensity to en-
couragepopulist,manualist,antiintellectualsentiments
thatcan
havethe effectof isolatingmanifestationsof devianceamongthe
scientic-humanistic elite. Socially, this support relationship
could lead toward the consolidation of a labor aristocracy enjoy-
ing corporatistrelationswith management
anddominatingover
any tendenciestowarddeviancyfrom a subproletariat
of non-
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 207
character.
Second,
and
closely
related
tothe
first,
isacontradict
betweenthe commandhierarchyandalienatingcharacterof work
in industryorganized
onthesamepatternascapitalistproduction
andthe expectationof newnonalienating
workingrelationships
kindled by revolution.
Third, the rationality of central planning is limited by
inefciencies,but changesin centralplanning might well leadto
lower rates of redistributive accumulation. For instance, to seek
greaterefcienciesby givinggreaterscopeto marketmechanisms
might encourage corporativeengrossment of earningswith the
result that less would flow into central redistribution. Alterna-
RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 209
hierarchicalbasisof established
statepowerandwouldprobably
also lead to lower central accumulation.
Fourth, the reemergenceof civil society after an initial
phasein whichthePartyhasanexclusiveinitiativein reshaping
society requires that a modus vivendi be reached between state
structures
andemergent
socialforces.Thisconcerns
particularly
the relationships between Party elite, technical intelligentsia,
humanistic intelligentsia, and workers.
FURTHER ANALYTICAL
PROPOSITION S
PAX Al\/IERICANA
GLOBAL HEGEMONY
control.
The
history
ofinternational
economic
institution
buildin
afterWorld WarII tracesthe victory of the liberal internationalists
over the proponentsof statecapitalism?The way in which the
InternationalMonetaryFundsmodusoperandiwasput in place
in March 1946gavethe Fund powerful leverageover economic
policyin decit countries.WhereKeyneshaddefended theprin-
cipleof unconditionalityin drawingrightson theFundsoasnot
to compromisea governmentsability to pursue expansionist
policiesinternally,loanswouldin factnowbemadeconditional
upon the adjustmentof nationaleconomicpoliciesto favora
returnto paymentsequilibrium,andthis would mostlikely re-
quire debtorsto abandonexpansionary measures
for full em-
ployment.Eventhoughthe Fund did not beginto operatefor
someyearsthereafterbecauseof the onsetof the Cold War and
the exceptionalmeasurestakenby the United Statesfor European
recovery,the future policy lines for the world economicsystem
were made clear at that time.
The principalinstrumentalitythroughwhich the United
Statesshapedthe postwar world economicorder was the Mar-
shall Plan. The conceptof multilateralism was embodiedin the
provisionthat the countriesreceivingMarshallfunds should
agreeamongthemselvesthrough the Organizationfor European
EconomicCooperationon the distribution of thesefunds. They
would also through this agencydevelop a practice of mutual
negotiationoverthe framingof nationaleconomicpolicies.Com-
mon policy conceptionsenvisagingmovementtoward a more
integratedmultilateralworld economyconsistent
with U.S.pol-
PAX AMERICANA 215
postwaryears,wasstemmed.TheMarshallPlanwasableto bring
about a center-right orientation in the domestic politics of West-
ernEuropeduring the 1950sand 1960sthat providedthe political
basis for the building of neoliberal states.
By 1958,the WesternEuropeangovernments,their econ-
omiesfully recovered,were able to maketheir currenciesfreely
convertible. Six of these countries joined in a common market
and seven others in a free-trade association. These steps signied
the readiness of the Western European countries to participate
without basic reservations in the U.S.-sponsoredworld economic
order. In 1960, the coordinating agency for economic policies of
the Western European countriesrenamed as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD)-was ex-
pandedto include the United States,Canada,and Iapan.All the
major capitalist countriestherebysignied their commitmentto
the new world order.
U.S. initiative, based on that countrys economic and mil-
itary preponderance, thus led the Western European countries
and Japan toward a world economy with free access to raw
materials; free movement of goods, capital, and technology; and
the elimination of discrimination in economic relations. In such
a world economicspace,capital accumulationcould transcend
national limitations. Only the Soviet sphere remained outside
this design.
The new world economy grew very largely as the conse-
quenceof the U.S. hegemonicrole and the global expansionof
U.S.-based corporations. U.S. hegemonic actions included the
Marshall Plan and extensive military expenditures abroad (no-
tably in Koreaand Indochina,the Indian Ocean,and the Persian
Gulf). U.S. corporations moved capital on a large scale, particu-
larly into Europe.Thesetwo factors createda large and accu-
mulating U.S. payments decit.
Initially, the ood of dollars stimulatedeconomicgrowth
in Europe and elsewhere. From the 1960s, it created inationary
pressures.From the mid-1970s, the dollar ow continued as the
world economy was stalled in prolonged recession. Burgeoning
unemployment coincided with continuing inflation as Keynes
liquidity trap reemerged.5Only the U.S. government might
have been able to control the decit, but it was a convenience to
PAX AMERICANA 217
U.S. world policy that foreign rms and governments were ready
to accept and hold dollars. Seigneurageof the worlds money
gavethe U.S. governmentunlimited credit abroadto pay for its
foreign expenditures without having to compensate by liquidat-
ing U.S. assets and increasing taxes on U.S. corporations and
citizens.
The U.S.public debtbecamea world debtasan increasing
proportion of it washeld by foreigners.The moredollarsforeign-
ers held, the more they becamehostageto U.S. hegemonic policy.
Some countries had specic interests implicated in the dollar
outow. West Germany agreedto accept more and more dollars
in order to maintain a U.S. military presence in Europe. Arab
countries accumulated big dollar balancesby increasing the price
of oil, which was denominated exclusively in dollars. U.S. policy
makers were able to ignore the admonitions of some foreign
governments that they should control the decit and adopted an
attitude of benign neglect. The international nancial institu-
tions-the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank-
behaved as accessoriesto U.S. policy.
The new hegemonic order was held in place by a cong-
uration of different forms of state whose common feature was the
role each form played in adjusting national economic policies to
the dynamics of the world economy. The central premise of
hegemonic order was that the world economy is a positive-sum
game in which some businesses and some national economies
may benet more than the others but in which all have the
opportunity to gain. The ideology derived from this premise
representsthe highest interest of all countries as being to faciliate
the expansion of the world economy and to avoid restrictive
national measures of economic policy that would be in contra-
diction in the long run with world-level expansion. The inter-
national institutions of this world orderprincipal among them
the International Monetary Fundwere able to use both incen-
tives and sanctions to secure compliance on the part of the more
reluctant governments and disabled national economies.
Two principal forms of state constituted the most active
participants in the world economy that emergedfollowing World
War II. The neoliberal form of state managedthose national econ-
omies with the most highly developed productive forcesthe
218 STATES, WORLD ORDERS, AND PRODUCTION
Moderate
levels
ofination
were
the
consequence
ofcor-
poratisttripartiteeconomicmanagement. Suchination wasthe
price paid by the neoliberalstatefor the moderatingof social
conict among the most powerfully organizedeconomic and
social forces. Moderate ination had a redistributory effect fa-
voring both corporationsand establishedlabor though disadvan-
taging unorganizedgroups excludedfrom the corporatistcom-
pact.Higherlevelsof ination had,however,a contraryeffect.
At a certain threshold the stimulus to growth turned into a dis-
incentive to invest and a consequential downturn in growth. A
series of factors could combine to reversethe growth trend: ina-
tion led to trade decit and pressure on currency exchangerates;
monetaryrestrictions,i.e.,higherinterestrates,intendedto com-
bat both ination and exchange depreciation, inhibited invest-
ment while raising the cost to capital of debt service;unions
would pressharder to maintain the inationary incomesexpec-
tations of established workers, narrowing capitals prot margins
and creatingfurther disincentivesfor investment.This negative
spiral did not materializeuntil the mid 1970s.The neoliberal
stateworked well enoughduring the long postwarphaseof eco
nomic growth.It provedunableto copeeffectivelywhen inatior
combinedwith surplus capacityand unemployment.
The world economywasthe externalconstraintupon the
neoliberal state. Whereas the welfare-nationalist state had sought
to createits own protected autonomousspherewithin which
national goalscould be pursued,the neoliberalstateourished
or languished with the world economy.The major capitalist
states,foremostamongthem the United States,could exertsome
inuence over the world economy. They had differing concep-
tions of their roles in this respect. The United Statesand Britain
generallyespousedthe pure conceptof neoliberalism:primacy
224 STATES, WORLD ORDERS, AND PRODUCTION
THE NEOMERCANTILIST
DEVELOPMENTALIST STATE
repression
protect
foreign
investments
andsafeguard
theservic-
ing of debt.
The statethat seizesthe initiativein the state-society
im-
passewilltrytoincorporate
some elements
ofsociety
withinits
sphere,
underitsdirectsponsorship
andcontrol.
Theseefforts
usually
encompass theindustrial
workersandsomepartsofthe
ruralpopulation.
Theattempt
toincorporate
industrial
workers
ofteninvolvesdomesticating
or replacinganyformsof labor
organization
notcontrolled
bythestate.
Incorporation
oftherural
population
usually
implies
setting
upnewstate-sponsored
co-
operative
organizations.
Corporatist
initiatives
ofthiskindare
oftenundertaken
in atimeof socialcrisiseitherasapreemptive
response
bythestatetothethreat
thatautonomous
class-based
organizations
mightgaintheallegiance
ofthese
social
groups
or
asameans
ofneutralizing
suchorganizations
wheretheyalready
exist.State-sponsoredorganizations arealsoa means of giving
thedevelopmentalist program a basisof popular support.
Cor
poratism canresulteitherfromtherulers desiretocreate
asecure
base ofsupportforstateinitiatives
orfromfearthatindependent
initiatives
arising
in civilsocietywill thwartstateaims.
Thefirst
leads toadegree ofmobilizationatstate initiative;
thesecond, to
a degree
of demobilization
understatesupervision.
In both
cases,
themobilization
ofsociety
ispartialandcontrolled.
Socialconditionscharacteristic
of Third Worldcountries
arein some
respects
propitious
forthispattern
ofstate-dominated
organization.
Dependentandinstrumental
attitudes
andbehavior
patterns
tendto prevail
among newlyurbanizedpopulations.
Autonomy,whether
forindividuals
ororganizations,
usually
re-
quires
adegree
ofadaptation
totheurban-industrial
milieuand
anaccumulation
of resources
sufficient
to giveself-condence.
Bothconditions
areusuallymissingin ThirdWorldurbanset-
tings.Reforms
designed
to beneturbanmarginals
comemore
frequently
fromincorporative
initiatives
ofthestate
thanfrom
thepressure
ofmass
revolt.
Thistends toconrmthedependent
pattern
ofbehavior.
Mobilizing
experiences
in different
coun-
triesdo,however,
leavelegacies
of autonomous
organizations,
e.g.,thePeronist
tradeunionsin Argentina,
thetin miners
or-
ganization
inBolivia,
theAPRAlinked
unions
inPeru.
Residues
of autonomy
maythuspersist
in uneasy
coexistence
withthe
234 STATES,WORLDORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
ported
credit
andlocally
based
political
power
resulted
infarmer
indebtedness
andareturnof dominant-subordinate
relationships
in the countryside
andin marginalization
of partof the rural
population
intosubsistence
farming.
Halfhearted
landreforms
in
IndiaandPakistan
generally
did not breakthe localpowerof
landlords.
In Indonesia,
theprospectof landreformimplicit in Pres-
identSukarnos movetowardcloseralliancewith theIndonesian
CommunistPartyin 1965was counteredby a military coup
supported
bytheU.S.Central
Intelligence
Agency
andthemas-
sacreof morethanhalfamillion people.In Brazil,atacitdivision
of powers came aboutfromthe1930sbetween urbanbased po-
liticalparties
andrurallandlords,
whichleftthelatterafreehand
in ruralareas
[rulebylocalcolonelsorstrong
men)andresulted
in violent repressionof recurrentattemptsto organizepeasant
and subsistence farmercooperation and resistance
to landlord
power,asin thepeasant
leagues
of thenordeste
in the19603.
Whenthepopulistpresident
IoaoGoulartseemed
to beencour-
aginga mobilization
of peasants,
urbanworkers,
andrank-and-
le militarysuchaswouldthreaten
toupsetthebalance
ofsocial
forcesin a radicaldirection,he wasremovedby a militarycoup
in which covertU.S. encouragement
was alsoa factor.
Thepoliticallimitsofpopulism
werethusmanifested
by
militarycoupwhenpopulistregimes
seemed
to beturningto-
wardradical
popular
mobilization.
Themilitaryregimes
thattook
overprovedtobebetter
abletopreside
overadifferent
direction
of change:
theremovalof obstacles
to capitalist
development.
Military-bureaucratic
statesexpanded
thestate
sectorsofnational
economies;
theybargained
with multinational
corporations
and
persuaded
themto undertake
moreinnovative
anddevelop-
mentalactivitiesin the country;theychanneled
foreignborrow-
ingfromtransnational
privatebanksintonational
[publicand
private)
investment
projects;
andtheyfacilitated
thedisplace-
mentoftraditional
agriculture,
bothintensive
small-holder
farm-
ingandwastefulextensive
latifundiafarming,
by indigenous
green-revolution
commercialfarmingand foreigncontrolled
agribusiness.
At the lower reachesof the socialhierarchies,a new bal-
anceof forceswasalsoemerging.
Between
theabjectpovertyand
Z40 STATES, WORLD ORDERS, AND PRODUCTION
social disorganization
of the primitive labor marketand the
closelysupervisedspheresof enterprisecorporatismand state
corporatism,thenonestablishedworkforceof theenterprise
labor
market.grew appreciably.
Nonestablished workersconsistof dis-
tinct segments:green-revolution-promoted commercialagricul-
ture hasexpandedwageemploymentin agriculture;small indig-
enous industries have grown with ofcial encouragement;and
largerindustries,both national and foreign,employmorenones-
tablished labor. The latter segment,often working in proximity
to the more protected and privileged establishedworkers, are
mostlikely to becomea selfconscious
and articulateworking
class.Agricultural laborers,experiencinga growingpolarization
of rural society, may also becomeavailable for protest move-
ments.Thesenewly mobilized workerscould becomea threatto
the stability of domestic politics.
Capitalist development led by neomercantilist states
achieved some notable successesduring the decade of the 1970s
with the stimulus of foreignborrowing. During this decade,the
growthratesof countrieslike Brazil,Mexico,SouthKorea,and
Taiwan measure this achievement. This pattern of development
alsogeneratedinternal socialtensionsin someof thesecountries;
it fosteredwidening income differentialsbetweensocial classes
andregions.Foreign-linked
rms usinghightechnology
enjoyed
relatively high prot rates; local enterprises,maximizing their
commercialadvantagein local markets,had lower ratesof prot.
Established workers in the state corporatist sector received a
certainmeasureof protectiongiving them advantages relative to
enterprise-labor-market workersand the unemployed.Commer-
cialization of agriculture favored the larger holdings, reduced
employmentin rural areas,and increased
the flow of rural mi-
grantsinto the primitive labormarketof the urbancenters.Prices
rose during the ination of the expansionaryphase;the most
favoredgroupscouldkeeppacewith it, thoughthoseoutsidethe
corporatistsectorwere in greaterdifculty.
Thenat thebeginningof the 1980scamethe debtcrisis.
Regimesthat had nancedtheir growthon foreigncreditwere
no longerableto meetthe interestpaymentson their external
debt. The measuresrequired by foreign creditorsas a condition
for extendingdebtsincludedcurrencydevaluations
andcutbacks
PAXAMERICANA 241
in domestic
spending,
which
hadtheeffect
ofraising
prices
of
foodtothegeneral
population,
raising
prices
ofimported
equip-
menttolocalcapitalists,
reducing
governmentservices,
andre-
ducing
realwages.
These
measures
could
onlyexacerbate
the
social
tensions
andinequalities
thathadbeen
generated
during
theexpansionary
stage.
Thesuccess
ofdependent
development
had a social cost.
Wouldit alsohaveapolitical
costin termsoftheviability
ofthemilitary-bureaucratic
regimesthathadledthelatest
phase
ofneomercantilist
development?
Schematically,
thereseemed
to
bethreepossibilities
offuturepolitical
orientation.
Onewasa
continuation
ofmilitaryrulemaintaining
sufficient
repression
to
prevent
theincreased
tensions
fromexploding
intodomestic
disorder.
Another
possibility
wasaradical
turnunder
different
leadership
toward
amore
autocentric
development.
Athirdwas
reversion
frommilitaryruletothecartel
state
thatwouldcontinue
thepath
ofdependent
developmentundercivilian
auspices,
gain-
ingindomestic
legitimacy
whatit lostinrepressive
capability.
Underthemilitary-bureaucratic
regime,therelatively
moresatisedpartofthepopulationacquiesces
inrepression
in
order
tofendoffthethreat
ofrevolt
fromthedissatised.
Inorder
to maintain
thisbalance
of support,
themilitary-bureaucratic
regime
must
beable
toensure
continuance
oftheprocess
of
dependent
developmentthatsustains
therelatively
satised
part
ofthepopulationand
thismeans retaining
andexpanding
for-
eignmarkets,
maintaining
aflowofforeigncredit,
andcontinuing
thegrowth
ofexport
industries.
Themilitary-bureaucratic
regime
may
beable
tocount
onexternal
military
aidfromtheprincipal
guarantor
oftheworld
hegemonic
order.
Butmilitary
aidandthe
maintenance
of a strongdomestic
repressive
capability
maynot
beenough.
Dependent
development
must
beperceived
towork
in theeconomic
sphere,
atleastforenough
ofthepopulation
to
maintain
sufcient
support
fortheregime.
Events
duringtheearly
1980s
in Argentina,
Chile,Brazil,
andthePhilippines
suggest
thatsome
ofthosemiddle-strata
social
groups
thatinitiallysup-
ported
military-bureaucratic
government
mayhave withdrawn
support
andthereby
opened
theprospect
ofatransition
tocivilian
rule.
Autocentric
development
under
radical
leadership
would
242 STATES,WORLDORDERS,
ANDPRODUCTION
THE
INTERNATIONA
OF
PRODUCT
The PaxAmericanacreateda world hegemonicorderin which a
worldeconomy of international
productionemergedwithinthe
existinginternationaleconomy of classical
tradetheory.The
international-economy
modelconnectsnationaleconomies
by
flowsofgoods,
capital,andspecie.
Where theinternational-econ-
omymodelfocuses on exchange, theworld-economy modelfo-
cuseson production.
It consists
of transnational
production
or-
ganizations
whose
component
elements
arelocated
in different
territorial jurisdictions.
Eachof thesetransnationalproduction organizationspro-
ducesfor the world market.Eachtakesadvantageof differences
in costs and availabilities of factors of production in deciding
about the location of its component elements.
Knowledge,in the form of technologyandmarketinfor-
mation,is the principalresourcein the world economy,espe-
cially knowledgein its dynamicformasthe capacityto generate
newtechnologies andto marketnewproducts. Moneycanbe
tappedwhereit is to befoundby thosewhohaveknowledge
assets,
e.g.,in localcapitalmarkets
orin international
credit.The
nature of international trade changes.Arms-lengthintercountry
PAX AMERICANA 245
THE
INTERNATIONAL
OFTHE
STATE
The internationalizingof the stateis the global processwhereby
national policies and practices have been adjusted to the exigen-
ciesof the world economyof internationalproduction.Through
this process the nation state becomes part of a larger and more
complex political structure that is the counterpart to international
production. The process results in different forms of state corre-
sponding to the different positions of countries in the world
economy. The reshaping of specific statestructures in accordance
with the overall international political structure is brought about
by a combinationof externalpressures(external,that is, to par-
ticular countries though arising within the overall international
political structure) and realignments of internal power relations
among domestic social groups. Like the internationalizing of pro-
duction, the tendency toward the internationalizing of the state
is never complete, and the further it advances, the more it pro-
vokes countertendenciessustainedby domestic social groups
that have beendisadvantagedor excludedin the new domestic
reali.gnments. These countertendencies could prove capable of
reversing the internationalizing tendency, especially if the bal-
254 STATES,
WORLD
ORDERS,
ANDPRODUCTION
nothing
inevitable
about
thecontinuation
ofeither
theinterna-
tionalizing
ofthestate
ortheinternationalizing
ofproduction.
Themeaning givento theterminternationalizing
of the
statecanbeexpressedin threepoints:
First,thereisaprocessof
interstate
consensus
formationregarding
theneedsor require-
mentsof theworldeconomythattakesplacewithina common
ideological
framework
[i.e.,common
criteria
ofinterpretation
of
economic
events
andcommon
goals
anchored
in theideaof an
openworldeconomy).
Second,
participation
in thisconsensus
formationis hierarchically
structured.
Third,theinternalstruc-
turesof states
areadjusted
sothateachcanbesttransform
the
global
consensus
intonational
policyandpractice,
takingac-
countofthespecic
kindsofobstacles
likelytoarise
in countries
occupying
thedifferent
hierarchically
arranged
positions
inthe
worldeconomy.
State
structure
heremeans
boththemachinery
of government
administration
andenforcement
(wherepower
liesamong
thepolicy-elaborating
andenforcement
agenciesof
states)
andthehistoric
bloconwhichthestate
rests
(thealign-
mentof dominant
andacquiescent
socialgroups).59
In considering stagesin theinternationalization
of the
state,it is usefulto referbackto thedistinction
madeabove
between
theinternational
economy
andtheworldeconomy.
In
theinternational
economymodel,
thestateactsasa bufferbe-
tweentheexternal economic
environment andthe domestic
economy.
Itspolitical
accountability
iswithin,itsprincipal
task
beingtodefend
theinterests
embodied
in thedomestic
economy
against
disturbances
fromwithout,
togivepriorityto domestic
overexternalforces.Inward-directed
accountability
in a gener-
allyhostile
external
environment
wasexpressed
intheeconomic
nationalisms
of the Depression
yearsof the 1930s.Countries
turned
inwardtorevive
economic
activity
andemployment,
nd-
ingtheeventual
solution
inrearmament
andworldwar.
TheBretton
Woods
stage,
conceived
in themid1940s
and
putintopractice
ultimately
inthelate1950s,
placed
thestate
in
a halfwaypositionmediating
between
international
economy
andworld-economy
structures.
BrettonWoodswasa compro-
misebetween
accountability
ofgovernments
[especially
ofdebtor
countries)
toinstitutions
oftheworldeconomyandaccountabil
ity ofgovernments
todomestic
opinionfortheireconomic
per-
PAXAMERICANA 255
formance
andforthemaintenance
ofwelfare.
In ordertobeable
to borrowor to renewdebtabroad,
governments
wouldhaveto
satisfyconditions
laiddownby theinternational
institutions.
Theabilitytoborrowwouldmake it possible
forgovernmentsto
soften
theimpact
ofexternal
economic
developments,
e.g.,
the
riseof rivalswith a competitive
advantage
overdomestic
pro-
ducersorfallingprices
ofcommodity exports,
soastoallowtime
forinternaladjustmentsandto maintaininternal
welfarecom-
mitments.Thecenter ofgravity
shifted
fromnationaleconomies
to the worldeconomy,
but stateswererecognized
ashavinga
responsibility
toboth.Theprospect
ofopen
contradiction
be-
tweenthetwowasobscured
in a condence
thattimeandre-
sources
wouldbeadequate
to effecta reconciliation.
Thecom-
promise
worked
aslongastheworldeconomy
wasindeed
expanding.
TheInternational
Monetary
Fundwassetup to provide
timeandmoney
to countries
withbalance
ofpayments
decits
inorder
thattheycould
make
thekindofadjustments
thatwould
bring
theireconomies
back
intopayments
equilibrium
andavoid
thesharp
deationary
consequences
ofanautomatic
goldstand-
ard.TheWorldBankwastobeavehicle
forlonger
termnancial
assistance.
Economically
weakened
countries
wereto begiven
assistance
bytheworldsystem
itself,
either
directly
through
the
systems
institutions
orbyother
states
once
theircredit
worthi-
nesshadbeencertiedbythesystems
institutions.
Theinstitu-
tionsof the world economyincorporated
mechanisms
to super-
visetheapplication
ofthesystems
norms
andtomake
nancial
assistance
andotherbenetsof thesystem
conditional
upon
reasonable
evidenceof intentto live up to thenorms.
Thismachinery of surveillance
was,in thecaseof the
Westernalliesand,subsequently,
ofall industrialized
capitalist
countries,
supplemented byelaborate
machinery fortheharmo-
nization
of national
policies.
Theincentive forpolicyharmoni-
zationcamewith thepromise of externalresources,
initially
through
theMarshall
Plan.
Thepractice
ofharmonization
shifted
thebalance
ofaccountability
onestepfurtherin theworld-econ-
omydirection.
Thispractice
began
withthemutual
criticism
of
reconstruction
plansin Western
Europeancountries,
whichwas
theU.S.condition
forMarshall
funds.
It evolved
further
withthe
256 STATES, WORLD ORDERS,AND PRODUCTION
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE WORLD
ECONOMIC CRISIS:
Il\/[PACT ON STATE
AND
WORLD-OR
STRUCTUR
Since the word crisis is so fre-
quentlyabused
for dramatic
effect,it is well to beprecise
here
aboutits meaning.Economists distinguisha crisisfroma cyclical
downturn:the economymustundergosomestructuralchangein
orderto emergefrom a crisis;in a cyclicaldownturn,the same
structurecontainsthe seedsof its own revival. Crisis signies a
fundamental disequilibrium; the cyclical downturn, a moment
in the diachrony of equilibrium.
In a morepoliticalvein,Gramsciwroteof organiccrisis
andcrisis of hegemony.Whatheidentiedby thesetermswas
a disarticulationbetweensocialgroupsand their putative polit-
ical leaders,in sum a crisis of representation.In sucha situation,
old and new social forces coexisted, but the old ones had become
detached
fromthe politicalorganizations
that hadformerlyrep-
resentedthem,and the new oneshad not producedorganizations
or organicintellectuals
whocouldleadthemeffectively
and
bringtheminto coalescence
with existingsocialforcesto forma
new hegemonic bloc.Two outcomes arepossiblein an organic
270 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
attention.
Somewhat
less
apparent
than
the
changes
taking
place
in
the structuresof statesand world order are those transforming
production
processes,
changes
bothin theinternational
division
THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE 271
{?#-:_'g:
Production
Relations
in the Making
of the Future
Uptonow wehavebeenconsidering
theinterconnectio
ofmodesofproduction
relations,
formsofstate,
and world
orders
ascomplexhistorical
structures
inwhich elementsofcoherence
andstability
arematchedagainst
contradictions
andconflicts.
Outofthese
conflicts
ultimately
come structural
transformations
Theadvantage
oflooking
tothepastistobeable tosee
someof
these
processes
completedcompleted,that
is,bytheinitiation
ofanew phaseofstabilization
leading,after
atime, toafurther
transformation.
Fromaconsideration
ofthese
completed
phases
a series
ofpropositions
have
been
advanced
asguides
tothe
analysis
ofhistoricalstructural
changes.
These
considerations
havebrought
ustoathreshold
ofthe
world
system
during
the19703.
Thepurpose
ofacquiring
knowl-
edge
about
past
processes
istobeable
toapply
this
knowledg
toanunderstanding
ofthepresent
insuch
awayastogain
more
initiative
inthemaking
ofthefuture.
Thepresent
isin itsnature
incomplete.
Ithas
tobeseen
asmovement,
whereas
thepast
can
more
clearly
begrasped
asstructure.
Thestructures
oftherecent
past
fixthecircumstances
inwhich
thehistorical
action
ofthe
present
takes
place.
Theactors
have
power
toshape
their
future
both
inrelation
totheircommand
over
material
resources
andin
274 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
tainingstatepolicies.
Laboralsoin anumberofcountries
secured
protectionagainstinationin theformofwageindexation
to the
cost of living.
- Signsthatthelimitsof thisconsensus
hadbeenreached
occurredin the explosionof socialconict thatoccurredin May
1968 in Franceand the autunno caldo of 1969 in Italy. These
events were followed by an accelerationof wage increasesin
otheradvanced
capitalistcountries,
includingWestGermany
and
IapanandtheScandinavian
countries,
wherelabor-managemen
relationshad beenleastconictual. In all thesecountries,higher
levelsof ination temporarilyattenuatedsocialconict, post-
poningratherthanavoidingit.
In neomercantilistdevelopmentaliststatesination has
been the natural consequenceof caesarism,i.e. the temporary
stabilizationof an unresolvedconfrontationof socialforcesnone
of which can subordinatethe others without at the sametime
riskingits own survival.Caesarism,
in whatwe maycall its
benignphase,tendstoaccommodatethissituation
byacquiescing
in the demandsof all groups(thoughfavoringsomeoverothers)
andallowingthemarketto inict theconsequences in theim-
personalized
formofination.Caesaristregimes
will leantoward
onesideor anotherin usingination asa redistributivemecha-
nism.Populism,
in economic
terms,wasapolicyof distributing
incomestoward workersand other popular groupsa leftist in-
ation. Thefirst Perongovernment
of ArgentinaandtheAllende
government
in Chilepresided
overinations
ofthiskind.5
Other
typesof Caesarist
ination favoredsomebourgeoissectorsover
othersimportsubstitution
manufacturers
overagricultural
ex-
porters,
for instance.
AlbertHirschman
recounts
howin Argen-
tina the industrialbourgeoisie
wouldmakecommoncausewith
the urban massesunder populist leadershipduring recessionin
orderto securean expansionary
policy and to hold down the
priceof meat,
theprincipal
exportproduct
andwage
good,
but
would shift to ally with the cattlebreedersin backingmilitary
interventionwhenworkersin atighteninglabormarketwereable
to demandhigherwages.Military regimeshavebeenjust as
inationaryasnonmilitaryformsof caesarism in theirpropensity
to offer incentivesto many differentindustrialgroupsand to
satisfy
thedemands
ofthemilitaryandotherinuentialsegments
THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 277
dollarandgold)9
asabargaining
chip;in the1970s,
thatweapon
havingbeenexpended,
theymadeacceptance
of U.S.debtthe
quidproquofor U.S.militarycommitments
in Western
Europe
and the FarEast,and they arguedthat generalrecoverywould
depend
on recovery
of theU.S.economy,
whichothermajor
capitalistcountries
wouldhaveto helpnance.
The dollars contestedstatusin the systemthus also re-
flecteda shiftin power.AlthoughtheUnitedStates
remained
predominant, it faceda challenge
to itspolicies
fromeconomi-
callyrecovered Western EuropeandJapan. Pressure
ontheU.S.
government fromtheotheradvanced capitalist
countries
reached
a peakin 1978,butthenal blowthatprecipitated a radical
change in U.S.monetary policycame, notfromthem,butfrom
theperiphery. TheAyatollah Khomeini triggered
a sequence
of
eventsthat led to PaulVolkersinstallationas chairmanof the
New York FederalReserveand the beginningof restriction on
the U.S.moneysupply.Meanwhile,
ideologues
of the hege-
monicorderhad soundedan alarmthat the diffusionof power
within statesas within the internationalsystemhad led to a
problemof ungovernability
THE DISINTEGRATION
OF THE NEOLIBERAL HISTORIC BLOC
A keyindication
thattheworldsystemconfronted
crisisrather
thanconjunctural
adjustment
came withareevaluation
ofofcial
thinkingaboutthehierarchy
of economicproblemsthattook
placeatthemidpoint
ofthe1970s.
Inationceased
toberegarded
benignlyasthe inevitablebut relativelyinnocuousconsequence
of a necessary
stimulusto growthandbegan
to beperceived
by
thedominantgroupsandstateeconomic managersastheprin-
cipalobstacle
toeconomic
revival
andrenewed
growth.
Ination
at the new higherratesnow signiedunpredictability
of the
future economicenvironmentand becamean inhibition to
investment.
Behind the disincentive to invest was a long-term narrow-
ingofprotmargins
beginning
inthe19603.
Partofthissqueeze
onprotswasperceived
bybusiness
ascomingfromthesucces-
280 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
Twoprincipal
directions
ofmovement
in politicalstructures
are
visible in the erstwhile neoliberalstates:one is exemplied by
286 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
hegemonic
rolebymaking
capital
accumulation
onaworldscale
appear
tobecompatible
withawiderange
ofinterests
ofsubor-
dinategroups.
It foundedits legitimacy
on consensual politics.
Thewouldbehyperliberal stateconfrontsall thosegroupsand
interestswith which the neoliberalstatecameto terms.It does
notshrinkfromopenopposition
to state-sector
employees,
wel-
farerecipients,and tradeunions.
Thegovernment-business
alliancethatpresides
overthe
transformationof the neoliberalinto a would-behyperliberal
formof stategenerates
an imposinglist of disadvantaged
and
excludedgroups.State-sector
employees madegreatgainsas
regards
theircollective
bargaining
status
andtheirwages
during
theyearsof expansionandhavenowbecome front-linetargets
for budgetary
restraint.Welfarerecipientsandnonestablished
workers,
sociallycontiguouscategories,
arehit by reduced state
expenditureandunemployment. Farmers andsmallbusiness-
menareangrywith banksandwith governments asaffordable
nance becomesunavailable to them. Establishedworkers in
industriesconfrontingsevereproblemsin a changinginterna-
tional divisionof labortextiles,automobiles,
steel,shipbuild-
ing,forexampleface
unemployment
orreduced
realwages.
So
longastheexcluded
groups
lackstrong
organization
andpolitical
cohesion,ideologicalmysticationand an instinctivefocuson
personal
survivalratherthancollective
actionsufcetomaintain
the momentumof the new policy orthodoxy.If at leasta small
majorityofthepopulation
remains
relatively
satised,
it canbe
politically
mobilized
asnecessary
to maintainthese
policiesin
placeagainst
thedissatisfaction
of anevenverylargeminority
that is divided and incoherent.
Thisconfrontational
postureof thewould-behyperliberal
statetoward the variousexcludedgroupsrequiresa new basisin
legitimacy.
Theanswerhasbeensoughtin a nonhegemonic,
populist
appeal
to thesanctity
oftraditional
values.
At theora-
toricallevel,the newlegitimacystresses
the work ethic,family,
neighborhood,
andpatriotism.
Atasubliminal
level,theappeal
is tingedwith racism-against
immigrantsand minoritiesster-
eotypedinconsistently
bothaswelfareburnsandasthreatsto
jobs.Theideological
appeal
is nominally
classless,
thoughin
practice
aimedatanamorphous
blue-collar
andpetty-bourgeois
THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 289
quiredto negotiate
theindustrialandincomes
policybases for
state-capitalist
developmentwouldinvolvea revivalof tripar-
tism.Theindustrial-policy
proposals
fortheUnitedStates
drafted
by FelixRohatynenvisage
a top-levelindustrialdevelopment
boardcomposed of members of cabinet,business,andlabor,
located in the ExecutiveOfce of the President,and disposing
througha newIndustrialFinanceAdministrationof fundsto
supportindustries
or rms whosecompetitiveness
is criticalto
the national interest. The Boards administrative authority
would be limited, but the statureof its membersand its access
to thePresidentwouldgiveit inuenceto marshaltheresources
of the executivebranch in support of a coherentdevelopment
strategy.35
Sucha mechanism
seemsto assumenot onlythat
laborrepresentatives
beaccorded
considerable
inuencein the
determinationof national economicpriorities but alsothat these
representatives
will be ableto arbitratethe differences
among
differentunionsandgroupsof workersthatwill inevitablyarise
in anyreadjustmentof productionstructures.
Bothassumptions
aremostdoubtfulin thelight of theweakening
of thetradeunion
movementby the economiccrisisandthe restructuringof pro-
duction. The lack of centralizedcontrol over economicnegotia-
tions has differentiatedthe U.S. labor movementfrom those in
Scandinavia and West Germany.
If tripartitecorporatismappearsan unlikely prospectin
the United States,Christian Stoffaesperceivedsome risks for
industrialpolicyin France
of allowingtripartismfreerein.The
worldmarket-conquering offensivestrategyhe sawasFrances
salvationwould requirea strongstatecapableof dening and
implementing
specicpolicychoiceswhile at the sametime
associating
economicandoccupational
interestswith thepursuit
of nationalgoals.He feared,however,
that a morepolitically
likelyoutcomewouldbeadefensive protectionist
policydictated
by the diverseinterests
with access
to government. In other
words,themoresocietal(toborrowPhilippeSchmitters
term]
tripartitecorporatism
becomes,
thelessaptit is forthemanage-
ment of an effectiveworld-marketcompetitivestrategy,but the
moretripartiterepresentationis subordinatedto state-ledcor-
poratism,
themorechance thereis thatcompetitiveratherthan
protectionist
policieswill beconsistentlyfollowed.This,atany
THEWORLD
ECONOMIC
CRISIS 297
rate,
may beavalidproposition
forcountries
witharelatively
weaklabor
movementandonehastobear
inmind thegeneral
weakening
oflabor
movements
intheadvanced
capitalist
coun-
triessince
themid-1970s.38
It maywellprove
thattheIapanese
model ofstate-capitalist
development,
inwhichtrade unionpar-
ticipation
takes
placethrough
anenterprise-corporatist
relation-
shipwithbigenterprises
rather
than
through
national-level
union
representation
ontripartite
bodies,
isthemore
likely
formfor
state-capitalist
development
in the1980s.
Thecorporatist
process
underpinning
state-capitalist
de-
velopment,
whichwould
include
business
andlabor
in the
worldmarket-oriented
sector
andworkers
inthetertiary
welfare-
services
sector,
would
atthesame
timeexclude
certainmarginal
groups.
These
groups
have
afrequently
passive
relationship
to
thewelfare
services
andlackinuence
inthemaking
ofpolicy.
They aredisproportionately
theyoung,women, immigrant
or
minority
groups,andtheunemployed.Therestructuring
ofpro-
duction
tendsto increase
theirnumbers.
Sincethesegroupsare
fragmented
andrelatively
powerless,
theirexclusion
hasgener-
allypassed
unchallenged.
Itdoes,
however,
containalatent
threat
tocorporatist
processes.
Part
ofthisthreat
istheriskofanomic
explosions
ofviolence,
particularly
onthepart oftheyoungmale
unemployed element. Suchexplosions often,however,
strengthen
byreaction
theestablished
authority.
Theother
part
ofthethreat
istheriskofpolitical
mobilization
ofthemarginals,
whichwouldpitdemocratic
legitimacy
against
corporatist
eco-
nomicefficiency.
These
dangers
areforeshadowed
inthewritings
ofneoliberal
scholars
about
theungovernabi1ity
problem
of
modern
democracies.
Theimplication
is thatthecorporatist
processes
required
tomake
state-capitalist
development
succeed
may
have
tobeinsulated
fromdemocratic
pressures.
Tothe
extent
thisbecomes
true,theprospects
ofinternal
socialism
sus-
tained
byworld-market
state
capitalism
would
beanillusion.
Inshort,
thestate-capitalist
alternative
hassome
potential
for reconstructing
internal
hegemoniesandovercomingthe
caesarist
impasse
thathyperliberalism
tendstorigidify.
Thenar-
rowing
basis
ofcorporatism
(particularly
asregards
itslabor
com-
ponent)
onwhich
state-capitalist
development
must
restdoes,
however,
contain
alatent
contradiction
todemocratic
legitimacy.
298 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
STRUCTURAL CHANGE
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY
asystem
ofself-contained
economic-strategic
blocssimilartothe
trend of the 1930s.It is, however,movinginto an aggressively
competitive
tradingpattern
in whichnegotiating
power,
rather
thanthe impersonal
rulesof liberaleconomic
behavior,
deter-
mines outcomesin a zero-sumgame.The systemhas become
moredecentralized
andpowermorediffused,a diffusionthat is
morepronounced
in theeconomic
thanin themilitary-strategic
realm.Tothis diffusionof powercorresponds
a lossof hegemony
in the senseof a consensualnorms-based
system.The continuing
militaryandeconomicpredominance of theUnitedStates
out-
sidethe Sovietsphererestsmoreopenlyon its strengthand
bargainingpower.Hegemony hasgivenplaceto dominance.
Doesthisgreater
diffusionof powermeanthattheworld
orderis becoming
morepermissive
in thesensethatthereis more
freedom
forthedevelopment
of novelformsof stateandof pro-
duction relations?Not likely, becauseof the competitive pres-
sures
present
in theworldsystem.
These
arelikelytoactonall
statesoutside the redistributive societiesin such a way as to
encourage
theadoption
ofsimilarformsofstate-capitalist
devel-
opment
gearedto anoffensive
strategyin worldmarketsand
sustained
by corporatist
organization
of societyandeconomy.
Productionin thesesocietieswill most likely be organized
througha combination
of enterprise-corporatist
andenterprise-
labor-market
socialrelations,andtripartismwill be invokedin
somecountries
asa process
fortheformulation
of industrypol-
iciesandincomespoliciesunderstateleadership.
Any countries
drivenby internalpressures
to adopta defensive-withdrawal
strategy
vis-a-vis
theworldeconomywouldincurtheriskof
economicfailure with a drasticdrop in living standards.
The redistributivesocietieswill alsobe constrainedby the
competitive
pressures
oftheworldorder,
though
nottothesame
degree
asotherstates.
Thedevelopmentalpossibilities
of the
Soviet Union and China are limited aboveall by the armsrace.
Totheincreased
defense
budgetof theUnitedStatescorresponds
a proportionately
greater
economic
effortby theSovietUnion
with a smallermarginremainingfor socialdevelopment.
Never-
theless,
boththe SovietUnionand[to an evengreater
extent)
Chinahaveentered
phasesofexperimental
changein socialpro-
ductive
organization
regarded
bytheirleaders
asessential
tothe
300 THEMAKINGOFTHEFUTURE
maintenance
andstrengthening
of theirpowerwithintheworld
system.
These
social
andeconomic
experiments
areguided
by
the internalcriteriaof the redistributivesystems,eventhough
some
aspects
[e.g.,thegreater
useof market
mechanisms
and
decentralization
of management
in economicdevelopment)
may
appear
toreectsome
practices
ofcapitalist
development.
The
links that redistributivesocietiesestablishwith the capitalist
world marketare limited and controlledby themto servethe
specicpurposes ofthesesocieties.
Theireconomies
arenotin
thepositionof competingfor worldmarketshares
asarethe
countriesof capitalistdevelopment.Exportsare importantto
thesecountries,but assurplusfromtheir internallydetermined
production
requirements.
Thesecountries
areconstrained
exter-
nallybytheworldmilitarypowercompetition
andinternally
by
the limits to their ability to mobilizepopulationand resources
fornational
goals.
Furthermore,
thediffusion
of poweroutside
theSoviet
sphereandthedecline
ofU.S.hegemonicleadership
openmoreoptionsfortheSoviet
UnionandChina. Thearrange-
mentsconcludedby the SovietUnion with WesternEuropean
countriesfor the constructionof a naturalgaspipelinegiving
Western
Europe
access
to Sovietenergy
aresuggestive
of arange
of possible
international
economic
arrangements
the Soviet
Union and Chinacould makewith differentpartners(or with
eachother)in a worldeconomic
ordergoverned
bynegotiated
contracts.
Thedeclineof centralized
management
characteristic
of
theworldeconomy
ofPaxAmericana
canbetraced
through
the
1970s.Thetop management
of this worldeconomy
canmore
adequately
berepresented
asa system
thanasaninstitutiona
system
onlypartly
composed
ofstate-like
institutions.
During
the
1960s,
theU.S.Department
oftheTreasury
mighthaveappeared
tobetheapex,itsgeneral
policycriteria
being
internationalize
through
themedium oftheIMF,WorldBank, theGeneral
Ar-
rangements
to Borrow,
theBankforInternational
Settlements
theOECD,
andseveral
otheragencies.
Through
theseinstitutions,
linkedbytheoverlappingpersonnel
oftheirprincipal
decision
makers,theretookplace
theprocess
ofpolicyosmosis
among
the
leading
personnel
of advanced
capitalist
states
andof policy
projection
intoThirdWorld
countries
thathasbeen
described
in
THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 301
restrainttheyoperatedunder.It seems
evidentin retrospect
that
this was not a very tightly managedsystem.
When,in the early1980s,a sequence of crisesrevealed
the inability of someEasternEuropeanandThird World coun-
tries to meet their debt obligations,proposalsemergedto move
the official institutions, particularly the IMF, back into a central
role supervisinginternationallendingand at the sametime to
enhancethe political characterof the IMF, i.e., to reassertthe
statecharacterof internationalnance. This is somethingdesired
notjustbygovernmentsasameansof controlling
theirrisksbut
alsoby thetransnational
banksasa meansof limitingtheirs.
However,a more central and perhapsessentiallysymbolic role
for the international institutions in debt managementand the
multilateralizing of debt renewal conditions was not accom-
paniedby anyreformoftheinternational
monetary
system
such
aswould makepossibleenlargedcentrallycontrolledcreditand
greaterexchangestability.
The relativeenlargementof the private,nonstatecharacter
of international nancial managementduring the 1970smay be
seenas an effect of weakeninghegemony.Private international
credit expandedfor lack of any agreement
on how the ofcial
intergovernmental
structures
in thesystemcouldbereformed.
The impasseon reformwas the consequence
of stalemate
be-
tweenthe United Statesand the Europeancountrieson the future
role of the dollar. The United States had an effective veto on
reformandwasnot preparedto forgothe advantages
of the dol-
lars international status. The United States could run a contin-
uingdecit solongasthedollarremainedtheprincipalcurrency
for settling internationalaccountsand the principal reserve
currency.
Therelativelygreaterdependence of EuropeandJapanon
importedoil denominated in dollarstied thesecountriesever
moretightly to the dollar standardas OPEC,following 1973,
raisedthe price of oil. It weakened thesecountrieschancesof
gainingU.S.acceptance
of anyreformdisplacing
thedollarfrom
its dominantposition.Ascondencein U.S.management waned,
privatetransnationalbankstook on moreof the actualmanage-
ment of the system.In the absenceof agreementon management
by ofcialinstitutions,
dollarhegemony
shiftedto thenancial
THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 303
to massproduceconsumergoodsfor peoplesneeds,showedthe
progressivefaceof capitalism,its ability to developthe produc-
tive forces.This productive capacitywas opposed,not by work-
ers, but by the regressiveand parasitical forces in existing society
that lived off the fruits of capital but were not themselvespro-
ductive: the traditional intellectuals, the rural bourgeoisie, and
the multitudes who battened upon state office for their incomes.
If Fordism had achieved its breakthrough in America, it was
largelybecausetheseregressiveforceswere relatively powerless
in America. This was also why American industry could at the
sametime achievehigh levels of accumulationand afford high
wagesfor its workers-the weight of the unproductiveelements
of societywas relatively light. Subsequently,the lash of compe-
tition compelledEuropeanindustriesto emulateAmericanmeth-
ods, but in Europe the regressiveforces were relatively more
powerful, and the statemediatedbetweenthe rationalizationof
production, on the one hand, and the regressiveforceson the
other.
The fascist corporativestatewas caughton the horns of
this dilemma. There were some elements in fascism that envis-
aged the corporative state as the means of making a gradual
transition toward the adoptionof Americanmethodsthroughout
Italian industry. Gramsciwas,however,skepticalthat this tend-
ency within fascism could triumph, becauseof fascismsde-
pendenceon the entrenched,dominant,plutocraticlandlord and
traditional intellectual elements of society. This made a break-
through by the technical-managerial
cadresof industry improb-
able. Fascism would remain a passive revolution, stabilizing
through coercion an impassein social development,verbally
espousingcertain aims of industrial concentration,but stopping
shortof the agrarianand industrial reforma thoroughgoingFord-
ism would imply.
Thereis a strongsenseof historical dialectic in Gramscis
thoughtsaboutFordism.The condition for the successfulinstal-
lation of Fordismin industry wasthe breakingof worker power,
achievedby a combinationof coercion(the weakeningand de-
struction of trade unions] and persuasion(high wages).The im-
plications of Fordism, once establishedas a generalmodel of
production organization,were,on the onehand, economicplan-
ning for the economy as a whole, and on the other, a moral
MUTATIONS 311
course of which he can control the quality of his work and the
pace at which it is carried out.
2. Mass production with conveyor-belt technology (Ford-
ism) in which tasks have been highly fragmented and are carried
out by quickly trainable,semiskilledworkers.The motionsto be
performedby eachworker and the paceat which they are to be
performed is determinedby the technical system,not by the
workers judgment.
3. Automated or continuous processproduction in which
work is reintegrated on the scale of the workshop or enterprise
but is carriedout by machinesthat arenot directly controlledby
the worker. The worker plays a supporting role as dial-watcher
or maintenance mechanic.
THE CORE-PERIPHERY
STRUCTURE
OF PRODUCTIONAND JOBS
In order
tograsp
whether
andin whatwaytheglobal
accumu-
lation
process
maybechanging,
it isnecessary
toascertain
the
mutations
taking
place
intherelationships
among
different
tech-
nologies
ofproduction
andthemodes
ofsocial
relations
associ-
atedwiththem.
These
mutations
canbeobserved
onlyastend-
encies
thatarestillfluid.Thepatterns
thatultimately
emerge
will
MUTATIONS 3 19
thereis a morevariable
demand
arerelegated
to thetechnologi-
cally peripheralcategoryfor subcontracting,
etc. An interna-
tionalextension
of thesubcontracting
practiceis a mostlikely
development,
wherebyThird Worldenterprises
would contract
to undertake
the mostenergy-consuming
andmostpolluting
early stagesof industrial processes,
reservingthe cleanest,most
sophisticatedstagesfor the coreinstallationsin their homecoun-
tries. Sucha differentiationbetweencategoriesof tasksand terms
of employmentwas pioneeredin Iapaneseindustry.Now all
majorworld industries,fromtheircoresoutward,areundergoing
a process of Iapanization.
Through such strategies,employersare able to shift the
burdenof uncertaintyfromthemselves
andthecoregroupto the
variousperipheralgroups.Thecumulativeconsequences
of these
strategies
canbe observed in a decliningproportionof securely
employed, relativelyhighlypaid,andenterprise-integrated
work-
ers,togetherwith agrowingproportionoflesssecurelyemployed,
low-paid, peripheral workerssegmentedinto severaldistinctive
groups having little cohesion with one another. The social rela-
tionsof productionof thecoregrouparetypicallyon enterprise-
corporatist lines. Those of the peripheral groups rangefrom a
decliningbipartismamongthefirst category
of peripheralwork-
ers,through a vastly expandedenterprise-labor-market
modeen-
compassingboth in-plant part-timersand temporarypersonnel
and workersin subcontracting
enterprises,
to a self-employed
sectorof outworkersin effectdependenton enterprisecontracts.
Thesechangesin the socialrelationsof production in the
advancedcapitalist countriesare particularly marked since the
onset of the economic crisis in the mid-1970s. In the United
States,it has been observedthat new jobs createdhave been
predominantlyin thelow-skill,low-paycategory,
andmainlyin
services(of which temporaryclerical work and fastfoodrestau-
rants are preeminentexamples)?"In West Germany,beforethe
crisis, labor marketsegmentationinto isolatedcategorieswasnot
signicant; there was a generalmobility flow from lessto more
attractivejobs within enterprises,and where workerswere dis-
placedby technology,theywererapidlyreemployed elsewhere.
Sincethe crisis,boundarylineshavebecomevisibleseparating
[1] a corelaborforcewith secureemployment,(2)a secondary
324 THEMAKINGOFTHEFUTURE
laborforceofmoreprecariously
employed
workers
vulnerable
to
economic
cyclesanddoingthelessattractive
work,and[3]a
marginal
category
ofthemore
orless
permanently
unemployed.
At the sametime asthesechanges
areincreasing
socialvulnera-
bilityforalargesection
ofthelaborforceandforthose
excluded
fromthe laborforce,thescal crisisof the stateleadsto a reduc-
tion of social services.
Thetrendtowarda decliningproportionof corejobsand
anincreasing
proportion
of peripheral
jobsin theadvanced
cap-
italist countries,accelerated
by the economiccrisis,canbe de-
scribedastheperipheralization
of thelaborforce.Thestructure
ofemployment
in these
countries
begins
totakeonsome
ofthe
featureshithertoassociated
with industrializingcountriesof the
Third World.Thetrendhasalsobeenperceivedasa regression
to theheroicageof competitive
capitalism
in thenineteenth
century.
Peripheralization
takesbothlegalandextralegal
orillegal
forms.Thelegalavenues
includepart-timeandtemporary
em-
ployment
andsubcontracting.
Theextralegal
forms,
i.e.,avoid-
anceoflegalregulationsandnonobservanceoflegalnorms, and
theillegalforms,
i.e.,those
involved
in theactivities
ofcriminal
organizations,
together
comprise
whathasbeencalled
theun-
dergroundorsubmergedeconomy,acounterpart
in manyways
to whatin Third Worldcountries
hasbeendescribed
asthe
informal sector.
Theunderground
economy
covers
amultitudeofdifferent
formsof work andof socialrelationsof production.Mostunder-
ground
activities
areverypoorly
paid,afewarehighly
rewarded.
There
isworkbyundeclared
workers:
some
workasoutworkers
in theirhomes,
othersin clandestine
workshops oftenremovable
soasto avoidstateinspectors.
Thereis alsoundeclared
work
(andtherefore
untaxed
income]
byworkers
whoholdlegally
declared
jobs.Some
ofthistakes
theformofunreported
overtime
paidoutside
theofcialpayenvelope.
Often
it takes
theformof
aworker
having
twojobs,onelegally
regulated
anddeclared,
the
otherundeclared
andunregulated.
Different
kindsofpeopletyp-
icallyenterintothese
different
kindsofillicitproduction
rela-
tions. Womenand children are commonlyemployedas out-
workers.Thesegroupsare joinedby illegal immigrantsin
MUTATIONS 32 5
FLEXIBILITY, DECENTRALIZATION
AND THE BALANCE OF SOCIAL POVVER
meetcompetitive
pressures
haseliminatedthesalesperson
who
throughlongexperience
in the samedepartment haslearned
enoughaboutproductqualitiesanddifferences
to be ableto
advisecustomers.The salesfunction hasbeenTaylorized.
Theorganization
of the fast-food
business
is somewhat
morecomplex.Themanagement structurein formis anarrange-
mentbetweenabigbusiness
andamultitudeof smallbusinesses,
eachof whichhaspurchased
thefranchisefor exclusivemarket-
ing of thebig-business
productin its locality.Thebig-business
franchiserthus shifts part of the profit-and-loss
risk onto the
small-businessfranchisee.The latter benetsfrom the brand-
nameadvertising
of thefranchiser
but mustusetheprescribed
methods,
equipment, andmaterials
providedby thefranchiser.
Sinceproduction
is laborintensive,
themethods
prescribed
by
the franchiserinclude the organizationof the labor process.Pro-
ductionof the limited rangeof standardized
fooditemsoffered
byfast-food
restaurants
is structured
bythemachinery.
Workers
are unskilled and readily transferable
from one phaseof the
process
to another.
Thefranchisee
is boundby the operations
manualof thefranchiserandhasno autonomywith regardto the
organization
andmanagement
of thelaborprocess,
andopera-
tions allow for no worker discretion.The whole processis pro-
grammed fromcorporate
headquarters
andregulated
through
inspection
fromheadquarters.
Employees
consist
ofamajority
of
part-timeteenagers
paidat thelowerstudentminimumwage,
whosecareerswith the fast-foodchain end at the ageof eighteen
or whentheymustlegallybepaidthefull minimumwage,and
aminorityoffull-timewomenworkers paidatthefull minimum
wage.Laborturnoveris fairlyhighandof little concern
to man-
agement
since
workers
aresoeasily
replaceable.
Because
theonly
meansof demonstrating
oppositionto management
is to quit,the
highturnoveractsasa safetyvalvereinforcing
managements
authority.
An alternativeroute that also combinescore and periph-
eral work forceswithin the samelarge-scaleproduction organi-
zationis the creationof a complexin whichinnovativeresearch
anddevelopment, togetherwith the morecapital-intensive
pro-
ductiontechniques,
areconcentrated
in a centralplant,and
standardized,
laborintensive
phasesof productionare carried
330 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
recession.SomeIapaneseand U.S.steelproducersarefollowing
the same route, while the more conservative integrated steel
producersseekrefugein protectionistpressureon the state.
Onestagefurther in decentralizationof productionbeyond
the specializingof subdivisionsof abig corporationis production
by small independentunits. In manufacturing,technologicalde-
velopmentshavemadesophisticatedequipmentefficient for use
by small-scaleproducers.Numerically controlled machines,for
instance,can be reprogrammedfor different tasks. Largescale
no longernecessarilyhaseconomicadvantageand may havethe
competitivedisadvantageof rigidity, a rigidity derivedboth from
heavyinvestmentin a technologythat must be amortizedover a
long time and from bureaucraticrules often reinforcedby trade-
union-protectedworkshoprules. The small enterprisecan often
economizeon capital, plan for actual demandrather than the
cyclical peak,and enjoy more exible organizationalstructures
and stafng practices.
In the steel industry, so-calledminimills have taken an
increasingshareof the marketwhile the big integratedproducers
havebeensufferingsurplus capacity.Minimills arethe dynamic
component of an otherwise sick steel industry in the United
States.They competesuccessfullywith the big integratedpro-
ducersby using quite different technologyand materials.[They
use electric-arc furnaces, which can efciently produce much
smaller quantitiesthan the giant blast furnacesthat setthe min-
imum economicscaleof productionfor integratedmills, andthey
use scrap,which is cheaperthan iron ore.) In 1981,minimills
had about 15 percent of total U.S. steel shipments,and it is
projectedthat by 2000 they should be competitive in up to 40
percentof the U.S.market.Their technologyand marketingmeth-
ods are seenasthe most likely meansof revitalizing an industry
badly hit by foreigncompetition,andthe big integratedproducers
havebeenadoptingsomeof their features,alongwith decentral-
izing toward more specializedproduction.
The social relations of production in minimills make a
completebreakwith those of the strongly unionized integrated
steel industry. Minimills have located close to their markets,
awayfrom the old centersof steelproduction.They aregenerally
nonunionized, pay lower wagesthan integratedmills (though
334 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
ture.Theyaredriven
fromthelands
theytill intothefavelas
and
alagados
surrounding
theurban
centers.
Urban
crowding
in-
creases
the primitivelabormarket,which,in turn,serves
asa
reserve
armyfortherecruitment
anddisciplining
oftheenter-
priselabormarket
inbothsmall
andlarger
scale
industries.
Theredistributive
economies,
sincethemid-1950s,
have
been
preoccupied
withtheissue
ofdecentralization
ofmanage-
mentandproduction.
Developmentsin these
countries
haveim-
plications
forthesocial
relations
ofproduction.
Redistributive
systems
functionaccording
to a different
logicfromthatofcapitalist
development,
inwhich production
is directed
byanticipations
ofprot.Production
ofusevalues
is
in principleplannedona nationwidescale
accordingtothe
political
priorities
oftheleadership.
Allable-bodied
membersof
society
areavailable
forwork,andallshare
in some
manner
in
theredistributed
product.
Accordingly,
laboris a xed,nota
variable
cost;therefore
theproductive
effortofanyindividual
is
a netgainto thewholesociety,
evenif it is notsufcient
to
reproduce
thatindividuals
ownlabor
power
andinaddition
to
create
a surplus
value.(Thiswouldbethecondition
of its em-
ployment
in a capitalist
economy.)
Planning
in redistributive
systems
achieved
considerable
success
in initiatingrapidgrowth.
Capital
andlaborcouldbe
fullyemployed
anddirected
toward
attaining
theredistributor
goalsforoutput.
Redistributive
planning
alsoencountered
seri-
ousproblems,
thereverse
sideofitssuccess.
Theredistributors
preference
forlarge-scale
production
unitsandforbureaucrat
regulation
ledtoinefficiencies.
Laborshortages
emerged
asbot-
tlenecks
to production,
oftentheresultof laborhoarding,
as
enterprises
wanted
toretain
underemployed
workers
sothey
wouldbeavailable
in peakperiods.
Aftertheinitialphase
of
revolutionary
enthusiasm
anddespite
campaignsofsocialist
em-
ulation,workers
began
towithholdeffort.Theconsequences
were ,
thefrequently
mentioned
deciencies
of theplanning
system:
output
does
notmatch
demand,
particularly
forconsumer
items;
goods
areshoddy;
andworkers
perform
atasometimes
lacka-
daisicalpace.
SincetheendoftheStalinera,duringwhichmilitary-type
discipline
wasthemodel
forfactory
andfarm,
theleaderships
of
MUTATIONS 341
the redistributiveeconomies
havebeenrecurrentlypreoccupied
with the reform of economicmanagementso asto overcomethe
decienciesof thesystem.Experiments
in reformincludedecen-
tralizationof managementdecision-making authorityto enter-
prises;
simplication
ofplanprocedures,
forexample
through
a
reductionin the numberof controlgures;anda greateruseof
marketmechanismsfor the allocationof resourcesand nal
output.
Contemporaneous
withthesereformeffortsattheofcial
level,aspontaneous
compensation
forthedefects
oftheplanning
system
tookshapein whathasbeencalledthesecond
econ-
omy.Thiscorresponds
in some
waystotheunderground
econ-
omiesof capitalist
countries
buthastobeunderstood
withinthe
different context of a redistributive system.
The secondeconomyis part legal,part illegal.The legal
partincludes
privateplotcultivation
byfarmfamilies
andfree
marketingof their produce,someconstruction
andmaintenance
ofprivatehomes,
andsome authorized
artisan
work.Theillegal
partincludes
diversion
ofstate-enterprise
equipment,
materials,
andlaborfor privatepurposes
andtradein foreigngoods,etc.
Moreimportantlyit alsoincludestheactivityof enterprise
man-
agerswhoillicitlyobtainmaterials
theyneedin orderto meet
theirplantarget(notfortheirownpersonal
gainbuttomeetthe
obligations
of theenterprise)andwhoarethustempted to dis-
simulatepartof theirenterprises
outputin orderto beableto
makepayment
for suchneeded
inputsnot available
through
regularchannels. Thisamountsin practice
to thespontaneous
creationofanillegalmarket
throughwhichenterprisescanmake
goodtheshortfalls
in plan-directed
inputs.
Theexistence
ofthis
secondeconomyhasbeenfunctionalto the planningsystem,
despite
itspartialillegality,
in helping
bothindividuals
anden-
terprisesto meettheir needs.
Outrightrepression
ofthesecond
economy
[oratleastits
illegalcomponent)
wouldbebothimpossible
anddysfunctional
tothesystem.
Thereseem.tobetwoalternative
possibilities.
One
wouldbeto keepthingsthewaytheyareillegalbutneverthe-
lesspermeating
thesystem,
tolerated
butwithrecurrent
crack-
downson morenotoriousabuses.The otherwould be to legalize
moreof thesecondeconomy
soasto integrate
it with theplanning
342 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
system.
By andlarge,theSovietUnionseems
to havefollowed
the rst route,thoughthat maychange.Sincesomepeoplegen-
erate substantial illicit incomes in second-economyactivities and
manymanagers areaccustomed to operatingpartiallywithin the
secondeconomy,thereareundoubtedlyentrenched resistances
to change.The secondroutehasbeenfollowedin EasternEu-
rope and morerecentlyin China.
The Chinese case concerns an economy with far less de-
velopedproductiveforcesthan exist in the SovietUnion and
EasternEurope.Its primaryproblemsare:to put thewholelabor
forceto work, to effecta gradualtransferof laborfrom agriculture
to industry[andthereforeto raiseagriculturalproductivitysoas
to feedmore industrial workerswith fewer farmers],and to raise
theproductivityof industrythroughtechnological
improvement.
In confrontingthe employment problem,theChineseleadership
hasreversedpreviouspolicies in order to encouragean increase
of jobsoutsidethestatesector.It is anticipatedthatfuturetrends
in employment will below growthin the statesectorandhigher
growthin the collective[especiallysmallcollectives)and self-
employment sectors.
The transition from agricultural to industrial production
is to be effectedasmuch aspossiblethroughthe developmentof
rural industries,therebyavoidinglargemovementsof population
to the cities. Initially, rural industries were gearedto local agri-
culture,processing
of local crops,and productionof toolsand
utensils,etc.usedby local people.Fromthe late 1970s,however,
therehasbeengreaterofcial emphasis
on interdependence
and
division of labor within China. A core-peripherystructure has
developed in whichruralindustriesarecloselylinkedasperiph-
eralsuppliersto urban-based coreenterprises.
This core-periph-
ery structurealsofacilitatestechnological
upgrading:urbanen-
terprisesdisplacetheir oldermachineryto a rural site,working
it with locallyavailablelabor,makingplacefor moreup-to-date
equipmentin the corefactory.
The social relationsof production differ as betweencore
andperipheryfactories.Coreworkersarestateemployees,
estab-
lished workers with considerablerights in their jobs (despite
ofcial urgingsthat thereshouldbe moreexibility in manning),
but rural workers are nonestablished, technically peasants tem-
MUTATIONS 343
porarily
employedinrural
industries.
Inaddition,
casual
workers
mayberecruited
from ruralvillages
forspecic
types
ofxed-
duration
workin urbanfactories.
If enterprise
managers
have
Very
littleexibility
todismissestablished
workers, theyhave
muchmorescope forvarying
thesizeof staffto needsin the
peripheral,
nonestablished
laborsector.
These differencesin
workersrelative
jobsecurity
areprobably
moreimportant
than
differences
in money income,although
nonwagebenets
and
subsidies
alsogiveadvantage
totheestablished
urban
overthe
nonestablishedrural worker.
In themoredeveloped
redistributive
economies
ofEastern
Europe,
opportunities
forbroadening
thelegality
ofthesecond
economy
raise
prospects
analogous
tosome
ofthedevelopments
in capitalist
economies
discussed
above~as
regards,
forin-
stance,
theopportunities
fordecentralization
andforapplying
sophisticated
technology
in small-scale
production.
Small
co-
operatives
ofprofessionals
andtechnicians
couldcontract
serv-
icesto stateenterprises,
for instance;
thestatecouldcreate
a
network
ofworkshops
tobeleased
forsmall-scale
production.
Thiswouldbeconsistent
withtheexisting
practice
ofsmallplot
agricultural
cultivation
onstate
land,
which
has
proven
tobethe
mostefcientwayto growcertainmorelabor-intensive
crops,
andforwhichtheinputsandoutputs
areincluded
in state
plans.
Thusanexpansion
of self-employment,
andofwhatcouldbe
calleda plan-regulated
smallprivate-business
sector,
could
evolvewithin an overall plannedeconomy.
THE STATE
AND THE WORLD ECONOMY
IN THE RESTRUCTURING
OF PRODUCTION
Thetendencies
discussed
abovedepictmovements
in a variety
of directions,
someseemingly
negative,
some
morepositive
for
thepeople
involved
in them.
Tofocus
onanysingle
tendency
creates
theriskofbiasanddistortion
in appraising
thewhole.
Preoccupation
withthefastfood
chain
maycreate
animpression
thattheworldis moving
toward
theultimate
in Taylorization
of
344 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
THE
FORMATION
OF CLASSES
AND HISTORIC BLOCS
Themediating
roleof classbetween
production
andthe
stateis most clearlyperceptiblewithin particularsocietiesor
socialformations.
Thesamemediatingrolecanalsobeexamined
at thegloballevel.Hereclassformation
andconflictmediates
between the world economy of production and the interstate
system.Theclasses
thatparticipate
in thismediation
havetheir
origins
in national
societies,
butformlinksacross
theboundaries
separatingnational societies.
Thestudyof emerging
classstructureis an exercise
in
socialmapping
atbothnational
andglobal
levels.
Themapwill
includethe tendenciesin classformationthat areapparentin
differentkindsof nationalsocieties(e.g.,advanced
capitalistso-
cieties,industrializing
ThirdWorldcapitalistsocieties,
there-
distributivesocietiesof actuallyexistingsocialism,andsocie-
tieswith a still primitivelevelof productive
forces).
It will also
show tendenciestoward a globalizingof certain classesor tran-
scendence
of their originsin nationalsocialformations.
The
importance
ofattempting
thiskindofsocial
mapping
istobetter
understand
the composition
of existinghistoricblocsandthe
elementsavailablefor the formationof newhistoricblocsand
hencethepotential
forchangein theformofstate,
in theinterstate
system,andin thefutureorganization
of production.
Outcomesin all three spheresare an open question.No
independentanddependent variables
areposited,no one-way
causalities,
e.g.,froman inevitablyemerging
organization
of
production
to consequentially
necessaryformsof stateand
interstate
system.
Thefutureshape
ofproduction
organization
is
justasopenasthefutureformofstate
andjustasconstrained
by
theexistingpatternof forces.Thestruggle
goeson at thesame
time on all threeterrains.Thequestionto be addressed
hereis:
what are the forces that are either presentin combat or more
passively
available
formobilization
intocombat?
This approach,
whichregardsclassformationandthe
formationof historicblocsasthe crucialfactorin the transfor-
mationofglobalpoliticalandsocialorder,hasseveral
advantages:
1. It avoidsreducingstatesandthe statesystemto the
worldieconomy,
atendency
forwhichworldsystems
theory
has
been
criticized?
358 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
DOMINANT GROUPS
lic awareness
of a struggle
to resistconsolidation
of U.S.tech-
nological
supremacy
bystrengthening
anindependent
European
capacity
forindustrial
growth
andinnovation.
Thestruggle
wasnot,however,
openlyjoinedbetween
twoopposed
segments,
international
andnational,
of capital
withinEurope.
Alternative
policyclusters
emerged
in national
politics.
Thedominant
ones
(e.g.,
theregimes
ledbyValéry
Gis-
carddEstaing
in France
andHelmut
Schmidt
in WestGermany)
expressed
continuing
commitment
totheneoliberal
world-eco-
nomicorderwith continuingenhancement
of thecompetitive-
nessofbignational capitalin thissphere,
combinedwithtran-
sitionalprotection
andadjustment aidforthelesscompetitive.
Opposition
clusters
(e.g.,
theGaullists
inFrance]
expressed
the
apprehensions
ofcapital
lessabletoadapt
toworldmarket
con-
ditionsandofpopular
groupsnotbeneting
fromthegrowth
of
themoredynamic industrial
sectors.
Prolonged
economic
crisis
following
1973
reduced
theplausibility
ofthefirstanddeepened
theconcerns
ofthesecond.
Capitalmovements
reversed,
owing
nowthrough
Eurocurrencymarkets
intotheUnited States,
while
thedepreciation
ofthedollarfavoredU.S.overEuropean and
Japanese
exports
onworldmarkets andincreased laborcosts
in
Europe
andJapanrelative
totheUnited States.
Theearly advan-
tages
ofEuropean
andIapanese capital
in worldmarketcompe-
titionwerenowchallenged
by arevivedU.S.industrialcompet-
itiveness~~acompetitiveness
duemoreto theuseof U.S.power
to manipulate
theworldfinancial
systemthanto realgainsin
industrial
productivity.
Capital
in allthemajorcountries
became
morethaneverawarethatworldmarketsuccess depended
equally
uponproductive
efficiency
andpolitical
power. S
In late-developing
countries,
fromthoseof southern
Eu-
rope
totheindustrializing
countries
oftheThird
World,
national
bourgeoisies
neverattained
thesame degree
ofhegemonic
status
asbourgeoisies
in oldercapitalist
countries.
Thestate
inmostof
thesecountries
became
amajoragency
formobilizing
andaccu-
mulating
capital.
Thepredominance
ofstate
officials
in theac-
cumulation
process
andinthecontrol
ofthecountrys
productive
apparatus
gives
risetoanattempt
todene
thenature
ofthegroup
thatcontrols
development.
It is,of course,
necessary
to differ-
entiateseveral
distinctpatterns
of powerrelationship.
CLASSES AND HISTORIC BLOCS 365
background.
Theyweredrawn
fromtheeducated
pettybourgeoi-
sie with someadmixtureof moretraditionalsocialauthorities
[although
thechildren
ofthelattersoon
integrated
withthefor-
merthrough education].
Thishadledto a varietyof efforts
to
identifytherulinggroup
in theuseofterms
suchasbureaucratic
bourgeoisie,
managerial
ororganizational
bourgeoisie,
andstate
class.
Theyhavebeencalledabourgeoisie
byanalogy
because
of
thecontrol
theyhaveovertheproductive
apparatus
through
their
controlof the statebut also,perhaps,
because
of an observed
disposition
of someoftheirelementsto linkupwithforeign
capital
bothasrealcompradors,
e.g.,
in theroleoflocalstaffof
multinational
corporations,
andasanautonomous
groupseeking
external
capital
andalliesfortheirowneconomic activities.
The
stateclassappelation,bydropping thebourgeoisqualica-
tion,suggests
anindeterminacy onthepartofthisgroup(itcould
moveeithertowardintegration
withworldcapitalism
ortoward
a moreautocentricand socialistdevelopment).
It alsosuggests
thatthegrouphasattained
a self-reproducing
powerstatus
that
canbeopposed tosubordinate
classes
in thesociety.
The inherentambiguityof the ruling grouphasbeen
underlined
bymanyobservers.
Amilcar
Cabral,
believing
thatin
African conditions,only elementsfrom the petty bourgeoisie
couldleada successful
revolution,proposed thattherevolution
wouldbeableto maintainits integrityonlyif thesepetty-bour-
geois
elements
wereprepared
tocommit
class
suicide.
Broadly,twocoursesof actionareopentothem.Oneis to
maintainthe revolutionary
thrusttowardautocentricdevelop-
mentemphasizing basicneedsand socialequitya course
fraught
withpolitical
risks.Thisisnotinconsistent
withselective
links to the world economy
throughforeigninvestments
and
exports
butmustsubordinate
these
linkstonational
development
goals.
Theotheristoseek
oraccept
foreign
capital
andproduce
for the world marketasa meansof servicingthatcapital.Thisis
thesoftoptionforaleadership
tiredoforthreatened
bycontinued
popular
mobilization.
It isacourse
thatmayshowevidence
of
economic
growth,
albeitwithgrowing
inequities
andanexternal
orientationto the economy.The statemanagers
of a country
possessing
mineral
resources
in demand
onworldmarkets
are
especially
liableto beattracted
tothesecond
course.
Insofar
as
CLASSESAND HISTORICBLOCS 367
theyderiverentsfromtheircontroloveraccess
to minerals,
they
becomein effectpartnersof the multinationalcapitalthat pro-
cessesand marketstheir raw materials.
Thus, if the stateclassdoesexist,it is an ambivalent
structurethat may moveeitherin the directionof self-reliant
development
or in thatof dependent
integration
intotheworld
economy,
withanaturalinclination
overtimetothelatterunless
popular
pressures
canberecurrently
rekindled
to pressure
the
leadershipto staythe revolutionarycourse.
A numberof lessdeveloped countriesareonlyof marginal
interestto transnationalcapital.Their poor domesticmarkets
offerlittle or no incentivefor foreigninvestors
to setup local
production.
Norareexportplatforms
a likelyoptionsolongas
theindustrializing
ThirdWorldcountries containuntapped re-
servesof morereadilytrainable
anddisciplined
manpower. The
nancingof foodandenergy inputsposesproblemsof interna-
tional credit.Thegreatestinuencethe statecadresof these
countrieshavewith thoseelementsof the transnational
mana-
gerialclass
theyencounter
liesin thethreatof sociopolitical
disorderinherentin their countrieslack of development
and
deteriorating
economic andsocialconditions.
Somehopeto ex-
tractsufcientpoorrelieffromtherich countries,
averting
the
risksofpopular
mobilization.
Others offerthemselves
franklyas
repressive
policemenin returnfor militaryandcounterinsur-
gency assistance.
Whether playingthebenign orthemalevolent
role,thesestatecadres
become
accessories
to thetransnational
managerial
classthwarting
thedevelopment
of socialforces
in
their countries.
Economic
management
in socialistcountries
is a special
case.Industriesin thesecountriesoperateunderthe tutelageof
apoliticalsystem
centered
in aPartywhose
leadership
thinksin
termsof totality,linkingall signicantactivitiesin thesociety,
includingthemanagement ofindustry,to overallgoals. Thecon-
cernsof differentindustrialsectorsarereconciledwithin this
totalframeworkandmanagerial positionslled soasto conform
withthegeneral
directiongivenbythecentralleadership.
Poten-
tial existsfor the emergence
of a directingclassin the Soviet
system,
butit is stilldifculttospeak
oftheemergence
ofclass
asa self-reproducing
socialcategory.
Thesedirectinggroups
368 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
SUBORDINATE GROUPS
to particularenterprises,
andtheirmainfunctionis to ensure
conformitywith the normsof the enterprise
on the part of
subordinates.
Often suchspecializedjobs areto be found in older
industriesor oldertechnologies
that haveadaptedto the com-
petitiveimpactof thetechnologically
leading
enterprises.
The
coexistence
of old andnewtechnologies
is a furtherfactorfavor-
inga fragmentation
of theinterests
of differentgroupsof work-
ers. Someof the olderindustriesthat havetraditionallybeen
thepreserve of skilledtrades,e.g.,printing,furnituremanufac-
ture,precision mechanics, haveexperienced a shiftin thecom-
positionof theirlaborforceswith a reduction in theproportion
of skilled workers and an increasein the cheapersemiskilled.
Where this has occurred,someof the skilled workersare often
promoted
intotasks
involving
preparation
ofworkprocesses
and
supervision
whilesomeof theothersaredowngradedto less
skilled work alongsidea new lot of workers,oftenwomenor
immigrants.
Underbouyanteconomic
conditions
suchaspre-
vailedin the1960s,opportunities
for individualpromotionmight
outweigh resentmentatthedegradation ofskillsandimpede
any
collectiveprotestby erstwhileskilledworkers.Therestricted
opportunities
ofthepost-1973
crisisaremorelikelytoengender
a collectiveresponse.
Sucharetheforcesdetermining
thebor-
derlinesof the enterprisecorporatistconsciousness.
TheDefensive
Postureof Established
Workers
Skilled manual labor hasbeenthe coreof the tradeunion
movementin the industrialized capitalist countries.Strongor-
ganizations
of established
workersgained
recognition
bothas
legitimate
forces
bargaining
to determine
thetermsandcondi-
tionsofemployment
in industryandalsoasasignicant
political
forcein inuencingthe development
of socialpoliciesin the
statethroughtheir association
with mass-based,
oftensocial-
democratic,
politicalparties.Established
laborbecame
akeycom-
ponent
ofthecoalition
ofpoliticalandsocialforces
thatconsti-
tuted the social contract of the neoliberal state.
There were three variants of this generalpattern.In the
rst, unionsorganized
a relativelysmallproportion
of thetotal
nonagricultural
laborforce(notmorethanabout
25percent)
and
CLASSES
ANDHISTORIC
BLOCS 373
were effectivein determiningconditionsof employmentin large-
scaleenterprises
of key industrialsectorsbut somewhat
less
effectivein the realmof statepolicy.This wasthe casefor the
United Statesand Canada.In the second,unions were more
strongly
based
in thelaborforceandwereparticularly
inuential
in the determinationof statepolicy through social-democratic
parties,
whichheldpowerthrough at leastpartof thepostwar
period.Thiswasthecasein Scandinavia,
WestGermany, and
theNetherlands.
In thethird variant,unionswererelativelyweak
in membership
butbecame
vehiclesfor occasional
mass-based
protests,
whichtookonaclassform(unions,
in asense,
catching
up withdeeplyrootedrank-and-file
movements].
Theseexplo-
sionssecureda politicalresponse
froma statecontrolled
essen-
tiallybynonworking-class elements.
Thiswasthecasein France
andItaly,e.g.,in thebroadlybasedsocialmovements of May
1968in Franceand the hot autumn of Italy in 1969.
Duringthe1950s
and1960s,
variations
in strategies
of
socialconflictandin themodes
of resolution
of conflictscanbe
explained
verylargely
bythese
three
variants.
There
wasasteady
levelof strikeactivityin theUnitedStates
andCanada
(variant
one);a declineof strikes
to a negligible
levelin Denmark,
the
Netherlands,Norway,andSweden (varianttwo];andsomede-
clinein Belgium,WestGermany, andtheUnitedKingdom (par-
tial formsof varianttwo);andheavyconcentrations
of strike
activityin FranceandItalyaround
moments of sociopolitical
crisis(variant
three).z5
Theserepresented
different
waysinwhich
establishedworkersbroughtinfluenceto bearon bothindustry
and the statewithin the generalframeworkof Keynesian-type
economic
managementin aneraof economic growth.
Demand
management
maintained
a welfarestatewithreasonably
high
levelsof employment.
Withinthestate,established
workers
or-
ganizations
weresought
outaspartners
in national-level
eco-
nomicconsultative
bodiesandeconomicplanningcommissions
(withsomeexceptions,e.g.,theFrench
CGTandItalianCGIL,
considered
to fall outside
thebounds of consensus
because
of
their Communist
Partyconnections).
Workerswereaccorded
someconsultative
statuswithin industry,themostinstitutionally
developed
formbeingmitbestimmung
in theGerman
coaland
steelindustries.Established
laborparticipatedalbeit
asajunior
374 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
policy,
usheringin apost-Keynesian
typeofnational
economic
policy,thelikelyinternational
implications
ofwhichareneo-
mercantilist.
Thiswouldclearlyimplya resurgence
of labors
relative
powerandthereinsertion
ofestablished
laborbackinto
thehistoricbloc.However,
unless
anduntilthiscanbeachieved,
establishedlabormaytakethepositionthatunionsmustrelyon
theirownstrength aloneandremainsuspicious towardtheap-
peals
andblandishments
ofstates
which
havesoobviously
down-
graded
worker
interests.
Ofcourse,
whatunions
cannot
achieve
through
economic
strength
theymaytrytoachieve
through
po-
litical alliance.(Thismaybeseenasthemeaning
of AFL-CIO
support
fortheMondale
Democratic
Partycandidacy
in the1984
U.S.elections.)
Laborpoliticshave,however,beenno moresuc-
cessful
thanunionorganization
inmostoftheadvanced
capitalist
countries since the mid-1970s.
TheShiftingBoundary
Between
Established
and Nonestablished Workers
Asnotedin chapter9,thetransition
frommanufactureto
Fordismduringthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcentury
brought
withit a neworientation
oftradeunions.
Asworkers
lost control over the work process,their organizationsconcen-
tratedeffortsondefending
andimproving
theirlivingstandards
through
bothindustrial
andpolitical
action.
Attheworkplace,
managerial
authority
became
formallysupreme;
workerresis-
tancewaslimitedto informalrestrictions
of output.Modelsof
personal behavior
shiftedfromtheworkgroupto thestreet
groupandfromoccupational solidarity
toconsumer conform-
ity.Inthelatetwentieth
century,
automationandhightechnology
in theadvanced
capitalist
countries accelerated thesetendencies:
therehasbeenjobenrichment for a relativefew,jobimprover-
ishmentanda loweringof skillsfor others,
andanintroduction
of still othersto semiskilledwork havingno intrinsicallysatis-
fyingcontent.
Atthesametime,
thecommunications
media
have
spreadconsumerism,
instrumental
attitudes
toward
work,and
acquiescence
in thelong-term
stability
ofpoliticalsystems.
Theenlargement
thathastakenplacein thesphere of
semiskilled
workhasresultedin shiftinganduncertainbound-
ariesbetweenestablished
andnonestablished labor.Muchof
378 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
awareness
of collectivedisadvantage
in opportunities
vis-a-vis
othersocialgroups
or aneconomic
downturn
bringing
deterio-
rationoftheirrelativeincomes
couldsparksuchachange.
In the
absenceof anysuchevents,
bipartite
socialrelations
ofproduc-
tion among theseworkers
aresystemmaintaining ratherthan
systemtransforming.
A second
typeofworker
situated
close
totheestablished/
nonestablishedboundaryin the coreindustrialcountriesis in a
fulltime,low-statusjob.Manyof thesearerelativenewcomers,
including
people
ofruralbackground,
ethnically
differentiated
imigrants,
andwomen.
Theyareemployed
inthelargefactories
of theautomobile
industry,smallerregional
plantsof industries
suchaselectronics,
andin smallor medium-sizedlocalenter-
prises
suchastextiles
orinformation
processing.
Some ofthe
mostexplosive
social
conflicts
ofrecentdecades havebroken out
amongthiscategory.
Thesegenerallyfocusonunionrecognition
andtheattempttoacquire
established
status.Oftenthese efforts
havefoundered uponthehostilityor indifferenceof already
established
workers,
andthishasmadeit easier
foremployers
to
resistnonestablished
workerdemands.Sometimes,
however,a
prolonged
conictsparksamovement
ofsolidarity
onthepart
oftheestablished
workers,
andunionsareformedorrestructured
to encompass
anddefend
those
attempting
to gainestablished
status.Heretheboundaries
between established
andnonesta-
blishedaremostuid andformsof consciousnessrangefrom
social
passivity
andaninstrumental
Viewofthewage
relation-
ship,ontheonehand,
toactive
challenge
tothestructure
of
powerandcontrol
inboth
management
andunions,
ontheother.
It maywellbethatemployment
offulltime,
semiskilled
workersrecruited
fromamong
groupssuffering
variousformsof
socialdisadvantage
(minorities,
immigrants,
women)peaked
during
theprecrisis
years
ofthelate1960s
andearly1970s
and
will notgrowagain.
Thereby
theestablished
orderin industry
mightspareitselftheriskofgenerating
anexplosion.
Thefunc-
tionsperformedbythese workerscaneither
beshifted
totem-
poraryjobsorreprogrammed intothesphereofthemoreinte-
grated
enterprise-corporatist
work
forcethrough
automation
and
robotization.
A thirdtypeencompasses
thosein a moreprecarious
or
380 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
precapitalist
formationandinitiallytendedto strengthen
these
local authorities insofar as they could remain in control of the
trade.
The expansiveproclivity of capitalismand the superior
force it musteredled to a secondstagein which capitalist pro-
ductionimplanteditself directlyin the precapitalistformation.
This was accomplished throughthe mediumof imperialism,
eitherby supplantinglocalpowerswith acolonialadministration
or by useof gunboats
to compelacquiescence
by localpowers.
Therst capitalistundertakings
mightberaw-material
extraction
enterprises
(mines,plantations)
or facilitiesto penetrate
further
into domesticmarkets(ports,railways),or both.Whateverthey
were,theyrequiredwagelaborandlocalcashdemand.
Local
stateadministrations,whethercolonial or formally independent,
accordingly
hadto adoptmeasurestofurtheracashmarketecon-
omyanda supplyof wagelabor.Publicborrowingandtaxation
produced
these
effects,
supported
byotherinstruments
ofpublic
policy.
The socialrelationsof productionweretransformedat two
extremities. Production of agricultural products for markets,
whetherfor regionalurbanfood or long-distance
commercial
singlecrops,tendedtowarda consolidation of largerholdings
usingmorecapital(irrigation,
fertilizers)
in relationto laborand
alsoto extensiveengrossment
of landby agribusiness.
This left
only the lessproductivelandsfor subsistence
farming,andit
transformed
erstwhilepeasants
into agriculturalwagelaborersor
sent them to the urban slums. At the other extreme,capitalist
industryemployed
a relativefewin jobs,which,alongside
gov-
ernment services,seemedsecureand well paid by comparison
with what most of the urban population could hope to receive.
Commercialagricultureand industrial and governmentwage
earners
providedmuchof thecashflowintothelocaleconomy.
Betweenthem was a heterogeneous
group engagedin activities
variouslystyledastraditional,informal,or marginal,comprising
severalmodesof socialrelationsof production.Thereweresmall
workshops
employing
wagelaborin theenterpriselabor-market
mode;simplecommodity
productionby artisans
andproviders
of services(tailors,barbers)and small traders,all of the self-
employment
mode;andpeddlers,
domestic
servants,
andpara-
384 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
populistcharacter
ratherthanin thedevelopment
of class
consciousness.
Thepotentiality
for a revolutionary
roleonthepartof
wage
laborcannot,
however, bediscounted.
Asnoted,statecor-
poratism
hasbeen
moresuccessful
in screening
outalternative
leadership
thanin positively
attracting
theloyalties ofwage earn-
ers.A politicalvoidremains,
thoughit is difcultto ll, given
theobstacles
to buildingopposition
organizations,
whether
they
bebasedonresidence or ontheworkplace.
Factors
thatenhance
thepossibility
thatanoutbreak
of industrial
conflict
couldbe
transformed into a challengeto politicalandsocialauthority
include:[1]apriorhistoryof autonomous workerorganizations,
(2)theexistence
of occupational
communities
generating
a
greater
intensity
ofsocial
interaction
among
particular
groups
of
workers,
[3]theprevalence
ofarelatively
highlevelofeducation
among
theworkers
concerned,
and(4)thepresence
ofradical
intellectuals
amongworkerswho takeadvantage
of crisesin
society
totransform
prevailing
instrumental
attitudes
intoclass
solidarities.
Of course,thefirsttwo of thesefactorscouldbeconducive
to economistic
labor.-aristocracy
formsof consciousness,
aswell
asto a revolutionary
class-solidarity
perspective.
Furthermore,
evenaninitial class-based
revolutionarymovementmaybeen-
gulfed
in a comprehensive
populist
consciousness,
expressing
itselfmorein nationalist
or religioussymbols
suchasthoseof
ShiiteIslamin Iran.Third Worldindustrialdevelopment
is gen-
erating
conditions
propitious
forwork-related
social
protest.
Pos-
siblythepotential
forrevolt
arising
directly
outofthesocial
relations
in theproduction
process
isgreater
in theThirdWorld
thanin the advanced
capitalistcountries,
andthis despitethe
repressive
instruments
available
toThirdWorldstates
andthe
limitedandfragile
nature
ofworker
class
consciousness.
Whether
revolt,whereit occurs,
takesa classor a populistformremains
mootandwill depend
ontheideological
preparation
ofworkers
and the nature of the leadership.
Peasantsand Marginals
Thethirdquarter
ofthetwentieth
century
sawtheglobal
incidence
ofviolence
shiftfromtheindustrial
heartlands
toThird
388 THE MAKING OF THE FUTURE
Worldpeasant
societies.
Twoworldwarscentered
in Europe
werefollowedby the successof a peasant-based
revolutionin
Chinaandby warssuccessfully
prosecuted
by peasantghters
against
thearmsandtechniques
ofadvanced
industrialcountries
in Indochina,Algeria,andsouthernAfrica.Peasants
wereslaugh-
teredor repressed
in Indonesia
andfoughtcontinuing
struggles
in much of Central and South America.
This encouraged the notionthat peasantsthewretched
of the earth9werethe genuinerevolutionaryclass.Neverthe-
less,by the last quarterof the century,new revolutionaryper-
spectives
in peasantsocieties
appeared dim.In thosecountries
wherepeasant-based
revolutions hadsucceeded,established
rev-
olutionaryregimes
tookthevillagesin hand;theyreestablished
compliance by peasants
in the leadership
of urbanelites.The
dynamicof revolutionin the countrysidewasquelled.In the
nonrevolutionary
areasof Third World capitalistdevelopment,
two tendenciesbecamesalient.Onewas rearguardaction fought
bypeasants against
thetransformation
ofpeasant
agriculture
into
capitalist
farming.Sincethepeasants
werealways
thelosers,
the
result was an increase in urban marginality as peasants were
extrudedfrom the land and ocked to the cities. The other ten-
dencystemmed froma realization
bythemanagers
of theworld
economythatcapitalist
developmentwouldnotabsorb
morethan
a fraction of the worlds rural populations.It took the form of an
attemptto stabilize
theruralpopulation
leftoutside
theeffective
scopeofthecapitalisteconomythroughself-help
schemesaiming
toward self- sufciency.
Thegrowthin marginalityis the numericalconsequence
of (1)risingpopulations,[2]signicantdeclines
in thenumbers
ofpeoplesupported onthelandascapitalist
agriculture displaces
peasant cultivation,and(3)verysmallincreases in industrial
employment. Thesethreefactorsexplainwhymarginality grows
with thelevelof economicgrowthandis highest(reaching
about
30percentof thelaborforcein somecases)
in thoseperipheral
countriesthat haveachievedsomedegreeof industrialization in
both agricultureand manufacturing.
Objectively,
thegrowthin marginality mustberegarded
aspotentially
destabilizing
forthesocialandpoliticalorder,since
it impliesa concentration
of largerthannecessary
reservearm-
CLASSES AND HISTORIC BLOCS 389
IN SUMMARY
organization,
or whethertheexisting
order,evenweakened, is
stillstrong
enoughto eliminate
thepoliticalthreatofa consoli-
dationof counterhegemonic
tendencies.
Theanswerto this ques-
tion canbegivenonlyin politicalaction.Peoplein Nicaragua,
Mozambique
andPolandbearthecostof raisingit.
Theimplication
fortheoryoftheapproach
takenin this
studytoward
thetransformation
ofsocial,
political,
andworld
ordersis, in the first place,to forsakethe actors-interactions
paradigm
thathasbeen
soinuential
in social
science,
in favor
of onegroundedin historical
structures.
Theobjective
of-the
latterapproach
istodiscern
thestructures
thatgiveaframework
for action and that form the actors.Historical structuresexpress
theunityofthesubjective
andtheobjective.
A nation,
aclass,
a
religionarenotrealphysical
objects,
yettheygiverealformto
thehumansituation.
Theyareideasshared
in thesubjectivity
of
innumerableindividualswho arerealphysicalbeings.In being
soshared,theseideasconstitutethesocialworldof thesesame
individuals.
Theyattainobjectivity
in thestructures
thatcircum-
scribehumanaction.Thesestructures areasmucha partof the
materialexistence
of peopleasthefoodtheyeatandtheclothes
they wear.
Structuresarein onesenseprior to individuals.Theyare
already
present
in theworldintowhichindividuals
areborn.
People
learn
tobehave
withintheframework
ofsocial
andpolit-
ical structuresbeforethey can learn to criticize or opposeor try
to change
them.Butstructures
arenotin anydeeper
sense
prior
to the humandramaitself,assomestructuralist
theorywould
have us believe.Structuresare not givens (data),they are
mades(facts)madeby collective
humanactionandtrans-
formable
bycollective
human
action.
Thishistorically
changea-
ble character
of structures
is whatdistinguishes
the historical
structures
approach
fromstructuralism.
Myapproach
haslooked,
not at individualactionsandevents,but at evidenceof changes
in theframeworks that setlimits for thinkingandacting.
I havefound suchframeworksor structuresat the three
levelsof inquiry:modes
ofsocial
relations
ofproduction,
forms
ofstate,
andstructuresofworldorder.I havealsofoundstructures
of structures
linkingtogetherthesethreelevelsin systemsthat
havehada certainstabilityfor a certainduration.Thepointof
396 CONCLUSIONS
Thusthe enterprise-labor-market
modeof socialrelationsof pro-
duction becamethe preeminentmode during the era of compet-
itive capitalism,butthismodecameinto aworldin whichhouse-
hold production,subsistence production,slavery,peasant-lord
production,andselfemployment survivedfromanearlierepoch
and becamerestructured in a subordinate manner into a capitalist
accumulationprocess.Similarly, when centralplanningbecame
the preeminentmodein a redistributiveaccumulationprocess
installedby revolution,someothermodescontinuedor subse-
quentlyrevivedin a subordinate
relationshipto it. Thereseems,
indeed, to be little justification for attributing an indelibly or
essentiallycapitalistqualityevento the enterpriselabormarket
or to bipartiterelationsdespitetheir unquestionable historical
associationwith the rise and developmentof capitalism.Enter-
prise-labor-market
relationshavebeenrevivedin subordination
to centralplanning,and thereis no reasonto excludeevena
possiblecompatibilityof bipartismwith centralplanning[the
Polish Solidarnoscwas a failed attemptto achievethis].
If the socialrelationsof production arebestdistinguished
analyticallyfrom reproductionand accumulationprocesses
in
order to be able to examine how different modes of social relations
of productionhavebecomelinkedtogetherin complexsystems
of production,it is otherwisewith reproductionandaccumula-
tion processes.Theseseemto conformmorecloselyoneto the
other.
I made a first distinction between simple reproduction
(thereconstitutionin the nextproductioncycleof the sameso-
ciety asproducedin the first] and expandedreproduction[the
generatingof a surplusthat enablesthe societyto grow and
changethroughsuccessive cyclesof production).Only in ex-
pandedreproductioncan one speakmeaningfullyof develop-
ment,and accumulationis the meansto development.Expanded
reproduction,development,
and accumulation
designate
differ-
ent aspectsof the same process.
I distinguishtwo basicmodesof development:
capitalist
and redistributive modes. Both accumulate in order to grow. Both
may organizeproductionin similar waysin orderto produce
surplusfor accumulation,
but the mechanisms driving the ac-
cumulation process are different. Capitalist development is
CONCLUSIONS 399
development.
These
combinations
andthedominant
and
subordinate
linkagesamongmodesof socialrelationsof production delineate
the social structure of accumulation, i.e., the manner in which
production in one mode subsidizesproduction in another or
transferssurplus to that other [e.g.,householdproduction sub-
sidizes both central planning in redistributive development and
the dominant tripartite or enterprisecorporatist modes in capi-
talist development].If, hitherto, there has been a marked simi-
larity in production methodsunder capitalistand redistributive
development,this is to be attributedmore to the effectsof inter-
national competition (ultimately competitionin military prepar-
edness) between the two systems than to the inherent nature of
either
system.
Although
production
wasthe
point
ofdeparture
ofthis
study, the crucial role, it turns out, is playedby the state.States
create the conditions in which particular modes of social rela-
tions achieve dominance over coexisting modes, and they struc-
ture either purposively or by inadvertencethe dominant-subor-
dinate linkages of the accumulation process. States thus
determine the whole complex structure of production from
which the state then extracts sufcient resources to continue to
exerciseits power. Of course,statesdo not do this in an isolated
way. Each state is constrainedby its position and its relative
power in the world order,which placeslimits on its will and its
ability to changeproductionrelations.A majorpoint of emphasis
in this study has been on the crucial importanceof the states
relationship to production.
400 CONCLUSIONS
revolutionary
spasms,
followedagainbyperiods
ofsocialpassiv-
ity. Theconcerns
voicedrecently
by someideologues
of the
establishedorder that democracieswere threatenedby ungov-
ernability
wasa signalthatperhaps
thatpassivity
andabsten-
tionismtowardactiveinvolvementin politicalandsocialaction,
whichtheseideologues considered
to bea conditionfor political
stability,
mightbegivingplace
tomoreactive
participation.
If the
realityis not obviousat present,thefearof it is.
A varietyof practices
existthatobstruct
anysuchshiftin
the balanceof humaneffortawayfrom tasksof physicalrepro-
duction toward opportunitiesfor socialdevelopment.
One is
consumerism, which increases
demandsfor unnecessarygoods
andpromotes
obsolescence
andwasteandthereby
callsforth
everhigherlevelsof physicalproduction.
Anotheris excessive
individualism,wherebythe duplicationof privatefacilitiesis
preferred
topublicorcollective
facilities.
Yetanother
isthearms
race,absorbinga substantial
shareof productivecapacityand
demandingevermorein response to aperceived
mutualthreat.
Theprospectofsuchashiftin thebalanceofhumaneffort,
evenvaguelyperceived, appears asthreatening
to many.It is
threatening,
in therst place,to thosebenetingmostfromthe
existing
orderthreatening
to governmental
andpoliticalprac-
tices,to theauthorityof employers,
to established
tradeunion
leadership,
to thedeference
shownbythepublicto thesocial
policybureaucracies,
andsoforth.It wason behalfof these
interests
thatthecryof ungovernability
wasraised.
It is threat-
ening,also,to deeplyentrenched
notions
of morality
touching
thework ethicandconventional
sexroles.Thesehavefunction-
ally reconciled
peopleto a worldpreoccupied with physical
reproduction
andhavegiventhesocialinstitutions
ofthatworld
the aura of sanctity.
Theexistence
of productivecapacitythatcouldsatisfythe
essential
physicalneedsof thewholeworldspopulation
con-
trastswith a situationin which that capacityis underutilized,
andthereis waste,inequity,anddangerthreat
of nuclearde-
struction,bloodyconventionalwarsin theThirdWorld,envi-
ronmentaldamage, unemployment. Nowhere, perhaps,
is the"
contrastmoremarkedthanbetweenthe capacityof agricultural
science
toproduce
abundant
foodwithsmallnumbers
ofworkers
CONCLUSIONS 403
Preface
1.Several
articles
foreshadow
earlier
stages
inthe
thinking
that
hasgone
into this volume,includingRobertW.Cox(1971):13964;
Cox,Harrod,etal. (1972);
Cox (1977c):11337; and Cox (1973).
2. Somepreliminaryreectionson thelevelsof stateandworld orderareto
be found in Cox (1981):12655; and Cox (1982): 37-58.
3. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) named the irreducible simple
unity or spiritual substance
a monad.Monads,for Leibniz,hadbothindividuality
anddevelopment; eachmonad,differentiated
fromeveryother,hadits owninternal
principlethatguidedits changes
until all its possibilities
wereexhausted.
Each
monadalsohada particularperspective
on theworld.ForLeibniz,however,mon-
adscouldnotactupononeanother;theywerecompletelyprogrammed fromwithin
at the moment of their creation, seeLeibniz (1934).The monad concept is adopted
here as a heuristic device, not as a metaphysicalabsolute.In particular, the notion
that monadsarenot actedupon from outsideis rejected.Thesensein which the
term applieshereis onein which particularpatternsof productionrelationsare
examined as distinctive forms of social life so as to discern their characteristic
dynamics
asthoughtheydeveloped
according
to a distinctiveinternalprinciple.
Thisis merely,of course,arst step.Subsequently, thesepatternsmustbeexamined
in their interrelationships,i.e., explicitly recognizingmutualinuences.On the
contribution of Leibniz to the historicist concepts of individuality and develop-
ment, see Meinecke (1972):1530.
Theme
1.This
position
was,for
instance,
taken
byKerr,
etal.(1960)
inabook
that
hada certainideologicalimpactin andbeyondtheUnitedStatesin theearly1960s.
A similar messagewas conveyedby Bell (1960).
2. Bahro (1978): esp. 183-202.
3. Gorz (1982): esp. 15.
4. Reinhard Bendix (1967)usesthe terms limited applicability concepts
and contrast concepts to designatesuch models of historical structures.
406 THEME
6. This was the View of Giambattista Vico, who did not, of course, use the
term structure but rather cosa, a rendition of the Latin res, which can be understood
as institution. Language and law were, for Vico, such institutions. See Thomas
Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch Introduction to their English translation
of The New Science of Giambattista Vico (1970): lilii. For Vico, the nature of
institutions is nothing but their coming into being (nascimentoj at certain times and
in certain guises (ibid, para. 147, p. 22) and the world of civil society has certainly
been made by men, and . . . its principles are therefore to be found within the
modications of our own human mind (ibid., para. 331, pp. 52-53). I have elabo-
rated the notion of historical structure in Cox (1981).
7. Before speaking of modes of development, it is well to consider the more
nearly comprehensive notion of the mode of reproduction, i.e., the processes
whereby societies are extended through time by giving birth to, raising, and edu-
cating a new generation and placing its members in their economic and social roles.
Throughout much of human history, reproduction often seemed to have been a
circular process, constantly repeated, through which the same structure of society
was reproduced. Agrarian-basedsocieties reproduced themselves in the forms
either of small subsistence communities or of peasant villages part of whose product
was extracted by a dominant political-religious class that took no part in material
production but saw to the reproduction of the social-political order. Reproduction
tended to be a circular, no-growth, nonaccumulative process.
Development implies a reproduction process with both accumulation and a
consequential change of structures. (No positive valuation is necessarily intended
in the use of the term development, e.g., as is conveyed by a term such as progress.)
Development was initiated through the capitalist mode. In capitalism, the labor
hired by the capitalist produces more than is required for its own reproduction.
The surplus is taken by the capitalist who uses it, not for consumption and con-
spicuous display [like those extractedfrom precapitalist agrarianproduction), but
for investment in expanding the capacity to produce in the next cycle, either by
hiring more workers or by installing machinery that enables the same workers to
produce more in the same time. Of course, the capitalist as a person may also
indulge in excess consumption but to the extent that he does so he is not behaving
as a capitalist.
The term capitalism is used here exclusively in this senseas a mode of
development that breaks the cycle of continuous reproductio'n
and introduces a
purposive time dimension, an upward spiral of accumulation, investment, ex-
panded reproduction, and so on. The term capitalist is not used in this study to
apply to a single mode of production. Indeed, the capitalist mode of development
hasspawnedseveraldistinctive modesof social relations of production. To bracket
theseall togetheras a single capitalist mode of production confusesthings that are
signicantly distinct. Moreover, the capitalist mode of development links modes
of production that are distinctly noncapitalist into the capitalist process of
accumulation.
The capitalist mode of developmentdoesnot depend on individual capital-
ists or ultimately even on private property. It consists in (1) the appropriation of
the difference between, on the one hand, the costs of maintaining and reproducing
the labor force and productive equipment, and on the other, the returns from the
marketing of what is produced; and [2] the use of this appropriated surplus to
expand production in ways that will generatethe largestadditional surplus in the
next production cycle as indicated by market demand.Who or whate.g., individ-
ual capitalist or technostructureor stateactually appropriatesor reinvestsprots
THEME 407
production,thatacertainformof consciousness
canbededucedfromclassposition
[otherformsthatmaybefoundto prevailin practicebeingfalse consciousness),
and that classeshave historical roles attributed to them by a general theory of
history. The other extremeto be avoidedis an ernpiricismthat aggregates
the
attitudesandopinionsreportedby a numberof individualswhohavebeenprede-
termined for survey purposesas membersof the targetedsocial group; class con-
sciousness is then assumed to be the aggregate of individual consciousnesses.
Neither of these extremesgetsat the historical phenomenonof class.To do this, it
is necessary
to relatethedevelopment
of consciousness
to realeventsandhistorical
processes.
A priori deductionsconcerningclasslead to a dogmatismthat may
reconrm the convictions of committed activists possessedof a senseof historical
mission but are a poor guide to social and political practice. Empiricism reveals
statesof passive,manipulatedconsciousnessthat maywell betransformed under
pressureof eventsthat channelindividual responsesinto collectiveaction.The
sources of class identities and orientations are to be sought in events and changes
of real social, economic, and political situations in which particular social groups
areconfronted by specic problems:either theseeventsprovokea responsethrough
common action or they reveal an incapacity for action.
The socialpractices,i.e., the routinizedmeansof collectiveaction,of the
socialgroupsgeneratedin the productionprocesshavetakenformsorientedre-
spectivelyto thespheresof productionandof thestate.In thesphereof production,
these forms include trade unions and employer associations;in the sphere of the
state,political parties.Tradeunionismby itselfhasnotusuallybecomesufciently
free of the immediate context of production to be able to pose a challenge to the
productivesystem.It hasbeenimmersedwithin that systemand seeksits own
advantagewithin it-seeksthe maximumavailableto organizedworkerswithout
threateningthe systemitself.Compared
to tradeunions,political partiesof subal-
tern classeshave had a greater capacity for autonomy with a potential for trans-
forming production relations. Political parties are not the spontaneousemanations
of social classes. Rather, where class-based political parties have come into exis-
tence,they havethemselvesbeenthe meansof arousingand channelingclass
consciousness.There is commongroundbetweenthe Leninist and Gramscianviews
of partyand evenbetweentheseandtheoligarchytheoryof RobertMichelsbased
on trade union and social democraticpolitics or the elite theoriesof GaetanoMosca
and Vilfredo Paretoin regardto the critical importance of organizationalcadres.
Gramscistheoryhas,however,givena superiorformulationto the relationship
between cadres and class consistent with his broader understanding of the rela-
tionship betweensocialbeingand social consciousness.
The cadrescannotbe
merelymanipulative;theyareboundbytheobjectiveclassexperience
within which
theywork.Theycando no morethanto givethat experience consciousness of its
own potential.Gramscisviewsareto be foundin Gramsci(1971)andin the full
Italian edition (1975). Lenins views on the roles of party and trade unions are
expressed
in WhatIs ToBeDone?(1947).Theelitist theoriesarein Michels(1959);
Mosca(1939);andPareto(1963).SeealsoHughes(1979):ch.7;andBurnham(1943).
9. Since Gramsciswritings are fragmentary,unnished, and unsystematic,
they lend themselves
to varyinginterpretations.They containashesof insight,
manyof which arenot fully developed.
Whatfollowsmaybeconsidered by some
readersas developments of Gramscisthoughtratherthan propositionsdirectly
attributable to him in a literal sense.I am more concerned with following his
inspirationthan with textual exegesis.
Generallyspeaking,thereare two main
tendenciesin the interpretation of Gramsci.One comesout of the Marxist-Leninist
THEME 409
..°"t>5'°E°
Landes (1969):5462.
Braverman (1974):85121.
Anderson [1974):37187. In the wake of the Turkish conquest, peasant
tenure was guaranteedand local ethnic nobility displaced. Concurrently, peasants
in EasternEurope were being subjectedto stricter control and exactions.With the
decline of Turkish power, by the eighteenthcentury, Turkish provincial landlords
and the taxgatherersbetweenthem were taking two thirds of the peasantsoutput.
7. The contrast between community and association was made by Ferdinand
Tonnies (1957)in the conceptsgemeinschaftand gesellschaft.The formulation has
beenjustly criticized for ideological bias. Tonnies looked back nostalgically to the
warmth of gemeinschaft,confronted with the disintegration of social life in indus-
trializing and urbanizing Europe. Subsequently,values in dominant social theory
were reversed: modernization and rationalization of social relations became the
goal and.earlier forms of society were lumped together as traditional, i.e., to be
superseded.Eric Wolf [1982:1013) has recently pointed out that such a dualist
View of social processis nonhistorical in its singular disregardof the many differ-
encesamongso-called traditional societiesand in its unconsciousacceptanceof
412 1. DIMENSIONS OF PRODUCTION RELATIONS
an idealized U.S. society as the model of modernity. With these caveats concerning
the ideological traps to be avoided, the contrastsbetween community and associ-
ation, status and contract, remain useful tools of analysis.
3. Weber (1930), (1946]:30Z22.
9..Note Karl Polanyis (1957):4355 insistence that for most of humanity
through most of its history, the economy,including all laboring activity, has been
embeddedin society. The exceptional casehas been the selfregulating market of
early capitalism which separatedthe economyfrom society or disembeddedit.
10. There is a parallel here with Max Webers (1946:24564) charismatic
typeof authoritythat tendsto becomeroutinizedinto traditionalor legalbureau-
cratic forms.
11. Points discussed here have been dealt with also in Cox (1977c).
12. Bendix [1963]:8l0.
13. Hilton (1978):9Z9. On the affinity of social rebelsto heretical doctrines,
see Engels (1956]:part 2 and Cohn (1970). On the Anabaptists, who recuperated
someof the peasantangerfollowing the repressionof 1525,seeClasen[1972]. The
Dolcinians of northern Italy provide the backdropto UmbertoEcosnovel TheName
of the Rose (1983).
14. This loss of legitimacy in popular culture is well illustrated by von
Grimmelschausenspicaresque novel of the Thirty Years War Adventures of a
Simpleton (n.d.).
15. Bahro (1978):176.
16. One signicant reported caseof strike action in the Soviet Union was at
Novocherkasskin June 1952. It was triggered by a rise in food prices. SeeBoiter
(1964):3343. The Hungarian dissidents GeorgeKonrad and Ivan Szelényi (1979:
175)write: It is hardly a coincidencethat whenevera political upheavalculminates
in a workers rebellion . . . the rst order of business for workers is to form their
own, noncorporative organizations:workers councils or soviets.
17. The United Nations has inherited from the League of Nations the task of
investigating reports of the existenceof slavery.This is doneby the Working Group
on Slavery, which reports to the Subcommissionon Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities of the Human Rights Commission. In practice the
denition of slaveryhasbeenbroadenedto include many situations in which people
are not free to withdraw labor or in which conditions of superexploitation exist.
See,e.g.,Updating of the Reporton Slavery,E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/20and Add. 1. The
conditions of superexploitation range from child labor, rampant in many countries,
including European countries like Greeceand Spain, as well as Brazil and other
Third World countries; debt servitude, which continues to exist in India despite its
outlawing; practices like the sale of sugarcanecutters by the Haitian authorites
to the Dominican Republicsee Lemoine (1981);and trafc in women and children
for the whiteslave trade.
18. SeeCox [1971]for the original denitions with which this processbegan.
19. The structural denitions included in this chapter are preliminary ones.
The three volumes of this study that follow are devotedto an examinationin depth,
one after another, of these modes. The in-depth studies will, of course, give greater
nuance and a fuller senseof developmental movementwithin each mode than is
possible in this preliminary identication of its characteristics.The preliminary
statementof the concept as structure is a necessarystagearst approximation-'
in a research process in which the elaboration of the concept in the next three
volumes is a further stage.
2. SIMPLE REPRODUCTION 413
.°5-":5."-
Anderson (1974):44950.
Braudel (1979):tome 1, pp. 426-32.
7. Takahashi in Hilton (1978]:79, 87-97. The parallel transformation from
self-emp oyment to the employment of hired labor for expandedreproduction in
nineteenth-century United States is discussed in Gordon, Edwards, and Reich
(1982):65-66.
8. Hilton (1978222) writes: In the 13th-century Flemish textile towns there
was still confusion concerning the payment made to the textile craftsman by the
merchant putter-out. It was not quite a wage,and yet it was not simply a payment
for a job done by an independent craftsman.
9. Hobsbawn1(1954):nos. 5 & 6, esp. no. 6, pp. 46, 51-52.
10. The importance of the national market is stressed by Braudel (1979]:tome
3, pp. 235-330. Also Hobsbawm (1969):2378; Williams (1980) passim.
11. Polanyi (1957]:78102. Polanyi saw the Speenhamland system, intro-
duced in 1795, as a critical turning point. Speenhamland seemed initially to be a
generous measure in the tradition of the Elizabethan poor law. It was designed to
assure a minimum income linked to the price of bread irrespective of earnings. Its
result was to subsidize low wages paid by employers and to put increasing numbers
of people on the rates, leading to widespread pauperization and demoralization
while at the same time obstructing the formation of a working class by keeping the
recipients in their counties. The triumphant middle classes through the Poor Law
Reform of 1834 replaced this demoralizing protection with a harshly competitive
labor market. Also see Hobsbawm (1969):104-5, 229; Thompson (1968]:73.
12. Several studies in Landsberger, ed. (1974) illustrate these points, espe-
cially those by George D. Jackson (Eastern Europe], Yu. G. Alexandrov (Asia and
North Africa), and Gerrit Huizer and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Mexico and Bolivia).
These studies underline the importance of peasant political pressures in bringing
416 3. CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
with the working masseseven if it had wished to do so (p. 447). Blake also
considered that
Disraeli, more than any other statesmanof his day, had the imagination to adapt
himself to this new situation [i.e., an enfranchisedworking class] and to discern,
dimly and hesitantly perhaps, what the artisan class wanted from Parliament.
Imperialism and social reform were policies which certainly appealedto themor
to a large section of themand Disraeli seemsto have sensedthis in his curiously
intuitive way, although even here it is important not to overstatethe case(p. 553].
See also Hobsbawm (1969]:125.
24. Ingham (1974) discussessome of the factors inuencing employers to
prefer negotiation at these different levels.
25. Schlesinger(1960) part 6. Franklin Rooseveltmakesa striking parallel
to Disraeli in this respect (seenote 23]. Schlesingerwrites of him:
For Roosevelt, labour was not, like conservation or social welfare, a eld in which
he had primary experienceor clearcut views. He approachedit quite without the
preconceptions of his classwith, indeed, sympathy for the idea of organised
labour as a make-weight to the power of organisedbusiness.But he sympathised
with organisedlabour more out of a reaction againstemployer primitivism than as
necessarilya hopeful new developmentin itself. . . . He saw himself as holding the
balance between business and labour; and he viewed both sides with detachment.
. . . Rearedin the somewhatpaternalistic traditions of prewar progressivismand
of the social work ethos, Rooseveltthought instinctively in terms of governments
doing things for working people rather than of giving the unions power to win
workers their own victories (pp. 387-88].
SenatorWagnertook a more positive view of unions; he looked to collective
bargaining to increasepurchasing power that would keep the economygoing, and
he thought a strong labor movementwould convince workers they could gain their
own ends within capitalism so that unions would become our chief bulwark
againstcommunism and other revolutionary movements" (p. 390). Skocpol (1980)
concludes that the U.S. labor movement was too weak to have been a very effective
pressure on the state in the early 1930s and that state initiatives, opposed by
employer interests,to strengthenthe labor movementand institutionalize collective
bargaining were possible becausethe collapse of the international monetary and
trading order had openedpolitical space for the state,i.e., Rooseveltand Wagner,
to act. This spacewas not, however, sufcient for the stateto move further toward
more thoroughgoing intervention of a Keynesian social-democratic kind (which
would have implied a movementfrom bipartism to tripartism). The gures on the
growth of the U.S. labor movement are cited by Skocpol from Derber and Young,
eds. (1972):3, 134.
26. This proposition is conrmed by Shorterand Tilly (1974)with regardto
France.They infer from their data on strikes through the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries that the governmentsmain preoccupation in labor relations was the
preservationof public order, rather than the strangulationof working-classpolitical
movements (p. 39]. Governmentintervention in strikes, mainly by state ofcials
like labor inspectors and subprefects,would lean heavily on employers,as well as
on workers, to limit the chances of public disturbances and force the parties to
negotiate (pp. 39-41).
27. For example, Konrad and Szelényi (1979):22052, esp. 232 writing of
the countries of Eastern Europe:
. . . . economicreforms demandthe creation of a political systemin which arbitrary
interpretation of the law is replaced by formal legal guaranteeswhich will permit
the legitimate expression of different interests, place the struggle of contending
4 18 3. CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
political forces in a legal and constitutional framework and make it visible to all,
and guarantee public control over important decisions. The technocracy must ac-
cept the legitimate articulation of workers interests eventhough they now conict
at times with its own interests and may do so systematically in the more remote
futureup to and including worker self-managementand the right to organizeand
defend their interests, even if such organizations may develop into rival power
centers (p. 232).
28. Bendix (1963):810.
29. Galbraith (1968):7182.
30. Dore (1973):375420 and Hanami (1979).
31. Bendix (1963):41.On the effectsof Taylorism and the ideological signif-
icance of industrial psychology, see also Braverman (1974):12452. Mayos work
is described in Mayo (1945) and Homans (1951).
32. Dore (1973) uses the term welfare corporatism to describe what is here
called enterprise corporatism. In his comparison of British and Iapanese industrial
relations, the main point of which is to underline cultural differences that contradict
the convergence theories inspired by technological and economic determinism,
Dore nevertheless notes certain tendencies in Britain toward the Japanese model.
(Convergencetheories, by contrast, tend to forecastthe disintegration of the )apa-
nese pattern under the impact of markets.) See Dore (1973):3 38-71. He is, however,
cautious about exaggerating these trends. One is sometimes tempted to see in the
spread of enterprise corporatism the Iapanization of industrial relations in Europe
and North America. Enterprise corporatism has had its own dynamic in Europe and
North America arising directly out of the processesof concentration of capital and
segmentation of the labor force. Latterly, under the inuence of )apans economic
success, there has also been some conscious imitating of Japanese practice, includ-
ing naive transplants like compulsory morning exercisesfor workers and company
songstestimonials to the robustness of positivist thinking.
33. Maier (1975).
34. Schlesinger (1960):83-187.
35. Memoirs by two of the senior ofcials involved who later played leading
roles in the ILO are Sir Harold Butlers Confident Morning (1950) and Edward I.
Phelan's
Yesand Albert Thomas(1949).On the ideological role of the ILO regarding
tripartism, see Cox (1977a).
36. Maier (1975):513-15.
37. Schlesinger (1960):83.
38. Schlesinger (1960):83187.
39. A descriptive outline of these various tripartite organisms is given in
Malles (1971).For a critical analysis of tripartite experiences,seePanitch (1984).
40. Maier (1975):54578.
4. Hedistributive Development
1. Carr (1952); Nove (1969):5758, 63-72; Erlich (1967); Moshe Lewin
(1974).
Z. Grossman (1977); Sauvy (1984):23341.
3. Stalin told Churchill that the ordeal of collectivization was evengreater
than that of World War II. Volin, in Black, ed. (1960):306.
4. Bernstein (1967).
5. Bendix (1963):810.
6. Bendix (1963):181.
7. Bendix (1963):206-7.
5. LIBERAL ORDER 419
repayment
problem
afterthewarbecame
embroiled
inParliament,
whichdemanded
somereturnwhenthegovernment
wouldhavepreferred
to cancelthedebt.The
Austriangovernment
nallysettled
forsome partofthesumdue.Webster
(1963):
vol.2,p.401-2.TheBritishpractice
in theNapoleonic
warscompels
comparison
totheU.S.practice
duringWorldWarI,whichleftahuge wardebtandreparations
problem
to bedevilpostwar
international
relations.
31.Halévy(1949b):36-40,46-53.Ricardo andParliamentary
criticshad
objected
tothegovernments expedientofrenewing
thedebtbyborrowing
fromthe
SinkingFund:Ricardo wrotetoacorrespondent:
WhileMinisters
havethisfund
virtuallyattheirdisposal,
theywill ontheslightest
occasion
bedisposed
forwar.
Tokeepthempeaceable
youmustkeepthempoor(n.,p.40).
32.Theperpetuation
intothetwentieth-century
interwar
period
ofthiscon-
tradictionandofthemyththatreconciles
it is analyzedcriticallybyCarr(1946).
33.Halévy(1949b):164.
Nicholson(1947:266-78) is moreinclinedto stress
thebreakbetween Castlereaghs
andCannings policies,whereas Halévyseescon-
tinuity.Nicholsons
bookhas,at theend,theringof Greek
tragedy,
in which
Castlereaghs
suicide
coincides
withthedefeat
ofallhispublicgoals,
andpartic-
ularlytheendofthecongress
system.Hinsley
(1967:222-25]:
pointsoutthatthe
basicgoalsof Castlereaghs
policywerecontinuedbyCanning andPalmerston.
Webster(1963:
vol.2,p.504)alsorecognizes
that,thoughthecongress
system
came
to anend,Castlereaghs
fundamentalideacontinuedin theConcert
ofEurope.
34.Theprolonged
politicaldominance
ofthearistocracies,
notonlyin Brit-
ainbutalsoin all European
countries,
up to theFirstWorldWaris discussed
in
Mayer (1981,)
35. Hinsley (1967]:22021, 245.
36.A. ]. P.Taylor(1957):xxxv,
wrote:Nationalism
andmass-education,
whichhadbeenexpected
tobringpeace,
wereturnedeverywhere
totheadvantage
of state-power.
Where
Germany
ledtheway,Great
BritainandFrance
followed,
though more slowly.
37. Hinsley(1967:223}wrote:It is notunreasonable
to regard
theConcert
ofEurope
asbeing
fromonepointofviewthesystem
whichnaturally
replaced
the
aim of universalmonarchyduringthe periodof British predominance.
38.AdamSmithsviewsonthestatearefoundmainlyin books4 and 5 of
TheWealthofNations.
SeealsotheIntroduction
byAndrewSkinner
tothePelican
edition(1970):77-82.
Onthedismantlingof guildandmercantilist
restrictions,
Landes(1969):145;Hobsbawm(1977):51.
39. Landes(196Q]:152,
199-200;Checkland(1964):329.
40.Polanyi (1957)
discussesboththesocial
implications
oftheSpeenham-
landsystem,
evolved inthelateeighteenth
century
toreplace
theElizabethan
poor
law,instablilizing
therural
population
andinstemmingtheowintotheindustrial
labormarketandtheeffectof the1834poorlawin effectively
creating
a general
nationalmarketin labor.SeealsoThompson
(1968):73,
244,247-249; Hobsbawm
and Rudé (1969):50-51.
Bendix
(1963:21, 24,61-62,73-86,115)shows
thechanges
thattookplace
in theprevailing
attitudes
toward
poverty. Formerly
regarded
asamisfortunefor
whichthecommunity
asa wholeboresomeresponsibility,
povertynowbecame
a
matterof personal
responsibility
thatthehigherclasses
coulddonothing
to
alleviate(Malthusprovidingscienticjusticationfor this view).Povertywasa
self-inicted
deprivation
thatcouldbecombated
onlybyreforming
thecharacter
ofthepoorunderthestrictest
discipline.
Theoptimistic
counterpart
tothiswas
thatthemostindustrious
among
thepoormightthemselves
become
capitalists.
The
5. LIBERAL ORDER 423
any particular fraction or economic interest of the propertied class. . . . All this
provedfatalto the convictionandself-certaintyof the language
of Chartism,espe-
cially in the period after 1842, when somereal measureof prosperity returned to
the economy.
59. Hobsbawmand Rude (1969247)pointed to a fundamental contradiction
in English agrarian society:
Its rulers wanted it to be both capitalist and stable,traditionalist and hierarchical.
In other words they wanted it to be governedby the universal free market of the
liberal economist (which was inevitably a market for land and men as well as for
goods),but onlyto theextentthatsuitednobles,squiresandfarmers;theyadvocated
an economy which implied mutually antagonistic classes,but did not want it to
disrupt a society of ordered ranks.
The hegemonic order stabilized and perpetuatedthat contradiction. As Anthony
Brundagediscovered,the effect of the new poor law of 1834was to strengthen the
powerof thecountrystraditionalleadersovertheir localities,enablingthelanded
class,shakenby the Swing revolts, to restore labor discipline, lower the rates,and
try to reestablishsocialcohesionby a exible applicationof thenewrelief system.
In practice,they madeuse,despitethe new legislation,of outdoorrelief asbeing
less oppressive and also in somecasesless costly than incarceration in the work-
house.Brundage(1978):90,106, 144-45, 178-79, 182-84 (quotefrom p. 182).
60. Marx [1969):124.
61. Marx [l969):131.
62. Sellier, in Sturrnthal and Scoville, eds. (1973); also Shorter and Tilly
(1974): esp. 39-45.
63. On the U.S. economy in relation to government, Williamson, ed.
(1951):1004,113,359-63 (re land issue);118-28,282-84 (re governmentand
capital formation); 228-31, 244-53, 297, 554-63 (re cheapversus sound money);
302-5, 535-39 (re the tariff].
64. The Gilded Age, a novel by Mark Twain (SamuelClemens)and Charles
Dudley Warner (1873),set in a context of speculation, graft, and corruption during
the Grant administration years.
65. Beard and Beard (1940):esp. vol. 2, ch. 18, pp. 52-121.
66. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982): ch. 3, pp. 48-99.
67. Landes (1969):Z01-10.
68. Morazé (1957).
69. Gallagher and Robinson (1953).
70. One of the earliest analysesof the impact of expanding capitalism on
production relations in penetratedareaswas in Luxemburg (1968;first published
in 1913). A more recent attempt to theorize stagesin the impact of capitalism on
penetratedformations in the Marxist tradition is by Rey (1976).More recently still,
the task of interpreting history in terms of the impact of capitalist developmenton
precapitalist production relations hasbeencarried forward by Wolf (1982):esp.ch.
10, pp. 296-309.
71. Luxemburg (1968):42939; Wolf [1982).28687.
72. Luxemburg (1968):37177, 386-94; Wolf (1982]:24749, 252-61.
73. Wolf (1Q82):307.
74. Goldfrank (1975) gives an illustration of capitalist development in the
periphery under the regime of Porrio Diaz. The Mexican state,encouragedby the
localbourgeoisie,
soughtforeigninvestment,expectingit wouldtaketheportfolio
form. Foreign capital was forthcoming, but as direct investment along with U.S.
policing of foreign indebtedness.The Mexican bourgeoisiewas not strong enough
426 5. LIBERALORDER
orindependent
enough
tolead
anational
development
andwere
willing
tobecome
accessories to foreign capital.
75. Polanyi (1957): esp. 130-77.
76. Cited in Checkland (1964]:209~10.
77. Hobsbawm (1977):15060.
8. Wehler (1972]:77.
9. Barraclough (1947:43334), citing Halévy in support, considered that a
major factor in the decision of the Germanymilitary to run the risk of war in 1914
was the perceived threat to them of the Social-Democratic success of 1912. In
Britain, too, the coming of the war silenced a mounting revolt of both workers and
suffragettesthat threateneddomestic peaceand channeledboth into a nationalist
response. Note Wingeld-Stratford (1933:310):if the war peril from Germany
delayed much longer to materialize, it seemedquite on the cards that it might be
forestalled by revolution. As the Edwardian passes into the Georgian age . . . class
rises againstclass. . . faction againstfactionit is a questionwhether international
will not be anticipated by civil war. Note also Dangereld (1961;rst published
19352388]: with the outbreak of war, the suffragettes turned patriot to a woman.
. . . So in loyal fervor and jingoistic enterprise,endedthe greatWomansRebellion
(pp. 387-88); and . . . even the proletarian movement, the Workers Rebellion,
which had carried its semi-revolutionary banner on to the very ramparts of Capital,
now threw that banner aside, and hurled itself forward, in a new direction, against
a more visible enemy, and beneath the Union Jack.
10. The classicanalysisof long wavesis by Nikolai Kondratieff, summarized
in Kondratieff (1935). In his work, written in the 1920s, Kondratieff plotted two
and a half long cycles. The upswing of the most recent cycle he dated from 1896to
1914«1920. Ernest Mandel (1978) estimates the downswing of this long wave as
lasting until the end of World War II. Kondratieff did not claim to explain the waves,
only to plot them. He did hypothesizethat they could be explained within the logic
of capitalism and were not the product of exogenousforces.Different scholarshave
concurred in the probable existence of long waves while focusing on different
explanatory factors. Ioseph Schumpeter(1939) pointed to innovation (clusters of
inventions] and availability of credit as factors conducive to launching a wave.
Mandel (1978:108-46) considers the declining rate of prot to be the critical factor.
Monetarists have stressedchangesin the money supply, in particular the new gold
mined in the Rand and the Klondike after 1896 (although Kondratieff thought that
gold discoveriesshould be regardedaseventstriggeredby the logic of the capitalist
systemand not as chanceexogenousoccurrences).Landes(1969:23237)takesthe
balanced view that both innovation and expansion of the money supply were
critical. Iay Forrester (1976:195214) infers from his systemsdynamic modeling
that the explanation for long wavesmay be in the disjunction betweencapital goods
and consumer-production sectors,the application of new technologiesduring an
upswing leading to surplus capacity in the capital goodssector.He seesproduction
planning rather than monetary policy as the appropriate approach toward initiating
a new upswing. See also Forrester (1978) 145-48. For a summary analysis of long-
wave theorizing, see also Research Working Group on Cyclical Rhythms and Secular
Trends (1979) 483-500.
11. Gordon, in Hopkins and Wallerstein, eds. (1980). Gordon points to the
weaknessof earlier analysesof long waves,both Marxist and non-Marxist, which,
he suggests,lies in the fact that they havedwelt upon the purely economicindicators
of growth and crisis, ignoring the environment of social relations that conditions
whether or not investors are condent in the prospects for accumulation. The
composite of structures constituting this environment he calls the social structure
of accumulation, hypothesizing it as a unied whole, instability in one element of
which will tend to create instability in the whole. Gordon then explores the rela-
tionship between economic crises generatedin capitalist development and social
structures of accumulation. Crisis will, he suggests, undermine the stability of the
428 6. RIVAL IMPERIALISMS
socialstructureof accumulation,
sothat the constructionof a newsocialstructure
of accumulationwill be necessaryin orderthat investmenttakeoff again.Con-
versely,instabilityin thesocialstructure
of accumulation
maycontribute
to eco-
nomic crisis. Gordonthen denesan economiccrisis as a periodof economic
instabilityin capitalisteconomies
whoseresolution
depends
uponthereconstruc-
tionof asocialstructureofaccumulation(p.20].Aselements in thesocialstructure
of accumulation, Gordonconsiderssocialclassrelationsin theproductiveprocess,
stateinvestmentin theeconomicinfrastructuresnecessary for accumulation (trans-
port,communications,
etc.]andstateinvestment
in world-market
control[impe-
rialism, internationalmonetaryorder,etc.]. Gordon's
thinking carriesone step
forwardTrotskyscritiqueof the originalKondratieff
thesisaboutlongwaves.
Trotskycontested
theafrmationthatlongwavescouldbeexplained withinthe
logicofcapital,
asserting
thattheymustoccur
asaresultoftheinteraction
ofsocial
andpoliticalforceswith economiclogic.Gordon
provides
thegermof atheoryof
howsociopolitical
factorscanbeintegrated
witheconomic
factors
in anunderstand-
ingoftheunevenness
ofcapitalist
development.
Implicitinsuchatheory,
although
notdiscussed
byGordon,
istheproblematic andunpredictable natureofsociopolit-
ical changes.
Thereconstruction
of the socialstructureof accumulationis a
dramaof socialconict thatcannotbereducedto a sequence
of objectiveeconomic
data.The economicdatadene the stageon which the dramais playedout, but
theydonotdetermine
itsoutcome.
OnTrotskys
critiqueof Kondratieff,
seeGarvy
(1943);Mandel (1978]:12629; and Day (1976). y
12. Braverman(1974)dealswith the United States;GeorgesFriedmann
(1956), with France.
13. Edwards(1979):97104
takesa narrowview of Taylorism,conning it
to theapplication
of systematic
studyof timeandmotionandproduction
ow,
which he seesas only a small part of the changestaking placein management
practice.
Braverman
(1974) usedit in a broadsense to namethewholemovement
towardfragmentingof work,whichremoved controlof theworkprocess from
workersandplacedit in thehandsof management. Gramsci[1971]:277318
also
usedthetermTaylorism in a broadsense, linkingit with whathecalledFordism
andAmericanism,which he perceivedasa revolutionarydevelopment in produc-
tive methodsthat,in its impacton Europe,would havethe potentialbothto elim-
inate the residuesof feudalismand prepareworkersfor the next (proletarian)
revolution. See also ch. 9.
14. Gordon,Edwards,andReich(1982]:11264;
ShorterandTilly [1974):11
16,180-84,23435.Therestructuring
ofthelaborprocess
proceededatadifferent
pacein differentcountries,
depending
onthelevelof developmentof productive
forcesandthecapacityforresistance
of workingclasses.
Halévy(1961)pointedto
a contrastbetweenthe relativeeasewith which employerscouldintroducethese
innovationson the continentand in the United Statesand the resistanceBritish
employers
encountered
in thetradeunions.Onthecontinent,
andespecially in
Germany,
socialism
asa politicalpartymovement
wasrelativelystrong,
thetrade
unionsasan industrialforcerelativelyweak.In Britain,socialismwasa negligible
politicalforceduringthelatenineteenth
century,
butthetradeunions
wererela-
tivelysolidlyentrenched
among
theestablished
workerclassin industry.Halévy
wrote:
bythe
systematic
restriction
ofthe
numbers
employed
inaparticular
branch
of
industry. . . they[thetradeunions]eitherenforced
anapprenticeship,
extending
overa largenumberof years,on all whowishedto enterthetrade,or xed the
6. RIVAL IMPERIALISMS 429
the men evenreserveda denite proportion of the vacanciesfor their own children.
The aim avowedly pursued by the vast majority of unions was the transformation
of every industry and every trade into a speciesof guild closed to outside labour.
. . . The American or Germanemployer was free to introduce into his factory the
plant and processwhich madeit possibleto substitute unskilled for skilled labour.
But the British employer was faced by the organizedopposition of his men. In the
engineering trade he could employ only skilled workmen, each of whom would
serve only a single machine, whereas his German competitor could employ one
unskilled workman to tend three machines at the same time (pp. 215-16).
Gramsci (1971)graspedthe dialectical potential in Taylorism:
the brain of the worker, far from being mummied, reachesa state of complete
freedom. The only thing that is completely mechanisedis the physical gesture. . .
and not only doesthe worker think, but the fact that he getsno immediate satisfac-
tion from his work and realisesthat they aretrying to reducehim to a trained gorilla,
can lead him to a train of thought that is far from conformist (pp. 309-10).
15. Gerschenkron (1962).
16. Carr (1946) underlined the hiatus, during the interwar period, between
a residual hegemonicideology of laissezfaireand the practice of statesadopting
protectionism to defend their independence.Seeespecially pp. 54-60.
17. Quoted in Bruce (1966):262.
18. The rst use of the term welfare state has been attributed to William
Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury,in 1941,asa contrastto the Nazi power state.
Schottland, ed. (1967).
19. Beveridge (1909).
20. Bruce (1966):163~69.
21. Keynes (1936).
22. Tinbergen (1964):esp. 8 and 70.
23. The dilemma for the social democrat of recognizing that welfare policies
have involved economic nationalism is the theme of Gunner Myrdal, (1967). Polanyi
(1957:141)stressedthe spontaneous,ad hoc characterof the emergenceof planning
asa reaction to the social consequencesof laissezfaire: While laissezfaireeconomy
was the product of deliberate state action, subsequentrestrictions on laissez-faire
started in a spontaneousway. Laissez-fairewas planned; planning was not.
24. Landes (1969):33948; Hobsbawm (1969):17Z~94.
25. Shoneld (1965):17782, 193-96. Lowi, in Lindberg et al., eds. (1975),
denes the economic plan of a contemporarycapitalist state as the stateof perma-
nent receivership: a state whose governmentmaintains a steadfastposition that
any institution large enoughto be a signicant factor in the community shall have
its stability underwritten (p. 117), a situation in which there is less socialization
of production and distribution than socialization of risk (p. 118).
26. Cox, in Arthur M. Ross, ed. (1966).
27. On the role of British primary education as an agency of conformity,
Landes (1969]:34142. Dunlop (1958)and Kerr et al. (1960)write approvingly of a
perceived tendency toward decision making on the basis of technically dened
options(fromwhichunrealistic alternativeconceptions
of socialorderhavebeen
excluded), wherein the technical elites of the major interest groups (workers and
employers)havemore in commonwith eachother in the understandingof problems
than either have with their own rank and le. Wolfe (1977:298321) writes critically
of the depoliticizing tendency of late capitalism, which seemsto require a passive,
quiescent subject for its political system to work. Crozier et al. (1975) arguethat
high levels of participation are unpropitious for liberal democracy in advanced
capitalism. The conceptof governmentasa problem in technical engineeringrather
430 6. RIVAL IMPERIALISMS
documented
thecorporatisttheoryunderlyingBismarcks
socialreforminitiatives
of the early 1880s.
41. Maier(1975):138-41.
42. Halévy(1966]:17177, 189-94.Halévy,writing in 1922,described
Lloyd
Georgesproposalsfor the reorganization
of the coal industryasa meresmoke-
screenbehindwhich the government could beata retreatandrepudiatethe pro-
posals
fornationalization
(p.193).Theanticipated
nationalization
oftherailways
wassimilarly averted.Thesefailuresof nationalization,Halévywrote,allow me
to understandthe silentandpatienttacticsby which theruling classesin England
underLloydGeorge wereableto defeattheworkingclassagitation(p.197).Halévy
went further to arguethat the postwarweakeningof the workingclasshad been
followedbyadeclineofthesocialist
ideain Britain,astheLabour
Partyabandoned
nationalization in favor of the liberal pacism of Cobdenitelittle England (p. 206).
43. Halévysdiagnosisof the contradictionsbetweencorporatismand so-
cialist projectsfor nationalizationandworkerscontrolof industrywaswritten in
1921:
In England-and
I believethatit is still moretruein Germanysome
capitalists
are wondering whether it would not be in the employersinterest to createa com-
munityofinterestsin eachindustrybetween
employers
andworkers
inthatindustry
by settingup a kind of corporative
system.
Theemployers
wouldguarantee the
workerswhat they aremoreconcernedaboutthan anythingelse-security.They
wouldpromise
to establish
a fundto insurethemagainst
theperilsof unemploy-
ment.Theywouldofferthemasystemof prot-sharing.In return,oncetheworkers
weredirectly interestedin the prosperityof the enterprise,the employerswould
asktheir help in gettingassistance
fromthe state,protectionagainstforeigncom-
petition,andhigherpricesbywayof customs
reform.. . . Nowbetween
thesetwo
conceptions-one working-class,
the otheremanatingfromthe employers-the
difference is obvious. One looks to the gradual expropriation of the employersand
theeliminationof profit.Theotherwantsto interesttheworkingclassin thegrowth
of capitalist prots . . . (p. 79].
44. Gramsci (1971):238.
45. Regarding
the ILO andcorporatism,
seech. 3, note35;alsoCox,in Cox
andJacobson (1974).
TheUnitedStates, reluctantto jointheILObecause of ideo-
logicalreasons,
aswellasbecause of thepoliticalisolationism
thatkeptit outof
theLeague of Nations,overcametheseobjections undertheimpactof theGreat
Depression,whencorporatistinitiatives(withoutthe name)weretakenby the
Roosevelt
administrationduringtherst phaseof theNewDeal.TheUnitedStates
thentookits placealongside
the majorEuropean
powersin afrmingthatthe
concept of tripartism was consistentwith its state structures.
46. Following the British general strike of 1926, there was an attempt to
negotiate
a centralarrangement
between
workersandmanagements
throughthe
Mond-Turner talks between a head of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and a
representative
of theTradeUnionCongress
(TUC).Thetalkswereinconclusive.
British employerswereweaklyorganized,andbig corporationslike ICI couldop-
erate on their own in labor matters without being able to rally the majority of
employers.
In theTUC,theleft-wingopposition
opposed
thetalks.SeeIngham
(1974):7377; also Nigel Harris (1972):4142.
47. Katzenstein, in Ruggie, ed. (1983):11718.
48. Beer (1966):21516. '
49. Beer(1966):198209. Skocpol(1980),in her analysisof the NewDeal,
stresses
thelimitationsin thecapabilitiesof thestateandtheconstraints
of political
partyorganization
impeding
full development
ofsocial-democratic
Keynesian
plan-
6.RIVAL
IMPERIALISMS 433
ning.
There
are
some
analogies
with
thepost-World
War
11
British
situation.
U.S.
trade-union
ofthe strengthgrew
mass-production during
the
industries 19303
bytheC10with
withstate
backingthe
the
backing organization
ofthe
Wagner
Act
andNational
LaborRelations
Board.But
there
wasnopossibility
ofcentral
direction
oftheeconomygovernment administrative
reforms
wereblocked
byrivalries
among departmentsandbetween
theexecutive
andCongress.
Powerful
interests
were divided,
and whenWorldWar 11came,thegovernment
leaned
toward
an
understanding
with business
and mutedthe
tendencytoward
social
reform.
The
state,
whatever
itsintentions,
was limited
byitsowninternal
bureaucratic
politics
andby50.
theSome
pluralism
ofgroup
ofthese interests.
postwar
institutional
frameworks
are
described
inMalles
(1971).
See alsoLambruch(1977):91126',
andPanitch
(1984).
Onthe
Netherlands,
51.Panitch (1981)sees
acorporatism
limited
byarevival
ofclass
solidarity.
Windmuller (196Q):28297.
Corporatism,he argues,
was response
ofcapital
andthestate
toagrowth
inthe
power
oflabor
inconditions
offullemployment
and
tight
labor
market.
Itrepre-
sented
aconcession
bylabor
(accepting
less
than
itseconomic
power
could
have
extracted)
tofacilitate
capitals
continuing
accumulation.
This
concession
became
an
apparent
weakness
Panitch
when
renewed
isdiscussing
unemployment
corporatism
inthe
1960s
and
weakened
1970s,
laborsposition.
particularly
initsincomes
policy
form,
which,
as
I suggest
below,
isaresidue
ofanobsolescent
welfare-
nationalist form of state.
52.Maier,
inHirsch
andGoldthorpe
(1978).
53. Offe(197Z'.487-88].
55.Harrod
(1963:52526)
reported
that
54. Titmuss (1959).
Keynes
himself,
inthe1940s,
spec-
ulated
that
the
time
might
be
ripe
forKeynesianism
atthe
world
level.
On
the
failure
ofpostwar
corporatist
incomes
policies,
see
Panitch
(1976).
56.Maier
(1975]'.339,
349,
427,
574,
578;
Brian
Iohnson
(1970).64102&#
57.Maier
(1975):562,
Landes (1969):414.
565,567,571;
Landes
(1969)'.404;
Neumann
(1944].33740,
58. 417,41928.
Neumann
(1944)
described
how
National
Socialist
cartel
policy
favored
the
big
industrial
combines
(p.
264)
and
howthe
state
contributed
toinvestment
in
new
technologies
that
wereboth
instrumental
topreparing
Germanys
war-readi-
ness
and
protable
toprivate
industrial
combines
(p.
280).
National
Socialism
was
not
interested
innationalizing
industry,
but
asection
ofthe
party
acquired
control
over
asegment
ofheavy
industry
(the
Hermann
Goring
combine)
asameans
of
access
tothe
remained
industrial
the
motive
bourgeoisie
power
(pp.
298302).
ofGerman
Prot,
industry
under
Neumann
National
concluded,
Socialism.
Neu-
mann
treats
National
Socialist
pretensions
tocorporatism
asamyth(pp.
228-
32).
Inof
so
doing
zation he
restricts
industry
and themeaning
labor, ofof
whether corporatism
thekind toan
inautonomous
realized
the organi-
practice
ofthe
Weimar
Republic
orenvisaged
inthetheories
ofestates
and inCatholic
social
doctrine.
This
restricts
corporatism
towhatSchmitter
calls
societal
corporatism,
excluding
the
state
corporatist
type
instituted
byfascism.
SeeSchmitter,
inPike
59.Landes
(1969):41417;
Briggs,
inMowat,
and Stritch, eds. (1974):103. ed.
(1968:
vol.
12,ch.3,pp.
7075);Neumann
[1944):222,
228.
60. Gramsci
61. (1971):21923,
Gramsci
(1971):5Q,
10620, 228-29.
289~94;
Gramsci
(1975):
vol.
1p.504;
vol.
434 6. RIVAL IMPERIALISMS
2, p. 1220;vol. 3, p. 1781.Theanalyses
of MaieronItalyandNeumann
onNazi
Germanyconcordin this matter.Maier(1975:57778)
wrote:
Fascism
didnotsuppress
thecauses
ofcapitalist
strifeandclassrivalry;it encour-
aged
thecentralization
andcoordination
ofthatconflict
suchaswasdeveloping
in
othersocieties.Therewasa crucialdifference:in Italy the outcomewaspredeter-
mined. . . the Fascistregimeremainedin a reciprocalandsymbioticrelationship
with the old forcesof order.Evenasthe stateasserted
newclaimsoverthe control
of all policy,includingeconomic
decisions,
it cededtobusiness
leaders
extensive
control over industrial organization.
Concerning NaziGermany, Neumann (1944:227)
wrote:the antagonisms
of capi-
talismare[1944]operating
in Germany onahigherand,therefore,
amoredangerous
level,evenif theseantagonisms
arecoveredupbyabureaucraticapparatus
andby
the ideologyof the peoplescommunity;andIt wasoneof thefunctionsof
NationalSocialismto suppressand eliminatepolitical and economicliberty by
meansof thenewauxiliaryguarantees of property,by thecommand, by theadmin-
istrativeact,thusforcingthewholeeconomicactivityof Germanyinto thenetwork
of industrial combinations run by the industrial magnates (p. 261).
62. Maier [1975):322.
53. Maier (1975):--16-50,
322-24, 428Z9, 547, 557, 561, 572.
64. Barraclough(1947):44853;Neumann (1944):passim.
65. Maier (1975):353.
66. Barraclough(1947]:44143; Neumann (1944):11.
67. Neumannand Maieragreethat NationalSocialismdid not changethe
Weimar
corporative
organization
ofbusiness
in anyfundamental
way.It did elim-
inatetheautonomyof workerorganization.
SeeMaier(1975):59294
andNeumann
(1944):24o, 471.
68. Gramsci (1971}:21012.
69. Gramsci(1971:220)
citedRamsay
Macdonalds
NationalGovernment
in
Britain after 1931as caesarismwithout a caesar.He also saw the successiveItalian
governments
fromOctober
1922upto Ianuary1925,i.e.,thecoalitions
formedby
Mussolini, as various gradations of caesarism.
70. Regardingtrasformismoseech. 3, pp. 79-80 above.
71. Forze elementari, Ordine Nuovo, April 26, 1921. Cited in Alastair
Davidson (1977):189~90.
72. Reich(1975).Reichhasexpressed
in Freudiantermsanotionwith a long
genealogyin European
thought.
Giambattista
Vico(1970),
writinghisNewScience
in eighteenth-century
Naples,
sawthereturnofbarbarism
asarecurrent
possibility
in human history.
73. This point is cogentlydevelopedby BarringtonMoore,)r. (1967).
74. Bendix(1963:11991)recountsthe transitionof industrial laborfrom
servile to nominally free status in Czarist Russia. The Czarist state was never
content,astheliberalstatewas,to enacttheconditionsfor themarketandthenlet
the marketdisciplinethe workers.TheCzaristapproach to the creationof an
enterprise
labormarketcanberegarded asprotoliberalism
withinthestructuresof
an old-regime bureaucracy.Seealso ch. 4.
75. Skocpol(1979)stresses
thefactorof defeatin warasa determinant
of
the origins of revolutionary states.
76. KonradandSzelényi(1979:pp. 85-93, 127-30)advancethethesisthat
theSovietpatternof redistributive
statedevelops
directlyoutof oldregime
tradi-
tional redistribution without passingthrough capitalism.
77. Carr (1952).
7. PAX AMERICANA 435
Beloff(1963);
onJean
Monnets
ActionCommittee
fortheUnited
States
ofEurope,
Haas(1958);
Lindberg
(1963);
andLindberg
andScheingold
(1970).
5. Keynes wasconcerned witha situationin whichwealthholders
were
unwillingto investin productive
assetsbecause theyhadnocondence in the
future,
alackofcondence thatnoreductionininterest
rates
wouldovercome.The
onlythingthatwouldovercome theirreluctance
toinvestwouldbeanincreasein
effectivedemand,
whichhe thoughtgovernments
couldbringaboutby public
spending.
Economic
orthodoxy
inthe1980s
rejected
Keynes
remedy,
andPresident
Reagansadvisers
havetakenthepositionthatthewaytopromoteinvestment
isto
makethingsmoreattractive
for investors
onthesupplyside,e.g.,bytaxcuts,
deregulation, etc.
6. Theargument thataU.S.paymentsdecitis goodforeveryone
because
it
increases
theliquidityonwhichinternational
economic exchangesarebased
was
expressed
in Gardner
(1960).
A radical
critique
oftheconsequences ofthispolicy
isin Hudson(1968)
and(1977).
Theevolution
ofU.S.policyiscritically
analyzed
in Calleo (1982).
7. As instances,
theNicaragua
of Anastasio
Somoza,
Bokassas
CentralAf-
ricanEmpire,
IdiAmins
Uganda,
Bolivia
under
theinternationaldrugracketeer
GeneralLuis GarciaMeza,andtheDuvalieristregimein Haiti.
8. In the literatureexploringattemptsto build socialistsocietiesin poor
peripheral
countries
under
revolutionary
leadership:
Thomas
(1974);
Shivji(1976);
Mittelman(1981);Ziegler(1983);andSaul,ed.(1984).
9. Upuntilthelate1960s
hegemonic
economic
theoryheldthatlessdevel-
opedcountries
wouldin thelongrunbecaught
upin theworld-economy devel-
opmental
process.
Theirdevelopment
couldbeencouraged
bymeasurescalculated
to facilitatethemovement
of privatecapital.Thelastmajorofcialinternational
document
topresent
thislong-term
optimism
asascenario
wasthereport
prepared
byacommission
chaired
byformerCanadian
PrimeMinister
Lester
B.Pearson
for
the WorldBank(1969).Subsequently,
forecasts
havebeenlessencouraging
in
respect
totheprospects
ofauniversal
developmental
processthroughtheworld
economy.Sometime
duringthe1970s,
aFourthWorld"wasdistinguished
from
theThird Worldto designate
byimplication
theleastdeveloped
countries
now
recognized
tobemarginal
totheworldeconomy. WorldBankprograms
adjusted
fromthenancing
ofprojects
deemed
tobelikelytoresult
ingrowth
through
linkage
to worldmarkets
in orderto focuson projectsdesigned
to stemthebuildupof
sociopolitical
pressuresinareasmarginal
totheworldeconomy
through
population
limitation,
self-help
agriculturaldevelopment,
andencouragement
ofinformal-
sectoremployment expansion. Mittelman
(1980)
showshowtheWorldBankrst
opposed supportforujamma village
development
(aformofcommunal
agriculture)
whilesupporting privatecommercialfarming
andthenswitched
tosupport
ofthe
ujamma
villages
in 1974~75
when
it became
concerned
withthedanger
ofsocial
andpoliticalupheavals
inherent
in massive ruralexodus
andagrarian
crisis.
10.JohnGerard Ruggiehascalledthisworldorder structure
embedded
liberalism,
drawinghisadjective
fromPolanyis distinction
betweenembedded
anddisembedded economicprocesses,
i.e.,whetherornoteconomics
isembedded
in socialrelations.
ForPolanyi,
thenotionof a self-regulating
market(classic
lib-
eralism)
wasautopian
construct
in whichtheeconomy
wasconceived
tobearti-
ciallydisembedded
fromsociety.
SeeRuggie
(1982).
Thethreefold
division
of
capitalist
economies
isfromOConnor
(1973):1318.
Galbraith
(1975)
uses
atwo-
folddivisionintoplanningsectorandcompetitive
sector.SeealsoAveritt(1968).
OConnors monopoly sectorwouldbeincludedin Galbraithsplanningsector.
7. PAX AMERICANA 437
Claus Offe considers the capitalist state to have two main functions: (1) allocation,
which is determined by politics and carried out by bureaucratic methods, and (2)
production. The latter function is required when private industry is incapable of
providing certain of the inputs it requires because to do so would not be protable.
Offe argues that decisions about what the state is to produce are more complex than
allocation decisions. Offe, in Lindberg, ed. (1975).
11. Calleo [198Z):14551; Blank (1977).
12. Maier (1978) passim; Calleo (1982):3031, 40-43, 97-98.
13. Maier (1978):70.
14. Special issue of International Organization (1977):31(4) edited by Peter
J. Katzenstein; Katzenstein (1983); and Zysman (1983).
15. Edelman, in Somers, ed. (1969), writes of the symbolic political conse-
quences of institutionalized industrial relations. Business, labor and related gov-
ernment agencies:
are components of a single system whose functions are (1) to ensure and promote
a continuing demand for production and a continuing flow of public contracts and
(2) to arrange a mutual exchange of economic and political benets. Once all the
major dimensions of the transaction are brought into perspective, the assumption
that union-management bargaining is a key forum for economic decision making is
no longer tenable. It becomes at most a short-run and derivative inuence upon
economic trends and frequently a ritual, though it continues to make a signicant
organizational and political impact. . . . (T)hose directly involved in the bargaining
and decision making can act only when they win support or neutrality from a large
public of rank-and-le workers and political spectators. Any analysis that fails to
take account of those aspects of the transaction that serve to win such acquiescence
is bound to be supercial. The present analysis suggests that symbolic reassurances
are partly what these large publics draw from the total transaction; reassurances
that serve incidentally to tie them economically and psychologically to the political
establishment and the status quo (p. 174).
16. On state sector unionization in Iapan, Alice H. Cook et al. (1971).
17. Beveridge (1944):200.
18. Leo Panitch cites Jack Iones the main union architect of the Social
Contract speaking in 1977 to a TUC conference:
I have yet to see . . . any rm evidence that the efforts of the sector working parties
(i.e. the bodies charged under the NEDC with investment planning] . . . have pro-
duced any signicant increase in investment or in employment, and that is the test.
. . . In my view, an industrial strategy which relies only on the deliberations of
sector working parties, on polite talks with industrialists and trade associations . . .
is not a strategy at all, but an excuse for one. Cited in Panitch (1981):39.
19. The French CGT position was that the criterion proposed for an incomes
policy, e.g., that wage increases should not exceed average increases in productivity,
would only be acceptable sil sagissait dune société différente de la notre. La
Documentation frangaise (1964).
20. Reynaud (1968).
21. The breakdown of concerted action between unions and employers in
Germany is analyzed in Markovits, Gibbs, and Allen (1980). Windmuller (1969)
analyzes the strains affecting national wages policy in the Netherlands in the late
1960s.
22. See note 4 above.
23. OECD, Economic Surveys France, February 1977, p. 52. Direct controls
were also used by the socialist Mauroy government in 1982. The arguments used
were similar to those advanced for incomes policies in earlier social democratic
438 7. PAX AMERICANA
experiments:
theLeftmusthangtogether
to makeit asuccess in orderthattheLeft
experiment
in government
cansucceed.(In this vein,seeanarticleby Maurice
Duverger,
Lagauche unieoudivisée?
addressed totheFrench Communist Party,
in Le Monde, July 11-12, 1982.)
24. OECD, Economic Surveys, Sweden, Iune 1981.
25. Katzenstein (1983).
26. Friedberg(1974):94108;
andFriedbergavecla collaborationdeD. Des-
jeux (1976);also Zysman (1983):99-169.
27. The transformation of French planning consequentialupon Francesen-
try intotheEECarediscussed
in StephenS.Cohen(1977). MichaelCrozier,who
hasappeared asthesociologist
of Giscardien
liberalism,
wrotetwoarticlesforLe
MondeentitledReflexionssur le VHIePlan (August8 and9, 1980)in which he
argued
thatthepurpose
ofthePlanshouldbetoassist
theFrench
economy
toadapt
to international competition:
Cestdelanalyse
delévolution
dumonde
quilfautpartiretnonpasdelexamen
de la situationfrancaise.Notre competivitédifférentielleest notre guide.Pour
obtenir le plein emploi, nous ne devonsplus chercheraemployertoutesnos
capacités
actuelles
tellesquellessont,maisa lesplacersurtousle créneaux
ou
elles peuvent étre compétitives.
Stoffaés
(1978)alsoarguedthattheaimof industrialpolicyshouldbeto make
Frenchindustrymoreaggressively
competitive
ontheworldmarket,althoughhe
perceives
thatthiscanbeachieved
onlybyamoreinterventionist,
neomercantilist
state.
28. Zysman (1983):16869.
29. Frenchplannersspeakof an 80-20ratio";i.e.,effective
planningre-
quiresthatcloseto80percent
ofproductionin asectorcomefromabout20percent
of therms. SeeShoneld(1965]:138.
Winkler(1976:t. 17,no. 1, pp. 120-21)also
makes thepointthatcorporatismis facilitatedby concentration
of capitalsince
government caninuencethewholeeconomy bycontrolling
afewbigcorporations.
30.Thedevelopment of enterprisecorporatism among established
workers
in theleadingsectors
ofindustryemerges fromthedebate aboutthenewworking
class in France; This is discussed in part 3 below.
31. Girvan (1976)has used the term rentier state.
32.Classicdependency
is expounded
by Frank(1969).
Thenotionof de-
pendent
development
wasputforward
byCardoso
andFaletto
(1969)
andhasbeen
elaborated in Evans, (1979).
33. Frieden(1981).For the Third-Worldcountries,borrowingfrom private
transnationalbankswasmoreexpensive, but it avoidedthepolitically unpalatable
conditionsattachedto borrowingfrom the IMF. Thetotal externalpublic debtof
ninety-sixdeveloping
countriesrosefrom$U.S.75.1billionin 1970to $U.S.272
billionin 1977,
themostsignicantchange
beingin liabilitiestoprivatecommercial
bankswhosenet shareof externalborrowingof non-oil-producing,lessdeveloped
countriesrosefrom 6 percentin 1968to 42.9percentin 1977.Crough(1979):190.
34.Regarding cooperatives,FalsBorda(1970)presentsthecasethatsuch
organizationsin theLatinAmerican experience havebeendependent on states
servingtheinterests of foreigncapital.Korovkin(1985)hasperceived
a complex
varietyof possibilities
among agricultural
cooperatives
in Peru,rangingfromde-
pendency
onthestate
toautonomy
inthemarket,
although
theroleofthestate
has
remained generally preponderant.
35. The Peruvian military regime under General Velasco, 1968-1975, at-
tempted
to mobilizepeasants
andurbanmarginals
intostate-sponsored
organiza-
7. PAX AMERICANA 439
managerial
control,
andhascommitted
theperiphery
state
more
nearly
fullytothe
successof theinternational
industryon whichmuchof its revenuesdepend.
In
suchcircumstances,themoderate
response of bothmultinationals
andU.S.gov-
ernments
maybeunderstood,
notasresignation
tofate,butastheworking
outof
newmechanisms
to preservetheessentialfeaturesof theworld-economy
structure
whileaccommodating to politicalgroups
in Third-World
countries
whosesupport
is needed
in orderto maintaintheirpartofthestructure.
SeealsoKrasner(1978).
53. Evans (1979):74,165, 194, 261, 288-90.
54.Strange
(1979).
Onthedecline
ofprotsandinvestments
fromthemid-
1960s,
Arnoult(1978).
OntheoriginsoftheEurodollar
market,
Hirsch,(1967):236
42,andMcKinnon
(1979).
AlsoCrough
(1979):esp.7392,
186~90.
PaulSweezy
andtheMonthlyReview grouphavestressed thecreditexpansion
phenomenon as
anindicatorof economic
crisisin capitalism,
e.g.,Sweezy
(1981),
alsothearticles
collected in Magdoff and Sweezy(1977).
55.Hymer,
in Bhagwati,
ed.(1972).
Evans
(1979):30-31
refers
totheinter-
nationalizationof the internalmarketof a peripheralcountry.Vernon(1966)pro-
pounds
hisproduct
life-cycle
theoryto explain
industrialization
based
oncon-
sumer-durable type products.
56.Forexample,nonational
economy(eventheU.S.economy)
wasbig
enough
toabsorb
thelevelofproduction
reached
bythecomputer
industry
bythe
1980s. SeeDuncan (1982):93.
Onthequestion
ofscales
ofproductionwithmodern
technology andless-developed-country
markets,
seeMerhav(1969).
57. Cox(1976). CharlesLevinson,
one-timesecretary-general
of theInter-
nationalChemical andGeneral Workers,
Geneva,wasa leadingpublicistformul-
tinationalcollectivebargaining.
SeeLevinson(1972).
Levinsonsclaimsarecon-
testedin a seriesof articlesby NorthrupandRowan(1974).
58. Ozawa(1979:esp.
7,8081,201,203)pointsoutthatmultinational
ex-
pansion
of Japanese
industry
wasof particular
concern
to thelow-productivity,
labor-intensive
sectorof Iapaneseindustry,whichwashardhit by tight labor
marketsin thelatterhalf of the1960s.
Theavailabilityof cheaplaborin South
Korea,
HongKong,
andSingapore
wasaboontothissector,
enabling
it tosurvive
competitively.
59. Asbackground to theusehereoftheterminternutionalizing
ofthestate,
thereis anextensiveliteraturetouchingontheimpactof externalinuenceson
nation-states.
Beloff(1961)wasperhaps therst toattempt
toanalyze
systematically
themechanisms whereby participation
in international
organizations
alteredthe
internal
policy-makingpractices
ofstates.
CoxandJacobson(1974)
represented
the
politicalsystems
of international
organization
asincludingsegmentsof states.
Keohane andNye(1974) pointed
totheprocesses
whereby coalitions
areformed
among segmentsoftheapparatuses
ofdifferent
states
andthewaysinwhichinter-
nationalinstitutionsfacilitatesuchcoalitions.
Thesevariousworks,whilethey
pointtotheexistence
ofmechanisms
forpolicy
coordination
amongstates
andfor
penetration
ofexternal
inuences
withinstates,
donotdiscuss
theimplications
of
thesemechanisms
forthestructure
ofpowerwithinstates.
It isthisstructural
aspect
I wishto designate
bytheterminternationalizing
of thestate.
Christian
Palloix
(1975b:82)
refers
toPinternationalisation
delappareil
delEtat
national,
decer-
tainslieuxdecetappareildEtat. . ., bywhichhedesignates thosesegments of
nationalstates
thatserve
aspolicysupports fortheinternationalization
ofproduc-
tion.Hethusraisesthequestion
ofstructural changesin thestate,
though hedoes
notdevelop thepoint.Thevarious worksonneo-Marxist structural
viewsofthe
stateseemgenerallytohave
neglected theinternational
dimension ofthestate,
e.g.,
442 7.PAXAMERICANA
Miliband(1969),
Poulantzas
(1968),
Habermas (1976),
Offe(1975),
Anderson(1974).
Keohane andNye(1977),subsequent
to theworkmentionedabove,linkedthe
transgovernmental
mechanism
to theconceptof interdependence. I nd this
concept
tends
toobscure
thepower relationships
involvedin structural
changesin
bothstateandworld orderandprefernotto useit for thatreason.Gourevitch(1978)
doesretaintheconcept
of interdependence
whileinsistingthatit belinkedwith
powerstruggles
among
socialforces
withinstates.
A recent
fashion
hasbeento
introduce
thewordregimeto designate principles,norms,rules,anddecision-
makingproceduresaroundwhichactorexpectations convergein a givenissue-
area,asin thespecialissueof International
Organization
(Spring),36(2),1982,
editedbyStephenD.Krasner.
TheobjectionI seetothemethodfollowed in this
particular
literature
(though
not,ofcourse,
tosome contributions
toit) isthatthe
methodtriesto nd general propositions
aboutpoliticalbehavior
abstracted
from
historicalprocess.
I nd myselfin agreementwiththecriticismsof Susan
Strange
includedin thatspecialissue(Cave!hicdragones:
acritiqueofregimeanalysis,
pp.479-96].
Closer
to thenotionadvanced
hereis thatsuggested
byLaurence
Harris, in Miliband and Saville, eds. (1980):
I thinkit [thestate]shouldbeconceivedasa hierarchical
structureof stateinsti-
tutions,onlyonesetofwhicharethoseencompassed bytheideaofthenationstate.
At onelevelin thehierarchy wehaveto placeinternational
stateinstitutionssuch
asthe IMF,the organsof theEEC,theBankfor International Settlements, and
NATO.At a differentlevel,we haveto placethe institutionsof thelocal stateof
townsandregions.
Withsucha hierarchical
concept
of thestateit is possible
to
analyze
therelations
between
theactions
ofagents
initsdifferent
parts,
themanner
in whichorganized
classforcesin onepartaffecttheothers,
andhowmarket
forces
affect each part of the structure (p. 260).
This denition is, however,limited to thegovernment
apparatus
aspectof thestate
andignores
thehistoric-bloc
aspect.
Myemphasis
ismoreontheprocess
ofinter-
nationalizationor formationof the hierarchicalstructurethan on the structure
depicted as a finished thing.
60. Strange (1971):29192.
61. Emerson,in AbrahamandAbeele,eds.(1981);AbrahamandLemineur-
Toumson,
in Abraham
andAbeele,
eds.(1981).
Francois-Xavier
Ortoli,thevice-
president
oftheEuropean
Communities
executive,
hasstressed
theneed
forcloser
coordinationof internalmonetarypolicies,includingmoneysupply,exchange
rate,
andinterestratepolicies,in AbrahamandAbeele,eds.(1981):18.
62. Speechreproduced in Radice(1975):237.
63. Turkey,Peru,Portugal,
andIamaica
underwent
suchinternalchanges
during the late 19705.
Turkeywasconfrontedwith a balance
of payments
crisisin 1976-77.An
IMFteamleftAnkarain December
1977withoutcomingto anagreementonloan
conditionswith theDemirelgovernment,
whichwasunwilling toacceptsometerms
oftheIMFsstabilization
package.
A newgovernment
wassubsequently
formedby
Mr.Ecevit,
whichdidcome
to anagreement
withtheIMFandsigned
a letterof
intent in March 1978.
In Peru,relationswith theIMFwereinvolvedin thechangeover
fromthe
government
ofGeneral
IuanVelasco
Alvarado
tothatofGeneral
Morales
Bermudez
in 1976.Gen.MoralesBermudez
tried to playthehumanrightscardin Washington
togetabetterdeal,tellingPresident
IimmyCarter
thattheIMFdeationary
stabi-
lizationprogram
wouldinevitably
leadto acycleofsocialagitation
andrepression
that would obligePeruviangovernments
to violatehumanrights.His argument
7.PAXAMERICANA 443
appears
tohave carried
littleweightinWashington.(Thierry
MaliniakinLeMonde,
November 15,1977.)Bytheendof1982, thePeruvianarmyandpolice
were engaged
inrepression
ofaninsurgency that
had occupiedmuch oftheprovince
ofAyacucho
(LeMonde, January 3,1983] whilethegovernments austerity
programwas being
monitoredbyquarterly visitsfromtheIMF.ContinuationoftheIMF-dictated
aus-
terity
program led,inMarch 1983,
toageneral strike.
Thegovernmentinreprisal
imprisonedthetrade union leaders.
InIune 1983,agovernmentcrisis
forcedthe
resignation
oftheminister oflaborwho had criticized
theIMF-dictated
policies
for
making thepoorest bearthesocial costsofeconomic stabilization
andforunder-
mining
localproducers
infavor
ofimports
(LeMonde,
Iuly1,1983).
In Portugal,
thefirst[minority
socialist]
government
of MarioSoares
was
defeated
byacondence
vote
inParliament
inDecember
1977
when
other
political
parties
refused
tosupport
anausterity
economic
program
worked
outwithanIMF
consortium
ofwhich
theFederal
Republic
ofGermany
wasthekeymember.
The
crisiswasresolved
bytheinstallation
ofa newSoares
government
withcentrist
partyrepresentation
andatechnocrat
(Victor
Constancio)
incharge
ofasupermin-
istryoftheeconomy
(NewYork
Times,
December
9,1977;
LeMonde,
Ianuary
29,
1978)
Foreign
commercial
bankscutofftheircredit
toIamaica
inMarch
1976,
citing
inflation
andwage
increases
ascauses
foralarm
concerning
theIamaican
economy.
ThislefttheIMFastheonlypossible
source
offoreign
credit.
TheMichael
Manley
government
had
adopted
economic
nationalism
andasocial
policy
program
that
IMFsources
regarded
asresponsible
forpersistent
decits
andination.
Thegov-
ernment
wasconsidered in Washington
tobeleft~wing.Lengthyinterrupted
negotiations,
punctuated
bystop-gogovernment
measures,
cametoanendinDe-
cember
1979 withthegovernmentsrefusal
toaccept
IMFconditions,
whichin-
cluded
anincomes policydesigned
toreducerealwages,
devaluation,
andcutsin
government
spending
(which
would
have
involved
ring11,000
employees
ata
timewhenunemployment
wasmore
than25percent).
Manley
appealedfromthe
IMFofficials
totheexecutive
board
oftheFund,
which
preferred
nottorespond,
awaiting
theresults
ofelections
thatManley
hadhad
toadvance
forlack
offunds.
TheManley
governments
tractations
withtheFundhadresulted
in austerity,
falling
realwages,
andrising
unemployment
without
meeting
theFunds condi-
tions.
Thenewgovernment
ofEdwardP.G.Seaga,
which
wasformed
after
Manley
losttheelections,
quickly
metwithadelegation
ofU.S.
business
leaders
andcame
toanagreement
withtheIMF.
Loansonceagain
owedtoIamaica.
SeePaul
Fabra
inLeMonde,
Iuly15,1980;
Phillips,
inHollySklar,
ed.(1980);
andGirvan
and
Bernal(1982),andArthur Lewin(1982).
AsforZaire,following
theShaba incursions
of 1977-78,
a conference
of
creditors
laiddownthecondition
thatofcials
oftheIMFbeplaced
withinthekey
ministries
ofthestate
tooversee
thefullmentoftheconditions
fordebtrenewal
(New
York
Times,
May24,1978,
IV,13:3;
June
14,1978,
124;
June
15,1978,
II:1).
Thisis reminiscent
of thearrangements
putin placebythewestern
European
creditors
oftheOttoman
Empire andEgypt
inthelatenineteenth
century
whereby
western
agentsadministered
thecustoms
services
ofthosestates
inorder
toensure
debt service. SeeFeis (1930]:332~41,384-97.
64.Theargument
ofthosewhohave written
aboutungovernability
is
couched
inmore
general
terms,
i.e.,thedecline
ofdeference,
agrowing
intensity
ofpolitical
participation,
thegreater
difficulty
ofstates
toserve
capital
accumula-
tionneeds.
Theyconsider
abroad
measure
ofpublicapathy
necessary
tomake
liberaldemocratic
government
workable.
SeeCrozier
etal(1975).
444 7. PAX AMERICANA
65. Industrial policy poses some interesting issues as between the old and
the new corporatisms. See Diebold, (1980); and Pinder et al (1979). If planning
evokes the specter of economic nationalism, industrial policy, as the Trilateral
Commissionstudy points out, can be looked upon with favor in a world-economy
perspectiveas a necessaryaspectof policy harmonization:
We have argued that industrial policies are needed to deal with structural problems
in modern economies. Thus, international action should not aim to dismantle these
policies. The pressure should, rather, be towards positive and adaptive industrial
policies, whether on the part of single countries or groups of countries combined.
Far from being protectionist, industrial policy can help them to remove a cause of
protectionism, by making the process of adjustment less painful (p. 50).
66. Stepan (1978):287.
butiveprograms
thesoleorprimarycause
oftheslowdown
in thecapitalist
growth
process,maintain that they havemadean important contribution to that slowdown.
15. Thephrasecorporatewelfarebumswasusedby DavidLewis,former
leaderof the NewDemocraticPartyof Canada,
to castigategovernment
readiness
to provide relief for big corporations in nancial trouble.
16. It is remarkable,in the light of scholarlystresson the legitimacy
functionof thewelfarestate,howlittle opposition
therehasbeentothistendency
to sacrice employment in the ght againstination and how little of that hasbeen
clearlygrounded
in alternative
ideology.An exception
wasthe 1982year-end
statementof theCanadianConference
of RomanCatholicBishops,which asserted
thatthehighunemployment
ratesresultingfromgovernment
antiinationpolicy
reected a basicmoraldisorderin societyand indicatedthe needfor a basic
shift in values(TorontoGlobeandMail,January1, 1983).
17. McCrackenReport (1977).
18. Bowles(1982149) calls this the shift from an accumulationprocess
constrainedprimarily by conditionsof aggregate demand(or the realizationof
surplusvalue)to an accumulationprocessconstrainedprimarilyby conditionsof
exploitation.
19. Biasco (1979):104;Bowles (1982):64.
20. Sabel (1982):esp.78126.
21. Italy is one countryin which a policy of working-classsolidarityhas
beeneffectivelypursuedby the left notablyduringtheautunnocaldoof 1969.The
difcultiesfortheleftpresented
bythescalbackground
to politicalissues
andby
the segmentation
of the workforcewere,however,apparentin the discomtureof
thePCIfollowingthereferendum heldonJune9 and10,1985,on wageindexation,
whichthePCIinitiated.Thereferendum
proposed
to reverse
theItaliangovern-
mentspolicy of endingwageindexationas part of an antiination program.It
ralliedlessthan46percent
of thevotersin favor,whilethemajoritysupported
the
government.Theissuehadtheeffectof dividingestablished
employees
(in govern-
mentand big industry],who would havebenetedfrom indexedwages,from the
growing numbersof nonestablishedand self-employed,who would not. Thus some
otherwiseloyal communistvoterssplit with thePartyon this issue,while neofas-
cistsof the MSI,who havemanyadherentsamongstateemployees, supportedthe
referendum
proposal.
Theeventconrmsthat evenin this mostideologically
evolvedandarticulatepolitical party,analysisof theimplicationsof theeconomic
crisisandthe development of appropriatestrategies arestill far fromadequate.
22. This rhetoricrecallsthe travail,famille, patrie sloganof the Pétainist
French state.It tends to conrm the thesis that there is a contradiction betweenthe
undisciplined individualismandhedonisticvaluesthatcapitalist
societytendsto
produce andtheasceticindividualismandotherdisciplinedtraditionalorprecap-
italistvaluesrequiredto sustainthekindof statethatcanperpetuatecapitalism.
Habermas(1976):7592. This thesis implies that fascism in someform is the ulti-
mate recoursefor the maintenanceof capitalist development.
23. Ginsberg and Shefter (1984) argue that supply-side economics was
more a political program than an economictheory; i.e., it was a rationale for over-
comingthe contradictionbetweencuttingtaxesandincreasingdefensespending,
measuresaddressedto differentsegmentsof the political coalitionReagans
can-
didacy put together.
24. Magri (1982).
25. Stoffaes(1978)contraststhe quasi-autarkicapproachto constructing
socialismof theFrenchCommunist Party(PCF)andtheCERES groupoftheSocialist
446 8. WORLDECONOMIC
CRISIS
Party,in whichFrance
wouldhaveto isolate
itselffromEuropean
andworld-
economy inuences,
withthetechnocratic
approachoftheMichelRocard
faction
in theSocialist
Party,whichadvocates
anoffensive
strategy
of adjustment
to the
worldeconomy (pp.7-12).Stoffaes
concludes:
Onnepeutfairedehonsocialisme
alintérieur
quenrestant
libéralvis-a-vis
delextérieur:
cestlalesensduvéritable
compromishistorique
quisoffrealaFrance (p.345).TheBritishcounterpart
to
thePCF-CERES
positionwouldbeTheAlternative
Economic
Strategy.
A Labour
Movement
Response
totheEconomic
Crisis,
produced
bytheConference
ofSocialist
Economists
LondonCoordinating
Group(London:Blackrose
Press,1980).
26. Katzenstein, ed. (1977).
27. Katzenstein(1983),and Katzenstein(1984).
28.Zysman
(1983:306),
likeKatzenstein,
inquires
intotheinternaldeter-
minantsof differences
in nationaleconomic
policies.WhereKatzenstein
looksfor
generalizable
structural
characteristics,
e.g.,strong/weak
states,
centralized/decen-
tralizedsocialprocesses,
andthecomposition
ofdominantcoalitions,
Zysman pays
moreattention toeconomic
organization
andpractices,
especially
therelationships
amonggovernment,
nance,andindustry.Zysmanargues
thattheseinstitutional
arrangements
determine
distinctive
developmental
types
andthatvariationsinthe
powerofsocial
groups
account
onlyfordifferences
ofoutcomeswithinthese
types.
29. Schmitter (1974).
30. Ginsberg andShefter
(1984)
pointto thedisintegration
oftheNewDeal
coalitionwith theprogressive
alienation
fromtheDemocratic Partyof (1)thein-
ternationally
oriented,
technologically
advanced,
andcapital-intensive
sectors
of
business
thatFranklinRoosevelt
hadcultivated;
(2)thedefense-sector
industries
thathadprotedfromtheKorean
andVietnam
Warbooms;and(3)manualworkers
whoperceived theMcGoverncandidacy
asgeared
to a shakyalliance
between
blacksandthe New Politics segmentof the uppermiddle class.TheReaganite
coalitionor Reconstituted
RightpoliticallyreuniedU.S.business,including
thedefenseindustry;socialandreligious
conservatives;
Southernwhites;Northern
blue-collar
workers;
andlargesegments ofthesuburban
middleclass.
These authors
conclude:
EachofReagans
themestaxcuts,socialservice
reductions,
expandedmilitary
spending,
relaxation
ofbusiness
regulations,
andsoon~was designed
toestablish
linksbetween
Reagan
andamajornationalpoliticalforce.Thechiefproblem
faced
by theReaganites
wasthatthesetheses,
howeverplausible individually,
were
mutually
contradictory.
Themostimportant
ofthese
contradictionswastheobvious
discrepancy
between
Reaganspromiseofsubstantial
taxreliefforthemiddleclass
andReagans
pledge to drastically
increase defensespending.(p.39).
Whattheseauthorsheredescribe is, in Gramscianterms,anunresolved
crisisof
representation,
givenatransitorystabilitythroughcaesarism.
31. Zysman (1983):18Z84,201-6, 21216.
32. Witnesstheself~conscious
effortsof aneomercantilist
like StephenKras-
ner(1978:590)
torehabilitate
astatistperspective
inU.S.political
science.
The
verytermhasa foreignring in theU.S.culturalcontext.
33. A NewYorkTimeseditorialcommentingon the industrial-policypro-
posals
putforward
in January
1984
byastudygroup
co-chaired
byLane
Kirkland
oftheAFL-CIO,
FelixRohatyn,
aninvestment
banker,
andIrvingShapiro,
formerly
of DuPontde Nemours,was entitled: Industrial policy ==industrial politics
(Ianuary
23,1984).
It concluded:
Conventional politicalpressures
couldall too
easily
bringdamaging
remedies
thatfavoroneindustryorregionoveranother,or
invokeprotectionist
measures,
at enormous
costto consumers
andcompetition."
8. WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 447
make the difcult changes in their lives that industrial redeployment would require.
41. The scal crisis of New York City in 1975 and its sequel could be a
paradigmfor the emergence
andcontradictionsof the state-capitalist
approach.It
is not without signicance that Felix Rohatyn,a principal architect of the settlement
reached in the NYC scal crisis, is one of the major advocates of state capitalism in
the United States. The crisis has been analyzed in political terms by Martin Shefter
[1977):98127. The background to the crisis lay in the emergenceof three new
political groups during the 1960s: the reform movement, the black civil-rights
movement, and the movement to unionize city employees. In 1965, the reformers
abandonedtheir allies in the municipal labor movementto back Iohn Lindsay for
mayor. To gain political support in an attack on the municipal bureaucracyand
unions, this combination allied with the black civil-rights movement, an alliance
that contained the promise of an expansion of municipal services to this client
group. Lindsay found he could not govern the city without the support of the
municipal unions, and to win their support he conceded their demands in the
1969-70 negotiations. Since the city could neither raise through taxes nor obtain
through the budget of New York State sufcient revenuesto pay for the enhanced
expenditures resulting from these concessionsto both blacks and unions, it had
recourseto borrowing from the banks.By the mid-1970s,severalfactors combined
to precipitate nancial crisis: ination raisedthe costsof municipal services,reces-
sion limited revenues, and there was an explosion in the costs of retirement benets
grantedto city employeesin the previous decade.In face of the evident inability of
the city to serviceits expandeddebt,banksand New York Stateofcials were caught
between unwillingness to concedemore in taxes or loans and realization that city
bankruptcy would havedisastrousrepercussionsfor themselves,aswell asthe city.
The city was, in effect, placed in a kind of trusteeship. The state, at the urging of
the banks, createdan EmergencyFinancial Control Board empoweredto freezethe
wagesof city employees,approve all city contracts, and supervise city nances.
Members of the banking community were placed in positions of control over the
city budget and administration. Retrenchmentwas directed at programswith black
clienteles and at labor costs. The former were out most easily, since the blacks,
abandonedby the middle-classreformerswho had mobilized them into the politics
of the city, lacked effective organization to retain independent political clout.
Municipal unions were a more difcult target becausebetter organized;neverthe-
less, they were vulnerable to their corporatist involvement with the cityto prej-
udice the citys accessto borrowing in the nancial market, e.g.,by forcing wage
concessions, would undermine the source of their own salaries; and furthermore,
the unions had been pressuredto invest a substantial part of their pension funds
in new city bonds, which would be renderedworthless by bankruptcy. The lessons
of this episode are that (1) corporatism can provide a way out of a scal crisis
provoked by the demands of new political groups; (2) this solution requires a
restriction of decision power to elementsacceptableto the nancial market and the
political demobilization or exclusion of elementslikely to challengethat restriction;
and (3) it is vulnerable to a political remobilization of the excluded elements.
42. Miller (1983).
43. Crough (1979):199; and U.S. Congress (1976).
44. Paul Volker, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, has proposed that the
IMF be both strengthened(by giving it a central position in the managementof the
world monetary system]and politicized (by giving it a permanentcouncil of min-
isters]: The objecthere,quite frankly, is to bring a little moreinternational political
clout to the IMF and in turn to have international concerns reected intimately and
9. MUTATIONS IN ACCUMULATION 449
ployments.
Themanwhose
wholelifeisspent
in performing
afewsimple
opera-
tions,of whichtheeffectstooare,perhaps,
alwaysthesame,or verynearlythe
same, hasnooccasion to exerthisunderstanding,
or to exercise
his inventionin
ndingoutexpedients
forremoving
difculties
whichnever
occur.
Henaturally
loses,therefore,the habit of suchexertionand generallybecomesasstupid and
ignorantasit is possiblefor a humancreatureto become. . .
It is otherwisein the barbaroussocieties,asthey arecommonlycalled,of
hunters,of shepherds,
andevenof husbandmen
in thatrudestateof husbandry
whichprecedes theimprovement
of manufactures,
andtheextension of foreign
commerce.
In suchsocietiesthevariedoccupations
of everymanobligeeveryman
to exerthiscapacity,
andto inventexpedients forremovingdifcultieswhichare
continually occurring.
Inventionis keptalive,andthemindis notsuffered to fall
into that drowsystupidity,which,in a civilizedsociety,seemsto benumb the
understanding
of almostall the inferiorranksof people.
FromTheWealthof Nations,
book5, section1,f, 50.SeeSmith(1976)
vol.2,pp.
781-783.
6. Gramsci (1971):309.
7. Thethreefoldtypologywasproposed byTouraine
(1955).
It hasbeentaken
overbya number of others,
includingMallet(1963)
andShorter
andTilly (1974).
8. Thompson (1968):33846;Landes(1969):6063.
9. The first thesiswasthat of Mallet, (1963);the secondis expressedin
Blauner(1964).
In a thirdvariant,Naville(1963)
argues
thatautomation,
farfrom
integrating
workers
moreclosely
withtheirenterprises,
leadsto a newformof
alienationasworkis renderedmorestressfulandboring.Thiscould,hespeculated,
leadworkersto attemptto regaincontrolat a higherlevel (bothin the enterprise
andin the coordinationof the industrialsystemasa whole),which wouldunder-
mine the legitimacy of the capitalist system.
10.Technological
determinism
hashadan importantplacein theoriesof
industrialrelations.Onevein of theory,for instance,explainslabormovements
in
termsof theconditionof labormarkets,
asin theworkof Perlman(1928)andof
Sturmthal,in ArthurM. Ross,ed.(1966):165-81.
Sturmthalsthesisis that an
abundance
of laborleadsto a labormovement
focusingon political action,while a
scarcity
of laborinclinesunionstowardcollective
bargaining,
jobcontrol,
and
economistic
practices.
Theabundance or scarcityof laborderivesat leastin part
fromthetechnology
ofindustry,i.e.,technologies
thatemployrelativelyunskilled
labor drawn from a homogeneous
and abundantpool versustechnologiesthat
requirescarce
skilledlabor,whosesupplycanberegulated
by craftassociations.
Thisapproach
explains
something
about
thenature
oflabormovements
butnothing
aboutchanges
in technology
orlabormarkets.
Anothertheoretical
approach
treats
employerpower asthedetermining
factorin industrial
relations
andsees thisas
shaped
bywhatcanverybroadly becalledthetechnological
context,
asin Ingham
(1974).
lngham comparesSwedish andBritishindustrialrelations.
Briey,his
argumentis thatemployer
action
in industrialrelations
isaconsequenceofthree
mainfactors;
(1)thedegree
ofconcentration
ofcapital;(2)theextentoftechnological
complexity,
i.e.,coexisting
varieties
oftechnology;
and(3)thedegree
ofspeciali-
zationor, conversely,
of differentiation
in production.
Swedish
industryis rela-
tivelymoreconcentrated,lesscomplex(mainlycontinuousprocess
production),
andmorespecialized
in exportmarkets. Thisenables
Swedish
employers
toachieve
greater
unityandcoherence
intheirindustrial
relations
practices.
Britishemploy-
V
ers,by contrast,
aredividedalongall threedimensions.
Likethepreviously
men-
tionedtheoriesof labormovements,
this theoryexplainssomethingaboutthe be-
haviorofthepartiesto industrialrelations
butnothingaboutthetechnologies
that
are assumed to determine this behavior.
9. MUTATIONS IN ACCUMULATION 451
machine-paced
assembly
linebyaseries
ofproduction
islands"
based
onthework
of multiskilled,self-regulating
groups.
TheVolvoexperiment
hasbeencriticized
asa kind of democratizationof theworkprocessimposedby management
in an
authoritarian
manner.
Ienkins(1981):27.
German
andItaliantradeunionshave
givenconsiderable
attention
toworkorganization
issues
in theirbargaining,
per-
ceiving
thisterrainaspropitious
forenhancement
ofworkercontrol
andperhaps
as an avenuefor changeof the capitalistsystem.RegardingWestGermany,see
Markovits
andAllen(1979b).
Pressure
by Italianunionswasinstrumental
in dis-
placing
assembly-line
production
atFiatbya system
based
onislands.Italian
unionsconcernwith workorganization questions
waslinkedto theireffortsto
makeinvestmentpolicya matterfor collective
bargaining.
Amyot(1981). French
unionshavebeengenerallysuspicious anduncooperativeregardingemployer-
initiated
workreorganizationschemes.
Gallie
(1978:31112)
studied
comparatively
theexperiencein BritishandFrench
plants
ofthesame
company,
bothengagedin
oilreningusinghighlyautomated,continuous-process
technology.
Inbothplants
therehadbeenamovetowardgreater
teamcontrolbytheprocess
operators.
In the
French
plant,unions
wererelatively
weakin theplant,andunionattitudes
were
derivedfromheadquarters;
workerssensed
a greatdistance
between
themselves
andmanagement,
andmanagement
asserted
tighter
control
insupervision
ofdetail.
It wasa low-trustsituation.In theBritishplant,theunionwasstronger
in the
workplace
andmoredefensive
ofworkshop
autonomy;
andworkers
hadlessofa
senseof distancefrom management.
It wasby comparisona high-trustsituation.
Gallieconcludesthatthe needto negotiate technological
changein theBritish
situation
ofbalancedpowercouldresultin inefciencies,
butthemoreauthoritarian
Frenchmanagerial practicehadhighsocialcosts.Hespeculateswhethera more
participativesystemmightleadtomore ready consent onthepartoftheworkforce
toradicalchanges (theBritishpractice
givingtheworkers adefactovetobutlittle
initiative].
Onemightfurtherquestion whether suchaparticipativesystem
would
bepossible shortofmorefundamental changes in thecapitalist
mode ofdevelop-
ment and accumulation.
41. BarnettandSchorsch(1983);Sabel(1982):Z045;
Brodaet al. (1978).
42. Redivo (1983):35; Sabel (1982):65.
43. Barnett and Schorsch (1983):83103.
44. Barnett and Schorsch (1983):93.
45. Brusco(1982);Bruscoand Sabel,in Wilkinson,ed. (1981);Sabel
(198Z]:2Z031.
46. Brusco and Sabel(1981):108or Sabe1(1982):255.
47.Chiarello
(1983):233;
Levitan etal.(1972).
Theunderwriting
ofsubstand-
ardwages bywelfare
isanalogous
totheoperationoftheSpeenhamlandsystemas
analyzedbyPolanyi
(1957:7785),withthedifference
thatnowthelawisignorant
oftherelationship.
Polanyi
attributed
thepauperizationofEnglish
countrypeople
to Speenhamland.
48. DeGrazia(1983):60.
In the summerof 1980,LeMonde(June24,25,26,
and27]published
a series
ofarticles
byDanielle
Rouard
underthegeneral
title
Travaillerautrement
concerning
various
experiments
in alternative
formsofwork
in Berlin, Birmingham, Italy, and France.
49. Chiarello (1983)passim;Redivo (1983):3742.
50. Barraclough (1975).
51,Brandao Lopes(1977).Charles
Vanhecke, in LeMonde,July27,1982,
described
thesituationin theMaranhao
regionin thenortheast
of Brazil:
11y adixans,leMaranhao,
cétait
laterrepromise:
alentrée
delAmazonie,une
456 9. MUTATIONS IN ACCUMULATION
région immensément verte et immensément vide ouverte aux paysans qui fuyaient
les sécheresses du Ceara, du Piaui, de Pernambouc voisins. Aujourdhui, cest lun
des haut lieux du western brésilien: un endroit ou la terre peut se disputer a
coups de feu entre les posseiros et les pistoleiros, cest-a-dire entre les petits agri-
culteurs sans titre de propriété et les hommes de main des grands fermiers. . . .
Les grands éleveurs ont installé partout leurs barbelés. Les capitaux indus-
triels venus du Sud ont envahi louest et le nord du pays en quéte de surfaces ou
le prix de vente du boeuf compenserait celui de lhectare. LEtat du Maranhao,
grand comme les six dixiemes de la France, a été transformé en enclos do11dispa-
raissent peu a peu les cultures qui permettaient a la population de salimenter.
Pour payer Findustrialisation forcenée de ces quinzes dernieres années, les
militaires au pouvoir a Brasilia sacrient les cultures vivrieres aux grands produits
dexportation (soja, sucre, café). Ils ne peuvent y parvenir quen concentrant au
maximum la propriété agricole. Ils ont donc décidé que le Far-West brésilien serait
capitaliste ou ne serait pas . . .
52. Nova (1980); Dobb, in Abramsky, ed. (1974).
53. Braudel (1979:3:54548) concludes his study by underlining the dis-
tinction with which he began (1:8) between the market and capitalism. The market
is no more an exclusive feature of capitalism than it is inconsistent with socialism.
54. Simes (1975) quotes a report from the Literaturnaya Gazeta on the con-
viction of two collective farm chairmen for buying from thieves badly needed pipes
for a cowshed and boxes to pack apples in. One of these chairmen subsequently
asked: Which is the greater crimeto pay thousands of rubles to thieves, or to lose
a harvest?
55. Grossman [1977):2540.
56. Cox (1985).
57. Gabor (1979).
58. Frobel et al. [1980].
59. Evans (1979]:18491.
60. Doeringer and Piore (1971:17577) make the point that in the United
States, enterprises that are exempt from the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts and from
National Labor Relations Board decisions are all part of the secondary labor market.
Furthermore, unemployment compensation, social security, and minimum wage
legislation all exempt parts of the secondary labor market from coverage. In addi-
tion: The public assistance system as at present structured . . . encourages people
to work on the fringes of the labor market in jobs where earnings are not reported
to ofcial authorities. Markovits and Allen (1979a:1011] point out how unem-
ployment compensation in the Federal Republic of Germany is administered so as
to encourage unemployed workers to take jobs below their level of qualications.
61. In Sao Paulo, women street cleaners, who receive half of the minimum
wage, work for enterprises that contract with the municipality for their services.
Charles Vanhecke, in Le Monde, 28 juillet 1982, Le tiers-monde brésilien. II. La
civilisation du bidonville.
62. Milton Friedman has argued that the clandestine economy, by enabling
individuals to get around state restrictions on personal initiative, was an important
bulwark against state interference in the economy. Michel Crozier, a French soci-
ologist who has become an ideologue for the liberal right in France, took the same
position: clandestine work was an outlet for the spirit of initiative and a nursery
for future enterprises. . . . Cest peut-étre un peu immoral, mais tant pis. De Grazia
[1983:89), citing an article by M. Roy, Le travail noir, Le Point, nov. 12, 1979,
which reported these interviews.
10. CLASSES AND HISTORIC BLOCS 457
inantsystem,
heargues,
drawsprotsfromits domination
overits suppliers
and
clientsmorethanfromits ownlaborforce;thedominatedsystemnds theessential
partof its prots internally,i.e.,fromexploitation
of its ownlaborforce.This
distinctionleadsto relativelygoodconditionsfor the employees
of the dominant
systemandrelatively
greaterexploitation
oftheemployees
ofthedominated
system
(esp.pp.37-44).Attalisdistinctionbetweendominant
anddominatedsystems
is
doubtless derived from Francois Perrouxs (1973) concept of economy as a com-
positeofmarketexchange
andpowerrelations.
Doeringer
andPiore(1971134)
note
the incentivesto management
to stabilizeemploymentof scientic andtechnical
cadresin order to maintain its investmentin the recruitment, screening,and training
of an elite work force. Also Touraine et al. (1965):51.
20. Offe (1976).Concerningthe debateaboutautomationandworkerinte-
gration, seech. 9, note 9.
21. Adam and Reynaud (1978):24552.
22. Attali(1975)envisages
a decentralized
self-management
system
for the
future,but he doesnot revivethe argument,in Mallet (1963),that this will come
aboutthroughanenterprise-oriented
labormovement ledbythenewworkingclass.
Malletarguedthat advancedtechnologies,
e.g.,producergoodsin electronics,
woulddevelop mosteffectively
understatecapitalismwhereatechnocratic
direc-
tion of industrywould sharepowerwith bankinggroupslinked to the state(pp.
197-203).
BihrandHeinrich(1980:7981,
105,176)picturetheAttaliprogram
as
anallianceof bureaucratic-technical
pettybourgeoisie
with workersfor thepurpose
of salvaginga reformedcapitalismfromtheeconomiccrisis.
23. Dubois (1978).
24. Mickler (1979)notedreductionsin the proportionof skilledworkersin
German industries between 1950 and 1974: from 95 to 63 percent in composition
(printing),
from70to 10-20percentin furnitureassembly,
from50to23-29percent
in prefabricated
construction,
andfrom80to20-30percent in precision
mechanics.
Theseareall industriesin which enterprises
aretypicallyof mediumsize.Mickler
attributes
thesechanges to competition,
whichstimulatedrationalization andef-
fortstoraiseproductivity.
Neithersupplyanddemand forskillsin thelabormarket
norconscious management policies
favoring
deskilling
were,hethought, signicant
factors.Sabel(1982:8999)discussestheworldviewsof craftsmen in declineand
workers with plant-specic technical skills.
25. Hibbs, )r. (1978).
26. Onlaborrepresentation
in nationaleconomic
management,Shoneld
(1969).
Ontheimplications
ofmitbestimmung,
Cox(1977b).
SeealsoPanitch
(1984).
27. Issuesin WestGermanlaborrelationsfrom about1978centeredon the
demand for thethirty-ve-hourweek,humanization
of workandcontrolof tech-
nological
change,allraisedbyrank-and-le
pressures.
Markovits
andAllen(1979b).
See also chapter 9.
28. Unionsuspicionof enterprisecorporatismwasdiscussedin Touraineet
al. (1965).It has,if anything,grownduringtheensuingtwentyyears.
29. Italian metalworkers and chemical workers have been among the most
explicitin linkingtheissueof reduction
in theworkforceto a demand
fora voice
in investmentdecisionsandindustrialreconversion
policies.SeeTrentin (1962);
Momigliano (1962);and Amyot (1981).
30. Thechallengeto unionleadershippreceded
thecomingof theeconomic
crisis.Alreadyin the1960s
a shiftof powertowardtheshopfloorhadbeennoted.
Reynaud (1968).
31. Tradeunionismin theUnitedStatesandCanada,
which historicallyhas
460 10. CLASSES AND HISTORIC BLOCS
40. Massari (1975); Ielin (1976). The Cordobazo was a strike movement that
occurred in the northern Argentine city of Codobain 1969. Since the 1950s,the
city had becomea center of the automobile industry, which had attracted a new,
young, and relatively well-educated work force employed by multinational corpo-
rations. Someradical intellectuals were within this work force. Though the move-
ment was ultimately repressed,it was sustainedlong enoughto shockthe political
system and weaken the government,which changedultimately as a result of it. It
demonstrated
the possibilityof protestagainsttradeunionbureaucracies,employ-
ers,andgovernmentwhena relativelywelleducated work force,angeredby frus-
tration, links with a radical ideology. Stepan (1978:102)notes that the relative
weaknessin repression manifested by the Argentine state during the Cordobazo
adverselyaffectedits ability to attractinternationalnance.Conversely,
therelative
severity of Brazilian coercion favored foreign capital inows.
41. Azad(1980).Continuingstrikesby the oil workersplayeda majorpart
in the ultimate paralysis of the Shahsregime. Other industrial workers also took
part in the movement, which set up workers councils. This proletarian success
was, however, short-lived, and the councils were soon dismantled by the Islamic
revolutionaries, who destroyedoil workers unity by pitting religious againstnon-
religiousworkers.Azadattributesthis defeatof classconsciousness
in a populist
revolutionarywaveto the youthfulnessof the Iranianworkingclass,a groupvery
largelyof peasantorigin,andto the absenceof independentworking-classorgani-
zation. The contradiction betweena class orientation and a religious-populist ori-
entation is endemic in Third World revolutionary movements.For a full examina-
tion of an earlier case--thatof the Indonesian Communist party before 1926see
McVey (1965).
42. On liberalization in Brazil in 1979-80, a series of articles by Marcel
Niedergang in Le Monde, December 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1980. The article of December
12 deals with the emergenceof opposition unions analogousto the illicit workers
commissions in Spain during the last years of the regime of General Francisco
Franco.
43. The most notableproponent of this thesiswasFanon(1968).For a critical
discussion of the thesis, seeSandbrook(1977).Turner (1966)arguesthat organized
workers in less developed countries have captured a disproportionate share of
national income, and this has reduced the possibilities of employment creation.
Organizedworkers have thus, he argues,entrenchedtheir own privileged position
at the expenseof peasantsand marginals.
44. Bates (1971).
45. Stepan (1978]:195229.
46. Sandbrook (1977).
47. The concept of occupational communities is taken from Kerr and
Siegel, in Kornhauser et al., eds. (1954). Also Sandbrookand Arn ,(1977:57),in
which occupational communities are dened as places where, owing to a con-
centration of similarly-employed workers,their insulation from moderatingoutside
inuences, and their peculiar schedules occasionedby shift-work, work-mates
interact both on and off the job to createand reinforce commonimagesof the world.
48. Wolf (1969).
49. Fanon (1968).
50. See,for example,World Bank (1975).Also Feder (1976).
51.Nelson(1969and1979).Stepan(1978:15889)
pointsoutthattheurban
squatters in Peru have not been notably radical or populist, but rather instrumental
and clientelistic, and were relatively easily organizedduring the Velascoregimeby
state and church initiatives into structures articulating them with the state in a
462 10. CLASSES AND HISTORIC BLOCS
Conclusions
1.Marx
[1957):1;544.
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486 BIBLIOGRAPHY
69,106,117,147,397-99,406n7;
capitalist,
232;fascist
state
and,
196;Bahro, Rudolf, 2, 208
in international production, 245-
Bakunin, Michael, 64
47, 2.49, 261, 264, 267; at national
Balance of payments, 221, see also
and world levels, 188-89; redistribu-
Incomes policy
tive, 205, 208-9; socialist primitive,
Balance of power, 111, 113-14, 118,
86, 90; social structure of, 159, 164,
125,127-29,15253,164,211,25
209,212,27071,285,298,30953, British management of, 123; permis~
sive, 148
Bank for International Settlements
[BIS], 301
399,
427n11;
states
role
in,133,
169, Banks, private transnational, 301-3
281; world order and, 210 Barraclough, Geoffrey, 151
Agrarian bureaucracy, 116, 118 Barter, 325
Agrarian-bureaucratic state, 198 Basic needs, 242, 251, 306, 366
Agribusiness, 44, 339, 383 Beer, Samuel, 184
Agroindustrial complexes, 92 Bendix, Reinhard, 70-71, 80, 93,
Alexander I, Czar, 121-22 422n40,423n41
Alienation, 312, 331, 382; in actually Betriebsgemeinschaft (enterprise com-
existing socialism, 401 munity), 190
Allende, Salvador, 242, 261, 276, 292 Beveridge, William, 166, 174, 225
American Federation of Labor (AFL), Bilderberg conferences, 282
67 Biparsnn 6369,161,227,374,379;
American Federation of Labor-Con- and restructuring of production, 323;
gress of Industrial Organizations weakened by hyperliberal tendency,
[AFLCIO), 377 287
Anarcho-syndicalism, see Syndicalism Bismarck, Otto von, 157, 164, 173-74,
Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 180, see also 4311140
Works councils Black death, 53
Aristocracy of labor, see Labor Bolshevism (Bolshevik revolution], 75,
aristocracy 83, 163, 178,194, 198
Arms race, 260, 298, 299, 304, 346, 402 Bonapartist state, 138-41
Assembly line, see Mass production Brandt, Willy, 374
Augsburg, Peace of (1555), 112 Braudel, Fernand, 44
490
(C10), 65, 68
Consumerism, 377-78, 380-81, 390,
402
Continental power state, 116-18
Cooperatives, 55, 88; in Peru, 386; in
small-scale industry, 93; see also
Labor movement
Cordobazo (Argentina), 385, 461n40
Core-periphery structure, 144-46, 150, 491
245-49,26061,319-21;pepheb
alization of labor, 324, 327, 400,
Development, see Capitalist develop-
453n26; in production and jobs, 329,
ment, Dependent development, Re-
334,344-45,348,453n22;andredm-
distributive development
tributive societies, 342, 346 Dialectical explanation, 4, 12, 32, 129,
Corn laws, repeal of (1846), 86, 130;
358,389,393
and Anti-Corn Law League, 136-37
Disraeli, Benjamin, 150, 156, 173,
Corporatism, x, 27,28, 194; in central 416n23,423n43
planning, 206-7; ideologyof, 170-71, Dominant groups, 17-18, 21, 356, 358-
187; included and excluded groups, 68
187; inationary bias of, 187; infor- Dual society, 348-51
mal, 228-29, 263; and the neoliberal
she,220,22223,26263,27E
Ebert, Friedrich, 194
Ecological movement, 381
Economic crisis (1970s), 2, 270, 274-
307,321,3Z324,36164,390,40U
and
state
capitalism,
291,
293,
295- and household production, 50, 337-
38, 346; world-economy, 226, 251,
96; and trade unions, 223; and tri-
partism, 78, 225, 227; and the wel- 26263
fare-nationalist state, 161, 170, 182, Educational system, 169-70
186, 188; see also Enterprise corpora- Employer organizations, 66-67
tism, State corporatism, Tripartism Encomienda, 41
Corporative state, see Fascism Engels, Frederick, 59, 157, 358
Cottage industries, 334-37 Enterprise corporatism, 28, 70-74,
Counterhegemony, see under 101, 171, 182; in the neoliberal state,
230, 263; in the neomercantilist de-
Hegemony
Crisis: denition, 273; of representa- velopmentalist state, 234-35; and
the new working class, 369, 371-
on,273,285,401,446n30,447n38;
72; and multinational corporations,
251; and polarization of the working
class, 381, 400; and the restructuring
see
also
Debt
crisis,
Economic
crisis, of production, 315, 323, 334, 345,
379; and transformation of the neoli-
Fiscal crisis beral state, 281, 284, 287,297
Cujus regio, ejus religio, 112 Enterprise labor market, 55-63; under
Cultural Revolution (China), 92 central planning, 85, 100; in hyperli-
beral tendency, 287; and internation-
Debtcsm,240,275,282,339,390
alizing of production, 247, 253; in
liberal world order, 145, 149; and
restructuring of production, 323,
328, 345, 349; and Stolypin reforms,
400,439n43 199; in Third World countries, 340
Dehio, Ludwig, 116 Ethic of work, 22-25; in central plan-
Deindustrialization, 321, 362, 376 ning, 94
492 INDEX
Events of May 1968 (France), 274, 276, 13, 345, 449n2; and Taylorism,
373 428n13, 428n14; see also Hegemony,
Historic bloc, Organic intellectuals,
Fabian Society, 157,174 Passive revolution, War of move-
Factory legislation, 147, 156 ment/war of position
Factory systems, 56, 316 Guilds, 55-57, 130
Family, 48-49, 415n21; and enterprise Guild socialism, 180
corporatism, 73; see also Household Guomindang, 201
production, Patriarchy
Famine, 339, 403 Harcourt, Sir William, 175
Fanon, Frantz, 64 Harmonization of national policies,
Fascism, 79, 189-98, 210, 310 255, 259, 262
Feminism, 381; and nonestablished Healy, Denis, 374
workers, 62-63 Hegemony: absence of, 236, 244 (in
Feudalism, 21-22, 29-30, 40-41, 52- France, Second Empire), 140, 148 (in
53, 56, 114, 116, 130,139,414n7; 19th century U.S.), 142, 148 (in state
transformation of, 58; new serfdom, corporatism), 79; bourgeois, 218,
112, 119 (in Britain] 123,128,137-38,148;in
Fiscal crisis: and the modern state civil society, 182; among classes,
(17th century], 115; and the neoli- 356; counterhegemony, 382, 390-91,
beral state, 224, 280-81, 324, 326, 394, 403; crisis of, 195; decline of
345, 374, 400; of New York City, (in world order), 151-64, 299, 302;
448n41; and welfare-nationalist state, in the factory, 311; Peel, Sir Robert
172 as architect of, 137; in redistributive
Forced labor, 146 societies, 206; Restoration (1815),
Ford, Henry, 311 119-23; revolutionary party as sub-
Fordism, 270, 309-14, 316, 321, 328, stitute for, 205; and tripartism,
377, 397; decline of, 345; neo-Ford- 74-75, 78; weakness of in late devel-
ism, 330-32; in Soviet Union, 318; oping societies, 266, 364; in world
see also under Gramsci order, 2, 7, 9, 108, 149-50, 209-10,
Franchise system, 329, 362-63 212-19, 265-66, 270,394, 4101111
Franco, General Francisco, 385 Hindenberg, Field Marshall Paul von,
French Revolution (1789), 83, 116, 119, 194
131, 139, 149 Hirschman, Albert, 276
Free trade, 145, 154 Historical materialism, 311
Historical structures, see Structures
Galbraith, Iohn Kenneth, 61, 70 Historic bloc, 6-8, 105-9, 147-48,
Gaullism (France), 364 244, 254, 400, 409n10; disintegration
General Agreement on Tariffs and of neoliberal, 270, 279-85, 401; for-
Trade (GATT), 303 mation of, 355-91; and fascism, 195;
Gierek, Edward, 31 in liberal state, 129; in old-regime
Giolitti, Giovanni, 79, 196 Europe, 116; and state capitalism,
Giscard dEstaing, Valéry, 258, 364 297-98, 348; and the welfare-nation-
Gold standard, 126, 132, 145, 147 alist state, 163, 173, 178
Goldthorpe, John, 378 Hitler, Adolf, 193
Gorz, Andre, 3, 352 Holy Alliance, 122-23, 126-27
Goulart, I050, 239 Homestead Act (1362, US], 143
Gramsci, Antonio, 6, 65, 79, 237, 273, Household contract system (China), 92
294, 390, 408118,409n9, 409n10, Household production, 48-50, 102,
416n22, 439n41; and fascism, 191- 351
93, 195, 197; and Fordism, 309- Households, and unemployment, 252
INDEX
Slavery,32,142,146,412n17
Slave trade, 57
Small enterprises,60-62, and franchise
system,363; seealso Poujadeisme
Small holders (family farms), 39, 52- INDEX
54,58,138,140,14243,149,175
199, 339, 413111;see also Self-
employment State class, 366-67
Smith, Adam, 129, 131,13334, 312, State corporatism, 79-81, 101, 163;
449n5 under fascism, 190, 210; and neo-
Social class, see Class, social mercantilist developmentalist state,
Social contract [in neoliberal state), 233-34, 236, 244; in Third World,
373-74 345,38485,387
Social forces, 6, 58, 159, 176, 185, 195, State, forms of, x, 1, 5, 8, 355, 394,
206,209,271,274,353;ahgnrnent 409n10; and creation of modes of
in neoliberal state, 263; in disinte- social relations of production, 103,
gration of neoliberal state,285; and 105; in relation to world orders,
the Marshall Plan, 215; in post-Na- 105-9; see also Historic bloc, Haison
poleonic Europe, 126, 128 detat, State
Social insurance, 64, 147, 156, 167, 173 State sector, 167, 169, 185
Socialism: police socialism" in Czar- Stepan, Alfred, 265
ist Russia, 94; socialism in one Stinnes, Hugo, 179
country, 200; seealso socialist polit- Stoffaes, Christian, 295-96
ical parties by name,Redistributive Stolypin reforms, 198
societies Stop-go [economic management),
Social partnership, see Corporatism, 221,262
Social contract, Tripartism Strange, Susan, 256, 258, 278, 303, 306
Social revolution, 106, 356 Suikes,25,184,190,196,373
Solidarnosc (Solidarity, Poland), 3, 28, Structural-functionalism, 358
31, 207, 398 Structuralism, 395, 405n5, 408n9
Sorel, Albert, 113-14, 119 Structures, historical, 4, 15, 269-70,
Sovereignty, doctrine of, 112 39596,406n6
Soviets, 83 Subcontracting[and restructuring of
Specialized workers, 371-72 production), 323-24, 330, 334
Speenhamland system, 131 Subordinate groups, 17-18, 21, 356,
368-89
Stahnisn1,83,95,96,201,203,206, Subsistence mode, 36-39, 383, 406n7
Sukarno (Presidentof Indonesia), 239,
243
312,340 Summit conferences, 259
Surplus capacity, 249-50, 274, 321
State, 5, 18-19, 405n2, 409n10; auton-
Sweatshops, 61, 325
(nny,124,137,142,148,399-400;
Smnngrks(1830),135,138,425n59
Syndicalism, 28, 65, 175-76, 180-81,
316, 332, 416n21; and fascism, 193;
and state corporatism, 79
central
agencies
of,259,
263;
and
class structure, 39; and historic bloc,
400; internationalization of, 7, 228, Taiping rebellion, 150
253-65, 441n59; and labor adminis- Talleyrand, Charles-Mauricede, 120
tration, 68; and modes of social rela- Taxation, 43, 54, 172, 281, 325
tions of production, 67, 73, 74, 77 Taylor, Frederick William, see
Statecapitalism: and economic plan- Taylorism
INDEX
ISHH
8 HR4