Section 90 of the Corporation Code states that membership in
a non-stock corporation and all rights arising therefrom are personal and non-transferable, unless the articles of incorporation or the by-laws otherwise provide.
Western Institute of Technology v. Salas 278 SCRA 216
The phrase as such directors is not without significance for it
delimits the scope of the prohibition to compensation given to them for services performed purely in their capacity as directors or trustees. The unambiguous implication is that members of the board may receive compensation, in addition to reasonable per diems, when they render services to the corporation in a capacity other than as directors/trustees.
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw 20 SCRA 987
The board of directors of a corporation holds the duty to
act for the corporation according to their best judgment, and in so doing it cannot be controlled in the reasonable exercise and performance of such duty. So long as it act in good faith its orders are not reviewable by the court
Benguet Electric Coop. v. NLRC 209 SCRA 55
Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be jointly liable and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons Prime White Cement v. IAC 220 SCRA 103
A director's contract with his corporation is not in all instances void
or voidable. If the contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances, it may be ratified by the stockholders provided a full disclosure of his adverse interest is made.
Gokongwei v. SEC et al. 89 SCRA 336
Where the two competing firms control a substantial segment of
the market this could lead to collusion and combination in restraint of trade. Reason and experience point to the inevitable conclusion that the inherent tendency of interlocking directorates between companies that are related to each other as competitors is to blunt the edge of rivalry between the corporations, to seek out ways of compromising opposing interests, and thus eliminate competition.
Strong v. Repide 41 Phil. 947
The ordinary relations between directors and shareholders in
a business corporation are not of such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to disclose to a shareholder the general knowledge which he may possess regarding the value of the shares of the company before he purchases any from a shareholder, yet there are cases where, by reason of the special facts, such duty exists. The purchaser of corporate stock cannot escape liability for his fraud in concealing facts affecting its value which he was in good faith bound to disclose, on the theory that, because of the insistence of the seller that her agent was not authorized to make the sale, there had never been any consent on her part, obtained by fraud or otherwise, where the court finds that the agent's authority was sufficient. Steinberg v. Velasco 52 Phil. 953
The creditors of a corporation have the right to assume that
so long as there are debts and liabilities, the board of directors of the corporation will not use its assets to purchase its own stock or to declare dividends to its stockholders when the corporation is insolvent