(CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Maria Elena Malaga, et al. v. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et
al. GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF)
through its (PBAC) caused the publication for an
Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro
Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last
day for submission of prequalification requirements
(PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would
be opened on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners
submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2 December 1988.
They were not allowed to participate in the bidding
because their documents were considered late, having
been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2
December. Petitioners file a complaint with the RTC
against the chairman and PBAC members. Respondent
Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting
PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the
project. Defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining
order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from
issuing restraining orders by PD No. 1818, which
provides: “Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order… in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project… of the government… to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from proceeding
with, or continuing the execution or implementation of
any such project…” Petitioners argue against the
applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while
ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and
separate existence and was not part of the national
government or of any local political subdivision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a
government instrumentality such that it would
necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a
government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality
refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCC’s. It is clear
from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered
institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818.
Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)
FACTS: Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine
Nuclear Research Institute, applied for a Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But
before she got the rank, the CSC passed Resolution No.
93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board
1
Service Commission (OCES).
ISSUE: Whether or not CSC usurped legislative function
of Congress by abolishing the CESB and transferring its
budget to OCES .
HELD: CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-
related government agency to another is to attain
“policy and program coordination.” While CSC has the
power to reorganize under Administrative Code of 1987,
CESB is not one of the offices under CSC. CESB was
intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to CSC. This essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control
of respondent
Commission.
De La Llana v. Alba
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the
Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission
on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to
MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their
incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this
character, it being alleged that thereby the security of
tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored
and disregarded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the
security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for
under the Constitution.
RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal
or separation of the judges and justices from their
services. What is important is the validity of the abolition
of their offices. Well-settled is the rule that the abolition
of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of valid
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

Lianga Bay Logging v. Judge Enage
July 16, 1987
FACTS: The parties herein are both forest
concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to
each other with a common boundary whereby the
eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is
petitioner Lianga's western boundary. Because of
reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's
concession areas, the Director of Forestry fixed the
common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago
Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. In an
appeal by respondent Ago, the then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, set aside the decision
of the Director of Forestry and ruled another common
boundary line of the licensed areas more favorable to
Ago. Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the
President which affirmed the ruling of the then Acting
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. But upon
motion for reconsideration reversed the decision of the
then Acting Secretary and affirming in toto and
reinstating the decision of the Director of Forestry.
Thereafter, Ago brought the action in the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not NHA had jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. The National Housing Authority has the
jurisdiction. PD No 957, as amended by PD No 1344,
provided that the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on specific
performance on contractual obligations and claims
involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision
lot owners or condo unit buyers against project owner,
developer, dealer, broker, or salesman. In case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail, thus PD 1344 prevails over BP 129. As a result of
the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its
ramified activities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has authority to hear and

decide the case.

RULING: The CFI has no competence nor authority to

review anew the decision in administrative proceedings
of respondents public officials (director of forestry,
secretary of agriculture and natural resources and
assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the
President) in determining the correct boundary line of
the licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The
Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of
fact by an administrative board or agency or official,
following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will
not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or
official(s) have gone beyond their statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily and without regard to their duty or with grave
abuse of discretion.

Solid Homes, Inc. v. Teresita Payawal

August 29, 1989

FACTS: Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who

is suing Solid Homes at the RTC for failure to deliver the
certificate of title despite of repeated demands by
Payawal because defendant had mortgaged the property
in bad faith. Solid Homes averred that jurisdiction is with
the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD
957, as amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive
jurisdiction to NHA. Payawal contended that RTC has
jurisdiction of civil cases on real properties pursuant to
BP 129.