RETRACTED CONFESSION

FACULTY OF LAW
JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

Submitted By- Mohd Yasin

Semester- 7th
Section – A
Roll No.- 20
Submitted To- Dr. Syed Yawar, Assistant Professor

Evidence Law Project

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF
CASES…………………………………………………………………….…3

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………… ………...
6
SCOPE/OBJECTIVE…………………………………………………………………..
5
HYPOTHESIS OF THE
STUDY………………………………………………………….5
RESEARCH
QUESTIONS………………………………………………………………5
RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………5
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF RETRACTED
CONFESSIONS………………………………...7
 Retracted Confession: Not a rule of law, but a rule of
prudence……………………………9
 Twin Test………………………………………………………………………………….9
 Corroboration of material
particulars…………………………………………………….10

RIGHT TO RETRACT A CONFESSION UNDER THE GARB OF ARTICLE 20(3) OF THE

CONSTITUTION……………………………………………………………………..1
0

REPERCUSSIONS AND EFFICACIES OF RETRACTED CONFESSION AGAINST/BY CO-

ACCUSED AND
ACCOMPLICES……………………………………………………...12

II
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………… 1
6

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………. 1
7

III
 LIST OF CASES

Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230…………………………...….10, 11

Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 4 SCC 600……………………………..12

Bharat v. State of U.P., MANU/SC/0096/1970……………………………………………………7

Bhuboni Sahu v. Emperor, MANU/PR/0014/1949……………………………………………….12

Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan and Another, (1994) 3 SCC 440……………….12

Emperor v. Bhagi Vedu, (1906) 8 BomLR 697………………………………………………..….11

Emperor v. Krishna Babaji, (1933) 35 BomLR 728…………………………………………..….11

Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty, I.L.R. 38 Cal. 559………………...……………………..15

Emperor v. Panchkari Dutt, (1925) ILR 52 Cal 67……………………………………………..….6

Haroon Haji Abdulla vs. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0060/1967………………………8, 12

In Smt. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani and Another, AIR 1978 SC 1025…………………………11

K.I. Pavunny v. Asstt. Collr. (H.Q.) CE, MANU/SC/2303/1997…………………………………16

Kalawati v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 131…………………………………..11

Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 US 436…………………………………………………………..11

Mohan Wahi v. State, 1982 CrLJ 2040 (Del)……………………………………………………..16

Nandini Satpathy v. P L Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025…………………………………………...10, 11

Nathu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SC/0104/1955…………………………………………14

Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47…………………………………………5, 10

Parmanand Pegu v. State of Assam, MANU/SC/0696/2004…………………………………9, 10

Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094………………………………..8, 9

4
Pyare Lal v. State of Assam, MANU/SC/0101/1956………………………………………………9

Rajen Boro v. State of Assam, 2003 (2) GLT 632…………………………………………………..6

Ram Lalwani v. The State, 1981 CriLJ 97 (Del)…………………………………………………..11

Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0051/1958………………………………………...13

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0036/1951……………………………………….15

Re: Kodur Thimma Reddi and Ors, AIR 1957 AP 758…………………………………………6, 7

Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1978 SC 1248…………………………………………...7, 9

Shanker Rao Chitnavis v. Ganpat Rao Pande, AIR 1925 All 606…………………………………7

Shrishail Nageshi Pare v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 2 SCC 341……………………………..16

State (N.C.T. of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu and Ors., MANU/SC/0465/2005…………………7, 11

State of Tamil Nadu v. Kutty @ Lakshmi Narasimhan, AIR 2001 SC 2778………………………..6

Subramania Gounden v. The State of Madras, MANU/SC/0045/1957…………………….8, 9, 14

Vishnu v. Achut, AIR 1925 All 627…………………………………………………...……………6

5
 I. INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVE:- The author, amidst an exhaustive research on ‘Retracted Confession’,

endeavours to highlight and understand the status quo of the retracted confession in Indian
Criminal Jurisprudence. The scope of the research remains narrowed owing to the peculiar
nature of the topic.

HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY:- Therefore, the author delves into understanding the nuances of
retracted confession, and to look for reasons as to why it has not been given a statutory
recognition explicitly.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:- The author delves into several research questions viz. Firstly,
evidentiary value of retracted confession; Secondly, whether the person making statement
before the Magistrate has the right to retract his confession under the garb of Article 20(3)
of the Constitution; Thirdly, Repercussions and efficacies of retracted confession against co-
accused and accomplices. With no statutory bar on admissibility of retracted confessions, the
author elucidates the aforementioned topic majorly under the light of Judicial
Pronouncements of Indian Courts.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:- The methodology deployed to assimilate this study has been an
empirical one.

There is no definition of the word “confession” in the Indian Evidence Act and it appears for the
first time in Section 24. It is clear that confessions are merely a species of admission which is
defined under Section 17 of the Act. It is correct to say that every confession necessarily is an
admission but every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession. Sections 17 to 23 deal
with admissions whereas Sections 24 to 30 deal with confessions. Sir Stephen in his Digest of the
Law of Evidence defines confession as “an admission made at any time by a person charged with
a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.”

6
Lord Atkin has observed1 that, “A confession must either admit in terms the offence or at any rate
substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating
fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact is not in itself a confession.”

Retraction may be defined as the act of recanting.2 To recant means to withdraw or renounce prior
statements formally.3 A retracted confession is one which is withdrawn or retracted later on by the
person making it. Retraction of statements is something that happens in most criminal cases. The
reason behind the same may be the inadequate police protection or the ill-developed mechanism
for witness protection or the inherent securities of the witnesses or the accused under the influence
of the status of the opposing party as happens in almost all the high-profile cases.

It should be noted here that the Act makes no distinction whatsoever between a retracted
confession and an unretracted confession and both are equally admissible and may be taken into
consideration against the accused though it may be that less weight would be attached to a retracted
confession.4

Retraction must be affected only when the confession in Involuntary: When a confession has
been retracted, the court has a duty to evaluate the evidence concerning the confession by looking
at all aspects.5 The first test that the court is required to apply with regard the same is to ascertain
whether the confession was voluntary or not.6 Satisfaction of this test is a sine qua non for
admissibility of the confession in evidence.7 The word ‘voluntary’ used in respect of a confession
refers to a confession that is not caused by inducement, threat or promise.8 If it appears to the court
that a confession has been procured using any inducement, then it would be rendered irrelevant.9 A
well-grounded suspicion based on the circumstances of the case may exclude a confession10 since
the use of the word ‘appears’ in Section 24 suggests a lesser degree of probability than ‘proof’

1
Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47.
2
P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 4122 (3rd Edition, Volume IV, Wadhwa and Co, Nagpur, 2005)
3
Id.
4
Re: Kodur Thimma Reddi and Ors, AIR 1957 AP 758
5
State of Tamil Nadu v. Kutty @ Lakshmi Narasimhan, AIR 2001 SC 2778; Rajen Boro v. State of Assam, 2003 (2)
GLT 632
6
Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1978 SC 1248
7
Id.
8
Shanker Rao Chitnavis v. Ganpat Rao Pande, AIR 1925 All 606
9
The Indian Evidence Act 1872, s. 24
10
Emperor v. Panchkari Dutt, (1925) ILR 52 Cal 67

7
defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act.11 It is idle to expect the accused to ‘prove’ the
inducement for in most cases such proof cannot be available.12 In light of the same, anything from
the barest suspicion to positive evidence is considered sufficient for discarding a confession.13

II. EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF RETRACTED CONFESSION

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction whatsoever between a retracted confession
and an unretracted confession and both are equally admissible and may be taken into consideration
against the accused though it may be that less weight would be attached to a retracted confession.14

The Supreme Court has, time and again dealt with ‘evidentiary value of ‘Retracted
Confession’. Justice Hidayatullah, speaking for a three judges Bench in the case of Bharat v.
State of U.P.15 has summarized the legal approach of a Court called upon a person primarily
in the light of the confession or a retracted confession. The Court held that confessions can
be acted upon if the court is satisfied that they are voluntary and that they are true. The
voluntary nature of the confession depends upon whether there was any threat, inducement
or promise and its truth is judged in the context of the entire prosecution case. The confession
must fit into the proved facts and not run counter to them.

The Court further in the case of State (N.C.T. of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu and Ors.16
summarized the evidentiary value of retracted confession and referred to Bharat v. State of
U.P.17 It held that when the voluntary character of the confession and its truth are accepted,
it is safe to rely on it. Indeed, a confession, if it is voluntary and true and not made under any
inducement or threat or promise, is the most patent piece of evidence against the maker.
Retracted confession, however, stands on a slightly different footing. Privy Council once
stated, in India it is the rule to find a confession and to find it retracted later. A court may
consider the retracted confession, but it must look for the reasons for the making of the
confession as well as for its retraction, and must weigh the two to determine whether the

11
Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094
12
Vishnu v. Achut, AIR 1925 All 627; Bhukhin v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Nag 344
13
Emperor v. Panchkari Dutt, (1925) ILR 52 Cal 67
14
Re: Kodur Thimma Reddi and Ors, AIR 1957 AP 758
15
MANU/SC/0096/1970.
16
MANU/SC/0465/2005.
17
Id. at 2.

8
retraction affects the voluntary nature of the confession or not. If the court is satisfied that
it was retracted because of an after-thought or advice, the retraction may not weigh with the
court if the general facts proved in the case and the tenor of the confession as made and the
circumstances of its making and withdrawal warrant its user. All the same, the courts do not
act upon the retracted confession without finding assurance from some other sources as to
the guilt of the accused. Therefore, it can be stated that a true confession made voluntarily
may be acted upon with slight evidence to corroborate it, but a retracted confession requires
the general assurance that the retraction was an after-thought and that the earlier statement
was true.

In an earlier case of Supreme Court Subramania Gounden v. The State of Madras 18 and in
Haroom Hazi Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra19 observed that a “retracted confession must
be looked upon with greater concern unless the reasons given for having made it in the first
instance are on the face of them false.” There was a further observation in the same
paragraph that retracted confession is a weak link against the maker and more so against a
co-accused. With great respect to the Justice Hidayatullah, the comment that the retracted
confession is a “weak link against the maker” goes counter to a series of decisions. The
observation must be viewed in the context of the fact that the Court was concentrating on
the confession of the co-accused rather than the evidentiary value of the retracted confession
against the maker.

Retracted Confession: Not a rule of law, but a rule of prudence-

Dealing with retracted confession, a four-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking
through Subba Rao, J, in Pyare Lal v. State of Assam20, further went on to clarify the legal
position. He held that a retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the
court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court
shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law,
but is only rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule of practice or

18
MANU/SC/0045/1957
19
MANU/SC/0060/1967
20
MANU/SC/0101/1956

9
prudence that under no circumstances such a conviction can be made without corroboration,
for a court may, in a particular case, be convicted of the absolute truth of a confession and
prepared to act upon it without corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general rule of
practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confession, unless
the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been
corroborated in material particulars.”

As to the extent of corroboration required, it was observed in Subramania Gounden's case21

that each and every circumstance mentioned in the retracted confession regarding the
complicity of the maker need not be separately and independently corroborated. The learned
Judges observed:

“it would be sufficient in our opinion that the general trend of the confession is substantiated
by some evidence which would tally with what is contained in the confession”.

Twin Test-

In the case of Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan22 decided by a three-Judge Bench. Sarkaria,

J, noted the twin tests to be applied to evaluate a confession: 1) Whether the confession was
perfectly voluntary; and 2) If so, whether it is true and trustworthy. The learned Judge
pointed out that if the first test is not satisfied, then the question of applying the second test
does not arise. Further, the Court indicated one broad method by which a confession can be
evaluated. It was said:

“The Court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the
evidence, in the light of the surrounding circumstances and probabilities of the case. If on
such examination and comparison, the confession appears to be a probable catalogue of
events and naturally fits in with the rest of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances,
it may be taken to have satisfied the second test.”

Corroboration of material particulars-

21
Id. at 5.
22
MANU/SC/0165/1978

10
While adverting to the expression “corroboration of material particulars” used in Pyare Lal
Bhargava’s case, the Supreme Court in Parmanand Pegu v. State of Assam23 clarified the
position and held that by the use of the expression ‘corroboration of material particulars’,
the Court has not laid down any proposition contrary to what has been clarified in
Subramania Goundan case as regards the extent of corroboration required. The above
expression does not imply that there should be meticulous examination of the entire material
particulars.

With regard to the voluntary nature of a confession, the truth of the confession should then
be tested by the court. The fact that the confession has been made voluntarily, free from
threat and inducement, can be regarded as presumptive evidence of its truth. Still, there may
be circumstances to indicate that the confession cannot be true wholly or partly in which case
it loses much of its evidentiary value.24

In order to be assured of the truth of confession, this Court, in a series of decisions, has
evolved a rule of prudence that the court should look to corroboration from other evidence.
However, there need not be corroboration in respect of each and every material particular.
Broadly, there should be corroboration so that the confession taken as a whole fit into the
facts proved by other evidence. In substance, the court should have assurance from all angles
that the retracted confession was, in fact, voluntary and it must have been true.

III. RIGHT TO RETRACT A CONFESSION UNDER THE GARB OF ARTICLE 20(3) OF

THE CONSTITUTION

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that no person accused of any offence shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. The right to remain silent is an extension of the rule of
civil liberty enjoined by our Constitution. Considering the guarantee under Article 20 (3) and also
humanizing standards under Article 21 retracted confession must cautiously construed. Although
such caution is subject to some exceptions such as per se evidence of the motivating factors of
retraction or retraction based on extraneous circumstances.25

23
MANU/SC/0696/2004
24
Id. at 3.
25
Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors vs State of West Bengal, Appeal (Crl.) 867-868 of 2005

11
The scope and ambit of Article 20(3) i.e. the stage at which criminal process the safeguard
becomes operative. In Smt. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani and Another26, this Court stated the
law thus:

“We hold that Section 161 enables the police to examine the accused during investigation. The
prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation not, as contended,
commencing in court only. In our judgment, the provisions of Article 20(3) and Section
161(1) substantially cover the same area, so far as police investigations are concerned. The ban
on self-accusation and the right to silence, while one investigation or trial is under way, goes
beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or imminent, which
may deter him from voluntary disclosure of criminatory matter.”

The Supreme Court in the case of State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan
Guru27 rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the State that the two provisions,
namely, Article 20(3) and Section 161, did not operate at the anterior stages before the case came
to Court and the incriminating utterance of the accused, previously recorded, was attempted to be
introduced. Noting that the landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona28 did extend the embargo to
police investigation also, the Court observed that there was no warrant to truncate the constitutional
protection underlying Article 20(3). It was held that even the investigation at the police level is
embraced by Article 20(3) and this is what precisely Section 161 means.

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, 1950 guarantees protection against the compulsion to be
a witness against oneself. The application of this provision extends to statements made during
police interrogations.29 This means that no person can be forced to make a confession, against his
will. Thus, the test of relevancy of a confession is whether it is voluntary or not.30 Since there is a
danger that the confessor may implicate himself against his will, the law regarding the same is so
strict that a confession that is not voluntary is rejected even if it is true.31 Sections 24 to 30 of the
Evidence Act have been legislated to take care of this constitutional right by excluding from

26
AIR 1978 SC 1025
27
(2005)11SCC 600
28
1966, 384 US 436
29
Nandini Satpathy v. P L Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025
30
Kalawati v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 131
31
Emperor v. Bhagi Vedu, (1906) 8 BomLR 697

12
evidence all self-incriminating statements that have not been made voluntarily.32 A right to retract
is important because a retraction puts the court on enquiry as to the voluntary character of the
confession.33 Moreover, to withdraw from what has been said previously is to be interpreted as an
extension of civil liberty.34

To withdraw from what has been said previously needs to be interpreted in the vein of right to
remain silent as an extension of this civil liberty. The quality or merit of confession, in no uncertain
terms, is in voluntary narration by the accused. The issue of evidentiary standards is a very delicate
one and has a great bearing on the outcome of cases. But be it as it may, basic tenets of criminal
law cannot be lost sight of. In similar vein the law on retracted confession must be judged in the
context of each case.35

IV. REPERCUSSIONS AND EFFICACIES OF RETRACTED CONFESSION AGAINST/BY

CO-ACCUSED AND ACCOMPLICES

There are cases where a co-accused or an accomplice retract their confession made before a
Magistrate. Therefore, it is pertinent to understand the repercussions and efficacies of such
retracted confessions by the co-accused/accomplice. The Evidence Act in S. 133 provides that
an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person and that a conviction is not
illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The
effect of this provision is that the court trying an accused may legally convict him on the
single evidence of an accomplice. To this there is a rider in illustration (b) to s. 114 of the Act
which provides that the Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless
he is corroborated in material particulars. This cautionary provision incorporates a rule of
prudence because an accomplice, who betrays his associates, is not a fair witness and it is
possible that he may, to please the prosecution, weave false details into those which are true
and his whole story appearing true, there may be no means at hand to sever the false from
that which is true. It is for this reason that courts, before they act on accomplice evidence,

32
Ram Lalwani v. The State, 1981 CriLJ 97 (Del)
33
Emperor v. Krishna Babaji, (1933) 35 BomLR 728
34
Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230
35
Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan and Another, (1994)3 SCC 440; Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State
of Maharashtra, (1980) 4 SCC 600

13
insist on corroboration in material respects as to the offence itself and also implicating in
some satisfactory way, however small, each accused named by the accomplice. In this way
the commission of the offence is confirmed by some competent evidence other than the single
or unconfirmed testimony of the accomplice and the inclusion by the accomplice of an
innocent person is defeated. This rule of caution or prudence has become so ingrained in the
consideration of accomplice evidence as to have almost the standing of a rule of law.36

Whether there be one accomplice or more and that the confessing co-accused cannot be
placed higher than an accomplice. Therefore, unless there is some evidence besides these
implicating the accused in some material respect, conviction cannot stand. In Bhuboni Sahu
v. Emperor37, a case in which a conviction was founded upon the evidence of an accomplice
supported only by the confession of a co-accused. The Judicial Committee acquitting the
accused observed:

"...... Their Lordships whilst not doubting that such a conviction is justified in law under s.
133, Evidence Act, and whilst appreciating that the coincidence of a number of confessions
of co-accused all implicating the particular accused given independently, and without an
opportunity of previous concert, might be entitled to great weight, would nevertheless
observe that Courts should be slow to depart from the rule of prudence, based on long
experience, which requires some independent evidence implicating the particular accused.
The danger of acting upon accomplice evidence is not merely that the accomplice is on his
own admission a man of bad character who took part in the offence and afterwards to save
himself betrayed his former associates, and how has placed himself in a position in which he
can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecution; the real danger is that he
is telling a story which in its general outline is true, and it is easy for him to work into the
story matter which is untrue....."

However, on the contrary the Imam, J. in Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab38 observed that
the Evidence Act nowhere provides that if the confession is retraced, it cannot be taken into
consideration against the co-accused or the confessing accused. Accordingly, the provisions

36
Haroon Haji Abdulla vs. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0060/1967
37
MANU/PR/0014/1949
38
MANU/SC/0051/1958

14
of the Evidence Act do not prevent the Court from taking into consideration a retracted
confession against the confessing accused and his co-accused. Not a single decision of any of
the courts in India was placed before us to show that a retracted confession was not
admissible in evidence or that it was irrelevant as against a co-accused. An examination of
the reported decisions of the various High Courts in India indicates that the preponderance
of opinion is in favour of the view that although it may be taken into consideration against a
co-accused by virtue of the provisions of s. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, its value was
extremely weak and there could be no conviction without the fullest and strongest
corroboration on material particulars. The corroboration in the full sense implies
corroboration not only as to the factum of the crime but also as to the connection of the co-
accused with that crime. In our opinion, there appears to be considerable justification for
this view. The amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted confession, however, would
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. Although a retracted confession is
admissible against a co-accused by virtue of s. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, as a matter of
prudence and practice a court would not ordinarily act upon it to convict a co-accused
without corroboration.39

The case of the Judicial Committee dealt with accomplice evidence which was sought to be
corroborated by retracted confessions. The case of the Supreme Court dealt with a retracted
confession which was sought to be used without corroboration. Both cases treat the retracted
confession as evidence which may be used although not within the definition of evidence. But
both cases regard this evidence as very weak and only to be used with great caution. Although
Govinda Menon, J. in Subramania Gounden v. The State of Madras 40, placed a confession
on a slightly higher level than accomplice evidence, the observation is intended to convey the
difference between the extent of corroboration needed for the one or the other before they
can be acted upon. To read more meaning into the observations is not permissible for no
such meaning was intended. The confession there considered was also intended to be used
against the maker and not against a co-accused. A confession intended to be used against a
co-accused stand on a lower level than accomplice evidence because the latter is at least tested
by cross-examination whilst the former is not. The observations of Govinda Menon, J. must

39
Id.
40
MANU/SC/0045/1957

15
not be applied to those cases where the confession is to be used against a co-accused. As
pointed out by this Court in Nathu v. State of Uttar Pradesh41, confessions of co-accused are
not evidence but if there is other evidence on which a conviction can be based, they can be
referred to as lending some assurance to the verdict.

Therefore, a retracted confession must be looked upon with greater concern unless the
reasons given for having made it in the first instance (not for retraction as erroneously stated
in some cases) are on the face of them false. Once the confession is proved satisfactorily any
admission made therein must be satisfactorily withdrawn or the making of it explained as
having proceeded from fear, duress, promise or the like from someone in authority. A
retracted confession is a weak link against the maker and more so against a co-accused.

In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan42, the Supreme Court laid down certain general rules
about the nature of corroboration needed before accomplice evidence may be accepted. The
can summarized as follows: -

a. It is there pointed out that every detail of the story of the accomplice need not be
confirmed by independent evidence although some additional independent evidence
must be looked for to see whether the approver is speaking the truth and there must
be some evidence, direct or circumstantial which connects the co-accused with the
crime independently of the accomplice.
b. One such circumstance may be the making of a number of confessions without a
chance for prior consultation between the confessing co-accused. But before even a
number of such confessions can be used, each such confession must inspire confidence
both in its content and in the manner and circumstances of its making.
c. If there be any suspicion of false implication the confession must be discarded as of
no probative value. This may result from a variety of circumstances of which a few
alone may be mentioned, such as why the accused confessed whether he expected a
gain for himself by implicating his co-accused, the part he assigns to himself and that
to his co-accused, the opportunity for being coached up to narrate a false story or a
story false in certain details.

41
MANU/SC/0104/1955
42
MANU/SC/0036/1951

16
 d. Where there is a single retracted confession corroborating other accomplice evidence,
the caution must necessarily be still greater and the probative value smaller.
e. Even if there are more than one such confession and they are proved to be given
independently and without an opportunity for a prior concert, the probative value
may increase but the need for caution remains because a number of suspects may be
prompted by the same or different motives to embroil a particular individual. It is
only when false implication is excluded after close scrutiny that confession of a co-
accused can be used to lend assurance to other evidence. This was so stated by Sir
Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty43, and accepted by the
Supreme Court, and a retracted confession cannot obviously go further or have
higher value.
f. The Delhi High Court has held that a retracted confession can be taken into consideration
to indicate the prima facie involvement of others.44
g. A retracted confession can be considered against but it cannot be the basis for conviction
of co-accused.45

CONCLUSION

Trend which emerges out of analysis of above rulings is that rule of practice and prudence requires
corroboration of retracted confession. This rule of practice is so consistently followed that it
virtually amounts to a rule of law. 14th report of Law Commission recommended that this rule
should be given statutory recognition.46 But 69th Report of the Law Commission after a careful
consideration concluded that it is better to leave the matter as it is, so that the court may decide the
matters on a consideration of all evidence before it, giving such credence to confession as it thinks
fit in the circumstances of the case.47 In sum and substance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also rules
in the case of K.I. Pavunny v. Asstt. Collr. (H.Q.) CE48 that there is no bar under the Evidence
Act to rely upon the retracted statement and to make it the basis for conviction when the Court is

43
I.L.R. 38 Cal. 559
44
Mohan Wahi v. State, 1982 CrLJ 2040 (Del)
45
Shrishail Nageshi Pare v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 2 SCC 341
46
Law Commission of India. 14th Report, Vol. 2, page 751, para 41.
47
69th Report, page 222, para 11.77
48
MANU/SC/2303/1997

17
satisfied that it was a voluntary and true statement. Thus, the subjectivity and dynamic nature of
cases constrains the Parliament to give a statutory recognition “Retracted Confessions”.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

STATUTES

 Constitution of India
 The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973
 The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
CASES

 Supreme Court Cases

 Privy Council Cases
 High Court Cases

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

 Durga Das Basu, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 4th Edition-2010, Vol.1, Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur.

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  S.C. Sarkar, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 10th Edition-2012, Vol. 1, Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur.
 Dr. Avtar Singh, Principles of the Law of Evidence, 19th Edition-2011, Central Law
Publications
 M. Monir, Textbook on the Law of Evidence, 10th Edition, 2016, Universal Law Publishing,
Allahabad
 K.D. Gaur, Textbook on the Law of Evidence, 10th Edition, 2016, Universal Law
Publishing, Allahabad

3. LEGAL DATABASES/ OTHER SOURCES

 Manupatra
 SCC Online
 JStor

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