Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961

SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

P. N. Stuart del Rosario for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which was increased to
10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.

It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the
Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by
them, although in fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had
been altered and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in
the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes
of the Philippines. The only question raised in this appeal is whether the possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H
constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of
our government, the possession thereof cannot be illegal. We find no merit in this pretense. lawphil.net

It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as
to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of
Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.

Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. — Unless the
act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly
use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section,
shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

ART. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the
following means;

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the
appearance of a true and genuine document.

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained
therein.

It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters,
words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by
petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to
Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).

Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs against
petitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Paredes, J., took no part.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111806. March 9, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN GALANO y

GLORIA, ELMER HONORIO y GAYO, BRIGIDO TRIPOLI y CABILOSA and
ROMULO STA. IGLESIA y CUISON, accused. Jur-is

BENJAMIN GALANO y GLORIA, BRIGIDO TRIPOLI y CABILOSA and ROMULO

STA. IGLESIA y CUISON, accused-appellants.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, [1] convicting
accused-appellants Benjamin Galano y Gloria, Brigido Tripoli y Cabilosa, and Romulo Sta. Iglesia
y Cuison of the crime of murder under Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code for the killing of
Leonardo Torres, and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Their co-accused,
Elmer Honorio y Gayo, was acquitted. Sc-juris

Benjamin was a 30 year-old laundryman; Brigido, a 24 year-old janitor; and Romulo, a 24 year-old
baker, at the time of the alleged offense. They all resided in the Sampaloc area of Manila. Their
alleged victims, Virgilio and Leonardo Torres, were total strangers to the appellants. Both were
brothers who merely happened to be waiting for a ride and came to the succor of an alleged
snatching victim when both were suddenly grabbed from behind by appellants Brigido and
Romulo, and then stabbed by Benjamin. Leonardo succumbed to stab wounds but Virgilio
survived to tell his story before the trial court.

The pertinent facts in this case are as follows:

On September 8, 1990, at around 8:30 in the evening, while Virgilio and his older brother,
Leonardo, were standing at a street corner of Espaa near Centro St., waiting for a ride, they heard
somebody shout "snatcher". They approached and asked him what happened. [2] Suddenly, a fast-
running jeepney going to Lepanto made a turn at Centro St. and parked on Espaa. A man with a
knife in his left hand (later identified as appellant Benjamin) alighted from the jeepney, and ran
after the person who had shouted "snatcher". Upon seeing Benjamin, this person ran
away[3] Virgilio then lost sight of both in the traffic. He and his brother Leonardo continued waiting
for a ride. After a while, two men alighted from the jeepney. [4] To the surprise of Virgilio, the two
men (whom he later identified as appellants Brigido and Romulo) suddenly held him and his
brother.[5] Appellant Brigido embraced Virgilio from the back, while appellant Romulo similarly held
the brother Leonardo.[6] Appellant Benjamin soon appeared and suddenly stabbed Virgilio on the
right side of his stomach, then turned to Leonardo and likewise stabbed him in the
stomach.[7] Thereafter, the three assailants ran towards the parked jeepney, which the driver first
maneuvered backwards, then sped off towards Lepanto St.. As the two brothers tried to follow the
jeepney, Leonardo turned to Virgilio to ask if he was also hit, and Virgilio replied "yes". After that,
Leonardo fell on the pavement. In spite of the pain, Virgilio continued to run after the jeepney and
took note of its plate number, CBR 522. Virgilio even managed to throw stones at the speeding
jeepney.[8] Some bystanders joined him in running after the jeepney.[9] He shouted for help. Some
people heard him and brought his brother and him to the UST Hospital. There, Leonardo was
declared dead on arrival. Juri-ssc

Virgilio was more fortunate. His wounds only required surgery. Before he was operated on, he
informed his father of the plate number of the jeepney that their assailants used.
Virgilio stayed in the hospital for more or less a month.[10] He only saw the assailants again when
he identified them at the Western Police District headquarters from a police line-up of eight
persons.[11] He positively identified appellants Brigido and Romulo as the ones who held him and
his brother, respectively, and appellant Benjamin as the one who stabbed them.[12]

On October 16, 1990, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information [13] for Murder
against four (4) accused, as follows:

"The undersigned accuses Benjamin Galano y Gloria, Elmer Honorio y Gayo, Brigido
Tripoli y Cabilosa and Romulo Sta. Iglesia y Cuison of the crime of Murder,
committed as follows: M-isjuris

That on or about September 8, 1990 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent
to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault, and use
personal violence upon one LEONARDO TORRES y BARTOLOME by then and
there holding his two arms and thereafter stabbed him at the back of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said Leonardo Torres y Bartolome mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter."

On December 5, 1990, upon arraignment, all accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, entered
a plea of not guilty. J-jlex

Trial ensued, with the prosecution presenting two witnesses, namely (1) Virgilio Torres, the brother
of the deceased Leonardo Torres; and (2) Dr. Marcial Ceido y Guevarra, a Medico-Legal Officer of
the Western Police District who conducted the post-mortem examination on Leonardo Torres, and
who testified that the latter died as a result of severe hemorrhage caused by the stab wound which
pierced the internal organs of the victim.[14]

For the defense, appellants testified on their behalf and interposed the defense of alibi and denial.
Accused Elmer Honorio waived his right to present evidence on his behalf.

Appellant Benjamin testified that on September 8, 1990, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he
left his place of work (Metrobank) where he is a janitor and proceeded to Raon to canvass certain
appliances. On his way home from Quiapo, the passenger jeepney which he was riding was
stoned. Some of the passengers jumped out of the vehicle but he remained inside the
jeepney.[15]Thereafter, he saw a man being chased by two other persons. Still, the jeepney
proceeded to Lepanto St. where he alighted and went home. [16]Newmiso

Appellants Romulo and Brigido, in their corroborating testimonies, claimed that on September 8,
1990, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, they were watching the movie Die Hard II in a
moviehouse along Morayta St., and that they left the moviehouse late in the evening and took a
ride home to Antipolo St. along Espaa.[17] The jeepney they were riding was stoned but they
remained inside while the other passengers jumped off the jeepney. Nevertheless, the jeepney
continued on Espaa up to Antipolo St., where they alighted and proceeded to the house of Romulo
where they both spent the night.[18]

On August 20, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for Elmer Honorio who had no

participation in the crime charged, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein all the
three (3) accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under
Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly, the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA is imposed upon them."
Hence, the present appeal. In their consolidated brief, [19] appellants Benjamin, Romulo and Brigido
assign the following errors: Acctmis

A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE UNCORROBORATED

TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION'S WITNESS VIRGILIO TORRES IS UNRELIABLE
AND INCREDIBLE. THEREFORE, INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY
OF THE ASSAILANTS.

B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED BENJAMIN

GALANO COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED OR PETPETRATED (SIC) THE
STABBING COMMITTED BY A "LEFT HANDED" ASSAILANT, WHO WAS THEN IN
FRONT OF THE VICTIM, CONSIDERING THAT, AS BORNE BY THE RECORDS
OF THIS CASE, SAID ACCUSED GALANO IS "RIGHT HANDED".

C.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED
IN COMMITTING THE MURDER IS A GROUND FOR THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
ACCUSED, CONSIDERING THAT THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANTS IS IN
QUESTION OR DOUBTFUL AND HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BY
EVIDENCE.Misact

D.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION OR

ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED CONSIDERING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

E.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT TREACHERY HAS NOT
ATTENDED THE KILLING OF VICTIM.

F.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY

OF RECLUSIONPERPETUA, SINCE THE OFFENSE PROVED BY THE EVIDENCE
IS HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION TEMPORAL.[20]

Considering the aforecited assignment of errors, we find that the main issues in this case concern
the credibility of the principal witness, Virgilio Torres; the sufficiency of the evidence presented by
the prosecution to convict the appellants of murder; and the propriety of the penalty imposed by
the trial court. Sdjad

A. ON THE CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS VIRGILIO TORRES

Appellants contend that Virgilio Torres was not a credible witness. He could not have possibly
identified appellants inasmuch as he failed to state that the nearby lamp post shed enough light on
the faces of the appellants at the time of the incident, and that coupled with the fast turn of events,
no man would have the capacity to remember details of the alleged incident at the same time.
Further, appellants argue that Benjamin could not have stabbed the victims with his left hand since
he was "right-handed," as indicated in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report. Sppedsc

We find appellants' contention unconvincing. In several cases, we have found that illumination
from a lamp post is sufficient for purposes of identification,[21] particularly in this case where the
victims had an opportunity to see the faces of the assailants before and after they were attacked
and considering that the distance from the locus criminis to the parked jeepney were assailants
fled was only about ten (10) armslengths.[22]

That Virgilio Torres could vividly recall the circumstances attending the killing of his brother is not
at all surprising. It has been repeatedly ruled that people react differently under emotional stress
and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. [23] In
general, witnesses to a crime react in different ways.[24] Witnesses to startling occurrences react
differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.[25] The sudden cold-blooded attack on the two brothers by total strangers must have
heightened the memory of Virgilio, such that the images of the appellants must have been literally
burned into his memory and thus enabled him to identify the appellants subsequently with
absolute confidence. Ca-lrsc

Appellants assert that the testimony of Virgilio Torres was uncorroborated. For indeed, the lips of
his brother, Leonardo, were sealed by death. But the sole testimony of an eyewitness, if found
convincing and trustworthy by the court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[26] The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial
court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of
truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward
manner.[27]Witnessses are to be weighed, not numbered. Hence, it is not at all uncommon to reach
a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. For although the number of
witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not
necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible
and positive testimony of a single witness.[28] Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary "only
when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate."[29] In this case, we find the testimony of Virgilio Torres
convincing and trustworthy. The trial court correctly relied on his testimony. The defense failed to
prove any ill-motive on his part to testify against appellants. In the absence of evidence or
any indicium that the prosecution's main witness harbored ill motives against the accused, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and that his testimony was untainted with bias. [30]Scc-alr

Lastly, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court, particularly in regard to
the fact that although Benjamin was right-handed, according to the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report, for nothing therein negates the fact that he was the one who stabbed the victims. Nothing
on record shows that Benjamin's left hand could not be used in a lethal attack. Calrs-pped

B. ON THE ABSENCE OF MOTIVE AND THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

Appellants claim they have no possible motive to attack the victims, who were total strangers to
them. In the crime of murder, however, motive is not an element of the offense. Motive becomes
material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on
whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is
totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.[31] Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused
as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the successful prosecution of a
criminal case.[32] Hence, whether or not appellants had any motive in attacking the victims, their
conviction may still follow from the positive and categorical identification made by witness Virgilio
Torres. Sce-dp
Appellants profess innocence and invoke the defense of denial and alibi. For alibi to prosper,
however, appellants must prove not only that they were not present at the scene of the crime but
also that it was physically impossible for them to have been present there at the time the offense
was committed.[33] Here, appellants not only admitted to being within the vicinity of the commission
of the crime but also failed to prove the physical impossibility of their being present at the time and
place it was committed. It is well-settled that "[p]ositive identification, where categorical and
consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence
are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law."[34]

C. ON THE EXISTECE OF TREACHERY

Appellants contend that no treachery attended the fatal attack on Leonardo, for though the victim's
hands were held at the back, he could have used his lower extremities to repel the attack by
kicking the assailant. We find, however, that the deceased was hardly in a position to defend
himself. Ed-psc

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from defense which the offended party might make.[35] For
treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must be satisfied: (a) the
malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety
from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (b) the said means, method or manner of
execution was deliberately adopted.[36] The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning -- done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.[37] In this case, the attack on the two brothers
was unexpected and sudden, and neither of them could have resisted the knife attack by Benjamin
even if they wanted to because of its suddenness. Moreover, the brothers were each held in the
tight embrace of appellants Romulo and Brigido. At no time were the assailants open to retaliation.
Also, they immediately fled from the scene of the crime by the use of a motor vehicle, a jeepney.
Clearly, treachery qualified the killing to murder.

D. ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CRIME AND THE PROPRIETY OF THE PENALTY

Considering that treachery attended the commission of the offense, we agree with the trial court
that the crime committed is murder, under Article 248, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Ed-p

However, contrary to the allegation in the information that the killing was attended by evident
premeditation, we cannot appreciate this aggravating circumstance since it was not proved with
"clear and convincing evidence."[38] The prosecution ought to have shown the following: (1) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such a
determination and its execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [39] The
records do not show the presence of these three conditions, nor any attempt on the part of the
prosecution to establish them. Mis-edp

In this case, the offense was committed prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, commonly
known as the death penalty law. The penalty for the crime of murder then was reclusion
temporalin its maximum period to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
the trial court correctly imposed on appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition to said
penalty, appellants ought also to jointly and severally pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), pursuant to prevailing case law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding appellants guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt
and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellants are also hereby
ORDERED to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim, Leonardo Torres, in the
amount of P50,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Mis-oedp

[1]
Presided by Judge Cesar J. Mindaro.
[2]
TSN, August 6, 1992, pp. 8-9; TSN, February 4, 1993, p. 3.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Id. at 9-10.
[5]
Id. at 11.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Id. at 11-12.
[8]
Id. at 13-14; TSN, February 4, 1993, p. 4.
[9]
TSN, February 4, 1993, p. 4.
[10]
TSN, August 6, 1992, p. 15.
[11]
Id. at 16-17; Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Records, pp. 25, 26, 28, 29.
[12]
Id. at 17-18.
[13]
Rollo, p. 2; N.B. Per the records, Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga stated in open court that Virgilio Torres also filed a separate
complaint for Frustrated Murder against the same accused; TSN, August 6, 1992, p. 11.
[14]
TSN, August 6, 1992, pp. 2-7.
[15]
TSN, May 10, 1993, pp. 3, 6.
[16]
Id. at 6.
[17]
TSN, May 26, 1993, pp. 2, 6.
[18]
Id. at 3-4; TSN, May 31, 1993, pp. 3-4, 10.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 71-89.
[20]
Id. at 74-75.
[21]
People v. Evangelista, 256 SCRA 611, 621 (1996); People v. Fulinara, 247 SCRA 28, 40 (1995); People v. Abalos, 258 SCRA
523, 531 (1996).
[22]
TSN, August 6, 1992, p. 13.
[23]
People v. Ranido, 288 SCRA 369, 379 (1998).
[24]
People v. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210, 220 (1998) citing People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615, 626 (1996).
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
People v. Bundang, 272 SCRA 641, 651 (1997), citing People v. Camat, 256 SCRA 52, 63 (1996).
[27]
People v. Tulop, 289 SCRA 316, 332 (1998), citing People v. De la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 (1992); People v. De Cruz, 148
SCRA 582 (1997); People v. Javier, 182 SCRA 830 (1987); People v. Francia, 154 SCRA 495 (1987).
[28]
Ibid., citing People v. Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 (1995); People v. Jumao-as, 230 SCRA 70 (1994).
[29]
Ibid., citing People v. De la Cruz, supra.
[30]
People v. Timon, 281 SCRA 577, 594-595 (1997).
[31]
People v. Astorga, 283 SCRA 420, 433 (1997), citing People v. Sta. Agata, 244 SCRA 677, 684 (1995); People v. Cayetano,
223 SCRA 770 (1993); People v. Magpayao, 226 SCRA 13, 27 (1993).
[32]
People v. Castillo, 273 SCRA 22, 32 (1997), citing People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389 (1995).
[33]
People v. Nialda, 289 SCRA 521, 532 (1998), citing People v. Balderas, 276 SCRA 470 (1997).
[34]
People v. Enriquez, 292 SCRA 656, 661 (1998), People v. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26, 44 (1997), citing People v. Armania, 248
SCRA 486, 493 (1995), reiterated in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 171, 177 (1998).
[35]
Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code.
[36]
People v. De la Cruz, 291 SCRA 164, 184 (1998).
[37]
Id. at 184-185, citing People v. Zamora, 278 SCRA 60 (1997).
[38]
People v. Pallarco, 288 SCRA 151, 169-170 (1998), citing People v. Ganzagan, Jr., 247 SCRA 220, 236 (1995) and People v.
Halili, 245 SCRA 340, 352 (1995).
[39]
Id. at 170, citing People v. Silvestre, 244 SCRA 479, 494 (1995); People v. De la Cruz, 242 SCRA 129, 142 (1995).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.

Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila:

Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public and official documents,
committed, according to the information, as follows:

That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Estela
Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in
the discharge of public functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, and by reason of said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers and
documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held in the
months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the archives of the said court,
confabulating with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with him, who was then
one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from
the said archives of the Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the compositions,
which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination. Once in
possession of the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and
acting in common accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the
correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and
prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the grade
of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the composition in
Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and
by means of these alterations the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change
the relative merits of those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements and
declarations contrary to what they really made, and the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus
succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in the aforesaid public and official documents in
making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the Supreme
Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the great
prejudice of the public.

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and documentary, the presentation
of which consumed considerable of the court's time.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by the prosecution or by the
defense:

The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice Norberto Romualdez of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on November 1, 1921, and continued as such until
September 15, 1928.

The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar examinations held in 1926.

The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on July 11, 1912, acts every
year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination committee for admission to the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as chairman of the
examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926, and upon recommendation of Clerk Vicente
Albert, he appointed the following as members of the examination committee, with their respective subjects:
Attorney Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes,
Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin
Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.

Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors was appointed,
composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil Service, and Jeronimo Samson,
deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and
Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City
Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits
and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the Executive Bureau, and
the accused Estela Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo
Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors in International Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau of Lands,
and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was substituted by Jeronimo
Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors were designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of
the chairman of the examination committee.

The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of the questions in their
respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the articles, legal provisions and jurisprudence showing the
sources from which the questions were taken. The work of reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to
the correctors designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note or memorandum, and a set
of rules, patterned after those of the Civil Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the
correctors in grading the examination papers.

The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject assigned to them, noting the
grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but in a separate note book, which were later checked with
the grades given by the other corrector in the same subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to
be given to the composition.

The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the year 1926 was submitted,
under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and was published on the fifth of said month. In the list of
successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of
75%. The grades of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the
publication of the result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in
Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a
later revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit
B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said compositions after
striking out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight
(58) theretofore given to the composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation of this irregularity by the
City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.

Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez

Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show the identity of the person who
altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela
Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity of her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395,
s. n.):

"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis are in my regular
handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four and the figures 64% inclosed in parenthesis appearing
in said composition are also in my regular handwriting."

Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades

In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person who wrote on the
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures alleged to have been falsified, it now appears that the
burden of establishing the authority under which said changes and alterations were made is on the accused. On this
point the evidence for the defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as
private secretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of
the correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions already reviewed by the other correctors
and to change the grades given by them.

Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered the accused Estela Romualdez
and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the correctors; and explaining the powers of the former he said (page
721, s. n.):
 "As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand that in order to do justice
to the compositions, she could review the compositions already graded by the other correctors; provided, I
want to add, that the new revision was done in order to do justice to the compositions and before the
names of the candidates were known."

Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by the corresponding
correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified that said alterations were made within
the limits of the powers he had given to said accused (pages 723, 726, s. n.).

For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said that the chairman of the
examining committee, gave her to understand that she "was authorized to correct any composition in any subject" in
the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that she had never corrected any composition after the name of the
corresponding candidate was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known Luis Mabunay, and said
that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).

Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney

The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez may be summarized in
two following propositions: 1st — that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the examination committee, did not have
authority to delegate to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects
in which she was not a corrector and which had already been graded by the other correctors, and much less the
power to alter or change the grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd — that granting that the
chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the
same in the manner prescribed by said chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on the
condition that the revision and the changes of grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom
the compositions belonged, were known.

In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice Romualdez was appointed by the
Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, so that he would supervise the
examinations in accordance with law and the rules, and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman
can not by himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among which were the powers to review, and to
change or alter the grades given to the compositions.

As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accused Estela Romualdez made the changes
in the grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis
Mabunay, to whom she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon her by the
chairman of the examination committee when she was given said authority.

As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence for the prosecution
shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in the alteration by the latter of his grades in
Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of raising to 75% the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.

Theory of the Defense

In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power of supervision given by
Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is not contrary to law, rules or precedents. This
assertion is based on the testimony of said Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance
with section 2 of the rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926, and that
when said court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee without designating the
examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and conferred upon him ample powers to do what in his judgment
was most in line with justice and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the
propriety or illegality of the procedure employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the powers
conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman was responsible only to the Supreme Court for his
acts.

The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to whom compositions Exhibits
B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the alteration of the grades appearing on the first pages thereof,
because, according to the testimony of said accused, corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those
who helped in the preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and the
identification numbers of the candidates were opened just one day before the publication of the result of the
examination, and that in order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates on said list, they had to
work continuously from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to the publication of
the result of the examinations.

Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties

Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense, the court finds that the
accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the examination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as
deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects
assigned to them but also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and
authority so that neither could consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears, however, that
while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that she
"was authorized to revise the compositions already graded by the other correctors provided the new revisions were
made for the purpose of doing justice to the compositions and that the same were mad before the names of the
candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo
Samson, to whom he said nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the accused Estela
Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the committee about the corrections or alterations made by her in
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said compositions to determine whether or not
their merits justified the changes so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of the information
against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, she made no report to the chairman of the examination
committee of any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told him during the progress of the
work of grading the papers that they were being graded very strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might
be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that
"should a case of the kind come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do
justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such case in which, in her opinion, some
injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put things in order (page 781, s. n.), and the revision in such
cases was left to the judgment of his secretary (page 780, s. n.).

The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination
committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a discretionary power of supervision that in its
exercise she should act independently, not only of the correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but
also of the examination committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee
appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer such power of
supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercise that power when she made the
changes in the compositions in question?

The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations of the grades originally
given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the only person who could give an account of
and explain the circumstances under which said alterations were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in
her own behalf, was not able to explain how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. When
pressed by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state the circumstances under which she came across those
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez said: "If I were to make any statement with
reference to the circumstances under which I came across these compositions, you would compel me to tell a lie,
because I do not really remember" (page 823, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her
initials under or at the side of those alterations she made on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to
say, when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials which were exhibited to
her by the fiscal, that she placed her initials on said compositions because she graded them as corrector, and she
did not put her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised them in her capacity as supervisor
(pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said, that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing the
original grade on any composition, but as supervisor "she was under no obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s.
n.) and that the chairman of the examination committee "has not gone into such minor details" (page 831, s. n.).
Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same
line and immediately before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on that occasion it pleased me to do so"
(page 836, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory authority with
respect to the other five compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and
when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase given by her to the grades originally given to
said compositions had the effect of raising the general average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%,
the accused answered that "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.).
With these answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a satisfactory explanation
of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the encouragement given by Justice Romualdez to the effect that the
new revision of the compositions was left to her discretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised
by her in the bar examinations of 1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject already
graded and increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in other words, that she could, at her pleasure,
do or undo the work done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or
of keeping a note or memorandum of the compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.

The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity as chairman of the
examination committee, the compositions of the candidates who filed motions for reconsideration of the grades
given them, after the publication of the result of the examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal
that he noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to each answer of the candidate, but
also the total grade obtained by the candidate in the revision, together with such other data which would explain the
increase of the grades of this or that candidate.

The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand that she had such
unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in designating said Justice as chairman of the bar examination
committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer such powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed
fact that his designation was made so that he should conduct the examinations in accordance with law and the
rules.

But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by the correctors to
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by the chairman of
the examination committee, is there any ground in support of her claim that she made those alterations only to do
justice to the compositions, and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom they belonged?

Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor, which, according to the
defense is not worthy of credit because of the contradictions and inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains
other evidence establishing certain facts from which such knowledge can be inferred.

It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-
1, was prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with the intervention of the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine
Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the
preparation of this list, sometime during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing the
identification numbers attached to each composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on the upper
part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s.
n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to the compositions
were first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the grades in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71,
184, s. n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on
an adding machine the grades in each composition as they were read out by one of the helpers, and then the
corresponding general average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens
wrote said grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by Deputy
Clerk Samson on the adding machine was presented as Exhibit C-6.

After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of each candidate, who was
theretofore known by his identification number only, was prepared, the envelopes containing the names
corresponding to the identification numbers written on said list were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk,
and the names of the candidates were inserted in said list by those who assisted in the preparation thereof (pages
166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination, having
written many of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit C-1
was prepared the examination committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report recommending the admission to
the bar and not only for those candidates with a general average of 75% or more, but also of those who had
obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic increase was ordered noted on said
list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation was not approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that said
automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed
his deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the names of the candidates who had originally
obtained a general average of 75% without having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance thereof
the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved by the Supreme Court and
published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with an average of 75%.

Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2 was prepared in the same
form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the compositions; while one of the helpers read them, Deputy
Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machine and computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of
paper used by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.

Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the office of Justice
Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of the irregularities in the examinations of 1926 was
commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that investigation it was discovered that the grades of
candidate Luis Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been
prepared simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law of
candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit
C-6 shows that the grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in
the same subject), a difference also being noted between the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6,
which is 72.8%, and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to
the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the examinations of 1926, which were united to his personal
record (Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and written by the respective correctors on the
compositions of said candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further,
that the grades that appeared on said compositions before the alterations were identical with those that appeared
on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers
73, 64, and 75 in the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General Average, respectively, were
written after erasing with rubber what was there originally written. It may also be noted, upon an examination of the
alterations appearing on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by
the correctors, authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to make out said
original grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades written by the correctors on
the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make it appear that said alterations had been made
by the correctors themselves; second, that said alterations were made after the grades written by the correctors had
been noted on the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared
simultaneously; third, that after said alterations had been made, and in order that the grades so altered should
agree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were erased
with rubber, and in place thereof were written the grades now appearing in said compositions. The accused Estela
Romualdez having admitted that she was the author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her
admission and the facts above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not only the grades originally
written by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the columns
corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades
now appearing in said columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez erased in the manner stated the grades originally written, and substituted for
them the grades now appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well as in the columns corresponding
to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that in making such erasures and
alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing her identity, but she also knew the number and the name
of the candidate to whom said composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the names of the
candidates were already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in the office of Justice Romualdez
(page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute control as private secretary and supervisor of the
examinations.

Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay

Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay called up the accused
Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days before the publication of the results of the examinations, there is,
indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other
evidence for the prosecution establishing certain facts which show strong indications that he operated in the act
before or at the time of its execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the bar examinations in 1926; that the general average
obtained by him, according to the computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that
originally written in the list Exhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the
examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75% be automatically raised to 75%, his name,
nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5),
and that said inclusion was due to the increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit
B-2), which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades theretofore given by the correctors.

It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motive whatsoever for favoring
his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not know him and that the first time she saw him was on the first
day of the trial of this case. However, in view of her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis
Mabunay had been benefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the power to
revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the compositions already graded by the
correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her knowledge, or which might be brought to her attention (page
781, s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions of
her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due only and solely to a happy coincidence.

Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the prosecution with reference to
his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings account in the Philippine Trust Company on the second day
of March, 1927, or three days before the publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when
correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current account
(Exhibit H) with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps, give an
explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to
reach the lowest passing general average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez testified that said amount had been
sent to her by her cousin named Prisca Magpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise for
sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was not corroborated either by her said
cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding check or
postal money order, as she had done when referring other deposits in the bank.

Conclusion

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the information are sufficiently
supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter as accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official
documents with which they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela Romualdez, who
was a Government employee at the time of the commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300 of
the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one day of prision mayor with the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature
of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis
Mabunay, who was a private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer, under the provisions of article
 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four months and one
day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.

The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of error:

I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of "falsification of public and
official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer imprisonment without due process of law, contrary to section 3,
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled "An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as
to the future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous Government
for those Islands".

II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully authorized to make the
alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the Government,
and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.

III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and impartial trial.

The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez with reference to his
authority as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, to confer upon the accused Estela
Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon her, in connection with said examination.

II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to the fact that he, as
chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and truly conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez
the powers which she exercised in that examination.

III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the powers conferred upon her
by the chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, within the limits fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the
new revision and grading of the compositions be made in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the
corresponding candidates were known.

IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the general average and the grades
of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list Exhibit C-1.

V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M.
Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the opinion of said lawyers as to the grades to which said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly entitled.

VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised by the accused in the bar
examination of 1926.

VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged to her
coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the court erred in concluding that said act
constitutes the offense charged in the information.

VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, was not authorized
by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination, the
court erred in concluding that she altered the grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.

IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her identity when she
revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.

X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers as supervisor of the
correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.

XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2,
was the fact that she had received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay the sum of P400.

XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification with which she is charged,
the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a joint memorandum on July 10,
1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for
the defense.

The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was disqualified to sit in this case.
Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices were in favor of affirming the decision of the trial court and the
same number were in favor of acquitting the defendants. The court being unable to reach a decision in the usual course, an
attempt was made on February 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:

The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No. 31012, those participating
being all the members of the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was moved that
following precedents elsewhere, particularly in the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an
equal division in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment appealed from stand
affirmed, and in accordance with the action taken in the case of Nacionalista Party vs.Municipal Board of Manila,
No. 21265 — the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avanceña and Messrs. Justices
Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-
Real voted against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based his dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in
the Philippine Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.

The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further order of the court.

On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be considered separately and he be
absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by the court. He renewed his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion
was also denied on the ground that no severance had been asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason that there
was a prospect that the membership of the court would soon be increased.

The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement of three justices only six of
the former members remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition
praying that this case be set for a rehearing before the court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2, 1932
he filed a motion for the dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to reach a
determination from the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had been denied
her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.

After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional memorandum, to which the Attorney-
General filed a reply.

Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the lower court's findings of fact
be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any criminal offense, recognized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend that the appointment of the committee of attorneys by Justice
Romualdez to read and grade the examination papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the
defendant Estela Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question did not constitute
a crime.

The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this contention. He testified that
the bar examining committee was composed of two groups of attorneys: Those that were appointed to prepare the
questions, and those that were appointed to grade the papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the way in
which the examination was conducted and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and some
eight thousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys appointed to prepare
the questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly untenable. The attorneys that
prepared the questions did not intervene in the grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which
served the other group of attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the
"correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and the intervention of the two groups of
attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.

It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered were not public or official
documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys, the examination of candidates for
admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be maintained with any show of reason that the papers
submitted by the candidates in the course of the examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration,
under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime.
(In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as "falsification of public
documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of Castro for the falsification of his examination
papers was affirmed.)

In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year make all the necessary
arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated Justice Romualdez for that purpose, and in
pursuance thereof he appointed one group of attorneys to prepare the questions and another group to grade the papers. If
any of these attorneys were designated by the clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the authority of
Justice Romualdez.

The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of
the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be committed in the following eight ways:

1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.

2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate.

3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them.

4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

5. By altering true dates.

6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.

7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.

8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades in such a way as to
make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and
wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials, without indicating by her own initials that she had made the
alterations. She in that way attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only
explanation of why she altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.

A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in the American Bar Association
Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the
examination papers of applicants for admission to the bar by any person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The
Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of the
Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. They replied that such a
law would be unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides that the marking of
the written examinations may be performed by competent persons not members of the board but acting under the direction
of such members, that pertains directly to the ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the
judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also stated that the plan of employing assistants to aid the bar
examiners in marking the papers had been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.

In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial court erred in not finding that
she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1
and B-2, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.

In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the authority which she claims
to have received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that he gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise
it in accordance with the terms thereof.

The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela Romualdez, and the deputy clerk,
Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela
Romualdez to revise any grade to correct an injustice, without consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the
"correctors' who had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record thereof or any
report to him or to anybody else.

Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance with the law and the
Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given his secretary. He is presumed to have
discharged his duties in accordance with the law, and it is inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or
attempt to give his secretary the unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will
any grade or any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of such a claim
shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by him as a supervisor of equal
rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he was regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that
capacity.

Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused Estela Romualdez.

It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement. Justice Romualdez testified
that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to understand that if a case should be brought to her
attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she did not know the name of the candidate to whom
the paper belonged. When asked where she was when the pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not
remember.

There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising the revision of Estela
Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her, and he was supposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.

If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority which she claims to
have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now in question, because when she made the
changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that
conclusion is carefully set forth by the trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice
Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within the authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a
mere expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela Romualdez did not
even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the
necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did not confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question.
She di not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise the grades in question,
how she happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that had been
altered by her.

Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she freely and voluntarily
admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the alterations had been made by her, and concludes therefrom that she
acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statement of fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did
not admit that the alterations were made by her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty
pages of testimony and announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the
handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's office a
photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a specimen of defendant's handwriting and that of the altered
grades. The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez made the alterations under the circumstances which we have
mentioned, when she already knew that the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention that she acted in good
faith.

In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:

When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent evidence, criminal intent may be
and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome this
presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing the absence of such criminal intent.

The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court erred in failing to extend to her a
fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on this assignment of error, which is utterly without merit. The record
itself completely refutes any such contention. If the learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the
defendants too great latitude in arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the
stenographic record of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal and a
persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.

The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most part embraced in the assignments of
error of his coaccused which we have already considered. These remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of
error. In his fifth assignment of error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of attorneys
Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of said
attorneys as to the correct grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.

The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three attorneys on the ground that it was
not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense might call the members of the examining committee that prepared the
questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to adopt the
suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore that the lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that
the examination papers in question deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez gave them. The
attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best qualified to decide whether
or not the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of other attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination,
would only lead to confusion. We find no merit in this assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of the accused Estela Romualdez
in reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 was the fact that she had received four hundred
pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.

The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the crime of
falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in concluding that the accused Luis Mabunay participated in its
commission.

For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.

In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez ever reviewed the
examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she merely raised his grades in two subjects, thus
giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own words, a passing mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court
as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the
record does not show that she raised the grades of any other candidate.

The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed in the examination in
question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining committee recommended that not only those having
the required general average of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent.
This is referred to in the record as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the
Supreme Court, and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had obtained a
general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list submitted three days later,
notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez
had in the meantime raised the grades now in question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required
for admission to the bar.

The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust Co., and that on March
7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not
present any evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was
disapproved.

In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may
not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by
which it may assist him.

In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laid down the following
rule:

When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge, and it is apparent that the
accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts and circumstances as they existed, and show, if
such was the truth, that the suspicious circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he
fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to
sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is manifest that proofs are in the
power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution.

Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10 by her brother, but she
could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca
Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she could not name the person that brought the money to her, or explain
why she deposited it in the bank. She did not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase
of goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.

An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produce evidence. The inference,
unless the failure to produce evidence is explained away, is that the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence
would not support the party's case. (U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)

In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence,
Vol. IV, p. 3148:

The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to inference against a party
accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes
tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule
 of law to produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming
paradox, which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has misled a few courts to
deny that any inference may be drawn.

The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her coaccused Luis
Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had
received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money
after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the
accused Mabunay to present evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank. As this
court said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):

When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the
facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to
offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the
inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.

The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the third time in the bar
examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of his grades, based on an alleged mistake in computation. This
motion was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It was subsequently found that alterations had been made in his
examination papers, and he and Juan Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed
full responsibility for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not know anything about the making of
the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking disciplinary actin
against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in banc, said:

It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally
unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole
beneficiary.

The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.

In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the falsification of a public document.
The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys the name of an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had
written his own name in that space, although he had not admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote his name
in the register under the direction of an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He was convicted, and on
appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that the offense
committed required the participation of some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as the court found, did not lessen
the criminal responsibility of the appellant."

It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord in the commission of the
crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is
proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)

The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the secrecy of the crime,
usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently
indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means
is proved. Evidence of actual participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of
acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party,
and generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words of one against the
others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the evidence.

As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, the trial court found her
guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and
one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer
perpetual disqualification to hold any public office.

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one day to twelve years, and
the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and
one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one
day of prision mayor.
The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the Penal Code, the crime not
being connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of the Government, and sentenced him to suffer four
months and one day of arresto mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a conspirator and
coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712,
is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that has been changed by the Revised Penal Code toprision
correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months,
and twenty-one days to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased
to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional.

The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed, with the costs against the
appellants.

Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AVANCEÑA, C.J., concurring:

I agree with the majority opinion. My vote regarding the defendant, Estela Romualdez, is based on the ground that she did
not act under authority alleged to have been given her by Justice Norberto Romualdez. She made the alteration after the
candidates' names were already known. She did not act in the interests of justice, inasmuch as among the compositions of
1,056 candidates she examined those of her coaccused Luis Mabunay only, and she failed to show or to allege that before
examining his compositions she had reasons for believing that Mabunay's case was meritorious.

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

I concur with the comprehensive opinion of the majority in its principal features, but more especially am I in accord with the
views expressed by the Chief Justice. My position will bear a word of explanation.

The charge is that of falsification of a public document by the accused Estela Romualdez, secretary to Justice Romualdez,
acting in conspiracy with Luis Mabunay, a candidate in the 1926 bar examinations, by altering the grades of the candidate
so that it was feloniously made to appear that he had passed the bar examinations. The finding was of guilt in a decision by
the trial judge, concerned almost entirely with questions of fact. Speaking to these questions, since this case should be
considered exactly in the same manner as any other case, these findings are entitled to our most respectful consideration.
Not desiring to enlarge upon the findings, it is only necessary to observe that the changes made in the papers of the
candidate Mabunay have been admitted by the accused Estela Romualdez to have been made by her in her ordinary
handwriting. Added to this we have the testimony of Justice Romualdez as follows: "As supervisor, I believe that there were
occasions when I made her understand that in order to do justice to the candidates, she could revise papers already graded
by the other correctors, provided that the new revision was made before the name of the candidate concerned was known."
In this connection it has been demonstrated beyond civil by a series of damaging and fatal circumstances that during the
three-day interval between the making of the first report of the bar examinations and the second report when the names of
the candidates were known, the accused Estela Romualdez made changes in the grades of Luis Mabunay in express
contravention of the authority alleged to have been given her by Justice Romualdez and in bad faith. Not alone were the
erasures on the papers made in a manner difficult to be deciphered, leaving below the erasures the initials of the readers;
not alone did the accused fail to place her own initials over the changes; not alone was there no attempt to show why the
grades were increased to give exactly a general average of 75 per cent, but there are two other circumstances entirely
inconsistent with innocence. The first is that two of the readers, namely, Jeronimo Samson, the deputy clerk of court, and
Estela Romualdez were supposed to have identical authority, yet Samson never understood that he had any right to change
grades without the knowledge of the readers in the particular subject; when Samson acted as a substitute reader, changes
were made with the knowledge and consent of the other reader and Samson placed his initials under the new grades. The
second question is how Estela Romualdez could remember having made erasures in the grades in two papers out of eight
thousand to the advantage of one candidate out of more than one thousand, but could not recall any other similar incident
and could not offer any explanation of why the grades of the one candidate merited an increase. I am, therefore, constrained
to conclude that the findings of fact, along the line above indicated, made in the trial court and here confirmed by other
judges who have minutely examined the record, must be taken as conclusively established.

The legal features of the case offer no particular difficulties. Articles 300 and 301 of the old Penal Code were violated.
Examination papers leading to admission to the bar constitute a part of judicial proceedings and are in the nature of public
documents. These documents were altered and their meaning changed to permit a candidate in the bar examinations
illegally to be admitted at the bar.
A number of cases growing out of the bar scandal of 1926 have reached this court and have resulted in convictions.
Basically there is no difference in fact and in law between the principles governing those cases and the principles governing
the case before us. If the accused in those cases merited punishment, the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay
are equally guilty.

STREET, J., dissenting:

It is the opinion of the undersigned that the acts imputed to Estela Romualdez do not constitute the crime of falsification of a
public document, and with respect to Luis Mabunay there is no proof connecting him in any way whatever with the acts of
Romualdez. As a preliminary to the demonstration of these conclusions it appears desirable to give few words of explanation
to show how the situation arose with which the court is here confronted.

Under the American occupation, prior to the year 1921, high school graduates were eligible to take the course in law in any
accredited law in the Philippine Islands. In that year, however, the court decided to require two years of college work as a
prerequisite to matriculation in a law school, thereby materially raising the standard of education of lawyers. But inorder not
to affect adversely the rights of those who were already qualifying under the prior rule, the requirement for two years of
college work was made effective beginning with the examinations in 1927. It resulted that 1926 was the last year in which
examinations could be taken under the old rule, and there were nearly 1,100 candidates who presented themselves for
examination in that year.

It has been the usage of this court to place the bar examinations for each year in the hands of a member of the court
designated by the Chief Justice; and it is made the duty of this member to appoint the examiners and to superintend the
giving of the examinations. In the year 1926 Justice Norberto Romualdez was named to conduct the examinations, and he
appointed the requisite number of members of the bar to prepare the questions in the several subjects of examination. In
view of the great number of papers to be read in that year, it was quite evident that able lawyers could not be expected to
read so many papers, as the work, as could be foreseen, would undoubtedly have taken up months of their time. Justice
Romualdez, therefore, upon the suggestion of our clerk, decided to adopt the plan followed in the Bureau of Civil Service,
which is, to appoint readers (referred to in the record as "correctors") to read and grade the examination papers in
conformity with the written guides prepared by the examiners. These readers (as we shall call them) were qualified lawyers
chosen from the Government service, chiefly from the personnel of the Supreme Court and of the Bureau of Justice.

The reading of the papers occupied a period of about six months, and the report presented by the examiners was not finally
passed upon by the court until March 5, 1927. The questions in the examination in Civil Law were prepared by Francisco
Ortigas, and the questions in Remedial Law were prepared by Judge J. C. Abreu. The two readers primarily chosen to read
and grade the papers in Civil Law were Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario, and the readers in Remedial Law were
Alfonso Felix and Marciano Guevara.

As Justice Romualdez had general charge of the examinations, his niece, Estela Romualdez, who was also his secretary
and who had been admitted to the bar in 1925, was selected as one of the readers. In addition to her duties as mere reader,
Justice Romualdez confided to her the custody of the examination papers and other apparatus of examination, which were
kept under key in his office when not in issue. Samson was at this time a deputy clerk of this court, and because of his
official position he and Miss Romualdez were charged with the supervision of the clerical work connected with the
examinations.

In the conduct of the bar examinations it is important that the examiner or reader of papers should have no knowledge of the
personality of the author of any composition when the same is read and graded, and a device had been adopted in the
clerk's office which was supposed to accomplish this end. This was that the name of the candidate was not permitted to
appear on the composition. Instead, there was assigned in the clerk's office a number to each candidate, and this number
was written on the outside of small envelope affixed to the composition when it was turned in by the candidate. Sealed within
the same envelope was a small slip of paper containing the corresponding name of the candidate. A record of the names
and numbers was also kept in the clerk's office. Every step in the reading, grading, and collating of the examination papers
was therefore supposedly taken before the names of the different candidates were known.

When the work of the various readers in this case had been collated in the latter part of February, but before the names of
the various candidates had yet been written in the list showing the results, the committee of the bar examiners was called
together. Upon assembling the committee found that the percentage of candidates passing was exceedingly low, being
around ten per centum of the total number of candidates. This result was no doubt partly due to the hasty way in which a
great number of immature candidates had rushed in the hope of being admitted to the bar before the standards of the
examination were raised, and in part also doubtless to the fact that the readers had applied the straight-edge pretty firmly in
judging the grades. The committee of the bar examiners therefore thought it proper to suggest to the court the propriety of
admitting all the candidates who had made as much as 70 per centum, and a recommendation to this effect was submitted
to the court. With this suggestion the court did not agree, and a new list had to be made up, showing as passing the names
only of those who had made the requisite average of 75 per centum in all subjects without falling below 60 per centum in
any.

Among the candidates in these examinations was the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom, at the examinations, was assigned
number 898. In the list submitted by the bar examiners recommending that all be admitted who had made a general average
of 70, Luis Mabunay appeared as receiving 72.8 per centum; and when the court decided that the passing grade could not
be lowered, the result was naturally fatal to him as a candidate. But in the list later submitted to the court containing only the
names of those who had made an average of 75 the same Luis Mabunay appeared as having received the requisite per
cent. Upon the showing his name was therefore passed as a successful candidate.

The explanation is that, in the interval between the submission of the first recommendation of the bar examiners and the
submission of the later list, the grades corresponding to Luis Mabunay were raised by Miss Romualdez in an amount
sufficient to give him a general average of 75 per centum. In this connection it appears that in the subject of Civil Law
Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario had assigned to Luis Mabunay 63 per centum as the value of his composition in
that subject, and this number was written on the composition cover and accredited by the initials of the two examiners. This
credit was raised by Miss Romualdez to 73. Likewise in Remedial Law the readers Alfonso Felix and Marciano Guevara had
given 58 as the value of the paper. This credit was changed by Miss Romualdez to 64. In effecting these changes Miss
Romualdez in each case obliterated the original grades by the use of pen and ink, and wrote thereunder in her own hand
"73" and "64" in words and figures. She did not sign her name to this alteration but left intact the initials of the original
graders. No attempt was made by her to imitate the script used by the graders, and the making of these changes was
admitted by her.

Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness in the case, stated that he authorized Miss Romualdez, upon finding any error
made by the readers, to correct it, provided that this should be done before the names of the candidates should be known.
Miss Romualdez testified that the changes effected by her in the papers of her coaccused were made under this authority.
Furthermore, at the trial of the case, she offered to prove by three able lawyers of the Manila bar that the grades actually
assigned by her to the papers referred to were fully merited by the answers given. The trial court refused to admit this
testimony, and there is nothing before us to show whether the changes made were in conformity with the merit of the papers
or not.

The case for the prosecution supposes that the changes above referred to were made by Miss Romualdez in bad faith and
that she was corrupted by Luis Mabunay to make the changes in his papers for the purpose of securing his successful
completion of the examinations when in fact he had failed. In this connection proof was submitted showing that on March 7,
1927, Luis Mabunay withdrew from his savings account in the Philippine Trust Co. the sum of P600, and that on March 7,
1927, Miss Romualdez deposited a sum of money to her credit in the Bank of the Philippine Islands, among the items of
which deposit was the sum of P400.

It appears that there are two persons bearing the name of Luis Mabunay in the City of Manila. The individual who was
candidate in the bar examinations of 1926, and who is one of the two accused in this case, was, at the time with which we
are here concerned, assistant chief of the administrative division of the Executive Bureau. The other Luis Mabunay was, at
the same time, a clerk in the law office of Vicente Romualdez, who is a brother of Miguel Romualdez, father of the accused
Estela Romualdez. In the early stages of this prosecution confusion existed concerning these two individuals. So much so
that the fiscal, when this proceeding was begun, was under the impression that the Luis Mabunay who was joined as
codefendant in this case was the Luis Mabunay who was employed in the office of Vicente Romualdez. On the other hand
Estela Romualdez says that prior to his appearance in court, she had never seen her codefendant Luis Mabunay and had
never known that there was such a person in existence. This point of the confusion over these two individuals has a bearing
on the case against Luis Mabunay, but is not otherwise important.

An incident connected with the examinations now under consideration is found in certain corrections made by our then
deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, in the grades given by a reader named Remo who was relieved from duty as a reader.
Samson has the complete confidence of the court, and nobody has called in question the good faith of his work throughout.
Well, after Remo was relieved, Samson took the papers in hand that Remo had already graded and in a number of cases
changed his grades in precisely the same way in which Miss Romualdez changed the two papers of Luis Mabunay. In some
of these corrections Samson did not append his own initials, and although in one of the corrections made by Miss
Romualdez the obliteration of the original grade was more complete than in the case of the grades obliterated by Samson,
the manner of correction was substantially the same.

The dominating question in the case against Miss Romualdez is, in our opinion, whether Justice Romualdez gave her
authority to revise the grades in the two papers marked "898". If that authority was in fact given, no case of falsification is
made out against this accused; for, although she may have abused the authority and increased the grades in question for a
corrupt purpose, her delinquency would have the character of an abuse of authority only. That this authority was given we do
not entertain the slightest doubt, and the reason for crediting Justice Romualdez' statement on this point rests not only upon
his character but upon the circumstances under which that statement was made in court. Of course a person will sometimes
testify falsely or distort the truth for the purpose of assisting another; but experience shows that the most powerful motive
which operates upon people as witnesses is the motive of self-protection. When the testimony of Justice Romualdez was
delivered in court, the full extent of the irregularities attendant upon the examination of 1926 were generally known; and the
slightest consideration of self-interest would have indicated to Justice Romualdez that he would do himself a service by not
testifying as a witness. However, in the face of all these considerations, Justice Romualdez, in the interest of truth, did not
hesitate to go into court and state that he in fact gave his niece authority to revise the grades. and what necessity can there
be for us to debate the question of the truthfulness of Justice Romualdez when the fiscal who prosecuted this case more
than once stated in open court that he had never doubted the veracity of the witness in this case?

Upon this point we quote textually from the transcript of the proceedings in the lower court:
 FISCAL GUEVARA. We have never doubted the veracity of the witness.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL GUEVARA. On the other hand, as we have already stated, we do not doubt the veracity of the witness in
this case.

But it is said that the authority granted by Justice Romualdez contemplated a revision of the grades in good faith and was
coupled with the condition that the revision to be effected by her should be accomplished before the names of the
candidates should be known. But the fact that the authority may have been coupled with this condition could not alter the
character of the authority. She was made judge of the conditions under which the revision should be entered upon, as well
as judge of the extent of the revision, and the violation of her by Justice Romualdez' directions on these points could not
have the effect of obliterating the authority. However gross may have been her delinquency the offense could be nothing
more than an abuse of authority.

In the course of these proceedings the evidence has been thoroughly combed by the prosecution to discover indications that
Miss Romualdez acted in bad faith. Thus it is said that bad faith is shown in circumstances such as these: That she did not
affix her initials to her corrections; that she used black ink to obliterate the grade that had been altered, and that she
confessed her inability to recall the exact considerations which led her to increase the grades allowed by the original reader.
All these considerations, and others equally trivial, as it seems to us, come with very poor grace from a court that had
refused to permit the accused to prove by the testimony of experts that the examination papers whose grades were altered
by her were in fact entitled at least to the grades which she affixed to them, if not more. What circumstance could possibly
show more effectually the good faith of Miss Romualdez in increasing the grades than the fact, if it be a fact, that the papers
merited the higher grades given by her to the candidate. But the merit of the grades must remain, by the action of the court
in this case, like the location of the grave of Moses, forever unknown; and this long drawn-out litigation will shed no light
upon what seems to the undersigned to be the most vital question with which the court should have concerned itself,
namely, whether the grades assigned by Miss Romualdez to two of the papers of Luis Mabunay were right or wrong. One of
the reasons suggested for sustaining the objection against the proffered testimony of experts to show the propriety of the
grades given is that the court itself could judge of the true value of the papers without the assistance of expert testimony, but
no attempt had been made by the prosecution or by the court to demonstrate from the papers themselves that the grades
assigned to them by Miss Romualdez were unmerited. Why should the court concern itself so meticulously with the
circumstances indicative of possible bad faith when the grades raised are before us, affording the best evidence of their
character.

In United States vs. Michelena (4 Phil., 492), it was held by this court that a person who makes a false statement in a
certificate of merit in an application for an examination by the Civil Service Board cannot be convicted of the falsification of a
public document, but of an offense punishable by arresto mayor under article 311 of the Penal Code. This decision was
repeated in United States vs. Dumandan (8 Phil., 61). These decisions apparently attracted the attention of our lawmakers
as indicating that the penalties affixed by the Spanish Code to certain offenses against the Civil Service were too light; and
on August 26, 1907, the Philippine Commission adopted a law now incorporated in section 2674 of the Administrative Code.
One of the provisions of this section punishes any person who shall falsely rate, grade, estimate, or report upon the
examination or standing of any person examined by the Bureau of Civil Service. But that provision is limited to Civil Service
examinations, and cannot be applied to bar examinations. Therefore, when confronted with the irregularity, or supposed
irregularity, presented in this case, the fiscal's office was unable to proceed with the prosecution under section 2674 of the
Administrative Code, and was compelled to fall back upon article 300 of the Penal Code which deals with the falsification of
public documents.

The suggestion contained in the opinion of the court to the effect that Justice Romualdez had no authority to authorize Miss
Romualdez to revise grades is in our opinion wholly untenable. He had as much authority to authorize her to revise grades
as he had to authorize her to read and grade papers in the first place, there being no difference whatever in point of principle
between the two acts. Now, the alteration of a grade by one authorized to revise is on exactly the same footing in law, under
No. 6 of article 300 of the Penal Code, as the giving of a false grade, under No. 4 of the same article, by one who is
authorized to grade. Does the court mean to suggest by this decision that the assigning of an untrue grade in bad faith by
any reader authorized to grade examination papers constitutes a falsification of a public document? Legal literature does not
furnish the slightest hint that would afford a basis for such a ruling. But this would be no more untenable than the conclusion
reached by the court in this case that the alteration of a grade in bad faith by a person authorized to revise constitutes
falsification of the document. A person charged with the duty of grading or revising examination papers exercises a power
involving judgment and discretion. Such duty is evidently of a quasi-judicial nature; and a violation of such duty constitutes
an abuse of authority rather than the falsification of a public document. And if the law in its present state, as thus interpreted,
should appear to be inadequate, the Legislature might safely be relied upon to extend to bar examiners and readers the
provisions already applicable to examiners under the Civil Service Law. This court is not called upon to legislate, and it
should not distort the severe provisions relating to falsification for the purpose of covering delinquencies not fairly included
therein.

With respect to the connection of Luis Mabunay with this case, we do not hesitate emphatically to say that, in our opinion,
there is no item of proof connecting this accused with the irregularity imputed to Miss Romualdez. It is true that Luis
Mabunay was the person whose interests were primarily served by Miss Romualdez in raising the grades above mentioned;
and if there were independent proof connecting him with the offense, the fact that his interests were so served would supply
the explanation of the acts committed. But in the absence of adequate proof, this circumstance supplies no basis upon which
to convict him. The only fact supposedly pointing to him as the guilty suborner of Estela Romualdez is that he drew out six
hundred pesos from a savings account on March 2, 1927; but there is no proof that any of this money ever reached Miss
Romualdez or that he was ever in communication with her in any way.

The fact that Luis Mabunay did not testify as a witness in his own behalf cannot be used as an affirmative admission, and
the logical propriety of his assumed guilt is no substitute for proof. It is true that some authority can be cited for the
proposition, always guardedly advanced, that where there is some evidence, showing an incriminatory fact, and the accused
is in a position to dissipate the inference drawn from that evidence, his failure to do so may be used as an admission of the
injurious inference. But the application of that rule presupposes the existence of some incriminatory evidence; and in this
case, to the mind of the undersigned, there is no proof, even weak, connecting this accused with the offense charged.

To present in a few words the legal basis of this dissent, we are unable to agree with the court in extending the concept of
falsification to cover an abuse of authority on the part of a reviser of examination papers, a person who is clothed with a
discretion in appraising the work revised. The circumstance that the cases against Felipe del Rosario and Jose Bautista
should be cited as authority in the opinion of the court merely shows that there is no legal warrant in past jurisprudence for
the decision now made; for the acts of falsification in those cases were not done by an examiner, reader, or reviser, but by
the individual who was prosecuted or by some unauthorized individual acting at his instance. Moreover, the falsifications
there accomplished were effected after the examinations had been concluded and the documents falsified had been
committed to the archives of the court.

In the infancy of jurisprudence a sentiment had its birth in the mind of some jurist-poet which is still thought fit to be inscribed
over the Temple of Justice: Fiat Justitia Ruat Coelum. The decision of the court in this case is a reminder that junctures
sometimes occur in human affairs when even courts of last resort are constrained to ignore the suggestion expressed in this
motto. Fortunately such occasions are rare; and we are unable to see any necessity in the present case requiring a
departure from accepted doctrines.

For the reasons stated we dissent from the decision in this case.

Villa-real and Villamor, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION

October 5, 1932

VICKERS, J.:

The attorney for the appellant Estela Romualdez submits in support of his motion for reconsideration the following
propositions:

First Proposition

The court has erred in finding defendant guilty of falsification of public and official documents in view of the authority
to revise the examination papers extended by Mr. Justice Romualdez.

Second Proposition

The court has erred in finding with respect to Mr. Justice Romualdez that "he himself had no such authority as is
alleged to have been given his secretary," in view of the inconsistency of such finding with its other findings.

Third Proposition

The court has erred in not extending any consideration to the question as to the true merit of the examination
papers of Luis Mabunay Exhibits B-1 and B-2.

Fourth Proposition

The court has erred in finding as a fact that "the accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were
made by her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented 350 pages of testimony and announced his
readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the handwriting of the accused."
 Fifth Proposition

The court has erred in finding as a fact that the defendant "when she made the changes already knew that the
papers belonged to her co-accused, Luis Mabunay."

Sixth Proposition

The court has erred in finding the existence of a conspiracy between defendants, Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay.

Seventh Proposition

The court has erred in ignoring the statutory provisions of section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, prescribing the
manner of conducting bar examinations.

Eighth Proposition

The court has erred in failing to recognize the right of defendant at least to the benefit of a reasonable doubt and by
its judgment it has apparently nullified the principle that a person accused of crime is presumed innocent until his
guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ninth Proposition

The court has erred in failing to extend to the defendant her constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.

Tenth Proposition

During the period from the time this cause was submitted on appeal to this Honorable Court, defendant has suffered
punishment neither ordained, recognized nor authorized by any law on our statute books.

Eleventh Proposition

The court has erred in imposing upon the defendant a sentence of punishment above and beyond such as is
authorized under our Revised Penal Code.

The first ten propositions raise the questions which were discussed in the arguments and duly considered in the decision of
this case. No reason has been adduced that would justify us in changing our decision.

In support of his eleventh proposition, the attorney for the appellant points out that the penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office is not included in article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which corresponds to article 300 of the Penal
Code. He overlooks the fact, however, that the penalty of prision mayor under the Revised Penal Code, as well as under the
Penal Code, carries with it certain accessory penalties.

The penalty provided in article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, for a public officer or
employee or notary, who by taking advantage of his official position shall be guilty of the falsification of a document,
is prision mayor and a fine in a sum not less than 250 and more than 12,500 pesetas, and in addition thereto perpetual
disqualification from any public office.

Article 61 of the Penal Code provides that the penalties of prision mayor, prision correccional, and arresto mayor shall carry
with them suspension of the right to hold public office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute
disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have seen expressly remitted in the pardon.

According to article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.

In other words article 42 of the Revised Penal Code perpetually disqualifies the offender from the right of suffrage, and
article 32 provides that the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification;
whereas under article 300 of the Penal Code the offender is perpetually disqualified from holding public office, but under
article 61 his right of suffrage is only suspended during the term of the sentence. Under both the Penal Code and the
Revised Penal Code the offender is perpetually disqualified from holding public office. The provisions of the Revised Penal
Code are, therefore, not favorable to the appellant.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the appellant Estela Romualdez is denied.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

STREET, J., dissenting:

I adhere to my views expressed in my dissenting opinion in the main case.

Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., dissent.

RESOLUTION

October 5, 1932

VICKERS, J.:

On September 22, 1932, the attorney for the appellant Estela Romualdez filed a motion for a new trial on the following
grounds:

(a) That the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, has just discovered new evidence material to the defense in
this case, which could not have been discovered and produced at the trial below with reasonable diligence;

(b) That the judgment of this court is contrary to law.

Affidavits of Godofredo Reyes and of appellant's attorney are attached to the motion. The evidence which the appellant
wishes to present is the testimony of Godofredo Reyes, who was a member of the bar examination committee in 1926.

After considering the motion and the affidavits presented in support thereof, we find that it is without merit. In the first place
the evidence which it is proposed to present is not newly discovered evidence within the technical meaning of that phrase,
and in the second place this evidence, if admitted, would not affect the result of this case.

In the case of United States vs. Luzon (4 Phil., 343) and United States vs. Quijano (11 Phil., 368), it was held that a motion
for a new trial, based upon newly discovered evidence, will not be granted unless the following conditions exist: (1) The
evidence must have been discovered since the trial; (2) it must be such that with the use of reasonable diligence on part of
the defendant it could not have been secured at the former trial; (3) it must be material, and not merely collateral, or
cumulative, or corroborative, or impeaching; (4) it must be such as ought to produce a different result on the merits of
another trial; and (5) it must go to the merits and not rest on a merely technical defense.

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant's motion for a new trial is denied.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

STREET, J., concurring:

While not questioning the propriety of the resolution I adhere to the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in the main
case.

Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

 RESOLUTION

October 5, 1932

VICKERS, J.:

The appellant Luis Mabunay asks for the reconsideration of the decision of this court of September 10, 1932 for the following
reasons:

(1) The court relied on mere suspicion and conjecture in convicting Mabunay.

(2) From the fact that the accused Mabunay did not testify at the trial of this case, nothing against his innocence should be
inferred.

The motion for reconsideration raises only questions which have been carefully considered and decided, and it is
unnecessary to restate our findings and conclusions.

The attorney for the appellant calls attention to the Spanish text of section 59 of General Orders No. 58 reading as follows:

En todas las causas criminales las pruebas admitidas deberan ser concluyentes para demostrar el hecho que se
trata de probar. Al querellante correspondera proponer y practicar las pruebas que demuestren la culpabilidad, y
debera ser presentada la prueba mas concluyente de que sea susceptible la causa.

This does not seem to us an exact translation of the original of this section in English, which should prevail. It is as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions the evidence admitted must be relevant to the fact at issue, the burden of proof of guilt
shall be upon the prosecution, and the best evidence must be produced of which the case is susceptible.

With respect to the second ground of the motion for reconsideration, based upon paragraph 3 of section 15 of General
Orders No. 58 which provides that the neglect or refusal of a defendant to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or
be used against him, it is sufficient to refer to the decision in question. The attorney for the appellant appears to make no
distinction between the failure of the defendant to testify and explain a certain fact and the failure of the defendant to present
any other witness in explanation of that fact.

After having elected not to testify in his own behalf or to present any other witness to explain for what purpose he withdrew
the money in question from the Philippine Trust Company, the appellant Mabunay, now that he has been convicted by the
lower court and his conviction has been affirmed by this court, prays that he be granted a new trial in order that he may
testify himself and present other witnesses to testify as to that fact. The appellant is clearly not entitled to a new trial for such
reason.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the appellant, Luis Mabunay is hereby denied.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
Street, Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., dissent.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981

SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC in Rosales, Pangasinan, who
was convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of falsification of public or official documents of the seven (7) separate
informations filed against her for making false entries in her daily time records, elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 20319 to 20322 promulgated on September 18, 1978, affirming in toto the judgment of
conviction rendered on July 30, 1976 by the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City. The dispositive
portion of the decision of the lower court reads as follows:

FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and with the prosecution not having established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the herein accused and for insufficiency of evidence or the lack of it, the Court
hereby finds. as it so holds, accussed Salud P. Beradio NOT GUILTY of the charges in Criminal cases
Nos. CCC-0258, CCC-0259, and CCC-0263; consequently, she is hereby acquitted therefrom with costs de
oficio; and decreeing the bail bonds posted for her provisional release in these cases cancelled and
discharged.

On the other hand, however, the Court so finds and holds accused Salud P. Beradio GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public or official document as charged in Criminal Case No.
CCC-0260 as to entry on July 13, 1973 only, Criminal Case No. CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262
as to entry on May 28, 1973 only, and Criminal Case No. CCC-0264, defined and penalized under Article
17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Act, hereby accordingly sentences said Salud P. Beradio to serve an
indeterminate prison term in the following manner, to wit:

a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000)
but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and, to pay the cost;

b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost;

c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correcional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.

d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR(4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and 0NE (1) DAY of prision mayor,
as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.

The penalties herein imposed shall be served successively with the maximum duration of the sentences
not to exceed threefold the length of tune corresponding to one penalty imposed upon tier in accordance
with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260, and on May 30, 1973, the
Court finds no sufficient Evidence to hold the accused liable. Consequently, the accused is hereby
absolved therefrom.
The facts pertinent to the specified dates of falsification as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

... On the following particular dates, as reflected in her daily time records (Exhs. "D" to "H"), BERADIO
reported her attendance in office and actual hours of work performed as:

On

)
1
7:35 12:00
March a.m. n.;
15,
1973

1:00 5:00
p.m. p.m.
to

2) 7:30 12:00
March a.m. n;
23,
1973

1:00 5:00
p.m. p.m.
to

3) May 7:45 12:00

28, a.m. n;
1973

1:00 5:00
p.m. p.m.
to

4) June 7:30 12:00

6, 1973 a.m. n;

1:00 5:00
p.m. p.m.
to

5) June 7:35 12:00

22, a.m. n;
1973

1:00 5:00
p.m. p.m.
to

6) July 8:00 12:00

13,1973 a.m. n;

1:00 5:00
p.m. p.m.
to

The veracity of the foregoing reports were negated by the following:

1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the applicants at the initial hearing and reception
of evidence in land Registration Case No. 19-R before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
XIV, Rosales, in both morning and afternoon sessions (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2").

2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the petitioner in the hearing of
Special Proceedings No. 24-R (summary settlement of the estate of Vicente Oria, Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XIV, at Resales, which was called first in open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M"
and M-1 ").
 3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp. Proc. No. 24-R, BERADIO again appeared as counsel for the
petitioner in the same court which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45 (Exh. "M").

4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the defendant in CAR Case No.
19882-.TP '73, entitled "Pepito Felipe vs. Ismael Pontes and Camilo Tamce before CAR Branch 11 in
Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh. "J"). Minutes of the pre-trial conference which the appellant attended are
manifest in the pre-trial order that was dictated in open court (Exh. "J-1").

5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio appeared in Sp. Proc. No. 24-R before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at Rosales (Exh. "M").

6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio appeared as counsel for plaintiff at the pre-trial conference of
Civil Case No. 137R, "Venancia Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" before Branch XIV of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan (Exhs. "L" to "I-3").

It is thus clear that while in the six abovementioned dates, BERADIO made it appear in her daily time
records that she was in her office and performed her work on the dates and hours she specified, the facts
were that she was elsewhere attending court sessions. 2

From the said decision of the Court of Appeals and the denial of her motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1978,
Salud Beradio filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to the Court. We asked the Solicitor General to comment on
the petition and thereafter, We resolved to give due course to said petition it appearing that the issues raised are, in the main
questions of law rendered novel by the peculiar circumstances of the case. Thus, he raised the following legal issues:

WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISION OF
ARTICLE 171, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS LEGAL AND PROPER.

II

WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL BE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY PROSECUTED FOR AN
OFFENSE WHERE SHE WAS NO LONGER A PUBLIC OFFICIAL

III

WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL OBLIGATION TO FILL UP AND SUBMIT TIME RECORD.

IV

ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE STATEMENTS THEREIN REFLECTED IN HER TIME RECORD
BEAR ANY' COLOR OF TRUTH'.

WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL

DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO MOMENT.

VI

IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW AND
WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL ON THE GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.

Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
on February 1, 1964 (Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972 and 1973, she was stationed in Resales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office,
Office of the Election Registrar, COMELEC holding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and
from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work, she was required to fill up and
submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time records after having been counter-signed by her provincial
supervisor. 3

On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, CCC-0261) granted her request for permission to
appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the case before the Court of Agrarian Relations in Rosales,
Pangasinan. 4
During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez filed with the COMELEC,
sometime in September, 1973, an administrative complaint charging her of unauthorized practice of law. On the other hand,
Salud Beradio tendered her resignation as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC resolution
(Exhibit B) of October 25, 1973, was accepted and made to retroact on the close of office hours on September 30, 1973.
She was duly granted clearance by all the offices of the COMELEC, and she received her retirement benefits under the law.

Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the status of his administrative case against Salud P. Beradio,
and upon being informed of her separation from the service, he initiated the filing of criminal charges against Salud Beradio
on grounds of falsification of daily time records defined and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code as falsification of public documents. In the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan where he lodged the criminal
charges, Jose Peralta, and his wife Paz de Guzman-Peralta, trial attorney of Agrarian Legal Assistance (DAR) submitted
affidavits in support of the charges against Salud P. Beradio.

On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate informations all dated July 7, 1975 with the
Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, charging Salud P. Beradio with falsification of public or official
documents for making false entries in her daily time .records on: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case CCC-0258; 2)
September 4, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and 22,
1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and 30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3, 1973 in Criminal Case
CCC-0263; and 7) March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0264 that she submitted to the Commission on Election in
Manila. 5 The separate informations allege that petitioner was absent the whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the
"damage and prejudice of the National Government," she made it appear in her time records that she was not so absent
from the office, when in fact she well knew that on such date or time she was in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch XIV, Resales, Pangasinan, appearing in her cases .

While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal issues which, to Us, point to the more basic issues inherent in acts mala in
se as contra distinguished from mala prohibita, We narrowed down these issues, for proper disposition of the instant case,
into whether or not the alleged acts of falsification of public documents imputed against the petitioner were tainted with
criminal intent (dolo), and whether or not the act of alleged false narration of facts in the daily time record bears, under the
law, some semblance of colorable truth. This We did in full considerations of the peculiar circumstances which render the
instant case novel in some respects, worthy of pronouncements from this Court.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the offense of falsification of public or official documents, defined
and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the requisite elements thereof must be clearly
established, namely: 1) the offender makes in a document false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false, and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 6

Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent (dolo), without
which it cannot exist. 7 Actus non facit reum nisi mens set rea, the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions
were so. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code clearly indicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an
essential requisite of all crimes and offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases where the element required is
negligence (culpa).

On one point, however, the claim of the petitioner that she is not under strict obligation to keep and submit a time record is
not at all empty with justification. While it is true, as held by the respondent court, 8 that the obligation to disclose the literal
truth in filling up the daily time record is required of all officers and employees in the civil service of the government in
accordance with Civil Service Rule XV, Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909, this vague provision, however, is rendered
clear by Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service Rule, dated December 3, 1962, later Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of
1965 which exempt from requirements of keeping and submitting the daily time records three categories of public officers,
namely: 1) Presidential appointees; 2) chiefs and assistant chiefs of agencies; and 3) officers in the three branches of the
government. Clearly thus, petitioner as Chief of theOffice, Office ofElection Registrar, COMELEC in the municipality of
Rosales, Pangasinan exercising supervision over four (4) subordinate employess, would fall under the third category
aforementioned. An Election Registrar of the municipality performing the powers, dutied , responsibilities of the COMELEC,
a constitutional body, in the conduct of national or local election, referenda, and plebiscites, in aparticular voting district may
be regarded as an officer who rank higher thab such chiefs or assistant chiefs of agencies although he may not be a
presidential appointee. Notwithstan ding such an exemption, if the election registrars of the various municipalities all
throughout the country, who occassionaly work more than ordinary eight-hours on the last day of the registration or on
lection day, are keeping and submitting the daily time records to the main office in Manila, it may be only to the sake of
adminstrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice, but by reason of strict legal obligation.

On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep and submit the daily time
records, We are definitely inclined to the view that the alleged false entries made in the time records on the specified dates
contained in the information do not constitute falsification for having been made with no malice or deliberate intent.
Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all candor her appearances in six (6)
different ways, on March 15, March 23, May 28, June 22, July 13,, all in 1973 before the Court of First Instance, Branch XIV,
Rosales, Pangasinan, in the aforementiones cases, claiming that she did not reflect this absences in her daily time records
because they were for few minute-duration, the longest was on March 15, 1973 being for forty-five (45) minutes; they could
be absorbed within the allowed coffee breaks of 30 minutes in the morning and in the afternoon; that as Chief of Office, and
all Election Registrars of the COMELEC for that matter, she is allowed to have one (1) day leave during week days provided
she worked on a Saturday: and that her brief absences did not in any way interfere with or interrupt her official duties as an
Election Registrar. Above all, petitioner categorically emphasized that her appearances in court were duly authorized by the
COMELEC, which in certain instances were as counsel de oficio, and no remuneration whatsoever from her clients was
received by her,

Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio as unavailing, the Court of Appeals ruled that her various appearances in
court were not on official business, and the permission granted her by the COMELEC was to appear in behalf of her
relatives, and she was still obligated to reflect in her daily time records only the hours when she was actually in the office. 9

We are not convinced. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan, is only two (2) meters from her own
office as Election Registrar in the said municipality. She had standing authority to act as de oficio counsel given by the
COMELEC evidently in furtherance of the free legal aid service program of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the
Government itself, 10 especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had been held during the regime of martial law,
did not have much office work to keep them busy. This state of virtual absence of electoral activities is what prompted
COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take active part in the free legal aid program above adverted to, if to do so would not
unduly interfere with their work. In recognition of the long standing policy of the COMELEC in response to the legal aid
program of the Government 11 and the "free access to the courts" provision of the 1973 Constitution, 12 the COMELEC, by
Resolution No. 1401, 13 formally created the Legal Assistance Office thereby constituting all COMELEC lawyers with rank of
division chief and below as COMELEC Legal Assistance Officers. Even prior to the formal creation of the Legal Assistance
Office, the liberal policy of the COMELEC in allowing its Election Registrars to act as counsel in areas where there are no
lawyers available is, indeed, laudable.

Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to commit the crime with which she is
charged can be imputed against the petitioner. In the information, it was alleged that the petitioner was not in her office for
the full office hours from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified dates therein as she was
then busy attending her cases in court. On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution belies its allegation of the wholeday
absence in office as Election Registrar. Records reveal that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40 or 45 minutes a
day for her appearances therein, at no instance exceeding one (1) hours.

If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question making it appear that she attended her office from 8:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more than color of truth in the entry made. It is not shown that
she did not report first to her office as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to the courtroom just two (2)
meters away. Petitioner thus likened her appearance to going out for the usual coffee breaks. The comparison is not even
apt for during the while she appeared in court, she was rendering service more, if not wholly, for the public good, than just
for her own well-being as when she goes out for snack during the coffee-break period. The court being only two (2) meters
away from her office, she did not even have to go so far as when one goes out for snack. What is more, everytime she
appeared in court, she surely must have made this fact officially of record in the court proceedings, something which is not
done with leaving the office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the entries in petitioner's daily time records were not absolutely
false. The alleged false entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and willful falsehood which alone would
constitute falsification as a crime. 14 As Cuello Calon stated: "La mera inexacted tio es bastante para integrar este
delito (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal 6th Ed. Vol. 11, p. 216, cited in People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691; People vs. La
Corte, CA-G. R. No. 05818-CR; U.S. vs. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518)."

In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief that she was just making of
record the fact that, as was her honest opinion, she was entitled to receive her full pay even for those days she appeared in
court, rendering what she felt was no less a public service, being in furtherance of a public policy on free legal assistance.
As a lawyer, and as in officer of the court, she, for one, aids in the administration of justice, oathbound servant of society
whose duty is not solely for the benefit of her clients but for the public, particularly in the administration of justice. The court a
quo itself recognize, that the COMELEC registrars, at that time, are directed to appear as counsel de oficio when there are
no lawyers to represent the parties in litigation. 15 If petitioner is not at all appointed as counsel de oficio strictly in accordance
with the Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, it is an undisputed fact, as reflected in court records, that petitioner, true to her
oath, acted as counsel in certain cases. On this point, if one fills up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the
time so indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay corresponding to the time so indicated, no intent
to commit the crime of falsification of public document can be ascribed to her. In the case of the herein petitioner, she was
only submitting a time record she knew would be the basis for computing the pay she honestly felt she deserved for the
period indicated. Indeed, the time record is required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of serving as basis for the
determination of the amount of pay an employee is entitled to receive for a given period.

Further, on the issue of malus animus or criminal intent, it was ruled by the court a quo, confirmed by the respondent Court
of Appeals, that in falsification of public document, in contradistinction to private document, the Idea of gain or the intent to
injure a third person is unnecessary, for, what is penalized is the undermining or infringement of the public faith and the
violation of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, invoking the case of People vs. Po Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing
against this ruling, petitioner cited the case of People us. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the ponente in the instant case upheld
in the case of People vs. Motus, CA-G.R. No. 18267-CR when he was in the Court of Appeals, that although the Idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, htis Court emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that
the change in th epublic document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change in the public document must
be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that
happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by Article 1 (now
Article 3) of the Penal Code.

We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the evident purpose of requiring government employees to keep time record is to
show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely adhering tot he policy of no work no pay, a daily
time record is primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss tot he government as would result in instances
where it pays an employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily time record as an official document, however, remains
untarnished if the damages sought to be prevented has not been produced. As this ponente observed in the case of People
v. Motus, supra while it is true that a time record is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its
avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case of a public document
with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is
necessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In the instant case, the time records have already served
their purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government or third person because under the facts duly proven,
petitioner may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper permission from her superiors. They
may now even be condemned as having no more use to require their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not been
harmed by their contents, and continuing faith in their verity is not affected.

As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in the daily time records of officers and employees in the Government service
is a matter of administrative procedural convenience in the computation of salary for a given period, characteristically, not an
outright and strict measure of professional discipline, efficiency, dedication, honestly and competence.

Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner-appellant surely is entitled to receive the pay as if she had stayed in her
office the whole period covered by the official hours prescribed. ,She had perhaps made herself even more useful in the
general benefit of the public than if she had remained practically Idle in her office as Election Registrar with perhaps no work
at all to attend to, its is generally the case long before elections take place, specially during the martial law regime. The
COMELEC must have been fully cognizant of the legal implications of the peculiar facts and circumstances that obtained in
this case, when it gave petitioner full clearance after she presented her resignation when an administrative charge was filed
against her by the same complainant as in the criminal charge. The courts, in the present criminal prosecution, should do no
less. It would be too harsh and cruel for the courts to punish petitioner not only with imprisonment but with general
disqualification and possible disbarment, for an act or omission which she performed or failed to perform without any criminal
intent. Such an insignificant transgression, if ever it is one, would not beam the scales of justice against the petitioner, for
courts must always be, as they are, the repositories of fairness and justice. It is inconceivable that a person who, without any
attempt to conceal her appearances in court for this is a matter always made officially of record in the court proceedings,
emphatically, not for his own private gain, but animated by the zeal of service not wanting in public benefit, and as an officer
of the court, petitioner could have acted with a deliberate criminal intent. Moreover, what she stated in her daily time record,
as earlier observed, had more than a mere color of truth to exclude such act from the pale of the criminal offense of
falsification of public document with which she is charged.

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not to have been established beyond reasonable doubt, the judgment of
conviction rendered by respondent court in affirming that of the trial court is hereby reversed, and petitioner, acquitted of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Footnotes

* Mr. Justice de Castro was designated to sit with the First Division under Special Order No. 225.

1 Decision was penned by Justice Corazon Juliano-Agrava and concurred in by Justice Crisolito Pascual
and Justice Edgardo Paras, p. 45, Rollo.

2 p. 45, Rollo.

3 Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 47, Rollo.

4 Decision, Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Ap- appellant's Brief, p. 58, Rollo.

5 Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, Appellant's Brief, p. 58, Rollo.
6 U.S. vs- Reyes, 1 Phil. 341; People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333; People vs. Arca, 56 0. G. 297 1.

7 Article 3, Revised Penal Code.

8 Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 50, Rollo.

9 p. 51, Rollo.

10 Republic Act No. 6028 (August 4, 1969), otherwise known as the Citizen's Counselor Act of 1969; L. 0.
1. No. 4 (October 23, 1972), creating the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO); Presidential Decree No.
543 (August 31, 1974), authorizing the designation of municipal judges and lawyers in any branch of the
government service to act as counsel de oficio for the accused who are indigent in places where there are
no available practising attorneys.

11 lbid.

12 Sections 1 and 25, Article IV, Bill of Rights, 1973 Constitution

13 COMELEC Resolution No. 1401, promulgated on September 10, 1979, creating the COMELEC Legal
Assistance Office.

14 U.S. vs. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518, U.S. vs. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604; People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691;
People vs. Macaraig, 68 O.G. No. 26 p. 5159 (1971).

15 Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, Appellant's Brief, p. 56,
Rollo.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982

PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 22414-16 CR which affirmed the decision of The
Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch X, convicting the petitioner of three counts of falsification of commercial documents
in Criminal Cases Nos. 599, 600 and 601.

The facts are stated in the poorly written decision of the Court of Appeals thus:

Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar, died at the G.B. Tan
Memorial Hospital at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 24, 1972 after he was confined in said
hospital since January 3, 1972.

Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants [Exhibits A (599), A
(600) and A (601)] to the Superintendent of schools at Catarman Northern Samar who in turn forwarded
them to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks.

The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers certifying that on his
official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rolls had received the salary warrant indicated
opposite his name on February 7, 1972, February 17, 1972 and February 25, 1972, respectively, and
returned the same to Jose Figueroa, the District Administrative Officer of Northern Samar.

Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar S. Luague, while Exhibit A (600) was received by Glen S.
Luague. Exhibit A (601) was received by Edmundo Echano, a relative of Iliuminado Luague and who
claimed to be employed in the Office of the District Supervisor.

Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to return the treasury
warrants issued in the name of her husband Iluminado Luague, further claiming that appellant promised to
do so, but actually did not. Upon the receipt of the xerox copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of
Public Schools, Guillermo discovered that the treasury warrants in question had been encashed by
appellant and Glen Luague with different local stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599) was cleared on February
22, 1972, while Exhibit A (600) was deposited to the account of a certain Lee and/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at
Philippine Bank of Communications; and Exhibit A (601) was deposited to the account of Colgate-
Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Appellant admitted having endorsed the treasury warrants by means of which
she was able to encash the same.

For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasury warrants for purposes
of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Document. [Note: The appellant was charged with three counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial
document but was convicted of falsification only.]

It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of Appeals that she acted in good faith or had no criminal
intent when she cashed her deceased husband's paychecks. As stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals:

Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in signing theme of her deceased husband in the treasury
warrants in question.

Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on leave from January 3 to February 9, 1972, as evidenced by
his approved application for sick leave. On January 23, 1972, the Principal, Jose Infante, while visiting
Iluminado Luague in the hospital, handed to Luague a check representing his differentials. Luague in turn
handed over the check to his wife, the herein appellant, who was then present. Before Infante left, he
informed the Luague spouses that Luague's pay check for the second half of January 1972 had arrived and
 advised Mrs. Luague to get the same from Florencio Guillermo so that she could use it to pay for medicine
and hospital expenses of her husband.

Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife to get the check from Florencio Guillermo. Appellant went to
the house of Guillermo in the afternoon of January 23, 1972. Guillermo asked her to sign the name of her
husband on the payroll warrant register and counter-sign with her initials. Guillermo then handed her the
treasury warrant [Exhibit A (599)].

Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972. From the proceeds of the warrants they received were paid
the amount the Luague family owed the drugstores owned by Amor Carandang, Purisima Saba and Luz
Tan. A treasury warrant was also paid to Edward Kam from whom they bought construction materials for
the tomb of the deceased and to Ong Kiat store for the payment of materials used for the coffin of the late
Iluminado Luague which were purchased on credit.

Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on her belief and upon suggestion of Florencio Guillermo
himself that the warrants could be used to settle their financial obligations incurred by the hospitalization
and death of her late husband, appellant indorsed the said treasury warrants by signing the name of
Iluminado Luague.

Heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the deceased employee
failed to receive. Appellant claims that it was upon this honest belief that she endorsed the treasury
warrants of her late husband to defray for the necessary expenses incurred due to the latter's
hospitalization, funeral and burial.

The Court of Appeals did not reject the petitioner's version, except in respect of the date when the first paycheck was
delivered. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals followed the simplistic procedure of applying
literally the letter of the law, namely: there was falsification because the petitioner "signed her husband's name in indorsing
the treasury warrants in question." The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That the petitioner
signed her husband's name to the checks because they were delivered to her by no less than her husband's district
supervisor long after the husband's death which was known to the supervisor; that she used the proceeds of the checks to
pay for the expenses of her husband's last illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to the money as
an advance payment for her husband's vacation and sick leave credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the
checks. In the fight of these circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal intent to the petitioner. We sustain her claim that she
acted in good faith.

During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due to the encashment of the
checks because the petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value of which exceeded the
value of the three paychecks and the value of the checks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves. This
explains why the petitioner was not convicted of estafa but of falsification only. While we do not mean to imply that if there is
no damage there can be no falsification, We do say that the absence of damage is an element to be considered to
determine whether or not there is criminal intent.

We notice here the lack of compassion on the part of the prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge, and the Court of Appeals. Even
the Solicitor General who is alert in seeking to correct improper convictions by trial courts has somehow misappreciated the
evidence in this case.

The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of bewilderment due to the recent death of her husband when
she cashed the paychecks. She was also in dire need of money to settle the expenses for her husband's last illness and his
burial. A compassionate attitude repeatedly urged by the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order
under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the petitioner is acquitted of
the charges against her. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Ericta, JJ., concur.

Escolin J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-67472 July 3, 1987

DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Under separate informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of the Tanodbayan charges Dario Cabigas y Cacho
and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two (2) counts, with the crime of Falsification of Official Documents allegedly committed
in the following manner:

(1) Criminal Case No. 6529

That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers being then
employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring together, taking advantage of their
official position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their Office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify ... Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 ... evidencing, among others,
receipt by them in their official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A-000064 up to A000082 of the 795th
series, by then and there making alterations and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only treasury bills
bearing SN-A-000064 to A-000076 were received by them on March 9, 1982, for the purpose of hiding or
concealing the loss while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills bearing SN-A-000077 to A-000082 of the 795th
series, thereby changing the meaning of said Securities Delivery Receipt.

(2) Criminal Case No. 6938

That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers, being then
employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring together, and taking advantage of
their official positions and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under custody dated March 30, 1982,
which is an official document evidencing the securities transactions and/or operations of the Makati Branch of the
aforenamed bank, and which it was their official duty to prepare and submit to their superiors, by then and there
indicating in said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss or disappearance while in their custody of six (6)
treasury bills of the 795th series, with face value of P500,000.00 each, that the beginning balance of securities
under their custody as to volume was 1,533 pieces, when, the ending balance as to volume in the previous day's
report was 1,539 pieces and that the beginning balance as to face value in the previous day's report was
P610,095,000.00 and thereafter falsely stating in the footnote of the same document that the reduction was due to
"Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" the truth being that the six (6) pieces of treasury bills
with aggregate face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the Securities Delivery Receipt
or the Daily Report of Securities /Documents under Custody, both dated March 9, 1982, but were discovered to
have been missing after an inventory conducted by accused on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful
statement in a narration of facts in violation of par. 4 of Articles 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez,
with costs de officio and ordering their bail bonds in the said case cancelled.

2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:

a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
of Falsification of a Public or Official Document defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph No. 6 of
the Revised Penal Code without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances; and applying the
 indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio, an ordering his bail bond
cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y Cacho from the foregoing decision
in Criminal Case No. 6938.

The following pertinent facts are not disputed: Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities
Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work
is Benedicto Reynes, the securities receiving clerk. The Fund Management Department (FMD) of the Land Bank of
the Philippines is engaged in money market and securities trading transactions. The securities which are in the form
of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Makati Branch.

On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department, delivered to the Securities Section, Makati Branch of the
Land Bank of the Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00
and for which a copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) Exh. D, was issued to the Fund Management Dept.
while the original of the same was retained by the Securities Section. Included in the securities received on March
9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of
P500,000.00 each, or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities, the accused would prepare
the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the securities transactions and
operations of the Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been the routine procedure being
adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a Security Custodian.

On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited with them, Cabigas and
Reynes discovered the loss of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series with a total value of P3,000,000.00. Upon
verification that Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the source document of the
missing securities which were delivered to them for safekeeping, accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in the
said document the last two digits "82" and the addition after them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064
to A-000082 of the 19 treasury bills of the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then at the
bottom of the SDR Cabigas placed the notation "For adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then upon
Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram When the DR SDUC for
March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills of the 795th series stood at 1,539 pieces with a total
face value of P610,095,000.00.

The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30, 1982 by Carrying forward the ending balance of the
treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated March 29, 1982. However, instead of following the
draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas prepared his own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G ") dated March 30, 1982 wherein
he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the 795th series with a total amount of P607,095,000.00 which the
latter claimed to be the number of securities of the 795th series in his possession at the time of the preparation of
said report. At the bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas place the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry
(incoming) dated March 9, 1982" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the figure "1,533."

On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the Philippines a
treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI
agents, it was discovered that the Land Bank of the Philippines Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram was the
one who negotiated the said treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation revealed that the five
(5) missing treasury bills with series numbers A-000077 to A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home
Savings Bank to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the assistance of the NBI in investigating the
case. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation, Cabigas and
Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR)
dated March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the Daily Report on Securities/Documents under custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G
dated March 30, 1982 and for which the corresponding informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both
accused were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938, while his co-accused was acquitted therein.

In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan stated in its now assailed Decision that

In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) for March
30, 1982, the alleged falsification consists of the following entries (figures) pertaining to treasury bills:
"1,533", "607,095,000.00", "1,533 and 607,095,000.00 "marked on the document as Exhibit G-1, and the
 legend of the asterisk (*) sign at the bottom portion reading, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming)
dated 3/09/82" marked as Exhibit G-2. The numbers "1,533" and "607,095,000.00" represent the volume
and the total face/maturity value, respectively, of the treasury bills supposedly in the custody of the
Securities Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries were falsifications, the prosecution maintains,
because the correct number of treasury bills deposited with the Securities Section as of that date was
1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said figures were altered to "1,533 and 607,095,000.00,"
respectively, to conceal the loss or disappearance of 6 treasury bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the
footnote at the bottom portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was written to attribute the reduction in the
number of treasury bills from "1,539" to "1,533" to mistake or error in the entries in the Securities Delivery
Receipt of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C).

The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 (Exh. F), the ending
balance on the number of treasury bills at the close of office hours on that day was 1,539 pieces with a total
face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-1). Accordingly, the beginning balance on the number of
the same treasury bills on the following day, March 30, 1982, must also be 1,539 pieces with a total
face/Maturity value of P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the DR SDUC for March 30, 1982
(Exhs. G and G-1), the beginning and ending balances on the number and value of treasury bills for that
date were 1,533 pieces and P607,095,000.00 maturity value. 1avv phi1

The question now is, who caused the alterations and what was caused the alteration and what was the
purpose behind them.

xxx xxx xxx

By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from "1,539" and "610" to "1,533" and "607"
respectively, and causing Reynes to type the final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis of the corrected draft
Cabigas caused the document to show that the treasury bills in their custody as of March 30, 1982 were
1,533 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P607,095,000.00. By placing, likewise, an asterisk (*) sign
after the figure "1,533" and writing the words "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as
legend of the asterisk (*) sign, Cabigas caused to make it appear that the discrepancy of 6 treasury bills
valued at P3,000,000.00 was due to error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9,
1982(Exh. C). Considering that the said SDR of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C) did not contain any error but
reflected the number of securities received by them on that day, it is obvious that Cabigas made the
alterations in Exhibit G and the misleading footnote (Exh. G-2) in order to suppress, hide or conceal the fact
that the 6 treasury bills comprising the discrepancy were lost while in their custody.

The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit G, a public or official document, under paragraph No. 4,
Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. As
Securities Custodian, Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in the said document the correct number
and total maturity value of the securities under his official custody as of March 30, 1982.

It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171, which reads-"by making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts,"-the following elements must concur-

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and

(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person.

Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar. The correction of the
figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of treasury under custody is not falsification
because it was made to speak the truth (US vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk (*) sign after the
figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the
asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, was not effected to hide or conceal the fact that the
missing 6 treasury bills were lost. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was no asterisk
or footnote in the DR SDUC Exh. G. In fact, the evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss on
March 29, 1982, petitioner reported the matter to his immediate supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and Branch Manager
of the Securities Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive on the part of petitioner to
conceal the said loss.

Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on Securities/Documents under Custody (DR SDUC) is a form purely
devised and adopted by him. This form was never required, neither was it introduced nor prescribed by the Land
Bank. Petitioner, therefore, was not under "legal obligation" to disclose in the DR SDUC or SDR, the correct number
 and total maturity value of the securities under their official custody as of a given date. It is purely optional on the
part of petitioner to use the said forms.

The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be acquitted because —

There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh. G, for the alleged falsification of which
petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the submission of which was or is required by law. In
the petition for review, petitioner points out that as testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land
Bank. The form was his own initiative adopted "for our own convenience and also for reference purposes."
Petitioner therefore, was not under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by said DR SDUC. In the absence
of such obligation and of the alleged wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of
falsification of public document with which he is charged. (People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).

WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 6938 is hereby
REVERSED and another one rendered ACQUITTING the petitioner, Dario Cabigas y Cacho.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-
appellant.

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,

vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *

Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.

Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego,
the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware
store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial
vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.

The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the
nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's
office and by the governor's representative.

The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the
creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the
instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works
projects.

Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial
engineer.

Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available
therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.

Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, reads:

I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of sixteen thought
seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund
cover the payment.

This is signed by the auditor.

Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's
certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ."
It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of the voucher.

Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K,
the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
 Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the sum of seven
hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the above stated account, which I
hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check No. .................................

CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON

According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words:
"Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."

Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the payment of PI 6,727.52 to
the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the
bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher
makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.

The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:

(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).

(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The alleged official receipt
No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.

(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to the provincial government

(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated
January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the signatures of the following office were forged:
Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting
provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their
signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.

(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For and By Authority of the
Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in
Primicias office.

(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969, containing a description
and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the
company's assistant manager, the company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1).
Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.

(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those documents are the
taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327
and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D
and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.

(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on the left margin is his
signature (Exh. A-10).

The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.

Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of certain amounts to the
Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were
also falsified. These five vouchers are the following:

(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for number and
hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).

(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware
materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)

(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware
materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).

(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware
materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
 (5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware
materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).

As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their signatures in the said five
vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to
the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence,
those supporting papers could not be presented in evidence.

Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that the lumber and
hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his company to the provincial government. The
charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The
projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.

The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and hardware materials. The
receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine
official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to
transactions with the provincial government.

Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the pro treasurer's office.
He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of
the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial
auditor, provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the
employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).

The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered
the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature
(Ekh. DD).

Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who
performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R
and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.

Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial t r's office. Crusade
said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of
the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).

From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to
record the same (Exh. CC).

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher After Rosete had
initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the voucher were
paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh.
EE). He received the payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the
vouchers.

The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego
signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest
belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited
and approved by the auditor.

Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he received from
Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he
presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's
signatures are genuine.

In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with malversation through falsification
in three docketed as follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969 in the sum of
P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.

2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated April 15 (two
dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38
(four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.
 3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969 in the sum of
P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.

After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation through
falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the following penalties:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one-
days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in
the same amount;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90 and to
indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount; and

(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one
days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as maximum ,
and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same
amount.

Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.

Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal
liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows:

The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of
conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and executory extinguished his criminal
liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the
fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his
death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify
the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil
action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of
Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has
no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar
as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable,
in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of
attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant,
there is no specific assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for
the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief,
he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida,
Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the following. Province
of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil
liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.

Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary to resolve his first two
assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it
is argued that there is no complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence.

In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private prosecutors Millora and
Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-
judgment, bias and political self-interest.

Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of the case from the
preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.

At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora
was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the
offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.

The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had authorized Atty. Millora
to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).

Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private prosecutors. The lower court
denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No. 23350).

After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final
of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated November 4, 1969.

At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and Atty. Millora, the
private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to
conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).

At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to examine the prosecution
witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the motion (155 tsn).

The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were present together with
the private prosecutor.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule that the criminal action
should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the
province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code).

The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have been the result of the
undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial
court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The
unassailable probative value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the
trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.

Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the propriety of the imposition
of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes
committed were not complex.

The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's conclusion that Sendaydiego
and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial
treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.

Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer,
testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had
signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers,
approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the
voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3,
1969).

Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred in finding that he
signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher,
Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts covered thereby should
be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the
column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he
(Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were
instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.

The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the cashier was summoned to
make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the
payments should be made in the treasurer's office when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.

The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the Carried Construction Supply
Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be
present when the payments were received, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the
payments or to require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.

Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have been unmasked by the
supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by means of checks. The company on
receiving the checks would have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any
payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson.

Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the provincial and Samson as
shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner
office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer.

The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments were made. However,
Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he
wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K.
Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).

Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers inner office because his
table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when
the cashier went to the treasurers office because the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the
cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).

Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a crime which can be
committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same). This argument does not deserve serious
consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted
maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.

The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor, then the treasurer's
exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention because the evidence for the prosecution
against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an
accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that
the treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by the auditor. In
short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in
good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.

We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of
the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore,
the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts malversed was duly substantial.

Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the
expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and
received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.

As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in fairness to the accused, in
the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had conducted the preliminary investigation.

Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who
conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly.
His conduct of the trial does not show that he had already prejudged their guilt.

Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation, does
not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed
the corresponding information. The rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could
impartially try the case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they would invariably be iron-
bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.

The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then tries the case on the
merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense
falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court
after terminating the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First
Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad
vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without
any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.

Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the Constabulary crime laboratory,
a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signatures.

Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of Samson have
fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the exemplar signatures of Samson were
not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).

After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of the parties, we find
that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical differences between the
questioned and authentic signatures.

But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had
no hand in the writing thereof.

The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his residence certificates,
income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded
form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.

On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial government are in angular
form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.

Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his
fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in
the six fake official receipts of the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers
were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn
July 16, 1970).

Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and when necessary (Mehta,
Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents
418-419).

Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's signatures (94-
99 tsn July 31, 1969).

Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers were written by only
one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).

The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried
Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and
auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those
circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of
it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use
or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be
proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had
complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28;
People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered
it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government and another form of
signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note
that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to

Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers, Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).

As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial court made absolutely no
finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is not correct.

We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers
ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there was conivance
between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office,
instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that
Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).

Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the vouchers is not well
taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven
that Samson signed the vouchers).

Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the six vouchers "was
really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he contends that his signatures thereon are
forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in
the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).

These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant manager of Carried
Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the
company (Exh. HH).

And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried Construction Supply Co.,
denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six vouchers which he was supposed to have collected
for the company from Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of
construction materials.

Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after Sendaydiego admtte that
Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.

The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on a shaky foundation or
is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.

Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation on his belief that in the
six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the
fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments
of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.

On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received the said amounts from the
cashier of the treasurer's office.

These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the inexpugnable fact that Samson
had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in the offices of the provicial government the construction
materials described in the six vouchers and denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.

The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and
the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having committed an honest mistake have to be
disbelieved.

The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to
camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have some genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake.

Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through falsification of public
documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.

The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and malversation were
committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where
the falsification was used as a means to commit malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to
for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil
354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).

In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal treasurer made it appear in
two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked as laborers in a certain street project at
Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and
taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons
mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.

It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime because the
falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each falsification and each malversation
constituted independent offenses which must be punished separately.

The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct penalties were imposed.

In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and bridge could have
malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of
the malversation.

The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.

Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct
offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).

And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of malversation were
committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.

As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession of the forged vouchers
and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.

He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those
offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing
malversation is also guilty of malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and
Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).

Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide or qualified theft. In
such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and
simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).

Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code
by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872
(Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayorminimum and
medium.

For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh.
Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.

For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in paragraph 4 of article
217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.

In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the imprisonment penalty.

In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying circumstances (Arts.
64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate sentence.

WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation.

In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:

For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccionalmedium, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in
the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252).

For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the
same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).

For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an
indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same
amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same
amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum,
as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case
No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor
minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is
three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him,
or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).

The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub,
69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.

Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay
one-half of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson guilty of six separate crimes each of falsification
and malversation as elucidated in the very well studied and ably prepared main opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Aquino, and while I further agree that said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego are
lointtv and solidarity liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts stated ir. the dispositive portion of the decision
herein, I have my own legal basis for holding that the estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the, said amount&
To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego (he died during the pendency of this appeal) insofar as his liability is concerned, ... Sendaydiego's appeal will
(nevertheless) be resolved only for the purpose of showing his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate is liable." It seems to me that there is some degree of irreconcilable incontency in dismissing a case, thereby
acquitting the accused therein of criminal liability because of death or any other cause not amounting to a finding that he had
not committed the act complaint of and at the same nine holding that he or his estate has in civil liability based on his
criminal liability. It is to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an appml due to death of the appellant, from a judgment of
conviction by a trial court does not result in the affirmance of sruch conviction contrary to the general rule when an appeal in
a case is dismissed but, on the contrary, it amounts to an acquittal of the appellant based on the constitutionally mandated
presumption of innocence in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt, something that his death prevents the
court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-appellant has the effect of his total absolution by God from any
earthly responsibility for the offense as such, a divine act of clemency no human court can reverse, qualify, much less
disregard. It is an inherent inalienable human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of criminal liability in
any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt in a duly held
criminal proceeding. The intervention of death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself that no criminal
liability whatsoever should be imposed on him, not only because from the very nature of the situation, it is impossible to do
so but also because it would be a juridical absurdity to contemplate such a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the
crime, and, corollarily, all its consequences.

Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal liability under Artide 100 of the Revised Penal
Code would have no basis unless criminal responsibih"ly is fixed or exists. It has been said that civil liabilitv under this
provision "is rooted in the criminal liability". 1 In this connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that "when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, etc." But it must be emphasized that these legal precepts refer exclusively to the civil liability
consequent of the offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it being elementary on our legal system that the same act my
give rise to civil responsibility independent of that resulting from the commission of the act as a crime.

Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in the act viewed as a violation of the penal law
and still be liable civilly for it considered otherwise as an infringement of a right based on a created by contract or by laws
other than the criminal law. A consistent host of jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem
exists upholding the right of a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity, restitution or reparation, notwithstanding the
absence or failure of the usual prosecution, in view of the provisions of the pertinent articles of the Civil Code on Human
Relations and Section 2 of Rule III. Stated the same act or got Of facts can be the subject of obligations arise at the same
time thru the different modes contemplated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code providing that "obligations arise from (1) lave, (2)
contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or omissions punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or omission is
punished by law, thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor, does not exclude simultaneous liability of the for the same
act viewed also as one giving rise to an obligation under the another law, and/or under a contract, quasi-contract or quasi-
delict, with the sole qualification that the aggrieved party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or
omission. (See Art. 2177, Civil Code.)

I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And as I see it my learned colleagues in the majority
and I are agreed that in the light of the legal Principles I have stated, there can be no doubt that the estate of Sendaydiego
could be held liable for the acts of the d that can be proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of
Sendaydiego's appeal by reason of his death. Our possible disagreement relates only to the procedural aspect of the matter.

The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate within this appeal proceedings, thereby sing with the
filing of a separate civil action for the In my view, the dismissal of Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as I have said to his
acquittal This acquittal to my mind is different juridically from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only intimated
earlier, it is a total absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from or extinction of the civil liability as if the
Court had hold that the act from which the civil (action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e), Rule 111.) But this is not to
say that the state is already exonerated altogether from another kind of civil liability for indemnity, restitution or reparation,
for under the unbroken line of precedents I have already referred to, the pertinent provisions on Human Relations of the Civil
Code, particularly Article 30, come into play, for under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based on his
death becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal
offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as such, that is, without having to
prove the criminal liability of the defendant so long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by
a preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings, are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."

My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on the act as crime has to be prosecuted in a te
civil action and not within the same criminal proceedings wherein the accused has been acquitted or the case against him is
terminated with exonerative consequence. If there is any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding
precedent. Worse, in my opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous premise that Article 29 of the Civil Code
does not mean literally what it says. Textually, this article states:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
 requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In
the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not
the acquittal is due to that ground.

Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted." It does not say that the civil action joined with the criminal action, as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 111, shall
survive and be the one continued. I reiterate that what is left to the offended party after the death of an accused before
conviction is the right to institute a civil action for damages for the same act or omission pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the
Civil Code and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to take the position that since the point I am
pressing on is more or less procedural or remedial in nature, and perhaps, the failure of the parties concerned to seriously
object to the procedure pursued in the main opinion could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper
way of dealing with the civil liability incurred by the estate of the deceased Sendaydiego, hence my concurrence, in the
qualified sense implicit in this separate opinion, in the dispositive portion of the decision herein.

May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted that when appeals in criminal cases before us
have to be dismissed by reason of the death of the appellant, it is not proper to qualify such dismissal as limited to that of the
criminal liability of the appellant. It is my humble view that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the offended parties
concerned should be left to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the appropriate separate civil action contemplated
both in the Civil Code and in Rule 111, as explained above. I admit this view might entail the institution of what is virtually a
repetitive proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding what the unequivocal language of the pertinent legal provisions
mandate, unless I make myself a party to judicial legislation, which I believe it is not constitutionally permissible for me to do,
no matter how practical the procedure might be.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson guilty of six separate crimes each of falsification
and malversation as elucidated in the very well studied and ably prepared main opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Aquino, and while I further agree that said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego are
lointtv and solidarity liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts stated ir. the dispositive portion of the decision
herein, I have my own legal basis for holding that the estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the, said amount&

To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego (he died during the pendency of this appeal) insofar as his liability is concerned, ... Sendaydiego's appeal will
(nevertheless) be resolved only for the purpose of showing his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate is liable." It seems to me that there is some degree of irreconcilable incontency in dismissing a case, thereby
acquitting the accused therein of criminal liability because of death or any other cause not amounting to a finding that he had
not committed the act complaint of and at the same nine holding that he or his estate has in civil liability based on his
criminal liability. It is to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an appml due to death of the appellant, from a judgment of
conviction by a trial court does not result in the affirmance of sruch conviction contrary to the general rule when an appeal in
a case is dismissed but, on the contrary, it amounts to an acquittal of the appellant based on the constitutionally mandated
presumption of innocence in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt, something that his death prevents the
court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-appellant has the effect of his total absolution by God from any
earthly responsibility for the offense as such, a divine act of clemency no human court can reverse, qualify, much less
disregard. It is an inherent inalienable human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of criminal liability in
any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt in a duly held
criminal proceeding. The intervention of death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself that no criminal
liability whatsoever should be imposed on him, not only because from the very nature of the situation, it is impossible to do
so but also because it would be a juridical absurdity to contemplate such a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the
crime, and, corollarily, all its consequences.

Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal liability under Artide 100 of the Revised Penal
Code would have no basis unless criminal responsibih"ly is fixed or exists. It has been said that civil liabilitv under this
provision "is rooted in the criminal liability". 1 In this connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that "when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, etc." But it must be emphasized that these legal precepts refer exclusively to the civil liability
consequent of the offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it being elementary on our legal system that the same act my
give rise to civil responsibility independent of that resulting from the commission of the act as a crime.

Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in the act viewed as a violation of the penal law
and still be liable civilly for it considered otherwise as an infringement of a right based on a created by contract or by laws
other than the criminal law. A consistent host of jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem
exists upholding the right of a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity, restitution or reparation, notwithstanding the
absence or failure of the usual prosecution, in view of the provisions of the pertinent articles of the Civil Code on Human
Relations and Section 2 of Rule III. Stated the same act or got Of facts can be the subject of obligations arise at the same
time thru the different modes contemplated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code providing that "obligations arise from (1) lave, (2)
contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or omissions punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or omission is
punished by law, thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor, does not exclude simultaneous liability of the for the same
act viewed also as one giving rise to an obligation under the another law, and/or under a contract, quasi-contract or quasi-
delict, with the sole qualification that the aggrieved party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or
omission. (See Art. 2177, Civil Code.)

I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And as I see it my learned colleagues in the majority
and I are agreed that in the light of the legal Principles I have stated, there can be no doubt that the estate of Sendaydiego
could be held liable for the acts of the d that can be proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of
Sendaydiego's appeal by reason of his death. Our possible disagreement relates only to the procedural aspect of the matter.

The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate within this appeal proceedings, thereby sing with the
filing of a separate civil action for the In my view, the dismissal of Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as I have said to his
acquittal This acquittal to my mind is different juridically from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only intimated
earlier, it is a total absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from or extinction of the civil liability as if the
Court had hold that the act from which the civil (action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e), Rule 111.) But this is not to
say that the state is already exonerated altogether from another kind of civil liability for indemnity, restitution or reparation,
for under the unbroken line of precedents I have already referred to, the pertinent provisions on Human Relations of the Civil
Code, particularly Article 30, come into play, for under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based on his
death becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal
offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as such, that is, without having to
prove the criminal liability of the defendant so long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by
a preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings, are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."

My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on the act as crime has to be prosecuted in a te
civil action and not within the same criminal proceedings wherein the accused has been acquitted or the case against him is
terminated with exonerative consequence. If there is any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding
precedent. Worse, in my opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous premise that Article 29 of the Civil Code
does not mean literally what it says. Textually, this article states:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In
the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not
the acquittal is due to that ground.

Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted." It does not say that the civil action joined with the criminal action, as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 111, shall
survive and be the one continued. I reiterate that what is left to the offended party after the death of an accused before
conviction is the right to institute a civil action for damages for the same act or omission pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the
Civil Code and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to take the position that since the point I am
pressing on is more or less procedural or remedial in nature, and perhaps, the failure of the parties concerned to seriously
object to the procedure pursued in the main opinion could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper
way of dealing with the civil liability incurred by the estate of the deceased Sendaydiego, hence my concurrence, in the
qualified sense implicit in this separate opinion, in the dispositive portion of the decision herein.

May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted that when appeals in criminal cases before us
have to be dismissed by reason of the death of the appellant, it is not proper to qualify such dismissal as limited to that of the
criminal liability of the appellant. It is my humble view that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the offended parties
concerned should be left to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the appropriate separate civil action contemplated
both in the Civil Code and in Rule 111, as explained above. I admit this view might entail the institution of what is virtually a
repetitive proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding what the unequivocal language of the pertinent legal provisions
mandate, unless I make myself a party to judicial legislation, which I believe it is not constitutionally permissible for me to do,
no matter how practical the procedure might be.

Footnotes

* Title of case was amended pursuant to resolution dated July 8, 1977. In the resolution of August 31, 1977
Sendaydiego's heirs, namely, his wife Paula and Children, Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo,
Wilfredo, Cesar, Nela and Aida were substituted for him.

Barredo, J.:

1 The Revised Penal Code by Aquino, Vol. I, p. 711, (1976 ed.)

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989

MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of
falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal
before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:

That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela,
taking advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and,
sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July
1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk
in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in said document
that there was such a position existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused
well-know (sic), there was no such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of
Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds
therefor.

xxx

[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan,
Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for
employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask
information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in his house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio
Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following
day and that she should be included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the
accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers.

She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused.

xxx

Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1,
1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of
1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C").

xxx
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her
monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October, November and
December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the
Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see
the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that there was no money.
because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic)
information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty.
Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976,
against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the
annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No
supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new
item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new
position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for
1974- 1975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that
position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the
Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the
accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who
was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l").

xxx

[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]

After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
document as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from
FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS
of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed.
Costs against the accused- appellant.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]

Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian.
Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
when it affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following

A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence of
criminal intent on the part of the accused.

B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedly
falsified certification.

C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.

D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence
despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]

Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public
officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification,
the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA
18.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality
of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued
in connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official
in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether
or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner.
Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government
(specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public
document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that
funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself
did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.

Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not
meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:

Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination
of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p.
161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362].

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are
available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the position what
one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such
item exists and funds are allocated therefor.

In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to
in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position
are available" [Rollo, p. 41).

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D.
No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of
Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office
of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made
in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification
utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an
iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From
the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically
the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the
availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been
delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as Civil Service
Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said
certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified
document is a public document. This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96
Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to
injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. The rationale for this
principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the
falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be
present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,
the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed"
[People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents
therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to
third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his
part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to
exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the
municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the
municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget
for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal
Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His
knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these
documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-
32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the
time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance
creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council.

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false
certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an
untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and
the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that petitioner
committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document should
likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the
offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime"
[U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document
in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the
preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case
of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in
the absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A
careful and thorough review of the record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view
of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution
had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence,
this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due
process of law:

. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the
orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an
opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has
had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing
People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due
to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon
the evidence presented by the prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be
present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf
[People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of the
petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of
venue, he also failed to appear [See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto,
one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for
the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial
court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and
the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:, concurring.

I agree with the precedent rulings applied by the Court to the facts as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. I
believe, however, that a too literal application of the rules may blur the line between deliberate intent to commit a crime and
the unwitting commission, through negligence, of an act which would otherwise be criminal if intentionally committed.

It is a well-known fact that many top officials both national and local, usually rely on the initials of lower echelon employees
on such routine matters as prior compliance with regular procedures. When a government executive sees the required
initials below his typewritten name, he confidently affixes his signature to certifications, clearances, and approvals of permits
or licenses. He is technically guilty of falsification if what he signed turns out to be false but should we require him to
personally go over every step and procedure which he ordinarily leaves to subordinates? In this case, of course, there is
evidence that the accused was aware that the position to which Carreon was appointed is non-existent.

There is likewise an indication in this case that the petitioner could not present evidence in his defense because he was in
the United States hiding from political enemies. However, his counsel was here and his main plea was for change of venue.
If the venue had been changed, there would have been presentation of evidence. I agree with the ponente that the due
process argument has not been presented adequately, sufficient to reverse the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:, concurring.

I agree with the precedent rulings applied by the Court to the facts as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. I
believe, however, that a too literal application of the rules may blur the line between deliberate intent to commit a crime and
the unwitting commission, through negligence, of an act which would otherwise be criminal if intentionally committed.

It is a well-known fact that many top officials both national and local, usually rely on the initials of lower echelon employees
on such routine matters as prior compliance with regular procedures. When a government executive sees the required
initials below his typewritten name, he confidently affixes his signature to certifications, clearances, and approvals of permits
or licenses. He is technically guilty of falsification if what he signed turns out to be false but should we require him to
personally go over every step and procedure which he ordinarily leaves to subordinates? In this case, of course, there is
evidence that the accused was aware that the position to which Carreon was appointed is non-existent.

There is likewise an indication in this case that the petitioner could not present evidence in his defense because he was in
the United States hiding from political enemies. However, his counsel was here and his main plea was for change of venue.
If the venue had been changed, there would have been presentation of evidence. I agree with the ponente that the due
process argument has not been presented adequately, sufficient to reverse the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]
192 SCRA 521
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and
FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel Castañeda on
January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the herein
public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo
Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered
in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public
Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact.
On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and
Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the
amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the
mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964. :- nad

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been paid, the
mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta
Quinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972,
complainant allegedly discovered that their property was already registered in the name of said Ramon
Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed
against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the information reading
as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private
individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a
Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and
affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter of
fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof,
nor gave his permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with intent of gain and by
means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified
public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from the People's Bank and Trust
Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency,
without the knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and the
prosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a
handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was not continued as counsel for private
respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime
charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he
authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him and his
brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was foreclosed by
the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to sign a
document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de
Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother
said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you to
sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned
by you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that?
xxx
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of
identification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This document
consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and the second page
be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court what is this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient basis for
the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years had
elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information charges the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the more serious crime
which shall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code. The
more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the public document which is punishable
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.
Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the same prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged the date of
the commission of the crime which was February 5, 1964 and the information was filed only on March
29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10) years has passed
from the commission of the crime to the filing of the information. No other allegation having been
made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that the period of
prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was committed. He asserts that, from the date
appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage
documents were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1984,
hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on the same date. To support his theory, private
respondent made the following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it is
known at the time of its commission. :-cralaw

"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire series of
transactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection
with said transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and the period of
prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th
Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-
712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended was
an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only quoting
what his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get a
loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be considered
should not be the date of registration of the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It argued
that the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed an action to
eject complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in the information because it was
considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be in accord with the
legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner submits that "(t)he
same has only a persuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had prescribed. The
People's motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang
Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court. In a
resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a petition for review
on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for review and the
corresponding comment and reply of the parties having been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court
resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required petitioner and private respondent to
submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private respondent would
thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private
respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished by
prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs. City
Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant
to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the
prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the
defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of
the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so
that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis
to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a public document may be a
means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage
not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The
damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document,
hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to
complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of
petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the offense
charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera
and of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense that
the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by the evidence
because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly shows that what was
intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding
that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other
words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half
portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the following
quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get
a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his brother
Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano
Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru falsification of
a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however, determinative of the validity
of the impugned orders of public respondent. : nad

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that for the most
serious component offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification which carries with it the
correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not more
than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable by correctional penalties
prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the
prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to mortgage a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00
from the People's Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru falsification of a public
document was filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim that the ten-year period
commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972 by reason of the
ejectment suit against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a public registry is
a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. On
these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that
in the crime of falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences from the time the
offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with
the Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the
discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case of mistake or
fraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held that the
discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world and this should
apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad

We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on constructive
notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to
private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with
earlier, that is, from the time the questioned documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13, 1964. The
criminal information against private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or more
than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent was charged has indubitably
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders of public
respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Endnotes
1. Complainant's Affidavit, Original Record, 4-5, 193-194; T.S.N. June 18, 1974, 2-7; Nov. 28, 1975, 2-6.
2. Original Record, 1.
3. Rollo, 54-69.
4. Ibid., 55-56.
5. Ibid., 59.
6. Ibid., 62.
7. Ibid., 64.
8. Ibid., 65.
9. Ibid., 42.
10. Ibid., 136.
11. Ibid., 153, 165.
12. 154 SCRA 175(1987), reiterating People vs. Desalisa, et al., 125 Phil. 27 (1966).
13. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book II, 235.
14. Original Record, 204-205.
15. 175 SCRA 597 (1989).
16. 70 SCRA 606 (1976).
17. 18 SCRA 1253 (1966).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.:

On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then
holder of non-professional driver's license No. 14744271 with official receipt No. 7023037,2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette
Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former and physical injuries to the latter.

As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters where his driver's license was
confiscated by Cpl. Daniel Severino who later submitted Dava's driver's license to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license
was thereafter presented as prosecution evidence in criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries reckless
imprudence filed against Dava in the then Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig.3

On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a maroon
Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court
and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava, Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce
Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license.4 The Ministry of Defense later indorsed Roxas' request for
assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).

At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya of the CHPG saw the
maroon Volkswagen car described by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide Department Store near the then Nation theater in
Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and his companion arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver
for his license. They were shown non-professional driver's license No. 27068875 with official receipt No. 06058706 issued by
Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed them
that his officemate had secured it for him.

Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for questioning. Dava refused to give a
statement upon the advice of his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report to Col. Maristela stating therein that "subject
had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false representation in the application of a driver's license intended to be used as a
legal license."7 In his affidavit of apprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising stated that he was 'about to book him for
violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when subsequent investigation revealed that the Driver's License above-mentioned
is a Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification and use of falsified documents under Section 172 of the
Revised Penal Code should be filed against Dava.8 Lising concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he
compared it with the xerox copy of Dava's license which was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the
signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not tally."9

Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City.10 One of the prosecution witnesses was Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the
Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). He testified that hen was then the registrar of the said office when Dava's driver'
license was brought to him by lawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing whether it was genuine or fake and if
was issued by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He examine it and found out that it was "fake or illegally issued" because
form No. 2706887 was one of the fifty (50) forms which had been reported missing from their office sometime in November,
1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant for a license.11He added that any license that was not included their office
index card was considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency." 12

Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine,13 the signature of the issuing official was fake.14 He
"believed" certain persons had been apprehended for "plasticization" of licenses outside their office 15 and that sometime
November, 1976, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation raided the house of a certain person who had in his
possession some of the forms which had been missing from office.16 He concluded that the license was fake because the
form was issued by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its face to have been issued the San
Fernando, Pampanga agency.17

Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of Appeals 18 which affirmed the lower court's decision
on January 29, 1982. Dava filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to try the case. On April 27, 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its decision and issued a
resolution the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and another judgment shall be
entered annulling the proceedings in the court a quo without prejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper
court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)

Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47 at San Fernando as Criminal
Case No. 2422. The information for falsification of a public document reads as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of San Fernando,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
MICHAEL T. DAVA, a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be
falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No. 2706887 covered by Official Receipt No. 0605870,
dated January 24, 1978, a public document, by making it appear that the signatories therein who are officials of the
Pampanga LTC Agency participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not so participate
and the accused made use of the same knowing it to be falsified.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava driving a car and that, knowing that
Dava's license had been confiscated as a result of the filing of the homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence case, he thereafter sought the assistance of then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a
license.19 For his part, Domingo Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in court how he first saw Daya driving a car along
Banahaw and N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon City until he finally confronted Dava at the vicinity of the Araneta Coliseum and
confiscated his driver's license. As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's license shown to him by Dava was fake
because he noticed that, when compared with the license attached to record of the criminal case filed against Dava, the
license confiscated bore a different signature and date of birth.20

Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he investigated the traffic incident along Shaw
Boulevard on October 19, 1975 which involved Dava and the two relatives of Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's
no professional driver's license No. 1474427 which he later turn over to the fiscal's office.21

In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court that, upon a resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Dava was allowed by the lower court having jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's
license 1474427 from the records of said case.22 When confronted by the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said
license in December, 1982 and surrendered it to the BLT Western District Office so that he could renew his license. 23 Hence,
the evidence presented before the Court was a mere xerox copy of said license24 which also bears a notation that Dava
received original driver's license and its receipt on December 15, 1982.25

Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT and whose name appears
registrar thereof in official receipt No. 0605870 which was supposed to be attached to Dava's driver's license No. 270688
admitted that the form of the said license was genuine although he could not tell whether its contents were likewise genuine
because it was "opened" and "spliced."26 He asserted, however, that since the said form "did not emanate" from his office
and "a facsimile was not printed" over his name, said license was "not OK".27

Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional office that the number in the license was one of
"the numbers requisitioned by (the) Angeles City agency." 28 He affirmed that drivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by
(their) agency"29 although when recalled to the stand, he admitted that the "2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on
the face of license No. 2706887 referred to the San Fernando agency.30 Martin also confirmed the genuineness of official
receipt No. 0605870 although it was his assistant who signed it for him31 and affirmed that the amount of P10.00 indicated
therein had been collected and received by his office.32

Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its chief and inquire about the
number of driver's license issued to Dava and whether said office had indeed issued them. According to him, the head of the
office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to verify from the index card in the possession of the License Division head whether the
Angeles City agency had indeed issued Dava's license.33 Thereafter, the officer-in-charge of the License Division of the BLT
in East Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina, issued a certification dated December 24, 1979 to the effect that non-
professional drivers license No. 2706887 in the name of Dava was "not registered in (their) Index Card."34

Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles City BLT agency, had died on May
12, 1980.35 He offered in evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh. J.
Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of Carolino Vinluan
which was taken on January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal,
Branch V at Quezon City. It was marked as Exh. K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was
transmitted to the Regional Trial Court Pampanga.36

The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his former co-trainee at the Sandoz
Philippines, a pharmaceutical firm, Manalili testified that Dava quested him to secure a driver's license for him because he
had none. Manalili went to the San Fernando office of the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to secure
own license. At the LTC branch office, he was "approached"37 the fixers who roamed around the compound. When he as
them how much it would cost to secure a driver's license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00. 38 He agreed to pay amount
and gave the fixers the personal data of Dava.39

After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic jacket. (Manalili identified the license as Exh. B.)
He examined it and found out that it looked "like a genuine and authentic driver's license" to him. The license, which opened
and unsealed, bore a signature in the portion which showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of
Dava. Because it did not bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave the license to Dava and told him to sign it
immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's presence.40

On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision41 finding that the license in question was "fake or spurious", that was
not duly issued by any proper government licensing age and that the accused directly participated in the commission of the
falsification or caused said falsification. The court took into account the facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license
because of his work as a detailman; that he received his genuine license from the court only on December 15, 1982, and
that Dava himself personally requested his friend, Manalili, to secure the license for him. It arrived at the conclusion that
since Dava was the possessor or user of the fake license, he himself was the forger or the one who caused its forgery or
falsification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal of the came of Falsification of a Public Document, as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby
sentences him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correecional as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, plus the costs of this suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,42 which on September 30, 1985 affirmed in in toto the decision of
the trial court. On February 27, 1986, the appellate court denied Dava's motion for the reconsideration of said decision
finding that no new grounds had been raised therein. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of Carolino Vinluan on the ground that being a part
of the annulled proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may not be considered as admissible in evidence as it cannot
qualify as a "testimony at a former trial" under the provisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No.
24312-CR, expressly annulled the proceedings had in Criminal Case No. Q-10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City
court over the case. That ruling is founded on solid jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the absence of proof
that the party raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel,43 a decision rendered by a court without
jurisdiction is a total nullity.44 Being worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. 45 Hence, the
testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in evidence but may well be considered as totally nonexistent.

With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of
petitioner for the crime charged?

The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's license No. 2706887 that
"officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in in-preparation and with having used the said driver's license knowing
that it was falsified. The charges therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which
punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically paragraph 2
thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any act proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a false document
under the last paragraph of Article 172.

The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license, asked his friend, Manalili, to
secure one for him. Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his own driver's license in San Fernando,
Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's license No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation
Commission (LTC) agency in said locality.46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said office by paying
the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870.47
In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt showing that at the previous year
the licensee had paid for his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the
transaction did not involve the issuance of "another form," a driver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal
of a license. The said agency would then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but the driver's
license itself would not be changed.48

Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No. 864321 49 were presented to
the San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein issued official-receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although
the receipt was not personally signed by office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt50 was genuine and the
amount indicated therein was actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando agency.51 The driver's license itself may not
have been issued by said agency52 but its form was likewise genuine. However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because
it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name therein. 53 Moreover, according to the
officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional
driver's license No. 2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in their index card.54

Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint the
petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at
he caused the falsification and made use of the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.

The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed
penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by
another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he
used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last
it was used with intent to cause such damage.55 Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason
doubt in this case.

It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that
he has not at any time been issued a driver's license.56 Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili
awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform
duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing
the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a without having
to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire to
help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid
P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee then was only P15.00.57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili
with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers
cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the
commission of said crime.

Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No. 2706887. Having already
obtained a driver's license, he knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would
have been no need for him to misrepresent to his friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even
with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili would be able to secure a driver's license
through legal means in about an hour's time.58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's license No. 2706887 was more
than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In
fact, Manalili testified that he himself was surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of
Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the fixer's assistance. 59 In those days, all plastic
jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the release of the license applied for. Under
these circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say that petitioner did not know that his license was a
fake.60

A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license
becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished.61 Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with
petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the
same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document.

The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on
April 12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a
detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12,
1978, petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887.

The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least an
intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. 62

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego,63 should be applied in his
favor:
 The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is
especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that
the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection
with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45
PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil.
1253). In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who
used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA
688; People vs. Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the
exception that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document.64 His
explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above,
Manalili himself could not have acted on his own accord without the prodding of petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government agencies. To him, a fixer is a
"necessary evil" who could do things fast for the right amount. He is "not necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or
falsification of official documents" and he shares his fees with "insiders." 65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they proliferate is a sad commentary
not only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple
serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact
business with the government and for corruption of the gullible government employees. Their unwanted presence must be
dealt with accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government agencies the better for all of us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of this decision be served on
that Department of Transportation and Communication. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Exh. G.

2 Exh. G-1.

3 Criminal Case No. 16474; Exh. F.

4 Exh. A.

5 Exh. B.

6 Exh. B-1.

7 Exh. D.

8 Exh. E.

9 TSN, November 29, 1983, pp. 15-17.

10 Criminal Case No. Q-10759.

11 Exhs. K, K-2, K-4, K-11.

12 Exh. K-4.

13 Exh. K-5.

14 Exh. K-10.
15 Ibid.

16 Exh. K-11.

17 Ibid., Exh. K-6.

18 CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR.

19 TSN, September 27, 1983 & October 13, 1983.

20 An examination of Dava's two licenses reveals that there is al a discrepancy on the data regarding his height. In
license No. 270688 it is indicated that Dava is 6 feet 2 inches tall while in license No. 1474427, he is 5 feet 8 inches
tall. (TSN, November 29, 1983).

21 TSN, December 8, 1983.

22 Ibid., pp. 9 & 13.

23 Ibid., P. 10.

24 Exh. G.

25 Exh. G-1.

26 TSN, December 8, 1983, p. 29.

27 Ibid., p. 22.

28 Ibid., p. 25.

29 Ibid., p. 28.

30 TSN, January 10, 1984, p. 2.

31 Exh. B-1.

32 TSN, December 8, 1983, p. 31.

33 TSN, December 20, 1983, p. 7.

34 Exh. 1.

35 TSN, December 20, 1983, p. 12.

36 TSN, November 8, 1983, p. 7.

37 TSN, January 17, 1984, p. 20.

38 Ibid., p. 21.

39 Ibid., p. 23.

40 Ibid., pp. 23-30.

41 Penned by Judge Florencio Florenda.

42 Justice Juan A. Sison, ponente, with Justices Federico B. Alfonso, Jr. and Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente,
concurring.

43 Technically, petitioner was barred from raising the issue of la of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal (PNB vs.
IAC, G.R. 62831-32, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 299). But, inasmuch as the prosecution did not question the
appellate court's resolution annulling t proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759 on the ground of lack jurisdiction
 of the lower court, and went along with the refiling an trial of the case in Pampanga, the said resolution of the
appellant court should be respected.

44 Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989, 177 SCRA 72.

45 Estoesta, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, November 1989, 179 SCRA 203.

46 TSN, January 17, 1984, p. 16.

47 Exhs. B-1 and H.

48 TSN, December 8, 1983, pp. 22-23, 32-33.

49 See: Exh. B-1.

50 Exh. B-1.

51 TSN, December 8, 1983, pp. 21, 24 and 31.

52 Ibid., p. 28; TSN, January 10, 1984; Exh. H.

53 TSN, December 8, 1983, p. 22.

54 Exh. I.

55 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book 11, 1975, ed., p. 219.

56 TSN, January 17, 1984; pp. 16-17.

57 Ibid., pp. 62; 64-65.

58 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

59 Ibid., pp. 68-69.

60 See: Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, 125 Phil. 1110, 1112 (1967).

61 U.S. vs. Asensi, 34 Phil. 750 (1916).

62 Sarep v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 68203, September 13, 1989, 177 SCRA 440, 449; Syquian v. People, G.R.
No. 82197, March 13, 1989, 171 SCRA 223 citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913.

63 L-33252, L-33253 & L-33254, January 20, 1978, 81 SCRA 120, 141.

64 Petition, p. 19.

65 Petition, p. 18

People v Cortez 73 OG 10056

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988

MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

YAP, C.J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 01119 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Melencio
Gigantoni y Javier," promulgated on November 13, 1985, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, Pasig, Metro Manila, finding the
accused guilty of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code with modification of the penalty by reducing the same to one (1) month
and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, after crediting the accused with a mitigating circumstance analogous
to voluntary confession of guilt.

Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Pasig, with the crime of
usurpation of authority in violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code upon an information alleging that the crime was
committed as follows:

That on or about the 14th and 15th day of May, 1981, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is not a
bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and
falsely represented himself as a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, said accused, knowing
fully well his representation to be false.

After arraignment during which the accused pleaded not guilty and after trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty as charged. On appeal to the appellate court, the judgment was affirmed with modification only as to the
penalty imposed.

The facts of the case, as recited in the decision of the appellate court, are as follows:

During the period material to this case, or in 1981, accused-appellant Melencio Gigantoni was an employee
of Black Mountain Mining Inc. and Tetra Management Corporation, which are both private companies doing
business in the Philippines .... On May 14, 1981, as an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the
office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) at Vernida Building, Legaspi Street, Makati, Metro Manila, allegedly
to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the said PAL
office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping
case, and requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-
Baguio-Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3 1981. He explained that he was then at the
tracking stage of aforementioned kidnapping case. ... To further convince the PAL officials of his supposed
mission, Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS agent. ...
Thereupon, his aforesaid request was granted, and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado A. Boro showed to him
the requested PAL records. Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest ...and the used
PAL tickets of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an
employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL premises.

When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired from Atty. Boro
about Gigantoni's purpose in securing copies of PAL records. They then became suspicious of the
accused" real identity prompting them to conduct verification from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently
learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he
had been dismissed from the service for gross misconduct ... brought about by the extortion charges filed
against him and his final conviction by the Sandiganbayan for the said offense.... Upon discovering the
foregoing, Atty. Puno immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL office the
following day. ...

On May 15, 1981, when Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, he was brought by Atty. Puno to their
conference room while awaiting for the arrival of the NBI agents who were earlier contacted. In the
presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity.
He later admitted that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was working for the Black Mountain Mining
 Corporation; and that he was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had
travelled. ...

Upon the arrival of NBI agents Teodoro Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and Dante Crisologo, Attys. Puno and
Boro turned over the person of Gigantoni to the NBI. They also submitted a complaint affidavit against
Gigantoni .... On that same day, after the investigation, arrest and booking conducted by the NBI, Gigantoni
was charged before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, thru its office in Makati, with the crime of
Usurpation of Authority.

The petitioner-accused raised substantially the same errors on appeal to respondent appellate court, to wit:

1. The appellate court erred in interpreting that presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, its applicable in
the case at bar;

2. The appellate court erred in its interpretation of the difference between suspension and dismissal.

The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not be guilty of the crime charged because at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, he was still a CIS agent who was merely suspended and was not yet informed of his termination
from the service. Furthermore, he avers that the receipt by him of the notice of dismissal, if there was any, could not be
established on mere presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed.

Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under which the petitioner was
charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of
any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official
position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign
government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of
authority under which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official
functions.

The question before us is—did petitioner knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine
Constabulary? Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his suspension from the CIS effective June 20, 1980. This
admission is supported by the record (Annex "D") which shows the letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June
23, 1980, regarding said action. Said official letter was also sent to the Commissioner of the Merit Systems Board, Civil
Service Commission, the Minister of National Defense and the Commanding General of the CIS. However, as to petitioner's
alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies having been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or
proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in
convicting him, relied on the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, that is, that it is
presumed that he was duly notified of his dismissal.

The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge
that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only
be overturned by competent and credible proof and never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate
courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that
official duty has been regularly performed." It was not for the accused to prove a negative fact, namely, that he did not
receive the order of dismissal. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution.
Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely
represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly
notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense that he was already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his
dismissal would not be sufficient.

The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or
dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform
acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of " (Emphasis supplied). The observation of the Solicitor
General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is
charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges the accused with the crime of
usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government."

Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the
accused was confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official
function. He was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the
information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made available to the accused because PAL
officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the
information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.
Premises considered, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional
Trial Court is reversed and set aside. Petitioner-accused, Melencio Gigantoni y Javier is hereby aquitted of the crime
charged.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984

CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Felipe O. Pascual for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.

In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. The information against her reads:

That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute or alias
name CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was
christened or by which she has been known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym for literary purpose and
without having been previously authorized by a competent Court to do so; that it was discovered only on or
about November 4th, 1974. (Rollo, pp. 11-12.)

She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term of only (1) year, as minimum, to
two (2) years, as maximum; to pay a fine a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the costs. The trial court recommended, however, that she be extended
executive clemency. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant
petition.

The facts:

Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died.
During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on
October 18, 1971.

From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she
styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.

Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29,
1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for
death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the
amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a
complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which
is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice given by Atty. Diomedes A.
Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)

The law:

Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person
shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil
registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered
 in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry
and who have not been baptized have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their
names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames. (As amended by R.A. No. 6085.)

The issue:

Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?

The resolution:

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is
living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither
is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and
social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that
he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a
bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and
she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits
upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the
lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their
own Corazons.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted of the charge. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Makasiar (Chairman) and Guerrero, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur especially for the sake of the son. But the practice should not be encouraged. If there is no impediment, common-
law husbands must marry their wives.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur especially for the sake of the son. But the practice should not be encouraged. If there is no impediment, common-
law husbands must marry their wives.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990

REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VI, San Fernando, Pampanga, petitioner Reolandi Diaz
was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official Document committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of December 1972, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School and, therefore, a public
employee, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit falsification of official documents,
to wit: by executing and filing in the office of the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a Personal
Data Sheet, CS Form No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting it appear therein that he was a
fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which
document is a requirement for his reappointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose Abad
Santos High School and wherein the academic requirement to said Position is at least a fourth year college
undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that the statement is false and he did
not reach the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and consequently, by reason of said
untruthful narration of facts, his appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service
Commission.

All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo)

After trial following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, petitioner was found guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Reolandi M. Diaz guilty as
charged of the crime of falsification of official document penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code, and he is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)

Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of conviction to the Intermediate Appellate Court, said appeal being docketed
thereat as CA-G.R. No. 24580- Cr.

In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the respondent court modified the trial court's decision by increasing the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment in the event of non-payment of the fine due to insolvency, but
affirmed the verdict of conviction in all other respects. The pertinent and dispositive portions of respondent court's decision
read:

The penalty for the offense of falsification of an official document committed under Article 171, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code is (prision mayor) and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. The correct penalty that
should be imposed on the appellant applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is imprisonment of Two (2)
Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of (prison correctional) as minimum to Eight (8) Years and One
(1) Day of (prision mayor) as maximum In cam of non-payment of the fine of P1,000.00 due to insolvency,
the appellant should be subject to subsidiary imprisonment.
 WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects with costs against
accused- appellant' (P. 68, Rollo)

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present recourse.

It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled to an acquittal because—

1. The findings of the lower court adopted by the respondent intermediate Appellate Court that he was not a fourth year A-B.
College student is contrary to the evidence presented.

2. The respondent intermediate Appellate Court gravely commuted an error of law in convicting him as he did not have any
legal obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he was a fourth year college student.

3. The Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding that the transcript of records (Exhibit I)
is spurious.

Upon the following facts, found by both the trial court and respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, to have been sufficiently
and satisfactorily established by the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner Reolandi Diaz was a senior clerk at the
Jose Abad Santos High School in San Fernando, Pampanga.

In 1972 he sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the same school and as one of the requirements for
appointment to said position, filled up the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, and swore to the
truth and veracity of the data and information therein furnished by him before the proper administering officer. As one of the
required informations, he indicated in Exh "A" that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts)
allegedly pursued or obtained at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the years 1950 to 1954
inclusive. On the basis thereof, he was extended an appointment as School Administrative Assistant I (Exh. "B"). His
personal information sheet (Exh. "A") together with his appointment paper (Exh. "B"), the certification as to the availability of
funds for the position (Exh. "C") and the resolution of the Provincial Board of Pampanga creating the position (Exh. "D") were
all forwarded to the Civil Service Commission for the approval of petitioner's appointment.

But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. which he allegedly took at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950 to 1954, he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges
which later became the Abad Santos Educational Institution and still later the Ortanez University-at any time during the
period covering the years from 1950 to 1954, inclusive as certified to by the Registrar of Ortanez University, Mr. Atilano D.
Solomon. Likewise, petitioner was never a student at the Harvardian Colleges in Tondo, during the first quarter of school
year 1953-1954, inclusive, as certified to by the school's President, Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap.

Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate student at the Harvardian Colleges in San Fernando, Pampanga after he
finished his secondary course in the same school in June 1950, as certified to by its Executive Director, Atty. Arnulfo Garcia.

Also, the name of petitioner was not included in all the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of
Private Schools of the Department of Education by the Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo,
Manila, during the period during which petitioner claimed to have been enrolled. The same thing is true with the list
submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to the said bureau.

The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He only presented in evidence an alleged transcript of record (Exh. 1)
purporting to show that he took up collegiate courses at the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from
the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of school year 1953-1954 which transcript of record was
allegedly signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then President of the school, Ildefonso Yap. But
Mrs. Virginia Yap, testifying for the prosecution disowned the said signature. Besides, at the bottom portion of the transcript
is a printed notation reading — this is only valid with the college seal and signature of Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I"
lacks the imprint of the college seal and the signature of President Ildefonso Yap himself. No other corroborating piece of
evidence was presented by petitioner.

Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was ample, solid and conclusive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove that
he was not a fourth year A.B. undergraduate.

It was clearly established that the statement made by the accused — that he reached fourth year A.B. and that he studied
for this course (Liberal Arts) at the Cosmopolitan Colleges and the Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-1954, is devoid
of truth. The records of these colleges do not at all reveal that petitioner was even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in
its College of Liberal Arts. His name does not appear and could not be found in the enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau
of Private Schools by these colleges.

While the petitioner in his defense presented an alleged transcript (Exh. purporting to show that he took up collegiate course
at the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to
the first quarter of the school year 1953-1954, both the trial court and the respondent court correctly disregarded said
transcript as having emanated from a spurious source. The transcript presented lacks the authenticating marks-the imprint of
the college seal and the signature of the President of the college.

As correctly observed by the trial court —

It is also quite significant to note in this score that the accused in his defense failed to present any
corroborating piece of evidence which will show that he was indeed enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian
Colleges from the first quarter of the school year 1953- 1954. If he had enrolled as a student during this
period of time and he was positive that the transcript of records issued to him and in his possession is
genuine and valid, it could have been easy for him to introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the testimony
of any of his classmates or teachers in the different subjects that he took to support his claim that he
studied and passed these collegiate courses at the said school. But this he failed to do despite all the
opportunities open to him and in the face of damning evidence all showing that he had not really enrolled in
this school or in the other school mentioned by him the personal information sheet that he filed up as
requirement for his appointment. (p. 53, Rollo)

Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz, No. L-15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255
and the earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is
perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood
under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The said article provides —

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayorin
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who,
knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding
articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer respective
penalties provided therein.

In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the accused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an application form (Civil Service Form No. 2) for
the patrolman examination. He stated therein that he had never been accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law,
ordinance or regulation before any court, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he had been prosecuted and
tried before the Justice of the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The application was signed and sworn to by him
before the municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal.

This Court in that case held:

This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, which was formerly the law
punishing perjury. Under said section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina
(29 Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated under oath in his application to take police examination that
he had never been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions,
committed perjury. The facts in that case are almost exactly analogous to those in the present, and we find
no reason, either in law or in the arguments of the Solicitor General to modify or reverse the conclusion of
this Court therein. More so, because all the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art. 183 of the
Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.

The elements of the crime of perjury are —

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.

Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a lesser penalty. The penalty for this crime is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Since there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should be from four
(4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is modified as follows:

(a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found guilty of the crime of perjury defined and penalized under Art. 183 of the Revised
Penal Code; and

(b) The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months of arrests mayor as minimum to one (1)
year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129279. March 4, 2003]

ALFREDO M. OUANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and HEIRS OF

JULIETA M. OUANO, respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari against the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals on CA-GR CV No. 33499[1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 19, in Civil Case No. CEB-596, which set aside the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
involving respondents properties.
From the documentary evidence and the Stipulation of Facts [2] filed by the parties before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, the facts of the case are, as follows:
On June 8, 1977, respondent Julieta M. Ouano (Julieta), now deceased, obtained a loan from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P104,280.00. As security for said loan, she
executed a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City. [3] She
defaulted on her obligation. On September 29, 1980, PNB filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure with the City Sheriff of Mandaue City.
On November 4, 1980, the sheriff prepared a notice of sale setting the date of public auction of
the two parcels of land on December 5, 1980 at 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.[4] He caused the notice to
be published in the Cebu Daily Times, a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaue City, in its
issues of November 13, 20 and 27, 1980.[5] He likewise posted copies thereof in public places in
Mandaue City and in the place where the properties are located.[6]
However, the sale as scheduled and published did not take place as the parties, on four
separate dates, executed Agreements to Postpone Sale (Agreements). [7] These Agreements were
addressed to the sheriff, requesting the latter to defer the auction sale to another date at the same
time and place, without any further republication of the Notice. The first of the four pro-forma
Agreements reads, as follows:

AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE SALE

Provincial Sheriff

Mandaue City

Sir:

In accordance with this agreement of the parties in the above named case, it is respectfully
requested that the auction sale of the properties of the mortgagor, scheduled to take place
on December 5, 1980 at 9:00 oclock in the morning at Office of the City Sheriff of Mandaue
City be postponed to February 5, 1981, at the same time and place, without any further
republication of the notice of sale as required by law. [italics supplied]
Cebu City, December 11,1980.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

(Mortgagee)

By: _____________________

(SGD.) F.B. Briones

Cebu Branch

Branch Attorney

____________________

(SGD.)JULIETA M. OUANO

(Mortgagor)

Address: Opao, Mandaue City

On December 3, 1980, two days prior to the date of the sale as published, the parties
executed and filed with the sheriff the Agreement to Postpone Sale moving the date of sale from
December 5, 1980 to February 5, 1981.[8] On February 5, 1981, however, no sale occurred.
Eight days later, on February 13, 1981, the parties executed and filed for the second time a
similar agreement moving the date of sale to February 28, 1981.[9] Again, on February 28, 1981,
no sale occurred.
Ten days later, on March 10, 1981, the parties executed and filed for the third time a similar
agreement moving the date of sale to March 30, 1981.[10] No sale occurred on this date.
On March 30, 1981, the parties executed for the fourth time a similar agreement moving the
date of sale to May 29, 1981.[11] This agreement was filed with the sheriff on April 30, 1981.
In all these postponements, no new notice of sale was issued, nor was there any republication
or reposting of notice for the rescheduled dates.
Finally, on May 29, 1981, the sheriff conducted the auction sale, awarding the two parcels of
land to PNB, the only bidder. He executed a Certificate of Sale certifying the sale for and in
consideration of P195, 510.50.[12]
As Julieta failed to redeem the properties within the one year period from registration of sale,
PNB consolidated its title on February 12, 1983.[13] On February 23 of the same year, it conveyed
the properties to herein petitioner Alfredo Ouano, the brother of Julieta, under a Deed of Promise
to Sell payable in five years.[14]
On March 28, 1983, Julieta sent demand letters to PNB and petitioner, pointing out
irregularities in the foreclosure sale.[15] On April 18, 1983, Julieta filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu for the nullification of the May 29, 1981 foreclosure sale. [16]Petitioner filed
a motion for leave to intervene in said case, and filed his Answer in Intervention to protect his
rights over the properties.[17]
While the case was pending, on February 25, 1986, PNB executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
petitioner.[18] The Register of Deeds of Mandaue City accordingly cancelled the TCTs in PNBs
name and issued in lieu thereof TCTs in the name of petitioner over the two parcels of land. [19]
 On January 29, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu rendered a decision in favor of Julieta,
holding that the lack of republication rendered the foreclosure sale void. The dispositive portion
ofsaid decision states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,

1. declaring as null and void:

a) the auction sale by the City Sheriff of Mandaue City on May 29, 1981 over the aforesaid
properties of plaintiff Julieta Ouano;
b) the Certificate of Sale (Exhibit K) issued by the City Sheriff of Mandaue City on May 29,
1981, in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
c) the Deed of Sale (Exhibit L) executed by PNB to itself;
d) the Deed of Promise to Sell (Exhibit O) executed by PNB on February 23, 1983 in favor of
Alfredo Ouano
e) the Deed of Sale (Exhibit 24) executed by PNB on February 5, 1986 in favor of Alfredo
Ouano;
f) TCT No. 17929 (Exhibit M) and TCT No. 17930 (Exhibit N) in the name of PNB;
g) TCT No. 21982 (Exhibit 21) and TCT No. 21987 (Exhibit 22) in the name of Alfredo
Ouano;

2. ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel the aforementioned titles (TCT
Nos. 17929 and 17930, as well as TCT Nos. 21982 and 21987), and to reinstate TCT Nos.
15724 (5033) and 24377 (6876) in the name of Julieta Ouano;

3. ordering the City Sheriff of Mandaue City to conduct a new auction sale strictly complying
with the requirements for publication and posting as required by Act 3135, as amended by Act
4118;

4. ordering PNB to return to Alfredo Ouano all amounts the latter has paid to the said bank;

5. ordering Alfredo Ouano to vacate the premises in question and turn them over to Julieta
Ouano;

6. ordering PNB to pay the plaintiff the sum equivalent to 10% of the market value of the
properties in question as indicated in Tax Declaration Nos. 01134 and 00510, as attorneys fees,
and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. [20]

Not satisfied, PNB and petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. [21] In its decision
dated February 17, 1997, said court affirmed the trial courts ruling on the same ground that there
was no compliance with the mandatory requirements of posting and publication of notice of
sale.[22]Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit by the same
court on April 15, 1997.[23]
PNB and petitioner filed their own petitions for review on certiorari before us. PNBs petition
however was dismissed on July 21, 1997 for being filed out of time and for lack of certification of
non-forum-shopping.[24] The petition herein remaining is the one filed by petitioner.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
 I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THE POSTPONED AUCTION SALE OF SUBJECT PROPERTIES
HELD ON MAY 29, 1981 UPON WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS NULL AND
VOID FOR LACK OF PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF SALE ON THE SAID DATE ALTHOUGH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF SALE ON THE ORIGINALLY
INTENDED DATE [WERE] FULLY COMPLIED WITH.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISION OF SEC.
24, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH ALLOWS THE SHERIFF TO ADJOURN
ANY SALE UPON EXECUTION TO ANY DATE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JULIETA M. OUANO IS
NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE AUCTION SALE SINCE
THE SALE WAS REPEATEDLY POSTPONED UPON HER REQUEST AND WRITTEN
AGREEMENT[S] THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REPUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF
SALE.
IV RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT ALTHOUGH JULIETA M. OUANO FILED HER COMPLAINT AFTER
ALMOST TWO YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE AUCTION SALE.[25]
The main issue before us is whether or not the requirements of Act No. 3135 were complied
with in the May 29, 1981 foreclosure sale.
The governing law for extrajudicial foreclosures is Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
The provision relevant to this case is Section 3, which provides:

SEC. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty (20) days in
at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such
property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week
for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality of
city.

It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage

foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable. [26] In a number of cases, we have
consistently held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory
requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale. [27] Consequently, such defect
renders the sale absolutely void and no title passes.[28]
Petitioner, however, insists that there was substantial compliance with the publication
requirement, considering that prior publication and posting of the notice of the first date were
made.
In Tambunting v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that republication in the manner prescribed by
Act No. 3135 is necessary for the validity of a postponed extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Thus we
stated:

Where required by the statute or by the terms of the foreclosure decree, public notice of the
place and time of the mortgage foreclosure sale must be given, a statute requiring it being held
applicable to subsequent salesas well as to the first advertised sale of the property. [underscoring
supplied].

Petitioner further contends that republication may be waived voluntarily by the parties.[30]
This argument has no basis in law. The issue of whether republication may be waived is not
novel, as we have passed upon the same query in Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno
Productions Inc,.[31] Petitioner therein sought extrajudicial foreclosure of respondents mortgaged
properties with the Sheriffs Office of Pasig, Rizal. Initially scheduled on August 12, 1976, the
auction sale was re-scheduled several times without republication of the notice of sale, as
stipulated in their Agreements to Postpone Sale. Finally, the auction sale proceeded on December
20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest bidder. Aggrieved, respondents sued to nullify the
foreclosure sale. The trial court declared the sale void for non-compliance with Act No. 3135. This
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Upholding the conclusions of the trial and
appellate court, we categorically held:

Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication
requirements of Act No. 3135.

In People v. Donato, the Court expounded on what rights and privileges may be waived, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at large.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.

xxx xxx xxx

The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the
mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be
sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and
prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication
are mandated, not for the mortgagors benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal
notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless
stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would
be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

Publication, therefore, is required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably wide publicity such
that those interested might attend the public sale. [32] To allow the parties to waive this jurisdictional
requirement would result in converting into a private sale what ought to be a public auction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the written waivers are valid, we find noticeable flaws that
would nevertheless invalidate the foreclosure proceedings. First, the Agreements, as worded, only
waived further republication of the notice of sale. Nothing in the Agreements indicates that the
parties likewise dispensed with the reposting of the notices of sale. As there was no reposting of
notice of the May 29, 1981 sale, the foreclosure fell short of the requirements of Act No.
3135. Second, we observe that the Agreements were executed and filed with the sheriff several
days after each rescheduled date. As stated in the facts, the first agreement was timely filed, two
days prior to the originally scheduled sale on December 5, 1980. The second agreement,
however, was executed and filed eight days after the rescheduled sale on February 5, 1981. The
third agreement was executed and filed ten days after the rescheduled sale on February 28, 1981.
The fourth agreement was timely executed, but was filed with the sheriff one month after the
rescheduled sale on March 30, 1981. On the rescheduled dates, therefore, no public sale
occurred, nor was there any request to postpone filed with the sheriff, except for the first one. In
short, the Agreements are clearly defective for having been belatedly executed and filed with the
sheriff. The party who may be said to be at fault for this failure, and who should bear the
consequences, is no other than PNB, the mortgagee in the case at bar. It is the mortgagee who
causes the mortgaged property to be sold, and the date of sale is fixed upon his instruction. [33] We
have held that the mortgagees right to foreclose a mortgage must be exercised according to the
clear mandate of the law. Every requirement of the law must be complied with, lest the valid
exercise of the right would end.[34]PNBs inaction on the scheduled date of sale and belated filing of
requests to postpone may be deemed as an abandonment of the petition to foreclose it filed with
the sheriff. Consequently, its right to foreclose the mortgage based on said petition lapsed.
In a vain attempt to uphold the validity of the aforesaid waiver, petitioner asserts that the Court
of Appeals should have applied Rule 39, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, which allows
adjournment of execution sales by agreement of the parties. The said provision provides:

Sec. 24. Adjournment of Sale By written consent of debtor and creditor, the officer may adjourn
any sale upon execution to any date agreed upon in writing by the parties. Without such
agreement, he may adjourn the sale from day to day, if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of
time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice. [35]

Petitioner submits that the language of the abovecited provision implies that the written request of
the parties suffices to authorize the sheriff to reset the sale without republication or reposting.[36]
At the outset, distinction should be made of the three different kinds of sales under the law,
namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. An ordinary execution sale is governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court applies in cases of judicial foreclosure sale. On the other
hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the
Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages applies in
cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sale. A different set of law applies to each class of sale
mentioned.[37] The cited provision in the Rules of Court hence does not apply to an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale.
Moreover, even assuming that the aforecited provision applies, all it authorizes is the
adjournment of the execution sale by agreement of the parties. Nowhere does it state that
republication and reposting of notice for the postponed sale may be waived. Thus, it cannot, by
any means, sanction the waiver in the case at bar.
Next, petitioner maintains that Julietas act of requesting the postponement and repeatedly
signing the Agreements had placed her under estoppel, barring her from challenging the lack of
publication of the auction sale.[38]
We rule otherwise. Julieta did request for the postponement of the foreclosure sale to extend
the period to settle her obligation.[39] However, the records do not show that she requested the
postponement without need of republication and reposting of notice of sale. In Nepomuceno,[40]we
held:

xxx To request postponement of the sale is one thing; to request it without need of compliance
with the statutory requirements is another. Respondents, therefore, did not commit any act that
would have estopped them from questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale for non-
compliance with Act No. 3135. xxx

In addition, we observe herein that the Agreements prepared by the counsel of PNB were in
standard forms of the bank, labeled as Legal Form No. 41. The Nepomuceno[41] case likewise
involved an Agreement to Postpone Sale that was in a ready-made form, and the only participation
of respondents therein was to affix or adhere their signatures thereto. We there held that said
agreement partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion, i.e., one in which one of the
contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party may accept or
reject, but cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party
merely affixes his signature or his adhesion thereto, giving no room for negotiation, and depriving
the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. [42] As such, their terms are construed
strictly against the party who drafted it.[43]
More importantly, the waiver being void for being contrary to the express mandate of Act No.
3135, such cannot be ratified by estoppel.[44] Estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is
prohibited by law or one that is against public policy. [45] Neither can the defense of illegality be
waived.[46]
Petitioner, moreover, makes much of the fact that Julieta filed her complaint with the trial court
after almost two years from the May 29, 1981 auction sale, thus arguing that the delayed filing was
a clear case of laches.[47]
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. [48] In the case at bar,
Julieta only realized the defect in the foreclosure sale upon conferring with her counsel who
discovered the irregularity.[49] Thus, on March 25, 1983, Julieta filed her adverse claim with the
Registrar of Deeds.[50] Three days after, she sent demand letters to PNB and petitioner.[51] Soon
after they replied on April 6 and 7, 1983,[52] she promptly sued to nullify the foreclosure sale in the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City on April 20, 1983. [53] She likewise filed a suit for forcible entry
against petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City. [54] Considering all these, we find the
delay of almost two years not unreasonable. Julieta cannot be guilty of laches. Her prompt actions
upon discovering her cause of action negate the claim that she has abandoned her right to claim
the properties. Besides, this defense lacks merit in light of the Civil Code stating that an action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. [55]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 33499 and the Resolution therein dated April 15, 1997 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part, former counsel of a party in another case.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

[1]
Entitled: Julieta M. Ouano v. Philippine National Bank and Alfredo Ouano, rollo, pp. 20-29.
[2]
RTC Records, pp. 132-136.
[3]
Id., p. 6.
[4]
Id., p. 191.
[5]
Id., p. 192.
[6]
Id., p. 133.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 74-77.
[8]
Id., p. 74.
[9]
Id., p. 75.
[10]
Id., p. 76.
[11]
Id., p. 77.
[12]
Id., pp. 78-79.
[13]
Id., p. 199.
[14]
Id., pp. 174-178.
[15]
Id., pp. 185-189.
[16]
RTC Records, p. 1.
[17]
Id., pp. 79-84.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 179-180.
[19]
Id., pp. 181-184.
[20]
RTC Records, pp. 454-455.
[21]
Julieta Ouano died while the case was pending with the appellate court, see CA rollo, p.52.
[22]
See note 1, supra.
[23]
Rollo, p. 40.
[24]
Id., p. 165.
[25]
Id., pp. 203-204.
[26]
PNB v. Nepomuceno Productions Inc. et. al, G.R. No. 139479, December 27, 2002; San Jose v. CA, 225 SCRA
450 (1993); Tambunting v. CA 167 SCRA 16 (1988); Jalandoni v. Ledesma, 64 Phil. 1058, (1937).
[27]
PNB v. Nepomuceno Productions Inc. et. al., supra; DBP v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 144877, September 7, 2001;
Bohanan v. CA, 256 SCRA 355 (1996); Olizon v. CA. 236 SCRA 148 (1994); San Jose v. CA, supra;
Masantol Rural Bank v. CA, 204 SCRA 752 (1991).
[28]
Borja v. Addison, 14 Phil. 895 (1922) citing Campomanes v. Bartolome and German & Co. 38 Phil. 808 (1918).
[29]
Supra.
[30]
Rollo, p. 207
[31]
Supra.
[32]
Olizon v. CA, supra.
[33]
L.F. Lang v. Prov. Sheriff of Surigao, 93 Phil. 661 (1953).
[34]
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, G.R. No. 120859, June 26, 2001.
[35]
RULES OF COURT (1964).
[36]
Rollo, p. 13.
[37]
Fiestan v. CA, 185 SCRA 751 (1990).
[38]
Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[39]
Id., p. 42.
[40]
Supra.
[41]
Id.
[42]
Citing Polotan, Sr., v. CA, 296 SCRA 247 (1998).
[43]
Citing BPI Express Card Corp. v. Olalia, G.R. No. 131086, December 14, 2001.
[44]
NEW CIVIL CODE, Art. 1409.
[45]
Auyong Hian v. CA, 59 SCRA 110 (1974).
[46]
See note 44, supra.
[47]
Rollo, p. 219.
[48]
Benito v. Saquitan-Ruiz, G.R. No. 149906, December 26, 2002 citing De Vera v. CA, 305 SCRA 624 (1999).
[49]
Rollo, pp. 185-189.
[50]
Id., p. 181.
[51]
Id., pp. 185-189.
[52]
RTC Records, p. 135.
[53]
See note 16, supra.
[54]
RTC Records, p.136.
[55]
NEW CIVIL CODE, Art. 1410.