"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS'

TEONARDO - DE CASTRO DOCTRINES

CIVIL LAW

PERSONS AND FAMITY RELATIONS

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Psychological Incapacity; Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage; ln the landmark case of Santos a. Court of Appenls, the court observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (u) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge onlv after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure r,r'ould be bevond the
means of the party involved fOchosa as.Alano, 640 SCRA 517(20L1)].

Marriages; In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is

trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.-In more recent jurisprudence, the
court observed, that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to
emphasize other Perspectives as well which should govem the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 35. The Court laid down in Republic af the Philippines a. Court
of Appeals and Molinastringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article i6 of
the Family Code, to wit: (1) The burden of proof to show the nulliW of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolabIe," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protecte d" by the state.Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapaci$ as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "a11 fours" with another case [Azcueta as. Republic,
588 SCR 4 196QAA9)1.

The Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those
instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time
and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of
psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and
medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional
gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the
financial and miterial support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that
the farnily should be an "autonomous" social institutiory wherein the spouses cooperate anC are
equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family [Azcuetaus. Republic,588 SCR.4
1s6z00e)1.

Conjugal Partnerships. Article 124of the Family Code relied upon by petitioners provides that
the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertakirg of the husband and
the wife. Irr the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assurne sole powers of
administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or

Page 2 of tZ
 F rd>t-atf3' J V-t *r3|' t-t ]r f L f
-izL
"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

encumber property belonging to the conjugal parbrership. h all instances, the present law
specifically requires the written consent of the other spouser or authority of the court for the
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partrership property without which, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void [Dela Cruz as. Segouia, 555 SCRA 453QAAil].

Conjugal Properties. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "[a]ll property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, for this presumption to apply, the party
who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal parturership. Thus, the time when the property \^ias acquired is material
[Corpuzas. Pascua, 658 SCR 4 239QA11,)].

Husband and Wife; Coniugal Property;Before the effectivity of the Family Code, alienation
and/or encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband without the wife's consent is not null
and void but merely voidable. hr the cases ofGarcia a. CA and Bucoy p. Paulino, the contracts
involving the sale of conjugal property by the husband without the wife's consent were
declared null and void by the Court. But even in the Bucoy case, the court signi{icantly ruled, in
reference to Article 173, that: The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that
the conkact, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be
annulled by the wife. In succeeding cases, the court held that alienation and/or encumbrance of
conjugal property by the husband without the wife's consent is not null and void but merely
voidable [Heirs af Domingo Hernandez, Sr . as. Mingoa, Sr., 508 SCRA 394Q0Ag)] .

Status of Legitimate Child. To prove the relationship of respondent's mother to the petitioner's
brother, the laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final iudgment. In the absence of
these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of
evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court
[Heirs af Teafilo Gabatnn as. Caurt of AVpeals, 581- SCRA 70(2009)].

OBTIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Contracts; Fraud. There is fraud when one party is induced by the other to enter into a contracf
through and solely because of the latter's insidious words or machinations. But not all forms of
fraud can vitiate consent. "IJnder Article 1330, fraud refers to dolo causante or causal fraud, in
which, prior to or simultaneous with the execution of a contract, one party secures the consent
of the other by using deception, without which such consent would not have been given."
"Simply stated, the fraud must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused
the consent to be given." "[T]he general rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake in a
transaction must substantiate his allegation as the presumption is that a person takes ordinary
care for his concems and that private dealings have been entered into fairly and regularly." One
who alleges defect or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence
must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence such specific acts that vitiated a party's
consen! otherwise, the latter's presumed consent to the contract prevails fFontana Resort and
Country Club, lnc. as. Tan, 664 SCR 4 382(2012)1.

Page 3 of 12
 P \}+i-ttfL I, ft=t +{llllrt f 3lL 3 \
-i,zL.f
,.HOME
OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

Contracts; Compromise Agreements. Article 2A28 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as
follows: A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Article 2A37 of the Civil Code
provides for the effects of a compromise agreement, to wit: A compromise has upon the parties
the effect and authority of res judi cata; but there shall be no execution excePt in compliance
with a judicial compromise. Expoundirg on the concept of compromise agreements, the Court,
rn Air Transportation Office u. Gopuco, It., 462 SCRA 544 (2005), said: [W]e have time and again
ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, is a valid contract which is the law between the parties. It is a contract
perfected by mere consent, whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation
or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of law and is conclusive between the
parties, and courts will not relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply
because their contracts turned out to be unwise. x x x. Likewise, tn Philippine National Oil
Company-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) a. Abella,448 SCRA 549 (2005), the Court
pronounced: Prevailing case law provides that "a compromise once apProved by final orders of
the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for
vices of consent or forgery. Flence, 'a decision on a compromise agreement is final and
executory.' Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive on the parties. It transcends
its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment
that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. ]udges therefore have the ministerial
and mandatory duty to implement and enforce lt." F{ence, compromise agreements duly
approved by the courts are considered the decisions in the particular cases they involve
[Cachopera ns. Celestial, 665 SCRA 619Q01-D].

Obligations and Contracts; Sales; hr the past, the Court has distinguished between a condition
imposed on the perfection of a contract and a condition imposed merely on the performance of
an obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a contract,
failure to comply with the second merely gives the other party the option to either refuse to
proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. This principle is evident in Article 1545 of the
Civil Code on sales, which provides in part: Art. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a
contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to
proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition x x x fCatungal as.
Rodriguez, 646 SCR { 130(201,1)1.

Rescission. "The right to rescind a contract arises once the other party defaults in the
performance of his obligation." "Rescission of a contract will not be permitted. for a slight or
casual breach, but only such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very
object of the paities in making the agreement." fFontana Resort and Country Club, Inc. as. Tan, 664
scRA 382(201.2)1.
PROPERTY

Innocent purchaser for value. An "innocent purchaser for value" or any equivalent phrase
shall be deemed to include, under the Torrens System, the innocent lessee, mortgagee, and other
encumbr€ulcer for value. In Bautista a. Caurt af Appeals, 230 SCRA 446 (1994), *he court held that
where the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and first registers it in the
Registry of Property, in good faith, shall be the owner fChing vs. Enrile, 565 SCRA 4A2Q008)],

Pase 4of],2
 _ '-___ __ ___ _ .-F-r-lD--r!D

"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

Possessor in Good Faith. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary
or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law. hr the case of ownership and other real rights over
immovable property, they are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of L0 years.
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whorn he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership fRepublic as.
Mangotara, 624 SCRA 360QArc)1.

Co-ownership. There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different

persons. It is a parfurership when two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money,
property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves U arantilla, lr. vs. l arantilla, 636 SCRA 299Q010)1.

Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs
made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower
has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary
to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. Le
view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership," the
law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to
acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who
is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing [Torbela vs. Rasano, 661SCRA
633(2011)1.

It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it
where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove
the improvements from the land.-The landowner has to make a choice between appropriating
the buildi.g by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the tand.
But even as the option lies with the landowrrer, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He
must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the buildirrg to remove the
building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owrrer chooses to
sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the
value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The
owner is entitled to such remotion only whery after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same [Torbelaus. Rasario,66l SCR 4 633(2011-)].

Writs of Possession. Theright of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property
becomes absolute upon the expiration of the redemption period. The basis of this right to
possession is the purchaser's ownership of the property. After the consolidation of title in the
buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of
right and its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial
function [Torbela vs. Rasario, 661 SCRA 633Q0LL)].

Page 5 of 12
 P \+LltfL f at;t *tGf tlr ll f L f
-L--L
"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

LEASE

Lease. An express agreement which gives the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is
frequent and subject to statutory restrictions, valid and bindi^g on the parties. This option,
which is provided in the same lease agreement, is fundamentally part of the consideration in
the contract and is no different from any other provision of the lease carrying an undertaking on
the part of the lessor to act conditioned on the performance by the lessee. It is a purely
executory contract and at most confers a right to obtain a renewal if there is compliance with the
conditions on which the right is made to depend. The right of renewal constitutes a part of the
lessee's interest in the land and forms a substantial and integral part of the agreement. The fact
that such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not
render it void for lack of mutuality. After all, the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to
the lessee fManila'lnternational Airpart Authority as.Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc., 662 SCR.A
39eQA11)1.

The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant or lessee. According
to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Courf "[t]he tenant is not permitted to deny the title of
his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them." The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees carries
with it a recognition of the lessor's title. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title
at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the
original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his trtle [Century Saaings Bank as. Samonte, 634
scRA 261_(2010)1.

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

Concurrence and Preference of Credit. The law expressly provides that debts and liabilities of
the bank under liquidation are to be paid in accordance with the rules on concurrence and
preference of credit under the Civil Code. Duties, taxes, and fees due the Government enjoy
priority only when th"y are with reference to a specific movable property, under Article 2241(7)
of the Civil Code, or immovable property, under Article 2242(l) of the same Code. However,
with reference to the other real and personal property of the debtor, sometimes referred to as
"free property," the taxes and assessments due the National Government, other than those in
Articles 2241(1) and 2242(1) of the Civil Code, such as the corporate income tax, will come only
in ninth place in the order of preference fPhilippine Deposit Insurance Corporation us. Bureau of
Internal Reaenue, 698 SCRA 311(2013)1.

Guaranty; Sur0tyship; Special Power of Attorney. The scope of an agent's authority is what
appears in the written terms of the power of attomey granted upon him: Under Article 1S78(11)
of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to obligate the principal as a
guarantor or surety fCountry Bankers Insurance Corporation as. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, 673 SCRA
427(2012)1.

Mortgage. The real nature of a mortgage is described in Article 2126 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2126. The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security
it was constituted. Simply put, a mortgage is a real right, which follows the property, even after

Paee 6 of t2
 \f, Llrff I tt= attlt \4.--rrltlrl-
"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

subsequent transfers by the mortgagor. "A registered mortgage lien is considered inseparable
from the property inasmuch as it is a right in rem."
The sale or transfer of the mortgaged property cannot affect or release the mortgage; thus the
purchaser or transferee is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the errcumbrance. Lr
fact, under Article 2129 of the Ciuil Code, the mortgage on the property may still be foreclosed
despite the transfer, viz.: Art. 2129. The creditor may claim from a third person in possession of
the mortgaged property, the payment of the part of the credit secured by the property which
said third Person Possesses, h terms and with the formalities which the law establish es fGarcia
as, Villar, 675 SCRA S0(20L2)1.

As a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in the
contract. However, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not limit
the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if, from the four corners of the
insfrument, the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. This stipulation
is valid and binditlg between the parties and is known as the "blanket mortgage clause" (also
known as the "dragnet clause)" [Ramon as. Philippine Nationnl Bank, 662 SCRA 479(20LL)].
Mortgages; Foreclosure of Mortgage. h Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 336 SCRA 419
(2000), the Court held that "[i]n respect of the lease on the foreclosed property, the buyer at the
foreclosure sale merely succeeds to the rights and obligations of the pledgor-mortgagor subject
to the provisions of Article 1676 of the Civil Code on its possible termination. This article
provides that '[t]he purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in
the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the
contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.' In
short, the buyer at the foreclosure sale, as a rule, may terminate an unregistered lease except
when it knows of the existence of the lease ." [Cebu Bionic Builders Supply, Inc. us. Deaelopment
Bank of the Philippines, 635 SCR 4 L3(2010)1.

Mortgages; Pactum Commissorium; Elements of Pactum Commissorium.-The following are

the elements of pactum commissorium: (1) There should be a property mortgaged by way of
security for the Payment of the principal obligation; and (2) There should be a stipulation for
automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thirg mortgaged in case of nonpayment of the
principal obligation within the stipulated period [Garcia as.Villar, 675 SCRA S0(20L2)].

SALES

Sales; Contract to Sell. A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the
ProsPective seller, while exPressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery
-
thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the
prosPective buyer uPon fulfillment of the condition agreed , i.8., full payment of the purchase
price. hr a contract to self the prospective seller explicitly reserves the fransfer of title to the
ProsPective buyer, me€u:ting, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to fransfer
ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which
for present purposes the court shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the
seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfilt his promise to sell the subject property when
the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him [Republic as, Marazni-Marantao
General Hospital, lnc., 686 SCRA 546(2012)1.

n^-^ a 4q
 \
"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVTEWERS'
-
Buyers in Good Faith. Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property in possession of persons
other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession, for
without such inquiry the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith and cannot
have any right over the property [Heirs of Romnna Saaes as. Heirs af Escolastico Saaes, 632 SCRA
236Q0101.

Innocent Purchasers in Good Faith. It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can
legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes; An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim [Rufloe as. Burgos, 577 SCRA
264Q0Ae)1.
PARTNERSHIP AND AGENCY

Contract of Partnership. Und.er Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements
in a contract of partnership: (a) an agreement to contribute monef, property or industry to a
common fund; and (b) intent to divide the profits among the contracting parties $arantilla, lr. as.
larantilla, 636 SCR 4 299Q01"0)1.

Agency. In a contract of agency, a person, the agent, binds himself to represent another, the
principal, with the latter's consent or authority. Thus, agency is based on representation, where
the agent acts for and in behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of the authority
conferred upon him. Such "acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally done by
the principal. By this legal fiction of representation, the actual or legal absence of the principal is
converted into his legal or juridical presence." fCauntry Bankers Insurance Corporation as. Keppel
Cebu Shipyard, 673 SCRA 427(20L2)1.

Agency; Agent.Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that an agent acting in
his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal
tPhilWine Charter Insurance Corporation as. Explorer Maritime Co., Ltd., 657 SCRA 165QA1il1.

Contracts; Agency; Right to bring an action. In Uy v. Court of Appeals, SLA SCRA 69 (1999) the
Court held that the agents of the parties to a contract do not have the right to bring an action
even if they rendered some service on behalf of their principals. To quote from that decision:
.. . [Petitioners] are mere agents of the owrrers of the land subject of the sale. As agents, they only
render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of their principals. The
rendering of such service did not make them parties to the contracts of sale executed in behalf of
the latter. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, the
real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon that contract rnust,
generally, either be parties to said contract fOrmac Sugarcane Planters' Association, lnc. (OSPA) as.
Court of Appeals, 595 SCRA 630(2009)1.

Agency by Estoppel; Article 191..'1-., on the other hand, is based on the principle of estoppel,
which is necessary for the protection of third persons. It states that the principal is solidarily
liable with the agent even when the latter has exceeded his authority,if the principal allowed
him to act as though he had full powers. However, for an agency by estoppel to exist, the
following must be established: 1. The principal manifested a representation of the agent's

Page 8 of 12
 P \'1l- a-3tfL f lt:t *{cf jlSt f f f L f

r
-i--L.
"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

authority or knowirgly allowed the agent to assume such authority; 2.The third person, h
good faith, relied upon such representation; and 3. Relying upon such representation, such third
person has changed his position to his detriment [Country Bankers Insurance Corporation us.
Keppel Cebu Shipyard, 673 SCRA 427(201.D1.
Trusts. Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is
vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property
for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or
implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an
implied trust comes into being by operation of law [Torbela vs. Rasario, 66T SCRA 633(2011)1.

Express trusts. Express trusts, sometimes referred to as direct trusts, are intentionally created
by the direct and positive acts of the settlor or the trustor-by sorne writing, deed, or will or
oral declaration. It is created not necessarily by some written words, but by the direct and
positive acts of the parties. This is in consonernce with Article 1,444 of the Civil Code, which
states that "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." fPhilippine Natianal ,Bank as. Aznar, 649 SCR 4
214(201,D1.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Torts and Damages; Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name.
This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs,
whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct. Also, partners are obliged to respect
respondenfs good name even though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case.
As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith." A violation of such principle constifutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct
[Manaloto as. Veloso III, 632 SCR'4 347QAL0)].

Contributory Negligence. Article 2L79 of the Civil Code defines the concept of contributory
negligence as follows: ArL 2179. \Atrhen the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his iniury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the iniury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured par$, conkibuting as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection [Sealoader Shipping Corporation us. Grand Cement Manufacturing
Corporation , 638 SCRA 488(2010)l,

Moral damage. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape.
Moral damages are automatically awarded without need of further proof, because it is assumed
that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award fPeople
as. Dion, 653 SCRA 117QA1il1.

Temperate Damages. In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further orders the
award of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. The award
of P25,000.00 for temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence
of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil

Page 9 of t2
 r.l'-l>r> r-.v- l1l.ilt't'-rll'!,Z =--l> D- rD l> rD
\
-
"HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim
suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proven [People us. Rebucan,654
scRA 726(201"1)1.

It is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attomey's fees and expenses of
litigation; and (6) interesf in proper cases [People us. Dadao,71.4 SCRA 524(2014)].

Civil Indemnity; Damages. Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is mandatory and is
granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime. Moral damages in
the surn of P50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim's heirs. As borne out by human nafure and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's
family. Also under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, like treachery, as in this
case. Thus, the award of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages is in order [People us. Escleto, 671
sCR 4 149(2012)1.

Criminal Law; Damages; Loss of Earning Cap acity; Factors in computing the amount of
damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased.
-The following are the
factors in computing the amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased: 1) The number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed. This is
based on the formula (213 x 80 - age of the deceased at the time of his death - life expectancy),
which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality; and 2) The rate at which
the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed. Net income is arrived at by
deducting the amount of the victim's living expenses from the amount of his gross income
[People vs. Asilan, 669 SCR 4 405(201,2)].

LAND TITTES

Land Titles. Generally, a certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein
and conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it bears
stressing that while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and bindiog against the
whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. Thuy merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper
from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of ftaud; neither do
they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other [Sta. Lucia Realty & Deaelapment, Inc. vs.
City of Pasig, 652 SCRA 44(2017)1.

Land Titles. The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a vendee and an
attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who registers the order of attachment and the sale of
the property to him as the highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as against a
vendee who had previously bought the same property from the same owner but who failed to
register his deed of sale. This is because registration is the operative act that binds or atfects the
land insofar as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there is notice to the
whole world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest, as here, which is
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior

Page 10 of 12
7 .HOME
OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVIEWERS"

unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale
is equivalent to registration.

The general rule is that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the
register to determine the condition of the property. In that case, such person is charged with
notice of the burden on the property which is noted on the face of the register or certificate of
title fChing us. Enrile,565 SCRA 4A2Q0Ail].

Regalian Doctrine. Under the Regalian dockine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain [Republic as. Capco de Tensuan, 708 SCR 4 367(201"3)].

Public Land AcU Right of Repurchase. It is true that Section 118 of the Public Land Act pertains
to the prohibition of the sale or encumbrance of a land acquired through free patent and
homestead provision within a period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent or
grant. On the other hand, Section 1L9 of the said law subjects said land's alienation, impliedly
after the expiration of the prohibitive period, upon a right of repurchase by the homesteader,
his widow, or heirs, within a period of five years from the date of its conveyance. hrdeed, these
provisions complement the intent and purpose of the law "to pleserve and keep in the family of
the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him."
However, it is important to stress that the ultimate objective of the law is "to promote public
policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at providi.g a class of
independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order." Prevailing
jurisprudence requires that the motive of the patentee, his widow or legal heirs in the exercise
of their right to repurchase a land acquired through patent or grant must be consistent with the
noble intent of the Public Land Act. The right to repurchase of a patentee should fail if his
underlying cause is contrary to everythirg that the Public Land Act stands for [Capistrany as.
Limcuando, 579 SCRA 176(2009)1.

Land Registration; Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); The requisites for the filing of
an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
(2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in--interest have been in
open, continuoud, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since ]une 12, 1945 or earlier.

Land Registration; Reconstitution of Titles. The relevant law that governs the reconstitution of
a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title is Republic Act No. 25. Section 2 of said stafute
enumerates the following as valid sources for judicial reconstitution of title: SECTION 2.
Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title; (b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a

Page t"L of 12
 "HOME OF THE NATION'S TOP BAR REVTEWERS"

legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the
case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A
document, on
file in the Registry of Deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or Eu1 authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the
judgment of the courf is sufficient and proper basis'for reconstituting the lost or
destrbyed
certificate of tttle [Republic as. Lorenzo, 6g7 scR 4 47se012)].