G.R. No.

101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN,
GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA
MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE
ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and
MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE,
MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by
their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR.
and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment
of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters
per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including
the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent
spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result
from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the
reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic
changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
— nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of
the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;
 (c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition
to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not
only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined
the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section
4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by
the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They
then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that
the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would
ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition
to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as
a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both
in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless
to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised
and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent
Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

 After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court
notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence
to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:
 Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution —
air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it
the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided
for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by
law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations
as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:
 Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive
to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian
of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is
the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would
still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
 Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this
Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
 at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER

vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE,
GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND
JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order2 dated September 16,
2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed
issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.

Antecedent Facts

On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish
and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained the following
pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located
in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect,
preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides,
and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to
operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit,
which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest
of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for
the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations
in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of
an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron
ore, among others.7

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental
court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside
from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court
decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the
writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.12

Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The other
issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that
the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government
or appropriate agency.

Ruling of the Court

Jurisdiction and Venue

In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and
Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations
of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial
jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla,
Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests
before another co-equal court."15

Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and
confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.

None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and
decide a case, is conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person
of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the
RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction –

in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)

A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court
authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders
and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the
power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.18 It also
cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states
that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Matas20 that –

Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial
Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts
or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines
the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21

The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action
or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience
to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts.22Consequently, the RTC’s
motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.

At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action
for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable
neglect or omission occurred x x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in
the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does
not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by the
petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission
on Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the
case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice28 if the Court orders
the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the
Rules in its disposition of the case.

At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different
"green courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of environmental cases.
While the designation and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court
decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.

The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct
procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by
Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be
cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of
discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view
in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31

Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:

When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and
to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.1âwphi1

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates
that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must
establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of
government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically
enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or
violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law.32

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently
based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of
the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree
that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree
shall subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
"permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court’s decision."35

The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of
Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.

Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes.36 But the petition filed below
does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-
scale mining operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR
Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these
entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these
matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of
judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation,37 the Court stated
–

Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some
provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge
and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract
cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.38(Emphasis supplied in the former and
ours in the latter)

Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As
previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of
judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses
that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached
to the petition/complaint.39

Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be
dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should
be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an
end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard."40

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18, 2011
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial
Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish
the respondents with a copy of the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision and to submit
its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-
Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna
Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO,
Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY
JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer
of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense,
HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS
M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA,
Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan,
MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G.
ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR, J.:

Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military
ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.

Factual Background

The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which means "long reef
exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie
Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley
are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.1

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City,
Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.

In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a
World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of
pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat
for internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as
an important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing
significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic
importance.2

On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park
(TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological,
sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and
future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human
activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within
the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole
policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in
the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On
January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan.1âwphi1

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil.

On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press
statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy
Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the
ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from
the coral reef.

On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H.
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS
Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US
respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin
(Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-
Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast
Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio
0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents."

The Petition

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to
cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident.

Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized
entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30);
damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail
certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.

The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,

a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the Guardian
grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;

c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear
guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to assume
responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage under the
Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.

d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited commercial
activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and
an additional buffer zone;

2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;

3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:

a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to
forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on [environmental
guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "

b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings
against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public;

c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S.
personnel under the circumstances of this case;

d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for
damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other
States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;

e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and
production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to the
grounding of the Guardian;

f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition of all
cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;

g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or
plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement
approved by the Honorable Court;

h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local Government
Code and R.A. 10067;

i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined
under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;

j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian
in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar grounding incidents;

k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and
accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of
negotiation;
 l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;

m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty to
consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;

n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged areas
of TRNP;

o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces
Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of
nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine
Constitution;

p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;

q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and

4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just and
equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)

Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early
resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.9

Respondents' Consolidated Comment

In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production orders,
respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait
accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and
substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the
damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.

The Court's Ruling

As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged,
and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this
Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.12

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary
citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their
own and future generations. Thus:

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now
enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the
Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature."16

Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has
jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State,17is
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of
our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under
the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that
''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non
habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B.
171]

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as
the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the
state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction
of local courts, as follows:

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international
law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to
the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred
by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be,
in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose
service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise
of territorial jurisdiction.22

In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark
Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was
eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for
damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that
petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their
duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts
(Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity,
State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.24

In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers
by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State,
he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

xxxx

The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The
cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers
vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing
official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this
case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system,
brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He
explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of
the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the
coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the
US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS,
as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of
United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27

The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the uses
of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public
international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral
treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines
in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.

The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the
principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest
customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over
the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic
zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where
the vessel is located.31

Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the
UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as
to its bed and subsoil.32

In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to
leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship

or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules
of international law.

Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A
foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation
in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case,
the US?

An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world's
leading maritime power, has not ratified it.

While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately
voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions
contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states
cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton
administration, which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton
transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite
consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the
Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.

While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its
progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in international
institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full
Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by
the 112th Congress.34

Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will
"recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long
as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states",
and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to
traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional
uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their
coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their
internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was centered on
its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed
commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation."

It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the ratification of the
UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:

The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones, including a
maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage
rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and
reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.

xxxx

Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability of the US to
assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law
of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles,
and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.35

We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard
the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
"international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the
damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:

Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into
account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds
the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States
shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and
they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.

Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in
the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common law
tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.

We are not persuaded.

The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to
promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,
materials and supplies.36 The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that
it is the VF A which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the
objectives of the agreement.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions
such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the
Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:

SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude
the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.

In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions
of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted
from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.37

Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:

SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of
a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;

(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;

(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;

(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the
salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse
from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture
and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the
fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating
with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the
following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute
resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:

RULE3

xxxx

SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they have
settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients,
to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to
the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.

Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral to
mediation.

The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.

SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the
scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for
the following purposes:

(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;

xxxx

SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they shall
remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.

The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a
consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and public
policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.

xxxx

SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle in accordance
with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground
about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After spending $6.5 million
restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over
coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38

To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific
team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in
Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage
and remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government
entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities."39

A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be
obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES

SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other
litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose
subject to the control of the court.1âwphi1

In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the
context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision."40

On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to
nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.

As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required
as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the
proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege
of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS,
PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards
of God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA,
DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape
Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR
Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented
by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 181527

CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO
LABID, in their personal capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF
FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in
his capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape
Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director - Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII,
DOE Regional Director for Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as
represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

"Until one has loved an animal,

a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."

Anatole France

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.

In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging
that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a
representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations."1 They
use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic
environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.3As the representatives of
Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the
affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as
primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the
opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."5

The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to continue to define
environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space for legal creativity usually
required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other
values protected by current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set the
balance between competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity is not clearly and convincingly
presented.

The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for animals through their
allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen by the
Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the species of the
Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their
animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us
to acknowledge through judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what
the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the
strategies that they agree with.

In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship between them
and all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.

Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law cannot be founded on
feigned representation.

Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have legal standing to sue with
respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have already been liberalized to take into consideration
the difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for
abuse.

II

Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:

SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action.

The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be authorized by statute to be
parties in a civil action.

Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:

ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:

ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the following article.

Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality
begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe, the provisions of the Rules
of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6

A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party in interest.7 When a case is
brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that another party's act or omission has caused a direct injury,
making his or her interest both material and based on an enforceable legal right.8

Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real party in interest, as defined
in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be
the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9

The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to directly or actually benefit or
suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real party in interest. 10 The representative is
an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not
an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11

These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that for the Petition of the human
petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the
human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.

The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species
inhabiting Tañon Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have legal standing
before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.

In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan explains as the
"guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13

Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to
enforce their statutory rights and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy organizations may
bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-
challenged humans who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Christopher D. Stone
asserts that the environment should possess the right to seek judicial redress even though it is incapable of representing
itself. While asserting the rights of

speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate challenges - such as
identifying the proper spokesman -the American legal system is already well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by which
nonhumans may obtain standing via a judicially established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless - and
nonhuman - entities such as corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own
behalf. There is little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts
of interest, and termination of a guardianship are well established.

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that AL VA
might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane
treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is
more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established
prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities
demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action.
The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring
suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.

This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit organizations with an
established history of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official guardians ad !item on behalf of
nonhuman animals interests. The American legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and
interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are
minimal compared to an interest in the proper administration of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals, the legal system must recognize those statutory rights independent of humans and provide a viable
means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has been urged on
behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they
are sentient beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively different from
other legally protected nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal protection.

Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal
statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman
animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known example is found
in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic participation on
behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable
representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as individuals
who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves.
They are also similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations,
states, and others).

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and,
therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals.

Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel the
need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore,
speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals
and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger,15 the court held that an emotional response to what humans
perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16Such sympathy
cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to represent
animals was further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting animal
rights:

What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing doctrine further required
ALVA to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general disdain for animal
cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and
thus relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "

....

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA
might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane
treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is
more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established
prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities
demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action.
The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring
suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over the
environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to
act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is
defined in Section 5: .

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file
an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue
an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested
parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may
publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies
of said order.

There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on behalf of
animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we,
humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed
to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves, which of
course includes compassion for all living things.

Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.

In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have given to the rule on
standing. While representatives are not required to establish direct injury on their part, they should only be allowed to
represent after complying with the following: [I]t is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on
whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal
rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20

I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño21 regarding this rule alongside the appreciation of legal
standing in Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases
brought by representatives, should be used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.

That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of
emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used
to obtain judgments that would preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual
concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a
different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably
result in preventing future generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It
reduces the autonomy of our children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their
ability to make their own arguments.

It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there
is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c)
there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to
be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that
an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all
together.23 (Emphasis in the original)

Similarly, in Paje:

A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the
court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words, he or she must have a cause
of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the
real party in interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a
curiosity about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and substantial. It is not a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent interest.

A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as representative of a .real party in
interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, that representative is not and does not become
the real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative remains to be
a third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.

....

To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right
has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court
to represent the victim."

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any
Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn.
It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf
of the real party in interest.

The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition
of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to
file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the
future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.

To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous for three
reasons:

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question its
representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues,
the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors
and generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the
impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.

In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue
for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the
court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court's
decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.25

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the
value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine
Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on
mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns
are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking
legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure
that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.

Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be considered carefully so that
no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident
Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.

However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center,. Engarcial,
Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the
Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future generations of
Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected
their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest.27 The actual, direct, and
material damage they suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a
legal suit.

III

In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners, most especially when
the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating
unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human
petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon Strait."28

No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction,
only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was unwilling to join would there be an allegation
as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary
party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find
the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over
his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim
against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a
defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may
be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.30

The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but who do not consent
should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other court processes. Petitioners. should not take
it upon themselves to simply imp lead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-
petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal constitutional department,
we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural
situation caused by petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous.
The Former President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case.

IV

I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.

SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992,
and Presidential Decree No. 1234,31 which declared Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of
the .1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts
that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section
2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of
paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under paragraph 4.34· Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither
granted exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential
use of communal marine and fishing resources.35

VI

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception. of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)

I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural
resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import of the words "either
financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also

the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:

1973 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the
Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or association at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other forms of
assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)

1935 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.

The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer interpretation from the
Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in
a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other
hand, may result in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further subjectivity from
those who spoke during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will
be used. It is safer that we use the words already in the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were
read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.

SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.

Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the standards set forth in La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant
thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented
to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)

Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against three important points: (a)
whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether
SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President
to Congress within 30 days of execution.

VII

The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972.1âwphi1 It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts,
contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)

The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter into with
foreign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no longer
allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders the
law invalid and ineffective.

SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an important point, which
is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should
it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape under
Presidential Decree No. 123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are
explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except
strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information
on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be
conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made
available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization
of energy resources found within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.40 (Emphasis
supplied)

No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil exploration, extraction,
and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a
protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.

VIII

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by paragraph
4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then
Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in
cases where the Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated
to another public official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the President's involvement, being one of the
constitutional safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality:

At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:

• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in
referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance. • They spoke of service contracts
as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.

• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.

• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would eliminate or m minimize the
abuses prevalent during the marital law regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)

Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the signing or
execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null and void.

IX

Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the execution and existence of SC-46.
The reporting requirement is an equally important requisite to the validity of any service contract involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress about
SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.

In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII,
Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.

I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being
violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the
requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañon Strait is covered by the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of the natural
environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement and
recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the
environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant
and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future
generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system
of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.

It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values that may be
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of these areas is
possible only through cooperation among national government, local and concerned private organizations; that the use
and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.

To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass
outstanding remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of
plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall
be designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment:

SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management plan
for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted,
and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.45(Emphasis supplied)

The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty project is implemented:

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) under the Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed
to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and
take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution
or indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)

In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the
program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources
found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except
strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information
on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be
conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made
available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization
of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed by Congress.47 (Emphasis
supplied)

Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining an Environmental
Compliance Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that
the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon Strait is
not a nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering information; and ( c) measures were in
place to ensure that the exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49
Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for cases involving Philippine
energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize the importance
of protecting the environment in light of resource exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for
Filipinos local resources under the most favorable conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected seascape, the
institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46. Based on the records, JAPEX
commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its project, with the Environmental
Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007.51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any environmental assessment
contrary to Section 12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

XI

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in the
wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not
incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign
representation of any other species or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim
any of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the
responsibility deserving of the grace and power endowed on our species.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote:

(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;

(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and

(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586,
and Presidential Decree No. 1234.
G.R. No. 194239 June 16, 2015

WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the Residents of West Tower Condominium and in
representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and generations yet unborn,Petitioners,
vs.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AND OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before the Court is the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan filed following the leak in the oil pipeline owned by
First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati City. The Facts

Respondent FPI C operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: ( 1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a 117-
kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene;
and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a
depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts
of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.

The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety allowance against leakage,
considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than twice the current operating pressure
and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the US Department of Transportation standard of
0.9 meters. In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (West Tower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the
condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control
the flow, West Tower's management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called
the city's Bureau of Fire Protection.

What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the
drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their
respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo's power was shut down.

Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of West Tower shouldered the expenses
of hauling the waste water from its basement, which eventually required the setting up of a treatment plant in the area
to separate fuel from the waste water. On October 28, 2010, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of
Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to determine the source of the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's
WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower.

A day after, or on October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL, which was already
closed since October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities on the roads surrounding
West Tower.

On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding
communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and
several people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their
intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.1
In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board of directors and officers, and First Gen Corporation
(FGC) and its board of directors and officers be directed to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of
negligence in the performance of their functions as a common carrier; (2) continue to check the structural integrity of the
whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same; (3) make periodic reports on their findings with regard to the 117-
kilometer pipeline and their replacement of the same; (4) rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay
Bangkal and West Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak became manifest; and (5) to open a special
trust fund to answer for similar and future contingencies in the future. Furthermore, petitioners pray that respondents be
prohibited from opening the pipeline and allowing the use thereof until the same has been thoroughly checked and
replaced, and be temporarily restrained from operating the pipeline until the final resolution of the case.

To bolster their petition, petitioners argued that FPIC's omission or failure to timely replace. its pipelines and to observe
extraordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in the City of Makati. Thus, for petitioners, the continued use of the
now 4 7-year old pipeline would not only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health, and property of those who live or
sojourn in all the municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would also affect the rights of the generations yet unborn
to live in a balanced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan2 with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns.
The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the
structural integrity of the whole span of the 11 7-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and
avert any untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and ( c) make a report thereon within 60 days
from receipt thereof.

In compliance with the writ, FPIC directors Edgar Chua, Dennis Javier, Dennis Gamab and Willie Sarmiento submitted a
Joint Return3 praying for the dismissal of the petition and the denial of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan. They alleged
that: petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation that the environmental damage
affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces; and the continued operation of the pipeline should be
allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to the public.

Respondents FPIC and its directors and officers, other than the aforementioned four ( 4) directors, also filed a Verified
Return4 claiming that not all requirements for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan are present and there is no showing
that West Tower Corp. was authorized by all those it claimed to represent. They further averred that the petition contains
no allegation that respondents FPIC directors and officers acted in such a manner as to allow the piercing of the corporate
veil.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 201-1, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a Joint
Compliance5 submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own nor
operate the pipelines, adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines, much less
to cease and desist from operating them as they have no capability, power, control or responsibility over the pipelines.
They, thus, prayed that the directives of the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.

On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page "Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and
Preventive Maintenance Program."6 In gist, FPIC reported the following: (I) For the structural integrity of the 117-kilometer
pipeline, (a) the DOE engaged the services of UP-NIGS to do borehole testing on 81 pre-identified critical areas of the
WQPL in eight cities and municipalities-all the boreholes showed negative presence of petroleum vapors; (b) pressure
tests were conducted after the repair of the leak and results showed negative leaks and the DOE's pipeline expert, Societe
General de Surveillance, New Zealand, has developed a pressure test protocol requiring a 24-hour operation of running a
scraper pig through the pipeline to eliminate air gap; (c) In-Line Inspection Test, was conducted by NDT through MFL and
ultrasonic. The NDT later cleared the WOPL from any damage or corrosion.

(II) For preventive maintenance measures, (a) Cathodic Protection Systems are installed involving the use of anode
materials and the introduction of electric current in the pipeline to enhance prevention of corrosion; (b) Regular Scraper
Runs through the pipeline to maintain cleanliness and integrity of the pipelines' internal surface; (c) Daily Patrols every
two hours of the pipeline route to deter unauthorized diggings in the vicinity of the pipeline segments; ( d) Regular
coordination meetings with DPWH, MMDA and utility companies to monitor projects that might involve digging or
excavation in the vicinity of the pipeline segments; (e) Installation of Security Warning Signs along the pipeline route with
toll free number which can be called in the event of an accident or emergency; (f) Emergency Response Procedure of the
ERT is activated by a call-out procedure; (g) Maintenance of Emergency Equipment and Repair Kit which are always on
standby; and, (h) Remotely controlled Isolation Valves are in place to shut the pipeline when necessary.

On February 9, 2011, petitioners filed, and the Court eventually granted, their Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary
Conference and Hearing7 pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

On April 15, 2011, the Court conducted an ocular inspection of the WOPL in the vicinity of West Tower to determine the
veracity of the claim that there were two (2) additional leaks on FPIC's pipeline. Results of the ocular inspection belied the
claim.

In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints against respondents arising from the same incident or
leakage from the WOPL.8

Since after the Court's issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations
on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of the DOE, clarified and
confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume
operation of its BOPL System.9

On July 7, 2011, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion10 assailing the Court's May 31, 2011 Resolution, praying for the
conduct of oral argument on the issue of reopening the BOPL System. This was followed, on September 9, 2011, by a
Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion11 wherein petitioners invoked the precautionary
principle12 and asserted that the possibility of a leak in the BOPL System leading to catastrophic environmental damage is
enough reason to order the closure of its operation. They likewise alleged that the entities contracted by FPIC to clean
and remediate the environment are illegally discharging waste water, which had not undergone proper treatment, into
the Parañaque River. Petitioners, thus, prayed that respondents be directed to comply with environmental laws in
rehabilitating the surroundings affected by the oil leak and to submit a copy of their work plan and monthly reports on
the progress thereof. To these omnibus motions, respondents were directed to file their respective comments.

On September 28, 2011, respondent FPIC filed an Urgent Motion for Leave (To Undertake "Bangkal Realignment"
Project)13 in order to reduce stress on the WOPL System. FPIC sought to construct a new realigned segment to replace the
old pipe segment under the Magallanes Interchange, which covers the portion that leaked. Petitioners were directed to
file their comment on FPIC's motion.

Report and Recommendation of the Court of Appeals

To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). By this Court's
Resolution dated November 22, 2011,14 the appellate court was required to conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a
report and recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties' memoranda.

On March 21, 2012, the preliminary conference was continued before the CA wherein the parties made admissions and
stipulations of facts and defined the issues for resolution. In view of the technical nature of the case, the CA also
appointed15 several amici curiae,16 but only four (4) filed their reports.17

On December 26, 2012, the CA Former 11th Division submitted to the Court its well-crafted and exhaustive 156-page
Report and Recommendation18 dated December 21, 2012 (CA Report). Some highlights of the Report:

1. Anent petitioners' June 28, 2011 Omnibus Motion assailing the reopening of the BOPL System, the CA directed
respondent FPIC to submit the appropriate certification from the DOE as to the safe commercial operation of the
BOPL; otherwise, the operation of the BOPL must also be enjoined.
2. On petitioners' September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion, the CA
directed the Inter-Agency Committee on Health to submit its evaluation of the remediation plan prepared by
CH2M Hill Philippines, Inc. for FPIC. Further, the appellate court directed FPIC to strictly comply with the
stipulations contained in the permits issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for
its remediation activities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. The DENR was in turn directed by the CA to:

(a) monitor compliance by respondent FPIC with applicable environmental laws and regulations and
conditions set forth in the permits issued;

(b) conduct independent analysis of end-products of the Multi-Phase Extraction System;

(c) conduct regular consultative meetings with the City of Makati, residents of Barangay Bangkal and other
stakeholders concerning the remediation activities; and,

(d) evaluate the viability of the recommendation of amicus Dr. Benjamin R. De Jesus, Jr. to include the use
of surfactants and oxygen-releasing compounds (ORCs) in the middle and terminal portions of the
remediation plan.

3. Respondent's September 27, 2011 Urgent Motion for Leave (To Undertake "Bangkal Realignment" Project) was
denied.

4. With regard to the March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation (Re: List of Amici Curiae and Recent Possible
Leak in the Pipeline) filed by petitioners, the CA found that the existence of another possible leak alleged by
petitioners was not established. Nonetheless, to prevent such event, the CA ordered FPIC to: (i) review, adopt and
strictly observe appropriate safety and precautionary measures; (ii) closely monitor the conduct of its
maintenance and repair works; and (iii) submit to the DOE regular monthly reports on the structural integrity and
safe commercial operation of the pipeline.

5. As to the merits of the case, the CA submitted the following recommendations:

(a) That the people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and public interest groups that
indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality (namely: the
Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines; Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc.; Women's
Business Council of the Philippines, Inc.; Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan
Chapter; Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations; and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium
Corporation) be allowed to be formally impleaded as petitioners.

(b) That respondent FPIC be ordered to submit a certification from the DOE Secretary that the WOPL is
already safe for commercial operation. The certification should take into consideration the adoption by
FPIC of the appropriate leak detection system to be used in monitoring the entire pipeline's mass input
versus mass output. The certification must also consider the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing
patches and sleeves. In case of failure of respondent FPIC to submit the required certification from the
DOE Secretary within sixty (60) days from notice of the Honorable Supreme Court's approval of this
recommendation, the TEPO must be made permanent.

(c) That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer for similar contingencies in
the future be denied for lack of sufficient basis.

d) That respondent FGC be not held solidarily liable under the TEPO.

(e) That without prejudice to the outcome of the civil and criminal cases filed against respondents, the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be not held liable in their individual capacities.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration19 of the CA's Report praying that (a) instead
of the DOE, the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry Research and Development Center;
(b) a trust fund be created to answer for future contingencies; and ( c) the directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be held
accountable.

On January 25, 2013, FPIC filed its Compliance (Re: Department of Energy Certification on the Black Oil Pipeline)20and
submitted the required DOE Certification21 issued on January 22, 2013 by DOE Secretary Carlos Jericho L. Petilla (Secretary
Petilla). On March 14, 2013, petitioners countered with a Manifestation with Motion22 asserting that FPIC's certification is
not compliant with the CA's requirement. Hence, petitioners moved that the certification should be disregarded, the 30-
day period be deemed to have lapsed, and FPIC be permanently enjoined from operating the BOPL.

On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and Recommendation
that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations. The
pertinent portion of said Resolution reads:

[FPIC] is hereby ORDERED to submit a certification from the DOE Secretary that the pipeline is already safe for commercial
operation. The certification should take into consideration the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection system
to be used in monitoring the entire pipeline's mass input versus mass output. The certification must also consider the
necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches and sleeves x x x.23

The DOE Secretary is DIRECTED to consult the [DOST] regarding the adoption of the appropriate leak detection system
and the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches and sleeves.

On October 2, 2013, petitioners, in a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification, emphasized that the CA
found FPIC's tests and maintenance program to be insufficient and inconclusive to establish the WOPL' s structural
integrity for continued commercial operation.24 Furthermore, petitioners point out that the DOE is biased and incapable
of determining the WOPL's structural integrity.

Respondents, for their part, maintain that the DOE has the technical competence and expertise to assess the structural
integrity of the WOPL and to certify the system's safety for commercial operation.25 Respondents further allege that the
DOE is the agency empowered to regulate the transportation and distribution of petroleum products, and to regulate and
monitor downstream oil industry activities, including "product distribution" through pipelines.26

In compliance with the Court's July 30, 2013 Resolution, the DOE Secretary issued on October 25, 2013 a
Certification,27 attesting that the WOPL is safe to resume commercial operations, subject to monitoring or inspection
requirements, and imposing several conditions that FPIC must comply with. The Certification, in its entirety, reads:

This is to certify that based on the Pipeline Integrity Management Systems (PIMS) being implemented by [FPIC] for its
[WOPL] facility, the same is safe to resume commercial operations. This certification is being issued after consultation with
the [DOST] and on the basis of the following considerations, to wit:

1. DOE noted the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection system to be used in monitoring the pipeline's
mass input versus mass output, as well as the other measures of leak detection and prevention adopted by the
latter;

2. DOE further noted that FPIC has already undertaken realignment and reinforcement works on the current
pipeline to remove majority of the patches. FPIC has likewise presented substantial and adequate documentation
showing that the remaining patches and sleeves are safe, and that the use of such is recognized by the industry
and complies with existing standards;

3. DOE finally noted the results of various tests and inspections done on the pipeline as indicated in the
Manifestation submitted by ,the DOE on March 31, 2012, in the civil case docketed as CA GR SP No. 00008 and
entitled West Tower Condominium, et al. [v.] First Philippine Industrial Corporation, et al.
This certification is being issued subject to the condition that FPIC will submit itself to regular monitoring and validation
by the Oil Industry Management Bureau (OIMB) of the implementation of its PIMS, particularly on the following: (a) mass
or volume input versus mass or volume output loss/gain accounting; (b) results of borehole monitoring, (c) inspection of
the pipeline cathodic protection and (d) pressure test.

Further, FPIC shall submit itself to any test or inspection that the DOE and DOST may deem appropriate for purposes of
monitoring the operations of the WOPL facility.

The Court is fully cognizant of the WOPL' s value in commerce and the adverse effects of a prolonged closure thereof.
Nevertheless, there is a need to balance the necessity of the immediate reopening of the WOPL with the more important
need to ensure that it is sound for continued operation, since the substances it carries pose a significant hazard to the
surrounding population and to the environment.28 A cursory review of the most recent oil pipeline tragedies around the
world will readily show that extreme caution should be exercised in the monitoring and operation of these common
carriers:

(1) On August 1, 2014, a series of powerful explosions from underground pipeline systems ripped up the streets
of Kaohsiung, Taiwan, killing at least 28 people and injuring 299 more. Further, 23 ,600, 2,268 and 6,000
households were left without gas, power and water, respectively, in the 2-3 square kilometer blast area.29

(2) On November 22, 2013, an oil pipeline leaked, caught fire, and exploded in Qingdao, Shangdao Province in
China, killing 55 people and injuring more than a hundred more.30

(3) On September 14, 2011, a fuel pipeline exploded in Kenya's capital city, Nairobi, reducing bodies to dust and
flattening homes. At least 7 5 people died in the explosion, while more than a hundred people were injured.31

(4) In September 2010, a natural gas pipeline ruptured and set off a fireball, killing eight (8) people and leveling 3
8 homes in San Bruno, California in the United States.32

(5) On July 30, 2004, a rupture of an underground natural gas pipeline buried six (6) meters in Ghislenghien,
Belgium resulted in 24 deaths and over 120 injuries.33

On April 29 and 30, 2014, the DOE organized a dialogue between said government agencies and the FPIC. There it was
stated that during the dialogue, "the division heads and a high profile team from FPIC, both from operation and
management made presentations and answered questions on pipeline pumping operation and product delivery, and a
detailed explanation of the FPIC PIMS' control measures, condition monitoring measures, and emergency measures, as
well as its various activities and projects implemented since 2010 such as pipeline replacement and realignment in
Pandacan and Bangkal, inspection and reinforcement of all patches in the WOPL, inspection and reinforcement of a
number of reported dents in the WOPL, conduct of successful leak tests, and installation of boreholes that are gas-tested
on a weekly basis, and the safety systems that go with the daily pipeline operation and maintenance and project
execution."34

On August 5, 2014, Secretary Carlos Jericho L. Petilla of the DOE submitted a letter 35 recommending activities and
timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations, to wit:

A. Preparatory to the Test Run

I. FPIC Tasks:

a. Continue submission of monitoring charts, data/reading, accomplishment reports, and project status for all
related activities/works. Respond to comments and prepare for site inspection.

b. Continue gas testing along the right-of-way using the monitoring wells or boreholes. Prepare for inspection of
right-of-way and observation of gas testing activities on monitoring wells and boreholes.
 c. Expound on the selection of borehole location. For example, identify those located in pipeline bends, bodies of
water, residential areas, repaired portions of the pipelines, dents and welded joints.

d. Continue submitting status report relating to "Project Mojica" (an ongoing pipeline segment realignment
activity undertaken by FPIC to give way to a flood control project of MMDA in the vicinity of Mojica St. and Pres.
Osmeña Highway in Makati City). Prepare for site inspection.

II. Inter-agency undertaking:

a. Conduct onsite inspection of right-of-way

b. Review/check remaining 22 patches that were already inspected and reinforced with Clockspring sleeves.

i. Determine location of sleeves.

ii. Review of procedures on repair of sleeves.

iii. Random visual inspection of areas easily accessible.

c. Cathodic protection's onsite inspection on rectifier to check readings

i. Old readings

ii. Current Readings

iii. Segment covered

iv. Criteria for prioritization for corrective action

d. Observe and witness the running/operation of the cleaning pig.

e. Check and validate all calibration certificate of instruments

i. Instrument verification and calibration.

B. Actual Test Run (to be undertaken both by FPIC and inter-agency)

a. Perform Cleaning Pig Run

i. Witness launching and receiving of the cleaning pig.

ii. Handling of the residuals after cleaning.

b. Demonstrate Various Pressure Tests (already being conducted by FPIC)

i. Blocked-in pressure test (Leak Test, not in operation)

ii. In-operation (hourly reading)

c. Continue Current Gas Monitoring (boreholes)

i. Ocular inspection of selected areas

 d. Demonstrate mass or volume balance computation during WOPL test run (already being implemented in the
BOPL)

i. 30 days baseline data generation

ii. 30 days computational analysis and monitoring

C. Commissioning or Return to Commercial Operation

I. FPIC Tasks:

a. Continue implementation of the PIMS. Review recommendations from DOE.

b. Continue monthly reporting of operations and maintenance activities with DOE.

c. Continue reporting and coordination with DOE and other government agencies for implementation of
projects.36

Secretary Petilla also recounted to the Court in his August 5, 2014 letter that the DOE, together with the DPWH and the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), observed the different milestones of the realignment project being
undertaken by FPIC in support of the MMDA Flood Control Project and stated that the new line segment as laid was coated
with corrosion protection prior to the backfilling of the excavated portion.

On February 3, 2015, the Court required the parties to submit their comment on Sec. Petilla's letter within ten (10) days
from receipt of the Resolution. On various dates, respondents First Gen Corporation, FPIC, and petitioner West Tower
filed their respective comments37 in compliance with the Court's resolution. The intervenors were unable to comply with
the Court's directive; hence, they are deemed to have waived their right to file their respective comments. The Issues

Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter from the DOE on the state of the WOPL,
as well as the parties' comments thereon, the following issues defined by the parties during the March 21, 2012
preliminary conference are now ripe for adjudication:

1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether the
other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;

2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to perform
or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;

3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies; and

4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the
environmental protection order.38

The Court's Ruling

We adopt, with modifications, the recommendations of the CA and discuss the foregoing issues in seriatim.

I.
Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest

On the procedural aspect, We agree with the CA that petitioners who are affected residents of West Tower and Barangay
Bangkal have the requisite concern to be real parties-in-interest to pursue the instant petition.
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.39 Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
parties-in-interest.40 In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the
right sought to be enforced.41 Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest.42

In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and
residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when
the condominium's electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still
not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-
interest.

There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and residents,
and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers
under RA 4 726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act,43 it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members.
In the instant case, the condominium corporation .is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that
may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.

It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number of
persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.

Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by West Tower Corp. authorizing Manuel Dy Chuaunsu, Jr. to
sign the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping is irrelevant. The records show that petitioners submitted a
notarized Secretary's Certificate44 attesting that the authority of Chuaunsu to represent the condominium corporation in
filing the petition is from the resolution of the total membership of West Tower Corp. issued during their November 9,
2010 meeting with the requisite quorum. It is, thus, clear that it was not the Board of West Tower Corp. which granted
Chuaunsu the authority but the full membership of the condominium corporation itself.

As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners and residents of West Tower and
are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners.

Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition

and submitted proof of juridical personality

Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya,
Inc., Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter,
Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the
case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.

This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.

Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court, including the
periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to state
in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other
recommendations of the CA, with a few modifications.

II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the

DOE Certification of the WOPL's Commercial Viability

To recall, petitioners' persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent
Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,46 Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently
address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.

With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning scraper runs,
which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line inspections (ILI),
which is done every five years; (c) pressure monitoring valves; and ( d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it
also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known
as segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d) inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and
reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.47Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging
the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and
ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.

The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak
detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required
to ensure that the WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that FPIC
obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according
to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection systems to
monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans
the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.

The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE
Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from the DOE considering
that the core issue of this case requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various other
administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013
Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter
recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue
between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.

After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the activities and
measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption
of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests
proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening
of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should
the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or
that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.

The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC's proper implementation and compliance with its PIMS and to evaluate the
result of the various tests conducted on the pipeline. The DOE is empowered by Sec. 12(b)(l), RA 7638 to formulate and
implement policies for the efficient and economical "distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal, natural
gas."48 Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical knowledge and special expertise with respect to
practices in the transportation of oil through pipelines.
Moreover, it is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and proficiency available within its offices,
it has also rallied around the assistance of pertinent bureaus of the other administrative agencies: the ITDI49of the DOST,
which is mandated to undertake technical services including standards, analytical and calibration services; the
MIRDC,50 also of the DOST, which is the sole government entity directly supporting the metals and engineering
industry;51 the EMB52 of the DENR, the agency mandated to implement, among others, RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and
Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275 (Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the BOD of the
DPWH, which is mandated to conduct, supervise, and review the technical design aspects of projects of government
agencies.53

The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore, be availed of to arrive at a judicious
decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate resumption of the WOPL's operation. In a host of cases, this Court
held that when the adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an administrative
body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative body equipped with the specialized knowledge
and the technical expertise.54 Hence, the courts, although they may have jurisdiction and power to decide cases, can utilize
the findings and recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that demand "the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact."55

Justice Leonen, in his dissent, is of the view that the petition should be denied and the TEPO immediately lifted in light of
the DOE's issuance of a certification attesting to the safety of the WOPL for continued commercial operations, thereby
rendering the instant petition moot and academic, seeking, as it does, the checking of the pipeline's structural integrity.
According to his dissent, the writ of kalikasan issued by the Court has already served its functions and, therefore, is functus
officio. Moreover, he argues that directing the DOE and FPIC to repeat their previous procedures is tantamount to
doubting the agency's performance of its statutorily-mandated tasks, over which they have the necessary expertise, and
implies that said DOE certification is improper, a breach, allegedly, of the principle of separation of powers.

He also contends that the majority ordered the repetition of the procedures and tests already conducted on the WOPL
because of the fear and uncertainty on its safeness despite the finding of the DOE in favor of its reopening, taking into
consideration the occurrence of numerous pipeline incidents worldwide. The dissent argues that the precautionary
principle should not be so strictly applied as to unjustifiably deprive the public of the benefits of the activity to be inhibited,
and to unduly create other risks.

The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and academic, that the writ of kalikasan has already served its
function, and that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO may do more harm than good are anchored on the mistaken premise
that the precautionary principle was applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and the FPIC for the conduct of the
various tests anew. The following reasons easily debunk these arguments:

1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case;

2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL's structural integrity and in fact imposes
several conditions for FPIC's compliance;

3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned agencies, proposed the activities to be
conducted preparatory to the reopening of the pipeline; and

4 . There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's structural integrity.

Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle,
provides that "[ w ]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the application
of said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary principle in deciding the issue
on the WOPL's structural integrity.

The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to be
inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty. Here,
however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL,
which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the
surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact,
the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even
questioned by FPIC.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL's compliance with pipeline structure standards
so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by
the parties on the WOPL's actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of the
CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL' s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent
propounds.

Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of the
operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and timetable, is a clear
and unequivocal message coming from the DOE that the WOPL's soundness for resumption of and continued commercial
operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline's actual
physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a short-form integrity audit,56that the factual issue
on the WOPL's viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline's structural integrity has not yet been rendered
moot and remains to be subject to this Court's resolution. Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE's issuance of the
certification adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

The dissent is correct in emphasizing that We defer to the findings of fact of administrative agencies considering their
specialized knowledge in their field. And We, as a matter of fact, acceded to the DOE' s conclusions on the necessity of the
conduct of the various activities and tests enumerated in Sec. Petilla's letter to this Court dated August 5, 2014. Hence,
Our directive for the DOE to immediately commence the activities enumerated in said Letter, to determine the pipeline's
reliability, and to order its reopening should the DOE find that such is proper.

The dissent also loses sight of the fact that the petition not only seeks the checking of the WOPL's structural integrity, but
also prays for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the leak, the creation of a special trust fund, the imposition of
liability upon the directors of FPIC, among others. These issues, undoubtedly, are matters that are not addressed by the
DOE certification alone. Furthermore, these are issues that no longer relate to the WOPL' s structure but to its
maintenance and operations, as well as to the residues of the incident. It will, thus, be improper for Us to simply dismiss
the petition on the basis solely of the alleged resolution of only one of several issues, which purportedly renders the issue
on the WOPL' s soundness moot, without disposing of the other issues presented.

Lastly, any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline is
commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive check on its structural integrity
when experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline. Even the DOE, the agency tasked to oversee
the supply and distribution of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this and even recommended the checking of the
patched portions of the pipeline, among others. In this regard, the Court deems it best to take the necessary safeguards,
which are not similar to applying the precautionary principle as previously explained, in order to prevent a similar incident
from happening in the future.

III.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the
environment. Said proviso pertinently provides:

SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other
litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose
subject to the control of the court. (emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of
damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

xxxx

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a
trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably
already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but
a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the
considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on petitioners' prayer for the
creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages
is found warranted.

IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found FGC not liable under
the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City)
and criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City)
filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.

The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not
liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,
the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against
respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents, if any, on their
exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of
petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.

Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can, however, be
properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.

Other Matters
The CA's resolution on petitioners' September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion
on the remediation plan in Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee on Environmental Health to submit
its evaluation of the said plan prepared by CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations
embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a certification from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well
taken. DENR is the government agency tasked to implement the state policy of "maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment"57 and to "promulgate rules and regulations for the control
of water, air, and land pollution."58 It is indubitable that the DENR has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the
environmental remediation of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.

With regard to petitioners' March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a recent possible leak in the pipeline, the
CA appropriately found no additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect on the environs in Barangay Bangkal
due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it fitting that the pipeline be closely and regularly monitored to obviate another
catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of the affected people, and to preserve and protect the environment
not only for the present but also for the future generations to come.

Petitioner's January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the CA' s Report need not be discussed and given
consideration. As the CA' s Report contains but the appellate court's recommendation on how the issues should be
resolved, and not the adjudication by this Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.

As to petitioner's October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification, the matters contained therein
have been considered in the foregoing discussion of the primary issues of this case. With all these, We need not belabor
the other arguments raised by the parties.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion for Clarification is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' recommendations, embodied in its December 21,
2012 Report and Recommendation, are hereby ADOPTED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

I. The Department of Energy (DOE) is hereby ORDERED to oversee the strict implementation of the following activities:

A. Preparatory to the Test Run of the entire stretch of the WOPL:

1) FPIC shall perform the following:

a. Continue submission of monitoring charts, data/reading, accomplishment reports, and project

status for all related activities/works. Respond to comments and prepare for site inspection.

b. Continue gas testing along the right-of-way using the monitoring wells or boreholes. Prepare
for inspection of right-of-way and observation of gas testing activities on monitoring wells and
boreholes.

c. Explain the process of the selection of borehole location and identify those located in pipeline
bends, bodies of water, highways, residential areas, repaired portions of the pipelines, dents and
welded joints, as well other notable factors, circumstances, or exposure to stresses. d. Set up
additional boreholes and monitoring wells sufficient to cover the entire stretch of the WOPL, the
number and location of which shall be determined by the DOE.

e. Continue submitting status report to the concerned government agency/ies relating to "Project
Mojica," or the on-going pipeline segment realignment activity being undertaken by FPIC to give
way to a flood control project of the MMDA in the vicinity of Mojica St. and Pres. Osmeña
Highway, and prepare for site inspection.

2) The DOE shall perform the following undertakings:

 a. Conduct onsite inspection of the pipeline right-of-way, the area around the WOPL and the
equipment installed underground or aboveground.

b. Review and check the condition of the 22 patches reinforced with Clockspring sleeves by
performing the following:

i. Determine the location of the sleeves

ii. Review the procedure for the repair of the sleeves

iii. Inspect the areas where the affected portions of the WOPL are located and which are
easily accessible.

c. Inspect onsite the cathodic protection rectifier to check the following:

i. old and current readings

ii. the segment/s covered by the cathodic protection system

iii. review the criteria for prioritization of corrective action.

d. Observe and witness the running/operation of the intelligent and cleaning pigs.

e. Check and calibrate the instruments that will be used for the actual tests on the pipeline, and
validate the calibration certificates of these instruments.

B. During the Actual Test Run:

1) FPIC shall perform the following:

a. Perform Cleaning Pig run and witness the launching and receiving of the intelligent and cleaning
pigs.

b. Demonstrate and observe the various pressure and leakage tests, including the following:

i. "Blocked-in pressure test" or the pressure test conducted while all the WOPL's openings
are blocked or closed off; and

ii. "In-operation test" or the hourly monitoring of pressure rating after the pipeline is filled
with dyed water and pressurized at a specified rate.

c. Continue, inspect, and oversee the current gas monitoring system, or the monitoring of gas flow
from the boreholes and monitoring wells of the WOPL.

d. Check the mass or volume balance computation during WOPL test run by conducting:

i. 30 days baseline data generation

ii. Computational analysis and monitoring of the data generated.

II. After FPIC has undertaken the activities prescribed in the preceding paragraph 1, the DOE shall determine if the activities
and the results of the test run warrant the re-opening of the WOPL. In the event that the DOE is satisfied that the WOPL
is safe for continued commercial operations, it shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operations of the pipeline.

III. Once the WOPL is re-opened, the DOE shall see to it that FPIC strictly complies with the following directives:

a. Continue implementation of its Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS), as reviewed by the DOE, which
shall include, but shall not be limited to:

1. the conduct of daily patrols on the entire stretch of the WOPL, every two hours;

2. continued close monitoring of all the boreholes and monitoring wells of the WOPL pipeline;

3. regular periodic testing and maintenance based on its PIMS; and

4. the auditing of the pipeline's mass input versus mass output;

b. submit to the DOE, within ten (10) days of each succeeding month, monthly reports on its compliance with the
above directives and any other conditions that the DOE may impose, the results of the monitoring, tests, and
audit, as well as any and all activities undertaken on the WOPL or in connection with its operation. The concerned
government agencies, namely: the Industrial Technology Development Institute (ITDI) and the Metals Industry
Research and Development Center (MIRDC), both under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the
Bureau of Design (BOD) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the University of the
Philippines - National Institute of Geological Science (UP-NI GS) and University of the Philippines - Institute of Civil
Engineering (UP-ICE), the petitioners, intervenors and this Court shall likewise be furnished by FPIC with the
monthly reports. This shall include, but shall not be limited to: realignment, repairs, and maintenance works; and

c. continue coordination with the concerned government agencies for the implementation of its projects.1âwphi1

IV. Respondent FPIC is also DIRECTED to undertake and continue the remediation, rehabilitation and restoration of the
affected Barangay Bangkal environment until full restoration of the affected area to its condition prior to the leakage is
achieved. For this purpose, respondent FPIC must strictly comply with the measures, directives and permits issued by the
DENR for its remediation activities in Barangay Bangkal, including but not limited to, the Wastewater Discharge Permit
and Permit to Operate. The DENR has the authority to oversee and supervise the aforesaid activities on said affected
barangay.

V. The Inter-Agency Committee on Environmental Health under the City Government of Makati shall SUBMIT to the DENR
its evaluation of the Remediation Plan prepared by CH2M Hill Philippines, Inc. within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.

VI. Petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer for similar contingencies in the future is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209165

LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
AGHAM PARTY LIST (represented by its President Rep. Angelo B. Palmones), Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Amended Decision dated 13 September 20132 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012.

The Facts

Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI’s
mining area is covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement3 No. 268-2008-III dated 26 August 2008 by virtue of an
Operating Agreement4 dated 5 June 2007 with Filipinas Mining Corporation.

LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. A port is a vital
infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and other minerals extracted from the mines and
make the venture economically feasible. Brgy. Bolitoc, about 25 kilometers away from the mine site, makes it an ideal
location to build a port facility. In the area of Sta. Cruz, Shangfil Mining and Trading Corporation (Shangfil)/A3Una Mining
Corporation (A3Una) and DMCI Mining Corporation, have been operating their own ports since 2007.

LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port project: (1) Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Environmental Compliance Certificate5 (ECC) R03-1104-182 dated 2 May 2011 covering the
development of causeway, stockpile and related facilities on LAMI’s property with an area of 18,142 sq.m.; (2) DENR
provisional foreshore lease agreement with LAMI;6 (3) Philippine

Ports Authority (PPA) Clearance to Develop a Port;7 (4) PPA Permit to Construct a Port;8 (5) PPA Special Permit to Operate
a Beaching Facility;9 and (6) Tree Cutting Permit/Certification10 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR.

The Zambales Alliance, a group of other mining companies operating in Sta. Cruz, Zambales which do not have their own
port, namely Eramen Minerals, Inc.; Zambales Diversified Metals Corporation; Zambales Chromite Mining Corporation,
Inc.; BenguetCorp Nickel Mines, Inc., supported the port project of LAMI and issued Letters11 of Intent to use the port
facilities of LAMI upon completion.

The Bolitoc community – the barangay, its officials and residents – gave several endorsements12 supporting the project.
Even the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz gave its consent to the construction of the port.13

However, LAMI allegedly encountered problems from the local government of Sta. Cruz, headed by Mayor Luisito E. Marty
(Mayor Marty). LAMI stated that Mayor Marty unduly favored some mining companies in the municipality and allegedly
refused to issue business and mayor’s permits and to receive payment of occupation fees from other mining companies
despite the necessary national permits and licenses secured by the other mining companies.

On 24 April 2012, Mayor Marty issued an order14 directing LAMI to refrain from continuing with its clearing works and
directed the Sta. Cruz Municipal Police Chief Generico Biñan to implement his order. On 26 April 2012, LAMI responded
through a letter15 explaining that Mayor Marty’s order was illegal and baseless. Chief Biñan, together with two of his
deputies, went to LAMI’s port site to demand that LAMI cease its clearing works. LAMI’s supervisor showed Chief Biñan
all of LAMI’s permits. In a Memorandum dated 3 May 2012, Chief Biñan made a report to his supervisor, S/Supt. Francisco
DB Santiago, Jr. (S/Supt. Santiago), Zambales Police Provincial Director, that there was no leveling of a mountain on the
port site. On 6 May 2012, S/Supt. Santiago made a Special Report re: Police Assistance16 to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Regional Director citing the findings of Chief Biñan.

Thereafter, Rep. Dan Fernandez, a member of the Committee on Ecology of the House of Representatives, passed House
Resolution No. 117 (HR 117) entitled "Resolution Directing the Committee on Ecology to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of
Legislation, on the Implementation of Republic Act No. 7942, Otherwise Known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
Particularly on the Adverse Effects of Mining on the Environment." HR 117 was issued in order to conduct an alleged ocular
inspection of the port site in aid of legislation. On 21 May 2012, the Committee on Ecology conducted an ocular inspection
of the LAMI port site, as well as the other ports adjacent to LAMI’s – those of Shangfil/A3Una and D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
Committee allegedly never visited any mining site in the area of Sta. Cruz.

Meanwhile, on 30 April 2012, the DENR Environmental Management Bureau in Region III (DENR-EMB R3) received a letter
dated 27 April 2012 from Mayor Marty inquiring if the ECC the DENR issued in favor of LAMI allowed LAMI to cut trees
and level a mountain.

On 25 May 2012, representatives from the DENR Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) in
Zambales and the local government of Sta. Cruz conducted an ECC compliance monitoring of LAMI’s property. The DENR
PENRO team found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC. Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV)
dated 1 June 2012 was issued against LAMI for violation of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order
from further constructing and developing until such time that the ECC conditions were fully complied.

On 8 June 2012, a technical conference was held where LAMI presented its reply to the NOV. The DENR-EMB R3
ascertained that LAMI’s violations of the four conditions of its ECC constitute minor violations since they only pertain to
non-submission of documents. However, the leveling of the elevated portion of the area was a major violation. A penalty
was consequently imposed on LAMI, and the DENREMB R3 directed LAMI to (1) immediately cause the installation of
mitigating measures to prevent soil erosion and siltation of the waterbody, and (2) submit a rehabilitation plan.

On 11 June 2012, LAMI wrote a letter17 to the DENR-EMB R3 regarding the commitments agreed upon during the technical
conference. LAMI signified compliance with the conditions of DENR-EMB R3. Attached to the letter were: (1) Official
Receipt of payment of penalties under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1586, (2) Matrix of Mitigation and Rehabilitation Plan,
(3) Designation of Pollution Control Officer dated 6 May 2011, and (4) Tree Cutting Permit dated 17 April 2012 issued by
DENR R3 CENRO.18

On 20-21 June 2012, the DENR composite team, composed of DENR-EMB R3, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) R3
and PENRO Zambales, conducted an investigation to determine whether mitigating measures done by LAMI were
sufficient. The composite team found that LAMI’s activities in its property would not result to any environmental damage
to its surrounding communities.

Thereafter, the DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to have complied with the
requirements. In a Letter19 dated 24 October 2012, Lormelyn E. Claudio (Dir. Claudio), the Regional Director of DENR-EMB
R3 wrote:

xxxx

The violated ECC conditions have been rectified and clarified while the penalty corresponding to such violation was fully
paid and the required rehabilitation and mitigating measures were already implemented as committed. As such, the
matter leading to the issuance of the NOV is now resolved.

As ECC holder, you are enjoined to ensure the effective carrying out of your Environmental Management and Monitoring
Plan.20
Meanwhile, earlier, or on 6 June 2012, respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its President, former Representative
Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition21 for the issuance of a Writ22 of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA,
and the Zambales Police Provincial Office (ZPPO).

Agham alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 6823 of PD No. 705,24 as amended by Executive Order No. 277,25 or the
Revised Forestry Code; and (2) Sections 5726 and 6927 of Republic Act No. 7942,28 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
(Philippine Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI cut mountain trees and flattened a mountain which serves as a natural
protective barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the residents of Zambales but also the residents of some nearby
towns located in Pangasinan.

On 13 June 2012, this Court remanded the petition29 to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
rendition of judgment.

On 25 June 2012, LAMI filed its Verified Return dated 21 June 2012, controverting Agham’s allegations. LAMI stated that
it did not and was not violating any environmental law, rule or regulation. LAMI argued that:

(1) LAMI had the necessary permits and authorization to cut trees in the port site; (2) LAMI had the necessary permits to
construct its port; (3) LAMI consulted with and obtained the support of the Sangguniang Barangay and residents of
Barangay Bolitoc; (4) LAMI’s port site is located on private and alienable land; (5) there is no mountain on the port site;
(6) the Philippine Mining Act is irrelevant and inapplicable to the present case; and (7) the other allegations of Agham that
LAMI violated environmental laws, rules or regulations are likewise baseless, irrelevant and false. LAMI stated further that
there is no environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities and provinces.

Public respondents DENR, PPA and ZPPO, filed with the Court of Appeals their Pre-Trial Brief dated 1 August 2012. In the
Pre-Trial Brief, public respondents stated that they will present the following witnesses: (1) Dir. Claudio, Regional Director,
DENR-EMB R3; two from the PPA – (2) Engineer Marieta G. Odicta (Engr. Odicta), Division Manager, Engineering Services
Division, Port District Office, Manila, Northern Luzon; and (3) Emma L. Susara (Ms. Susara), Department Manager,
Commercial Services of the PPA (NCR); and (4) S/Supt. Santiago, Provincial Director of the ZPPO.

The witnesses of public respondents submitted their Judicial Affidavits dated 6 August 2012. The testimonies of the
witnesses were offered to prove the facts and allegations in the petition:

(1) Dir. Claudio30 –

a) That the issues presented by Agham were already subject of the complaint filed by Mayor Marty with the DENR-
EMB R3;

b) That the DENR-EMB R3 issued an ECC to LAMI;

c) That the DENR-EMB R3 acted on the complaint of Mayor Marty with regard to construction by LAMI of its port
facility;

d) That the DENR-EMB R3 issued a NOV dated 1 June 2012 to LAMI;

e) That the DENR-CENRO issued a tree cutting permit to LAMI;

f) That there is no mountain within or inside the property of LAMI in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales;

g) That the cutting of the trees and the partial leveling of a landform (which is determined to be an "elongated
mound" but is alleged to be a "mountain" by the petitioner) conducted by LAMI in its property in Brgy. Bolitoc,
Sta. Cruz, Zambales do not pose adverse environmental impact on the adjoining communities more so to the
larger areas or the entire provinces of Zambales and Pangasinan.
(2) Eng. Odicta31 –

a) That the PPA issued a permit to construct to LAMI only after due application and submission of the required
documents;

b) That other private companies, namely: DMCI Mining Corporation and Shangfil/A3Una constructed port facilities
along the Brgy. Bolitoc coastline and contiguous to where the port facility of LAMI is located.

(3) Ms. Susara32 –

a) That the PPA issued a clearance to develop and a permit to operate to LAMI only after due application and
submission of the required documents;

b) That other private port facilities, namely: DMCI Mining Corporation, Shangfil/A3Una are operating along the
Brgy. Bolitoc coastline and contiguous to where the port facility of LAMI is located; and

c) That since the 1970’s, the coastline along Brgy. Bolitoc, Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, has been the
location of port facilities necessary for mining operations in the province of Zambales.

(4) S/Supt. Santiago33 –

a) That the members and officials of the ZPPO did not violate, or threaten with violation, petitioner’s right to a
balanced and healthful ecology;

b) That the members and officials of the ZPPO did not cover-up any alleged illegal activity of LAMI; and

c) The contents of the Memorandum (Special Report re: Police Assistance) dated 6 May 2012 submitted by S/Supt.
Santiago to the PNP Regional Director.

On 10 September 2012, Agham presented its first and only witness, former Rep. Angelo B. Palmones. Rep. Palmones was
cross-examined by counsel for LAMI and counsel for public respondents DENR, PPA, and ZPPO.34

On 26 September 2012, public respondents presented their witnesses.35

On 28 September 2012, LAMI manifested that it was adopting the testimonies of the witnesses of the public respondents.
On the same hearing, LAMI presented its witness, Felipe E. Floria, LAMI’s Vice-President and General Manager.36

In a Decision37 dated 23 November 2012, the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner. The appellate court
found that the government, through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to cut trees and LAMI strictly followed the proper
guidelines stated in the permit. The appellate court also stated that there can be no flattening of a mountain when there
is no mountain to speak of. Thus, for failing to comply with the requisites necessary for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan,
the Court of Appeals resolved to deny the petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.38

Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. In its Motion for Reconsideration, Agham argued
that the alleged leveling of the subject hill by LAMI: (1) was not sanctioned by the DENR since LAMI allegedly had no ECC
from the DENR; (2) affected the ecological balance of the affected towns and provinces since such leveling was done
without the concurrence of its residents; and (3) instigated the gradual eradication of the strip of land mass in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales that serves as protective barrier from floods brought about by the swelling or surging of the coastal water
moving inward reaching other towns of Zambales and Pangasinan.39

On 4 February 2013, LAMI filed its Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. Agham then filed its Reply
dated 21 February 2013.

In a Resolution dated 6 March 2013, the Court of Appeals declared that Agham’s Motion for Reconsideration was
submitted for resolution. Subsequently, Agham filed a Supplemental Reply dated 29 April 2013 reiterating the same
arguments.

In a Resolution40 dated 31 May 2013, the Court of Appeals set Agham’s Motion for Reconsideration for hearing on 13 June
2013. At the hearing, all parties were given time to argue their case. Thereafter, the Motion for Reconsideration was
submitted for resolution.

Agham then filed a Manifestation dated 17 June 2013 summarizing its arguments. On 4 July 2013, LAMI filed a Motion to
Expunge with Ad Cautelam Comment/Opposition. On 11 July 2013, the Court of Appeals, for the last and third time,
submitted the Motion for Reconsideration for resolution.

In an Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its original Decision dated
23 November 2012. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 23, 2012 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE
and, in lieu thereof, another judgment is rendered GRANTING the petition for WRIT OF KALIKASAN as follows, to wit:

(1) respondent LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is directed to PERMANENTLY CEASE and [DESIST] from
scraping off the land formation in question or from performing any activity/ies in violation of environmental laws
resulting in environmental destruction or damage;

(2) the respondent LAMI as well as the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources and/or
their representatives are directed to PROTECT, PRESERVE, REHABILITATE and/or RESTORE the subject land
formation including the plants and trees therein;

(3) the Secretary of DENR and/or his representative is directed to MONITOR strict compliance with the Decision
and Orders of the Court; and make PERIODIC REPORTS on a monthly basis on the execution of the final judgment.

SO ORDERED.41

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI violated the environmental laws as alleged by Agham, and (2) whether
LAMI flattened any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that it has the necessary permits and authorization to cut trees on the port site, controverting the
allegation of Agham that it violated Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Petitioner also insists that it did
not violate nor is it violating the Mining Act as alleged by Agham. Petitioner argues that it is not conducting any mining
activity on the port site since the mine site is about 25 kilometers away from the port site. Further, petitioner adds that
after filing its Verified Return dated 21 June 2012, Agham never mentioned again the alleged violation of the Revised
Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act. Instead, Agham changed its position and later claimed that
LAMI was flattening a mountain on the port site which was allegedly illegal per se. Petitioner insists that Agham did not
even present evidence to establish any environmental damage which is required for the issuance of the privilege of the
Writ of Kalikasan.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that even if the subject land formation is not a mound, hill or mountain, the fact
remains that the scraping and leveling done by petitioner caused serious environmental damage which affects not only
the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales but also the nearby towns of Zambales and Pangasinan.

The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.42 Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules provides:

Section 1. Nature of the writ. – The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.

The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, 43 covers
environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. The writ is available against an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity.

The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation
involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

In the present case, Agham, in its Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, cited two laws which LAMI allegedly violated: (1) Section
68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended; and (2) Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act.

Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers
who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.

xxxx

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.44
In the present case, LAMI was given a Tree Cutting Permit45 by the CENRO dated 17 April 2012. In the permit, LAMI was
allowed to cut 37 trees with a total volume of 7.64 cubic meters within the port site, subject to the condition that the
trees cut shall be replaced with a ratio of 1-30 fruit and non-bearing fruit trees. Thereafter, the Forest Management Service
and Forest Utilization Unit, both under the DENR, issued a Post Evaluation Report46 dated 3 May 2012 stating that LAMI
properly followed the conditions laid down in the permit. The relevant portions of the Post Evaluation Report state:

x x x the following findings and observations are noted:

1. That the tree cutting implemented/conducted by the company was confined inside Lot No. 2999, Cad 316-D
situated at Barangay Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales and within the area previously granted for tree cutting;

2. It was found that the thirty seven (37) trees of various lesser-known species and fruit bearing trees with a total
volume of 7.64 cubic meters as specified in the permit were cut as subject trees are located within the directly
affected areas of the port facility project of the company;

3. The other trees previously inventoried and are not directly affected by the project within the same lot are
spared; and

4. There are forty four (44) various species of miscellaneous trees counted and left with a computed volume of
6.04 cubic meters.

Relative the above findings and in compliance with the terms and conditions of the permit issued, the company should be
reminded to replace the trees cut therein as specified in support with the environmental enhancement program of the
DENR.

xxxx

Since LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by the CENRO and even passed the evaluation conducted after the issuance
of the permit, then clearly LAMI had the authority to cut trees and did not violate Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code,
as amended.

Next, Agham submitted that LAMI allegedly violated Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act.

Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act state:

Section 57. Expenditure for Community Development and Science and Mining Technology – A contractor shall assist in the
development of its mining community, the promotion of the general welfare of its inhabitants, and the development of
science and mining technology.

Section 69. Environmental Protection – Every contractor shall undertake an environmental protection and enhancement
program covering the period of the mineral agreement or permit. Such environmental program shall be incorporated in
the work program which the contractor or permittee shall submit as an accompanying document to the application for a
mineral agreement or permit. The work program shall include not only plans relative to mining operations but also to
rehabilitation, regeneration, revegetation and reforestation of mineralized areas, slope stabilization of mined-out and
tailings covered areas, aquaculture, watershed development and water conservation; and socioeconomic development.

These two provisions are inapplicable to this case. First, LAMI is not conducting any mining activity on the port site. LAMI’s
mine site is about 25 kilometers away from the port site. Second, LAMI secured all the necessary permits and licenses for
the construction of a port and LAMI’s activity was limited to preparatory works for the port’s construction. The Philippine
Mining Act deals with mining operations and other mining activities. Sections 57 and 69 deal with the development of a
mining community and environmental protection covering a mineral agreement or permit.
Here, Agham reasoned that LAMI was destroying the environment by cutting mountain trees and leveling a mountain to
the damage and detriment of the residents of Zambales and the nearby towns of Pangasinan. Agham simply submitted a
picture taken on 4 June 2012 where allegedly the backhoes owned by LAMI were pushing the remnants of the mountain
to the sea.

This explanation, absent any concrete proof, is untenable.

Clearly, Agham did not give proper justifications for citing Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act. Agham did not
even present any evidence that LAMI violated the mining law or any mining undertakings in relation to LAMI’s construction
of a port facility. Agham only alleged in very general terms that LAMI was destroying the environment and leveling a
mountain without conducting any scientific studies or submitting expert testimonies that would corroborate such
allegations.

Section 2(c), Rule 7, Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides:

Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall contain the following:

(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the act or omission complained of,
and the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.

The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or
regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of environmental
damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the
verified petition.

Agham, in failing to prove any violation of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act, shifted
its focus and then claimed that LAMI allegedly flattened or leveled a mountain.

The mountain, according to Agham, serves as a natural protective barrier from typhoons and floods to the residents of
Zambales and nearby towns of Pangasinan. Thus, Agham argues that once such natural resources are damaged, the
residents of these two provinces will be defenseless and their life, health and properties will be at constant risk of being
lost.

However, Agham, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not cite any law allegedly violated by LAMI in
relation to this claim. Agham did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local residents in Zambales, and even the
nearby towns of Pangasinan, complained of any great danger or harm on the alleged leveling of the land formation which
may affect their lives, health or properties. Neither was there any evidence showing of a grave and real environmental
damage to the barangay and the surrounding vicinity.

To belie Agham’s contentions, the records, from the testimonies of those experts in their fields, show that there is in fact
no mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

First, in the Judicial Affidavit047 dated 6 August 2012, the Regional Director of DENR EMB R3, Dir. Claudio, categorically
declared that there is no mountain on LAMI’s property. The relevant portions state:

32. Q: One of the complaints of Mayor Marty in his letter dated 27 April 2012, x x x, is that LAMI is "leveling a mountain"
in its property in Barangay Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. Is there really a mountain in the property of LAMI in the said place?
A: None, sir. The subject landform is not considered as a mountain based on commonly accepted description of a mountain
as having 300 meters to 2,500 meters height over base. The highest elevation of the project area is 23 meters.

33. Q: Do you have any proof that the landform in LAMI’s property is not a mountain?

A: Yes, sir. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. III, through the OIC of the Geosciences Division,
issued a Memorandum dated June 26, 2012 proving that there is no mountain in LAMI’s property. The proper description
of the landform, according to the said memorandum, is an "elongated mound"48

Second, LAMI, through the Judicial Affidavit49 dated 3 August 2012 of Felipe E. Floria, LAMI’s Vice-President and General
Manager, was able m to establish that Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz had no mountain. The relevant portions provide:

126. Q: Why do you say that this elevated portion is not a "mountain"?

A: The port site where the alleged mountain is located is only 1.8 hectares of alienable and disposable land. It is private
property, lawfully possessed by LAMI, with the latter exercising rights based on its occupation thereof. The mound and/or
ridge within the private property is only about 23 meters high. The base or footing of the mound therein which the
Petitioner insists is a mountain is only 1.5 hectares, and the height is approximately 23 meters. I have been advised that a
mountain, as described by the United Nations Environment Programme – World Conservation Monitoring Centre ("UNEP-
WCMC"), must be, at least, of a height greater than 300 meters or 984 feet in addition to other requirements on slope
and local elevation range. In other countries, the United Kingdom for example, the minimum height requirement is 2,000
ft or 609.6 meters.50

Third, several government entities and officials have declared that there is no mountain on the port site: (1) in a Letter51 to
LAMI signed by the Sangguniang Bayan members of Sta. Cruz dated 4 June 2012, the Sangguniang Bayan members stated
that there is no mountain in the area; (2) in a Memorandum52 dated 4 June 2012, the CENRO concluded that the
"mountain" is a "hill falling under Block I, Alienable and Disposable land per LC Map 635"; and (3) in a Special Report53 re:
Police Assistance dated 6 May 2012, the Provincial Director of PNP Zambales reported to the PNP Regional Director, citing
the findings of the local chief of police, that no leveling of a mountain transpired in the area.

Last, in an Inspection Report54 dated 26 June 2012, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Geosciences Division of the DENR
concluded that the "mountain" is only an elongated mound. The findings and conclusion of the report provide:

FINDINGS

1. The Bolitoc LAMI Port Facility is approximately centered at the intersection of geographic coordinates
15°45’00.4" north latitude and 119°53’19.9" east longitude, x x x. It is bounded on the north by the West Philippine
Sea (Bolitoc Bay), on the west and east by the continuation of the elevated landform, and to the south by an
unnamed creek and a concrete barangay road connecting the Brgy. Bolitoc to the Zambales National Highway.

Brgy. Bolitoc also hosts the port facilities of the DMCI and the Shangfil Corporation both of which occupy the
former loading site of the defunct Acoje Mining Corporation.

2. The landform of interest is characterized by a roughly east-west trending elevated and elongated landmass.
Within the LAMI site, the elevated landform measures 164 meters in length and about 94 meters in width and is
almost parallel to the coastline. It has a maximum elevation located at its eastern end of 26 meters above mean
sea level more or less. Its western end has an elevation of 23 meters above mean sea level more or less x x x. The
landform is about 16 meters higher than the barangay road and nearby houses x x x.

From the LAMI area, the landform continues eastwards to the DMCI and the Shangfil Port facilities and also
westwards to the vicinity of Brgy. Bolitoc proper.
 3. The area is underlain by interbedded calcareous sandstone, shale, and siltstone of the Cabaluan Formation
(formerly Zambales Formation), x x x. Rock outcrops show the sedimentary sequence displaying almost horizontal
to gently dipping beds cut by a minor fault. These rocks weather into a 1-2 meter silty clay.

DISCUSSION

Considering elevated landform of interest measures 164 meters in length and about 94 meters in width disposed in an
elongate manner with a maximum elevation of 26 meters more or less above mean sea level and is about 16 meters higher
than the barangay road and nearby houses and using the Glossary of Landforms and Geologic Terms x x x by Hawley and
Parsons, 1980 above that the elevated landform is neither a mountain or hill, but instead it is considered elongated
landmass/or elongated mound.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above geological and landform (geomorphic) classification, considering its elevation of 23 to 26 meters
above mean sea level and which is 16 meters above the barangay road and vicinity, the elevated landform present in
the LAMI port facility is neither a hill or mountain. Its elevation of 16 meters above its vicinity is lower than a hill (30
meters). Its height above its vicinity can be possibly categorized as a mound which is defined by the Dictionary of
Geological terms (1976) prepared by the American Geological Institute as which defines a mound as "a low hill of earth,
natural or artificial." In the United Kingdom, mounds are also called hillocks or knolls. The term elongated is prefixed as a
modifier to describe its east-west disposition. Hence, the elevated landform of interest is considered as elongated
mound.55 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the lone witness of Agham, former Rep. Palmones, admitted in the 10 September 2012 hearing
conducted by the Court of Appeals that he was incompetent to prove that the elevated ground located in Brgy. Bolitoc is
a mountain. The relevant portions56 of Rep. Palmones’ testimony provide:

Atty. Gallos: Mr. Congressman, you conducted an ocular inspection in Brgy. Bolitoc in Sta. Cruz, Zambales on May 21?

Cong. Palmones: Yes.

xxxx

Atty. Gallos: That was the first time you were in Brgy. Bolitoc?

Cong. Palmones: Yes.

Atty. Gallos: That was also the first and the last ocular inspection that you did so far in Brgy. Bolitoc?

Cong. Palmones: Yes.

xxxx

Atty. Gallos: What is the name of this mountain?

Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know the name of the mountain, Your Honor.

Atty. Gallos: What is the elevation or height of this mountain?

Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know the elevation of that mountain, Your Honors.

Atty. Gallos: What is the base of this mountain?

Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know, Your Honors.

Atty. Tolentino: Your Honor, the witness is incompetent to answer the questions.

Cong. Palmones: I’m not competent to answer that question.

Atty. Gallos: Your Honor, that’s exactly our point. He is claiming that there is a mountain but he cannot tell us the
height, the slope, the elevation, the base, Your Honor. So you admit now that you do not know, you do not have the
competence to state whether or not there is a mountain?

Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know what is the technical description of a mountain but based on the information that
we got from the community during the consultation it’s full of vegetation before it was leveled down by the operation,
Your Honors. (Emphasis supplied)

Agham, in its Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, then asserted that even if the subject land formation
is not a mound, hill or mountain, the fact remains that the scraping and leveling done by petitioner caused serious
environmental damage which affects not only Sta. Cruz, Zambales but also the nearby towns of Zambales and Pangasinan.

The Court of Appeals, in granting the Motion for Reconsideration embodied in its Amended Decision dated 13 September
2013, held that what LAMI did was not to simply level the subject land formation but scrape and remove a small mountain
and, thereafter, reclaim a portion of the adjacent waters with the earth it took therefrom, making out of the soil gathered
to construct a seaport. The Court of Appeals stated that the scraping off or the cutting of the subject land formation by
LAMI would instigate the gradual eradication of the strip of land mass in Brgy. Bolitoc which serves as protective barrier
to floods brought about by the swelling or surging of the coastal water moving inward reaching other towns of Zambales
and Pangasinan. The Court of Appeals added that the port site is prone to frequent visits of tropical depression and that
the coastal portions of the "Sta. Cruz Quadrangle – Zambales and Pangasinan province" are touted to be highly susceptible
to landslide and flooding.

We do not subscribe to the appellate court’s view.

First, the Court of Appeals did not provide any basis, in fact and in law, to support the reversal of its original decision.
Agham, in its Motion for Reconsideration, did not present new evidence to refute its claim that LAMI leveled a "mountain"
or that there was an environmental damage of considerable significance that will harm the life, health and properties of
the residents of the municipality of Sta. Cruz and its neighboring towns or cities, or even the provinces of Zambales and
Pangasinan. The pleadings and documents submitted by Agham were just a reiteration of its original position before the
original Court of Appeals’ decision was promulgated on 23 November 2012.

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be violated. In the present case, the allegation by Agham that two laws – the Revised
Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act – were violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated by
Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to establish environmental damage were mere general allegations.

Second, Agham’s allegation that there was a "mountain" in LAMI’s port site was earlier established as false as the
"mountain" was non-existent as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses and reports made by environmental experts
and persons who have been educated and trained in their respective fields.

Third, contrary to Agham’s claim that LAMI had no ECC from the DENR, the DENR restored LAMI’s ECC. After LAMI was
issued a Notice of Violation of its ECC dated 1 June 2012 by the DENR-EMB R3, LAMI complied with all the requirements
and its ECC had been reinstated. In the Letter57 dated 24 October 2012, Dir. Claudio wrote:

xxxx

Regarding the alleged cutting of trees and leveling of the mountain, we have verified that:
1. There is no illegal cutting of trees since a Tree Cutting Permit was issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO). Monitoring of the compliance with the conditions of the said Permit was also undertaken by
the CENRO; and

2. There is no leveling of a mountain. As certified by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 3, the landform in the area
is an elongated mound which is 164 meters in length and 94 meters in width and its maximum elevation is 26 meters
above mean sea level.

Further, we recognize your efforts in revegetating the exposed side slopes of the cut portion of the mound and the
construction of drainage system and silt traps to prevent the siltation of the bay.

The violated ECC conditions have been rectified and clarified while the penalty corresponding to such violation was fully
paid and the required rehabilitation and mitigating measures were already implemented as committed. As such, the
matter leading to the issuance of the NOV is now resolved.

As ECC holder, you are enjoined to ensure the effective carrying out of your Environmental Management and Monitoring
Plan.

Even Rep. Dan S. Fernandez, the Chairman of the Committee on Ecology of the House of Representatives, acknowledged
that LAMI had fully complied with its ECC conditions. In a Letter58 dated 26 February 2013 addressed to the DENR
Secretary, Rep. Fernandez wrote:

xxxx

On 21 February 2013, the Committee on Ecology received a letter from Director Lormelyn E. Claudio, the Regional Director
for Region III of the Environment Management Bureau of the DENR. The letter ascertains that, among other things, based
on the investigation and monitoring conducted led by Dir. Claudio, LAMI is, to date, in compliance with its environmental
commitments as required under the ECC and said Order.

In view thereof, the Committee would like to express its appreciation for the apt and prompt action on the matter. We
expect that the subject company’s conformity to environmental laws, as well as its activities’ impact on the environment,
will remain closely monitored and evaluated.

xxxx

Last, the alleged scraping off or leveling of land at LAMI’s port site is deemed insignificant to pose a detrimental impact
on the environment.

Dir. Claudio testified at the hearing conducted by the Court of Appeals on 26 September 2012 that the cut and fill
operations of LAMI only affected the port site but not the surrounding area and that the environmental effect was only
minimal and insignificant. The relevant portions of Dir. Claudio’s testimony provide:

A/Sol. Chua Cheng: Madam Witness, you made mention that the cut and fill operations involved the... or the causeway
created during the cut and fill operation is 82 meters in length and 8 meters in width. What is the overall environment
effect of this cut and fill operation in Barangay Bolitoc?

Dir. Claudio.: It is minimal, insignificant and temporary in nature, Sir, because as I mentioned, only 11,580 cubic meters
had been stripped off and the tree cutting which had been issued with a permit is only less than about 37 trees based on
the Post Evaluation Report done by the CENRO, Sir.

A/Sol. Chua Cheng: What about the effect of such cut and fill operations as regards the two provinces, Pangasinan and
Zambales, does it have any effect or what is the extent of the effect?
Dir. Claudio: It is just localized; it is just confined within the project area because we required them to put up the drainage
system, the drainage, the canals and the siltation ponds and the laying of armour rocks for the sea wall and the
construction of causeway, Sir, to avoid erosion and sedimentation. We also required them to rehabilitate the exposed
slopes which they already did.

xxxx

A/Sol. Chua Cheng: Only in the project area specifically located only in Brgy. Bolitoc?

Dir. Claudio: Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales, Sir. It does not in any way affect or cannot affect the Province of
Pangasinan as alleged, Sir.59 (Emphasis supplied)

Even the Geoscience Foundation, Inc., which conducted a scientific study on the port site regarding the possible damage
to the environment from the construction of the port facility, found that the landform was too small to protect against
typhoons, monsoons and floods due to heavy rains and storm surges. Its Report60 on the Topographical, Geomorphological
and Climatological Characterization of the LAMI Port undertaken in September 2012 stated:

6.0 Findings in Relation to the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan

xxxx

1. The LAMI Port is partly situated in a hill and not a mountain. The topographic and geologic maps of NAMRIA
and the MGB do not show the presence of a mountain where the port is partly located. The detailed topographic
survey moreover indicates that this hill had an original elevation of 23 m.MSL in the portion where it was
excavated to 0accommodate the access road leading to the wharf.

Mountains attain much higher elevations than 23 m.MSL. Kendall et al. (1967), defines a mountain as having a
height of at least 900 meters and are usually characterized by a vertical zonation of landscape and vegetation due
to increasing elevations.

2. No leveling of a mountain was done. The construction of the access road required a V-cut through the hill that
lowered it from 23 m.MSL to 7.5 m.MSL. This elevation is still much higher than the flat land surrounding the hill.
The hill had an original length of 600 meters through which the V-cut, which has an average width of 26.5 meters,
was excavated. Only a small portion of the hill was therefore altered.

The topographic survey further reveals that the total volume of earth material removed is 24,569 cubic meters,
which would fit a room that has a length, width and height of 29 meters. This amount of earth material does not
constitute the volume of a mountain.

3. The hill is too small and not in the right location to protect against typhoons. The hill cannot serve as a natural
protective barrier against typhoons in Zambales and some towns of Pangasinan because it is too small compared
to the magnitude of typhoons. Typhoons approach the country from east and move in a west to northwest
direction through Zambales Province as clarified in Figure 7. They are even able to cross the Sierra Madre Range
and the Zambales Range before reaching Zambales Province. Since the port is situated at the western coastline of
Zambales, it would be the last thing a typhoon would pass by as it moves through Zambales.

4. The hill is too small to protect against the Southwest Monsoon. The hill does not shield any area from the heavy
rains that batter the country during the Southwest Monsoon. It is too small to alter the effect of the Southwest
Monsoon in the way that the Sierra Madre Range forces the Northwest Monsoon to rise over it and release much
of its moisture as orographic precipitation on the windward side of the range such that the leeward side is drier.

5. The hill is not in the right location to protect against flooding due to heavy rains. The hill does not protect against
the floods that occur from heavy rains. Since Zambales regionally slopes down to the west, flood water during
 heavy rains will move from east to west following the flow direction of rivers in the area. Flood water from the
Zambales Range will inundate the coastal plain first before reaching the coastline where the hill is situated. Figure
11 depicts the flow direction of flood water in the municipality.

6. The hill is too small to protect against floods due to storm surges. Storm surges appear as large waves that are
caused by the pushing of the wind on the surface of the sea or ocean during storm events. Since the hill has a
present length of only 420 meters, it is too small to prevent flooding due to storm surges.1âwphi1 The large waves
will just skirt the hill and sweep through the low-lying coastland to the west and east of the hill.

The hill shields against the direct impact of large, south-moving waves to several homes located immediately south of the
hill. Since the V-cut of the access road is small compared to the rest of the hill and terminates at a relatively high 7.5
m.MSL, this protection offered by the hill is not significantly diminished.61

Further, the DENR composite team, in its Report of Investigation62 conducted on 20-21 June 2012 on LAMI’s port site to
ensure that LAMI undertook mitigating measures in its property, found that LAMI’s activities posed only a minimal or
insignificant impact to the environment. The relevant portions of the Report state:

Findings and Observations:

The composite team gathered data and the following are the initial observations:

1. Site preparation which includes site grading/surface stripping, low ridge cut and fill and reclamation works were
observed to have been undertaken within the project area;

2. A total volume of approximately 11,580 cubic meters of soil cut/stripped from low ridge was noted being used
for causeway construction. Part of the discarded soil with a volume of 5,843 cubic meters was already used for
causeway preparation while the remaining 5,735 cubic meters was noted still on stockpile area;

3. Discarded soil generated from ridge cut and fill consists of clay with sandstone and shale;

4. The partial low ridge cut and fill poses minimal or insignificant impact to the environment due to threats of
storm surges, strong winds and flooding because the protective natural barriers against northeast monsoon are
the mountain ranges in the eastern part of Zambales and Pangasinan which are geologically and historically
effective as in the case of the adjoining and operational ports of the DMCI and Shang Fil.

5. The height of the low ridge is still maintained at an elevation of 23.144 meters above sea level while the
constructed access road to the causeway has an elevation of 7.46 meters with a width of 8 meters and length of
80-100 meters only.

Remarks and Recommendation:

The construction of the access road on the low ridge does not pose adverse environmental impact to the adjoining
communities more so to the larger areas or the entire province of Zambales and Pangasinan.

It was determined as a result of our verification and based on the above findings supported with field GPS reading
that there had been no leveling of the mountain undertaken in the project site as there is no mountain existing inside
the area covered by the ECC issued by EMB-Region 3. The landform claimed by Mayor Marty to be a mountain is actually
an elongated low ridge with a peak of approximately 23 meters above sea level which is located in a private land falling
under Block 1, Alienable and Disposable Land per LC Map 635 with Lot No. 2999 originally owned by Mr. Severo Monsalud
which was transferred to Sta. Cruz Mineral Port Corporation with a Contract of Lease with LAMI (data provided by CENRO
Masinloc through a Memorandum dated June 4, 2012). The proponent (LAMI) only implemented road cutting of low ridge
in the middle to make an access way to the proposed marine loading facility. More so, tree cutting done by LAMI is covered
by a Permit to Cut issued by DENR-Region 3-CENRO, Masinloc which is responsible for the inventory and monitoring of cut
trees.

x x x x63 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, from all the foregoing, we agree with the appellate court, in its original Decision dated 23 November 2012, when it
denied the petition for a Writ of Kalikasan:

As between the too general and very hypothetical allegation of large-scale environmental damage at one hand, and the
remarks of government experts on the other, We are inclined to give more credit to the latter. Below is the further
articulation of our stance:

Presumption of regularity

It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed. Therefore, the
fact that the "remarks and recommendation" of the composite team from EMB R3, MGB R3, and PENRO Zambales were
made in the exercise of their government function, the presumption of regularity in the performance of such official duty
stands. It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove otherwise, a task which it failed to do here.

Expert findings are afforded great weight

The findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by
the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the
evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be
disturbed. x x x.64

In sum, contrary to the findings of the appellate court in its Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013, we find that
LAMI did not cause any environmental damage that prejudiced the life, health or property of the inhabitants residing in
the municipality of Sta. Cruz, the province of Zambales or in the neighboring province of Pangasinan. Agham, as the party
that has the burden to prove the requirements for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ ofKalikasan, failed to prove (1)
the environmental laws allegedly violated by LAMI; and (2) the magnitude of the environmental damage allegedly caused
by LAMI in the construction of LAMI' s port facility in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales and its surrounding area. Thus, the
petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan must be denied.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013 of
the Court of Appeals and REINSTATE AND AFFIRM the original Decision dated 23 November 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012 which DENIED the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209271

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, INC., Petitioner

vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA
(MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE
UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE., JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S.
HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner-in-Intervention

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209276

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY AND THE FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD
NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO
AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO
QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL
CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner-in-Intervention.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209301

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BANOS FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA
(MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE
UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZLUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S.
HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209430

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS, Petitioner,

vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA
(MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE
UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S.
HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are nine (9) Motions for Reconsideration1 assailing the Decision2 dated December 8, 2015 of the Court
(December 8, 2015 Decision), which upheld with modification the Decision3 dated May 17, 2013 and the Resolution4 dated
September 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013.

The Facts

The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
eggplant (Bt talong), administered pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking5 (MOU) entered into by herein
petitioners University of the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and International Service for the Acquisition
of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the University of the Philippines Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among
others. Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which produces the CrylAc protein that is
toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and
shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to eggplants.6

From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB), the implementing institution of the field
trials, conducted a contained experiment on Bt talong under the supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of
the Philippines (NCBP).7 The NCBP, created under Executive Order No. (EO) 430,8 is the regulatory body tasked to: (a)
"identify and evaluate potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments or the introduction of new
species and genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks"; and (b) ''formulate and
review national policies and guidelines on biosafety, such as the safe conduct of work on genetic engineering, pests and
their genetic materials for the protection of public health, environment[,] and personnel[,] and supervise the
implementation thereof."9 Upon the completion of the contained experiment, the NCBP issued a Certificate 10 therefor
stating that all biosafety measures were complied with, and no untoward incident had occurred.11

On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued two (2)-year Biosafety Permits12for field
testing of Bt talong13after UPLB's field test proposal satisfactorily completed biosafety risk assessment for field testing
pursuant to the Department of Agriculture's (DA) Administrative Order No. 8, series of 2002 14 (DAO 08-2002),15 which
provides for the rules and regulations for the importation and release into the environment of plants and plant products
derived from the use of modern biotechnology.16 Consequently, field testing proceeded in approved trial sites in North
Cotabato, Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City, and Laguna.17

On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) (Greenpeace), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa
Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and others (respondents) filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO)18 (petition for Writ of Kalikasan) against herein petitioners the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the BPI and the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the
DA, UPLBFI, and ISAAA, and UPMFI, alleging that the Bt talong field trials violated their constitutional right to health and
a balanced ecology considering, among others, that: (a) the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), as required by
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151,19 was not secured prior to the field trials;20 (b) the required public consultations under
the Local Government Code (LGC) were not complied with;21 and (c) as a regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is
presumed harmful to human health and the environment, and that there is no independent, peer-reviewed study showing
its safety for human consumption and the environment.22 Further, they contended that since the scientific evidence as to
the safety of Bt talong remained insufficient or uncertain, and that preliminary scientific evaluation shows reasonable
grounds for concern, the precautionary principle should be applied and, thereby, the field trials be enjoined.23

On May 2, 2012, the Court issued24 a Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners (except UPLB25) and UPMFI, ordering them to
make a verified return within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days, as provided for in Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.26 Thus, in compliance therewith, ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI, and UPMFI27 filed their
respective verified returns,28 and therein maintained that: (a) all environmental laws were complied with, including the
required public consultations in the affected communities; (b) an ECC was not required for the field trials as it will not
significantly affect the environment nor pose a hazard to human health; (c) there is a plethora of scientific works and
literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption; (d) at any rate, the safety of Bt talong for
human consumption is irrelevant because none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals and all materials
not used for analyses will be chopped, boiled, and buried following the conditions of the Biosafety Permits; and (e) the
precautionary principle could not be applied as the field testing was only a part of a continuing study to ensure that such
trials have no significant and negative impact on the environment.29

On July 10, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution30 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for acceptance of the return
of the writ and for hearing, reception of evidence, and rendition of judgment.31 In a hearing before the CA on August 14,
2012, UPLB was impleaded as a party to the case and was furnished by respondents a copy of their petition. Consequently
the CA directed UPLB to file its comment to the petition32 and, on August 24, 2012, UPLB filed its Answer33 adopting the
arguments and allegations in the verified return filed by UPLBFI. On the other hand, in a Resolution34 dated February 13,
2013, the CA discharged UPMFI as a party to the case pursuant to the Manifestation and Motion filed by respondents in
order to expedite the proceedings and resolution of the latter's petition.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision35 dated May 17, 2013, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and directed petitioners to pem1anently cease
and desist from conducting the Bt talong field trials.36 At the outset, it did not find merit in petitioners' contention that
the case should be dismissed on the ground of mootness, noting that the issues raised by the latter were "capable of
repetition yet evading review" since the Bt talong field trial was just one of the phases or stages of an overall and bigger
study that is being conducted in relation to the said genetically-modified organism.37 It then held that the precautionary
principle set forth under Section 1,38 Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases39 is relevant, considering
the Philippines' rich biodiversity and uncertainty surrounding the safety of Bt talong. It noted the possible irreversible
effects of the field trials and the introduction of Bt talong to the market, and found the existing regulations issued by the
DA and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) insufficient to guarantee the safety of the environment and
the health of the people.40

Aggrieved, petitioners separately moved for reconsideration.41 However, in a Resolution42 dated September 20, 2013, the
CA denied the same and remarked that introducing genetically modified plant into the ecosystem is an ecologically
imbalancing act.43 Anent UPLB 's argument that the Writ of Kalikasan violated its right to academic freedom, the CA
emphasized that the writ did not stop the research on Bt talong but only the procedure employed in conducting the field
trials, and only at this time when there is yet no law ensuring its safety when introduced to the environment.44

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed their respective petitions for review on certiorari before this Court.

The Proceedings Before the Court

In a Decision45 dated December 8, 2015, the Court denied the petitions and accordingly, affinned with modification the
ruling of the CA.46 Agreeing with the CA, the Court held that the precautionar; principle applies in this case since the risk
of harm from the field trials of Bt talong remains uncertain and there exists a possibility of serious and irreversible harm.
The Court observed that eggplants are a staple vegetable in the country that is mostly grown by small-scale farmers who
are poor and marginalized; thus, given the country's rich biodiversity, the consequences of contamination and genetic
pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.47

The Court likewise agreed with the CA in not dismissing the case for being moot and academic despite the completion and
termination of the Bt talong field trials, on account of the following exceptions to the mootness principle: (a) the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; and (b) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.48

Further, the Court noted that while the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were observed, the National Biosafety Framework
(NBF) established under EO 514, series of 200649 which requires public participation in all stages of biosafety decision-
making, pursuant to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety50 which was acceded to by the Philippines in 2000 and became
effective locally in 2003, was not complied with.51 Moreover, the field testing should have been subjected to
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), considering that it involved new technologies with uncertain results.52
Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the field testing of Bt talong. In addition, it declared DAO 08-2002 null and void for
failure to consider the provisions of the NBF. The Court also temporarily enjoined any application for contained use, field
testing, propagation, commercialization, and importation of genetically modified organisms until a new administrative
order is promulgated in accordance with law.53

The Issues Presented in the Motions for Reconsideration

Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,54 arguing, among others, that: (a) the case should have been dismissed
for mootness in view of the completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials and the expiration of the Biosafety
Permits;55 (b) the Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO 08-2002 as it was not raised as an issue;56 and (c) the
Court erred in relying on the studies cited in the December 8, 2015 Decision which were not offered in evidence and
involved Bt corn, not Bt talong.57

In their Consolidated Comments,58 respondents maintain, in essence, that: (a) the case is not mooted by the completion
of the field trials since field testing is part of the process of commercialization and will eventually lead to propagation,
commercialization, and consumption of Bt talong as a consumer product;59 (b) the validity of DAO 08-2002 was raised by
respondents when they argued in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan that such administrative issuance is not enough to
adequately protect the Constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology;60 and (c) the Court correctly
took judicial notice of the scientific studies showing the negative effects of Bt technology and applied the precautionary
principle.61

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the motions for reconsideration on the ground of mootness.

As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.62 The requirement of the existence of a "case" or
an "actual controversy" for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the comis of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable.63

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.64

Nevertheless, case law states that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.65 Thus, jurisprudence recognizes these
four instances as exceptions to the mootness principle.

In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was held that (a) the present case is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved, and (b) it is likewise capable of repetition yet evading review. Hence, it was excepted
from the mootness principle.66 However, upon a closer scrutiny of the parties' arguments, the Court reconsiders its ruling
and now finds merit in petitioners' assertion that the case should have been dismissed for being moot and academic, and
that the aforesaid exceptions to the said rule should not have been applied.

I. On the paramount public interest exception.

Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining whether a case involves paramount public
interest in relation to the mootness principle. However, a survey of cases would show that, as a common guidepost for
application, there should be some perceivable benefit to the public which demands the Court to proceed with the
resolution of otherwise moot questions.

In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,67an action for declaratory judgment assailing the validity of Republic Act No. (RA)
4880,68 which prohibits the early nomination of candidates for elective offices and early election campaigns or partisan
political activities became moot by reason of the holding of the 1967 elections before the case could be decided.
Nonetheless, the Court treated the petition as one for prohibition and rendered judgment in view of "the paramount
public interest and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections [of 1969] being barely six months away."69

In De Castro v. Commission on Elections,70 the Court proceeded to resolve the election protest subject of that case
notwithstanding the supervening death of one of the contestants. According to the Court, in an election contest, there is
a paramount need to dispel the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate.71

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,72the Court ruled on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, s.
2006,73 which declared a state of National Emergency, even though the same was lifted before a decision could be
rendered. The Court explained that the case was one of exceptional character and involved paramount public interest,
because the people's basic rights to expression, assembly, and of the press were at issue.74

In Constantino v. S'andiganbayan,75 both of the accused were found guilty of graft and corrupt practices under Section 3
(e) of RA 3019.76 One of the accused appealed the conviction, while the other filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court. While the appellant died during the pendency of his appeal, the Court still ruled on the merits thereof considering
the exceptional character of the appeals in relation to each other, i.e., the two petitions were so intertwined that the
absolution of the deceased was determinative of the absolution of the other accused.77

More recently, in Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO),78the petitioner prayed that the Commission on
Audit (COA) be ordered to audit the MECO which is based in Taiwan, on the premise that it is a government-owned and
controlled corporation.79 The COA argued that the case is already moot and should be dismissed, since it had already
directed a team of auditors to proceed to Taiwan to audit the accounts of MECO.80 Ruling on the merits, the Court
explained that the case was of paramount public interest because it involved the COA's performance of its constitutional
duty and because the case concerns the legal status of MECO, i.e., whether it may be considered as a government agency
or not, which has a direct bearing on the country's commitment to the One China Policy of the People's Republic of China.81

In contrast to the foregoing cases, no perceivable benefit to the public - whether rational or practical - may be gained by
resolving respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan on the merits.

To recount, these cases, which stemmed from herein respondents petition for Writ of Kalikasan, were mooted by the
undisputed expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by the BPI and the completion and termination of the Bt talong field
trials subject of the same.82 These incidents effectively negated the necessity for the reliefs sought by respondents in their
petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test to enjoin. Hence, at the time the CA rendered its
Decision dated May 17, 2013, the reliefs petitioner sought and granted by the CA were no longer capable of execution.

At this juncture, it is important to understand that the completion and termination of the field tests do not mean that
herein petitioners may inevitably proceed to commercially propagate Bt talong.83 There are three (3) stages before
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) may become commercially available under DAO 08-200284 and each stage is
distinct, such that "[s]ubsequent stages can only proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are completed and clearance is given to
engage in the next regulatory stage."85 Specifically, before a genetically modified organism is allowed to be propagated
under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit for propagation must be secured from the BPI; (b) it can be shown that based on the
field testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to the environment; (c)
food and/or feed safety studies show that the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human and animal
health; and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its transformation event has been duly registered with the
FPA.86

As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related to propagation were pursued
or the requirements therefor complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed after-effects to the already concluded Bt
talong field trials that demand an adjudication from which the public may perceivably benefit. Any future threat to the
right ,of herein respondents or the public in general to a healthful and balanced ecology is therefore more imagined than
real.

In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public to stay a verdict on the safeness of Bt talong - or GMOs, for
that matter - until an actual and justiciable case properly presents itself before the Court. In his Concurring Opinion87 on
the main, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) had aptly pointed out that "the findings [resulting from
the Bt talong field trials] should be the material to provide more rigorous scientific analysis of the various claims made in
relation to Bt talong."88 True enough, the concluded field tests ·- like those in these cases – would yield data that may
prove useful for future studies and analyses. If at all, resolving the petition for Writ of Kalikasan would unnecessarily arrest
the results of further research and testing on Et talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend to hinder scientific
advancement on the subject matter.

More significantly, it is clear that no benefit would be derived by the public in assessing the merits of field trials whose
parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bt talong tested, but are now, in fact, rendered obsolete by the
supervening change in the regulatory framework applied to GMO field testing. To be sure, DAO 08-2002 has already been
superseded by Joint Department Circular No. 1, series of 201689 (JDC 01-2016), issued by the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST), the DA, the DENR, the Department of Health (DOH), and the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), which provides a substantially different regulatory framework from that under DAO 08-2002 as will
be detailed below. Thus, to resolve respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan on its merits, would be tantamount to an
unnecessary scholarly exercise for the Court to assess alleged violations of health and environmental rights that arose
from a past test case whose bearings do not find any - if not minimal -- relevance to cases operating under today's
regulatory framework.

Therefore, the paramount public interest exception to the mootness rule should not have been applied.1âwphi1

II. The case is not one capable of repetition vet evading review.

Likewise, contrary to the Court's earlier ruling,90 these cases do not fall under the "capable of repetition yet evading
review" exception.

The Court notes that the petition for Writ of Kalikasan specifically raised issues only against the field testing of Bt
talong under the premises 'of DAO 08,..2002,91 i.e., that herein petitioners failed to: (a) fully inform the eople regarding
the health, environment, and other hazards involved;92 and (b) conduct any valid risk assessment before conducting the
field trial.93 As further pointed out by Justice Leonen, the reliefs sought did not extend far enough to enjoin the use of the
results of the field trials that have been completed. Hence, the petition's specificity prevented it from falling under the
above exception to the mootness rule.94

More obviously, the supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly prevents this case from being one capable of
repetition so as to warrant review despite its mootness. To contextualize, JDC 01-2016 states that:

Section 1. Applicability. This Joint Department Circular shall apply to the research, development, handling and use,
transboundary movement, release into the environment, and management of genetically-modified plant and plant
products derived from the use of modern technology, included under "regulated articles."
As earlier adverted to, with the issuance of JDC 01-2016, a new regulatory framework in the conduct of field testing now
applies.

Notably, the new framework under JDC 01-2016 is substantially different from that under DAO 08-2002. In fact, the new
parameters in JDC 01-2016 pertain to provisions which prompted the Court to invalidate D'AO 08-2002. In the December
8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was observed that: (a) DAO 08-2002 has no mechanism to mandate compliance with
inten1ational biosafety protocols;95 (b) DAO 08-2002 does not comply with the transparency and public participation
requirements under the NBF;96 and (c) risk assessment is conducted by an informal group, called the Biosafety Advisory
Team of the DA, composed of representatives from the BPI, Bureau of Animal Industry, FPA, DENR, DOH, and DOST.97

Under DAO 08-2002, no specific guidelines were used in the conduct of risk assessment, and the DA was allowed to
consider the expert advice of, and guidelines developed by, relevant inteniational organizations and regulatory authorities
of countries with significant experience in the regulatory supervision of the regulated article.98 However, under JDC 01-
2016, the CODEX Alimentarius Guidelines was adopted to govern the risk assessment of activities involving the research,
development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment, and management of genetically
modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modem biotechnology.99Also, whereas DAO 08-2002 was
limited to the DA's authority in regulating the importation and release into the environment of plants and plant products
derived from the use of modern biotechnology,100 under JDC 01-2016, various relevant government agencies such as the
DOST, DOH, DENR, and the DILG now participate in all stages of the biosafety decision-making process, with the DOST
being the central and lead agency.101

JDC 01-2016 also provides for a more comprehensive avenue for public participation in cases involving field trials and
requires applications for permits and permits already issued to be made public by posting them online in the websites of
the NCBP and the BPI.102 The composition of the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) has also been modified to include
an elected local official in the locality where the field testing will be conducted as one of the community
representatives.103 Previously, under DAO 08-2002, the only requirement for the community representatives is that they
shall not be affiliated with the applicant and shall be in a position to represent the interests of the communities where the
field testing is to be conducted.104

JDC 01-2016 also prescribes additional qualifications for the members of the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP),
the pool of scientists that evaluates the risk assessment submitted by the applicant for field trial, commercial propagation,
or direct use of regulated articles. Aside from not being an official, staff or employee of the DA or any of its attached
agencies, JDC 01-2016 requires that members of the STRP: (a) must not be directly or indirectly employed or engaged by
a company or institution with pending applications for pennits under JDC 01-2016; (b) must possess technical expertise in
food and nutrition, toxicology, ecology, crop protection, environmental science, molecular biology and biotechnology,
genetics, plant breeding, or animal nutrition; and (c) must be well-respected in the scientific community.105

Below is a tabular presentation of the differences between the relevant portions of DAO 08-2002 and JDC 01-2016:

DAO 08-2002 JDC 01-2016

1. As to coverage and government participation
WHEREAS, under Title IV, Chapter 4, Section 19
of the Administrative Code of 1987, the
Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau
of Plant Industry, is responsible for the
production of improved planting materials and
protection of agricultural crops from pests and
diseases; and
xxxx
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Applicability. This Joint Department
Circular shall apply to the research,
development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, release into the environment, and
management of genetically-modified plant and
plant products derived from the use of modern
PART I biotechnology, included under "regulated
GENERAL PROVISIONS articles."

xxxx xxxx

PART I ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE

GENERAL PROVISIONS
FRAMEWORK
xxxx
Section 4. Role of National Government
Section 2 Agencies Consistent with the NBF and the laws
Coverage granting their powers and functions, national
government agencies shall have the following
A. Scope - This Order covers the importation or roles:
release into the environment of: 1. Any plant
which has been altered or produced through the A. [DA]. As the principal agency of the Philippine
use of modem biotechnology if the donor Government responsible for the promotion of
organism, host organism, or vector or vector agricultural and rural growth and development
agent belongs to any of the genera or taxa so as to ensure food security and to contribute to
classified by BPI as meeting the definition of poverty
plant pest or is a medium for the introduction of
noxious weeds; or alleviation, the DA shall take the lead in
addressing biosafety issues related to the
2. Any plant or plant product altered or produced country's agricultural productivity and food
through the use of modern biotechnology which security.x x x.
may pose significant risks to human health and
the environment based on available scientific B. [DOST]. As the premier science and technology
and technical information. body in the country, the DOST shall take the lead
in ensuring that the best available science is
B. Exceptions. - This Order shall not apply to the utilized and applied in adopting biosafety
contained use of a regulated article, which is policies, measures and guidelines, and in making
within the regulatory supervision of NCBP. biosafety decision.

x xx.

C. [DENR]. As the primary government agency

responsible for the conservation management,
development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, the DENR
shall ensure that environmental assessments are
done and impacts identified in biosafety
decisions. x x x.

D. [DOH]. The DOH, as the principal authority on

health, shall formulate guidelines in assessing the
health impacts posed by modern biotechnology
and its applications. x x x.

E. [DILG]. The DILG shall coordinate with the DA,

DOST, DENR and DOH in overseeing the
implementation of this Circular in relation to the
activities that are to be implemented in specific
 LGUs, particulady in relation to the conduct of
public consultations as required under the Local
Government Code. x x x.
2. As to guidelines in risk assessment
PART I ARTICLE II. BIOSAFETY DECISIONS
GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 3. Guidelines in Making Biosafety
Decisions
xxxx
The principles under the NBF shall guide
Section 3 concerned agencies in making biosafety
Risk Assessment decisions, including:

A. Principles of Risk Assessment - No regulated xxxx

article shall be allowed to be imported or
released into the environment without the B. Risk Assessment. Risk assessment shall be
conduct of a risk assessment performed in mandatory and central in making biosafety
accordance with this Order. The following decisions, consistent with policies and standards
principles shall be followed when performing a on risk assessment issued by the NCBP; and
risk assessment to determine whether a guided by Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol on
regulated article poses significant risks to human Biosafety. Pursuant to the NBF, the following
health and the environment: principles shall be followed when performing a
risk assessment to determine whether a
1. The risk assessment shall be carried out in a regulated article poses significant risks to human
scientifically sound and transparent manner health and the environment.
based on available scientific and technical
information. The expert advice of, and guidelines 1. The risk assessment shall be carried out in a
developed by, relevant international scientifically sound and transparent manner
organizations and regulatory authorities of based on available scientific and technical
countries with significant experience in the information. The expert advice of and guidelines
regulatory supervision of the regulated article developed by, relevant international
shall be taken into account in the conduct of risk organizations, including intergovernmental
assessment. bodies, and regulatory authorities of countries
with significant experience in the regulatory
x x xx supervision of the regulated article shall be taken
into account. In the conduct of risk assessment,
CODEX Alimentarius Guidelines on the Food
Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from the
Recombinant-DNA Plants shall internationally
adopted as well as other internationally accepted
consensus documents.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
3. As to public participation
PART III ARTICLE V. FIELD TRIAL OF REGULATED
APPROVAL PROCESS FOR FIELD TESTING OF ARTICLES
REGULATE ARTICLES
Section 12. Public Participation for Field Trial
xxxx
Section 8 A. The BPI shall make public all applications and
Biosafety Permits for Field Trial through posting
Requirements for Field Testing on the NCBP and BPI websites, and in the offices
of the DA and DOST in the province, city, or
xxxx municipality where the field trial will be
conducted.
G. Public Consultation. - The applicant, acting
through its IBC, shall notity and invite comments x x xx
on the field testing proposal from the barangays
and city/municipal governments with jurisdiction
over the field test sites. The IBC shall post for
three (3) consecutive weeks copies of the Public
Information Sheet for Field Testing approved by
the BPI in at least three (3) conspicuous places in
each of the concerned barangay and
city/municipal halls. The Public Information
Sheet for Field Testing shall, among others, invite
interested parties to send their comments on the
proposed field testing to BPI within a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of posting. It shall
be m a language understood in the community.
During the comment period, any interested
person may submit to BPI written comments
regarding the application. The applicant shall
submit proof of posting in the form of
certifications from the concerned barangay
captains and city/municipal mayors or an
affidavit stating the dates and places of posting
duly executed by the responsible officer or his
duly authorized representative.
4. As to membership in the Institutional Biosafety Committee
PART I ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE
GENERAL PROVISIONS
FRAMEWORK
Section 1
xxxx
Definition of Terms
Section 6. Institutional Biosafety Committee
xxxx
The company or institution applying for and
L. "IBC" means the Institutional Biosafety granted permits under this Circular shall
Committee established by an applicant in constitute an IBC prior to the contained use,
preparation for the field testing of a regulated confined test, or field trial of a regulated article.
article and whose membership has been The membership of the IBC shall be approved by
approved by BPI. The JBC shall be responsible for the DOST-BC for contained use or confined test,
the initial evaluation of the risk assessment and or by the DA-BC for field trial. The IBC is
risk management strategies of the applicant for responsible for the conduct of the risk
field testing. It shall be composed of at least five assessment and preparation of risk management
(5) members, three (3) of whom shall be strategies of the applicant for contained use,
designated as "scientist-members" who shall confined test, or field trial. It shall make sure that
possess scientific and technological knowledge the environment and human health are
and expertise sufficient to enable them to
evaluate and monitor properly any work of the
applicant relating to the field testing of a
regulated article. The other members, who shall
be designated as "community representatives",
shall not be affiliated with the applicant apart
from being members of its IBC and shall be in a
position to represent the interests of the
communities where the field testing is to be
conducted. For the avoidance of doubt, NCBP
shall be responsible for approving the
membership of the IBC for contained use of a
regulated article.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
5. As to the composition and qualifications of the members of the Scientific and Technical Review
safeguarded in the conduct of any activity
involving regulated articles.
The IBC shall be composed of at least five (5)
members, three (3) of whom shall be designated,
as scientist-members and two (2) members shall
be community representatives. All scientist-
members must possess scientific or technological
knowledge and expertise sufficient to enable
them to property evaluate and monitor any work
involving regulated articles conducted by the
applicant.
The community regresentative must not be
affiliated with the applicant, and must be in a
position to regresent the interests of the
communities where the activities are to be
conducted. One of the community
regresentatives shall be an elected official of the
LGU. The other community representative shall
be selected from the residents who are members
of the Civil Society Organizations represented in
the Local Poverty Reduction Action Team,
pursuant to DILG Memorandum Circular No.
2015-45. For multi-location trials, community
representatives of the IBC shall be designated
per site. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

Panel
PART I ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxxx
Section 1
Section 7. Scientific and Technical Review Panel
Definition of Terms (STRP) The DA shall create a Scientific and
Technical Review Panel composed of a pool of
xxxx non-DA scientists with expertise in the
evaluation of the potential risks of regulated
EE. "STRP" means the Scientific and Technical articles to the environment and health. x x x
Review Panel created by BPI as an advisory body,
composed of at least three (3) reputable and x x x x
independent scientists who shall not be
employees of the Department and who have the The DA shall select scientists/experts in the STRP,
relevant professional background necessary to who shall meet the following qualifications:
evaluate the potential risks of the proposed
activity to human health and the environment A. Must not be an official, staff or employee of
based on available scientific and technical the DA or any of its attached agencies;
information.
B. Must not be directly or indirectly employed or
x x x x (Underscoring supplied) engaged by a company or institution with
 pending applications for permits covered by this
Circular;

C. Possess technical expertise in at least one of

the following fields: food and nutrition;
toxicology, ecology, crop protection,
environmental science, molecular biology and
biotechnology, genetics, plant breeding, animal
nutrition; and

D. Well-respected in the scientific community as

evidenced by positions held in science-based
organizations, awards and recognitions,
publications in local and international peer-
reviewed scientific journals.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the regulatory framework now applicable in conducting risk assessment in
matters involving the research, development, handling, movement, and release into the environment of genetically
modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modem biotechnology is substantially different from that which
was applied to the subject field trials. In this regard, it cannot be said that the present case is one capable of repetition
yet evading review.

The essence of cases capable of repetition yet evading review was succinctly explained by the Court in Belgica v. Ochoa,
Jr.,106 where the constitutionality of the Executive Department's lump-sum, discretionary funds under the 2013 General
Appropriations Act, known as the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), was assailed. In that case, the Court
rejected the view that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by
the Executive Department and former President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III's declaration that he had already "abolished
the PDAF." Citing the historical evolution of the ubiquitous Pork Barrel System, which was the source of the PDAF, and the
fact that it has always been incorporated in the national budget which is enacted annually, the Court ruled that it is one
capable of repetition yet evading review, thus:

Finally, the application of the fourth exception [to the rule on mootness] is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The
relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF-free budget for 2014." The evolution
of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth
to petitioners' claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of
repetition but evading review" exception in order "[t]o prevent similar questions from re-emerging." The situation
similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are
spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence; must not evade judicial
review.107 (Emphases supplied)

Evidently, the "frequent" and "routinary" nature of the Pork Barrel Funds and the PDAF are wanting herein. To reiterate,
the issues in these cases involve factual considerations which are peculiar only to the controversy at hand since the
petition for Writ of Kalikasan is specific to the field testing of Bt talong and does not involve other GMOs.

At this point, the Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered before a case is deemed one capable of
repetition yet evading review: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected
to the same action.
Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was too short to be fully litigated. It must be
emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field tests were issued on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, and
were valid for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed out by Justice Leonen, respondents filed their petition for Writ
of Kalikasan only on April 26, 2012 - just a few months before the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field testing
activities were already over.108 Obviously, therefore, the cessation of the subject field tests before the case could be
resolved was due to respondents' own inaction.

Moreover, the situation respondents complain of is not susceptible' to repetition. As discussed above, DAO 08-2002 has
already been superseded by JDC 01-2016. Hence, future applications for field testing will be governed by JDC 01-2016
which, as illustrated, adopts a regulatory framework that is substantially different from that of DAO 08-2002.

Therefore, it was improper for the Court to resolve the merits of the case which had become moot in view of the absence
of any valid exceptions to the rule on mootness, and to thereupon rule on the objections against the validity and
consequently nullify DAO 08-2002 under the premises of the precautionary principle.

In fact, in relation to the latter, it is observed that the Court should not have even delved into the constitutionality of DAO
08-2002 as it was merely collaterally challenged by respondents, based on the constitutional precepts of the people's
rights to infonnation on matters of public concern, to public participation, to a balanced and healthful ecology, and to
health.109 A cursory perusal of the petition for Writ of Kalikasan filed by respondents on April 26, 2012 before the Court
shows that they essentially assail herein petitioners' failure to: (a) fully infom1 the people regarding the health,
environment, and other hazards involved;110 and (b) conduct any valid risk assessment before conducting the field
trial.111 However, while the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were averred to be inadequate to protect (a) the constitutional
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology since "said regulation failed, among others, to anticipate 'the public
implications caused by the importation of GMOs in the Philippines"';112and (b) "the people from the potential harm these
genetically modified plants and genetically modified organisms may cause human health and the environment, [and] thus,
x x x fall short of Constitutional compliance,"113 respondents merely prayed for its amendment, as well as that of the NBF,
to define or incorporate "an independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific and socio-economic risk assessment,
public information, consultation, and participation, and providing for their effective implementation, in accord with
international safety standards[.]"114 This attempt to assail the constitutionality of the public info1mation and consultation
requirements under DAO 08-2002 and the NBF constitutes a collateral attack on the said provisions of law that runs afoul
of the wdlsettled rule that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally attacked as constitutionality issues must
be pleaded directly and not collaterally.115 Verily, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary,
in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefuliy studied by the
executive department and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.116

All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the expiration of the Biosafoty Permits and
the completion of the field trials subject of these cases, and with none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly
attending, the Court grants the instant motions for reconsideration and hereby dismisses the aforesaid petition. With this
pronouncement, no discussion on the substantive merits of the same should be made.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2015 of the Court, which
affirmed with modification the Decision dated May 17, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 20, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013, is hereby SET ASIDE for the reasons above-explained. A new one is ENTERED
DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) filed by respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura, and others on the ground of mootness.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211010

VICTORIA SEGOVIA, RUEL LAGO, CLARIESSE JAMI CHAN, REPRESENTING THE CARLESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
GABRIEL ANASTACIO, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER GRACE ANASTACIO, DENNIS ORLANDOSANGALANG,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER MAY ALILI SANGALANG, MARIA PAULINA CASTANEDA, REPRESENTED BY HER
MOTHERATRICIAANN CASTANEDA, REPRESENTING THE CHILDREN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CHILDREN OF THE FUTURE;
AND RENATO PINEDA, JR., ARON KERR MENGUITO, MAY ALILI SANGALANG, AND GLYNDA BATHAN BATERINA,
REPRESENTING CAROWNERS WHO WOULD RATHER NOT HA VE CARS IF GOOD PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION WERE SAFE,
CONVENIENT, ACCESSIBLE AND RELIABLE, Petitioners
vs
THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, AND
ITS COMMISSIONERS MARY ANN LUCILLE SERING, HEHERSON ALVAREZANDNADAREV SANO; DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE JOSEPH ABAYA;
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) AND THE ROAD BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
HONORABLE ROGELIO SINGSON; DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE RAMON PAJE; DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM),
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE FLORENCIO ABAD; METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(MMDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, FRANCIS TOLENTINO; DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA), REPRESENTED
BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE PROCESO ALCALA; AND JOHN DOES, REPRESENTING AS YET UNNAMED LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE, JURIDICAL ENTITIES, AND NATURAL PERSONS
WHO FAIL OR REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW OR COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, Respondents

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of the
following environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 97291 (Climate Change Act), and RA
87492 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 7743 (BO 774); AO 254, s. 20094 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s.
20075 (AO 171).

Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel: (a) the public respondents to: (1) implement the Road Sharing Principle in all
roads; (2) divide all roads lengthwise, one-half (½) for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling, the other half for Filipino-made
transport vehicles; (3) submit a time-bound action plan to implement the Road Sharing Principle throughout the
country; (b) the Office of the President, Cabinet officials and public employees of Cabinet members to reduce their fuel
consumption by fifty percent (50%) and to take public transportation fifty percent (50%) of the time; (c) Public respondent
DPWH to demarcate and delineate the road right-of-way in all roads and sidewalks; and (d) Public respondent DBM to
instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax.6

The Facts

To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was
reorganized through BO 774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the
Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a)
reads:

Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The new paradigm in the
movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road."
For this purpose, the system shall favor nonmotorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling,
and the man-powered mini-train).
In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate
a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly
mentioned, thus:

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF- In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and pursue the
formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines.

Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions:

(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of men and
things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the
system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the
manpowered mini-train).

xxxx

Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission which absorbed
the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to
coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change.7

Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding
the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said
letter - foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty
percent (50%).8 Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition.

The Petition

Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in turn represent "Children of
the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient,
accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the
alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of
environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of
all Filipinos.9

These identified violations10 include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as provided under Article XI,
Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst of acute public want under Article 25 of the Civil
Code for failure to reduce personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); (b) DOTC and
DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's failure to devote public open spaces along
sidewalks, roads and parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section 12(b)11 f EO 774; (d) DILG's failure
to coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under Section 9(g)12 of EO
774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for
purposes stated in Section 9(e)13 of EO 774.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in
the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology,14 and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land,
water, and air" by the government without due process of law.15 They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the
prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-
owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and
maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.16
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the outright dismissal of the petition
for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.17 Moreover, respondents argue that
petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.

Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to show that
the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities;
and prove that non- implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage. Respondents likewise
assert that petitioners are similarly not entitled to a

Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or personal injury or a clear legal right to the thing
demanded; (b) the writ will not compel a discretionary act or anything not in a public officer's duty to do (i.e. the manner
by which the Road Sharing Principle will be applied; and to compel DA to exercise jurisdiction over roadside lands);
and (c) DBM cannot be compelled to make an instant release of funds as the same requires an appropriation made by law
(Article VI, Section 29[1] of the Constitution) and the use of the Road Users' Tax (more appropriately, the Motor Vehicle
Users' Charge) requires prior approval of the Road Board.18

In any event, respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have taken and continue
to take measures to improve the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition - through
projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the
Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching
Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually
and jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of motorized
vehicles on the environment.19 Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact of
the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on Environment
Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions, greenhouse gases emission
mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector.

In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the Petition.

ISSUES

From the foregoing submissions, the main issues for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and

3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.

RULING

The petition must be dismissed.

Procedural Issues

Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases20 (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners
failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector
of society and without a concrete interest or injury.21 Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and
representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran;22 and that, in
any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.23
The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing
of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws.24 This has been confirmed by this
Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift,25 and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines).26 However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the
environmental damage subject of the writ;27 and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is
only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission. 28

Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme
Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals,29 then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is
applicable.30 Petitioners, on the other hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is
available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial
jurisdiction of the lower courts.31

The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering
environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental
rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address
the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.32 At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological
problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when
direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare.1âwphi1 Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this
Court,33 it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it.

Requisites for issuance of Writs of

Kalikasan and Continuing
Mandamus

We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;

2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.34

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be violated.35

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology
and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any
unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth by the petitioners on the correlation of air
quality and public health, petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are guilty of violation or neglect of
environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad air quality. Notably, apart from bare allegations, petitioners were
not able to show that respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited. In fact, apart from adducing expert
testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in
establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link or reasonable
connection to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature.36

Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted by the petitioners belies their claim
that the DENR failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in fact, the NAQSR shows that the National Ambient Total
Suspended Particulates (TSP) value used to determine air quality has steadily declined from 2004 to 2007,37and while the
values still exceed the air quality guideline value, it has remained on this same downward trend until as recently as 2011.38

On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect
the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek to improve
air quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders, such as: priority tagging of
expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest
major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban
Re-Greening Programs.

In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that the DENR was, and is, taking concrete steps to improve
national air quality, such as information campaigns, free emission testing to complement the anti-smoke-belching
program and other programs to reduce emissions from industrial smokestacks and from open burning of waste.39 The
efforts of local governments and administrative regions in conjunction with other · executive agencies and stakeholders
are also outlined.40

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing mandamus as follows:

RULES
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental
law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts
until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to
perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.

First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled
to the writ.1âwphi1 While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of
real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.41

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be considered an absolute
imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied
or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in
nature, not those that are discretionary,42 and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way
or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus,
the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can
only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.43
This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents to act one way to
implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling, and
the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that require that
specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot
supplant the executive department's discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs
of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically
enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to
show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to improve air quality.1âwphi1

At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act
- the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of
action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles)
to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act
enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as
to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the
determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive
policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority,"44 the general rule applies that discretion cannot
be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.1âwphi1

Road Users' Tax

Finally, petitioners seek to compel DBM to release the Road Users' Tax to fund the reform of the road and transportation
system and the implementation of the Road Sharing Principle.

It bears clarifying that the Road Users' Tax mentioned in Section 9(e) of EO 774, apparently reiterated in Section 5 of AO
254 is the Special Vehicle Pollution Control Fund component of the Motor Vehicle Users' . Charge ("MVUC') imposed on
owners of motor vehicles in RA 8794, otherwise known as the Road Users' Tax Law. By the express provisions of the
aforementioned law, the amounts in the special trust accounts of the MVUC are earmarked solely and used exclusively
(1) for road maintenance and the improvement of the road drainage, (2) for the installation of adequate and efficient
traffic lights and road safety devices, and (3) for the air pollution control, and their utilization are subject to the
management of the Road Board.45 Verily, the petitioners' demand for the immediate and unilateral release of the Road
Users' Tax by the DBM to support the petitioners' operationalization of this Road Sharing Principle has no basis in law. The
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioner do not rise to the level of law that can supplant the provisions of RA
8794 that require the approval of the Road Board for the use of the monies in the trust fund. In other words, the provisions
on the release of funds by the DBM as provided in EO 774 and AO 254 are necessarily subject to the conditions set forth
in RA 8794. Notably, RA 9729, as amended by RA 10174, provides for the establishment for the People's Survival
Fund46 that may be tapped for adaptation activities, which similarly require approval from the PSF Board.47

That notwithstanding, the claim made by the petitioners that hardly any budget is allotted to mitigating environmental
pollution is belied by the priority given to programs aimed at addressing and mitigating climate change that the DBM and
the CCC had been tagging and tracking as priority expenditures since 2013.48 With the coordination of the DILG, this
priority tagging and tracking is cascaded down to the local budget management of local government units.49

Other causes of action

As previously discussed, the petitioners' failure to show any violation on the part of the respondents renders it
unnecessary to rule on other allegations of violation that the petitioners rely upon as causes of action against the public
respondents.
In fine, the allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an actual or threatened violation of
the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology arising from an unlawful act or omission by, or any
unlawful neglect on the part of, the respondents that would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018

MAYOR TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF CEBU, Petitioner, v. JOEL CAPILI GARGANERA, FOR
AND ON HIS BEHALF, AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE CITIES OF CEBU AND TALISAY, AND THE FUTURE
GENERATIONS, INCLUDING THE UNBORN, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as provided under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) filed by petitioner Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, in his capacity as
City Mayor of Cebu (Mayor Osmeña), which seeks to reverse or set aside the Decision 2 dated December 15, 2016 and
Resolution3 dated March 14, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 004WK, that granted the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan and ordered Mayor Osmeña, and/or his representatives, to permanently cease and desist from dumping
or disposing garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same.

The Antecedents

On April 6, 1993, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) to the Solid Waste Sanitary Landfill Project at Inayawan landfill proposed by the Metro Cebu Development
Project Office (MCDPO). Thereafter, the Inayawan landfill served as the garbage disposal area of Cebu City.4

Sometime in 2011, the Cebu City Local Government (City Government) resolved to close the Inayawan landfill per Cebu
City Sangguniang Panlunsod (SP) Resolution and Executive Order of former Cebu City Mayor Michael Rama (former Mayor
Rama).5

Subsequently, SP Resolution No. 12-0582-20116 dated August 24, 2011, was issued to charge the amount of P1,204,500
in the next supplemental budget to cover the cost in the preparation of closure and rehabilitation plan of Inayawan
landfill.7 Another SP Resolution with No. 12-2617 20128 dated March 21, 2012 was issued to proceed with the bidding
process for the said preparation of closure and rehabilitation plan. As a result, the Inayawan landfill was partially closed
and all wastes from Cebu City were disposed in a privately operated landfill in Consolacion.9

On June 15, 2015, through former Mayor Rama's directive, Inayawan landfill was formally closed.10

In 2016, however, under the administration of Mayor Osmeña, the City Government sought to temporarily open the
Inayawan landfill, through a letter dated June 8, 2016, by then Acting Cebu City Mayor Margot Osmeña (Acting Mayor
Margot) addressed to Regional Director Engr. William Cuñado (Engr. Cuñado) of the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR.11 In response thereto, Engr. Cuñado invited Acting Mayor Margot to a technical conference.
Thereafter, on June 27, 2016, Acting Mayor Margot sent another letter to Engr. Cuñado submitting the City Government's
commitments for the establishment of a new Solid Waste Management System pursuant to the mandate under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9003,12 and accordingly, requested for the issuance of a Notice to Proceed for the temporary reopening of
the Inayawan landfill.13

In his reply letter dated June 27, 2016, Engr. Cuñado informed Acting Mayor Margot that although the EMB had no
authority to issue the requested notice, it interposed no objection to the proposed temporary opening of the Inayawan
landfill provided that the Cebu City will faithfully comply with all its commitments and subject to regular monitoring by
the EMB.14

Thus, in July 2016, the Inayawan landfill was officially re-opened by Acting Mayor Margot.15

On September 2, 2016, a Notice of Violation and Technical Conference16 was issued by the EMB to Mayor Osmeña,
regarding City Government's operation of the Inayawan Landfill and its violations of the ECC.
On September 6, 2016, the Department of Health (DOH) issued an Inspection Report17 wherein it recommended, among
others, the immediate closure of the landfill due to the lack of sanitary requirements, environmental, health and
community safety issues, as conducted by the DOH Regional Sanitary Engineer, Henry D. Saludar.18

On September 23, 2016, Joel Capili Garganera for and on his behalf, and in representation of the People of the Cities of
Cebu and Talisay and the future generations, including the unborn (respondent) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) before the CA.19

Respondent asserted that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill causes serious environmental damage which
threatens and violates their right to a balanced and healthful ecology.20 Respondent also asserted that the Inayawan
landfill has already outgrown its usefulness and has become ill-suited for its purpose.21 Respondent further asserted that
its reopening and continued operation violates several environmental laws and government regulations, such as: R.A.
9003; R.A. 8749 or the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999"; R.A. 9275 or the "Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004";
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 856 or the "Code on Sanitation of the Philippines"; and DENR Administrative Order (DAO)
No. 2003-30 or the "Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) for the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
System."22

The CA, in a Resolution dated October 6, 2016, granted a writ of kalikasan, required petitioner to file a verified return and
a summary hearing was set for the application of TEPO.23

In petitioner's verified return, he alleged that respondent failed to comply with the condition precedent which requires
30-day notice to the public officer concerned prior to the filing of a citizens suit under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. Respondent
further alleged that Inayawan landfill operated as early as 1998 and it conformed to the standards and requirements then
applicable.24

The CA, in a Decision25 dated December 15, 2016, granted the privilege of the writ of kalikasan which ordered Mayor
Osmeña and/or his representatives to permanently cease and desist from dumping or disposing of garbage or solid waste
at the Inayawan landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision, provides:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the privilege of the writ of kalikasan is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
pursuant to Section 15, Rule 7 of the RPEC:

1) the respondent Mayor and/or his representatives are ordered to permanently cease and desist from dumping or
disposing or garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill;
2) the respondent Mayor and/for his representatives are ordered to continue the rehabilitation of the Inayawan landfill;
3) the DENR-EMB is directed to regularly monitor the City Government's strict compliance with the Court's judgment
herein;
4) in case of non-compliance, the DENR-EMB is directed to file and/or recommend the filing of appropriate criminal, civil
and administrative charges before the proper authorities against the responsible persons; and
5) the DENR-EMB is ordered to submit to the Court a monthly progress report on the City Government's compliance/non-
compliance until such time that the rehabilitation of the Inayawan landfill is complete and sufficient according to the
standards of the DENR-EMB.

SO ORDERED.26

Mayor Osmeña's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution27 dated March 14, 2017, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises. the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Mayor Osmeña is
hereby DENIED.

The Compliances with attached Compliance Monitoring Reports for the months of January and February 2017, which were
filed by the public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), are hereby NOTED.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the public respondents in their Compliance Monitoring Reports, the Court hereby
DIRECT'S respondent Mayor Osmeña to comply with the DENR-EMB's request for the submission of the local government's
Safe Closure and Rehabilitation Plan (SCRP) for the Inayawan landfill within thirty days (30) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.28

Hence, this instant petition.

The Issues

For resolution of the Court are the following issues: 1) whether the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under
R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749 is needed prior to the filing of the instant petition; 2) whether the CA correctly ruled that the
requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasanwere sufficiently established.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner argues that respondent brushed aside the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A.
900329 and RA. 8749.30

Petitioner's argument does not persuade.

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), is instructive on the matter:

Section 5. Citizen suit.—Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may
file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall
issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions. (Underscoring
Ours)

Section 1, Rule 7 of RPEC also provides:

Section 1. Nature of the writ.- The Writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.

Here, the present petition for writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a separate and distinct action from R.A. 9003 and R.A.
8749. A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.31 It is designed for a narrow but special
purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective
resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends
political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.32

Moreover, Section 3, Rule 7 of RPEC allows direct resort to this Court or with any of the stations of the CA, which states:
Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals.

Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC allows direct action to this Court and the CA
where it is dictated by public welfare,33 this Court is of the view that the prior 30 day notice requirement for citizen suits
under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749 is inapplicable. It is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept
petitions brought directly before it.34

We affirm the CA when it ruled that the requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasanwere sufficiently
established.

Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1)
there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or
threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity;
and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.35

Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be
sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy.
The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.36

The Court is convinced from the evidence on record that the respondent has sufficiently established the aforementioned
requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan. The record discloses that the City Government's
resumption of the garbage dumping operations at the Inayawan landfill has raised serious environmental concerns. As
aptly and extensively discussed by the appellate court in its Decision based from the EMB Compliance Evaluation Report
(CER)37 dated August 18, 2016 and the Notice of Violation and Technical Conference38 dated September 2, 20 16, issued
by the EMB to Mayor Osmeña, to wit:

Moreover, based on the CER drafted by the EMB, the dumping operation at the Inayawan landfill has violated the criteria
specified under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-01 specifically as to the proper leachate collection and treatment at
the landfill and the regular water quality monitoring of surface and ground waters and effluent, as well as gas emissions
thereat. At the same time, as admitted by Mr. Marco Silberon from the DENR-7 during the Cebu SP Executive
Session39 dated 16 August 2016, the Inayawan landfill has already been converted to a dumpsite operation despite its
original design as sanitary landfill which is violative of Section 17(h)40 of R.A. 9003 expressly prohibiting open dumps as
final disposal sites.41

xxxx

Contrary to respondents' belief, the magnitude of the environmental damage can be gleaned from the fact that the air
pollution has affected resident not just from Cebu City but also from the neighboring city of Talisay. Also, in light of the
EMB's finding that the proper treatment of the leachate at the Inayawan landfill has not been complied with prior to its
discharge to the Cebu strait, there is no question that the scope of the possible environmental damage herein has
expanded to encompass not just the City of Cebu but other localities as well that connects to such strait. Since leachate is
contaminated liquid from decomposed waste,42 it is not difficult to consider the magnitude of the potential environment
harm it can unleash if this is released to a receiving water body without being sufficiently treated first, as in this case. In
view of the foregoing, the Court finds that that (sic) the closure of the Inayawan landfill is warranted in this case.43

It may not be amiss to mention that even the EMB's own official has recognized the need of closing the Inayawan landfill
due to the environmental violations committed by the City Government in its operation. This was the sentiment expressed
by Mr. Amancio Dongcoy, a representative from the DENR-EMB, during the Cebu SP Executive Session on 20 February
2015, thus:44

xxxx
Actually, DENR, way back in late 2010, my companion conducted Water Quality Monitoring and we took samples of the
waste water coming from the leachate pond and it is not complying with the Clean Water Act We wrote a letter to Mayor
Rama, advising him to take measures, so that the Clean Water Act can be complied with. So, that's why, the first reaction
of Mayor Rama, is to decide that it must be closed because it is necessary that it must stop operation.45

Also, the air and water quality impact assessment of the EMB Compliance Evaluation Report (CER)46dated August 18, 2016,
made remarks that the air quality poses a threat to nearby surroundings/habitat while the water quality (leachate) poses
threat of water pollution.47 The report also stated that the foul odor from the landfill already reached neighboring
communities as far as SM Seaside and UC Mambaling which have disrupted activities causing economic loss and other
activities for improvement particularly for SM Seaside.48 Further, most of the conditions stipulated in the ECC were not
complied with.49

In addition, the EMB's findings particularly as to the air quality is corroborated by 15 affidavits executed by affected
residents and/or business owners from Cebu and Talisay Cities who affirmed smelling a foul odor coming from the
Inayawan landfill, and some even noted the appearance of flies.50

Moreover, the DOH Inspection Report51 dated September 6, 2016, observed that the Inayawan landfill had been in
operation for 17 years, which exceeded the 7-year estimated duration period in the projected design data. This caused
the over pile-up of refuse/garbage in the perimeter and boarder of the landfill, having a height slope distance of
approximately 120 meters at the side portion of Fil-Invest Subdivision, Cogon Pardo Side portion has approximately height
of 40 meters and at Inayawan side portion is approximately from 10-20 meters from the original ground level. The standard
process procedure management was poorly implemented.52

As to the health impact, the DOH found that the residents, commercial centers, shanties and scavengers near the dump
site are at high risk of acquiring different types of illness due to pollution, considering the current status of the dump site.53

The DOH highly recommended the immediate closure of the Inayawan sanitary landfill. It was further stated that the
disposal area is not anymore suitable as a sanitary landfill even if rehabilitated considering its location within the city, the
number of residents and the increasing population of the city, the neighboring cities and towns, and the expected increase
in number of commercial centers, transportation and tourist concerns.54

Prescinding from the above, the EMB, DOH, Mr. Amancio Dongcoy, a representative from the DENR-EMB, and the Cebu
and Talisay residents are all in agreement as to the need of closing the Inayawan landfill due to the environmental
violations committed by the City Government in its operation. The Court, while it have the jurisdiction and power to decide
cases, is not precluded from utilizing the findings and recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that
demand "the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.55

Lastly, as much as this Court recognizes the parties' good intention and sympathize with the dilemma of Mayor Osmeña
or the City Government in looking for its final disposal site, considering the garbage daily disposal of 600 tons generated
by the city and its duty to provide basic services and facilities of garbage collection and disposal system, 56 We agree with
the appellate court that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill poses a serious and pressing danger to the
environment that could result in injurious consequences to the health and lives of the nearby residents, thereby
warranting the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 15, 2016 and Resolution dated March 14, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals, which granted the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and ordered petitioner Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, in
his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu and/or his representatives, to permanently cease and desist from dumping or disposing
of garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA LAWAGON, CRISPIN ALCOMENDRAS, CORAZON SABINADA,
VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, AND LEDEVINA ADLAWAN, Petitioners, v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 189305

CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION (PBGEA), DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal through the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assails the decision promulgated on January 9,
20091 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the judgment rendered on September 22, 2007 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, in Davao City upholding the validity and constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance
No. 0309-07, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2007 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), 11th Judicial Region, Branch 17, Davao City, upholding the validity and constitutionality of Davao City
Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

FURTHER, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 January 2008 enjoining the City Government of Davao, and any
other person or entity acting in its behalf, from enforcing and implementing City Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.
Antecedents

After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao
City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07
Series of 2007

AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES BY ALL
AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY

Be it enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City in session assembled that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 1. TITLE. This Ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance Banning Aerial Spraying as
an Agricultural Practice in all Agricultural Activities by all Agricultural Entities in Davao City";

SECTION 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. It shall be the policy of the City of Davao to eliminate the method of aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within Davao City;

SECTION 3. DEFINITION OF TERMS:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya. Aerial Spraying - refers to application of substances through the use of aircraft of any form
which dispenses the substances in the air.
b. Agricultural Practices - refer to the practices conducted by agricultural entities in relation to their agricultural activities;

c. Agricultural Activities - refer to activities that include, but not limited to, land preparation, seeding, planting, cultivation,
harvesting and bagging;

d. Agricultural Entities - refer to persons, natural or juridical, involved in agricultural activities

e. Buffer Zone - is an identified 30-meter zone within and around the boundaries of agricultural farms/plantations that
need special monitoring to avoid or minimize harm to the environment and inhabitants pursuant to policies and guidelines
set forth in this Ordinance and other government regulations. It is an area of land that must lie within the property which
does not include public lands, public thoroughfares or adjacent private properties. It must be planted with diversified trees
that grow taller than what are usually planted and grown in the plantation to protect those within the adjacent fields,
neighboring farms, residential area, schools and workplaces.

SECTION 4. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - The provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to all agricultural entities within the
territorial jurisdiction of Davao City;

SECTION 5. BAN OF AERIAL SPRAYING - A ban on aerial spraying shall be strictly enforced in the territorial jurisdiction of
Davao City three (3) months after the effectivity of this Ordinance.

SECTION 6. BUFFER ZONE - Consistent with national legislation and government regulations, all agricultural entities must
provide for a thirty (30) meter buffer zone within the boundaries of their agricultural farms/plantations. This buffer zone
must be properly identified through Global Positioning System (GPS) survey. A survey plan showing the metes and bounds
of each agricultural farm/plantation must be submitted to the City Mayor's Office, with the buffer zone clearly identified
therein;

SECTION 7. PENAL PROVISION - Violation of any provision of this Ordinance shall be punished as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya. First Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not
more than three (3) months;

b. Second Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than six (6) months
and suspension of City-issued permits and licenses for one (1) year;

c. Third Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than six (6) months but not more than one (1) year and
perpetual cancellation of City issued permits and licenses;

Provided, that in case the violation has been committed by a juridical person, the person in charge of the management
thereof shall be held liable;

SECTION 8. REPEALING CLAUSE - Any Ordinance that is contrary to or inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Ordinance shall be deemed amended or repealed accordingly.

SECTION 9. EFFECTIVITY - This Ordinance shall take effect thirty (30) days from its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Davao City;

ENACTED, January 23, 2007 by a majority vote of all the Members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007.3 The ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007
after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.4 Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial
spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits
Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.5They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property
without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code).

On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo
Mosqueda,7 joined by other residents of Davao City,8 (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene
and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.9 The RTC granted their motion on June 4, 2007.10chanrobleslaw

On June 20, 2007, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and subsequently issued
the writ.11chanrobleslaw

Judgment of the RTC

On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional,
decreeing thusly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the subject [O]rdinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional in all aspect of the grounds assailed by
the petitioner, said [C]ity [O]rdinance No. 0309-07, is sustained of its validity and constitutionality.

Accordingly, the order of this court dated June 20, 2007, granting the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by
petitioner is ordered cancelled and set aside as a result of this decision.

SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power13 under the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code;14 that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to
a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;15 and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality,
and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.16chanrobleslaw

However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition period under Section 5 of Ordinance No.
0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended transition period.17chanrobleslaw

Decision of the CA

PBGEA, et al. appealed,18 and applied for injunctive relief from the CA,19 which granted the application20and consequently
issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of the ordinance.21chanrobleslaw

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.22 It declared Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive; found the three-month
transition period impractical and oppressive in view of the engineering and technical requirements of switching from aerial
spraying to truck-mounted boom spraying; and opined that the ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection Clause inasmuch
as Section 3(a) of the ordinance - which defined the term aerial spraying - did not make reasonable distinction between
the hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the different classes of
pesticides or fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and could enhance
agricultural production.

The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the environment against
the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of
substances, on the other. It ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural
plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property without due process because the
landowners were thereby compelled to cede portions of their property without just compensation; that the exercise of
police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was
obnoxious to the public welfare; and that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional because of the
absence of a separability clause.

The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions
on August 7, 2009.23chanrobleslaw

Hence, the separate, but now consolidated, appeals by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the following grounds, namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS AND CONCEPTS OF LAW WHICH, PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID

II

THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

III

THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS MORE THAN REASONABLY RELATED TO THE PURPOSE IT SEEKS TO
ACHIEVE

IV

THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS VALID, BEING DEMONSTRABLY REASONABLE AND FAIR

THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO THE 30-METER BUFFER ZONE ARE [SIC] CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW, BEING
A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established precepts like the primacy of human rights over property rights
and the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance; that the CA preferred the preservation of the profits of
respondents PBGEA, et al. to the residents' right to life, health and ecology,24 thereby disregarding the benevolent
purpose of the ordinance; that the CA assumed the functions of the lawmaker when it set aside the wisdom behind the
enactment of the ordinance; that the CA failed to apply the precautionary principle, by which the State was allowed to
take positive actions to prevent harm to the environment and to human health despite the lack of scientific certainty; that
the CA erred in applying the "strict scrutiny method" in holding that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it only thereby applied in reviewing classifications that affected fundamental rights; that there was nothing wrong
with prohibiting aerial spraying per se considering that even the aerial spraying of water produced drift that could affect
unwilling neighbors whose, constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment might be impinged; 25cralawred that
as far as the three-month period was concerned, the CA should have considered that manual spraying could be conducted
while the PBGEA, et al. laid down the preparations for the conduct of boom spraying;26 that "reasonableness" could be
more appropriately weighed by balancing the interests of the parties against the protection of basic rights, like the right
to life, to health, and to a balanced and healthful ecology;27 that PBGEA, et al. did not substantiate their claim of potential
profit losses that would result from the shift; that business profits should remain inferior and subordinate to their
fundamental rights as residents of Davao City, which were the rights that the assailed ordinance has sought to
protect;28 that PBGEA, et al. did not explore other modes of pesticide treatment either as a stop-gap or as a temporary
measure while shifting to truck mounted boom spraying;29 that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone was a valid
exercise of police power that necessarily flowed from the protection afforded by the ordinance from the unwanted effects
of ground spraying; that the imposition of the buffer zone did not constitute compensable taking under police power,
pursuant to the pronouncements in Seng Kee & Co. v. Earnshaw and Piatt30Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,31 and Social
Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.;32 and that the 30-meter buffer zone conformed with the ISO 1400033 and the DENR
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) requirement.34chanrobleslaw

In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the following as the issues to be considered and resolved, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 5 OF ORDINANCE NO. 0309-
07, SERIES OF 2007 IS OPPRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF DELEGATED POLICE POWER

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 IS VIOLATIVE
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION;

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 CONSTITUTES
TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION, THUS, VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION

IV

WHETHER OR NOT AERIAL SPRAYING OF FUNGICIDES IS SAFE TO THE PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed ordinance because it would thereby protect the
environment and regulate property and business in the interest of the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local
Government Code;35 that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of promoting the public welfare under the
General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code); that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because the distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of application being more deleterious than other modes;
that aerial spraying produces more drift that causes discomfort, and an extremely offensive and obnoxious experience the
part of the residents; that spray drift cannot be controlled even with use by the respondents of highly advanced apparatus,
such as the Differential Global Positioning System, Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers, Intellimap, Intelliflow Spray
Valve System, Control and Display Unit and the Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System; 36 that because of the inherent
toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide aerially applied by the respondents), there is no need to provide for a substantial
distinction based on the level of concentration;37 that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they become air
pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999),38 and the activity thus falls
under the authority of the local government units to ban; and that the ordinance does not only seek to protect and
promote human health but also serves as a measure against air pollution.

The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does not thereby oblige the shift from aerial to
truck-mounted boom spraying; that the respondents only choose boom spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of
the transition period by erroneously adding the months required for each of the stages without considering other steps
that may be simultaneously undertaken;39 that the Court should apply its ruling in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,40 by
which the six-month period for the folding-up of business operations was declared a legitimate exercise of police power;
that the respondents did not present any documentary evidence on the feasibility of adopting other methods; 41that only
1,800 hectares out of 5,200 hectares of plantations owned and operated by PBGEA's members use aerial spraying, hence,
the perceived ominous consequence of imposing a ban on aerial spray to the banana industry is entirely misleading;42 that
the urgency of prohibiting aerial spray justifies the three-month transition period; that the complaints of the community
residents - ranging from skin itchiness, contraction and/or tightening in the chest, nausea, appetite loss and difficulty in
breathing after exposure to spray mist - only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and harm to the residents; that
considering that the testimony of Dr. Lynn Crisanta R. Panganiban, a pharmacologist and toxicologist, established that
fungicides could cause debilitating effects on the human body once inhaled or digested, the CA erred in holding that there
was no correlation between aerial application and the complaints of the residents; that given that aerial spray produces
more drift and is uncontrollable compared to the other methods of applying fungicides, the ordinance becomes
reasonable;43 and that the medical-related complaints of the residents need not be proven by medical records considering
that these were based on personal knowledge.44chanrobleslaw

The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is a valid exercise of police power, rendering
the claim for just compensation untenable; that the maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the respondents to
cede a portion of their landholdings; that the planting of diversified trees within the buffer zone will serve to insulate the
residents from spray drift; that such buffer zone does not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of their
property;45 and that the buffer zone is consistent with the Constitution, which reminds property owners that the use of
property bears a social function.46chanrobleslaw

In their comment, the respondents posit that the petition of the City; of Davao should be dismissed for failure to attach
material portions of the records, and for raising factual errors that are not within the realm of this appeal by petition for
review on certiorari;47 that the CA correctly declared the ordinance as unreasonable due to the impossibility of complying
with the three-month transition period; that shifting from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying will take at least three
years and entails careful planning, equipment and machineries, civil works, and capital funding of at least
P400,000,000.00;48 that the Court could rely on its ruling in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,49 where an ordinance directing an
existing establishment to wind up or to transfer its business was declared as confiscatory in nature, and, therefore,
unconstitutional;50 that the total ban against aerial sprayig, coupled with the inadequate time to shift to truck-mounted
boom spraying, effectively deprives the respondents with an efficient means to control the spread of the Black Sigatoka
disease that threatens the banana plantations; that the ordinance will only expose the plantations to the virulent disease
that is capable of infecting 60% of the plantations on a single cycle51 missed;52 that compared with other modes of
application, aerial spraying is more cost-efficient, safe and accurate; that truck-mounted boom spraying, for instance,
requires 80-200 liters of solution per hectare,53 while manual spraying uses 200-300 liters of solution per hectare; that
aerial spraying oily requires 30 liters per hectare; that in terms of safety and accuracy, manual spraying is the least safe
and accurate,54 and produces more drift than aerial spraying;55 that due to the 300-liter solution required, the workers
will be more exposed to the solution during manual application and such application will thus be more in conflict with the
purpose of the ordinance to prevent human exposure;56 that the respondents also find the irrigation sprinklers suggested
by the City of Davao as wasteful, unsafe and impractical because it cannot provide the needed coverage for application of
the solution to effectively control. the Black Sigatoka disease; that in contrast, aerial application, coupled with the latest
state of the art technology and equipment, ensures accuracy, effectiveness, efficiency and safety compared to the other
methods of application; that the respondents vouch for the safety of the fungicides they use by virtue of such fungicides
having been registered with the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and classified as Category IV,57 and found to be
mild; and that oral ingestion in large doses is required before any adverse effects to humans may result. 58chanrobleslaw

The respondents lament that the ban was imposed without any scientific basis; that the report59prepared by a fact-finding
team (composed of the Vice Mayor, the City Health Officer, The City Planning and Development Coordinator and the
Assistance City Planning and Development Coordinator) organized by the City of Davao revealed that there was no
scientific evidence to support the clamor for the ban against aerial spraying; that furthermore, national government
agencies like the Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Health (DOR) and the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) similarly concluded that there was no scientific evidence to support the ban;60 that for four decades since the
adoption of aerial spraying, there has been no reported outbreak or any predisposition to ailment connected with the
pesticides applied; that the testimonies of the residents during the trial were mere "emotional anecdotal evidence" that
did not establish any scientific or medical bases of any causal connection between the alleged health conditions
complained of and the fungicides applied during aerial spraying;61 that the allegations of health and environmental harm
brought by the pesticides used to treat the banana plantations were unfounded; that the 2001 study of the International
Agency for Research on Cancer showed that, contrary to the claim of Dra. Panganiban, the by-product of Mancozeb
(Ethylenethiourea or ETU) was "non-genotoxic" and not expected to produce thyroid cancer;62 that Carlos Mendoza, a
geo-hydrologist and geophysicist, testified that underground water contamination through aerial spraying would be
impossible because of the presence of latex, thick layers of clay and underlying rock formations;63 that even the study
conducted by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) showed that the rhinoceros beetle infestation in coconut plantations
adjacent to the banana plantations was due to the farmer's failure to observe phyto-sanitary measures, not to aerial
spraying;64 that furthermore, aerial spraying is internationally accepted as a "Good Agricultural Practice" (GAP) 65 under
the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides by the United Nations-Food and Agricultural
Organization (UN-FAO); that as such, they observe the standards laid down by the UN-FAO, and utilize aerial spraying
equipment that will ensure accuracy, safety and efficiency in applying the substances, and which more than complies with
the requirement under the Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001);66 that in addition,
they strictly observe standard operating procedures prior to take-off,67 in-flight68 and post-flight;69 that they substantially
invested in state-of-the-art technology and equipment designed to ensure safety, accuracy, and effectiveness of aerial
spraying operations, to avoid aerial drift;70 that their equipment include: wind meters (to measure the wind velocity in a
specific area), wind cones (to determine the wind direction, and whether the wind is a headwind, tailwind or a crosswind);
central weather station (to measure wind speed, the temperature and relative humidity), Differential Global Positioning
System (DGPS),71 Intellimap,72 Control and Display Unit,73 Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers (AU 5000 Low-Drift
model),74 Intelliflow Spray Valve System,75 and Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System;76 and that they want to minimize,
if not, eliminate the occurrence of spray drift in order to minimize wastage of resources and reduced efficiency of spraying
programs implemented to control the Black Sigatoka disease.77chanrobleslaw

The respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0309-07 will regulate aerial spraying as a method of application, instead of
the substances being used therein; that the prohibition is overbroad in light of other available reasonable measures that
may be resorted to by the local government; that the ordinance is unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, and tantamount to a
restriction or prohibition of trade;78 that the ordinance will effectively impose a prohibition against all pesticides, including
fungicides that fall under the mildest type of substance; that as such, the petitioner has disregarded existing valid and
substantive classifications established and recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) that are adopted by the
FPA; that the FPA is the national agency armed with the professional competence, technical expertise, and legal mandate
to deal with the issue of use and application of pesticides in our country; that the fungicides they administer are duly
registered with the FPA, and with other more developed countries that have observed a stricter environmental and public
health regulation such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the European Union (EU); that as
such, the City of Davao has disregarded valid, substantial and significant distinctions between levels of concentration of
the fungicides in the water solution aerially sprayed; that it is the FPA that regulates the level of concentration of
agricultural chemicals prior to commercial distribution and use in the country; that the members of PBGEA only spray a
water solution (water cocktail) containing 0.1 liter to 1.5 liters of the active ingredient of fungicide in a 30-liter water
solution per hectare that has undergone rigorous testing and .evaluation prior to registration by the FPA; that the active
ingredients of the fungicide are so diluted that no harm may be posed to public health or to the environment through
aerial application;79 that the ordinance was so broad that it prohibits aerial application of any substance, including
water;80 and that aside from fungicides, the respondents also aerially apply vitamins, minerals and organic
fertilizers.81chanrobleslaw

The respondents submit that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 5 of the ordinance constitutes
an improper exercise of police power; that the ordinance will require all landholdings to maintain the buffer zone, thereby
diminishing to a mere 1,600 square meters of usable and productive land for every hectare of the plantation bounding
residential areas, with the zone being reserved for planting "diversified trees;" that this requirement amounts to taking
without just compensation or due process; and that the imposition of the buffer zone unduly deprives all landowners
within the City of Davao the beneficial use of their property;82 that the precautionary principle cannot be applied blindly,
because its application still requires some scientific basis; that the principle is also based on a mere declaration that has
not even reached the level of customary international law, not on a treaty binding on the Government.83chanrobleslaw

The respondents argue that the illegality of the transition period results in the invalidity of the ordinance as it does not
carry a separability clause; and that the absence of such clause signifies the intention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
City of Davao to make the ordinance effective as a whole.84chanrobleslaw

The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying
as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other
modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under
Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling of the Court

We deny the petitions for review for their lack of merit.

I
Preliminary considerations:
The significant role of the banana industry
in ensuring economic stability and food security

There is no question that the implementation of Ordinance No. 0309-07, although the ordinance concerns the imposition
of the ban against aerial spraying in all agricultural lands within Davao City, will inevitably have a considerable impact on
the country's banana industry, particularly on export trading.

Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance of the country's economic, stability and food security.
Banana is a consistent dollar earner and the fourth largest produced commodity in the Philippines.85 In 2010, the
Philippines figured among the top three banana producing countries in the world.86 In 2014, fresh bananas accounted for
17% of the country's top agricultural export commodities, gaining a close second to coconut oil with 18%.87 The Davao
Region (Region XI)88 was the top banana producing region in 2013, with a production growth rate of 16.4%, and 33.76%
share in the total agricultural output of the Region.89chanrobleslaw

Despite these optimistic statistics, the banana industry players struggle to keep up with the demands of the trade by
combatting the main threat to production posed by two major fungal diseases: the Panama Disease Tropical Race 4
(Fusarium oxysprum f.sp. cubense) and the Black Sigatoka leaf spot disease (Mycosphaerella ffiensis morelet). Pesticides
have proven to be effective only against the Black Sigatoka disease. There is yet no known cure for the Panama
disease.90chanrobleslaw

The menace of the Black Sigatoka disease cannot be taken lightly. The disease causes destruction of the plant by
significantly reducing the leaf area, leading to premature ripening of the produce and resulting in yield losses of at least
50%.91 Due to its effects on banana export trading, the disease has emerged as a global concern that has correspondingly
forced banana producers to increase the use of chemical pesticides.92 Protectant fungicides such as Mancozeb,
chlorothalonil and Propiconazole are applied to combat the disease.93 These agricultural chemicals are aerially applied by
the respondents in the banana plantations within the jurisdiction of Davao City to arrest the proliferation of the disease.

Considering that banana export plantations exist in vast monocultures, effective treatment of the Black Sigatoka disease
is done by frequent aerial application of fungicides. This is an expensive practice because it requires permanent landing
strips, facilities for the mixing and loading of fungicides, and high recurring expense of spray materials.94 The cost of aerial
spraying accounts to 15-20% of the final retail price of the crop, making the technology essentially unavailable to small
landholdings that are more vulnerable to the disease.95chanrobleslaw

Aerial spraying has become an agricultural practice in Davao City since the establishment of the banana plantations in
1960.96 Out of the 5,205 hectares of commercial plantations devoted to Cavendish banana being operated by the
respondents in Davao City,97 around 1,800 hectares receive treatment through aerial application. These plantations are
situated in Barangays Sirib, Manuel Guianga, Tamayong, Subasta Dacudao, Lasang, Mandug, Waan, Tigatto and
Callawa,98 and are affected by the ban imposed by Ordinance No. 0309-07. The DTI has issued a statement to the effect
that the ban against aerial spraying in banana plantations "is expected to kill the banana industry," affects the socio-
economic development of the barangays hosting the affected plantations, and has a disastrous impact on export trading.
The DTI has forecasted that the ban would discourage the entry of new players in the locality, which would have a potential
drawback in employment generation.99chanrobleslaw

II
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07
under its corporate powers
The petitioners assert that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid act of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City- pursuant to its
delegated authority to exercise police power in the furtherance of public welfare and in ensuring a sound and balanced
environment for its constituents. The respondents negate this assertion, describing the ordinance as unreasonable,
discriminatory and oppressive.

The petitioners' assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07 is upheld.

To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether
the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy).100chanrobleslaw

The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53101 and Section 54102 of The Local Government Code.
These provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and
to be presented to the mayor for approval. With no issues regarding quorum during its deliberation having been raised,
and with its approval of by City Mayor Duterte not being disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-
07 for non-compliance with the formal requisites under the Local Government Code.

We next ascertain whether the City of Davao acted within the limits of its corporate powers in enacting Ordinance No.
0309-07.

The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order to promote the general welfare.103 Such legislative
powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The
General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local
government unit to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain
local autonomy.104 Section 16 reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general legislative power and the police power
proper. General legislative power refers to the power delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or
the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case of Dayao City,105 to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and
make regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the power must
be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and duties legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police
power proper, on the other hand, authorizes the local government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its
constituents, and for the protection of their property.106chanrobleslaw

Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with the authority to enact legislation
.aimed at promoting the general welfare, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of
the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code. x x x
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the local government unit takes its
cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local Government
Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents
and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government
unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an ordinance that
seeks to protect the health and well-being of its constituents.

The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-07 on the ground that the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao
City has disregarded the health of the plantation workers, contending that by imposing the ban against aerial spraying the
ordinance would place the plantation workers at a higher health risk because the alternatives of either manual or truck-
boom spraying method would be adopted; and that exposing the workers to the same risk sought to be prevented by the
ordinance would defeat its purported purpose.

We disagree with the respondents.

With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation workers are secured by existing state
policies, rules and regulations implemented by the FPA, among others, which the respondents are lawfully bound to
comply with. The respondents even manifested their strict compliance with these rules, including those in the UN-FAO
Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001). We should note that the Rome 2001
guidelines require the pesticide applicators to observe the standards provided therein to ensure the health and safety of
plantation workers. As such, there cannot be any imbalance between the right to health of the residents vis-a-vis the
workers even if a ban will be imposed against aerial spraying and the consequent adoption of other modes of pesticide
treatment.

Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental integrity are privileges that do not only
advance the interests of a group of individuals. The benefits of protecting human health and the environment transcend
geographical locations and even generations. This is the essence of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution.
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.107 we declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance
should be appreciated.

Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide
drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces
of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not
be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate.
A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.

By distinguishing authority from method we face this question: Is a prohibition against aerial spraying a lawfully
permissible method that the local government unit of Davao City may adopt to prevent the purported effects of aerial
drift? To resolve this question, the Court must dig deeper into the intricate issues arising from these petitions.

II
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law.108 In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with
the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be
fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.109chanrobleslaw

In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the Government.110 A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.111 The first requirement
refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.112chanrobleslaw

Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's
action.113 This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate
public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing
the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.114chanrobleslaw

The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets the
effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate
time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the
Black Sigatoka disease.

The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering the urgency of protecting the health of the residents.

We find for the respondents.

The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three months can readily be
appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall,
even the RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying within three months in view
of the costly financial and civil works required for the conversion.115 In the assailed decision, the CA appropriately
observed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There appears to be three (3) forms of ground spraying, as distinguished from aerial spraying, which are: 1. "Truck-
mounted boom spraying;" 2. "manual or backpack spraying." and 3. "sprinkler spraying." Petitioners-appellants claim that
it was physically impossible for them to shift to "truck-mounted boom spraying" within three (3) months before the aerial
spraying ban is actually enforced. They cited the testimony of Dr. Maria Emilia Rita G. Fabregar, Ph.D, PBGEA Chairperson,
to the effect that since banana plantations in Davao City were configured for aerial spraying, the same lack the road
network to make "truck-mounted boom spraying" possible. According to Dr. Fabregar, it was impossible to construct such
road networks in a span of three (3) months. Engr. Magno P. Porticos, Jr., confirmed that the shift demands the
construction of three hundred sixty (360) linear kilometers of road which cannot be completed in three (3) months.

In their separate testimonies, Dr. Fabregar and Engr. Porticos explained that a shift to "truck-mounted boom spraying"
requires the following steps which may be completed in three (3) years:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. six (6) months for planning the reconfiguration of banana plantations to ensure effective truck-mounted boom spraying
for the adequate protections of the plantations from the Black Sigatoka fungus and other diseases, while maximizing land
use;

2. two (2) months to secure government permits for infrastructure works to be undertaken thereon;

3. clearing banana plants and dismantling or reconstructing fixed infrastructures, such as roads, drains, cable ways, and
irrigation facilities, which phase may be completed in eighteen (18) months;

4. importation and purchase of trucks mounted with boom spraying, nurse trucks and protective gears. The placing of
orders and delivery of these equipments, including the training [of] the personnel who would man the same, would take
six (6) months; and cralawlawlibrary

5. securing the needed capitalization to finance these undertakings would take six (6) months to a year.
Ms. Maria Victoria E. Sembrano, CPA, Chairperson of the PBGEA Finance Committee, testified that her committee and the
Technical Committee and Engineering Group of PBGEA conducted a feasibility study to determine the cost in undertaking
the shift to ground spraying. Their findings fixed the estimated cost for the purpose at Php 400 Million.
x x x x

Both appellees failed to rebut the foregoing testimonies with empirical findings to the contrary.

x x x x

Thus, in view of the infrastructural requirements as methodically explained, We are convinced that it was physically
impossible for petitioners-appellants to carry out a carefully planned configuration of vast hectares of banana plantations
and be able to actually adopt "truck-mounted boom spraying" within three (3) months. To compel petitioners-appellants
to abandon aerial spraying in favor of "manual or backpack spraying" or "sprinkler spraying" within 3 months puts
petitioners-appellants in a vicious dilemma between protecting its investments and the health of its workers, on the one
hand, and the threat of prosecution if they refuse to comply with the imposition. We even find the 3-months transition
period insufficient, not only in acquiring and gearing-up the plantation workers of safety appurtenances, but more
importantly in reviewing safety procedures for "manual or backpack spraying" and in training such workers for the
purpose. Additionally, the engineering works for a sprinkler system in vast hectares of banana plantations could not
possibly be completed within such period, considering that safety and efficiency factors need to be considered in its
structural re-designing.

x x x x

Respondent-appellee argues that the Ordinance merely banned an agricultural practice and did not actually prohibit the
operation of banana plantations; hence, it is not oppressive. While We agree that the measure did not impose a closure
of a lawful enterprise, the proviso in Section 5, however, compels petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying
without affording them enough time to convert and adopt other spraying practices. This would preclude petitioners-
appellants from being able to fertilize their plantations with essential vitamins and minerals substances, aside from
applying thereon the needed fungicides or pesticides to control, if not eliminate the threat of, plant diseases. Such an
apparent eventuality would prejudice the operation of the plantations, and the economic repercussions thereof would
just be akin to shutting down the venture.

This Court, therefore, finds Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 an invalid provision because the compulsion thereunder
to abandon aerial spraying within an impracticable period of "three (3) months after the effectivity of this Ordinance" is
"unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with."116chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and
financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.117 As such, the conversion could
not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals
to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment
and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due
process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of
the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,118 we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially
divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is a
restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that
the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the
guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property.

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was held that a taking also could be found if government regulation
of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.

No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require
that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as
a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view,
equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make
the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings
clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking
nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the
character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner.
(bold Emphasis supplied)
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial spraying within and
near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified
buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation.
A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically
beneficial or productive uses of the land. The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of
their landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer
zones.

III
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its supposed collision with the Equal Protection
Clause. The respondents submit that the ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by
prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied;
and (2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the
landholding.

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State
governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the
legitimate governmental objective.119chanrobleslaw

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction,120 nor intends
to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.121 The
guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. 122 If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another.123 In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the
class.124chanrobleslaw

Based on these parameters, we find for the respondents.

The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the Government for its conduct is gauged by
using the means-end test.125 This test requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise,
as distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means employed that are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon individuals.126 To determine the propriety of the
classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.

The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that the classification
reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.127 The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics or social
welfare,128 or to any other case not involving a suspect class.129chanrobleslaw

When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or heightened
review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny.130To survive intermediate scrutiny,
the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the
justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.131chanrobleslaw

The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the burden
to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means
to protect such interest.132chanrobleslaw

The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular, the petitioning residents of Davao City argue that the CA
erroneously applied the strict scrutiny approach when it declared that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the ban included all substances including water and vitamins. The respondents agree with the CA, however, and
add that the ordinance does not rest on a valid distinction because it has lacked scientific basis and has ignored the
classifications of pesticides observed by the FPA.

We partly agree with both parties.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the
rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance;
and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable
distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law.133chanrobleslaw

Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed in relation to the group of
individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the
classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on purpose
(elimination of the mischief). The legislative classification found in Section 4 of the ordinance refers to "all agricultural
entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the classification based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily
discerned because the ordinance does not make any express or implied reference to it. We have to search the voluminous
records of this case to divine the animus behind the action of the Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial spraying
as an agricultural activity. The effort has led uS to the following proposed resolution of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod,134viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. ____
Series of 2007

A RESOLUTION TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL

AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY

WHEREAS, the City of Davao, with fertile lands and ideal climactic condition, hosts various large farms planted with
different crops;

WHEREAS, these farms, lay adjacent to other agricultural businesses and that residential areas abuts these farm
boundaries;

WHEREAS, aerial spraying as a mode of applying chemical substances such as fungicides and pesticides is being used by
investors/companies over large agricultural plantations in Davao City;

WHEREAS, the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources, located within and adjacent to Mount Apo may be
affected by the aerial spraying of chemical substances on the agricultural farms and plantations therein;

WHEREAS, the effects of aerial spraying are found to be detrimental to the health of the residents of Davao City most
especially the inhabitants nearby agricultural plantations practicing aerials spraying;

WHEREAS, the unstable wind direction during the conduct of aerial spray application of these chemical substances pose
health hazards to people, animals, other crops and ground water sources;

WHEREAS, in order to achieve sustainable development, politics must be based on the Precautionary Principle.
Environment measures must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are
threats of serious, irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures
to prevent environmental degradation;

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the City of Davao to ensure the safety of its inhabitants from all forms of hazards, especially
if such hazards come from development activities that are supposed to be beneficial to everybody;

WHEREAS, pesticides are by its nature poisonous, it is all the more dangerous when dispensed aerially through aircraft
because of unstable wind conditions which in turn makes aerial spray drifting to unintended targets a commonplace.

WHEREAS, aerial spraying of pesticides is undeniably a nuisance.

WHEREAS, looking at the plight of the complainants and other stakeholders opposed to aerial spraying, the issue of aerial
spraying of pesticides is in all fours a nuisance. Given the vastness of the reach of aerial spraying, the said form of
dispensation falls into the category of a public nuisance. Public nuisance is defined by the New Civil Code as one which
affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.

WHEREAS, the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code empowers Local Government Units to enact
ordinances that provide for the health and safety, promote the comfort and convenience of the City and the inhabitants
thereof.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that for the health, safety and peace of mind of all the
inhabitants of Davao City, let an ordinance be enacted banning aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural
entities in Davao City.

xxxx
The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance because of the unstable wind direction
during the aerial application, which (1) could potentially contaminate the Davao City watersheds and ground water
sources; (2) was detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most especially those living in the. nearby plantations;
and (3) posed a hazard to animals and other crops. Plainly, the mischief that the prohibition sought to address was the
fungicide drift resulting from the aerial application; hence, the classification based on the intent of the proposed ordinance
covered all agricultural entities conducting aerial spraying of fungicides that caused drift.

The assailed ordinance thus becomes riddled with several distinction issues.

A brief discussion on the occurrence of the drift that the ordinance seeks to address is necessary.

Pesticide treatment is based on the use of different methods of application and equipment, 135 the choice of which
methods depend largely on the objective of distributing the correct dose to a defined target with the minimum of wastage
due to "drift."136 The term "drift" refers to the movement of airborne spray droplets, vapors, or dust particles away from
the target area during pesticide application.137 Inevitably, any method of application causes drift, which may either be
primary or secondary. As fittingly described by scholars:138
Primary drift is the off-site movement of spray droplets at, or very close to, the time of application. For example, a field
application using a boom in a gusty wind situation could easily lead to a primary drift. Primary spray drift is not product
specific, and the active ingredients do not differ in their potential to drift. However, the type of formulation, surfactant,
or other adjuvant may affect spray drift potential.

Secondary drift is associated with pesticide vapor. Pesticide vapor drift is the movement of the gas that forms when an
active ingredient evaporates from plants, soil, or other surfaces. And while vapor drift is an important issue, it only pertains
to certain volatile products. Vapor drift and other forms of secondary drift are product specific. Water-based sprays will
volatize more quickly than oil-based sprays. However, oil-based sprays can drift farther, especially above 95°F, because
they are lighter.
Understandably, aerial drift occurs using any method of application, be it through airplanes, ground sprayers, airblast
sprayers or irrigation systems.139 Several factors contribute to the occurrence of drift depending on the method of
application, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
AERIAL AIRBLAST GROUND CHEMIGATION

Droplet size Crop canopy Droplet size Application height

Application height Droplet size Boom height Wind speed

Wind speed Wind speed Wind speed

Swath adjustment

Canopy

Boom length
 Tank mix physical properties
Source: F.M. Fishel and J.A. Ferrell, "Managing Pesticide Drift," available at http://edis.ifas.edu/pi232. citing Pesticide
Notes, MSU Extension.

The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are aerial, truck-mounted boom, truck-
mounted mechanical, and manual spraying.140 However, Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against
aerial spraying.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience
and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the
requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?

We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide
application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.141 A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.142 In the process, the ordinance suffers from
being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the
law seeks to eliminate.143 A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as
an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.144chanrobleslaw

The claim that aerial spraying produces more aerial drift cannot likewise be sustained in view of the petitioners' failure to
substantiate the same. The respondents have refuted this claim, and have maintained that on the contrary, manual
spraying produces more drift than aerial treatment145 As such, the decision of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted
with arbitrariness.

Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be "overinclusive" because its .impending
implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its
implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those included in the intended
class based on the purpose of the law.146chanrobleslaw

It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to
be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents admit that they aerially
treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances. The imposition of the ban against
aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the agricultural activity being performed becomes
unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and
environmental danger which the ordinance, seeks to address. The burden now will become more onerous to various
entities including the respondents and even others with no connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the
ordinance.

In this respect, the CA correctly observed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ordinance No. 0309-07 defines "aerial spraying" as the "application of substances through the use of aircraft of any form
which dispenses the substances in the air." Inevitably, the ban imposed therein encompasses aerial application of
practically all substances, not only pesticides or fungicides but including water and all forms of chemicals, regardless of its
elements, composition, or degree of safety.

Going along with respondent-appellee's ratiocination that the prohibition in the Ordinance refers to aerial spraying as a
method of spraying pesticides or fungicides, there appears to be a need to single out pesticides or fungicides in imposing
such a ban because there is a striking distinction between such chemicals and other substances (including water),
particularly with respect to its safety implications to the public welfare and ecology.
x x x x

We are, therefore, convinced that the total ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it
does not classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be
made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the
environment.147chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We clarify that the CA did not thereby apply the strict scrutiny approach but only evaluated the classification established
by the ordinance in relation to the purpose. This is the essence of the rational basis approach.

The petitioners should be made aware that the rational basis scrutiny is not based on a simple means-purpose correlation;
nor does the rational basis scrutiny automatically result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance or deference to the
wisdom of the local legislature.148 To reiterate, aside from ascertaining that the means and purpose of the ordinance are
reasonably related, the classification should be based on a substantial distinction.

However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position that there must be a distinction based on the level of
concentration or the classification imposed by the FPA on pesticides. This strenuous requirement cannot be expected
from a local government unit that should only be concerned with general policies in local administration and should not
be restricted by technical concerns that are best left to agencies vested with the appropriate special competencies. The
disregard of the pesticide classification is not an equal protection issue but is more relevant in another aspect of delegated
police power that we consider to be more appropriate in a later discussion.

The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section 6 by virtue of its requirement for the
maintenance of the 30- meter buffer zone. This requirement applies regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding,
geographical location, topography, crops grown and other distinguishing characteristics that ideally should bear a
reasonable relation to the evil sought to be avoided. As earlier discussed, only large banana plantations could rely on aerial
technology because of the financial capital required therefor.

The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more burdensome to the small agricultural
landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding their property; (2) that will have to be
identified through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to be plotted in a survey plan for submission
to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the crops that may be cultivated therein based on the mandate
that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified trees" taller than what are being grown therein.149 The arbitrariness of
Section 6 all the more becomes evident when the land is presently devoted to the cultivation of root crops and vegetables,
and trees or plants slightly taller than the root crops and vegetables are then to be planted. It is seriously to be doubted
whether such circumstance will prevent the occurrence of the drift to the nearby residential areas.

Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural entities engaging in organic farming, and' do
not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The classification indisputably becomes arbitrary and whimsical.

A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental claim that the
classification serves legitimate political ends.150 Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a
greater discriminatory or burdensome effect than necessary.151 In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.

The discriminatory nature of the ordinance can be seen from its policy as stated in its Section 2, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. It shall be the policy of the City of Davao to eliminate the method of aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within Davao City.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for the investment of
machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected individuals the technology aimed
at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition
against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology
to arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their production and harvest. As earlier
shown, the effect of the ban will not be limited to Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export
trading to the country's economy.

The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and unreasonable in light of the existence and
availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden the respondents and those dependent
on their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the ordinance. In the view of Regional Director Roger C.
Chio of DA Regional Field Unit XI, the alleged harm caused by aerial spraying may be addressed by following the GAP that
the DA has been promoting among plantation operators. He explained his view thusly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The allegation that aerial spraying is hazardous to animal and human being remains an allegation and assumptions until
otherwise scientifically proven by concerned authorities and agencies. This issue can be addressed by following Good
Agricultural Practices, which DA is promoting among fruit and vegetable growers/plantations. Any method of agri-
chemical application whether aerial or non-aerial if not properly done in accordance with established procedures and
code of good agricultural practices and if the chemical applicators and or handlers lack of necessary competency, certainly
it could be hazardous. For the assurance that commercial applicators/aerial applicators possessed the competency and
responsibility of handling agri-chemical, such applicators are required under Article III, Paragraph 2 of FPA Rules and
Regulation No. 1 to secure license from FPA.

Furthermore users and applicators of agri-chemicals are also guided by Section 6 Paragraph 2 and 3 under column of
Pesticides and Other agricultural Chemicals of PD 11445 which stated: "FPA shall establish and enforce tolerance levels
and good agricultural practices in raw agricultural commodities; to restrict or ban the use of any chemical or the
formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain period upon evidence that the pesticide is eminent [sic]
hazards has caused, or is causing widespread serious damage to crops, fish, livestock or to public health and environment."

Besides the aforecited policy, rules and regulation enforced by DA, there are other laws and regulations protecting and
preserving the environment. If the implementation and monitoring of all these laws and regulation are closely coordinated
with concerned LGUs, Gas and NGAs and other private sectors, perhaps we can maintain a sound and health environment
x x x.152chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, based on the Summary Report on the Assessment and Factfinding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in
Banana Plantations,153 submitted by the fact-finding team organized by Davao City, only three out of the 13 barangays
consulted by the fact-finding team opposed the conduct of aerial spraying; and of the three barangays, aerial spraying was
conducted only in Barangay Subasta. In fact, the fact-finding team found that the residents in those barangays were
generally in favor of the operations of the banana plantations, and did not oppose the conduct of aerial spraying.

IV
The Precautionary Principle still requires scientific basis

The petitioners finally plead that the Court should look at the merits of the ordinance based on the precautionary principle.
They argue that under the precautionary principle, the City of Davao is justified in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in order
to prevent harm to the environment and human health despite the lack of scientific certainty.

The petitioners' plea and argument cannot be sustained.

The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In the 1980s, the Federal Republic of
Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip ("foresight principle") to justify the implementation of vigorous policies to tackle acid
rain, global warming and pollution of the North Sea.154 It has since emerged from a need to protect humans and the
environment from increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but possibly catastrophic risks such as those
associated with Genetically Modified Organisms and climate change,155 among others. The oft-cited Principle 15 of the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992 Rio Agenda), first embodied this principle, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Principle 15

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-
6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect.156 In such an event, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting
either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment.157chanrobleslaw

It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three elements,
namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is
relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the
probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the
precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of environmental harm; or if the threatened harm is trivial
or easily reversible.158chanrobleslaw

We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no scientific study. Although the
precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between the serious or
irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a
necessary basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle.159chanrobleslaw

Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes place. This scientific stage is often
considered synonympus with risk assessment.160 As such, resort to the principle shall not be based on anxiety or emotion,
but from a rational decision rule, based in ethics.161 As much as possible, a complete and objective scientific evaluation of
the risk to the environment or health should be conducted and made available to decision-makers for them to choose the
most appropriate course of action.162Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an activity is also important in the
application of the principle. The potential harm resulting from certain activities should always be judged in view of the
potential benefits they offer, while the positive and negative effects of potential precautionary measures should be
considered.163chanrobleslaw

The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the Summary Report on the Assessment
and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations.164 Yet, the fact-finding team that
generated the report was not a scientific study that could justify the resort to the .precautionary principle. In fact, the
Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-finding team that recommended only a regulation,
not a ban, against aerial spraying. The recommendation was in line with the advocacy of judicious handling and application
of chemical pesticides by the DOH-Center for Health Development in the Davao Region in view of the scarcity of scientific
studies to support the ban against aerial spraying.165chanrobleslaw

We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known
of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the residents within and near the
plantations and to the integrity and balance of the environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of
aerial spraying would be adverse even in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban
on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for being unreasonable.

V
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act

The Court further holds that in addition to its unconstitutionality for carrying an unwarranted classification that
contravenes the Equal Protection Clause, Ordinance No. 0309-07 suffers from another legal infirmity.

The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of legislative and police powers by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to Section 458 in relation to Section 16 both of the Local Government Code.
The respondents counter that Davao City thereby disregarded the regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA), including its identification and classification of safe pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
We uphold the respondents.

An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature
of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject, and necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well-being of the people.166chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its general welfare provisions. The policy of
liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of local autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient
power and discretion to accelerate their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.

Verily, the Court has championed the cause of public welfare on several occasions. In so doing, it has accorded liberality
to the general welfare provisions of the Local Government Code by upholding the validity of local ordinances enacted for
the common good. For instance, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.,167 the Court validated a zoning ordinance that
reclassified areas covered by a large oil depot from industrial to commercial in order to ensure the life, health and property
of the inhabitants residing within the periphery of the oil depot. Another instance is Gancayco v. City Government of
Quezon City,168 where the Court declared as valid a city ordinance ordering the construction of arcades that would ensure
the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants, improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience, as well as the promotion of their prosperity. Even in its early years, the Court already extended liberality
towards the exercise by the local government units; of their legislative powers in order to promote the general welfare of
their communities. This was exemplified in United States v. Salaveria,169 wherein gambling was characterized as "an act
beyond the pale of good morals" that the local legislative council could validly suppress to protect the well-being of its
constituents; and in United States v. Abendan,170 whereby the right of the then Municipality of Cebu to enact an ordinance
relating to sanitation and public health was upheld.

The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an invincible authority. In
fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness and consistency of the exercise by the local government
units with the laws or policies of the State.171 More importantly, because the police power of the local government units
flows from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt
or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the power should be construed against the local legislative
units.172 Judicial scrutiny comes into play whenever the exercise of police power affects life, liberty or property.173 The
presumption of validity and the policy of liberality are not restraints on the power of judicial review in the face of questions
about whether an ordinance conforms with the Constitution, the laws or public policy, or if it is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. The ordinance must pass the test of constitutionality and the
test of consistency with the prevailing laws.174chanrobleslaw

Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with sufficient power to govern themselves and
manage their affairs and activities, they definitely have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State's laws and
policy. The Local Government Code has been fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to guide each
local government unit in exercising its delegated powers with the view of making the local government unit a fully
functioning subdivision of the State within the constitutional and statutory restraints.175 The Local Government Code is
not intended to vest in the local government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper
to legislate upon in the guise of serving the common good.

The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the jurisdiction of the FPA under Presidential
Decree No. 1144.176 The FPA was established in recognition of the need for a technically oriented government
entity177 that will protect the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides.178 To perform its mandate, it was given
under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1144 the following powers and functions with respect to pesticides and other
agricultural chemicals, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 6. Powers and functions. The FPA shall have jurisdiction, on over all existing handlers of pesticides, fertilizers and
other agricultural chemical inputs. The FPA shall have the following powers and functions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x

III. Pesticides and Other Agricultural Chemicals

1. To determine specific uses or manners of use for each pesticide or pesticide formulation;

2. To establish and enforce levels and good agricultural practices for use of pesticides in raw agricultural commodities;

3. To restrict or ban the use of any pesticide or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain
periods upon evidence that the pesticide is an imminent hazard, has caused, or is causing widespread serious damage to
crops, fish or livestock, or to public health and environment;

x x x x

5. To inspect the establishment and premises of pesticide handlers to insure that industrial health and safety rules and
anti-pollution regulations are followed;

6. To enter and inspect farmers' fields to ensure that only the recommended pesticides are used in specific crops in
accordance with good agricultural practice;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the usage and the application of pesticides in
agricultural activities and the demands for human health and environmental safety. This responsibility includes not only
the identification of safe and unsafe pesticides, but also the prescription of the safe modes of application in keeping with
the standard of good agricultural practices.

On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the local government units do not include the regulation and
control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.179 The non-inclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City from enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07, for otherwise it would be arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit
the aerial application of pesticides in derogation of the authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree No.
1144.

In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the City of Davao performed
an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act
should always conform to and reflect the will of its principal.180 As clarified in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:181
[W]here the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the
subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the
same conduct. In Keller vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality
authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a
municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the
legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated
the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for this view is that
such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.

Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU
cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.

It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An
ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The
principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot
adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to
pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the
general law.182 (Emphasis ours)
For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from Congress. In no instance can the local
government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its ordinance cannot run against or contravene existing laws,
precisely because its authority is only by virtue of the valid delegation from Congress. As emphasized in City of Manila v.
Laguio, Jr.:183
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units
are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of
the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.184chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered by the jurisdiction of the FPA, which
has issued its own regulations under its Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 2009, entitled Good Agricultural Practices
for Aerial Spraying of Fungicide in Banana Plantations.185 While Ordinance No. 0309-07 prohibits aerial spraying in banana
plantations within the City of Davao, Memorandum Circular No. 02 seeks to regulate the conduct of aerial spraying in
banana plantations186pursuant to Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1144, and in conformity with the standard of Good
Agricultural Practices (GAP). Memorandum Circular No. 02 covers safety procedures,187 handling188 and post-
application,189 including the qualifications of applicators,190 storing of fungicides,191 safety and equipment of plantation
personnel,192 all of which are incompatible with the prohibition against aerial spraying under Ordinance No. 0309-07.

Although Memorandum Circular No. 02 and Ordinance No. 0309-07 both require the maintenance of the buffer zone, they
differ as to their treatment and maintenance of the buffer zone. Under Memorandum Circular No. 02, a 50-meter "no-
spray boundary" buffer zone should be observed by the spray pilots,193and the observance of the zone should be recorded
in the Aerial Spray Final Report (ASFR) as a post-application safety measure.194 On the other hand, Ordinance No. 0309-07
requires the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone to be planted with diversified trees.195chanrobleslaw

Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact
Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also for being an ultra vires act on the part
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City.

We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their right to regulate activities within their
jurisdiction. They are empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Codeto promote the general welfare of the
people through regulatory, not prohibitive, ordinances that conform with the policy directions of the National
Government. Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as it contravenes the specific regulatory policy on aerial
spraying in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of the National Government, through the FPA.

Finally, the unconstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07 in its entirety. Consequently, any
discussion on the lack of the separability clause becomes entirely irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-
07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY ENJOINS respondent City of Davao, and all persons or entities acting in its behalf
or under its authority, from enforcing and implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
G.R. No. 230170, June 06, 2018

MA. SUGAR M. MERCADO AND SPOUSES REYNALDO AND YOLANDA MERCADO, Petitioners, v.HON.JOEL SOCRATES S.
LOPENA [PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 33, QUEZON CITY], HON. JOHN BOOMSRI S.
RODOLFO [PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, QUEZON CITY], HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY
[PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 90, QUEZON CITY], HON. ROBERTO P. BUENAVENTURA
[PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 86, QUEZON CITY], HON. JOSE L. BAUTISTA, JR. [PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 107, QUEZON CITY], HON. VITALIANO AGUIRRE II (IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE), BON. DONALD LEE (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
OF QUEZON CITY), KRISTOFER JAY I. GO, PETER AND ESTHER GO, KENNETH ROUE I. GO, CASEY LIM JIMENEZ, CRISTINA
PALILEO, AND RUEL BALINO, Respondents.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Petition), invoking the power of the
Court "to promulgate rules concerning protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, to declare the cases filed by
private respondents against petitioners as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and therefore contrary
to the Constitution, public policy and international law and x x x repugnant to fundamental equality before the law of
women and men and the spirit and the intent of Republic Act [No.] 9262."1

Petitioner Ma. Sugar M. Mercado (Mercado) is joined herein by her parents, co-petitioners spouses Reynaldo and Yolanda
Mercado (collectively, petitioners).

Private respondent Kristofer Jay I. Go (Go) is the husband of petitioner Mercado. The other private respondents herein
are spouses Peter and Esther Go (parents of respondent Go), Kenneth Roue Go, Casey Lim Jimenez, Cristina Palileo, and
Ruel Balino (relatives and friends of respondent Go) (collectively, private respondents). Likewise impleaded herein are
public respondent judges and prosecutors presiding over various cases filed against petitioners (collectively, public
respondents).

Factual Antecedents

The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses petitioner Mercado and private respondent
Go. Such dispute eventually led to the filing of numerous suits by both parties against each other, as summarized below.

Cases filed by private respondents against petitioners

Sometime in October 2015, respondent Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody of their children, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08943. The case was raffled to and is still pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 86, which is presided by herein public respondent Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.2

Within the period of September 2015 to November 2015, private respondents also filed the following cases against
petitioners:

1. People v. Sugar Mercado and Yolanda Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-06371-CR) for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 76103;

2. People v. Yolanda Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-06372-CR) for violation of R.A. No. 7610;

3. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado-Go (NPS XV-INV-15J-11698) for Libel;

4. Kristofer Go v. Yolanda Mercado (NPS-XV-INV-15J-11699) for Libel;

 5. People v. Sugar Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-5596-98-CR) for Physical Injuries, Oral Defamation, Slander by
Deed, and Unjust Vexation; and

6. People v. Yolanda and Reynaldo Mercado (Crim. Case No. 16-09066-69) for Unjust Vexation, Unlawful Arrest,
Slight Physical Injuries, Grave Coercion.

All the cases were still pending at the time the Petition was filed, except for NPS XV-INV-151-11698, which was dismissed
by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City in a Resolution dated November 23, 2016. 4

In addition to the foregoing, beginning February 2016, private respondents initiated the following cases:

1. Kristofer Go and Christina Palileo v. Yolanda Mercado (QCOCP-NOS-INV-16A-01033) for Grave Threats;

2. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (NPS-XV-02-INV-16C-00840) for violation of R.A. No. 101755;

3. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (Civil Case No. R-QZN-16-02517-CV) for Indirect Contempt; and

4. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (Civil Case No. R-QZN-16-07881-CV) for Indirect Contempt.

Of the above cases, NPS-XV-02-INV-16C-00840 was dismissed for lack of probable cause.6

Cases filed by petitioners against private respondents

On the other hand, on November 5, 2015, petitioner Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for Issuance of Temporary and/or
Permanent Protection Order (TPO/PPO), docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201 (the PPO Case).7 The case was also
raffled to Branch 86 of the RTC of Quezon City.8 Therein, petitioner Mercado complained of several acts of respondent Go
allegedly constituting domestic violence.

At the same time, petitioner Mercado also filed a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No. 92629against respondent Go
and his parents, respondent spouses Peter and Esther Go, which was eventually dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On February 19, 2016, the RTC in the PPO case granted the petition and forthwith issued a PPO in favor of petitioner
Mercado.10 The Order granting the PPO was appealed by respondent Go to the Court of Appeals (CA) and was docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 106476.11 In a Decision dated March 3, 2017, the CA denied respondent Go's appeal.12 The CA's Decision
was then elevated to the Court via Rule 45 appeal by certiorari in G.R. No. 232206 (Kristofer Jay I. Go v. AAA), which was
denied through a Resolution dated October 2, 2017 for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA.13

Petitioner Mercado also filed several other cases against private respondents, as follows:

1. Sugar Mercado v. Kristofer Jay Go (R-QZN-16-05478-CV) for Indirect Contempt;

2. Sugar Mercado v. Krystle Anne I. Go-Cantillo (OCP NPS-INV-16H-09264) for violation of R.A. No. 10175;

3. Ma. Sugar Mercado v. Kristofer Hay Go, Peter and Esther Go (NPS-XV-03-INV-15K-12139) for violation of R.A. No.
9262; and

4. Ma. Sugar Mercado v. Kristoffer Jay Go, Peter and Esther Go (NPS-XV-INV-16C-00802 OCP) for violation of R.A. No.
9262.

The last two cases for violation of R.A. No. 9262 were eventually dismissed by the OCP of Quezon City for lack of probable
cause.14

Hence, the instant Petition.

Petitioners aver that the cases filed by private respondents against them (the subject cases) are forms of SLAPP intended
to harass, intimidate, and silence them.15 Petitioners claim that the subject cases are false and baseless complaints that
were filed to emotionally, psychologically, and financially drain them and ultimately to pressure them to give up custody
of petitioner Mercado's minor children. Petitioners also argue that the filing of the subject cases falls within the definition
of "abuse" and "violence against women" under R.A. No. 9262. In this regard, petitioners claim that public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the subject cases
even though petitioner Mercado is a "judicially declared victim of domestic violence" and in whose favor a PPO has been
issued.16

Petitioners thus pray that the Court declare the subject cases as SLAPP and for the Court to issue a TRO/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction directing public respondents to desist from conducting further hearings on the subject cases and for the
immediate dismissal of the same. Petitioners also seek the amendment of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence Against
Women and Children) to include provisions against SLAPP.

Comment of Private Respondents

On September 14, 2017, private respondents filed their Comment to the Petition.

Private respondents allege that the Petition does not satisfy the procedural requisites of judicial review and that
petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping. They likewise claim that the filing of the subject cases against petitioners was
not a violation of the PPO as some of the cases were filed prior to the issuance of the PPO on February 19, 2016.
Nonetheless, there was no pronouncement in the PPO that the filing of said cases was a violation thereof. Private
respondents further allege that the subject cases had factual and legal bases and that the enforcement of a right or seeking
redress through judicial processes does not constitute violence against women. Thus, private respondents argue that there
was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents as they were merely performing their official functions.

Comment of Public Respondents

On November 9, 2017, public respondents Vitaliano Aguirre II, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and Donald Lee, in
his capacity as Chief of the Prosecutor's Office, Quezon City, filed their Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).

Public respondents stress several procedural infirmities in the Petition, namely: (i) that the requisites for judicial review
are not present in this case; (ii) that the filing of the Petition is premature because there are other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedies available to petitioners; and (iii) that there was also a failure to observe the hierarchy of courts.

With respect to the substantive issue, public respondents further aver that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance of the subject cases as the same cannot be considered as SLAPPs because such rule applies specifically
to environmental cases only. Hence, the relief being sought by petitioners lacks legal or procedural basis.

Issues

As gathered from the submissions of the parties, the principal issue for the Court's resolution is whether public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
subject cases.

Discussion

The Petition is dismissed.

The Petition is procedurally infirm; availability of plain, speedy, and adequate remedies; failure to state material dates

At the outset, the Court finds the filing of the instant Petition premature. For a petition for certiorari or prohibition to
prosper, the Rules require that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
law.17 Here, the cases before the public respondents are still pending. Thus, there still exists in law a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy for petitioners which is to participate in said cases and await the judgment of the RTC. And, if the RTC
renders an unfavorable judgment against petitioners, they may appeal the cases to the CA. Meanwhile, as to the
complaints filed before the OCP of Quezon City, the same may be elevated via petition for review before the Secretary of
Justice and thereafter to the Office of the President; if the prosecutor's finding of probable cause is ultimately upheld, the
case may then proceed to trial.

In the same vein, petitioner Mercado is also entitled to the appropriate relief under R.A. No. 9262 in case of a violation of
the PPO dated February 19, 2016 issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201. Under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, a violation
of any provision of a PPO shall constitute Contempt of Court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules:
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. -

x x x x

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of
the acts committed.18
The Court is a court of last resort. This policy must be strictly observed so as not to unduly burden the Court with cases
that may be resolved by the lower courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction. The Court's original jurisdiction may only be
invoked when serious and important reasons exist that necessitate the same.

Furthermore, the Petition is dismissible for failure to include a statement of material dates in violation of Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46. Rule 46 provides that the following material dates must be stated in a
petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was
received, (b) the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed, and (c) the date when notice of the
denial thereof was received.19 The same provision states that the petitioner's failure to comply with said requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.20

The purpose of this requirement is to determine whether the petition was filed within the proper reglementary period. A
petition for certiorari or prohibition must be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution sought to be assailed.21

Here, out of the ten (10) subject cases, not once did petitioners allege any material date in compliance with Rule 56, much
less cite a specific order or ruling of the court or agency which they are questioning. Consequently, there is no way for the
Court to determine the timeliness of the Petition because petitioners failed to include the required statement, nor did
they attempt to satisfactorily explain their failure to do so.

Parenthetically, on the issue of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the Court finds the direct filing with the Court unwarranted
under the circumstances. Generally, a direct invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor.22 Thus, in Rama v. Moises,23 the Court
recognized the following exceptions to the strict application of the rule on hierarchy of courts:
x x x (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when
the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression; (d) when the constitutional issues
raised are best decided by this Court; (e) when the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored; x x x.24(Emphasis
supplied)
Notwithstanding the foregoing, while the Court notes that the Petition presents, at the very least, a case of first
impression, novelty alone cannot cure the inherent defects of the Petition.

Those who seek relief from the Court must comply with its rules. Procedural rules are in place for the orderly
administration of justice. Litigation may not be a mere contest of technicalities, but this does not excuse strict compliance
with the Rules of Court.25 The Court will only relax the application of the rules for the most compelling and exceptional
reasons, none of which are existent in this case. Based on the foregoing, the Petition should therefore be dismissed.

The Court's rule-making power cannot be invoked through a Rule 65 petition

Petitioners invoke the power of the Court to promulgate rules of procedure, presumably to extend the relief of SLAPP to
those cases filed against victims of domestic violence in the context of R.A. No. 9262.

Foremost, the rule-making power of the Court in matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested by
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.26 Hence, being plenary in nature, the Court cannot be called upon by a private
citizen to exercise such power in a particular manner, especially through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari or
prohibition, which is intended for an entirely different purpose.

Moreover, as discussed above, a petition filed under Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions that has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.27 Relief in such a petition merely takes the form of correcting any
error of jurisdiction committed by the tribunal or officer. Here, petitioners would want the Court to accommodate her
cause of action by granting a collateral relief that is not comprehended under the provisions of Rule 65 - or any of the
Rules, for that matter - which is to extend the concept of SLAPP to cases of violence against women and their children.

Prescinding therefrom, the Court finds no occasion under the circumstances to allow such a relief.

The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against women and children under R.A. No. 9262

The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC).28 As defined therein, a SLAPP refers to
an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or
local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal
recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental
laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.29 (Emphasis supplied)
In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed merely as a
harassment suit against environmental actions:
RULE 6

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation

x x x x

SECTION 2. SLAPP as a Defense; How Alleged. - In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of
environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an
answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, affidavits, papers and
other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim, pray for damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition showing the suit is not a SLAPP, attaching evidence
in support thereof, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of notice that an answer has been filed.

The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after issuance of the order to file an opposition within
fifteen (15) days from filing of the comment or the lapse of the period.30 (Emphases supplied)

RULE 19

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation in Criminal Cases

SECTION 1. Motion to Dismiss. - Upon the filing of an information in court and before arraignment, the accused may file
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal action is a SLAPP.

SECTION 2. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in nature. The parties must
submit all the available evidence in support of their respective positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the case must
prove by substantial evidence that his acts for the enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action for the
protection, preservation and rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action assailed as a SLAPP shall prove
by preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP.31 (Emphases supplied)
Transposed to this case, the Court finds no occasion to apply the foregoing rules as the Petition has no relation at all to
"the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights."32 R.A. No.
9262, which involves cases of violence against women and their children, is not among those laws included under the
scope of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC:
SECTION 2. Scope. - These Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the Regional
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts involving enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but
not limited to the following:
(a)
Act No. 3572, Prohibition Against Cutting of Tindalo, Akli, and Malave Trees;
(b)
P.D. No. 705, Revised Forestry Code;
(c)
P.D. No. 856, Sanitation Code;
(d)
P.D. No. 979, Marine Pollution Decree;
(e)
P.D. No. 1067, Water Code;
(f)
P.D. No. 1151, Philippine Environmental Policy of 1977;
(g)
P.D. No. 1433, Plant Quarantine Law of 1978;
(h)
P.D. No. 1586, Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System Including Other Environmental Management
Related Measures and for Other Purposes;
(i)
R.A. No. 3571, Prohibition Against the Cutting, Destroying or Injuring of Planted or Growing Trees, Flowering Plants and
Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value along Public Roads, in Plazas, Parks, School Premises or in any Other Public Ground;
(j)
R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake Development Authority Act;
(k)
R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;
(l)
R.A. No. 7076, People's Small-Scale Mining Act;
(m)
R.A. No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act including all laws, decrees, orders, proclamations and
issuances establishing protected areas;
(n)
R.A. No. 7611, Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act;
(o)
R.A. No. 7942, Philippine Mining Act;
(p)
R.A. No. 8371, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act;
(q)
R.A. No. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code;
(r)
R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
(s)
R.A. No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Management Act;
(t)
R.A. No. 9072, National Caves and Cave Resource Management Act;
(u)
R.A. No. 9147, Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act;
(v)
R.A. No. 9175, Chainsaw Act;
(w)
R.A. No. 9275, Clean Water Act;
(x)
R.A. No. 9483, Oil Spill Compensation Act of 2007; and
(y)
Provisions in C.A. No. 141, The Public Land Act; R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; R.A. No.
7160, Local Government Code of 1991; R.A. No. 7161, Tax Laws Incorporated in the Revised Forestry Code and Other
Environmental Laws (Amending the NIRC); R.A. No. 7308, Seed Industry Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High-
Value Crops Development Act; R.A. No. 8048, Coconut Preservation Act; R.A. No. 8435, Agriculture and Fisheries
Modernization Act of 1997; R.A. No. 9522, The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A. No. 9593, Renewable Energy
Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine Biofuels Act; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation, development,
preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.33 (Emphases supplied)
SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be exercised in the manner
and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body.34 Here, petitioners cannot, under the guise of
substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not available to them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making power
in their Petition, petitioners have admitted that the instant action has no basis under any of the rules promulgated by the
Court. The Court takes this occasion to remind petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-size fits-all" tool that
may be invoked in any and all instances at the whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly administration
of justice.

Further on this matter, it is highly improper for petitioners to invoke SLAPP as a defense in an original action before a
separate forum considering that the above rules clearly mandate that such a defense can only be invoked in the same
action and consequently, before the same court. Here, petitioners essentially initiated an omnibus motion before the
Court to dismiss all cases pending elsewhere. Such maneuver is patently repugnant to established procedure and thus
cannot be sanctioned by the Court.

Needless to state, the dismissal of the Petition does not mean denial of redress to the petitioners. As already discussed
above, there are still available and adequate remedies within the framework of the law and applicable rules.

The public respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion; writs of certiorari and prohibition are not available
remedies to petitioners

The writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary remedies that may be availed of when any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.35The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.36

Based on the foregoing standards, the Court finds that petitioners herein utterly failed to establish their entitlement to a
corrective writ of certiorari or prohibition.

It bears stressing that a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition seeks solely to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
merely errors of judgment made in the exercise of jurisdiction.37 In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the
subject cases fell outside of the respective jurisdictions of public respondents; there was no showing that the subject
matters of the said cases were not properly cognizable by the offices of public respondents. Instead, petitioners merely
argue that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in the taking of cognizance of the subject cases despite
the issuance of the PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado.38 This is serious error.

While the PPO indeed enjoins private respondent Go from committing acts amounting to physical, psychological, and
emotional abuse, and from harassing, annoying, contacting, or communicating with petitioner Mercado, such directive
can hardly be construed to extend to public respondents in their act of dispensing the functions of their office. There is
absolutely nothing that precludes public respondents from exercising their respective jurisdictions over the complaints
or cases filed before them; anything less would be tantamount to an abdication of their public offices.

Further, neither does the issuance of the PPO prevent private respondents from seeking redress from the courts for any
alleged offense committed by petitioners against them. The PPO granted in favor of petitioner Mercado does not and
cannot insulather from prosecution for acts committed in violation of the law, even if the action is initiated by private
respondent Go. Granted, the PPO is a directive addressed to private respondent Go; however, the latter is still entitled to
redress and be granted the reliefs he sought so long as they were based on legitimate grounds.

All told, as correctly submitted by both private and public respondents in their respective Comments, in taking cognizance
of the subject cases, public respondents were merely fulfilling their respective duties in the administration of justice. This,
the Court finds, does not amount to abuse of discretion, much less a grave one. Hence, the dismissal of the Petition must
follow.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.