chapter 9 equal protection

■Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I)

Brief Fact Summary. Black children were denied admission to schools attended by white children
under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. The children sued.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Separate but equal educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Facts. The Plaintiffs, various black children (Plaintiffs), were denied admission to schools
attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. Plaintiffs
sued, seeking admission to public schools in their communities on a nonsegregated basis.

Issue. Do separate but equal laws in the area of public education deprive black children of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution)?

Held. Yes.
Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that even if the “tangible” factors of segregated
schools are equal, to separate black children from others of similar age and qualifications solely on
the basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with respect to their status in the community
and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone.
Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is relying on the same
rationale to invalidate the segregation laws here that it did in Sweatt v. Painter (ordering the
admission of a black student to the University of Texas Law School, despite the fact that a parallel
black facility was available). The rationale is that it’s the intangible factors that make segregation
laws in the area of public education “inherently unequal.” Whether stigma or the perception of
stigma alone is sufficient injury to invalidate a law supported by a valid, neutral purpose is an
open question.

■ Yick Wo v. Hopkins
Posted on November 18, 2012 | Constitutional Law | Tags: Constitutional Law Case Brief
FACTS

The city of San Francisco passed an ordinance that required Laundromats located in wooden
buildings to have a permit. The ordinance established a board which would decide who would and
would not get the permit. The facts suggest that not a single Chinese applicant was ever granted a
permit, despite the fact that Chinese operated Laundromats constituted nearly 90% of the city’s
laundry business at the time. The Plaintiffs were held in violation of the ordinance and issued a
fine. Plaintiffs then sued under the 14th amendment, citing a violation of equal protection.

ISSUE

Does an ordinance that gives absolute discretion to a permit board that discriminates on the basis
of race in their eventual decision making violate the equal protection clause of the United States?
HOLDING/ANALYSIS

Yes, the ordinance is invalidated and the appeal ruling is overturned. The court noted that the
ordinance did not have any discrimination detectable within its text. However, its enforcement did
violate the equal protection clause because its execution was racially unequal. The court held that
the new rule should be that the Supreme Court may shoot down state or local laws that are neutral
in their text, but discriminatory in their execution.

The court wrote that the enforcement of the law was “a practical denial by the state of that equal
protection of the law,” and, as such, was a violation of the constitution. Moreover, the court also
noted that equal protection is afforded to non-citizens within US borders, as many of the Chinese
Laundromat operators were non-citizens.

■ People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera

Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Probation Law

Separation of Powers – Undue Delegation of Powers – Power to Pardon

Constitutionality of Laws – May the State Question Its Own Laws

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was
referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition
for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The
Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance
of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu
Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation
is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a
province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer –
hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC
averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the
probation law – if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation
officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed – hence, that makes it
violative of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the
option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however, the
legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power to
grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with
the issues raised by HSBC – ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State
as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which
the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had
used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning the validity of the said
law (estoppel).

ISSUE:

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been
using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the
equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by
simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer,
then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation
Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial
boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This
only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to
provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant pardon.
Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is
a power of the president to commute penalties.

■ People of the Philippines vs Cayat

68 Phil. 12 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Equal Protection – Requisites of a Valid
Classification – Bar from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any
other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was
caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00
and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or
“mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant
challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.”
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.”
On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them
rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now
enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is,
in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise
their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate
end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
■ Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)

February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those
employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or
congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in
the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to
6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.

Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting
P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and
excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e.
being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.

[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied
only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance
does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion,
thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable
aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval
of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of
50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human
right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or
denial of an alien employment permit fee.

■ Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado

227 SCRA 703 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection –
Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege
granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal
service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence,
the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a
result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is
the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in
contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at
once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including
those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may
or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by
violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from
other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely
relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age,
would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all
others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need
on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.