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SUPERLATIVE VIRTUE: THE PROBLEM OF
MONARCHY IN ARISTOTLE'S 'POLITICS'
W. R. NEWELL
ofNebraska-Lincoln
University
ECENT interpreters
of Aristotle'swritingshope to findin them a
communitarian alternative to contemporary liberalism. Although
these interpretations vary considerably, they share the hope that
the recovery of Aristotelian policial philosophy could mitigate the a priori
individualism of the liberal tradition without detracting from its broader
democratic impulse. Notable among them is the recent study by Ronald
Beiner (1983), who follows the work of H.-G. Gadamer (1975, 1976, 1983)
in looking to Aristotle for a philosophy that recognizes communal "dis-
course" rather than "technical expertise" as constituting our political es-
sence. Both believe that a recovery of Aristotle's emphasis on the "context
of mutual agreement" immanent in a healthy society can help to offsetthe
alienating tendencies of the modern technological state.1
Although these are serious and thought-provoking studies, what is ab-
sent from them is a consideration of Aristotle's reflectionon the good and
bad potentialitiesof monarchical rule as he analyses the prospects forachiev-
ing and sustaining political community. Beiner's analysis of Aristotelian
prudence, forexample, rightlysuggests that prudent judgments can be un-
derstood by non-expertcitizens. But while Beiner hopes to make Aristotelian
prudence the basis forwider and more meaningful participation, Aristotle
himselfnever attributesthe capacity formaking prudentjudgments to more
than a few leaders in any given time or place. Beiner concedes this diffi-
culty in a footnote, but he does not explore the implications it would have
forhis main argument thatwe need to combine the universalism(both logical
and political) of Kant with the "heteronomy" - the richness of experience
and responsiveness to circumstance - of Aristotle (Beiner 1983: 177-78,
48, 63, 68, 103). For ifAristotledoes not believe that even a sizable minority,
let alone a majority of people in a community are capable of exercising
prudent political judgment, what grounds are there for drawing upon his
conception of prudence to justifywider and more meaningful political par-
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160 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
2
AlthoughI have employedthe familiartranslationof the Greek word areteas "virtue,"
it is helpfulto note at the outsetthatthe Greek word has a broader range of meanings
than its Englishcounterpart.Literally,it means "excellence." Thus, it can make per-
fectsensein Greekto speakofthe"virtue" ofa carpenter,doctor,rhetoricianor general,
meaning theirtalentforwhat theydo. This can strikemodern readers as unusual be-
cause we generallytake "virtue" to mean somethingcompletelydisinterested,the ca-
pacity to rise above one's own desires, ambitionsand preferencesfor the sake of the
general good. We would be inclinedto thinkthata general's talentto conquer people
or a rhetorician'sabilityto persuade themto see an argumentas being strongerthan
it reallyis are too prone to belligerence,deceit, and self-aggrandizement
to be consid-
ered properlyvirtuous.The Greekaretecertainlycan have theconnotationofself-denial
and preference forthecommongood above one's own, and itoftendoes have thismeaning
in theworksof Plato and Aristotle.But its meaning is not restrictedto this,and virtue
is nevercategoricallydefinedin thisway so as to exclude all othermeanings. Plato and
Aristotleoftenuse thewordin itsmorecolloquial sense as a talentwhichmay well result
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Virtue 161
Superlative
in advantage, honor and reputationto its possessor. This makes it difficultto state at
the outseta generaldefinitionof Aristotle'sview of virtue,fromwhich all specificin-
stances of it could be rigorouslyderived. The plasticityof the Greek word gives "vir-
tue" a shiftingmeaning. For instance,"superlative virtue," the themeof this paper,
could also be translatedas "too muchvirtue," "excessive virtue." To our moralreason-
ing,thissoundsalmostlikea contradiction in terms,like"harmfulbenefit."For Aristotle,
however,as we will see, it is quite conceivable that a ruler could have an excessive,
overbearingamount of "excellence" fromthe viewpointof those under his rule. Psy-
chologically,Aristotleobserves, the "best man" may well be prey to anger and pas-
sion; only laws are capable of being purelydisinterested.Thus, one has to followthe
differentmeaningsofvirtuethroughout Aristotle'stexts,notingthewaysin whichAristotle
acknowledgesthe various "excellences" whichpeople contributeto theircommunities
and contrastingthis plural meaning with the "superlative virtue" which the rare in-
dividual of prudence will occasionallycome along to demonstrate.
3 I use the Newman edition of the Politics
(1950).
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162 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
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Virtue 163
Superlative
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164 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
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Virtue 165
Superlative
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166 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
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Virtue 167
Superlative
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168 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
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SuperlativeVirtue 169
9 As Newman notes
(1950, 3: xxii-xxiii),the problem cannot be solved by assuming that
"all such constitutions"refersonly to tyranny,oligarchyand democracyor to ones in
whichauthorityis claimed on thebasis of somethingotherthanvirtue.See also thedis-
cussion in Mulgan (1974).
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170 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
10Polityis themostinclusive
and stableofconstitutions
becauseitblendstheprinciples
of
democracy and oligarchy
which,betweenthem,includethemostpeopleand are the
sourceofthemostexplosiveandprevalent ofconflicts:
richversus
poor.ConsiderClark
1975: 104-05;Randall 1968: 263-64.
The languagerecallsBook1, wheresomeonewhois self-sufficientenoughnotto be "a
partofthecity"is said to be eithera beastor god (1253a25-30).
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Virtue 171
Superlative
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172 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
SUPERLATIVEVIRTUE ANDJUSTICE
The discussion of monarchy which completes Book 3 is a recapitula-
tion oftheproblemof how to reconcilecompetingclaims forauthority-
how to judge betweentheequal and the unequal - in lightof the admit-
ted possibilityof superlativevirtue. Aristotle'spresentationof virtuous
monarchyrecallshis discussionin Book 1 of rule in the "absolute" sense,
the 'architectonic'rule of reason. For thismonarchyof the "best man"
is a formofhouseholdmanagement(1285b20-1286a). Moreover, alone of
the correctconstitutions, monarchyis in principlelawless, since its ruler
"acts in all thingsaccordingto his own will" (1287a1-10; 1287a30-40. Cf.
Newman 1950, 3: 28; Plato Statesman 292b-303c). It is an emphatically'un-
political' formof rule, thatis, incompatiblewithany notionof civic com-
munity.Since the view ofjustice it embodies - the outstandingmeritof
one person- can in no way be sharedor participatedin by the members
of a local community, it is also universalistic in principle, and so capable
of swallowingup whole cities and "nations."
Aristotleraisessome possibleobjectionsto virtuousmonarchyfromthe
"constitutional"perspectiveon the cityas an association "composed of
many (people)" (1286a25-35). Thus, he suggeststhat the "multitude,"
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Virtue 173
Superlative
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174 Western
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CONCLUSION
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SuperlativeVirtue 175
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176 Western
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REFERENCES
Hannah.1965.TheHuman
Arendt, Condition. ofChicagoPress,
Chicago:University
Aristotle.
1950. ThePolitics
ofAristotle.
W. L. Newman,ed., withan introduction,
twoprefatoryessays,notescritical 3 volumes.Oxford:Claren-
andexplanatory.
don Press.
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SuperlativeVirtue 177
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178 WesternPolitical Quarterly
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