SUBMITTED TO

PROF. DR. MASSARAT ABID

SUBMITTED BY
FIZZA ALI (10)
FAZAL ABBAS (12)
MUHAMMAD AFZAAL (17)
TOPIC:
LAHORE RESOLUTION 1940
Contents

Abstract

Introduction

Address by Quaid e Azam to the session

Main theme of Lahore Resolution

Main Dimensions of Lahore Resolution

Principles of Lahore Resolution

Lahore Resolution as product of Change of Creed

The Lahore Resolution and those who made it possible

Sikh Reaction

The Issue of the Qadiani State

Congress Reaction

British Response

Debates on Lahore resolution

Objections and Allegations against the Lahore Resolution

Ambiguities

Omissions

Conclusion

Bibliography
 Lahore Resolution 1940

Abstract

A resolution is a firm expression of the will of the people who propose, second and finally adopt
it. It is a declaration of representatives of the people. It is a notice to the government by the
people that they have certain rights which are being denied or ignored or bypassed or not
attended to in the manner those should have been paid fairly and expeditiously. It is not an
ordinary civil or criminal notice. It is a notice that in case the demand made is not fulfilled the
responsibility shall lie on the government for all adverse consequences and the right holders shall
have the right to get their right by any means available to them. In other words a resolution is one
of the several forms of civilized behaviour shown by the people in a democratic set up.

Introduction

The resolution for the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India
passed in the annual session of the All India Muslim League held in Lahore on 22-24 March
1940 is a landmark document of Pakistan’s history. The passing of the resolution marked the
transformation of the Muslim minority in British India into a nation with its distinguishing socio-
cultural and political features, a sense of history and shared aspirations for the future within a
territory. The Lahore Resolution, popularly described as the Pakistan Resolution, employs
modern political discourse for putting forward its demand rather than using a religious idiom for
creating a religious-Islamic state for protection of Islam from the onslaught of other religions of
India. It made worldly demand keeping in view the peculiar problems of the Muslims of British
India, the political experience of the Muslim community and the prevailing debate about the
ways to protect Muslim identity, rights and interests against the backdrop of the modern state
system established by the British in India.

Address by Quaid e Azam to the session

On the first day of the session, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah narrated the events of the
last few months. In an extempore speech he presented his own solution of the Muslim problem.
He said that the problem of India was not of an inter-communal nature, but manifestly an
international one and must be treated as such. To him the differences between Hindus and the
Muslims were so great and so sharp that their union under one central government was full of
serious risks. They belonged to two separate and distinct nations and therefore the only chance
open was to allow them to have separate states.

In the words of Quaid-i-Azam: “Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions,
philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and, indeed,
they belong to two different civilizations that are based mainly on conflicting ideas and
conceptions. Their concepts on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and
Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics,
different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and
likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single
state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent
and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state”.

He further said, “Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of nation. We wish our
people to develop to the fullest spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that
we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people”.
On the basis of the above mentioned ideas of the Quaid, A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq, the then Chief
Minister of Bengal, moved the historical resolution which has since come to be known as Lahore
Resolution or Pakistan Resolution.

The Resolution declared: “No constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the
Muslims unless geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so
constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the areas in which the
Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should
be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous
and sovereign”.

It further reads, “That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically
provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of
their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights of the minorities,
with their consultation. Arrangements thus should be made for the security of Muslims where
they were in a minority”.

The Resolution repudiated the concept of United India and recommended the creation of an
independent Muslim state consisting of Punjab, N. W. F. P., Sindh and Baluchistan in the
northwest, and Bengal and Assam in the northeast. The Resolution was seconded by Maulana
Zafar Ali Khan from Punjab, Sardar Aurangzeb from the N. W. F. P., Sir Abdullah Haroon from
Sindh, and Qazi Esa from Baluchistan, along with many others. The Resolution was passed on
March 24. It laid down only the principles, with the details left to be worked out at a future date.
It was made a part of the All India Muslim League’s constitution in 1941. It was on the basis of
this resolution that in 1946 the Muslim League decided to go for one state for the Muslims,
instead of two. Having passed the Pakistan Resolution, the Muslims of India changed their
ultimate goal. Instead of seeking alliance with the Hindu community, they set out on a path
whose destination was a separate homeland for the Muslims of India.

Main theme of Lahore Resolution

The main theme of the Lahore Resolution is as under:

‘’no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless
it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are
demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as
may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the
North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent
States. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in
the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their
religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in
consultation with them.”

Main Dimensions of Lahore Resolution

The text of the Resolution covered the main dimensions including:

a. Mention of the communal problem of India;

b. British endeavor to unite the Indian communities;

c. Muslim majority areas were demanded as Pakistan;

d. League set a destination

The Resolution revived the pestering issue of communalism with full force and defined it as a
‘majoritarian’ phenomenon. This was due to the fact that Hindus were pursuing a policy which
forced the Muslims to perceive the former’s political drive as stride to enslave the latter after the
British departure. The British had consistently been endeavoring to unite the religious
communities living in the Subcontinent but the League termed it as a futile and fruitless effort.
The solution the League moved was a sovereign Muslim state consisting of the Muslim majority
areas in the north-western and eastern zones of India. The League’s program eliminated all the
confusions shared from time to time by the Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and British leadership about the
ambiguity regarding the League’s claim of having the popular support behind its demands. As a
comprehensive document, it cleared that the League intended to challenge all the Muslim
political parties working at the provincial level and to make them realize that only the League
would be justified in representing the Muslim community from top to bottom level. The Muslim
masses were made aware of the major shift in the political power and the new political direction
created a confidence and clarity of destination. A sane mind could easily comprehend the very
pertinent aspects of this scheme but the non-Muslim leaders tried to project it as ill worked out
and confused scheme while the Muslims immediately got the ultimate objective of this resolution
without any need of clarity and seemed prepared to face all the challenges coming in the way to
materialize it.

Principles of Lahore Resolution

It emphasized the principles that were relevant to modern state system and the political context
of British India. It made five principle demands:

1. The federal system of government as envisaged in the Government of India Act, 1935 "is
totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether
unacceptable to Muslim India."
2. The Muslims of India want that the existing constitutional plan should be totally
"reconsidered" and that they would not accept any new constitutional plan "unless it is framed
with their approval and consent."

3. The Muslims would not accept any constitutional plan unless it was it incorporated the
principle "that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so
constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the
Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India should
be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous
and sovereign."

4. The Resolution also underlined that "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be
specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the
protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and
interests in consultation with them, and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans (Muslims)
are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in
the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural,
economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them."

5. The Muslim League session authorised the Working Committee "to frame a scheme of
constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the
respective regions of all powers such a defence, external affairs, communications, customs and
such other matters as may be necessary."

This Resolution advocated a new strategy for the Muslim political struggle for protection and
advancement of their socio-cultural identity, rights and interests in British India. The Muslim
League in its session in Madras (now renamed as Chennai) in April 1941 not only adopted the
March 1940 resolution as one of its fundamental objectives but also added the word "together"
after the word "grouped."

Lahore Resolution as product of Change of Creed

The Resolution thus offered a new course of action for the Muslims of British India as compared
to the Muslim League position adopted on constitutional and political issues in the past. The
change was that of strategy but not of the goal. The Muslim League goal since its inception in
December 1906 was to protect and advance Muslim socio-cultural identity, rights and interests in
British India’s socio-political and constitutional context.

Initially the Muslim League demanded separate electorate for the Muslims so that they could
elect their representatives. Later, it sought adequate Muslim representation in the cabinets and
state services & jobs. It also demanded constitutional safeguards and guarantees for the Muslims.
It supported federalism with autonomy for provinces, hoping that the Muslims would be able to
exercise power effectively in the Muslim majority provinces which would not only boost the
Muslim community but also provide greater opportunity for advancement of Muslim rights and
interests. The change of strategy was caused by the political experience of the Muslim elite in
their interaction with other communities, especially the Congress Party, and the policies of the
British government. These strategies also manifested the growing desire of the Muslims to assert
their separate socio-political identity. The Muslim League began to think about discarding the
federal model in 1938, when the Sindh Provincial Muslim League proposed that the All India
Muslim League needed to review its position on constitutional issues in view of the experience
of the Muslims under the Congress governments in some provinces (1937-39).

What weakened Muslim League’s confidence in the federal model for the whole of India was the
bitter experience of the Muslim educated classes and urban population under the Congress
ministries in the provinces?

 The cultural and educational policies of these ministries alienated the Muslims.

 The Muslim elite in these and non-Congress provinces came to the conclusion that the
Congress governments in the provinces were imposing Hindu ethos in the name of Indian
identity.

 Further the Muslim leaders complained about the discriminatory policy for recruitment of
Muslims to government jobs and they maintained that the Muslims suffered in the
economic domain in the Congress-ruled provinces.
  The experience of the Congress rule in the provinces was the triggering factor that led the
Muslim League leaders to explore a political alternative to a single Indian federation.

Though the Lahore Resolution talked of a Muslim homeland, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali
Jinnah did not wholly give up the idea of some political accommodation within the framework of
a loose federal model. The Muslim League acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan (March -
April 1946) clearly showed that its leaders were willing to work within a loose federal model that
grouped the Muslim majority provinces into two political groups and non-Muslim majority
provinces were put together as the third group. These three groups were joined together under a
weak federal order. The provinces in each group could review their relationship with each other
and the federal government after ten years. The Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of
the Cabinet Mission Plan when it learnt that the Congress was only interested in getting into the
constituent assembly without giving any specific commitment that the future constitution would
be based on the provisions of the Cabinet Mission Plan.

The Lahore Resolution did not use the name “Pakistan” in the text and it did not link up the
demand with Islam.

The Resolution presented the Muslim demand in the context of British Indian politics rather than
giving a constitutional framework for a proposed Muslim homeland. The Muslim League used
Islam and made Islam-based appeals for political mobilization for the 1946 provincial elections.
A large number of people and rural-based Islamic clergy, pirs and Sajjadanasheens in the Punjab,
Sindh and NWFP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) joined the Muslim League after 1940, especially
during 1945-47. Some of the rural clergy helped the Muslim League in its election campaign.
Most of them believed and advocated that Pakistan would have an Islam based political system.

There is a territorial basis of the Lahore Resolution and its demand for a Muslim homeland.

This demand became credible because of territorial contiguity of Muslim majority provinces in
Northwest and Eastern zone where Bengal and some of its adjoining areas made it possible to put
forward this demand. Had the Muslim majority provinces been scattered the homeland demand
would not have worked. The Muslim League leadership was invoking the imperatives of modern
state that included people, territory, government and sovereignty.

The Lahore Resolution and those who made it possible

The resolution which was presented before thousands of the supporters of the Pakistan
movement at Minto Park, Lahore was drafted by Sir Zafarullah Khan, who was the prominent
representative of Pakistan at the international level. A diplomat and an international lawyer by
profession, Khan represented Muslims in round table conferences in London for three
consecutive years i.e. 1930, 1931 and 1932. He was a strong advocate of Muslim rights and
Muslim independence.

The wide acceptance and endorsement of the Pakistan resolution by the All India Muslim League
leaders and supporters made it a strong case in front of the Hindu and British leaders. Most
significantly, the Pakistan resolution gathered immense support and appreciation from all the
Muslim majority provinces such as Sindh, Punjab, N.W.F.P and Baluchistan as well as minority
provinces. The Lahore resolution didn’t appear all of a sudden. In fact, it was part of the process
in which resolutions had been passed by the Muslim Leagues members throughout the year 1939
demanding the partition of India into two separate states for the Muslims and the Hindus. All
these resolutions served as a precursor of the historical Lahore Resolution on March 23, 1940.

Jinnah in his presidential address on this occasion spoke in English and formally made the
demand of a separate homeland for the Muslims while representing a mammoth gathering of the
Muslims of the British India who were zealous and united under his leadership.

Maulvi Fazlul Haq popularly known as the Lion of Bengal moved the famous Lahore
Resolution in the annual session of the Muslim League. Haq explained in detail the merits and
objectives of the Pakistan Resolution and also spoke of the many injustices done to the Muslims
by the Congress in Hindu majority provinces. The resolution was seconded by
Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman who represented the Muslims in United Provinces (U.P)
Legislative Assembly in the 1937 Elections as its opposition leader. While lending his support
for the resolution, he said, “The Muslims of the United Provinces (U.P) would not get the
benefits of Pakistan because their minority status would not place them in the Muslim-majority
Pakistan scheme but the U.P. Muslims would be happy to see their brethren in the Muslim
majority areas as a part of independent Pakistan”. He expressed full confidence in the leadership
of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and publicly condemned the Congress leaders for
depriving the Muslims of their just rights.

From the Bihar province, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan supported the Pakistan Resolution
while saying “the Muslims of Bihar would make every sacrifice to see their Muslim brethren in
the Muslim-majority provinces united and free in a single independent Muslim State to be called
Pakistan.” and eulogized the brotherly attitude of the people of the Punjab towards the Muslims
from the provinces where they were in a minority. Nawab Ismail Khan also expressed his
confidence in the Muslim League and the leadership of Jinnah. He said “Mr Jinnah is the voice
and true spokesman of the Subcontinent’s Muslims who are united in demanding independent
Muslim Statehood under the banner of the Muslim League”.

Mian Bashir Ahmed, member of the Punjab Muslim Provincial League and a prominent literary
figure, also supported the Pakistan resolution. In his speech, he recited his famous poem ‘Millat
Ka Paasban Hai Muhammad Ali Jinnah’ which breathed a new spirit in the gathering.

Sir Abdullah Haroon, a noted businessman and philanthropist ardently supported the Pakistan
resolution from the Muslim majority Bombay province. He was the member of Bombay
Legislative Council where he worked hard for the rights of the Sindhi Muslims and resolved
their problems. He played a prominent role in the separation of Sindh from Bombay as an
independent province. He founded several educational institutions including ‘Islamia Orphanage
School’ for boys, ‘Katchi Memon Madarasa-e-Benat’ for girls and ‘Jamia Islamia Yatimkhana’
among others to help poor students acquire good education as well as vocational training. He was
the president of Sindh Muslim Provincial League and made significant contributions to improve
the lives of the Sindhi Muslims through his financial support in the fields of education, politics,
and journalism. He also setup a newspaper ‘Alwahid’ in 1920 to raise the voice of Sindhi
Muslims.
Baluchistan, the most backward region of Muslim India also represented itself on this historical
occasion and supported the Lahore resolution which was triumphant in the creation of Pakistan.
Qazi Mohammad Isa, who was the founding member of the All India Muslim League in
Baluchistan, fervently supported the Pakistan Resolution. He said that the ill-treatment of
Muslims in the seven provinces ruled by the Congress for two and a half years had forced the
Muslims to demand Pakistan and the partition of India. “The Muslims of Baluchistan, like the
Muslims of the NWFP will strive to safeguard the interests of the Muslims in the rest of India.
They are our brothers in Faith: and their defense is our moral and religious duty.” With his sheer
dedication and hard work, Muslim League firmly established itself as a representative of the
Muslims of Baluchistan.

Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, a renowned journalist, writer and poet delivered one of the most
eloquent speeches in favor of the Pakistan Resolution. He said, “I today feel as if I am living in a
Muslim environment of freedom and Islamic belief.” He expressed his disillusion on the conduct
of the congress leaders and said “for them (Congress) independence means the right to oppress
and ill-treat the non-Hindu minorities. The Congress rulers have not undertaken any economic
enterprise to benefit the Muslim masses in India.” He further said “I am skeptical of any
constitution or political setup that would doom Muslims to the unenviable status of a powerless,
downtrodden minority; subservient to the Congress rulers.”

From the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, member of
Muslim League from Peshawar, supported the resolution and represented the struggles of the
Muslims for independence in his region.

From the Muslim ruled State of Hyderabad Deccan, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang wholeheartedly
endorsed the Pakistan Resolution and served all his energies to support the idea of Muslim
struggle for the protection of their rights.

Lahore Resolution was a historical document in the history of Muslim struggle for an
independent state. The resolution united the Muslim supporters and leaders for independence
under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam, encouraged them to work devotedly to achieve the reality
of a pure motherland i.e. Pakistan. Lahore Resolution proved to be a strong foundation which
enabled the Muslims of the subcontinent to reach their destination within seven years of their
struggle.

Sikh Reaction

The Muslim state was not an abrupt show of the Muslims, rather this idea “had been in the air
since 1930, and the idea of a physical division of the country had been underlined by the Muslim
League throughout 1939.” Therefore, the rival community was ready to fully oppose it. Even
before the passage of the Lahore Resolution, the Sikhs raised their voice against the expected
Muslim demand for a separate country. The All India Akali Conference was held at Attari (15
miles from Lahore) on 10-11 February 1940 in which the Akali Sikhs from all the parts of India
participated. Isher Singh Majhail, Professor Ganga Singh, Santokh Singh, Sant Singh (MLA) and
Partap Singh (MLA) condemned the idea of a separate Muslim state. They also criticized the
Unionist ministry in his speech. Teja Singh of Akarpura said in his presidential address that the
Unionist Muslims were spending the government finances to spread Islam. The speakers
expressed determination to strengthen the Congress position. They also advised the audiences to
set up the Akali Fauj Centres in every village. To H. N. Mitra, the Sikhs pledged in this
conference to resist the Muslims by all possible means who desired to convert the Punjab into
‘Pakistan.’ On the question of Pakistan, according to Joseph T. O’Connell, they were ready even
to sacrifice Indian independence which was their political creed.

Demand for division and opposition to it went simultaneously as parallel forces. Where the
Lahore Resolution invoked a hostile reaction among all the factions of the Sikhs there it
provoked a new sense of entity among the Indian Muslims which appeared to determine the clear
cut destination of Pakistan. It proved a ‘bomb-shell’ to the Sikh community who, despite the
rampant factionalism, were firmly united on one point, opposition to the Pakistan scheme. To Tai
Yong Tan, the Resolution of 1940 brought a colossal unrest for the Sikh community. Their anger
was genuine because it was a direct threat to the economy, canal colony lands, religion and
existence of Sikhs. On 24 March 1940, Kartar Singh and Master Tara Singh led a Sikh
procession in Amritsar and condemned the idea of Pakistan. They advised the Sikhs to get ready
for sacrifices against the Muslims. Sikhs were hit the most by the Lahore Resolution and the
Shiromani Akali Dal declared it out rightly “a declaration of the civil war.

Master Tara Singh argued soon after the League’s resolution that if the Indian Muslims feared
the Hindu majority, the Sikhs too feared the Muslim domination in the Punjab. The Pakistan
scheme created panic among the Sikhs and the recruitment efforts in 1940 were severely
downed. Major-General Lockhart reported that the main factor behind the Sikh reluctance to join
army and the desertions was the Sikh fear that if they went to the front abroad, their property,
lands and villages would be attacked and occupied by the Muslims who desired to capture the
Punjab. The Sikhs, therefore, wished to live in India to protect their families and community
from the Muslims. The Sikhs would be contented if the concessions were to be given to the
Congress rather than the Muslim League. The Sikhs were well aware of the danger if it existed
but the situation required them to come up with remedies. Master Tara Singh himself writes in
his book that Pakistan meant ‘Muslim Raj’ either in the name of Pakistan or without it. To him,
Pakistan created a new sense of prejudice in the Muslims and increased apprehension of the non-
Muslims. The rule in the Punjab by the Unionist Muslims was enough to irritate the Sikhs but the
Leaguers had been pinching them more and more by adopting the word ‘Pakistan.’ On 20 May
1940, 125 Sikh leaders gathered at Lahore and established Guru Raj Khalsa Darbar to achieve an
independent state of Khalistan with the boundary from Jumna to Jamrud. They also planned to
have two more states including Takht Sri Hazur Sahib (Hyderabad State) and Takhat Sri Patna
Sahib. They claimed to regain the areas under the Sikh rule. In the next meeting presided over by
Gopal Singh Gargaj on 23 May, the Sikh leaders discussed the practicality of the scheme. This
meeting was a countering measure to the idea of Pakistan. The Sikhs were alarmed about the
proposed Sharia laws in the Muslim state therefore, they believed that in Pakistan, the Sikh
existence would be in danger.

The Issue of the Qadiani State

In November 1940, the Sikhs came to know that the British desired to establish an Ahmadi state
(covering an area of 10 miles) in Qadian, district, Gurdaspur, which caused bitterness between
them and the Muslims. A big procession of the Akalis passed through Qadian chanting anti-
Qadiani state slogans. Udham Singh Nagoke, Parlok Singh, Teja Singh Akarpuri and many
others addressed the conference (17-18 November) held near Qadian. Parlok Singh appealed to
the government not to form “an infant Pakistan in the Punjab.” Nagoke spoke against the
proposed Ahmadi state and Pakistan and exhorted the Sikhs to join the Congress and the Akali
Dal. Pandit Dhirat Ram of Qadian told stories of the painful experiences of the non-Ahmadis of
the area and requested the Sikhs to save them from the cruelty of the Qadiani Muslims. The
Sikhs found allies in the Hindu Mahasabha. In December 1940, an Anti-Pakistan Conference
was arranged under the chairmanship of Mr. Anney, a Mahasabha leader, who said that the
Muslims were planning to rule India without using weapons. The Conference also condemned
the Pakistan scheme. Thousands of non-Muslims attended this Conference including Master Tara
Singh. Sikhs and Hindus seemed on the same page against the Muslims as their anti-British
stance meant an enslavement of the minorities specifically the Muslims. According to
Khushwant Singh, the main purpose of the Sikh recruitment was to arm the community so that
after the British departure they might utilize these army men as the Khalsa fauj. The Hindu
Mahasabha had a similar sentiment. Its Working Committee on 22 September 1940 passed a
resolution opposing the Gandhian approach on the recruitment. The leaders said that the war was
a big opportunity “for the general militarization of the Hindus, and for the organization of the
system of India on sound and up-to-date modern lines, so that India be converted into a self-
contained defense unit.” The Sikhs and Mahasabha Hindus were united against the Muslim
League and were trying to increase their fighting potential and capacity.

Congress Reaction

In practical parlance, the mode of struggle was democratic in nature but the basis of the League’s
demand for Pakistan was the Two Nation theory. The Times of India threw light on the League
session of Lahore and wrote that the Congress Session of Ramgarh highlighted the single nation
theory in India as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had argued while the League retaliated with the
Two-Nation theory. The popularity of the League pervaded all the Muslim minds. Raghuvendra
Tanwar depicted the post-League session situation that “With every passing day after the
adoption of the Pakistan Resolution the League moved one step closer to its goal of a separate
home land for Muslims.” The sane minds could look into the sharply changing situation. The
Times portraying importance and numerical strength of the Muslims wrote that the course of
Muslim feelings could not be “brushed aside.” The other communities would have to
accommodate them in the constitutional war. “The French are a minority in Europe, which does
not imply that they must submit to German domination.” The Punjab Governor wrote to the
Viceroy that the Congress’ claim to lead India had been challenged by the League and the Hindu
leadership should not ignore the Muslim importance. Quaid-i-Azam himself asserted in January
1941 that the “Muslim League now represents 90 per cent Mussalmans” in the Subcontinent
which stamped the increasing Muslim support for the League leadership to continue their
struggle. The Congress leadership adopted erratic attitudes towards the Lahore Resolution. In the
beginning, they tried to conceal their real feelings about the Resolution but they could not help
exposingthemselves with the passage of time. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad said that Jinnah’s Pakistan
scheme would be disastrous to the interests of all the communities equally. In a meeting of the
Congress in 1940, Rajendra Babu said that “the recent resolution of the League meant civil war.”
Rajendra Babu maintained without caring as to what his leader Gandhi was uttering in favour of
the Muslim separatist movement. In the same meeting, Gandhi had pledged, “If Muslims want
separatism, he will not oppose.” Gandhi in April 1940 declared the fight against the Muslim
scheme of partition through nonviolent methods but at the same time he conceded that all the
communities had a right to demand their due political share which suited them. Jawaharlal
Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and other Congress leaders considered
that the Pakistan scheme was absurd. They believed that the Muslim masses would never back it.
The other Congress leaders expressed their incapability to oppose it if the Muslims desired it.
During May 1940, they made it clear that the Congress wished no use of coercion against the
Pakistan demand. The Congress did not make any ‘formal’ statement or pass any resolution
against the Lahore Resolution of the League until April 1942. Master Tara Singh points out that
the Congress had accepted the right of self-determination of the Muslims but not of Pakistan
however the Congress leaders including Gandhi obviously supported Pakistan if it was a demand
of the Muslim majority. So as a party, the Congress was not clear as to how they could better
deal with the Pakistan resolution and this confusion continued up to the partitioning decision.
The situation after the Lahore Resolution shows that no community including the British had any
sympathy for the partitioning scheme presented by the League. The British may have been
conducive to the Muslim rights but they showed no favor for the Pakistan idea. Therefore, the
League leadership had to plead its case on the universally accepted principle of self-
determination. Congress’ attitude towards Muslims remained a question throughout the political
history of British India. They hardly unleashed generosity on the issue of constitutional
concessions for the Muslims. Many exhorted them to be benign with the most important minority
but no attention was paid. Demand to separate Sindh from Bombay Presidency was mooted by
Harchand Rai C.I.E. in 1913 at Karachi but later on it was taken up by the Muslim League as a
political creed. It should have been treated as an indicator to the sensitive situation but the
Congress hardly dealt the issue with sympathy towards the Muslims. In June 1931, an analysis
published in the Manchester Guardian seems pertinent to share that insistence on the separation
of Sindh from Bombay by the Indian Muslims revealed their dissatisfaction with the Hindu
treatment on the issue of the Muslim rights and for the reason they were heading towards
partition. So the Congress apathy was a traditional mark on the issue of Muslim rights.

British Response

Ruling and local political protagonists were constantly in contact with each other as the
principal stakeholders and even before the Lahore Resolution was passed both blocs had been
observing and pondering over the political developments. On 1 July 1939, Quaid-i-Azam wrote a
letter to J. G. Laithwaite, Private Secretary to Viceroy, that the British would have to concede the
idea of Muslim state. As far as the British response to the Pakistan scheme was concerned, they,
as usual, favoured united India and seemed satisfied that the Muslim demand had no backing of
the Muslim majority provinces. Lord Linlithgow expressing his adverse remarks against the
League and Jinnah’s move wrote to Zetland that they could not make a plan as an alternative to
the Hindu domination. Zetland supported Linlithgow’s standpoint by saying that he disagreed in
April 1940 with the League’s proposal for the Indian vivisection. He was of the view that to
concede such a demand would mean to dishonor the efforts of the British and Indians for the
unity of India. In fact Zetland had always been in favour of the united India. He had expressed
the same in 1938 by saying that they would have “insuperable difficulties” in the acceptance of
any move that would result in the territorial separation from the Indian Union. Sir Roger Lumley,
Governor of Bombay, reported that although the partition idea was not new but this resolution
mattered as for the first time it was backed my any major political party. The Hindus, even
Muslims and non-Muslim minorities were angry on the League’s partition scheme. He further
writes that “my first impression of the reactions here is that Jinnah’s speech at Lahore is likely to
lose him a good deal of support from educated Muslims here and from other minorities.” He
feared that the Congress anger on the League could turn against the British as well. Governor of
Bihar said that Jinnah’s scheme of partition was to invite civil war but this call could gather
massive support from the community. R. F. Mudie rejected the idea of partition on the reason
that Hindus and Muslims were not distinctive nations and more importantly the expected foreign
attacks on the proposed dominions would never let them survive so the proposal seemed a
bargaining move to upset the Congress. Lord Linlithgow reported in April 1940 that many points
enunciated in the Lahore Resolution could be criticized “and we clearly could not accept and
endorse them.” He also attributed Jinnah’s partition scheme in response to the unreasonable
attitude of the Congress.88 Moreover, in 1942, Linlithgow wrote to Amery that it was the Hindu
community which “made a mistake of taking Jinnah seriously about Pakistan, and as a result they
have given substance to a shadow.” The Congress leadership followed this strategy and tried to
ignore the League leadership. The Congress had many friends in England who always paved the
way for the Congress’s popularity through effective propaganda. The press generally supported
whatever the Hindu leadership stood for. All these fronts were facilitating the Hindu struggle,
even Sir Stafford Cripps, a friend of Nehru, extended greetings to the Congress leadership on
success in the 1937 elections and later had been continuously in contact with him before he was
sent to India in 1942. On the other hand, the Muslim League was busy in spreading the idea of
Pakistan among the Muslim masses. According to the Intelligence Reports, the League held
eleven meetings at mosques in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, Rohtak, Jullundur, Jhelum,
Karnal, Gurdaspur, Lyallpur, Jhang, Rawalpindi and Simla, celebrated the ‘Pakistan Day’ on 19
April and passed pro-Pakistan resolutions. In the Rawalpindi meeting, Dr. Muhammad Alam
declared that the Muslims were ready to sacrifice their lives for their own cause but not for the
Hindu Raj.

Debates on Lahore resolution

The Lahore Resolution has been a basis of three debates in the pre- and post- independence
periods.

 The first debate relates to the non-use of the name Pakistan in the demand. The Hindu
press and leaders were quick to describe the resolution as the demand for the creation of
 Pakistan; some people began to call it the Pakistan Resolution soon after the Lahore
session of the Muslim League.

The second debate focuses on the use of certain terms in the Resolution.

 These include “independent states” and that the constituent units will be “autonomous
and sovereign.”

 Was the Lahore Resolution talking of one or more than one state for the Muslims of
British India?

These ambiguities can be addressed if a literalist approach is not adopted to understand the
Lahore Resolution. Rather, it has to be viewed in the political context of British India in and
around 1940 and the Muslim political experience over time. In a federal system sovereignty is
the prerogative of the federal government and its constituent units cannot be both “autonomous
and sovereign” at the same time. In the case of Pakistan, the British government transferred
power and authority to the state of Pakistan through its federal government established in
Karachi. Pakistani provinces got power from the federal state and the first Interim Constitution.
Pakistan’s federal system was not created by the provinces deciding to set up a federation.
Pakistan’s federation was built into the Indian Independence Act, passed in July 1947 by the
British Parliament and the First Interim Constitution. This envisaged a strong centre and weak
provinces. This legacy has haunted Pakistan’s political system from the early years. The Pakistan
movement developed gradually. It did not stop with the passage of the Lahore Resolution. Next
seven years were important to understand the making of Pakistan. The Muslim League demands
became more specific and assertive in the post-1940 period. By 1942, the Muslim League focus
shifted to a singular phrase of state. In September 1944 Jinnah was very categorical in asserting
that he was taking of one state of Pakistan. This issue was finally clarified by the convention of
Pakistani parliamentarians held in Delhi in April 1946. The evolutionary process of the
movement for the creation of Pakistan began before March 1940 and ended with the attainment
of independence in Pakistan in 1947.
  The third political debate relates to the post-independence period. Some regional-
nationalist leaders in Sindh and Balochistan invoke the Lahore Resolution for seeking
maximum autonomy for provinces. They demand that Pakistan’s federal model should be
based on the Lahore Resolution. Some leaders have talked of turning Pakistan into a
confederation. This is a literalist interpretation of the Lahore Resolution which can be
described as flawed. The Lahore Resolution did not offer a framework for organizing the
Pakistani state, especially the distribution of powers between the federal government and
provinces. It addressed the constitutional issues in an all-India framework and offered a
framework to settle the Hindu-Muslim question on a permanent basis. The demand for
greater autonomy can be raised by political parties and leaders in Pakistan with reference
to the Muslim League’s political disposition on federalism in the pre-independence
period. It favored greater autonomy to the provinces but it turned in favour of a strong
and assertive centre in the post-independence period.

The 18th constitutional amendment marks the beginning of the era of greater administrative and
financial autonomy for provinces. Provinces have more control over their finances and natural
resources. If democracy continues to function and the federal and provincial governments
improve their performance the confidence of people in the state system will improve. This will
weaken the role of regionalist-nationalist leaders and they will find it more difficult to invoke the
Lahore Resolution for seeking more provincial autonomy.

Objections and Allegations against the Lahore Resolution:

The most serious criticism of Lahore Resolution is the allegation that the British inspired this
Resolution to promote their imperial ends as a counter weight to the pressure tactics of the
Congress.Tara Chand and other official historian of freedom movement for India allege that
Pakistan demand was made effective by the ‘will of the British rulers’.

Ramji Lal has attributed the Resolution to the ‘role played by the British as
it was bent on thwarting the issue of Indian independence byfollowing policy of ‘divide and
rule’. In a similar vein Uma Kaura concludes her argument saying that:” Lintithgow was
jubilant at the adoption of the Partition Resolution.” V.B.Kulkarni insists that Lahore
Resolution was the product of the British encouragement of
separatist politics. Ayesha Jalal supports this argument in her book The Sole Spokesman:
Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan.

She says that Lord Linlinthgow asked Jinnah to come up with some ‘constructive policy’ as a
counterweight to the Congress demand for Independence and a Constituent Assembly.

This criticism loses weight if viewed in the context of long-term political, economic and strategic
interests of the British in India which could be served best if India remained united. The very
idea of the partition stirred ‘distaste in the British governing circles’ In his letter of 18 April,
1940, Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, expressed his fear that
separate Muslim states might join Islamic commonwealth. Lord Linlithgow asked Jinnah
to come up with a ‘constructive policy’ because he tried to convince Jinnah about the usefulness
of British parliamentary institutions and about talks with the Congress leadership to settle the
constitutional problem. But Jinnah was not moved. Lord Linlithgow wrote to Zetland on 24
March, 1940 a letter in which he criticized the Jinnah’s demand as ‘extreme’ and preposterous’
which was meant as ‘an attempt on the part of Jinnah and the League to free themselves from the
damaging charge leveled against them they had no constructive ideas of their own. Zetland
agreed with these views and he also called it ‘silly scheme of partition’ and ‘counsel of despair’.
Both Linlithgow and Zetalnd thought of Skindar Hayat as a ‘man of such broad-minded views
and so tolerant an outlook because he was opposed to partition demand of the League. So the
demand for Pakistan was the logical outcome of the political developments which had been
taking place in India over the past half century. V.P. Menon gives details of Jinnah’s interview
with Lord Linglithgow and he says: “ Jinnah also wished to make it clear that if His Majesty’s
Government could not improve on its present solution for the India’s constitutional development,
he and his friends would have no option but to fall back on some form of partition of the country;
that as a result of this discussion they had decided first of all, that the Muslims were not a
minority but rather a nation; and secondly that democracy for all India was impossible.” Menon
at the end says that ‘throughout the discussion the Viceroy remained non-comital’
The second criticism looks on the Resolution as a tactic or ‘bargaining counter’. Ayesha Jalal
advances this criticism in her book when she says: “ By apparently repudiating the need for any
Centre, and keeping quiet about its shape, Jinnah calculated that when eventually the time came
to discuss an All-India Federation, British and the Congress alike would be forced to negotiate
with organized Muslim opinion and would be ready to make substantial concession to create or
retain that Centre. The Lahore Resolution should therefore be seen as a bargaining counter which
had the merit of being acceptable to the majority-province Muslims and of being totally
unacceptable to the Congress and in the last resort to the British also.”

Before Ayesha Jalal, Penderel Moon, Kanji Dwarkdas, and Durga Dashad suggested the similar
criticism of the Resolution. Penderel Moon points to the fact that Jinnah was ready to accept the
Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946 suggested that he was not really irrevocably committed to Pakistan
demand. Ayesha Jalal’s criticism is based on absence of ‘connecting link between the two
zones’ and a clear cut ‘Centre’. She forgets that two zones were ‘grouped together in the Madras
session of AIML in 1941.The phrase now used was: the North-Western and Eastern zones of
India should be grouped together.” The absence of hint of any centre does not mean that the
Resolution was meant as ‘bargaining counter”. The
League deliberately avoided mentioning the ‘centre’ whether in the context of Muslim India or
India as a whole, whether in the sense of Indian federation of All
India confederation as it might have compromised the very idea of Pakistan. The League had
‘eliminated ’Skindar’s idea of centre and coordination of the activities of the various units when
the Resolution was drafted. Jinnah himself categorical rejected the impression that the
Resolution was intended as the bargaining counter. While speaking the Pakistan Session of the
Punjab Muslim Students Federation on 2 March, 1941, he said, “ The only solution for Muslims
of India, which will stand the test of trial and time, is that India should be partitioned so that both
the communities can develop freely and fully according to their own genius, economically,
socially, culturally and politically. The vital contest in which we are engaged is not only for the
material gain but also the very existence of the soul of a Muslim nation. Hence I have said often
that it is matter of life and death to the Musalmans and is not a counter for bargaining.”

The charge of ‘bargaining counter’ is weakened by the fact that both the British and Hindus
accused Jinnah of intransigence and obstinacy on the issue of Pakistan. Furthermore, bargaining
was not Jinnah’s style of politics. As for his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946, it
must be kept in mind that Jinnah did not fail to insist on two separate constituent assemblies and
the right to secede from the Union after an initial period of ten years. He
accepted the plan for ‘tactical reasons than any compromise on the fundamental principle of
Pakistan.

Ambiguities

Two ambiguities are usually pointed out in the Lahore Resolution.

 It was not clear whether the goal contemplated was one or more sovereign states and if
the idea was to attain one state, how could the constituent units be ‘autonomous and
sovereign’ at the same time. It would be anomaly or self-contradictory. In the Resolution,
the details were left imprecise, but principle stood clear. The language used in the
Resolution was ‘loose’ which suggests something of a federation type. The League’s
Madras session made it clear. The Muslims dropped all Idea of unity and stood for
separate homeland. The confusion as to one or more states was finally laid to rest in 1944
when Jinnah in his vital talks with Gandhi emphatically stated what the League really
sought for the Indian Muslim in Lahore Resolution was the establishment of
asingle Muslim state comprising both the North-Western and eastern zones.

 Lahore Resolution is allegedly in clear about the areas to be included in the states. In
response to Beverly Nicholas’s question that why Pakistan has not been defined in detail,
Jinnah replied, “ All details were left to the future and future is often an admirable
arbitrator. It is beyond the power of any man to provide in advance a blue print in which
every detail is settled.”

The Resolution was deliberately kept vague to take full advantage

of element of uncertainty and the power of manipulability. It alsodistracted the Congress from
targeting a visible goal set by the League. The League had purposely left this matter ambiguous
to get as manyMuslim majority areas as possible, including some in the Muslim-minority
provinces.
Omissions:

The critics of the Resolution usually ask questions why the word ‘Pakistan’ was not mentioned
in the Resolution and why there is no reference to princely states like Kashmir. As for reference
to word Pakistan is concerned, the word ‘Pakistan’ as coined by Chaudhary Rehmat Ali was used
in specific context in which he proposed the idea of Bengal and Assam to constitute a separate
Muslim state of Bang-i-Islam’. The Lahore Resolution pointed to the areas of both North-
western and eastern India. The Resolution did not favour the exchange of population. The word
was not used as it could give the impression of pan-Islamism and scare the British and
provokeHindu propaganda. But when Hindu press regarded the LahoreResolution as the ‘Pakista
n demand’, the Quaid owned it withouthesitation. Madras session of the League in April 1941
formally adopted ‘Pakistan demand’ as the goal of the Muslim League. As for not making any
reference to the ‘princely states’, they did not lie within the constitutional jurisdiction of the
British India and theLeague’s interest was confined to Kashmir whose ultimate fatedepended on
the League’s strength in the British India.

The critics of the Resolution are of the view that it had ignored the Muslims of minority
provinces and it did not solve the problem it stood for. The Resolution was directed more at the
Muslim-majority provinces and could offer no more than promise of “adequate, effective and
mandatory safeguards” to the minority -provinces. These safeguards could be ensured
reciprocally with the Hindus. The Muslim League leadership was convinced that a separate
Muslim state would better protect the Muslim rights in Hindu India.

B.R. Ambedkar who had been an influential actor in the Indian political drama brushes aside
the main thrust of these criticisms in these words: "It is doubtful if there is a politician in India to
whom the adjective incorruptible can be more fittingly applied. Anyone who knows what his
relations with the British government have been, will admit that he has always been their critic, if
indeed, he has not been their adversary. No one can buy him. For it must be said to his credit that
he has never been a soldier of fortune."
Conclusion

Quaid-i-Azam was the statesman and constitutionalist of the highest stature. The constitutional
process by its very nature progresses slowly. Jinnah kept his hand on the pulse of the Muslim
nation which was waking up slowly from the slumbers of the past. The long journey of the All
India Muslim League from its inception in 1906 to the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in 1940
is manifestation of this reality. Jinnah demonstrated full control of his emotions when the
Congress leadership subjected him to the sarcasms and taunts. Jinnah, in Hegel’s words, was
concerned with ‘formulating the desires of his fellows explicitly’ and he diverted his personal
rage into the creative process of fathering a separate state for them. Jinnah and Iqbal both
experienced the anguish of falsehood of ‘united’ Indian nationalism and they both came to
Muslim nationalism but by different routes. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Allama Iqbal were not
the inventors of two-nation theory. It was implicit in the minds of the Muslims already. They
only realized this implicit principle it was espoused the nationalism which was ideological in
character but Jinnah’s nationalism had a territorial ring about it. The adoption of Lahore
Resolution and its materialization in the creation of Pakistan proved beyond doubt that Jinnah
played a role of ‘world historical’ significance. Thus the Resolution neither made an immediate
secessionist demand, nor was it a 'bargaining counter' as alleged by the League's opponents at the
time. We might describe it as a deferred or open secessionist demand, since it was written when
Indian Muslims were not single-minded in their purpose. Nevertheless the Resolution focused on
the two largest Muslim zones, and the League demanded its recognition as a prerequisite to
further negotiations. Once this was conceded by the British and Congress, it would be easier to
bring indecisive Muslims across the subcontinent round to the idea. This 'go-slow' approach is
consistent with Jinnah's methodology throughout his life, as well as that of Dr. Iqbal. Lahore
Resolution was solely successful due to the Jinnah’s struggle and revival of the Muslim League
after the bitter experience of congress ministries rule. The objection on Lahore resolution by
Gandhi and others that it was the British backed resolution to counter Hindhus and Congress was
totally wrong even the British opposed the resolution firmly and called the resolution as Jinnah’s
childish act and speculation and considered vivisection of subcontinent on the basis of religion
is totally impossible and acceptance to that resolution ultimately means to throw water on all
British constitutional and political reforms and efforts.
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