MOTION TO QUASH CASES
1. MYRNA ANTONE V. LEO BERONILLA
Issues Petitioner Myrna Antone / Prosecution
Executed an Affidavit-Complaint for
Bigamy against Leo Beronilla (O.P.
Pasay City).
2007, the prosecution filed the
corresponding Information (RTC
Pasay City)
Alleged that her marriage with
respondent in 1978 had not yet been
legally dissolved when the latter
contracted a second marriage with
Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
In its comment/opposition to the motion,
the prosecution maintained that the
respondent committed an act which has
all the essential requisites of bigamy.
Moved for reconsideration of the said
Order on the ground, among others, that
the facts and attending circumstances in
Morigo are not on all fours with the case
at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in
Mercado v. Tan, this Court has already
settled that “(a) declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of
action or ground for defense.”
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from
Judgment before the RTC of Naval,
Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity
Leo Beronilla RTC Pasay RTC Naval BIliran Court of Appeals Supreme Court
Pending the setting of the case for
arraignment, he moved to quash the
information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
He informed the court that his marriage
with petitioner was declared null and
void by RTC Naval, Biliran on April 26,
2007; that the decision became final
and executory on May 15, 2007; and
that such decree has already been
registered with the Municipal Civil
Registrar on June 12.
He argued that since the marriage had
been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first
marriage to speak of. Absent a first
valid first marriage, the facts alleged in
the Information do not constitute the
crime of bigamy.
Quashed the information,
applying Morigo v. People,
“no marriage to speak of.”
Contrary on what was
stated in the information,
accused Beronilla was
never legally married to
Myrna Antone.
Denied the motion for
reconsideration stating that
Mercado has already been
superseded by Morigo.
The Court set aside The matter is still pending resolution.
its Decision of April
26 2007 declaring
of the proceedings in the petition for the the marriage of
declaration of nullity of marriage. petitioner with
respondent null and
void, and required
herein petitioner to
file her “answer to
the complaint.”

The court
DISMISSED the
petition for nullity of
marriage for failure
of herein respondent
to submit his pre-trial
brief.

Respondent,
however, challenged
the orders issued by
the court before the
CA.

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 The CA dismissed the petition stating that:
of the Rules of Court before the CA,
herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay The petition is fatally infirm in form and
City trial court acted without or in excess substance for the following reasons:
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of 1. The verification is defective as it
discretion amounting to lack or excess of does not include the assurance
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of that the allegations in the petition
bigamy and denied her motion for are based on authentic records.
reconsideration. 2. Since the petition assails the trial
court’s dismissal of the criminal
information of bigamy filed
against private respondent Leo
Beronilla, the petition, if all
warranted, should be filed in
behalf of the People of the PH by
the OSG, being its statutory
counsel in all appealed criminal
cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on
double jeopardy as the dismissal
of the subject criminal case is
tantamount to an acquittal based
on the trial court’s finding that the
first essential element of bigamy,
which is a first valid marriage
contracted by respondent is
wanting.
Notably, petitioner filed her
comment/opposition to private
respondent’s motion to quash
before the trial court issued its
Order dismissing the information.
Hence, if there is no denial of due
process, there can be no grave
abuse of discretion that would
(NOT MTQ)
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number
of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that
the ends of justice may be served. The
defect being merely formal and not
jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may
nevertheless order the correction of the
pleading, or even act on the pleading "if the
attending circumstances are such that . . .
strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice . . . may be served." 33 At any rate, a
pleading is required to be verified only to
ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and
that the allegations were true and correct and
not based on mere speculations.
There is likewise no dispute that it is the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
has the authority to represent the
government in a judicial proceeding before
the Court of Appeals.
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala, 37 we held
that the summary dismissal of an action in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is
in order. 38 Not even the appearance of the
conformity of the public prosecutor in a
petition for certiorari would suffice because
the authority of the City Prosecutor or his
assistant to represent the People of the
Philippines is limited to the proceedings in
the trial court.
 merit the application of the
exception to the double jeopardy
rule.
We took exceptions, however, and gave due
course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were
not properly represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.

Since the challenged order affects the

interest of the State or the plaintiff People of
the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the
petition on this technical ground. Instead, we
required the OSG to comment on the
petition, as we had done before in some
cases. 42 In light of its Comment, we rule
that the OSG has rati@ed and adopted as its
own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Labaro v. Panay)

The CA denied Respondent’s Motion for

REconsideration of the aforequoted Resolution
for lack of merit.

WHETHER THE CA YES. Well settled is the rule that for

ERRED IN RULING THAT jeopardy to attach, the following
THE FILING OF THIS requisites must concur:
PETITION IS IN 1. There is a complaint or
VIOLATION OF THE information or other formal
RESPONDENT’S RIGHT charge sufficient in form and
AGAINST DOUBLE substance to sustain a
JEOPARDY ON THE conviction;
THEORY THAT HE HAS 2. The same is filed before a
ALREADY BEEN court of competent
PRACTICALLY jurisdiction;
ACQUITTED WHEN THE 3. There is a valid arraignment
TRIAL COURT or plea to the charges; and
QUASHED THE 4. The accused is convicted or
INFORMATION. acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or
terminated without his
express consent.

The 3rd and 4th requisites are clearly

wanting in the instant case as (a)
respondent has not yet entered his plea to
the charged when he filed the Motion to
Quash the Information, and (2) the case
was dismissed not merely with his
consent but, in fact, at his instance.

Jeopardy does not attached in favor of

the accused on account of an order
sustaining a motion to quash. More
specifically, the granting a motion to
quash anchored on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an
offense is “not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.”
 Thus, it will be noted that the order
sustaining the motion to quash the
complaint against petitioner was based
on Subsection (a) of Sec. 3 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court -- that the facts
charged in the complaint do not
constitute an offense. If this is so then the
dismissal of said complaint will not be a
bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, for it is provided in Sec. 6 of Rule
117 that an order sustaining the motion to
quash is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense unless the motion
was based on the grounds specified in
Sec. 3 (g) and (i).

DID THE TRIAL COURT Petitioner maintains that the trial court YES. We define a motion to quash an
ACT WITHOUT OR IN did so because the motion was a Information as — the mode by which an
EXCESS OF hypothetical admission of the facts accused assails the validity of a criminal
JURISDICTION OR alleged in the information and any complaint or Information filed against him for
GRAVE ABUSE OF evidence contrary thereto can only be insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
DISCRETION WHEN IT presented as a matter of defense during defects which are apparent in the face of the
SUSTAINED trial. Information.
RESPONDENT’S
MOTION TO QUASH ON
THE BASIS OF A FACT This motion is "a hypothetical admission of
CONTRARY TO THOSE the facts alleged in the Information," 53 for
ALLEGED IN THE which reason, the court cannot consider
INFORMATION? allegations contrary to those appearing on
the face of the information.

As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of

Appeals: It is axiomatic that a complaint or
information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged;
otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the
ground that it charges no offense may be
properly sustained. The fundamental test in
considering a motion to quash on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as
defined in the law.

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, a

reading of the information will disclose that
the essential elements of the offense
charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not
proper therefore to resolve the charges at the
very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and
without the bene@t of a full-blown trial. The
issues require a fuller examination. Given the
circumstances of this case, we feel it would
be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this
stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the
informations on the basis only of the
petitioner's evidence, such as [this].

2. PEOPLE V. PANFILO LACSON
ISSUES PETITIONER
Before the Court is the petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the
Resolution 2 dated May 28, 2002,
remanding this case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 81, for the determination of
several factual issues relative to the
application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 filed against the
PANFILO LACSON RTC QUEZON CITY
In the aforesaid criminal cases, the The Court ruled in the Resolution sought
respondent and his co-accused to be reconsidered that the provisional
were charged with multiple murder dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
for the shooting and killing of eleven Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the
male persons, bandied as express consent of the respondent as he
members of the Kura-tong Baleleng himself moved for said provisional
Gang. dismissal when he filed his motion for
judicial determination of probable cause
The respondent opposed and for examination of witnesses. The
petitioners’ motion for Court also held therein that although
reconsideration. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure could be given
The documents showing that: (1) the court
has decreed that the marriage of petitioner
and respondent is null and void from the
beginning; and (2) such judgment has
already become final and executory and duly
registered with the Municipal Registrar of
Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that
seek to establish a fact contrary to that
alleged in the Information — that a first valid
marriage was subsisting at the time the
respondent contracted a subsequent
marriage. This should not have been
considered at all because matters of defense
cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for
sustaining the motion to quash even after
taking into consideration the established
exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by
this Court, among others: (1) when the new
allegations are admitted by the prosecution;
61 (2) when the Rules so permit, such as
upon the grounds of extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy; 62 and (3) when
facts have been established by evidence
presented by both parties which destroyed
the prima facie truth of the allegations in the
information during the hearing on a motion to
quash based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, and "it
would be pure technicality for the court to
close its eyes to said facts and still give due
course to the prosecution of the case already
shown to be weak even to support possible
conviction . . . ."
SUPREME COURT
 respondent and his co-accused with retroactive effect, there is still a need to
the said court. determine whether the requirements for
its application are attendant.
WHETHER THE The trial court was thus directed to
REQUIREMENTS FOR resolve the following: . . . (1) whether the
VALID MOTION TO provisional dismissal of the cases had the
QUASH ARE express consent of the accused; (2)
ATTENDANT whether it was ordered by the court after
notice to the offended party; (3) whether
the 2-year period to revive it has already
lapsed; (4) whether there is any
justification for the filing of the cases
beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether
notices to the offended parties were given
before the cases of respondent Lacson
were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6)
whether there were affidavits of
desistance executed by the relatives of
the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the
multiple murder cases against respondent
Lacson are being revived within or beyond
the 2-year bar.
NO.
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the
respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal
of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal
case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean
that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of
dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the
motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing
amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of
the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal.
If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived
only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed
without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be
revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on
the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of
a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a
new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the
original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or
may no longer be available and new
witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information
is refiled or a new Information is filed.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the
new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.

3. William Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products
iSSUES PETITIONER WILLIAM CO. RESPONDENT NEW
A.K.A. XU QUING HE PROSPERITY PLASTIC
PRODUCTS, represented by
ELIZABETH UY
Respondent New Prosperity
Plastic Products, represented
by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the
private complainant in
Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22
filed against petitioner William
Co (Co), which were raffled to
the MeTC Branch. 49 of
Caloocan City.
Uy received a copy of the
June9, 2003 Order on July 2,
2003, while her
counsel-of-record received a
8
copy a day after. On July 2,
2004, Uy, through counsel,
filed a Motion to Revive the
Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his
part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in
Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecution’s
witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent contended therein that
until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest
should be issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by
the trial court. He then
prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by
this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the
resolution of this incident. Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
MeTC Caloocan RTC Caloocan Court of Appeals Supreme Court
In the absence of Uy and the
private counsel, the cases
were provisionally dismissed
on June 9, 2003 in open
court pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Rules).
Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then
Presiding Judge of the MeTC
Branch 49, granted the
motion on October 14, 2004
and denied Co’s motion for
reconsideration.10 When Co
moved for recusation, Judge

Co filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ
of preliminary injunction
(WPI) before the RTC of
Caloocan City challenging
the revival of the criminal
cases.
Co then filed a petition for
review on certiorari under
Rule 45 before the
Supreme Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No.
171096.
Before the MeTC Branch 50
where Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 were re-raffled after
the inhibition of Judge
Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for
Permanent Dismissal" on
July 13, 2006.
Co then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA
Criminal Cases.
Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion
raised the same issues
already resolved with
finality by this Court in G.R.
No. 171096.1
When the court
subsequently denied Uy’s
motion for reconsideration
on November 16, 2006,21
Uy filed a petition for
certiorari before the RTC of
Caloocan City.
Ortiz inhibited herself from
handling the criminal cases
per Order dated January 10,
2005.11 The cases were,
thereafter, raffled to the
MeTC Branch 50 of
Caloocan City.
It was, however, dismissed
for lack of merit on May 23,
2005.
Co’s motion for
reconsideration was,
subsequently, denied on
December 16, 2005.
We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.16 There
being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and
executory on March 20, 2006.
In spite of this, Judge
Esteban V. Gonzaga issued
an Order dated September
4, 2006 granting Co’s
motion
On January 28, 2008, Hon.
Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles of the RTC
Branch 121 acted
favorably on the petition,
annulling and setting
aside the Orders dated
September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 and
directing the MeTC Branch
50 to proceed with the trial
of the criminal cases.
dismissed the petition
and denied his motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, this present
petition with prayer for
TRO/WPI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE Co argues that the June 9, First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless.
DISMISSAL OF THE 2003 Order provisionally Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious,
CRIMINAL CASES dismissing Criminal Case capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or
AGAINST PETITIONER Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part
ON THE GROUND OF and 209634 should be of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a
DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT considered as a final relative term and necessarily a flexible concept."26 In determining whether
TO SPEEDY TRIAL dismissal on the ground the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
CONSTITUTES FINAL that his right to speedy trial considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors to
DISMISSAL OF THESE was denied. He reasons balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
CASES; out that from his assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such
arraignment on March 4, delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
2002 until the initial trial on suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
June 9, 2003, there was proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular
already a "vexatious, regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
capricious and oppressive" case.29 "While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and
delay, which is in violation adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive
of Section 6 of Republic the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable
of 1998)24 and Section 2, length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."
Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure25
mandating that the entire
trial period should not
exceed 180 days from the
first day of trial. As the
dismissal is deemed final,
Co contends that the MeTC
lost its jurisdiction over the
cases and cannot
reacquire jurisdiction over
the same based on a mere
motion because its revival
would already put him in
double jeopardy.

WHETHER OR NOT THE

METC ACTED WITH
JURISDICTION IN
REVIVING THE
CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST PETITIONER
WHICH WERE
DISMISSED ON THE
GROUND OF DENIAL OF
HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL; and

ASSUMING POR GRATIA Assuming that the criminal
ARGUMENTI THE cases were only
CASES WERE ONLY provisionally dismissed,
PROVISIONALLY Co further posits that such
DISMISSED: dismissal became
permanent one year after
a. WHETHER THE the issuance of the June 9,
ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF 2003 Order, not after notice
THEIR REVIVAL IS to the offended party. He
Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the
prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing
the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of
COMPUTED FROM also insists that both the
ISSUANCE OF THE filing of the motion to
ORDER OF revive and the trial court’s
PROVISIONAL issuance of the order
DISMISSAL; granting the revival must
be within the one-year
period. Lastly, even
assuming that the one-year
c. WHETHER THE period to revive the
PROVISIONALLY criminal cases started on
DISMISSED CASES July 2, 2003 when Uy
AGAINST PETITIONER received the June 9, 2003
ARE REVIVED IPSO Order, Co asserts that the
FACTO BY THE FILING motion was filed one day
OF MOTION TO REVIVE late since year 2004 was a
THESE CASES. leap year.
the order of provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is apparent
from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the
hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three
days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules.32
The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional
dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any
interest to pursue her complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the
offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in
People v. Lacson:34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the
new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the
victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the
offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if
there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the
notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to
confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The
proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice
will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to
seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid
grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the
accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving
the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses
unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent
release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill
the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine
jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the
prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the
offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his
concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting
of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the
dismissal of the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the
June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice to the offended party. When the
Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year
after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not
be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof
without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of
the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is
that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such
private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal.
When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating

b. WHETHER THE
ACTUAL NUMBER OF
DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE
BASIS FOR COMPUTING
THE ONE-YEAR TIME
BAR;
4. PEOPLE V. JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA
ISSUES
PETITIONER
On November 28, 1991, an
Information for murder committed
against Emmanuel Mendoza was
filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas,
against Joven de Grano (Joven),
Armando de Grano (Armando), and
Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao),
together with their co-accused
Leonides Landicho (Leonides),
Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and
Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who
RESPONDENT
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando,
and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty"
to the crime as charged; while their
co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and
Domingo remained at-large.
Thereafter, respondents filed a
motion for bail contending that the
prosecution’s evidence was not
strong.
RTC TANAUAN, BATANGAS
Meanwhile, considering that one of
the accused was the incumbent
Mayor of Laurel, Batangas at the
time when the crime was committed,
Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T.
Barrios moved that the venue be
transferred from the RTC, Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in
Manila. Consequently, the case was
transferred to the RTC Manila for
re-raffling amongst its Branches.
from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address.37
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made upon the latter.
the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the
court order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year
period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules.
Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the
mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court
judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative
duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times
on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the
prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them,
motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices
in not issuing the order of revival on time.
the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the
timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material
instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private
counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003.
Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the
period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the
reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private
counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into
account 2004 as a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case
should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases
against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of
whether it is a regular year or a leap year.39 Equally so, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. The
number of days is irrelevant.
RTC MANILA COURT
were at-large.
Before transferring the case to the
RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial
court deferred the resolution of
respondents’ motion for bail and
allowed the prosecution to present
evidence.
Thereafter, the hearing of the
application for bail ensued, wherein
the prosecution presented Teresita
and Dr. Leonardo Salvador. After
finding that the prosecution’s
evidence to prove treachery and
evident premeditation was not
strong, the RTC, Branch 11, Manila,
granted respondents’ motion for
bail. A motion for reconsideration
was filed, but it was denied.