Elena Dycaico vs SSS
Retirement Benefits: ….€“ (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as
Facts:
Elena Dycaico seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the decision of Social
Security Commission denying her claim for survivor’s pension which accrues from the death of her
husband, Bonifacio Dycaico.
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data
record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS.
He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997.
Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of SSS and designated Elena Dycaico and their eight children as
beneficiaries therein. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
Nine years after, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the
SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away. A few months prior to his
death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner .
Shortly after Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s pension.
Her application, however, was denied on the ground that they were not living under the benefit of
marriage when Bonifacio became a member of SSS. The basis was Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act
(Rep. Act) No. 8282 which reads: Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits . – (d) Upon the death of the retired
member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the
monthly pension.
An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but it was, likewise, denied. The same Court ruled that
that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement, his
designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries is void.
The petitioner claims that there is no merit to the decision of Court of Appeals as the SSS law does is
silent denying the beneficiary’s claim for survivor pension.
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data
record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS.
He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months
prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s pension.
Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act
(Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary
beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads: Sec. 12-B.
of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.
Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the records show that the member [referring to
Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon our receipt
of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage contract
with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement date; hence,
you could not be considered his primary beneficiary.
Petitioner contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his
SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be
made beneficiaries.
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be
legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled to the survivor’s pension. The SSS is legally bound to
respect Bonifacio’s designation of them as his’ beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be
interpreted to promote social justice. The SSC refuted the petitioner’s contention that primary
beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primary beneficiaries’
and dependents’ in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282.
Under paragraph (k) of the said provision, primary beneficiaries’ are [t]he dependent spouse
until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children: Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines
dependents’ as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over
twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent who is
receiving regular support from the member.
Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to
survivor’s pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased
member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the
date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension.
HELD:
YES For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of his retirement; in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution. The proviso infringes the equal protection clause As illustrated by the petitioner’s case,
the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the
term primary beneficiaries’ results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries
into two groups: (1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted prior to the latter’s retirement; and (2) Those dependent spouses whose respective her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivor’s pension accruing upon the death
marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement. of her husband.

The petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and those similarly situated are undoubtedly Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
discriminated against as the proviso as of the date of his retirement disqualifies them from clauses of the Constitution.
being considered primary beneficiaries’ for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension.
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the
proviso as of the date of his retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries’ in Section 12-B(d)
thereof. To the Court’s mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with the possibility of
relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. REASON OF THE
PROVISO: In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those
contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the
other spouse. This concern is concededly valid.

However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor’s

pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the
other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the
achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to members and
their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies. A resulting in loss of income or financial burden."

The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such
classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective. For if it were the
intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in contemplation of imminent death,
then it should have prescribed a definite “duration-of-relationship or durational period of relationship
as one of the requirements for entitlement to survivor’s pension.

Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to
the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latter’s retirement for the purpose of entitlement
to survivor’s pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory.
The proviso infringes the due process clause As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance
System v. Montesclaros, [18] the Court characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a
retiree. We held therein that “[i]n a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the
prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is
part of the terms of employment.

The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the
due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the
retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be
heard. Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the proviso
as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.

The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.[29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is
absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required the
parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in