Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Rep.

199 SCRA 692 / July 30, 1991

Facts: This case arose when the petitioner, Antonio Y. Co filed an election protest on the grounds that
Jose Ong, Jr is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of second district of
Northern Samar. Prior to this, the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives declared that
respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar
for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was
held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China
and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the respondent,
Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915,
he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984,
the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986,
Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those
elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino
mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural
born citizens. Besides, respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a
person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he
should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of friend or relative. To require him
to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be the same as to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting
and residence requirements.

Bengson III vs. HRET

G.R. No. 142840 / May 7, 2001

Facts: The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen. "Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted
in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country. "On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
11, 1998 elections. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held: YES. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such,
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives. The petition is hereby DISMISSED

Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 221697-221700 / March 8, 2016

Facts: Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant
in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care and custody
over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been reported and
registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was
given the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka
Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her adoption. The
trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied and
was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport.

She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and pursuing a
degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from
Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
 She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S.,
in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her
eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to support
her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her youngest
daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back to the
Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a
TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired property where she and her children resided.

In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No.
9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children which was granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport;
appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of
Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013
Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in
the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City
on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born
citizenship issue.

Issue: Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Held: Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino. It ruled
that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized.
 There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings as the three Constitution’s guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the
laws.

Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to
the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.

Djumantan vs. Domingo

G.R. No. 99358 / January 30, 1995

Facts: Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.He then
embraced and was converted to Islam. He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic
rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived
in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family
of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,”
petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were
admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship
of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently
dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor
to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’
eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was
detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on
the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage
of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.

Issue: Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to
permanent resident legal.

Held: There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country
and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such
privileges were obtained through misinterpretation. Never was the marriage of petitioner to
Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and
for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical
to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry
into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation,
their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.
 There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less
to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen
does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and
exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make
her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon
the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any
alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an
indefinite stay. An alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be
admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent
residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and
their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino
citizens.

Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano

(1968)

Facts: On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of Immigration
that, on the basis of the findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of
former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them
cable authorization No. 2230-V (File No. 23617) authorizing the documentation of Beato Go
Callano and others, were not authentic. Thereupon, the Department declared several documents
- amongst them the cable authorization just mentioned - to be null, void and of no effect, and the
documentation made by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong pursuant to said cable
authorization consisting of the certificates of registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano
and his brothers Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio for travel to the Philippines were cancelled. All this
was done without previous notice served nor hearing granted to said parties.

On August 21 of the same year, the Board of Immigration Commissioners, exercising its power of
review under Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, issued, also without any
previous notice and hearing, an order reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated
January 4, 1962, admitting Beato and his three brothers for entry as citizens; ordering their
exclusion as aliens not properly documented for admission pursuant to Section 27 (a)(17) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and ordering that they be returned to the port
whence they came or to the country of which they were nationals, upon the ground that they had
been able "to enter this country and gain admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulently secured
authorization." On the same date (August 21, 1962) the Commissioner of Immigration issued a
warrant of exclusion commanding the deportation officer "to carry out the exclusion of the above-
named applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on the first available transportation and on the same
class of accommodation in which they arrived to the port whence they came or to the country of
which they are nationals."
The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served immediately upon the parties
ordered deported, who, on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for injunction to restrain the Board of Immi-gration Commissioners and the Commissioner
of Immigration from executing the order of exclusion or deportation already men-tioned. They
based their action on the following grounds: (1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude them
from the Philippines because they were not aliens but Filipino citizens, and (2) that the order of
exclusion was issued by the Board without due process and in violation of the Constitution.
Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of pre-liminary injunction restraining the
respondents in the case from deporting the petitioners. After trial, the Court ren-dered judgment
finding that, according to petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the petitioners herein are the
illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her common law husband - a Chinese
citizen", and concluding that "until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered
as citizens of the Philippines as they were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father who,
however, was not married to their mother."

Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however, the Court dismissed the case holding
that "the petitioners are citizens of the Republic of China and not being properly docu-mented for
entry into the Philippines as found by the Immigration Commissioner, the writ of preliminary
injunction hereto-fore issued by this Court shall be deemed dissolved upon fi-nality of this
decision." The grounds upon which the Court based its decision were: (1) because petitioners
stayed in China for a period of fifteen years before returning to the Philippines, they must be
considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic; (2) as petitioners were recognized by their alien
father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the Chinese law of nationality. While
the Court also found that the cable authorization mentioned here-tofore was a forgery, it held
that, for the purpose of the petition before it, "it was immaterial to determine the genuiness or
falsity of the cable authorization.", "For if the petitioners are Filipino citizens, they are entitled to
remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic in whatever way they might have
entered."

After the denial of herein respondents' motion for reconsideration, they appealed to the Court of
Appeals where they raised the following issues: (a) that being Filipino citizens by birth, they did
not lose their citizenship nor acquire Chinese citizenship, neither by their prolonged stay in China
nor by their alleged recognition by their Chinese father, and (b) that the cablegram authorization
was not a forgery.

In due time the Court of Appeals rendered the decision now under review by certiorari, reversing
that of the lower court.

Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals found that the herein respondents were the
illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, who
started living maritally in Malitbog, Leyte, in 1934; that out of their illegitimate union were born
the fol-lowing: Beato, in Sugod, Leyte, on September 28, 1936; Manuel, in Libagon, Leyte, on June
17, 1941, Gonzalo, in Malitbog, Leyte, on April 17, 1943 and Julio, in Malitbog, Leyte, on January
31, 1945. The Court of Appeals also found that in 1946, Go Chiao Lin, Emilia and their four sons
went to Amoy, China, on vacation, but Go died there the same year. In 1948, Emilia had to return
to the Philippines as the maid of Consul Eutiquio Sta. Romana because she was penniless, leaving
 her children behind. Subsequently the latter were able to go to Hongkong where they sought and
obtained employment. In 1961, they applied with the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for
entry into the Philippines as Filipino citizens. On December 12 of that year, the Consulate received
a cablegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs authorizing it to investigate whether the
petitioners for entry were the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, and, if
satisfied, after a thorough screening, to issue the corresponding document certifying that they
were Filipino citizens. The Consulate made thereafter the appro-priate investigation, and on the
basis of the evidence presented consisting of the sworn statements of the applicants, their birth
certificates and blood test reports, said office issued late that month a certificate of registration
and identity to the effect that the applicants had submitted sufficient evi-dence of their citizenship
and identity and had been allowed to register in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel
directly to the Philippines.

On December 26 of the same year 1961, they arrived in Manila by plane from Hongkong. As the
Immigration Inspector at the airport was of the opinion that their travel documents did not
constitute conclusive proof of citizenship, he referred their case to the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 2. Thereupon the latter conducted an investigation at which the respondents presented oral
and documentary evidence to sustain their right to admission as Filipinos (Exhs. B, D, E and H; pp.
93-98; 99-100; 101-102; 104 of the Record). Upon these evidence, the Board on January 4, 1962,
promulgated a decision finding the Go Callano brothers to be the illegitimate children of Emilia
Callano, a Filipino citizen, and entitled to admission, as they were in fact admitted, as Filipino
citizens.

That Go Chiao Lin, a chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipina, lived maritally in several
municipalities of Leyte since 1934 and that out of their union the four private respondents were
born, are facts found, after appropriate pro-ceedings, first, by the Philippine Consulate General in
HongKong; second, by the Board of Special Inquiry who investigated their case in Manila upon
their arrival thereat in 1961; third, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and lastly, by the Court
of Appeals.

Issue: Wether or not the Go Callano Brothers lost their Filipino citizenship

Held: No. The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently
acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of recognition or a
pro-longed stay in China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine,
which cannot be resolved by a Philippine court without encroaching on the legal system of China.
For, the settled rule of international law, af-firmed by the Hague Convention on Conflict of
Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is that "Any question
as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state should be determined in
accordance with the law of that state." (quoted in Salonga, Private International Law, 1957 Ed., p.
112.) There was no necessity of deciding that question because so far as concerns the petitioners'
status, the only question in this proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their Philippine citizenship
upon the performance of certain acts or the happening of certain events in China? In deciding
this question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at
birth, and their status must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity
with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows: "Laws relating to
 family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine
Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.",
which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be
determined by no other than the Philippine law.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation
of citizenship; subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country; rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country;
cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; declaration by competent authority that he is a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman, by marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the grounds for losing Philippine
citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status
by reason of such recognition. About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which closely
bears on the petitioners' case is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in support
of the conclusion that petitioners lost their Philippine citizenship because the law requires an
express renunciation, which means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication; a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language,
as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. (Opinion No. 69 of the Secre-tary of
Justice, Series of 1940.) Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, a
case for deportation, where Ong, a natural child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, born
in the Philippines, was brought by his parents to China when he was 4 years old, where he
remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to the Philippines at 25 years of age, "The fact that a minor
child in those conditions was taken to China and remained there for several years is not suffi-cient
ground upon which to hold that he has changed his nationality, when, after reaching his majority,
he did not express his desire to choose the nationality of his father." The import of the foregoing
pronouncement is that of itself a protracted stay in a foreign country does not amount to
renunciation. Moreover, herein petitioners were all minors when they were brought to China in
1946. They were without legal capacity to renounce their status. Upon their return to the
Philippines only Beato Go Callano had attained the age of majority, but even as to him there could
not have been renunciation because he did not manifest by direct and appropriate language that
he was disclaiming Philippine citizenship. On the contrary, after he has attained the age of
majority, he applied for registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry into this country,
which are clear indicia of his intent to continue his former status. The foregoing shows that the
petitioners have not lost their Philippine citizenship.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC

(1989 and 1996)

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was
 also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo.

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States
as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos.

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February
21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said
orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits
scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.

Issue: WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,
1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely
secondary to this basic question.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing
his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge
to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered
only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
his loyalty and love.
Labo Jr. vs. COMELEC

Facts: In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a
petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo
avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual
citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married
an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later
declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an
Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of
the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

Issues: Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen.

Held: No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized
as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It
was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of
Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in
1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost
his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he
lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he
must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none
of this happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution
simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is
Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.

Aznar vs. COMELEC

Facts: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC
for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.

In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to
the evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate
son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines.
 COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack
of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of
winning candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship

HELD: SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision. The petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided
for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent
vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a
valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process
in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private
respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact
that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In
the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship
when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied"

Mercado vs. Manzano

(1999)

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the
highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition
for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position. However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.

Held: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance
on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result
of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
 nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Jacot vs. Dal

G.R. No. 179848, 2008

Facts: Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections,
on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989.
He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is
an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance
of having more than one citizenship.

Sobejana Condon vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 198742, 2012

Facts: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage
to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known
as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and
the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia,
which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an
Australian citizen.

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in
her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
 Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8
(private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen
and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased
to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and
that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold
office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.

After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the second
division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006,
she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does
not apply to her.

Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225

Held: R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil
and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed
in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was
not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
 The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it
was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon
void.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE).

Maquiling vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 195649, 2013

Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim
of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.

Held: Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008
when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation.
By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a
dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for
public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
 However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing
his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether
he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy,
thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively
and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.

Arnado vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 210164, 2015

Facts: Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later, however, he became an American citizen. On
July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines. On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship. On
November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.

A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification case against Arnado on the ground that
Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship in April 2009. It was argued that
such act of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance and that is a ground for disqualification
under the Local Government Code. In short, it was argued that Arnado remained a US citizen.

In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to run for public office because he complied
with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which provides that a former Filipino citizen may
run for elective public office if (1) they meet the qualifications for the elective office they desire,
and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships – which must
be done before the filing of the COC.

Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after April 2009 was because of the fact that he
did not know yet that he had been issued already a Philippine passport; that when he received
said Philippine passport, he used it since then; that at any rate, Arnado, on November 30, 2009,
again executed an Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance before a notary public.
 Balua however presented proof that Arnado again used his US passport in January 2010 and in
March 2010.

Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado, who won the 2010 elections, and
declared another rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. 195649). Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for the May 2013
elections. Another rival candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on
the ruling in G.R. No. 195649. While the case was pending, Arnado won the 2013 elections as he
even acquired 84% of the votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan.

Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013 Elections and his
declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC as he argued that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He averred that he was able to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225; and that his disqualification only disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan
voters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by Arnado are tenable.

HELD: No. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not override the requirements set by
law. The fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in Kauswagan cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications. Election victory
cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain
provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless.

The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed
to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines
and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed
recanted or withdrawn when he again used his US passport.

In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used his US passport in January 2010
and March 2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run for public
office. What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in the 2013 elections, was to
renounce again (for the third time) his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he was rightfully
disqualified in the 2013 elections too.

Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010,
he is still disqualified. Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to November 2009 was
cured when he again made a second renunciation of his US citizenship on November 30, 2009.
However, the Affidavit of Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a mere photocopy of
the original. Under the Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), the
original must be presented unless the same is lost. In this case, the original was never alleged to
have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was being used belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never
formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, “The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.”

David vs. Agbay

G.R. No. 199113, 2015

Facts: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach
in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they
built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225. The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. An information
for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued
against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted
to have been committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded
that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC.
The petition was denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in
his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. 9225.

Held: Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section
3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship,
in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who
became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together
with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the
new law’s effectivity.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.

Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization
in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
 falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as
his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause
for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

In Re: Petition to Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Phils.

B.M. No. 2112, 2012

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March
21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of
America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003"
by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice
of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere
photocopies thereof, to wit:

 Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;
 Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
 Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
 Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
 Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed
by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the
benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December
1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant
to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner's
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and
later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

It cannot be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest
that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required
the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in
relation to his petition:

 Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

 Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
 Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
 Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
 Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
 Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
 Proof of payment of professional tax; and
 Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

 Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

 Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
 Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
 Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
 Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
 Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
 Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
 Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE
Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all
the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that
the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition
that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-
acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed

forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in
theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
ARTICLE IV – 1987 Constitution

CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.