Evidence - 06/05/2019

People vs. Adoviso

GR No. 116196; June 23, 1999

FACTS: Pablo Adoviso, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and four
John Does, were tried for the MURDER of Rufino Agunos and Emeterio Vazquez. Pablo Adoviso was positively
identified by Bonifacio Agunos, the son of one of the victims, because the former did not wear a mask in the
perpetration of the crime.

Aside from denial and alibi, the defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph
Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on Adoviso.
In Polygraph Report No. 900175, Lucena opined that Adoviso’s “polygrams revealed that there were no specific
reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant” to the investigation of the crimes. The RTC of
Camarines Sur found Adoviso guilty.

On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of “mere conjectures and
speculations,” appellant argues that the negative result of the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the
scales of justice in his favor. ISSUE: Whether or not the result of the polygraph test should be given weight and be
admitted as evidence?

HELD: NO. A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records
certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee’s
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person
who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be
recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when
offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the
accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this
jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, stating that much faith and credit should not be vested upon a lie detector
test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to
him.

Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the killings to
murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In other words, there is treachery
when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and
without warning. The victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault — Rufino was sleeping
and Emetario was going down the stairs when they were shot.

Een vs. Consolidated Freightways

Civ. No. 2831; April 1, 1954

FACTS: This is an action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a collision between a car driven by
the plaintiff Clarence O. Een, and a truck drive by the defendant Dulski and owned by the defendant Consolidated
Freightways. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Court is now presented with plaintiff’s motion
for a new trial. Such motion is based principally upon the grounds that the Court erred in allowing a defendant’s
witness, one John Holcomb, a deputy sherrif and former city policeman with over 17 years experience
investigating accidents as law enforcement officer, to testify, over objection, that from his observations he
believed the collision had occured on the west (defendant’s) side of the highway. After establishing Holcomb’s
qualifications and having him describe what he found and what he did, defendants’ counsel asked him if, from his
observations, he had formed an opinion as to where the impact occured. Upon receiving an affirmative answer,
he was asked to state the opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of Holcomb should be admissible as evidence.

HELD: YES. The defendants cite Zelayeta vs. Pacific Greyhound Lines for the conclusion that under the
circumstances in this case, the opinion of Holcomb was properly admitted. While the decision is not that of the
highest appellate court in California, the reasoning in the opinion is highly persuasive. This Court is of the opinion
that under the circumstances as they existed and in considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the opinion
of the witness Holcomb was properly admitted. It was the view of the Court at the time the ruling was made
during trial that the subject was a proper one for the admission of an opinion of a concededly qualified expert.
The physical facts and circumstances found immediately after the accident prompted contrary inferences to be
argued with equal earnestness by able and experienced counsel. The witness had personally observed the
physical facts and circumstances soon after the accident occurred, before the damaged vehicles had been moved,
and before the highway had been opened to other traffic, and the witness was qualified through long years of
experience in the investigation of automobile accidents. Where the inference or conclusion to be drawn is not so
obvious that it can ve said that the jurors were as equally competent to reach it as one skilled through long
experience, then the opinion of one who is so skilled is not admissible but may be of aid to jurors.

Ruth vs. Fenchel

21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373; March 21, 1956

FACTS: In this automobile accident case Mrs. Ruth had a verdict of $2,000 for personal injuries. She was
allowed a new trial as to damages only at which a verdict of $10,000 was returned in her favor. Defendant
appealed to the Appellate Division, challenging the award of the new trial or, alternatively, its limitation to
damages only, and asserting error at the new trial in permitting cross-examination of defendant's medical
experts, Dr. Solk and Dr. Reilly, based upon medical treatises which were not relied upon by them in forming
their expert opinions.

The attack grounded in the cross-examination of defendant's medical experts relates to Mrs. Ruth's claim that
she suffered a "whiplash" injury of the neck from the accident. The neck pains did not manifest themselves until
some four months after the mishap. Defendant's medical testimony was in substance that the onset of pain
symptomatic of "whiplash" must appear within a few hours. Mrs. Ruth's medical experts, on the other hand,
testified that a "whiplash" could first manifest itself up to a year or even two years after the accident.

When Dr. Solk was cross-examined at the new trial the cross-examiner produced a copy of the medical treatise
by Key and Conwell, Fractures, Dislocations and Sprains, published in 1946. Dr. Solk identified the authors as
"orthopedic surgeons," and to the question, "Do you recognize Key and Conwell?," answered, "Yes, they are very,
very capable." He said that he had read "these authors" but not "that volume." Over objection by defendant's
counsel, the cross-examiner was permitted to require Dr. Solk to read excerpts from the treatise. Then Dr. Solk
summarized what he had read as saying "that you can have a whiplashing injury to the cord, to the cervical spine
and the symptoms complained of in some future date * * * up to a two-year period. They said that." From the
context of a question later put to him, we gather that what Dr. Solk read was the statement by the authors that
"The question of injury, whether recent or remote, is frequently slurred over by the patient for the reason that
painful symptoms do not develop until some time after, a good many times years after, the injury occurs." Dr.
Solk said that he did "not fully" agree with this opinion.

Dr. Reilly characterized the Key and Conwell treatise as "an excellent textbook," "one of the textbooks I have in
my library." Dr. Reilly acknowledged that he had read the book and that it contained the statement that a good
many times the symptoms of whiplash do not show up for years after the injury. He said that he agreed with that
statement "but not in its entirety," "I agree in general with the conclusions, but not the whole statement."

The cross-examiner also attempted to cross-examine Dr. Solk upon the basis of a paper by Doctors James R. Gay
and Kenneth H. Abbott appearing in an issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association. Appellant also
asserts error in this respect, but as the trial judge sustained his objections to all the significant questions put by
the cross-examiner in this connection we perceive no ground for the prejudice claimed. The point argued as to
the use of the treatises will therefore be decided in relation to the Key and Conwell book alone.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attention of an expert witness may be called in the course of cross-examination
to statements in conflict with his testimony contained in relevant scientific works not relied upon by him to
support his opinion but which he recognizes as authoritative.

HELD: The opinion of the Appellate Division goes beyond this limited aspect of the "learned treatises"
exception to the hearsay rule. That opinion deals expansively with the exception in its broad form as it appears at
page 165 of the Report of the Supreme Court's Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evidence, dated May 25,
1955. But that report has not *176 yet been acted upon and, apart from considerations which ordinarily suggest
in every case a decision confined to the issues presented on appeal, it is particularly appropriate in this instance
that our opinion be restrained within the necessities of the case. This we shall do, leaving all other aspects of the
"learned treatises" exception to the event of final action upon the report, except as meanwhile their treatment
may be compelled in cases which present them as issues for decision.

Where the contents of a treatise is offered as substantive evidence in the case, the general rule has been to deny
admission principally upon the ground that the offer of the contents in evidence purports to employ
testimonially a statement out of court by a person not subjected to cross-examination. The decisions of our
former Court of Errors and Appeals in Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., and New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v.
Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co., instance the general rule against admission of learned treatises as a substantive medium
of proof of the facts they set forth. In both cases texts were offered in evidence to buttress the opinion of an
expert witness testifying in behalf of the party making the offer.

But where, as in the instant case, the cross-examiner directs the attention of the expert witness to the contents
of treatises expressing an opinion at variance with the opinion of the witness, and does so, not to prove the
contrary opinion but merely to call into question the weight to be attached by the fact finder to the opinion of
the witness, the law of this State allows such use of the treatise even if not relied upon by the witness in arriving
at his opinion, provided the witness admits that the treatise is a recognized and standard authority on the
subject.

Galian vs. State Assurance Co.

G.R. No. 8405; February 10, 1915

FACTS: The property was insured on January 25, 1912, for P3,000. On March 25, 1912, the day following the
fire, the insured presented an itemized statement of the total value of which he claims to be P4,512. The insured
property was not a total loss, and some of it was afterward sold by the insured at public auction for the net
amount of P120.40. The complaint prays for the recovery of the total amount of the policy less two-thirds of the
P120.40, or P2,919.74.

The insurance company interposed a special defense to the effect that the policy had been forfeited by reason of
the fact that the claim presented by the plaintiff was fraudulently false in that (a) the insured had alleged a total
loss, (b) that not all the articles listed in the plaintiff's claim of loss were in the house where and when the fire
occurred, and (c) that the plaintiff had attributed much greater value to the articles included in the list than they
were worth.

Upon trial there was evidence for the plaintiff that the statement presented to the insurance company after the
fire was substantially correct, both in quantities and values. The plaintiff testified that the statement was
prepared from memory immediately after the fire by himself with the assistance of his brother. The
defendant introduced three witnesses, who were sent to the scene of the fire shortly after it occurred to
estimate the value of the property contained in the house. From photographs submitted in evidence it appears
that the first floor of the plaintiff's residence was not damaged by the fire at all, but did suffer damage from
water and breakage. In the parlor on the second floor the rattan work on the chairs was entirely consumed, but
the woodwork was probably only charred or scorched. The fire did the most damage in the bedroom, where the
roof partly fell in. Articles of clothing contained in the wardrobes in this room are visible in the photograph, they
having evidently been taken out for inspection after the fire. Mr. Young testified that upon request of the
defendant company he had examined the contents of the house and estimated the loss at P1,000. He said,
however, that this was only a casual estimate. They pulled out a few drawers of the wardrobes and examined
some of the wearing apparel contained in them. Mr. Dow testified that he made a rough estimate of
the damage done. He estimated the value of the goods on the first floor at P500, and said that from what he
saw of the remains on the upper floor, P1,500 would be a liberal estimate of the damage done. He did not
believe that there was P4,000 worth of property on the second floor. Mr. Laing, agent of the defendant company,
estimated the loss at P1,500. This, he thought, was a very liberal estimate. He appears to have made a more
careful estimate of the value of the different articles than either of the other witnesses called by the
defendant. He testified that nothing had been entirely consumed by the fire. In this he is contradicted by the
plaintiff, who claims that some of the furniture, even, was totally consumed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the witnesses as to the value of the property admissible.

HELD: After a careful examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion that there is no satisfactory
evidence that the plaintiff included in his itemized list of property contained in the house at the time of the
fire, any property which was not there. The plaintiff prepared the list from memory, and absolute accuracy
could hardly be expected.

The testimony of the three witnesses introduced by the defendant we decline to accept for two reasons: First,
because it appears that some of the plaintiff's property was entirely consumed by the fire and some was so badly
damaged that it was impossible to judge of its value. In the second place, the inspection made by these several
witnesses was so superficial, in view of their opportunity, that their conclusions do not carry conviction.

As to the ruling of the trial court that the plaintiff and his brother were not qualified to appraise the value of the
household effects of the former, we must say that we do not agree with the learned trial court on the
point. There is nothing in the whole list, except the jewelry, but what may be legitimately described as household
effects furniture, clothing, dishes, kitchen utensils, etc. They are articles with which all people of ordinary
education and refinement are reasonably familiar. Such articles are on sale in retail shops everywhere and the
prices are readily available to anyone seeking the information. Not only this, but most of them are articles which
persons with a reasonably fair income purchase for their own convenience and comfort. Hence, information as to
their value must necessarily be acquired by all such individuals. While the knowledge of some persons on the
subject may be greater than that possessed by others, this is true of all other branches of knowledge and equally
as true of experts. For these reasons we cannot subscribe to the proposition that none but experts can testify as
to the value of ordinary household articles.

"The knowledge of values in most cases does not depend upon professional or other special skill; and witnesses
without having any special experience or training as would entitle them to be called experts, may yet
have gained such knowledge of the land, or other subject under inquiry, as to aid the court or jury in arriving at
a conclusion. * * * Persons by their common experience and observation necessarily gain some knowledge as
to the values of those articles which are in common use by all or nearly all; and their evidence as to such values is
not excluded by the fact that experts may have more accurate knowledge as to such values. Obviously the
witness must have some means of knowledge as to the nature and quality of the articles in question before he is
qualified to express an opinion as to values. It would be an idle ceremony to allow witnesses to give their
opinions in evidence, unless they had better means of knowledge as to the subject matter of their testimony
than the jury might possess in common with all other persons. The qualification of the witness is, of course, a
question for the court."

The plaintiff was intimately acquainted with the articles described by him. He, no doubt, had purchased most of
them. One could hardly expect to be in much better position to estimate the value of the articles than this. We
conclude, therefore, that the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that the quantity and quality of the
goods contained in the house at the time of the fire were substantially those described by the plaintiff in his
claim of loss. Having reached this conclusion, we presume that the defendant company will no longer insist upon
the remainder of its points, which would, if decided favorably to its contention, tend to reduce the total value of
the plaintiff's household effects, but not to a figure which would make the company's liability under the policy
less than that which they would be held liable under the coinsurance clause of the policy.

People vs. Duranan

GR 134074-75; January 16, 2001

FACTS: Accused was convicted of raping a mentally retarded woman. Accused contends that there were no
findings that the victim was insane or otherwise retarded because no expert witness was presented. Only the
mother of the victim testified as to the sanity of the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not an expert testimony is necessary to ascertain the mental capacity of the witness.

HELD: Rule 130, sec. 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Opinion of Ordinary witnesses: The
opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding: a. the identify of a
person about whom he has adequate knowledge; b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and; c.
themental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The mother of an offended party in case
ofrape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born,
what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. It is competent
for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness
has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before
he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion
as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such
person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other
observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.

Ilao-Quianay vs. Mapile

G.R. No. 154087; October 25, 2005

FACTS: Subject of the case was a parcel of land owned by the deceased Simplicio Ilao, in a judicial settlement
of Ilao’s estate, the heirs found an adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT no. 48529 claimed by certain
Juanito Ibarra. Respondent filed a motion to exclude property from inventory on ground that it does not form
part of Ilao’s estate having disposed of during lifetime. Petitioner’s filed a case for quieting of title and damages
before the RTC of Manila. Relevantly, Ibarra filed a petition for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of subject
property on the ground that it was lost by fire. Respondent filed a case for specific performance and declaring a
nullity of Contract claiming that claim of Ibarra over the property was sold to him. Trial Court rendered decision
upholding the validity of the notarized Deed of Sale due to the conflicting testimonies of the two handwriting
experts. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was countered by an Omnibus Motion to strike out
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners being pro forma and seek a writ of execution, the latter was upheld
and the former was denied hence, they appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision
and stated that the appellate court does not take cognizance of cases based on question of fact but only law via
this petition for review hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged forgery will invalidate the Deed of Sale

HELD: Question on whether Ilao’s signature in the Deed of Sale was a forgery is a question of fact which
requires appraisal and re-evaluation of the evidence presented by parties. Such procedure is beyond the court’s
dominion because factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding on
the Supreme Court but admits certain exceptions found under the 1997 revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

The validity of the deed of sale should, therefore, be recognized, the only opposition thereto being the alleged
forgery of Ilao’s signature which, was not satisfactorily demonstrated. There is no doubt that the deed of sale
was duly acknowledged before a notary public. As a notarized document, it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

Tijing vs. CA
G.R. No. 125901; March 8, 2001

FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was
born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila.

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith
proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida
that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house
after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her
barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.

Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the
disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.

Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first
time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the
late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the
boy despite her demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez.
The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at
her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. The second witness,
Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the
edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further
declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita
were not blessed with children.

ISSUE: Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the
son of petitioners.

HELD: A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the
birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed,
she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife
who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order
from the clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son.
Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife,
Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead
of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the
attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default
of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the
local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas
Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false
because even private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife". This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two
had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's
conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of
the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the
signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ
of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

People vs. Umanito

G.R. No. 172607; April 16, 2009

FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had
resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child hereinafter identified as “BBB.”

In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering whether or
not Umanito is the father of BBB.

With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child.

The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not
to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results. The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the
confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby
ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.

The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, to
determine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in all
of the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is a
99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB.

The defense admitted that if the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a
disputable presumption of paternity.

ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].

HELD: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA
Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA,
Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was
raped by Umanito.

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).

The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and
overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the
DNA testing (Exhibits “A” and “B” inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.

By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the
Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.

Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and
that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny
Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Bautista vs. Sarmiento

G.R. No. L-45137; September 23, 1985

FACTS: An information charging Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere with estafa was filed
before the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento. The third accused, Teresita Vergere, was granted a separate trial.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only
witness. Thereafter, petitioners, believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the evidence.

The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss are as follows: First, the information alleges that the two accused
received jewelries from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on April 19, 1975 on consignment. The defense' contention is that the
jewelries were received by the said accused by virtue of purchase and sale. The defense overlooks the other
allegation in the Information specifically alleging that the pieces of jewelries should be sold by the accused on
commission basis and to pay or to deliver the proceeds thereof to Dr. Leticia C. Yap if sold, and if not sold to
return said jewelries.

The Court believes that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information
against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record, and denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted on the ground that the court found prima facie
evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: NO. A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counter-balance the
general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by evidence
tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the
establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion
of the jury be such as to rebut and control it.

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by
way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them,
they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if
not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of
the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of
proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed—the
prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the
case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances
that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.

A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater weight.
Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient.
As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight of
evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff who has the burden of
proof, he cannot prevail.

In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to present their evidence.
They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable result was that the
burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their
guilt.

MARUBENI CORPORATION vs. LIRAG

G.R. NO. 130998; 362 SCRA 620 (2001)

FACTS: Petitioner Marubeni Corporation is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Japan. It was doing business in the Philippines through its duly licensed, wholly owned subsidiary companies.

On January 27, 1989, respondent Felix Lirag filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati a complaint for specific
performance and damages claiming that petitioners owed him the sum of P6,000,000.00 representing
commission pursuant to an oral consultancy agreement with Marubeni.

The consultancy agreement was not reduced into writing because of the mutual trust between Marubeni and
the Lirag family. Their close business and personal relationship dates back to 1960, when respondent’s family was
engaged in the textile fabric manufacturing business, in which Marubeni supplied the needed machinery,
equipment, spare parts and raw materials.

In compliance with the agreement, respondent Lirag made representations with various government officials,
arranged for meetings and conferences, relayed pertinent information as well as submitted feasibility studies and
project proposals, including pertinent documents required by petitioners. As petitioners had been impressed
with respondent’s performance, six (6) additional projects were given to his group under the same undertaking.
One of the projects handled by respondent Lirag, the Bureau of Post project, amounting to P100,000,000.00 was
awarded to the “Marubeni-Sanritsu tandem.” Despite respondent’s repeated formal verbal demands for
payment of the agreed consultancy fee, petitioners did not pay. In response to the first demand letter,
petitioners promised to reply within fifteen (15) days, but they did not do so.

On April 29, 1993, the trial court promulgated a decision and ruled that respondent is entitled to a
commission. Respondent was led to believe that there existed an oral consultancy agreement. Hence, he
performed his part of the agreement and helped petitioners get the project.

The Court of Appeals relied on the doctrine of admission by silence in upholding the existence of a consultancy
agreement, noting that petitioner Tanaka’s reaction to respondent’s September 26, 1988 demand letter was not
consistent with their claim that there was no consultancy agreement. On the contrary, it lent credence to
respondent’s claim that they had an existing consultancy agreement.

The Court of Appeals observed that if indeed there were no consultancy agreement, it would have been easy for
petitioners to simply deny respondent’s claim. Yet, they did not do so. The conglomeration of these
circumstances bolstered the existence of the oral consultancy agreement.

ISSUE: (1) whether or not there was a consultancy agreement between petitioners and respondent; and
corollary to this, (2) whether or not respondent is entitled to receive a commission if there was, in fact, a
consultancy agreement

HELD: Wherefore, the petition is granted. the decision of the court of appeals is hereby set aside. Civil Case
No. 89-3037 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City is hereby dismissed.

No costs

An assiduous scrutiny of the testimonial and documentary evidence extant leads us to the conclusion that the
evidence could not support a solid conclusion that a consultancy agreement, oral or written, was agreed
between petitioners and respondent. Respondent attempted to fortify his own testimony by presenting several
corroborative witnesses. However, what was apparent in the testimonies of these witnesses was the fact that
they learned about the existence of the consultancy agreement only because that was what respondent told
them.

In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; a mere allegation is not evidence. He must
establish his cause by a preponderance of evidence, which respondent failed to establish in the instant case.

Any agreement entered into because of the actual or supposed influence which the party has, engaging him to
influence executive officials in the discharge of their duties, which contemplates the use of personal influence
and solicitation rather than an appeal to the judgment of the official on the merits of the object sought is
contrary to public policy. Consequently, the agreement, assuming that the parties agreed to the consultancy, is
null and void as against public policy. Therefore, it is unenforceable before a court of justice.

In light of the foregoing, we rule that the preponderance of evidence established no consultancy agreement
between petitioners and respondent from which the latter could anchor his claim for a six percent (6%)
consultancy fee on a project that was not awarded to petitioners.
Malana vs. People

G.R. No. 173612; March 26, 2008

FACTS: The petitioners Dominador and Rodel, together with their acquitted co-accused Elenito, were charged
with the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder before the RTC. The charges stemmed from an incident
that left Betty dead, and her daughter Suzette and granddaughter injured. The appellants pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment. Vicente, the husband of deceased Betty, testified that appellants had been threatening
to liquidate him and his family, due to their belief that he was in the practice of witchcraft by which he had
caused the deaths of Rodels parents-in-law.

Appellants proffered the defenses of denial and alibi. The RTC found Dominador and Rodel guilty of two (2)
separate crimes of murder and frustrated murder, and acquitted Elenito on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The trial court gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Vicente and Suzette who positively identified the
appellants as two of the three perpetrators of the crime. However, the trial court acquitted Elenito as he was not
positively identified by Suzette as the third man and his physical appearance does not fit the description of the
tall fat man seen by Suzette. The CA affirmed the guilt of appellants.

ISSUE: What is the “Equipoise” rule? When can this be invoked?

HELD: This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is, therefore, no
equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. Said rule is not applicable in the case before us because the
evidence here presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming.

Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the prosecution, appellants could only offer denials and
uncorroborated alibi. It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter.
Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants as two of the
perpetrators of the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when the
felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time it was committed. This they failed to prove.

Ultimately, the Court also said that there is no merit in appellants assiduous assertion that they should be
acquitted under the equipoise rule in view of what to them are doubts as to their guilt.

Pormellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration

1 SCRA 375

FACTS: The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled through
the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. In May 1941, the said Estate was acquired by the Government & was
entrusted to an office known as the Rural Progress Admin., which was later abolished & its functions was
transferred to the Bureau of Lands. Recently, such duties was given to the Land Tenure Administration.

The plaintiff acquired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in question from Vicente San Jose,
predecessor-in-interest. After the purchase of the Santa Clara Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs were
allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot, as fenced, included two hundred (200)
sq.m. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two (2) smaller lots, No. 44 and
78. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Hermino Guzman. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to compel the Director of
Lands to execute a Deed of Sale in their favor & declare null and void the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 44, executed in
favor of respondent Hemino. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the
Court of Appeals, dismissing the petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot, allegedly includes
200 sq.m.

HELD: The judgment under review was affirmed.

The lot on which San Jose’s house stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned.
Significantly, the plaintiff cannot show a contract whereby the Rural Progress Admin., has sold or promised to sell
them a lot of 200 sq.m. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.

Moreover the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private
document and does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. Acts and contracts which have for
their subject the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property
must appear in a public document.

IFC v. Tobias

L-41555 July 27, 1977

FACTS: Tobias bought on installment one a Dodge truck from Leelin Motors, Inc. To answer for his obligation
he executed a promissory note in favor of the latter, for the sum of P29.070.28 payable in thirty-six (36) equal
installments with interest at the rate of 12% per annum payable in the amounts and dates indicated in said
promissory note. To secure payment of the promissory note, respondent Tobias executed in favor of Leelin
Motors, Inc. a chattel mortgage on the Dodge truck. Leelin Motors, Inc. indorsed the promissory note and
assigned the chattel mortgage to petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation.

Tobias paid six (6) installments on the promissory note directly to the petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation
but defaulted on more than two installments, IFC through a letter gave Tobias a choice of either paying the
balance of the purchase price or surrender the truck. Tobias responded to the letter voluntarily and willingly
surrendering the truck which was still in the custody of Leelin Motors ever since the truck met an accident. Upon
learning that the truck met an accident, IFC decided not to get the truck anymore from Leelin Motors. Instead,
IFC filed an action against Tobias to recover the unpaid balance of the promissory note.

ISSUE: Whether possession by the mortgagee of the disputed vehicle bars its foreclosure
HELD: Possession by the mortgagee of the disputed vehicle bars the chattel mortgage foreclosure. The
contract being a sale of machinery payable in installments, the applicable provision of law is Article 1484 of the
Civil Code, which gives the vendor the option to exercise any one of the alternative remedies therein mentioned:
exact fulfillment of the obligation, cancel the sale, or foreclose the chattel mortgage. But the vendor- mortgagor
in the present case desisted, on its own initiative, from consummating the auction sale, without gaining any
advantage or benefit, and without causing any disadvantage, or harm to the vendees-mortgagees. The least that
could be said is that such desistance of the plaintiff from proceeding with auction sale was a timely disavowal
that cancelled and rendered useless its previous choice to foreclose; its acts, being extra-judicial, brought no
trouble upon any court, and were harmless to the defendants. For this reason, the plaintiff can not be considered
as having “exercised” (the Code uses the word “exercise”) the remedy of foreclosure because of its incomplete
implementation, and, therefore, the plaintiff is not barred from suing on the unpaid account.

The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are considered alternative, not cumulative such that the exercise of one
would bar the exercise by the others. Here, petitioner has not cancelled the sale, nor has it exercised the
remedy of foreclosure. Foreclosure, judicial or extra-judicial, presupposes something more than a mere demand
to surrender possession of the object of the mortgage. Since the petitioner has not availed itself of the remedy of
cancelling the sale of the truck in question or of foreclosing the chattel mortgage on said truck, petitioner is still
free to avail of the remedy of exacting fulfillment of the obligation of respondent Tobias, the vendee of the truck
in question. In Radiowealth Inc. vs. Lavin, the facts of which are similar to the ‘present case, the issue was
“whether the plaintiff is precluded to press for collection of an account secured by a chattel mortgagee after it
shall have informed the defendants of its intention to foreclose said mortgage, and the voluntary acceptance of
such step (foreclosure) by defendant mortgagor,” the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff mortgagee.

Sambar vs. Levi Strauss

G.R. No. 132604; March 6, 2002

Facts: Levi Strauss & Co., and Levi Strauss Phil, Inc., through a letter from their legal officer,demanded that CVS
Garment Enterprises (CVSGE) desist from using their stitched arcuate design on the Europress jeans which CVSGE
advertised in the Manila Bulletin.

Defense: Atty. Benjamin Gruba, counsel of CVSGE: the arcuate design on the backpockets of Europress jeans was
different from the design on the back pockets of Levi’s jeans. He further asserted that his client had a copyright
on the design it was using.

Private respondents filed a complaint against Sambar, doing business under the name and style of CVSGE.
Private respondents also impleaded the Director of the National Library. Alleged in their complaint that Levi
Strauss and Co. (LS&Co.), an internationally known clothing manufacturer, owns the arcuate design trademark
which was registered under U.S. Trademark Registration No. 404, 248 and in the Principal Register of
trademarks with the Philippine Patent Office under Certificate of Registration No. 20240c. CVSGIC and
Venancio Sambar, without the consent and authority of private respondents and in infringement and unfair
competition, sold and advertised, and despite demands to cease and desist, continued to manufacture, sell
and advertise denim pants under the brand name “Europress” with back pockets bearing a design similar to the
arcuate trademark of private respondents, thereby causing confusion on the buying public, prejudicial to
private respondents’ goodwill and property right.

Answer: CVSGIC admitted it manufactured, sold and advertised and was still manufacturing and selling denim
pants under the brand name of “Europress”, bearing aback pocket design of two double arcs meeting in the
middle. However, it denied that there was infringement or unfair competition because the display rooms of
department stores where Levi’s and Europress jeans were sold,were distinctively segregated by billboards and
other modes of advertisement. CVSGIC avers that the public would not be confused on the ownership of such
known trademark as Levi’s, Jag, Europress, etc.. Also, CVSGIC claimed that it had its own original arcuate design,
as evidenced by Copyright Registration No.1-1998, which was very different and distinct from Levi’s design.

TC: issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner from manufacturing, advertising
and selling pants with the arcuate design on their back pockets.

CA: affirmed

ISSUE: Wether or not there was an infringement of respondent’s arcuate mark.

HELD: YES. Europress’ use of the arcuate design was an infringement of the Levi’s design.

The back pocket design of Europress jeans, a double arc intersecting in the middle was the same as Levi’s’ mark,
also a double arc intersecting at the center. Although the trial court found differences in the two designs,
these differences were not noticeable. Further, private respondents said, infringement of trademark did not
require exact similarity. Colorable imitation enough to cause confusion among the public, was sufficient for a
trademark to be infringed. Private respondents explained that in a market research they conducted with 600
respondents, the result showed that the public was confused by Europress trademark vis the Levi’s trademark.

It must be stressed that it was immaterial whether or not petitioner was connected with CVSGIC. What is
relevant is that petitioner had a copyright over the design and that he allowed the use of the same by CVSGIC.

Private respondents assert that the lower courts found that there was infringement and Levi’s was entitled to
damages based on Sections 22 and 23 of RA No. 166 otherwise known as the Trade Mark Law, as amended,
which was the law then governing. Said sections define infringement and prescribe the remedies therefor.
Further, private respondents aver it was misleading for petitioner to claim that the trial court ruled that
private respondents did not suffer pecuniary loss, suggesting that the award of damages was improper.
According to the private respondents, the trial court did not make any such ruling. It simply stated that there
was no evidence that Levi’s had suffered decline in its sales because of the use of the arcuate design by
Europress jeans. They offer that while there may be no direct proof that they suffered a decline in sales, damages
may still be measured based on a reasonable percentage of the gross sales of the respondents, pursuant to
Section 23 of the Trademark law. The cancellation of petitioner’s copyright was justified because petitioner’s
copyright cannot prevail over respondents’ registration in the Principal Register of Bureau of Patents, Trademarks,
and Technology Transfer. According to private respondents, the essence of copyright registration is originality
and a copied design is inherently non-copyrightable. They insist that registration does not confer originality upon
a copycat version of a prior design.

PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE vs. TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES

G.R. No. 151890; June 20, 2006

FACTS: TRANS-ASIA is the owner of the vessel M/V Asia Korea. In consideration of payment of premiums,
PRUDENTIAL insured M/V Asia Korea for loss/damage of the hull and machinery arising from perils, inter alia, of
fire and explosion for the sum of P40 Million, beginning from the period of July 1, 1993 up to July 1, 1994.On
October 25, 1993, while the policy was in force, a fire broke out while [M/V Asia Korea was] undergoing repairs
at the port of Cebu. On October 26, 1993 TRANS-ASIA filed its notice of claim for damage sustained by the vessel
evidenced by a letter/formal claim. TRANS-ASIA reserved its right to subsequently notify PRUDENTIAL as to the
full amount of the claim upon final survey and determination by average adjuster Richard Hogg International
(Phil.) of the damage sustained by reason of fire. TRANS-ASIA executed a document denominated “Loan and
Trust receipt”, a portion of which states that “Received from Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the sum
of PESOS THREE MILLION ONLY (P3,000,000.00) as a loan without interest under Policy No. MH 93/1353 [sic],
repayable only in the event and to the extent that any net recovery is made by Trans-Asia Shipping Corporation,
from any person or persons, corporation or corporations, or other parties, on account of loss by any casualty for
which they may be liable occasioned by the 25 October 1993: Fire on Board. “PRUDENTIAL later on denied
Trans-Asia’s claim in stated in a letter that “After a careful review and evaluation of your claim arising from the
above-captioned incident, it has been ascertained that you are in breach of policy conditions, among them
“WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED”. Accordingly, we regret to advise that your claim is not
compensable and hereby DENIED.” and asked for the return of the 3,000,000. TRANS-ASIA filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money against PRUDENTIAL with the RTC of Cebu City, wherein TRANS-ASIA sought the amount of
P8,395,072.26 from PRUDENTIAL, alleging that the same represents the balance of the indemnity due upon the
insurance policy in the total amount of P11,395,072.26. TRANS-ASIA similarly sought interest at 42% per annum
citing Section 243 of Presidential Decree No. 1460, otherwise known as the “Insurance Code,” as amended.
PRUDENTIAL denied the material allegations of the Complaint and interposed the defense that TRANS-ASIA
breached insurance policy conditions, in particular: PRUDENTIAL posits that TRANS-ASIA violated an express
and material warranty in the subject insurance contract, i.e., Marine Insurance Policy No. MH93/1363,
specifically Warranty Clause No. 5 thereof, which stipulates that the insured vessel, “M/V ASIA KOREA” is
required to be CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED. According to PRUDENTIAL, on 25 October 1993, or at the time
of the occurrence of the fire, “M/V ASIA KOREA” was in violation of the warranty as it was not CLASSED AND
CLASS MAINTAINED. PRUDENTIAL submits that Warranty Clause No. 5 was a condition precedent to the recovery
of TRANS-ASIA under the policy, the violation of which entitled PRUDENTIAL to rescind the contract under Sec. 74
of the Insurance Code. By way of a counterclaim, PRUDENTIAL sought a refund of P3,000,000.00, which it
allegedly advanced to TRANS-ASIA by way of a loan without interest and without prejudice to the final evaluation
of the claim, including the amounts of P500,000.00, for survey fees and P200,000.00, representing attorney’s
fees. Trial court ruled in favor of Prudential. It ruled that a determination of the parties’ liabilities hinged on
whether TRANS-ASIA violated and breached the policy conditions on WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND CLASS
MAINTAINED. It interpreted the provision to mean that TRANS-ASIA is required to maintain the vessel at a certain
class at all times pertinent during the life of the policy. According to the court a quo, TRANS-ASIA failed to prove
compliance of the terms of the warranty, the violation thereof entitled PRUDENTIAL to rescind the contract. The
court of appeals reversed the decision. It ruled that PRUDENTIAL, as the party asserting the non-compensability
of the loss had the burden of proof to show that TRANS-ASIA breached the warranty, which burden it failed to
discharge.It considered PRUDENTIAL’s admission that at the time the insurance contract was entered into
between the parties, the vessel was properly classed by Bureau Veritas, a classification society recognized by the
industry. It similarly gave weight to the fact that it was the responsibility of Richards Hogg International (Phils.)
Inc., the average adjuster hired by PRUDENTIAL, to secure a copy of such certification to support its conclusion
that mere absence of a certification does not warrant denial of TRANS-ASIA’s claim under the insurance
policy.Also the C.A. ruled that TRANS-ASIA is entitled to the unpaid claims covered by Marine Policy, or a total
amount of P8,395,072.26 however even if there was unreasonable denial or withholding of the payment of the
claims due Trans-Asia is still not entitled to pay for attorney’s fees for it can only be awarded in the cases
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. But Trans-Asia is entitled to double interest on the policy for the
duration of the delay of payment of the unpaid balance, citing Section 244 of the Insurance Code.

ISSUE: Wether or not Prudential should pay Trans-Asia the unpaid claims covered by the marine policy
including attorney’s fees.

HELD: YES. Sec. 244 of the Insurance Code grants damages consisting of attorney’s fees and other expenses
incurred by the insured after a finding by the Insurance Commissioner or the Court, as the case may be,of an
unreasonable denial or withholding of the payment of the claims due. Moreover, the law imposes an interest of
twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board on the amount of the claim due the insured from the date
following the time prescribed in Section 242 or in Section 243, as the case may be,until the claim is fully satisfied.
Finally, Section 244 considers the failure to pay the claims within the time prescribed in Sections 242 or 243,
when applicable, as prima facie evidence of unreasonable delay in payment.

To the mind of this Court, Section 244 does not require a showing of bad faith in order that attorney’s fees be
granted.As earlier stated, under Section 244, a prima facie evidence of unreasonable delay in payment of the
claim is created by failure of the insurer to pay the claim within the time fixed in both Sections 242 and 243 of
the Insurance Code.

As established in Section 244, by reason of the delay and the consequent filing of the suit by the insured, the
insurers shall be adjudged to pay damages which shall consist of attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred by
the insured.

Section 244 reads:

“In case of any litigation for the enforcement of any policy or contract of insurance, it shall be the duty of
theCommissioner or the Court, as the case may be, to make a finding as to whether the payment of the claim of
theinsured has been unreasonably denied or withheld; and in the affirmative case, the insurance company shall
beadjudged to pay damages which shall consist of attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred by the insured
personby reason of such unreasonable denial or withholding of payment plus interest of twice the ceiling
prescribed by theMonetary Board of the amount of the claim due the insured, from the date following the time
prescribed in sectiontwo hundred forty-two or in section two hundred forty-three, as the case may be, until the
claim is fully satisfied;Provided, That the failure to pay any such claim within the time prescribed in said sections
shall be considered primafacie evidence of unreasonable delay in payment.”

Sections 243 and 244 of the Insurance Code apply when the court finds an unreasonable delay or refusal in the
payment of the insurance claims.

In the case at bar, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, and confirmed by the records show that there was
an unreasonable delay by PRUDENTIAL in the payment of the unpaid balance of P8,395,072.26 to TRANS-ASIA.
On 26 October 1993, a day after the occurrence of the fire in “M/V Asia Korea”, TRANS-ASIA filed its notice of
claim. On 13 August 1996, the adjuster, Richards Hogg International (Phils.), Inc., completed its survey report
recommending the amount of P11,395,072.26 as the total indemnity due to TRANS-ASIA. On 21 April 1997,
PRUDENTIAL, in a letter addressed to TRANS-ASIA denied the latter’s claim for the amount of P8,395,072.26
representing the balance of thetotal indemnity. On 21 July 1997, PRUDENTIAL sent a second letter to TRANS-ASIA
seeking a return of the amount of P3,000,000.00. On 13 August 1997, TRANS-ASIA was constrained to file a
complaint for sum of money against PRUDENTIAL praying, inter alia, for the sum of P8,395,072.26 representing
the balance of the proceeds of the insurance claim.As can be gleaned from the foregoing, there was an
unreasonable delay on the part of PRUDENTIAL to pay TRANS-ASIA, as in fact, it refuted the latter’s right to the
insurance claims, from the time proof of loss was shown and the ascertainment of the loss was made by the
insurance adjuster. Evidently, PRUDENTIAL’s unreasonable delay in satisfying TRANS-ASIA’s unpaid claims
compelled the latter to file a suit for collection.Succinctly, an award equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
unpaid proceeds of the policy as attorney’s fees to TRANS-ASIA is reasonable under the circumstances, or
otherwise stated, ten percent (10%) of P8,395,072.26. In the case of Cathay Insurance, Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, where a finding of an unreasonable delay under Section 244 of the Insurance Code was made by this
Court, we grant an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total proceeds. We find no
reason to deviate from this judicial precedent in the case at bar.