Art. 14 Full Cases

G.R. No.
214757
PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee

vs
TIRSO SIBBU, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the January 6, 2014 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 04127 which affirmed with modification the May 15, 2009 Decision2 of Branch 11,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City finding Tirso Sibbu (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 11722 and of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 11721,
11723, and 11724.
In Criminal Case No. 11722, appellant, together with Benny Barid (Benny) and John Does was
charged with attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth, Municipality of Marcos, Province
of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously shot BRYAN JULIAN y VILLANUEVA, twice but missed, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt act'>, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the said crime, by reason of some cause independent of his
will, that is, accused are poor shooters, to the damage and prejudice of the above-named victim.
That the crime was committed [in] the dwelling x x x of the victim at nighttime and disguise was
employed, with accused Sibbu wearing a bonnet on his face.3
In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, and except for the names of the victims and the
location of their gunshot wounds, appellant together with Benny and John Does, was charged with
murder in three similarly worded Informations4 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth, Municipality of Marcos, Province
of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and t11ere willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously shot [Trisha May Julian y Villanueva, Ofelia Julian y Bagudan, and Warlito
Julian y Agustin], inflicting upon [her/him] gunshot wounds, which caused [her/his] instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the above-named victim.
That the crime was committed in the dwelling x x x of the victim at nighttime and disguise was
employed, with accused Sibbu wearing a bonnet on his face.
During arraignment held on July 22, 2005, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.
After pre-trial was conducted, trial on the merits followed. On May 31, 2008, appellant's co-accused
Benny was arrested. However, his trial was held separately considering that the trial with respect to
the Appellant was also almost finished with the prosecution already presenting rebuttal evidence.5
Version of the Prosecution
Bryan Julian (Bryan), the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 11722 and a common witness to
all the cases, testified that between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he was with his three-
year old daughter, Trisha May Julian (Trisha), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11721; his mother
Ofelia Julian (Ofelia), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11723; and his father, Warlito Julian (Warlito),
the victim in Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his parents' house in Barangay Elizabeth,
Marcos, llocos Norte when he saw from a distance of about five meters a person in camouflage
unifo1m with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head. When the
armed man inched closer to the house, he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the
opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the armed man because there were Christmas
lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the appellant.6 Brian
also saw two men in crouching position at a distance of three meters away from the appellant.
Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Appellant then fired upon them killing
Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito.
Bryan ran inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito Julian, Jr. (Warlito Jr.) coming out of
the bathroom. Bryan then proceeded to the pigpen at the back of the house to hide.
Another prosecution witness, Eddie Bayudan (Eddie), testified that on December 6, 2004, he was by
a well near his house when he heard gunshots coming from the house of Warlito and Ofelia. When
he turned towards the direction of the gunshot5, he saw a man about five meters away wearing a
black bonnet and a long-sleeved camouflage uniform and holding a long firearm. He also saw
another man crouching on the ground whom he recognized as the accused Benny. Eddie went
inside his house for his and his family's safety. Afterwards, he heard Bryan shouting for help. When
he went out to investigate, he saw the dead bodies of Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha.
Warlito Jr. also testified that he heard gunshots coming from outside their house. When he went out
of the bathroom, Bryan told him that appellant gunned down their parents and his niece. In his cross-
examination, Warlito, Jr. claimed to have seen the appellant shooting at the porch of their house.7
Police Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad (P/Supt. Lusad), chief of the provincial intelligence and
investigation branch of Ilocos Norte, testified that at 7:00 a.m. of December 7, 2004, he conducted
an investigation and an ocular inspection at the crime scene. He found bloodstains on the floor of the
porch, the cadavers of the victims laid side by side in the sala, and bullet holes in the cemented
portion at the front of the house below the window gril1.8 During his interview with Bryan, the latter
pointed to appellant as the gunman.9
SPOl Eugenio Navarro (SPOl Navarro) also testified that he went to the crime scene together with
Senior Police Inspector Arnold Dada, P02 Danny Ballesteros, and SPO1 Lester Daoang, where they
found 13 spent shells and slugs of a caliber .30 carbine. Police Superintendent Philip Camti Pucay
who conducted the ballistic examination confirmed that the recovered shells and slugs were fired
from a caliber .30 carbine.
Version of the Defense
The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Appellant's father-in-law, Eladio Ruiz
(Eladio), testified that on December 6, 2004, appellant did not leave their house because they had a
visitor, Elpidio Alay (Elpidio); moreover, appellant tended to his child. Eladio stated that the distance
between his house and Warlito's is approximately two kilometers and that it would take an hour to
negotiate the distance by foot.10
Eufrecina Ruiz (Eufrecina), mother-in-law of the appellant, also testified that appellant had been
living with th.em for two years before he was arrested.11 She narrated that on December 6, 2004,
appellant did not leave their house the whole night as he was tending to his sick child. She also
claimed that they had a visitor who delivered firewood. Eufrecina alleged that appellant did not own
any firearm and that he did not know Benny.
Elpidio testified that on December 6, 2004, he went to the house of Eladio to deliver a wooden
divider.12 He arrived at around 6:00 p.m. and left at 7:00 a.m. the following day. Elpidio stated that the
appellant did not leave the house that night and that appellant was inside the house when he heard
explosions.
Appellant denied the charges against him. He testified that on December 6, 2004, he never left the
house of his in-laws because he was taking care of his sick son. He claimed to have heard the
explosions but thought that those were sounds of firecrackers since it was nearing
Christmas.13 Appellant denied having any misunderstanding with the Julian family, or knowing Bryan
and Benny personally, or possessing camouflage clothing.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 15, 2009, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and 11724, and of attempted murder in Criminal Case
No. 11722. The RTC gave credence to Bryan's positive identification of appellant as the person who
shot at him and killed his daughter, mother and father. On the other hand, the RTC found appellant's
defense of denial and alibi weak.
The dispositive part of the RTC's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 11721, accused TIRSO SIBBU is hereby declared GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Trisha Mae Julian y
Villanueva the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
REASONfJ3LE DOUBT of the crime of attempted murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor
as maximum.
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Ofelia Juliany Bayudan the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
RECLUSION PERPETIJA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Warlito Juliany Agustin the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, accused TISO SIBBU is hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of Trisha Mae Julian y Villanueva; Ofelia Julian y Bayudan; and Warlito Julian y Agustin the
amount of ₱55,602.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.14
Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 6, 2014, the CA aft1rmed the RTC's Decision with modification as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
May 15, 2009, issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Laoag City in Criminal Case Nos.
11721, 11722, 11723 and 11724, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11721, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha May Julian y Villanueva the
[amounts] of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, with interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid;
PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Juliany Bayudan the [amounts]
of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until folly
paid; and
PERPETUA.Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Juliany Bayudan the [amounts]
of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, appellant elevated his case to this Court. On February 9, 2015,
the Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs.
However, the appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since he had exhaustively discussed
his arguments before the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General also manifested that there was no
longer any need to file a supplemental brief since the appellant did not raise any new issue in his
appeal before this Court.16
Issues
The main issue raised in the Appellant's Brief concerns Bryan's identification of the appellant as the
assailant. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) giving undue credence to the
testimony of the alleged eyewitness Bryan; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
charged because the prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in
his favor.17 Further, appellant argues that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling, and
use of disguise were not sufficiently established.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
We uphold the findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, that Bryan positively identified
appellant as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha. We have consistently
ruled that factual findings of trial comts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled
to respect and generally should not be disturbed on appeal unless certain substantial facts were
overlooked which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. After due consideration of the
records of the case and the evidence adduced, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA did not err
in their appreciation of the facts and evidence.
We find that Bryan was able to identify the appellant as the assailant in the shooting incident; there
is no reason to doubt his positive testimony. As aptly observed by the RTC, Bryan's narration of how
he was able to recognize the appellant was credible and convincing, to wit:
q You said somebody [shot] at you, your father, your mother, and your daughter while you were at
the azotea of the house of your father on December 6, 2004. Did you see the person who shot at
you, your father, your mother, and your daughter?
a Yes, ma'am.
xxxx
q How far was [the gunman] when you saw him at the west side? a Around five (5) meters away,
ma'am.
q What was his position at the time you first saw him?
a He was at this position, ma'am. (Witness is showing as if a gun was slung on his neck) Then I told
my family, ''Somebody would shoot us, let us all run and hide," and then he shot [at] me twice,
ma'am.
xxxx
q How about [his] face x x x, can you x x x describe [it] to us?
a When be came near us he fixed his bonnet which covered one eye only that is why I recognized
him; and even though his face was covered with [a] bonnet, I could still recognize him because I
usually mingled with him, ma'arn.
xxxx
q You said you were able to recognize his face because you were familiar with him. Who was that
person whom you recognized?
A Tirso Sibbu, ma'am.
Q If this Tirso Sibbu is inside the courtroom today, would you be able to recognize him?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Kindly look around the courtroom and point to us if he is inside the courtroom?
A (Witness is pointing to a man wearing a black T-shirt with blue denim pants who when asked his
name answered Tirso Sibbu)
Q You said you were able to recognize the face of this man Tirso Sibbu because you are familiar
with him? Can you tell us why you were familiar with him? What were the circumstances where you
mingled with him?
A He was a jueteng collector and he came to our place three (3) times a day to get the bets, ma' am.
xxxx
q Considering, Mr. Witness, that it was already x x x 6:30 [to] 7:00 in the evening, how were you able
to see the face of Tirso Sibbo?
A There was a light in front of the azotea, ma'am.
q What was the light in your azotea you are referring to?
a Christmas lights that were not blinking, ma'am.18
xxxx
q Now, Mr. Witness, how far [was the accused when you first noticed his presence]?
a More or less 5 meters, sir.
xxxx
q By the way, that was the first time [you noticed the presence of] the accused. Was that in the same
place you saw him fire his gun?
a He came nearer, sir.
xxxx
q Now, Mr. Witness, [how did you recognize the accused]?
a He fixed his bonnet [his] face was partly covered, sir.

q x x x That bonnet x x x covered the face, is that correct?
a Only one eye was covered so he fixed it sir.
q And the whole face was covered except one eye, is that what you want to impress the Honorable
Court?
a The hole that was meant for his left eye went at his right eye so he stretched the bonnet and his
face was uncovered that is why I recognized him, sir.
q You said that his face was uncovered, are you referring, to the whole face that was uncovered?
a Because of the stretching, the eyes and the nose were uncovered, sir.19
From Bryan's testimony above, it is clear that he was only five meters away from the appellant when
the shooting incident happened. While the appellant was seen wearing a bonnet over his head,
Bryan was able to get a glimpse of appellant's face when the latter fixed his bonnet. In addition,
Christmas lights hanging from the roof of the porch provided illumination enabling Bryan to identify
the appellant. Moreover, Bryan is familiar with the appellant's built, height, and body movements. As
correctly pointed out by the CA:
It is equally of common knowledge that the eyes readily [adjust] to the surrounding darkness even if
one stands in a lighted area, and the distance of five meters is not an impossible or improbable way
as to preclude identification.
1âw phi1
Besides, Bryan’s identification did not solely rely on facial recognition but also from appellant's body
built and height, and the way he walked and moved, all proper standards of identification as
corroborated in the testimony of an experienced police officer and PMA graduate Police
Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad, chief of the provincial intelligence and investigation unit of Ilocos
Norte.20
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the RTC and the CA were correct in holding that
Bryan positively identified the appellant as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and
Trisha.
Appellant also questions the RTC's appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
dwelling. and use of disguise. Citing People v. Catbagan,21 appellant argues that "[t]reachery cannot
be considered when there is no evidence that the accused had resolved to commit the crime prior to
the moment of the killing; or that the death of the victim was the result of premeditation, calculation,
or reflection."
We disagree. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying circumstance in the instant case.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."22
The case of Catbagan has an entirely different factual context with the case at bar. In Catbagan, the
accused was a police officer who investigated reported gunshots during an election gun ban in the
residence of one of the victims. Prior to the shooting, Catbagan had no intention of killing anyone. It
just so happened that during a heated exchange, Cc1thagan drew his firearm and shot the victims.
In this case however, before the shooting incident, appellant was seen with a gun slung over his
neck and a bonnet covered his face to conceal his identity. It is clear that appellant's purpose is to
hmm and kill his victims.
In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia,
Trisha, and Bryan were at the porch of their house totally unaware of the impending attack. In
addition, they were all unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an attack. On the
other hand, appellant and his cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the
residence of the victims. Appellant, in particular, wore camouflage uniform to avoid detection.
Although Bryan was able to warn his family about the impending attack, it was too late for the victims
to scamper for safety or to defend themselves. At the time Bryan became aware of appellant's
presence, the latter was already in the vicinity of about five meters. In fine, appellant employed
deliberate means to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose of killing his victims with minimal risk
to his safety. There can be no other conclusion than that the appellant's attack was treacherous.
With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the trial court correctly held:
In the instant cases, the victims were at their azotea in their house when accused Tirso Sibbu fired
shots at them. Tirso Sibbu was outside the house of the victims. Under these circumstances, the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against Tirso Sibbu. Thus, the Supreme
Court ruled:
xxxx
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman
fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it
is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit
the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant
may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without x x x.23
The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Bryan testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident There
could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal his
identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live ir1 the same barangay and are familiar with each
other.24
As for the defense put up by the appellant that he was inside the house of his in-laws during the
shooting, the Court is unconvinced by his denial and alibi. Aside from being the weakest of all
1avvphi1
defenses, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time the shooting incident happened. We have consistently 1uled that ''for
the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place
when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing evidence."25
In this case, the crime was committed in the residence of the victims which is located within the
same barangay where appellant resides. In fact, appellant's father-in-law testified that the distance
between the crime scene and his house is "more or less 1 kilometer,"26 or two kilometers as he later
amended and that said distance could be traversed in one hour by foot.27 Verily, appellant's alibi
must fail for failure to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
The Court also upholds appellant's conviction for attempted murder. Appellant commenced the
commission of murder through overt acts such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but
did not perfom1 all the acts of execution which should produce murder by reason of some cause
other than his own spontaneous desistance. Appellant simply missed his target; he failed to perform
all the acts of execution to kill Bryan, Appellant is therefore guilty of attempted murder,
Unfortunately, Warlito, Ofelia and Trisha had to bear the brunt of appellant's firearm.
All told, appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder considering the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and one count of attempted murder. Since two aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the crime of murder, appellant should be
sentenced to death in accordance with Article 6328 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 24829 of
the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Thus under Article
63, the higher penalty should be imposed. However, because of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death
penalty is now prohibited. The law provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
1âwphi 1
perpetua shall be imposed with no eligibility for parole. Accordingly5 appellant should suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility forparole in lieu of the death penalty in Criminal Case
Nos. 11721, 11723, 11724.
In People v. Jugueta,30 the Court held that:
x x x [F]or crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary
aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and ₱l00,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or
the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱l00,000.00 is awarded as
exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of
qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. x x x
xxxx
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. x
x x Under Article 2424 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss allthough the exact amount was not
proved. In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to
₱50,000.00.
xxxx
In summary:
1. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other
crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R. A
9364:
a. Civil indemnity-₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages –₱l00,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity-₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages –₱50,000.00
Hence, in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and 11724 where the appellant was convicted of
murder, the crime being attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and by the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and disguise, we further modify the awards of civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00 each for each case. Moreover, since the award
of actual damages in the amount of ₱55,602.00 pertained to all three cases, the same should be
modified to ₱50,000,00 for each case.
In Criminal Case No. 11722 for attempted murder, the RTC as affirmed by the CA imposed the
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years as prision mayor as
maximum.
In People v. Jugueta,31 the Court en banc held as follows:
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties
imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of
murder. However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, prescribing the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2)
counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder,
the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggrawating circumstance
the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum penalty should be from two (10) years and one (l) day to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (l) day of prission correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing, the proper imposable penalty for attempted murder, and considering the
attendant aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disguise, is four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (l) day of prision mayor,
as maximum. In addition, appellant is liable to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages at ₱50,000.00 each. Finally, these monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the January 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04127
is AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11721, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha May Julian y Villanueva the
amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00, as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with interest at the ro1te of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Julian y Bayudan the amounts of
₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Warlito Julian, Sr. y Agustin the
amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
doubt of attempted 1nurdcr and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum. Further, he is ordered to pay Bryan Julian y Villanueva civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary dams.gos each in the amount of ₱50,000.00, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196434 October 24, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CHITO NAZARENO, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the evidence required for proving conspiracy and the qualifying circumstance of
abuse or superior strength in a murder case.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged the accused Chito Nazareno and Fernando
Saliendra, a barangay tanod, of murder before the Regional Trial Cow1 (RTC) of that city in Criminal
Case 94-133117.1
Since Saliendra remained at-large, only Nazareno was tried. The prosecution presented Roy
Magallanes, Roger Francisco, SPO1 Teodoro Sinag, SPO1 Julian Bustamante, Dr. Antonio E.
Rebosa, and Jovelo Valdez.2
On November 10, 1993 David Valdez (David), Magallanes, and Francisco attended the wake of a
friend. While there, they drank liquor with accused Nazareno and Saliendra.3 A heated argument
ensued between Magallanes and Nazareno but their companions pacified them.4
On the following day, November 11, David, Magallanes, and Francisco returned to the wake.
Accused Nazareno and Saliendra also arrived and told the three not to mind the previous night’s
altercation. At around 9:30 in the evening, while David, Francisco, and their friend, Aida Unos were
walking on the street, Nazareno and Saliendra blocked their path.5 Nazareno boxed Francisco who
fled but Saliendra went after him with a balisong.6 Francisco, who succeeded in hiding saw Nazareno
hit David on the body with a stick while Saliendra struck David’s head with a stone.7 David ran
towards a gasoline station but Nazareno and Saliendra, aided by some barangay tanods, caught up
with him.8 As David fell, the barangay tanods took over the assault.9 This took place as Magallanes
stood about five meters across the highway unable to help his friend.10 Afterwards, Unos brought
David to the hospital.11 Dr. Rebosa performed surgery on David’s head but he died on November 14,
1993 of massive intra-cranial hemorrhage secondary to depressed fracture on his right temporal
bone12 in a form of blunt trauma.13
On November 12, 1993 after David’s relatives reported the killing to the police, SPO1 Sinag
investigated the case and took Unos’s statement.14 On November 15, accompanied by SPO1
Bustamante and two other police officers, SPO1 Sinag went to the UST Hospital and took a look at
David’s body, noting the wounds on his forehead.15Subsequently, the officers went to the crime
scene but found no witness there.
In his defense, accused Nazareno claimed that he left his house at around 9:30 in the evening on
November 11, 1993 to buy milk. While on a street near his house, he noted a commotion taking
place nearby. He then bumped into Saliendra. Nazareno proceeded home and went to bed.16 His wife
Isabel supported his testimony, claiming that she asked her husband on that night to buy milk for
their children. When Nazareno returned home, he informed her of the commotion outside and how
someone bumped into him.17
Unos testified that she saw Saliendra chasing David as the latter hang on the rear of a running
jeepney. She claimed that she did not see Nazareno around the place.18
On March 9, 2004, the RTC found Nazareno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by
abuse of superior strength and aggravated by treachery. The RTC sentenced Nazareno to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay P141,670.25 as actual damages, P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages, without any subsidiary imprisonment.19
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. 20 Finding
no treachery, it convicted Nazareno of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, hence, this
appeal.
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether or not Nazareno took part in a conspiracy to kill David;
2. Whether or not a qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killing
of David.
The Court’s Ruling
One. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are, except for compelling or exceptional
reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully supported by evidence and affirmed by the
CA.21 Here, no sound reason exists to alter the findings of the RTC and the CA with respect to the
facts they deemed to have been proved and the credibility of the witnesses.22
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.23 Actions indicating close personal association and shared
sentiment among the accused can prove its presence.24 Proof that the perpetrators met beforehand
and decided to commit the crime is not necessary as long as their acts manifest a common design
and oneness of purpose.
Here, both the RTC and the CA found conspiracy in attendance. Magallanes and Francisco testified
that accused Nazareno and Saliendra purposely waited for David and his companions out on the
street as they came out of the wake. The witnesses testified that each of Nazareno and Saliendra
took concerted steps aimed at killing or causing serious harm to David. Nazareno repeatedly struck
David on the area of his neck with a stick; Saliendra hurled a fist-sized stone on his head. Even
when David tried to flee, they still chased him and together with other barangay tanods, beat him to
unconsciousness. Although Magallanes testified that Saliendra and Nazareno acted "quite
differently" from each other before the attack,25 their actions before and during the incident reveal a
common purpose.26 Saliendra appears to have delivered the fatal blow but Nazareno cannot escape
liability because, in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.27
Magallanes and Francisco saw the commission of the offense from different angles but the core of
their stories remains cohesive. The result of the autopsy of David’s body corroborates such stories.
True their accounts have certain inconsistencies but these do not weaken their credibility since they
concurred on material points.28 Rather, those small inconsistencies strengthened their credibility as
they evince spontaneity and candor.29 Completely uniform and identical statements manifest
rehearsed testimonies.30
Taken against these considerations, the Court cannot give credence to Nazareno’s defense of
alibi. To be admissible, not only must he be at a different place during the commission of the crime,
1âwphi1
his presence at the crime scene must also be physically impossible.31 Here, Nazareno even admits
that he encountered Saliendra, the accused who went into hiding, on the street and noticed the
commotion.32
Two. The CA held that the killing of David should be characterized as one of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength. The Court finds no fault in this ruling. There is abuse of superior strength
when the aggressors purposely use excessive force rendering the victim unable to defend
himself.33 The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the aggressor.
Here, Nazareno and Saliendra evidently armed themselves beforehand, Nazareno with a stick and
Saliendra with a heavy stone. David was unarmed. The two chased him even as he fled from them.
And when they caught up with him, aided by some unnamed barangay tanods, Nazareno and
Saliendra exploited their superior advantage and knocked the defenseless David unconscious. He
evidently died from head fracture caused by one of the blows on his head. 1âwphi 1
On the matter of penalty, the Court affirms the imposition of reclusion perpetua.34 The Court retains
the amount of P141,670.25 as actual damages.35 But, consistent with current jurisprudence, 36 the
Court is awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. 01308 dated December 17, 2010, that found Chito Nazareno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength in Criminal Case 94-133117.
The Court also AFFIRMS the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on accused Nazareno but
MODIFIES the award of damages to P141,670.25 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190912 January 12, 2015
GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners,

vs.
ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, dated January 20, 2010, of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva assailing the Decision2dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. R. CR. No. 31719, affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners
guilty of attempted murder.
The following are the antecedents:
On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of his sister
Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's son,
Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him,
which prompted the former to slapthe latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of
alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was
taking place inorder to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go
home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to offer
reconciliation. On his way there, he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested
the latter to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to proceed alone.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and her son-in-
law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary
responded, "putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka."
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw Isabelita's
elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit
Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter tobow his head but Salvador delivered a
second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time
but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled for the
possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed something on
Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador and to extricate himself,
Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to go
out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from Gary.
Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with his
arnis, including Titus, chased him.
Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe
which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his assailants tostop, but to no avail.
Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs, legsand knees using the rattan stick.
While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and
Tommy, he tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg,
between the knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees. Rolly
hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood on the back of his
shoulder.
Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him: "Huwag
makialam, away ng mag-anak ito" and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people who witnessed
the incident shouted "maawa na kayo" but they only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted
because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors
approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy
Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva. The Information reads:
That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
commence the commission of the crime ofmurder directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there
hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of
wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not
necessarily mortal.
They all pleaded "not guilty." The defense, during trial, presented the following version of the events
that transpired:
Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their house when he heard
his tenth son Winston crying while the latter was being castigated by Elpidio. He went down and told
Elpidio to come back the next day to settle. His wife Isabelita called the Barangay Chairman two
blocks away. Barangay Chairman Joseph Ramos and Elpidio's wife and daughter went to the house
and Elpidio was given warm water, but he showered his daughter and Winston withit. Elpidio was
brought to his house and the former told the Barangay Chairman that it was a family problem. Elpidio
went back to the house of Salvador where Titus was sitting on the sofa. Elpidio asked Titus to open
the door until the former kicked the door open. Titus escaped through the open door and Salvador
went out of the house because another child was on the roof, afraid that the said child might fall.
Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.
According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife and Titus when the
incident occurred. He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus went out when Elpidio hit the door.
Elpidio had a reputation for hurting people when drunk and Gary learned that Elpidio was brought to
the hospital because he was mauled by the people.
During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court, in a Decision dated
March 31, 2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary
Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of attempted murder and sentences them to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one(1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as
maximum. They are also ordered to pay the actual damages of ₱17,300.00 and moral damages of
₱10,000.00.
Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to the CA, but the
latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC and disposed the case as follows: WHEREFORE,
finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, we hereby AFFIRM the same and
DISMISS the instant appeal.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners stated the following arguments:
THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT FROM
THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.
THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS AND THE
NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. NOT ALL
OF THE ELEMENTSOF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. THERE IS NO
TREACHERY OR ANY OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK OF IN THIS CASE.
THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRESENCE
OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND THE TRIAL COURT.
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE

DEFENSE EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO ATTACKED
HIM IS INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.
CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal by certiorari to this Court
should only raise questions of law distinctly set forth in the petition.5
In the present case, the issuesand arguments presented by the petitioners involve questions of
facts. Therefore, the present petition is at once dismissible for its failure to comply with the
requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, that the petition should only raise questions of law. The
distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled. There is a "question of law"
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state offacts, and which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties- litigants.
On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether
or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.6
At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.
It is the contention of the petitionersthat the Information filed against them was defective because it
did not state all the elements of the crime charged. However, a close reading of the Information
would show the contrary. The Information partly reads:
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which should have produced
the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily
mortal.
From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements of the crime of
attempted murder has been included.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony,
thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.7
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
The non-performance of all acts ofexecution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.8
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.9
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
bythe spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal;
and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality ofbeing equivocal that
must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can
say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have
been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or
some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words
of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.11
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase "not necessarily mortal" in the allegations in the
Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an absence of an
intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through
external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,12 this Court considered the following factors to determine
the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered
by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.13 All
of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase, what is important
is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states

the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground
that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs
(a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA and the RTC, the
same is not ridden with any error. In People v. Alvarado,14 we held that greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than the accused's denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-
serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.15
It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of the petitionersas
the assailants, thus:
Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of the house,
then, I saw Gary was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe. Tonahawk with blade of ax
was dull and had a handle of one foot, with the diameter of one inch.
Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)
A. I also used that.
Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?
A. In the kitchen.
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?
A. He is right in the kitchen.
Q. Then what happened?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the kitchen door
and holding a tomhack(sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my right side and my
headand I got injury (sic) and blood profusely oozing, I want to get hold of the tomhawk (sic).
Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?
A. No sir.16
xxxx
Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?
A. Rolly Villanueva.
Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from behind?
A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.
Q. Who are they?
A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao, Saligan

Iguiron.
Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see first before
you were hit?
A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic), I saw him.
Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit you, you
mean you realized what he used in hitting you from behind?
A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.
Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw him
holding that pipe, how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?
A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17
In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that findings of facts of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties as well as its
conclusion on its findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is because
of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor
and deportment of the witness as they testify.18 The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.19
It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the medico-
legal findings as testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief Resident Doctor of the
Department of Orthopedics. He testified as to the following:
Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?
A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings
supposedly seen when he was admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions of our
Out Patient Department.
Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this complainant?
A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw the patient.
Q. Why does he has (sic) to makea follow up in your department?
A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated casting.
Normally, casting would take around three (3) months only but since the nature of his
fracture was relatively unstable, I think it necessitated prolong immobilization in a case.
PROSECUTOR TEVES:
Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained? A. I think one of his
leg has close fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a blunt injury rather than a
hacking injury, one on the left side, with an open wound which was very much compatible
with a hack at the leg area.20
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery or any
other qualifying circumstance.
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and ina swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery tobe considered, two elements
must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.21 From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous,
thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of the
moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime
committed. There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted
but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the partof the accused because of the provocative
act of the victim.22
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, thus:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio Malicsi, Sr.
twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house of the former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on
the right side of the head with an axe or tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando "Rolly"
Villanueva hit the victim on the head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down,
Gary hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick on
the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The
Provisional Medical Slip (Exh. "D"), Medico Legal Certificate and Leg Sketch (Exh. "D-2") and the
fracture sheet (Exh. "D-4") all prove that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple
lacerations on his head. The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt
instrument like a piece of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The other leg suffered
an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife or axe. This was caused by Gary
Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the victim. The multiple lacerations on the head were
caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. There is no
sufficient evidence that the other, accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi, Tommy Ballesteros,
Nestor Ballesteros and Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim. Titus having sprayed Elpidio
with the tear gas is not sufficiently proven. Neither was the alleged blow by Titus, using a piece of
wood, on the victim's private organ sufficiently established as the medical certificate did not show
any injury on that part of the body of the victim.
The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's
house. Whenhe kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of the injuries is proven by
1âw phi 1
victim's testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers were
all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes the
element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio
when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting for
him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously adopted the
said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this case and must be
considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico
and Salvador Iguiron were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself with.
There is clearly present here the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous
for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."24 "The fact
that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim."25 The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.26 "To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on
the age, size, and strength of the parties.28
Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum and ordered them to pay
actual damages of ₱17,300.00 and moral damages of ₱10,000.00, this Court finds an obvious error.
For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.29 Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly
imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of
prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years; and that the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed should have been
imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
January 20, 2010 of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution dated January 7, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioners are sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are also ORDERED to
pay Pl 7,300.00 as actual damages, as well as Pl 0,000.00 moral damages as originally ordered by
the RTC. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168169 February 24, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNERO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated
April 29, 2005. In said Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the August 29, 2002
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78 of Malolos, Bulacan, in Crim. Case No. 888-
M-2000, convicting herein appellants Alberto Tabarnero (Alberto) and Gary Tabarnero (Gary) of the
crime of Murder.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary went to the house of the deceased Ernesto Canatoy
(Ernesto), where he the former used to reside as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar (Mary
Jane), Ernesto’s stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation during which the latter was
stabbed nine times, causing his death. The versions of the prosecution and the defense would later
diverge as regards the presence of other persons atin the scene and other circumstances
concerning Ernesto’s death.
On March 3, 2000, Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with the crime of Murder in an
Information which read:
That on or about the 23rd day of October, 1999, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with bladed instrument
and with intent to kill one Ernesto Canatoy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with
the said bladed instrument the said Ernesto Canatoy, hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.3
On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of Gary and Alberto were issued by the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.4
On April 22, 20021, Gary surrendered to Barangay Tanod Edilberto Alarma.5 When he was
arraigned Oon April 30, 2001, Gary pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. 6 During this time,
Alberto remained at large.
On May 21, 2001, a pre-trial conference was conducted. Therein, Gary admitted having killed
Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense. Thus, pursuant to Section 11(e), Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court, an invertedreverse trial ensued.
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June 2001, testified that he
stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane were living together. Mary Jane
is the daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife7 of Ernesto. However, Gary left the house shortly before
the October 23, 1999 incident because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto when the latter allegedly
stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnant at that time.
On October 23, 1999, Gary was still allegedly in his house in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan at around
11:40 p.m. with his friend, Richard Ulilian; his father, co-appellant Alberto; his mother, Elvira; and his
brother, Jeffrey. Overcome with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, HeGary then went to
Ernesto’s house, but was not able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead
shouted his pleas from the outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to
break him and Mary Jane up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready
to marry her. When he Gary was about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck
him with a lead pipe. Ernesto was aiming at Gary’s head, but the latter blocked the blow with his
hands, causing his left index finger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled
him. At that point, Gary felt that there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernesto’s back. Losing control
of himself, Gary took the bladed weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many
times he did so.8
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, "saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako" three
times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, co-appellant Alberto, coming. Alberto asked
Gary, "anak, ano ang nangyari?" To which Gary responded "nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning,"
referring to Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, ran, since they were afraidallegedly out of fear.9
Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary claims that it was he and Ernesto
who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him.10
Gary’s sister, Gemarie Tabarnero, testified that she was a childhood friend of Mary Jane. Gemarie
attested that Mary Jane was Gary’s girlfriend from 1995 to 1999. Sometime in 1999, however, Gary
and Mary Jane were prevented from talking to each other. During that time, Gary was always sad
and appeared catatonicdumbfounded, sometimes mentioning Mary Jane’s name and crying.11
On the night of the incident on October 23, 1999, Gemarie observed that Gary was crying and
seemed perplexed. Gary told Gemarie that he was going to Ernesto’s house to talk to Ernesto about
Mary Jane. Gary was crying and dumbfounded at that time. Gary allegedly did not bring anything
with him when he went to Ernesto’s house.12
In the meantime, on August 5, 2001, Alberto was apprehended.13 On August 20, 2001, he pleaded
NOT GUILTY to the charge.14 However, while Alberto’s defense is denial and not self-defense like
Gary’s, the court decided to proceed with the reverseinverted trial, as it had already started that
way.15
Next on the witness stand was Edilberto Alarma (Alarma), who was a barangay tanod of Longos,
Malolos, Bulacan since February 2000. Alarma testified that while he was in a meeting at around
4:00 p.m. on April 22, 2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention to surrender to him. Gary told
him that he was responsible for the "incident [that] happened at Daang Riles." Together with his co-
fellow barangay tanod Zaldy Garcia, Alarma brought Gary to the Malolos Police Station, where the
surrender was entered in the blotter report.16
Appellant Alberto, a construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders, was 45

years old at the time of his testimony in September 2001. He testified that on October 23, 1999, at
the time when of the incident, he was living in Norzagaray, Bulacan. On October 23, 1999, however,
,he went to visit his children, Gary and Gemarie, in Barangay Longos, Malolos, Bulacan. Before
going to sleep at 11:00 p.m., he realized that Gary was not in the place where he would usually
sleep. He went downstairs, thinking that Gary was just urinating. He waited for five minutes; when
Gary did not show up, he proceeded to Daang Bakal, where Gary had many friends. He walked for
about 10 minutes. About Four400 hundred meters from where the site of the incident, happened, he
saw Gary and asked him what happened and why he was in a hurry, to which Gary replied: "Wag na
kayong magtanong, umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata si Kuya Erning." Alberto and Gary ran in
different directions. Alberto passed through the railways and exited in front of the capitol compound
to wait for a jeepney going to Sta. Maria, his route toward his home in Norzagaray.17
Alberto claims that he had no knowledge of the accusation that he conspired with Gary in killing
Ernesto. It was three months after the incident that he came to know that he was being charged for a
crime. At this time, he was already residing in Hensonville Plaza, Angeles City, Pampanga, where he
was assigned when his engineer, Efren Cruz, got secured a project in said place.18
During cCross-examinationed, Alberto repeated that he did not return to Gary’s house after the
incident. He said that it did not occur to him to call inform the authorities about the killing of Ernesto.
Later, Alberto learned from his sibling, whom he talked to by phone, that Gary had already
surrendered. He did not consider surrendering because, although he wanted to clear his name,
nobody would work to support his family. He said that he had no previous misunderstanding with
Ernesto.19
Answering questions from the court, Alberto stated that he immediately went home to Norzagaray
because he was afraid to be implicated in the stabbing of Ernesto. It did not occur to him to stay and
help Gary because he did not know where Gary proceeded after they ran away. The next time he
saw Gary was three months after the incident, when Gary went to Norzagaray.20
The first to testify for the prosecution was its eyewitness, Emerito Acibar (Emerito). Emerito, the
brother of Mary Jane,21 was inside their house in Daang Bakal, Longos, Malolos, Bulacan with his
brother and his stepfather, Ernesto, at around eleven o’clock on the night of the incident on October
23, 1999. He heard somebody calling for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then heard a "kalabog," followed
by Ernesto’s plea asking for help. Emerito was about to go outside, but, while he was already at the
door of their one-room22 house, he saw Ernesto being held by a certain Toning "Kulit" and another
person, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing Ernesto with a fan knivesfe. Emerito lost count of the
number of thrusts made by Gary and Alberto, but each inflicted more than one, and the last stab was
made by Alberto. Emerito shouted for help. The four assailants left when somebody arrived, allowing
Emerito to approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital.23
On cross-examination, Emerito statedconfirmed that Gary and Mary Jane used to reside in Ernesto’s
house. On the date of the incident, however, Gary had already left the house, while Mary Jane had
moved to Abra with Teresita (the mother of Emerito and Mary Jane). According to Emerito, his family
did not know that Mary Jane and Gary had a relationship because they treated Gary like a member
of the family. Ernesto got mad when because his wife, Teresita, found out about Gary and Mary
Jane’s relationship. On the night of the incident, at past 11:00 p.m., Emerito was fixing his things
inside their houseat past 11:00 p.m., when he heard someone calling from for themoutside, but was
not sure if it was Gary. Emerito neither saw Ernesto leaving the room, nor the fight between Ernesto
and Gary. All he saw was the stabbing, which happened seven to eight meters away from the
doorway where he was standing him. He was sure that there were four assailants, two of whom went
to a bridge 8 to 10 meters from the incident, where they boarded a yellow XLT-type car.24
Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Ronnie Morales of the Malolos Philippine National Police testified
that he was on duty at the police station on the night of October 23, 1999. During that night, Emerito
reported at the police station that Ernesto had been stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito proceeded
to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating room, very
weak due to multiple injuries. While in the presence of thetwo doctors on duty, SPO2 Morales asked
Ernesto who stabbed him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were the father and son, Gary and
Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan.25
Cross-examined, SPO2 Morales clarified that it was already 1:00 a.m. of the following day when he
and Emerito proceeded to the hospital. As they went to the hospital, Emerito did not inform SPO2
Morales that he witnessed the incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that Emerito did not tell him
who the suspects were when Emerito reported the incident, because they immediately proceeded to
the hospital, considering that the victim, Ernesto, was still alive. Ernesto was not able to affix his
signature on the Sinumpaang Salaysay26 because he could no longer talk after the fourth question.
Answering questions from the court, SPO2 Morales further stated that he could not remember
talking to Emerito on their way to the hospital, since they were in a hurry.27
The government physician at the Bulacan Provincial Hospital who prepared Ernesto’s death
certificate, Dr. Apollo Trinidad, clarified that Ernesto died on October 25, 1999. However, considering
the admission by the defense of the fact of death, the cause thereof, and the execution of the death
certificate, the prosecution did not proceed to solicit these facts fromno longer questioned Dr.
Trinidad on these matters.28
Teresita’s testimony was likewise dispensed with, in light of the admission by the defense that she
was the common-law wife of Ernesto, and that she incurred ₱55,600.00 in expenses in relation to
Ernesto’s death.29
On August 29, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting Gary and Alberto of the crime of
murder. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused Alberto Tabarnero and
Gary Tabarnero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder defined and penalized
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentences them to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay private complainant Teresita Acibar the amount of ₱55,600.000 (sic)
as actual damages[,] ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Ernesto Canatoy[,] ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, and the costs of suit.30
Gary and Alberto appealed to this Court. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, this Court,
in People v. Mateo,31 modified the Rules of Court in so far as it provides for direct appeals from the
RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Pursuant thereto, this Court referred32the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027.
On April 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification as regards
exemplary damages, disposing of the case in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 dated 29
August 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 is awarded because of the presence of treachery.33
From the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court anew when Gary and Alberto filed a
Notice of Appeal on May 13, 2005.34 In its Resolution on August 1, 2005, this Court required both
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. Both parties manifested that
they were adopting the briefs they had earlier filed with this Court.
Gary and Alberto, in their brief filed in this Court before the referral of the case to the Court of
Appeals, assigned the following errors to the RTC:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT GARY TABARNERO
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE
CASE AT BAR
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE CULPABLE, THE COURT A

QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY35
The justifying circumstance of self-defense on the part of Gary cannot be considered
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to
prevent and repel aggression.36
The defense invokes the said justifying circumstance, claiming that all of the above three elements
are present in the case at bar. There was allegedly unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto when
the latter delivered the first blow with the lead pipe. According to the defense, the means Gary used
to defend himself was reasonable, and the shouting shouted professions of his feelings forabout
Mary Jane could not be considered provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make the unlawful
aggression.
The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove the alleged
unlawful aggression was Gary’s own testimony. Citing Casitas v. People,37 the Court of Appeals held
that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicate Gary’s intent to kill, and not merely an
intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the claim that the means used by Gary
to defend himself was reasonable.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement of self-
defense of self-defense.38 As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the evidence presented by Gary to
prove the alleged unlawful aggression, namely, his own testimony, is insufficient and self-serving.
The alleged sudden appearance of Ernesto and his first attack with the lead pipe the very moment
Gary decided to leave seems to this Court to be all too convenient, considering that there was no
one around to witness the start of the fight.
The RTC, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, found Gary’s
account concerning the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto to be unconvincing.
Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case,
are binding onto this Court and are entitled to great respect.39 It also bears to emphasize that by
invoking self-defense, Gary, in effect, admitted killing Ernesto, thus, shifting upon him the burden of
evidence to prove the elements of the said justifying circumstance.40 A plea of self-defense cannot
be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence, but also extremely doubtful in itself.41
The defense further argues that assuming that Gary is not qualified to avail of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he would nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or
to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
We disagree. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete.42 There is incomplete self-defense when the element of
unlawful aggression by the victim is present, and any of the other two essential requisites for self-
defense.43 Having failed to prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary is not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance, regardless even assuming of the presence of the other two
elements of self-defense.
Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
The first assignment of error presents another issue for the consideration of this Court. The defense
argues that Gary’s yielding to Alarma should be credited as a mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The Solicitor General agreed with the defense on this point. The Court of Appeals,
however, disagreed, and held that the delay of six months44 before surrendering negates
spontaneity,45 a requisite for voluntary surrender to be considered mitigating.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to the accused, the
following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. A
surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit oneself to
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble
and expenses in capturing him.46
In People v. Barcimo, Jr.,47 the pending warrant for the arrest of the accused and the latter’s
surrender more than one year after the incident were considered by the Court as damaging to the
plea that voluntary surrender be considered a mitigating circumstance. Thus:
The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. To
benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not
actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. In People v. Viernes [G.R. No. 136733-35,
13 December 20010], we held that going to the police station to clear one’s name does not show any
intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed
since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither
shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble
and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender,
there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The records show that Gary surrendered on April 22, 2001.48 The commitment order commanding
that he be detained was issued on April 24, 2001.49 The surrender was made almost one year and
six months from the October 23, 1999 incident, and almost one year and one month from the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against him on March 27, 2000.50 We, therefore, rule that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited to Gary.
Alberto is a principal by direct participation in the killing of Ernesto
In insisting upon Alberto’s innocence, the defense claims that there was no conspiracy between him
and his son, Gary. The defense asserts that Alberto just happened to be near the scene of the crime
as he was looking for his son, whom he saw only after the altercation.
The basis of Alberto’s conviction, however, is not solely conspiracy. A review of the proven facts
shows that conspiracy need not even be proven by the prosecution in this case, since Alberto was
categorically pointed by the eyewitness, Emerito, as one of the assailants who actively and directly
participated in the killing of Ernesto:
Q Those 2 persons whom you saw and who stabbed your stepfather in the evening of
October 23, 1999, if theyb are now in court, will you be able to identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you please point to those 2 persons?
A (Witness pointing to the persons who, when asked answered to the name of Alberto
Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero)
Q What was the position of Alberto Tabarnero in that stabbing incident?
A He was the one whom I saw stabbed last my stepfather.
xxxx
COURT (TO THE WITNESS):
Q How many times did you see Gary stabbed your father?
A I cannot count how many stabs Gary made.
PROS. SANTIAGO:
Q Was it many times or just once?
A I cannot count but more than 1.
Q How about Alberto Tabarnero, how many times did you see him stabbing your stepfather?
A I cannot count also but he was the last one who stabbed my stepfather.51
Having actually participated in the stabbing of Ernesto, it was adequately proven that Alberto is a
principal by direct participation.
Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2
Morales, that it was "the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan" who
stabbed him.52 While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible
under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of
an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:
"It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his
demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This
may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and
extent of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant circumstances."53
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48 hours.
At the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was
already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end of the
questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the
point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth.54 It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his
body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon every remaining strength he had
just to lie about his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
The killing of Ernesto is qualified by treachery
Emerito had testified that he saw Ernesto being held by two persons, while Gary and Alberto were
stabbing him with fan knives with a fan knife:
Q When you said "lalabas po sana," what do you mean by that?
A I am at the door and saw what happened.
Q What did you see?
A I saw my stepfather being held by two persons and being stabbed.
Q Will you describe the appearance of your stepfather and the 2 persons whom according to
you were stabbing your stepfather at that time?
A My stepfather is "lupaypay" and he was being stabbed.

Q When you said "lupaypay," will you describe to this Honorable Court his position and
appearance?
A When I saw my stepfather he was about to fall on the ground.
Q Could you describe their appearance?
A They were helping each other in stabbing my grandfather. (sic)
Q Those two persons whom you saw and who stabbed your stepfather in the evening of
October 23, 1999 if they are now in Court, will you be able to identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please point to those 2 persons?
A (Witness pointing to the persons who, when asked answered to the name of Alberto
Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero)
Q What was the position of Alberto Tabarnero in that stabbing incident?
A He was the one whom I saw stabbed last my stepfather.
Q What about Gary, what is his position?
A He was helping in the stabbing.
xxxx
Q What kind of weapon or instrument were used by Gary and Alberto?
A Fan knife, sir.
Q Both of them were armed by a knife?
A Yes, sir.55
From said testimony, it seems uncertain whether Emerito saw the very first stabbing being thrust.
Thus, the defense asseverates that since Emerito failed to see how the attack commenced, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be considered, citing People v. Amamangpang,56 People
v. Icalla,57 and People v. Sambulan.58 In said three cases, this Court held that treachery cannot be
appreciated as the lone eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault.
Treachery is defined under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The Solicitor General argues that treachery was amply demonstrated by the restraint upon Ernesto,
which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less evade, the
assault.59
We agree with the Solicitor General.
In the cases cited by the appellants, the eyewitnesses were not able to observe any means, method
or form in the execution of the killing which rendered the victim defenseless. In Amamangpang, the
first thing the witness saw was the victim already prostrate on the bamboo floor, blood oozing from
his neck and about to be struck by the accused. In Icalla, the witnesses merely saw the accused
fleeing from the scene of the crime with a knife in his hand. In Sambulan, the witness saw the two
accused hacking the victim with a bolo. Since, in these cases, there was no restraint upon the
victims or any other circumstance which would have rendered them defenseless, the Court ruled that
it should look into the commencement of the attack in order to determine whether the same was
done swiftly and unexpectedly. However, the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the
only means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured.
In People v. Montejo,60 the prosecution witnesses testified that after challenging the victim to a fight,
the accused stabbed the victim in the chest while he was held in the arms by the accused and a
companion. Not requiring a swift and unexpected commencement to the attack, the Court held:
Thus, there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when he was
being held by the others while he was being stabbed, as the accomplishment of the accused's
purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim may offer [People v.
Condemena, G.R. No. L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v. Lunar, G.R. No. L-15579,
May 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 119.] In the instant case, it has been established that the accused-appellant
stabbed the victim on the chest while his companions held both of the victim's arms.
In People v. Alvarado,61 the accused and his companions shouted to the victim: "Lumabas ka kalbo,
kung matapang ka." When the victim went out of the house, the accused’s companions held the
victim’s hands while the accused stabbed him. Despite the yelling which should have warned the
victim of a possible attack, the mere fact that the accused’s companions held the hands of the victim
while the accused stabbed him was considered by this Court to constitute alevosia.
We, therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was attended by treachery. However, even assuming
for the sake of argument that treachery should not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being alleged in
the Information, this circumstance was not considered in the trial court as the same is already
absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding
him clearly shows the deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available in
to the person attacked. In People v. Gemoya,62 we held:
Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime (People vs.
Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 [1994]). When four armed assailants, two of whom are accused-
appellants in this case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said that excessive force was
purposely sought and employed. (Emphasis ours.)
In all, there is no doubt that the offense committed by the accused is murder.
The award of damages should be modified to include civil indemnity ex delito

In the Decision of the RTC convicting Gary and Alberto, it awarded the amount of ₱55,600.00 as
actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Ernesto, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and an unidentified amount as costs of suit.63 The Court of Appeals modified the RTC Decision by
awarding an additional amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of the presence of
treachery.64
The Solicitor General claims that the award of ₱55,600.00 in actual damages is not proper,
considering the lack of receipts supporting the same. However, we held in People v. Torio65 that:
Ordinarily, receipts should support claims of actual damages, but where the defense does not
contest the claim, it should be granted. Accordingly, there being no objection raised by the defense
on Alma Paulo’s lack of receipts to support her other claims, all the amounts testified to are
accepted. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Teresita Acibar’s testimony was dispensed with on account of the admission by
the defense that she incurred ₱55,600.00 in relation to the death of Ernesto.66 This admission by the
defense is even more binding to it than a failure on its part to object to the testimony. We therefore
sustain the award of actual damages by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Solicitor General likewise alleges that a civil indemnity ex delito in the amount of ₱50,000.00
should be awarded. Article 220667 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of civil indemnity for death
caused by a crime. The award of said civil indemnity is mandatory, and is granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.68 However, current
jurisprudence have already increased the award of civil indemnity ex delicto to ₱75,000.00.69 We,
therefore, award this amount to the heirs of Ernesto.1awph!1
Finally, the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00. An aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended
party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 223070 of the Civil
Code.71
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated April 29,
2005 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellants Alberto and Gary Tabarnero
are further ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Canatoy the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186541 February 1, 2012

vs.
VICENTE VILBAR, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00270 which modified the Judgment2 promulgated on August 6, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 35, of Ormoc City, in Criminal Case No. 5876-0. The RTC originally found accused-
appellant Vicente Vilbar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for treacherously
stabbing with a knife the deceased Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert), but the Court of Appeals
subsequently held accused-appellant liable only for the lesser crime of homicide.
The Information charging accused-appellant with the crime of murder reads:
That on or about the 5th day of May 2000, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at the public
market, this city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
VICENTE VILBAR alias Dikit, with treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab, hit and wound the victim herein GUILBERT
PATRICIO, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend himself, thereby inflicting upon said
Guilbert Patricio mortal wound which caused his death. Post Mortem Examination Report is hereto
attached.
In violation of Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, Ormoc City, June 13,
2000.3
When accused-appellant was arraigned on July 31, 2000, he pleaded not guilty to the criminal
charge against him.4
During the pre-trial conference, the parties already admitted that Guilbert was stabbed at the Public
Market of Ormoc City on May 5, 2000 at around seven o’clock in the evening, and that immediately
before the incident, accused-appellant was at the same place having a drinking spree with a certain
Arcadio Danieles, Jr. and two other companions. However, accused-appellant denied that it was he
who stabbed Guilbert Patricio.5 Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Maria Liza Patricio (Maria Liza),6 the widow of the
deceased, and Pedro Luzon (Pedro),7 an eyewitness at the scene. The defense offered the
testimonies of accused-appellant8himself and Cerilo Pelos (Cerilo),9 another eyewitness. On rebuttal,
the prosecution recalled Pedro to the witness stand.10
Below is a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses for both sides:
Maria Liza testified that in the evening of May 5, 2000, she was watching her child and at the same
time attending to their store located in the Ormoc City public market. It was a small store with open
space for tables for drinking being shared by other adjacent stores. At around 7:00 o’clock in the
evening, her husband, Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert) arrived from work. He was met by their child whom
he then carried in his arms. Moments later, Guilbert noticed a man urinating at one of the tables in
front of their store. The man urinating was among those engaged in a drinking spree in a nearby
store. It appears that the accused was with the same group, seated about two meters away. Guilbert
immediately admonished the man urinating but the latter paid no attention and continued relieving
himself. Guilbert then put down his child when the accused rose from his seat, approached Guilbert,
drew out a knife and stabbed him below his breast. The accused, as well as his companions,
scampered away while Guilbert called for help saying "I’m stabbed." At that time, she was getting her
child from Guilbert and about two feet away from the accused. She easily recognized the accused
because he would sometimes drink at their store. Guilbert was immediately brought to the hospital
where he later expired 11:35 of the same evening. She declared that for Guilbert’s medical and
hospitalization expenses, the family spent about ₱3,000.00. As for the wake and burial expenses,
she could no longer estimate the amount because of her sadness.
Pedro, an eyewitness at the scene, corroborated Maria Liza’s testimonial account of the events. On
that night, he was drinking together with a companion in Maria Liza’s store. He recalled Guilbert
admonishing a person urinating in one of the tables fronting the store. Thereafter, he saw the
accused pass by him, approach Guilbert and then without warning, stab the latter. The accused then
ran away and left. Together with his drinking companion, they rushed Guilbert to the hospital. Pedro
asserted that the area’s illumination was "intense" because of the big white lamp and that he was
certain that it was the accused who attacked Guilbert.
Denial was the accused’s main plea in exculpating himself of the charge that he killed Guilbert. He
claimed that in the evening of May 5, 2000, he and his wife went to the public market (new building)
to collect receivables out of the sale of meat. Afterwards, they took a short cut passing through the
public market where they chanced upon his wife’s acquaintances who were engaged in a drinking
spree while singing videoke. Among them were Dodong Danieles (Dodong for brevity) and his
younger brother. They invited him (the accused) and his wife to join them. While they were drinking,
Dodong had an altercation with Guilbert that stemmed from the latter’s admonition of Dodong’s
younger brother who had earlier urinated at the Patricio’s store premises. Suddenly, Dodong
assaulted Guilbert and stabbed him. Fearing that he might be implicated in the incident, the accused
fled and went to the house of his parents-in-law. Thereafter, he went back to the market for his wife
who was no longer there. When he learned that the victim was brought to the Ormoc District
Hospital, he went there to verify the victim’s condition. He was able to talk with the mother and the
wife of Guilbert as well as the police. He was thereafter invited to the precinct so that the police can
get his statement. The next day, the parents of Dodong Danieles came to his parents-in-law’s house
to persuade him not to help the victim’s family. He declined. Half a month later, he was arrested and
charged for the death of Guilbert Patricio.
The defense also presented one Cerilo Pelos ("Cerilo") who claimed to have personally witnessed
the stabbing incident because he was also drinking in the public market on that fateful night. He
insisted that Guilbert was stabbed by someone wearing a black shirt, whose identity he later on
learned to be Dodong Danieles.11
On August 6, 2001, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder
and decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the Court finds the accused Vicente Vilbar alias
Dikit GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged, and hereby sentences
him to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, [and ordered] to pay the offended party the sum of
₱75,000.00 as indemnity, the sum of ₱3,000.00 as medical expenses, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages.
If the accused is a detainee, his period of detention shall be credited to him in full if he abides by the
term for convicted prisoners, otherwise, for only 4/5 thereof.12
The foregoing RTC Judgment was directly elevated to us for our review, but in accordance with our
ruling in People v. Mateo,13 we issued a Resolution14 dated December 1, 2004 referring the case to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Accused-appellant, represented by the Public Attorney’s Office, 15 and plaintiff-appellee, through the
Office of the Solicitor General,16 filed their Briefs on August 15, 2006 and April 30, 2007, respectively.
The Court of Appeals made the following determination of the issues submitted for its resolution:
On intermediate review, accused (now accused-appellant) seeks the reversal of his conviction for
the crime of murder or in the alternative, the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime of
homicide. He argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the inconsistent, irreconcilable,
and incredible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) the exact number of persons
drinking with accused-appellant in the adjacent store; (2) what Maria Liza was doing at the exact
time of stabbing; and (3) the accused-appellant’s reaction after he stabbed the victim. Moreover,
accused-appellant argues that if he was indeed the culprit, why did he approach Guilbert’s family in
the hospital immediately after the stabbing incident? Granting without admitting that a crime of
murder was committed, accused-appellant insists that he could only be held guilty of homicide for it
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that treachery and evident premeditation existed. He
specifically directs our attention to the following details: (1) there was a heated argument between
the victim and a member or members of his group; (2) the stabbing happened in a spur of the
moment; and (3) the victim then was not completely defenseless.
Meanwhile, the OSG stresses that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are minor and inconsequential given the positive identification of the accused-appellant as
the assailant. As to accused-appellant’s contention that he is innocent because he even went to the
hospital and conferred with Guilbert’s relatives immediately after the stabbing incident, the OSG
maintains that such actuation is not a conclusive proof of innocence.
The issues for resolution are first, the assessment of credibility of the prosecution witnesses; and
second, the propriety of conviction of the accused-appellant for murder.17
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on February 14, 2008, in which it accorded great respect
to the assessment by the RTC of the credibility of the witnesses. The inconsistencies and
inaccuracies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are relatively trivial, minor, and do not
impeach their credibility. The positive identification and categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert prevail over accused-appellant’s self-
serving denial. However, the appellate court did not find that treachery attended the stabbing of
Guilbert and, thus, downgraded the crime to homicide. It also reduced the award of civil indemnity.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision sentenced accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the 1 August 2001 Decision appealed from finding accused-appellant VICENTE
VILBAR @ "Dikit" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds the
accused appellant GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen
years and eight months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the
heirs of Guilbert Patricio the amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral
damages, and Php3,000.00 as actual damages.18
Accused-appellant now comes before us on final appeal.

In our Resolution19 dated April 15, 2009, we gave the parties the opportunity to file their respective
supplemental briefs, but the parties manifested that they had already exhausted their arguments
before the Court of Appeals.20
After a scrutiny of the records of the case, we find that the submitted evidence and prevailing
jurisprudence duly support the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
Evidence in this case chiefly consists of testimonial evidence. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals gave credence and weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Case laws mandate that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally binding upon this Court."21 There is no compelling reason for us to depart from the
general rule in this case.
Prosecution witnesses Maria Liza and Pedro both positively and categorically identified accused-
appellant as the one who stabbed Guilbert.
Maria Liza vividly recounted her traumatic moment as follows:
Q: Mrs. Patricio, do you know the accused in this case in the person of Vicente Vilbar alias "Dikit?"
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He used to go there for drinking in our store.
Q: How long have you known this person?
A: About three (3) months.
xxxx
Q: Mrs. Patricio, can you recall where were you in the evening at about 7:00 o’clock of May 5, 2000?
A: I was at the store.
Q: Where?
A: In the market.
Q: What were you doing in the store?
A: I was watching after my, attending to my child there.
Q: How old was the child?

A: Two (2) years old.
Q: When you were attending to your child at this particular time, what happened?
A: My child saw my husband arriving.
Q: What happened after your child saw your husband arrived at the store you were tending?
A: He met him.
Q: And what did your husband do when he was met by your child?
A: He cradled the child.
Q: What happened after that?
A: So at 7:00 o’clock that evening there was somebody urinated and my husband told that someone
not to urinate that place because that was a table.
Q: Do you know who was this someone admonished by your husband not to urinate because that
was a table?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know where did he come from?
A: They were drinking.
Q: Do you know who was his companion while they were drinking?
A: No, only that Vicente Vilbar.
Q: From where he came from or from where he was drinking in the group of persons together with
the accused Vicente Vilbar, how far was the place wherein they were drinking to where he urinated
from where the group was drinking?
A: Just near.
Q: When you said near, can you estimate the distance?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness estimated a distance at about 2 meters.
xxxx
Q: What was the reaction of the person urinating when your husband told him not to urinate?
A: He continue urinating.
Q: What was the reaction of your husband when he did not heed to the advice not to urinate?
A: He put down the child, this Vicente Vilbar rose.
Q: Rose from where?
A: From the table.
Q: And what happened?
A: Without any word stabbed my husband.
Q: What did he use in stabbing your husband, this Vicente Vilbar?
A: Knife.
Q: Do you know, were you able to see where he kept the knife which he used in stabbing your
husband?
A: From his waist.
Q: When the said Vicente Vilbar delivered the stabbed thrust to your husband, was your husband
hit?
A: He was hit.
Q: On what part of his body was your husband hit?
A: Just below the breast.
xxxx
Q: Below the left nipple?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after your husband was hit below the left nipple?
A: Vicente Vilbar ran away and my husband told me to call for some help and he said, "I’m stab."
xxxx
Q: By the way, how far were you to your husband Guilbert Patricio when he was stabbed?
A: I was behind Vicente Vilbar.
Q: When you said you were behind, how far from Vicente Vilbar?
A: Just near, sir, from my husband next was the one who urinated, next Vicente Vilbar and I was
behind.22(Emphases supplied.)
Pedro corroborated Maria Liza’s testimony, recalling the same sequence of events the night of May
5, 2000, viz:
Q: Who was the companion of Guilbert when he arrived in the vicinity?
A: He was alone.
Q: So what happened after his arrival?
A: When he arrived he was with his child.
Q: And what did he do with the child?
A: He carried his child in his arms.
Q: And then what happened after he carried his child?
A: There was someone who [urinated] somewhere behind us and he was admonished by this
Guilbert Patricio by saying, "Bay, don’t urinate there it would somehow create a bad smell and
considering that this is a drinking area."
Q: Who was that person who relieved himself just nearby?
A: I did not know.
Q: Whose group was he coming from?
A: From Vicente Vilbar’s companion.
Q: Did that person who was admonished accede to the request of Guilbert Patricio not to relieve just
nearby?
A: He just did not do something, he just relieved.
Q: So that person who was admonished in fact urinated?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And so what happened?
A: I saw this Vicente Vilbar stood up and pass behind me and went to Guilbert Patricio and just
immediately stabbed him.
Q: What was the weapon used in stabbing?
A: It seems like a knife (and the witness demonstrated to the Court the length of the weapon at
about 10 inches with the width of about 2 inches).
Q: When this stabbing incident took place, was it in front of you or was it behind?
A: In front of me but I was facing his back.
xxxx
Q: Will you please point to us a part of your body that he was hit by the stab thrust?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness demonstrated below his left nipple and the witness was pointing to the position below
his left nipple.
xxxx
Q: At the time of that incident which was on the evening of May 5, 2000, did you already know that
the person whom you just pointed earlier was Vicente Vilbar?
A: I did not know about his complete name but I know of him as "Dikit" as alias and his face.
xxxx
Q: Under what circumstance that you learned of his name?
A: Because I ask the victim himself, that Guilbert Patricio by saying, "Who was that person who
stabbed you Dong?," and then he said "He is known to be Dikit and his real name is Vicente Vilbar."
Q: Prior to the incident, have you seen this Dikit or Vicente Vilbar?
A: Yes, because after we had our tuba drinking spree in that same day they were there also.
Q: Would you recall how many times you have seen Vicente Vilbar prior to the incident?
A: I could not just count how many times but what I’m sure is we know him.
Q: Could it be more than five (5) times?
A: It could be.23 (Emphases supplied.)
The RTC, assessing the aforequoted testimonies, declared:
Maria Liza Patricio is credible. She recognizes the accused, she was just behind him when he
stabbed her husband who was facing the accused. There was proper illumination of the place x x x
and her testimony was not destroyed in the cross-examination. Her testimony is positive and
spontaneous. The Court notes nothing in her demeanor and flow of testimony that would indicate
some contradiction or incredibility.
The other witness, Pedro Luzon, corroborates the testimony of Maria Liza Patricio. x x x.24
The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of
Maria Liza and Pedro,25 these being relatively trivial and insignificant, neither pertaining to the act
constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant. Also, these minor
contradictions were expected from said witnesses as they differ in their impressions of the incident
and vantage point in relation to the victim and the accused-appellant.
In contrast, accused-appellant admitted being present at the scene and time of the commission of
the crime but asserted that one Dodong Danieles was the perpetrator thereof. Yet, the RTC was
unconvinced by the version of events as testified to by accused-appellant himself and Cerilo,
because:
In the observation of the Court, the accused is inconsistent and he talked unintelligibly. His testimony
is not credible and perceived to be flimsy excuses. If it is true that his wife was with him at the time of
the incident and he was not involved in the stabbing, why did he have to leave the place and his wife
and go to the house of his parents-in-law rather than their house? The accused should have
presented his wife to corroborate his testimony in that regard, and also his parents-in-law so the
latter can testify regarding the alleged visitors, the alleged parents of one Dodong Danieles who
came to their place when the accused was also there days after the incident, telling him not to help
the family of the victim.
The accused’s witness, Cerilo Pelos, is the farthest of the expected witnesses for the defense. He
and the accused were not acquaintances and they only came to know each other in prison where
Pelos is also detained for another charge. x x x. The testimony of the witness is hazy and full of
generalities, even the way he speaks, the Court notes some inconsistency in his voice and
incoherence in his testimony.26
A closer perusal of the testimony of accused-appellant’s corroborating witness, Cerilo, reveals just
how incoherent and elusive he was in giving particular details about the stabbing incident:
Q: Now, while you were there, what happened?
A: When I arrived there, I arrived with this people having a drinking spree and I myself went to the
other table near this people and this quite thin or slim guy was standing in front of them and one of
these people who were having drinking spree seemed to relieve himself not to the C.R. but beside
the store.
Q: Now, you said a while ago that there were four (4) companions of the accused. Now, tell us, were
all of the four (4) people that you are referring to that exclude the accused?
A: There were four (4) of them including the accused, sir.
Q: Now, you said that there was somebody from the group who relieved himself, is that right?
A: Yes, sir, urinated.
Q: And what happened when he urinated?
A: He was confronted by that slim guy because he did not urinate in the C.R. but just beside the
store.
Q: And what happened when the confrontation took place?
A: They exchanged words and after that th[e] slim guy left the one who urinated because it seemed
that they were having an argument.
Q: And then, what happened after that?
A: The one who confronted left and this accused stood up went to this slim guy and talked to him.
Q: This slim guy you are referring to is the person who urinated?
A: Yes, sir.
Q; And so what happened with that meeting between the accused and the slim guy that you are
referring to?
A: They were still and they were talking, sir.
Q: Were you able to hear what they were talking about?
A: No, sir, because the place was quite cacophonic.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: They were still talking when the one who urinated went back to the table.
Q: And what happened after this person who urinated went back to the table?
A: They conversed with the one wearing black and after the conversation he stood up and went to
the slim guy.
Q: Who stood up?
A: The one named Dodong, the one who was in black and the one who stabbed.
Q: So, you said that this one wearing black approached the slim guy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: So then, he stabbed him and the one he stabbed ran away, because he was hit.
Q: How about the accused, where was the accused then when the man in black stabbed the slim
guy?
A: There, and they were still convering (sic) with each other with the slim guy, sir.
Q: And what did he do after the man in black stabbed the slim [g]uy?
A: He ran away passing by the Apollo and (while the witness was demonstrating by pressing his
hand to his chest) that he was hit.
Q: How about you, what did you do after that?

A: When the commotion of the people subsided, I asked from the people around there about the
name of the man in black and after getting the name of the said person, I called up the Police
Precinct I to inform them about the incident.
xxxx
Q: Now, this person whom you said who stabbed the victim, did you meet him before?
A: Not yet, sir.
xxxx
Q: As such a police asset, did you endeavor to know the personalities who were involved in that
stabbing incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, did you get name?
A: I only got one name only the name of that guy in black, sir.
Q: Why, did you interview the man in black?
A: I asked from those who were there hanging out if ever they know that person.
Q: Did you not follow the assailant after the stabbing incident?
A: No sir, because after I asked about his name from the bystanders, I immediately called
up.27 (Emphases supplied.)
Cerilo failed to mention what weapon was used to stab Guilbert or describe the manner Guilbert was
stabbed. Cerilo also appeared to have mixed-up the personalities in his narration. He first identified
the "slim guy" to be Guilbert who reprimanded the person who urinated, but he subsequently
referred to the "slim guy" as the person who urinated. Moreover, Cerilo’s identification of the
purported assailant of Guilbert as a certain "Dodong" is highly unreliable, given that Cerilo admitted
that he learned of said assailant’s name from an unidentified spectator of the stabbing incident.
The fact that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert to death on the night of May 5, 2000
was already established beyond reasonable doubt. The next question is what crime for which
accused-appellant should be held liable: murder as held by the RTC or homicide as adjudged by the
Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide in the absence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera,28 we ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated
simply because the attack was sudden and unexpected:
[W]e agree with accused-appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not established.
Surveying the leading decisions on this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro we recently stated:
In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must
establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. . . .
. . . where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was done
impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been aptly
observed the accused could not have made preparations for the attack, . . .; and the means, method
and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the accused, because the attack was
impulsively done.
Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack. . . . In point is the
following pronouncement we made in People v. Escoto:
We can not presume that treachery was present merely from the fact that the attack was sudden.
The suddenness of an attack, does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the
purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless
position was accidental. . . ."
In People v. Bautista, it was held:
". . . The circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not
constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise homicide to murder, where it did not appear
that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation
to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it
impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself. . . ."
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution has not proven that the
killing was committed with treachery. Although accused-appellant shot the victim from behind, the
fact was that this was done during a heated argument. Accused-appellant, filled with anger and rage,
apparently had no time to reflect on his actions. It was not shown that he consciously adopted the
1âwphi1
mode of attacking the victim from behind to facilitate the killing without risk to himself. Accordingly,
we hold that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide only.29
Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the prosecution in the instant case merely showed that
accused-appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to prove that accused-
appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without
risk to himself. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden, the surrounding circumstances
attending the stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the presence of the victim’s families and the
attending eyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accused-appellant wanted to make certain that
no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to stab the victim. Yet,
accused-appellant nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a public market at 7:00 o’clock in the evening.
The place was well-lighted and teeming with people. He was indifferent to the presence of the
victim’s family or of the other people who could easily identify him and point him out as the assailant.
He showed no concern that the people in the immediate vicinity might retaliate in behalf of the victim.
In fact, the attack appeared to have been impulsively done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of
anger or extreme annoyance. There are no indications that accused-appellant deliberately planned
to stab the victim at said time and place. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that accused-appellant,
who at that time was languishing in his alcoholic state, acted brashly and impetuously in suddenly
stabbing the victim. Treachery just cannot be appreciated.30
Lastly, we review the penalty and damages imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-
appellant.
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal.31 Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly
imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence
should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; and that
the minimum should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, is in order.
As to the award of damages to Guilbert’s heirs, we affirm the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Medical and burial expenses were indisputably incurred
by Guilbert’s heirs but the exact amounts thereof were not duly proven. So in lieu of actual damages,
we award Guilbert’s heirs ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. Article 2224 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]emperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."32
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar is found GUILTY of the crime of
HOMICIDE, for which he is SENTENCED to imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
ORDERED to pay the heirs of Guilbert Patricio the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206381

vs.
DANIEL MATIBAG y DE VILLA @ "DANI" or "DANILO", Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De Villa @
"Dani" or "Danilo" (Matibag) assailing the Decision2 dated September 13, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated August 1,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 13941, finding Matibag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The Facts
In an Amended Information4 dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was charged with the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,5 the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 o’clock [sic] in the evening at Iron Street, Twin Villa
Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a Beretta Caliber .9MM Pistol with
Serial No. 3191M9, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said
pistol one Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan, while the latter was completely defenseless, thereby hitting
him and causing gunshot wounds at his head and chest, which directly resulted to the victim’s death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm is attendant in the
commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination of the pre-trial, trial
on the merits ensued.7
The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar de
Jesus Duhan (Duhan), who just came from a meeting with the other officers of the homeowners’
association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City when Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, "ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?" Duhan
replied "wala," and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and
causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first
on the pavement. While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag shot him several more times. PO2
Tom Falejo, a member of the Philippine National Police, positively identified Matibag and stated on
record that he arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005. Dr. Antonio S. Vertido who
conducted an autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the latter suffered gunshot wounds in the head and
chest which led to his death.8
In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his neighbor
when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the homeowners’ association. Wanting to
settle a previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture
of reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and said, "putang ina mo, ang yabang
mo," thereby provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull something from
his waist and fearing that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew
his own gun, shot Duhan, and hurriedly left the place. Matibag went to see his police friend, Sgt.
Narciso Amante, to turn himself in, but the latter was unavailable at the time. As Matibag headed
back home, he was stopped by police officers who asked if he was involved in the shooting incident.
He then readily admitted his involvement.9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Matibag as charged, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Duhan the amounts of
50,000.00 as civil indemnity, 50,000.00 as moral damages, 59,000.00 as actual damages, and
25,000.00 as exemplary damages.11
The RTC refused to give credence to Matibag’s claim of self-defense as he failed to prove the
presence of unlawful aggression on Duhan’s part, finding that: (a) Duhan’s words and actions prior
to Matibag’s attack could not be considered as a real threat against him; (b) no firearm was
recovered from the victim; (c) Matibag’s account that Duhan was about to pull something from his
waist, which thus led him to believe that he was about to be shot, remained uncorroborated; and (d)
the number of gunshot wounds Duhan sustained contradicts the plea of self-defense.12
Separately, the RTC appreciated the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery since the
attack was sudden, unprovoked, and without any warning on the victim who was unarmed and in a
defenseless position.13Likewise, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
was appreciated since a firearm was used in the commission of a crime and, hence, considered
unlicensed.14
Dissatisfied, Matibag appealed15 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibag’s conviction in toto.17
The CA agreed with the RTC’s findings that: (a) treachery attended the killing of Duhan as the attack
on him was sudden;18 and (b) an unlicensed firearm was used in committing the crime, which is
considered as a special aggravating circumstance.19
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of
Matibag for Murder.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.

In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing principle that factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect. These factual
findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were
overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case. The Court
has carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate from the RTC and CA’s factual
findings. There is no indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed, overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court
defers to the trial court on this score, considering too that it was in the best position to assess and
determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.20
On this score, the Court now proceeds to resolve this case on points of law.
Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the
killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.21
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. In People v. Tan,22the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked.23 In People v. Perez,24 it was explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out
treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so
unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.25
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted
Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest.26 Although the attack was
frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan
to defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed.27 Matibag also failed to prove that a heated
exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack
from his assailant.28 The deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his disposition
preceding the moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined
to effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he confronted Duhan,
coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded handgun.29 Based on these findings, the
Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.
This finding of treachery further correlates to Matibag’s plea of self- defense. Note that by invoking
self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged,
albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission, the
burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of Duhan was attended by the following
circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense.30
Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful aggression. It is well-settled that there
can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.31 Jurisprudence states that not every
form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self- defense.32 For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,33 as against the one claiming self-defense.
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates unlawful aggression
in the sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the prosecution was able to prove that the attack was
so sudden and unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless. On the other hand,
Matibag’s version that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist (which thereby impelled his
reaction), remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from the victim.34 Hence, by
these accounts, Matibag’s allegation of unlawful aggression and, consequently, his plea of self-
defense cannot be sustained. The foregoing considered, the Court upholds Matibag’s conviction for
the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, as charged.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in the imposition of
penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866,35 as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294,36 treats
the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as
a special aggravating circumstance:
Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. – x x x.
xxxx
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term "unlicensed firearm" has already been
expanded as follows:37
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm shall include:
1. firearms with expired license; or
2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. (Emphasis

supplied)
Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized under the
purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance. As a result,
the imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA
9346,38 stands proper. To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.39
Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the heirs of the victim
are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without
need of evidence other than the commission of the crime;40 (b) actual or compensatory damages to
the extent proved,41 or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be provided with certainty;42 (c) moral damages;43 and (d) exemplary damages when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.44
In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of 100,000.00 and moral damages in
the amount of 100,000.00 are awarded to Duhan’s heirs without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime and Duhan’s death. Considering further that the crime was committed with
treachery, exemplary damages in the sum of 100,000.00 is also granted.45
The award of P59,000.00 as actual damages should, however, be deleted as the records do not
show that the prosecution was able to prove the amount actually expended. In lieu thereof,
1âwphi1
P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.46 In addition,

interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until
fullyonpaid is imposed all monetary awards.47
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 13, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 finding accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De Villa @ "Dani"
or "Danilo" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay the Heirs of Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan the
amounts of Pl 00,000.00 as civil indemnity, Pl 00,000.00 as moral damages, Pl 00,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality ofjudgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L.
ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel should
feel safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are
peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse
brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in
a senseless death whose justice is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are
prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present themselves
courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as
fraternity rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions.
They must do so for there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams
of his family. Excruciating grief for them will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)
members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked
men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against several
members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla,
Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida,
Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict
Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The
information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other
persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and
cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and
clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,3 and Leandro Lachica,4 and the frustrated
murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio5 and Amel Fortes.6 Only 11 of the accused
stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix
Tumaneng,7 and Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December
8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at
the back of the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.8 Suddenly,
Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when
Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.10 The men were armed
with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or
shirts.11 Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead
pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
because his mask fell off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.15 Just before reaching it, he looked
back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where
the commotion was.16 Both of them did not have their masks on.17 He was familiar with Alvir,
Zingapan, and Medalla because he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his friend.18 The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-
five (45) seconds.19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when
Venturina shouted.20He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks,
running toward them.21 He was stunned, and he started running.22 He stumbled over the protruding
roots of a tree.23 He got up, but the attackers came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and
baseball bats until he fell down.24 While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2) of the
attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not wearing any
masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men
coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group also beat him up.28 He did not move until
another group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.30 Several bystanders brought him to the
U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures.31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when Venturina
shouted and saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of
cloth around their heads.32 He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered
with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes.33 While running and parrying the
blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their
masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library.35 He then decided
that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House.36 There, he saw
Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while
Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.38 When they saw him, they went toward his
direction.39 They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were coming.
Feliciano and Narag then ran away.40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could
bring Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought the car over, other people, presumably
bystanders, were already loading Venturina into another vehicle.42 They followed that vehicle to the
U.P. Infirmary where they saw Natalicio.43 He stayed at the infirmary until the following morning.44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard
someone shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and
baseball bats.46 Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces.47 He was about to run when
two (2) of the attackers approached him.48 One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed
him with a bladed instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the blows from the lead pipe, but he
sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm.50
He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach
House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano.52 He decided
to go back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see any of his
fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them.54 He ended up going to their hang-out
instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers.55 They then proceeded to the College of Law where
the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident.56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of attackers
coming toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina.58 He was
also able to see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to
the College of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers.60 One of his fraternity brothers, Peter
Corvera, told him that he received information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west
wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM North.61 Lachica and his group then set off for
SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63 Lachica saw Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan.64 They had no choice but to
get away from the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held
a meeting.65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their
complaints with the National Bureau of Investigation.66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the
U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their statements before the National Bureau of
Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies of their statements. In the meantime,
Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8, 1994. He
died on December 10, 1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the cadaver of
Dennis Venturina.68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, found that Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the upper left arm
and hematoma on the back of both hands,"69 "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the
head,70 generalized hematoma on the skull,"71 "several fractures on the head,"72 and "inter-cranial
hemorrhage."73 The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard blunt
object.74 Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their
respective affidavits76before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal
examinations77 with their medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found
that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the
fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion on the left leg and thigh,"78 all of which could
have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required medical attendance for a period
of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.79
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg which could
have been caused by a blunt instrument."80 These injuries required hospitalization for a period of ten
(10) days to thirty (30) days from date of infliction.81 He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a
"healed abrasion on the left forearm which could possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard
surface and would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical attention."82 He found on Leandro
Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra
scapular area, left side."83 On Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior
chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left
side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the
prosecution's witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution.85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement of the facts, as
follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol with another
member of the U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the College
of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went
to the place where the alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped by
bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service vehicle of the Beach House Canteen.
They asked what his name was, and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When he asked
Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead told him that his attackers were
wearing masks. Oscar Salvador87 corroborated his testimony.
Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of
the attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted that he did not
see the attack; he just saw a man sprawled on the ground at the time of the incident.
Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a cigarette at a
vendor located nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten (10)
men, wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came from a
red car parked nearby. He also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two
(2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to help him, but the
attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping those who
were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later found out to be
Amel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban,90 testified that she and
her friends were in line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened.
She saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did
not see any mask fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz Perez,91 corroborated her
story that the masked men were unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however, admitted
that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified on substantially the same matters as
Panganiban and Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being
beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked men. She also stated that some of the men were
wearing black masks while some were wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any mask
fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in
Pampanga to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son went to
Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school where she teaches to get their house key
from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not been feeling well since December 5, 1994.
He said that he could not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was absent
even from work. He also testified that he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the
person identified by Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time
since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a
school project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the
rumble as he had an injury affecting his balance. The injury was caused by an incident in August
1994 when he was struck in the head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was corroborated by
Jose Victor Santos96 who stated that after lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him and,
afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and
another friend in Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m.
and went straight to their fraternity hang-out where he was told that there had been a rumble at the
Main Library. He also met several Sigma Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-
out. They were also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans and just go
home. Anna Cabahug,98 his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed to
have gone to SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He also
alleged that some Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM North that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision100 with the finding that Robert Michael
Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among
other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.101 The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo
Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag.102 The
case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension.103 The trial
court, m evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused,
some were sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous
images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of
the attackers etching an indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution
eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers rush towards them wielding deadly
weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their
hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the scene of the crime during
the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were
all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could
have easily tagged each and every single accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric
assault to make sure that no one else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named
only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows
against them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court
on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal,105 the case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals.106 In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several
Times107 before it was eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of
the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed108 the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring109 an one (1) dissenting.110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the issue may be
further refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information

against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of
the evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the
prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in
the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were
wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law."111 This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty and "to be informed of the nature and accusation against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in
compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended pary; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to

know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to
allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.114
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such.115 It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance.116 What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there
was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were
being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also
not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of
one is the act of all."117 This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their
identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the
crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons
involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,

when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
given great weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel
Quijada,118 as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses,
are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias,120 this court
stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies
of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception
that makes the rule is where such findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted
with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached without the
careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision.121(Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is always in
favor of innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is
sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the
defense were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial
court acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it
cannot be said that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it
was arrived at without a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is also nothing
that precludes this court from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of the
facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently

identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution to be credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind
bars, not one testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma
Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have
easily tagged each and every accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make
sure no one would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some
were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows against them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to
have seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said
that he did not have the opportunity to see and identify the person who hit him in the back and
inflicted a two-inch cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it.
Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized, was severely beaten by three waves of
attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that he
would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed
to at least 5 but he stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay,
Denoista, and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston could have named any of the accused as the
one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he frankly said their faces were
covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several groups but did not name any of the
accused as one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified were those leading the pack
with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing while he
was running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during the attack but did not know
then their names.122 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident,"123 there would be slight
inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,124 it was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying
details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe
or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different
witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.125 (Emphasis
supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla;126
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva;127 and Fortes was able to identify
Feliciano, Medalla, and Zingapan.128 Their positive identification was due to the fact that they either
wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor
to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be
apprehended. It has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of
their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of
the assailant and body movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from their memory.129
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks. It
had been testified by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of
cloth or a handkerchief and that Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133 had masks on at first
but their masks fell off and hung around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-examination who
observed that some of the attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the Beach House
Canteen, and then running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind to take a
look at their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence while Gaston's
testimony was found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris
members identified by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of
Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication."135 The court went on to state that they "were exonerated
merely because they were accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang,
under tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and their alibis, not
refuted."136 There was, therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that
the evidence presented was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy"137 by the trial court only with regard to
his identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with
Zingapan moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and
Morano were running after him. Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with
Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the trial court found that there was doubt as to who was really
beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the court still
did not" impute doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was brought
about only upon a thorough examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that these were minor and did not affect their
credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no
person with perfect faculties or senses."'138
Evidence as part of the res

gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139 when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they
were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and
are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony
taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way,
res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after
the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot
expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different
persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points
in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the
attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the
entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be
given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The belated identification by

the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the
Quezon City Police but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4)
days after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed
the victims who all told him they could not recognize the attackers because they were all wearing
masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang147testified to the effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked
them, Natalicio answered that he did not know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While this
court does not condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are
certain practices that are unique to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers but chose not to
disclose it without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by
the actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which showed that they confronted the members of
Scintilla Juris in SM North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have
been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make
the police officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be
forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer
Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident also
does not affect their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and
needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of
them were well enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order to give
their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their
legal counsel that they executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of Investigation
four (4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P.
Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of
Investigation more equipped to handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility
of the witnesses since they were merely following the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better equipped than
the U.P. Police to handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics
website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their station is located in
front of the College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and
property, enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and
Regulations including policies and standards; and to perform such other functions relative to the
general safety and security of the students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. x
x x.148 (Emphasis supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security. They are by no
means an actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternity-
related violence in U.P. has also increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have
desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their
investigations. The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation, therefore, is
understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the

positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim.149 In
People v. Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the
defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed
with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the
least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by
the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving
of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-appellants
merely offered alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both
the trial court and the appellate court while giving little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis.
There is, thus, no reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants were
correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball bats
attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis
Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of
armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the
commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For
treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.154 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to the
findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the
attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could
see them"155 and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in
the canteen could have helped the victims."156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They
were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack
by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way
they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to
help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or
even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy

makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of
Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro
Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their
liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against
Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased
by the attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and
from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make
them suffer pain by slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston
"was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their
degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of
the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of
the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.162 (Emphasis
supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the
others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the
moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the
presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their
attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and
whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical
injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the
attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica,
Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-
appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill.
1âwphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives
whose once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There
is now more honor for them to accept their responsibility and serve the consequences of their
actions. There is, however, nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully
compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this
case and many cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which
valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It colors the stories of
many who choose to expend their energy in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity
rumbles are an anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture
that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26,
2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla,
Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be
fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136,
Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195525 February 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WILFREDO GUNDA alias FRED, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the March 30, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No.
00397 which affirmed with modification the May 20, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, finding appellant Wilfredo Gunda alias Fred (appellant)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Factual Antecedents
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, the victim, Eladio Globio, Sr., and his son,
Eladio Jr., were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern
Samar. Suddenly, when Eladio Jr. was about 10 meters ahead of his father, the latter was waylaid
by appellant and his unidentified companions. The John Does held the victim's arms whereupon
appellant stabbed him several times. Fearing for his life, Eladio Jr. fled. The unidentified assailants
pursued him. Fortunately, he was able to outrun them and was able to reach their house. In the
morning of the following day, Eladio Jr. went to the house of his sister and informed her of the death
of their father. They then reported the incident to the police authorities who eventually arrested the
appellant. The body of the victim was recovered and post-mortem examinations revealed that he
suffered multiple stab wounds which caused his death.
Aside from Eladio Jr., Teofilo Ambal, Jr. (Ambal) who is a brother-in-law of the appellant, also
witnessed the crime. In the afternoon of May 25, 1997, while Ambal was at his farm gathering feeds
for his pigs, he saw appellant who was armed with a wooden pole position himself at the back of the
victim and strike the latter’s head with the wood. The companions of appellant then held the victim’s
arms whereupon appellant drew a bolo locally known as depang from his waist and stabbed the
victim several times. Fearing for his life, Ambal likewise left the crime scene.
On July 31, 1997, an Information3 was filed charging appellant and the John Does with the crime of
murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on May 25, 1997, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay,
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, and without justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound Eladio Globio, Sr., with the use of a sharp
bladed weapon (Depang) which the accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting
injuries upon the latter, which injuries caused the death of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with aggravating circumstances that the crime committed in an uninhabited
place and the superior strength [sic].4
Arraigned on September 10, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 The other accused
who have not been identified remained at large.
Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, he was
at Barangay Camada gathering and cleaning rattan poles.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 20, 2005, the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, rendered its Decision6 finding
appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Wilfredo Gunda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH; and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and another sum of
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court disregarded the denial of the appellant. On the other hand, it lent full credence to the
testimonies of Eladio Jr. and Ambal who both positively identified appellant as the assailant. The
RTC noted that their testimonies coincided with the postmortem findings of Dr. Samuel Baldono that
the victim suffered multiple stab wounds which caused his death. The RTC likewise brushed aside
the alibi of appellant. It noted that although he claimed that he was in Barangay Camada at the time
of the incident, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at
Barangay Cabay where the crime took place. Appellant even admitted that the distance between the
two barangays could be traversed in an hour or even less. The RTC also found that appellant
conspired with the John Does in committing the crime. It also noted that treachery attended the
commission of the crime because the victim was unarmed and totally unaware of the impending
attack. The attack was sudden thus depriving the victim of any opportunity to escape or defend
himself.
In imposing the death penalty, the RTC considered treachery and conspiracy as qualifying
circumstances.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 30, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 20, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 8th Judicial Region, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the lesser penalty of Reclusion Perpetua instead of Death be
imposed against appellant.
SO ORDERED.8
The CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court that indeed, it was appellant, in conspiracy with
the other John Does, who killed the victim. The CA also agreed with the findings of the trial court that
the killing was done in a treacherous manner. However, the CA noted that although the trial court
properly appreciated treachery and conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime, the
presence of both would not warrant the imposition of the death penalty. It ratiocinated that -
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence
served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Since treachery
qualified the commission of the crime to murder, this circumstance could no longer be appreciated
anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Furthermore, although there was conspiracy in this case, it is neither a qualifying circumstance [nor]
a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The two penalties being both
indivisible, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the deed, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied pursuant to the second
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code.9
Aggrieved, appellant filed this appeal10 to which the CA gave due course in its Resolution11 of
December 1, 2010.
On March 21, 2011, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs.12 However,
both parties opted not to file their briefs anymore considering that their arguments had been amply
discussed in the briefs that they filed before the CA.13
Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal.
Based on the above narrations, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Two
prosecution witnesses positively identified him as the person who waylaid the victim, and with the
help of his conspirators, stabbed the victim several times. According to the postmortem findings, the
victim suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death. There is also no doubt in our mind that the
attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was unarmed and had no inkling of the
impending attack on his person. In fact, he was just on his way home together with his son Eladio Jr.
The victim was attacked by appellant from behind with a blow to his head with a wooden pole. His
cohorts then held the victim’s arms rendering him helpless and immobile. In such position, there is
no opportunity for the victim to escape or even offer a feeble resistance. Appellant then delivered the
coup de grâce by stabbing the victim multiple times. Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the killing to
murder. "There is treachery when the offender commits [a crime] against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make."14 As regards conspiracy, the CA correctly ruled that it is not a circumstance which would
aggravate or qualify the crime.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of
1âwphi1
treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of
the two indivisible penalties. "It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for
parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended’."15
As regards the damages, the amount of civil indemnity must be increased to ₱75,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.16 Exemplary damages must likewise be increased to ₱30,000.00.17 Moral
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, however, was correctly awarded by the trial court and the
CA.18 Moreover, we note that the trial court and the CA did not award actual damages. In lieu thereof,
we award temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 "as it cannot be denied that the heirs of
the [victim] suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved."19 "This award is
adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the
purpose of indemnification."20 In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.21
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 30, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 00397 which affirmed with modification the May 20, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, finding appellant Wilfredo Gunda alias
Fred guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
As modified, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
PS0,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages. Interest on all damages awarded is imposed at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187683 February 11, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
VICTORIANO DELA CRUZ y LORENZO, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal,1 seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated
October 31, 2008, which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, dated August 15, 2005, convicting appellant Victoriano dela Cruz y
Lorenzo4 (Victoriano) of the crime of Parricide.
The Facts
Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide in an Information5 dated January 2, 2003, which
reads:
That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill his wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence and stab the said
Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Victoriano, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he and two others,
including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a card game known as tong-its just three to four arms
length away from the latter’s house.
While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein victim Anna Liza Caparas-
dela Cruz7(Anna), in front of their house. Joel knew the wife’s name as "Joan." Victoriano then
dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard
the couple shouting while they were already inside the house.8
Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with their young daughter.
Victoriano was behind Anna, with his arms wrapped around her. He asked for Joel’s help. Joel
noticed blood spurting out of Anna’s mouth. He took the couple’s daughter and gave her to
Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a
tricycle. However, Anna died.9
On the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., Senior Police Officers 1 Condrado Umali and Eligio Jose,
responding to the call of duty, went to the hospital for investigation. There, Victoriano was turned
over to the police officers by the hospital's security guard on duty.10
The Certificate of Death,11 prepared by Police Senior Inspector and Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray (Dr. Viray), showed that Victoriano’s wife died of "hemorrhagic shock as a result of a
stab wound, trunk." Moreover, in his Medico-Legal Report12 dated August 21, 2002, Dr. Viray had the
following findings:
HEAD and NECK:
1) Hematoma, frontal region, measuring 3 x 3 cm, 3 cm right of the anterior midline.
2) Hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 2 x 2 cm, 3 cm from the anterior midline.
CHEST and ABDOMEN:
1) Stab wound, penetrating, right shoulder region, measuring 2 x .5 cm, 2 cm right of the
posterior midline, about 12 cm deep, directed lateralwards and slightly downwards, piercing
the underlying tissues and muscle, lacerating the upper lobe of the right lungs.
xxxx
> There are about 2000 cc of blood and blood clots at the thoracic cavity.
UPPER and LOWER EXTREMITIES:
1) Hematoma, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 7 x 4 cm, bisected by its posterior
midline, with superimposed abrasion, measuring 1.5 x 7 cm, along its anterior midline.
Version of the Defense
Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he came home very drunk from a
friend's house. Before he could enter their house, his wife, Anna, started nagging him saying, "Hindi
ka naman pala namamasada, nakipag-inuman ka pa." He asked her to go inside their house but she
refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna and dragged her inside their house.
Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her aside so he could go out of the
house. However, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the process. When he helped her stand
up, Victoriano noticed that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass of the jalousie. He
brought her outside immediately and asked the help of his neighbors who were playing tong-its
nearby. Victoriano admitted that Joel accompanied him and his wife to the hospital.
At the hospital, Victoriano was taken into custody by policemen for questioning. It was only in the
following morning that Victoriano learned of his wife’s passing.
Victoriano also testified that he does not usually drink; that he consumed hard liquor at the time of
the incident; that Anna was not immediately treated in the hospital; that he loved his wife; and that
he did not intentionally hurt her.13
The Lower Courts’ Ruling

On August 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Victoriano L. dela Cruz Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz the
following sums of money, to wit:
1. ₱60,000.00 as civil liability
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
3. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.14
Aggrieved, Victoriano appealed to the CA.15
On October 31, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the findings of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 August 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The award of
civil indemnity is reduced to ₱50,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence, this appeal.
In its Manifestation17 filed before this Court, appellee, People of the Philippines, as represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, intimated that it was no longer filing any Supplemental Brief in
support of its position.
Meanwhile, in his Supplemental Brief,18 Victoriano, as represented by the Public Attorney's Office,
claimed that the CA erred in appreciating Joel's testimony, since the latter merely testified on the
non-mortal wounds that Anna suffered when the couple were outside the house. Insofar as the
actual killing was concerned, Joel's testimony was merely circumstantial. Moreover, Victoriano
averred that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong against his wife, evident from the facts
that he carried the injured body of his wife; that he sought for help after the accident; and that he
brought her to the hospital for medical treatment. Furthermore, Victoriano asseverated that he was
very drunk at the time. Thus, he prayed that these mitigating circumstances be appreciated in his
favor.
Our Ruling
The instant appeal is bereft of merit.
The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
Parricide ― other than the fact of killing ― is the relationship of the offender to the victim. In the
case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was
married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as
an admission against penal interest.19 Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna
were husband and wife.
Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his own, which refers to the slapping incident
that occurred outside their house. It does not at all point to him as the actual perpetrator of the crime.
Thus, Victoriano submits that Joel’s testimony is merely circumstantial.
But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we ruled in People v. Castillo:20
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial
evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.21
In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a
conviction. First, immediately preceding the killing, Victoriano physically maltreated his wife, not
merely by slapping her as he claimed, but by repeatedly punching and kicking her. Second, it was
Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their house, by pulling her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's
Report, Anna sustained injuries in different parts of her body due to Victoriano's acts of physical
abuse. Fourth, the location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's intent to kill the victim. The
Report revealed that the victim sustained a fatal stab wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right
lung, a vital organ. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased manifests Victoriano's
intention to extinguish life. Fifth, as found by both the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna
were inside the house, other than their young daughter. Thus, it can be said with certitude that
1avvphi1
Victoriano was the lone assailant. Sixth, we have held that the act of carrying the body of a wounded
victim and bringing her to the hospital ― as Victoriano did ― does not manifest innocence. It could
1avv phi1
merely be an indication of repentance or contrition on his part.22
The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no reason to discredit Joel’s
testimony and Dr. Viray's Report. Besides, well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying. The Court does not find any arbitrariness or
error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a deviation from this well-entrenched rule.23
Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider Victoriano’s claim that the injury sustained by his wife
was caused by an accident, without fault or intention of causing it, it is clear that Victoriano was not
performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused may be exempted from
criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements must
concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to
another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. For an accident to
become an exempting circumstance, the act that causes the injury has to be lawful.24 Victoriano's act
of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act. To say otherwise would be a
travesty -- a gross affront to our existing laws on violence against women. Thus, we fully agree with
the apt findings of the CA, to wit:
With the foregoing avowal, We find that the death of appellant’s wife was not caused by mere
accident. An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." It connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by a person’s overt acts.
In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that appellant started beating his wife outside their house
and was even the one who dragged her inside. This, to Our mind, contradicts his theory that he only
pushed her so as to go out of the house to avoid any further quarrel. Such incongruity whittles down
appellant’s defense that he did not deliberately kill his wife.25
Finally, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a
quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of
obfuscating reason.26 In short, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, and not
subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that the accused's drunkenness affected his mental
faculties. In this case, the absence of any independent proof that his alcohol intake affected his
mental faculties militate against Victoriano’s claim that he was so intoxicated at the time he
committed the crime to mitigate his liability.27
In sum, Victoriano failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its
assailed Decision. His guilt was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, considering that there was neither any
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance. The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil indemnity ex
delicto of ₱50,000.00, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the
culpability of the accused for such death. Likewise, moral damages, in the amount of ₱50,000.00,
should be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the
victim's heirs, because certainly the family suffered emotional pain brought about by Anna's death.
However, the CA erred when it deleted the award of exemplary damages. In line with current
jurisprudence, it is but fitting that exemplary damages, in the sum of ₱30,000.00, be awarded,
considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case of
Parricide.28
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01575, finding
appellant, Victoriano dela Cruz y Lorenzo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide,
is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. No costs.
G.R. No. 171018 September 11, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELLY NAELGA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the Decision1 dated 30 November 2005
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00304 entitled People of the Philippines v. Elly Naelga,
affirming the Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch
53, in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, finding Elly Naelga guilty of the illegal sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu.
By virtue of a Criminal Complaint, accused-appellant Elly Naelga y Bongay (accused-appellant) was

indicted before the RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, for violation of Sections 53 and
11(3),4 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 15, 2003, in Poblacion, Municipality of Rosales,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody the following, to wit: one (1) piece of small transparent plastic containing
"Shabu" weighing more or less 0.4 grams which he sold to a poseur-buyer designated by the police,
and without having the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
Contrary to Article II, Sec. 5 and Sec. 11(3) of R.A. 9165.5
Upon arraignment on 27 August 2003, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.6
A pre-trial conference was held on 16 September 2003 in the presence of the government
prosecutor, the accused and his counsel. Based on the pre-trial order issued by the trial court on 16
September 2003, the defense only admitted to the identity of the accused-appellant and the fact of
his apprehension, but denied any knowledge of the existence of a buy-bust operation. The defense
limited its testimonial evidence to that of accused-appellant himself. On the other hand, the
prosecution limited its testimonial evidence to the stipulations of Police Officer (PO) 2 Noe Sembran,
PO1 Rosauro Valdez, and Forensic Chemist Emelda Besarra Roderos. The prosecution’s
documentary evidence included the following: (a) Affidavit executed by PO2 Sembran who acted as
poseur-buyer; (b) the marked money/₱100 bill with Serial No. GW877766 recovered from accused-
appellant; (c) confiscation receipt; (d) Chemistry Report; and (e) sachet of shabu handed by
accused-appellant to PO2 Sembran. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution supported its version of the events through documentary evidence and the
testimonies of its two witnesses from the Rosales Police Station in Rosales, Pangasinan, namely:
PO2 Noe Sembran and PO1 Rosauro Valdez.
PO2 Noe Sembran testified that upon receiving information from a civilian asset that the accused
Elly Naelga was peddling illegal drugs at the public market of Rosales, Pangasinan, Police Chief
Inspector Policarpio Cayabyab, Jr. hatched a plan to conduct a buy-bust operation to apprehend the
accused. PO2 Sembran was tasked to act as poseur-buyer, with PO1 Danilo Asis, Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Jesus Caspillo, and PO1 Rosauro Valdez as backup operatives. The money used
for the buy-bust operation was provided by the Rosales Treasurer’s Office and affixed thereto were
his signature and that of the municipal treasurer of Rosales.
In his testimony, PO2 Sembran narrated that on 15 July 2003, he was informed by an asset that
accused-appellant Elly Naelga was selling illegal drugs at the Rosales Public Market in Pangasinan.
Thereafter, at about three o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, PO2 Sembran went inside the
public market and approached accused-appellant. PO2 Sembran was familiar with accused-
appellant, because the police’s confidential agent had been monitoring accused-appellant’s activities
for several weeks. PO2 Sembran talked to accused-appellant, who asked the former if he was a
security guard, to which he replied in the affirmative. While engaged in this conversation, PO2
Sembran asked the accused-appellant what he could use to keep him awake while on duty as a
security guard. Accused-appellant suggested that he drink Red Bull. PO2 Sembran replied that he
already did, but this did not work, and that he was caught sleeping on his post. Accused-appellant
then declared that he knew something more effective, as he passed his index finger under his nose
as if sniffing something. When asked what he meant, accused-appellant told PO2 Sembran that he
was referring to bato or shabu. PO2 Sembran said he was willing to try this and to buy Five Hundred
Pesos (₱500.00) worth of shabu. Accused-appellant told PO2 Sembran to give him the money and
committed to return with the shabu. PO2 Sembran gave appellant four One Hundred Pesos
(₱400.00) in marked bills. Upon receiving the money, accused-appellant left. PO2 Sembran went
back to the police station to plan the arrest of accused-appellant.
1av vphi1
Police Chief Inspector Policarpio C. Cayabyab, Jr. instructed PO2 Sembran to act as a poseur-buyer
and the other members of the team as backup. PO2 Sembran and his fellow police officers returned
to the public market almost an hour later. They waited for accused-appellant until he finally arrived,
alighting from a tricycle. PO2 Sembran followed him in an alley. There were people sleeping on
bamboo tables in the alley, and PO2 Sembran expressed apprehension at being noticed. Accused-
appellant reassured him that they would not be disturbed and immediately asked for the balance of
One Hundred Pesos (₱100.00). PO2 Sembran gave accused-appellant the marked money.
Thereupon, accused-appellant took out a sachet containing white granules and handed it to PO2
Sembran, who then revealed that he was a policeman. Accused-appellant tried to run, but PO2
Sembran held on to the former’s belt. They struggled and fell to the pavement. PO1 Valdez came to
help PO2 Sembran arrest accused-appellant. PO2 Sembran was able to recover the One-Hundred-
Peso (₱100.00) bill from accused-appellant, who had used the Four Hundred Pesos (₱400.00) he
earlier received to buy shabu. Accused-appellant was taken into custody, and PO2 Sembran
executed an affidavit of arrest. The plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline
substance purchased from accused-appellant for ₱500.00 was marked "EN" and taken to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office in Camp Florendo, San
Fernando, La Union, for laboratory examination.7 The four marked One-Hundred-Peso bills earlier
given to accused-appellant were no longer with him, but the last ₱100.00 marked bill later paid to
him was recovered.
PO1 Rosauro Valdez corroborated PO2 Sembran’s testimony, narrating how he acted as backup in
connection with the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of accused-appellant.
The parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of the Chemist, Police Inspector Emelda Besarra
Roderos, who conducted the laboratory examination of the subject drug, considering that the
defense admitted the existence, authenticity and due execution of Chemistry Report Number D-260-
2003-U dated 16 July 2003, showing that the laboratory examination of the drug confiscated from
accused-appellant yielded a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug. 8
For the defense, accused-appellant took the witness stand.
Accused-appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he was employed by a
Muslim named Khadi to sell compact discs (CDs) in a stall located inside the public market of
Rosales, Pangasinan. PO2 Sembran, who introduced himself as a security guard, had previously
been buying CDs from him. One Saturday, the exact date of which he could not recall, PO2
Sembran came at around 8:30 in the morning and bought a battery worth ₱5.00. On Tuesday of the
following week or on 15 July 2003, PO2 Sembran returned and asked accused-appellant to buy
shabu for him saying, "We need that this evening." He told PO2 Sembran that he did not know
anybody selling shabu; nonetheless, PO2 Sembran left ₱400.00, which was placed beside him. He
took the money, because it might get lost. At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day,
PO2 Sembran came back to the stall and waited for him. When he arrived, he gave to PO2 Sembran
what he bought. Accused-appellant admitted, although not certain, that what he bought was shabu,
which he gave to PO2 Sembran. After accused-appellant handed over the shabu and while he was
leaving the place, PO2 Sembran called him back uttering, "Pare, come here," and then handcuffed
him. PO2 Sembran told him, "Pare, I am a policeman" (pulis ako). On cross examination, accused-
appellant admitted buying the subject shabu in Urdaneta City.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on the merits. Finding that the prosecution had
proven accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC promulgated its Decision on 21
June 2004 convicting him of the offense charged, sentencing him to Life Imprisonment, and
imposing on him a fine of ₱500,000.00, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Elly Naelga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal sale of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" as charged, defined and
penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
suffer life imprisonment; to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and, to pay
the costs of suit.9
Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. On 30 November
2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the challenged decision of the trial court,
reasoning thus:
[T]here is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The choice of effective
ways to apprehend drug dealers is within the ambit of the police authority – police officers have the
expertise to determine which specific approaches are necessary to enforce their entrapment
operations. The court’s duty in these cases is to ensure that the rights of the accused have not been
violated during buy-bust operations.
The failure of the police authorities to comply strictly with the Dangerous Drugs Board’s Resolution
on the chain of custody of the seized shabu and its preservation, by itself, is not fatal to the
prosecution’s case. What is essential or necessary is that after the subject shabu was seized, the
same was duly identified, marked or preserved, and duly submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination. x x x.
xxxx
x x x We always adhere to the well-entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that the findings of facts of
the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the
probative weight of the evidence of the parties as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded by the appellate court high respect. In the absence of any showing that a judge’s
factual findings were reached arbitrarily or without sufficient basis, these findings are to be received
with great respect by the Supreme Court, and indeed are binding upon it.
Prescinding therefrom, We hold that the court a quo had sufficiently and clearly established both the
factual and legal basis that led to the verdict of conviction of accused-appellant Naelga. The Court a
quo’s findings and pronouncement that the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation
against accused-appellant Naelga, did so pursuant to their lawful exercise of police functions should
gain respect from Us. This is so because the defense miserably failed to produce any contrary
evidence that would show even how remotely it was, that police officers Sembran and Valdez were
motivated with grudge or ill-will to allow injustice to be committed against the person of accused-
appellant if their accusation was fabricated.10
Via a Notice of Appeal,11 accused-appellant elevated the case to this Court, which thereafter
resolved to require the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desired, within 30 days from notice.12Both the prosecution and the defense opted to adopt their
respective supplemental briefs filed before the Court of Appeals for purposes of expediency.13
In its brief, the defense raises the following issues for resolution by this Court:
I.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE DISPUTABLE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS REGULARLY PERFORMED THEIR OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS.
We sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.
Accused-appellant denies the charges against him and attacks the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
The core issue for resolution is the issue of the credibility of the witnesses.
Accused-appellant questions the trial court’s reliance on the credibility of the two prosecution
witnesses in convicting him on several grounds. First, material inconsistencies and gross
contradictions in the testimonies of the police officers destroyed their credibility. Second, accused-
appellant alleges that the police officers failed to observe the proper guidelines in securing the chain
of custody of the prohibited drugs; this alleged failure to follow proper procedure raises doubts as to
whether the specimen examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court was indeed the one
retrieved from accused-appellant. Thus, there can be no presumption of regularity.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General is for sustaining accused-appellant’s
conviction, arguing that the alleged inconsistencies are minor and inconsequential and, in fact, do
not negate the occurrence of the buy-bust operation and accused-appellant’s involvement.
The instant controversy involves no less than the liberty of accused-appellant. The presumption of
innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules that place on the prosecution the burden of proving that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. This being an appeal of a criminal case,
opening the entire case up for review, we have carefully reviewed and evaluated the records and the
decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and find no reason to deviate from their rulings.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Considering that this Court
has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the
assessment of the trial court.14 This Court will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.15 This rule is
consistent with the reality that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.16 Thus, factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and
its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case.
A successful prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous/prohibited drugs must establish the
following elements:
(1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.17
As correctly found by the trial court, accused-appellant was caught in a buy-bust operation. He was
caught in flagrante delicto selling a dangerous drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, to
PO2 Noe Sembran on 15 July 2003 at the public market of Rosales, Pangasinan, established not
only by the clear, straightforward, and convincing testimony of poseur-buyer PO2 Noe Sembran and
corroborated by PO1 Rosauro Valdez, but also by accused-appellant’s testimony.
Accused-appellant himself confirmed and admitted to the occurrence of said transaction. Following
his testimony, he admitted to taking the ₱400.00 left by PO2 Sembran for the purchase of shabu,
thereafter going to his alleged source in Urdaneta City, and then returning with the shabu to the
Rosales Public Market, and handing the sachet over to PO2 Sembran. The foregoing were not only
undisputed but were, in fact, admitted by accused-appellant himself in his testimony. Thus, there is
no denying that the said transaction indeed took place.
Desperate to get himself absolved from culpability, accused-appellant submits in the alternative that
the facts as presented by the prosecution reveal that the law enforcers, specifically PO2 Sembran,
instigated him to sell shabu. Accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who approached
and asked him to buy shabu, leaving the money even if he said he did not know anybody selling
shabu.
We find no instigation in this case. The general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a
crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
done upon the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives
feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. This is
particularly true in that class of cases where the offense is of a kind habitually committed, and the
solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will
not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of
the detective.18
Here, the law enforcers received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant
was engaged in illegal drug trade in the public market of Rosales. Poseur-buyer PO2 Sembran then
pretended to be engaged in the drug trade himself and, with the help of his fellow buy-bust
operatives, arrested accused-appellant in the act of delivering the shabu to him. In an entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be
defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no
bar to prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid
and effective mode of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the
idea of committing a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense.19 In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was formed by the police officers
precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend the perpetrator.
While accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who approached and asked him to buy
shabu for him, the same cannot be considered as an act of instigation, but an act of "feigned
solicitation." Instigation is resorted to for purposes of entrapment, based on the tip received from the
police informant that accused-appellant was peddling illegal drugs in the public market of Rosales. In
fact, it was accused-appellant who suggested to PO2 Sembran to use shabu; and, despite accused-
appellant’s statement that he did not know anybody selling shabu, he still took the money from PO2
Sembran and directly went to Urdaneta, where he claimed to have bought the illegal drug. Then he
returned to the Rosales public market and gave the drug to PO2 Sembran.
The records of the case disclose that PO2 Noe Sembran, the designated poseur-buyer in the buy-
bust operation, positively identified accused-appellant as the seller of the confiscated shabu. His
testimony was corroborated by PO1 Rosauro Valdez. The object of the corpus delicti was duly
established by the prosecution. The sachet confiscated from accused-appellant was positively
identified, marked and preserved as evidence, and upon laboratory examination yielded positive for
shabu.
Accused-appellant’s assertion that the police operatives failed to comply with the proper procedure
in the chain of custody of the seized drugs is premised on the idea that non-compliance with the
procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity accorded police authorities
in the performance of their official duties.
The argument fails.
Contrary to appellant’s claim, there is no broken chain in the custody of the seized items, later on
determined to be shabu, from the moment of its seizure by the entrapment team, to its delivery to the
investigating officer, to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory
for laboratory examination. It was duly established by documentary, testimonial, and object
evidence, including the markings on the plastic sachet containing the shabu indicating that the
substance tested by the forensic chemist, whose laboratory tests were well-documented, was the
same as that taken from accused-appellant.
Failure of the buy-bust team to strictly comply with the provisions of said section did not prevent the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying. 20
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which
implements said provision, reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.
The above provision further states that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under
justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items,
for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. The evident purpose of the procedure provided for is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Its absence, by itself, is not fatal to the
prosecution’s case and will not discharge accused-appellant from his crime. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the instant
case, the integrity of the drugs seized remained intact, and the crystalline substance contained
therein was later on determined to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21(1) were
already present, per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite such
regulation and the non-compliance therewith by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied the
presumption of regularity, holding:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979
is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally
irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of
illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established x x x and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers
to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board. 21
Assuming arguendo that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty will not
apply due to the failure to comply with Section 21(a), the same will not automatically lead to the
exoneration of the accused. Accused-appellant’s conviction was based not solely on said
presumption, but on the documentary and real evidence; and, more importantly, on the oral evidence
of prosecution witnesses, whom we found to be credible. One witness is sufficient to prove the
corpus delicti - that there was a consummated sale between the poseur-buyer and the accused -
there being no quantum of proof as to the number of witnesses to prove the same. To emphasize,
accused-appellant himself verified in his testimony that the said transaction took place.
The inconsistencies pointed out by the defense pertaining to whether or not he was already inside
the public market of Rosales at the time the operatives returned, or if the buy-bust team saw him
alighting from a tricycle, is an inconsistency immaterial to the commission of the offense and, thus,
cannot affect the overall credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The records of the case indicate that after his arrest, accused-appellant was taken into police
custody. After the arrest, the seized item, which had the marking "EN" and alleged to contain shabu,
was brought to the PNP crime laboratory for examination.22 The request for laboratory examination
and transfer of the confiscated sachet to the PNP crime laboratory was prepared by Chief of Police
Policarpio C. Cayabyab, Jr.23 The request indicated that the seized item was delivered by PO3
Resuello, Jr. and received by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Emelda Besarra Roderos,24 the same person
who conducted laboratory tests on the substance. The transparent plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance was later on determined to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
PO2 Sembran positively identified the plastic sachet containing shabu, which he had bought from
accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation. Thus, the identity of the shabu taken from accused-
appellant had been duly preserved and established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with. The accused-appellant in this case bears the burden of making
some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome the presumption of
regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers
properly discharged their duties. There is no doubt that the sachet marked "EN," which was
submitted for laboratory examination and found to be positive for shabu, was the same one sold by
accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer PO2 Sembran during the buy-bust operation.
Finally, accused-appellant’s claim that he is a victim of a frame-up is viewed by this Court with
disfavor, because being a victim can easily be feigned and fabricated. There being no proof of ill
motive on the part of the police operatives to falsely accuse him of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with
respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the claim of the accused-appellant.25 While
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents should
not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence, for the claim of frame-up to prosper, the
defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of
regularity, which the defense was not able to proffer.
Accused-appellant was charged with the unauthorized sale and delivery of a dangerous drug in
violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved.
Thus, the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
00304 convicting accused-appellant ELLY NAELGA of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 14 Full Cases

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Art. 14 Full Cases

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G.R. No.

PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Version of the Defense

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The dispositive part of the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appeal is unmeritorious.

q How about [his] face x x x, can you x x x describe [it] to us?

A Tirso Sibbu, ma'am.

A There was a light in front of the azotea, ma'am.

a Christmas lights that were not blinking, ma'am.18

a More or less 5 meters, sir.

a He came nearer, sir.

q Now, Mr. Witness, [how did you recognize the accused]?

a He fixed his bonnet [his] face was partly covered, sir.

a Only one eye was covered so he fixed it sir.

In People v. Jugueta,30 the Court held that:

b. Moral damages –₱l00,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages –₱50,000.00

In People v. Jugueta,31 the Court en banc held as follows:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

The issues in this case are:

1. Whether or not Nazareno took part in a conspiracy to kill David;

The Court’s Ruling

GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners,

The following are the antecedents:

Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners stated the following arguments:

THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE

At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

(1) That there be external acts;

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states

Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?

A. I also used that.

Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?

Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?

A. He is right in the kitchen.

Q. Then what happened?

Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?

Q. Who are they?

A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao, Saligan

A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.

A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17

Q. Why does he has (sic) to makea follow up in your department?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Appellant Alberto, a construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders, was 45

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE CULPABLE, THE COURT A

The justifying circumstance of self-defense on the part of Gary cannot be considered

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances: