Republic of the Philippines granted the private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages,
SUPREME COURT attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH
TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and
ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3
April 1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November
1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed
petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478
of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh
Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime
Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh
McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a
result of a vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim
Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh
McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee,
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen
Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife
and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the
owners of the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben
Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in
Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City
and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between
an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T
Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben
Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76
driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh,
Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother
of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc,
on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim.
At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc
who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her
two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded
with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos,
was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other
hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the
northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right
side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side
or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and
entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the
car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision
occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the
said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles
City; consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith dispatched
to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared by the
investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60)
"footsteps" long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide — seven (7)
"footsteps" from the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on
both sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of
concrete with soft shoulders and concrete railings on both sides about
three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear
portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the
right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center line
of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its front
bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from the
northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36)
"footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right
front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid marks
produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps." The two
(2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after
the accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles
(48 kilometers) per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477
and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of
First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and Branch
V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R.
No. 68103 prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for
burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the
tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No.
68102 prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of
Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for
funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the
tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of
Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries
suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the
hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the complaint;
and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection with the
serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following
medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00
payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the
Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to
25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the
crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide
and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial
court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to
Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478
was assigned. 5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private
respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded
and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as
counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees,
P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478,
private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to
implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they
also filed a motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477
pending before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by
the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions were denied by Branch V, then presided
over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed
their Answer with Counter-claim 8 wherein they alleged that Jose Koh
was the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck driven
by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane going towards
Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules and
regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in
their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as may be
determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of P10,000.00
as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed
on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses taken
during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private
respondents opposed and which the court denied. 9 Petitioners
subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying the motion for
consolidation, 10 which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5
September 1978; he then directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court then
presided over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh
McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel,
Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and offered
several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private
respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman,
Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs.
Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon
Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector,
Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel,
Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered
several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon the other hand, the defense
presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida
Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary exhibits. 14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the
accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged in the information and after applying the provisions
of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and indeterminate sentence
law, this Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum; the
accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnify the heirs of Loida
Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death; to
reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00
representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc
the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to
indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh the value of the
car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs. 15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980;
on the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the
court — where the two (2) civil cases were pending — a manifestation
to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision. 16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2)
civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 17 The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants
had proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and
unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of
P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual
damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby dismissing
for lack of proof to that effect (sic). 18
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on
28 November 1980 and was received on 2 December 1980. 19
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-
CR and was assigned to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12
November 1980 decision to the appellate court. The appeals were
docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R,
respectively, and were assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its
decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of
Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming
pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang
pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November
1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was filed with this Court; said
petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was
denied with finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision
in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041, 25 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set
aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to
pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:
For the death of Jose Koh:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 and
D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G and
G-1)
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)
P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
P 114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM)
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:
P 10,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case
No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case
No. 4478.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings
that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private
respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision
of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege
in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee.27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the
following findings of fact:
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the
determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the fourth assigned error
as follows:
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER
OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN
SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE
TO THE RIGHT.
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee
testified thus:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross
the right lane on the right side of the highway going to San Fernando.
My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2)
boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to
avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on
the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the
right of way to come back to our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right
lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes
and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6,
July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused,
Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know
(sic)?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could
have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir.
(tsn. pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp.
30-31, Appellants' Brief).
Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by
the following facts and circumstances:
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco,
declared that the truck stopped only when it had already collided with
the car:
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the
criminal case:
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness
because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene of the accident.
As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the
hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants' witnesses,
Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who
supposedly lived across the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course
of events people usually take the side of the person with whom they
are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general rule,
they do not wish to be identified with the person who was at fault. Thus
an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several persons
within the same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR,
Jan. 31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an
accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured
persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the
mishap, but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the trial
court in the criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit.
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that
Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car, according to
plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants was
completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by appellees in their
brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the record.
According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court below, said
Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this light, it is
not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim that he stopped was an
eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from
imprisonment and damages.
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10 meters
away:
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact that you
admitted that the road is straight and you may be able to (sic) see 500-
1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you first saw that car only
about ten (10) meters away from you for the first time?
xxx xxx xxx
A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you
have (sic) not noticed it before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept.
18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)
Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that Galang
stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the
truck running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's affidavit
(Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh impossible to avoid a
collision on a bridge.
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not because he
waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper lane. The police
investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuñag, stated that he found skid marks
under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the truck
(pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of skid marks show (sic)
that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the
truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the reasonable
conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck were caused by the
truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds
before the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid,
Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters away, a very short distance to
avoid a collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the collision he
abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened just the
same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the selection of
their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not allege
such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employees in their answers.
They did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods
of selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or
negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap. If
Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car
earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He proceeded to
cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision was already
inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge his attention
was not riveted to the road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply
proven, but the items must be reduced. 28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the
facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of
which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April
1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and
affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment of 12 November 1980. A
motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent
Court on 4 July 1984.30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
I
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY
BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY
COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
(sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE,
RESPONDENT COURT'S RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B,
PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON
SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE
FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.
II
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN
IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS,
"IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF
GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE
TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.
III
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT
HELD: "IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE
RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE
NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
IV
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR;
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED
ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO
THESE CASES.
V
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS,
SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED
FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
VI
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN
THE RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY
LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
VII
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES. 31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private
respondents to Comment on the petition. 32 After the said
Comment 33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply 34 thereto; this
Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required
petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they accordingly complied with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of
dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some observations
on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No.
3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil
Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records
do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may
therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate
Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties
may have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no
specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly allowed such
a consolidation, that an independent civil action, authorized under
Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the
civil cases in this case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal case.
Indeed, such consolidation could have been farthest from their minds
as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence." Be that as it may, there was then
no legal impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of
the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard
against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets
to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with
the least expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have easily sustained
a consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous,
spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same
facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Such
was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen
anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this
Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for the
recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176
of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the
condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal
case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No.
3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already
final by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last attempt
to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of
conviction, has no relevance or importance to this case.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from
fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new
Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action." 39 In Salta
vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this Court stated:
. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions
mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed
separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of
the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case,
to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during the
pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the court's
disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate
civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33
are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may
be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct
separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . .
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the
decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is
the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would have
been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for
damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents'
liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been
conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents. 41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised
in this petition is whether or not respondent Court's findings in its
challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere
speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts.
Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on
these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on
this Court. 42
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of
facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when
such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court
failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a
conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. 43 The same
is true where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on
conjectures, speculations and surmises 44 or where the conclusions of
the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of facts. 45
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one
of the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and conclusions of
the trial court and the respondent Court in its challenged resolution are
not supported by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension of
facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The
respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct
findings of fact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that
the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision
occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the
car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence,
the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the
petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's
lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two (2)
boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the
car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross
the right lane on the right side of the highway going to San Fernando.
My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2)
boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to
avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on
the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the
right of way to come back to our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right
lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes
and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. 46
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross
examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary
in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril —
death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as
negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus:
. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law Dictionary,
Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." (Cooley on Torts,
Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy years
ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct
of the discreet paterfamiliasof the Roman
law. . . .
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is
a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing
Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the
facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be
imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite
lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to
take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be
several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side
of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what
is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of
the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the
given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot
be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause has been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively,
the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom. 50
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of
Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events,
it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the
tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have
resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals
given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to
go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed
towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent
in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car
measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This
would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a
clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a
level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck.
Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have
tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself
said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour
along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot
give credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in
the translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's response
in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour
or miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been
regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof to the contrary, this
presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim is
based on mere conjecture.
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through
the earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which
was duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an
impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused,
Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could
have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir.
(tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these Civil Cases)
(pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief)54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?
A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.
Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know what happened?
A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place
to help the victims. (tsn. 28, April 19, 1979)
Q From the time you saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you
tell us if the said truck ever stopped?
A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already collided with the car
and it was already motionless. (tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis
Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief). 55
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in
failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to
avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting
accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law
of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In
such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
thereof.56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held:
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine
of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may
have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of
a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and
Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held
liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been
grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am.
Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled:
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case
of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this
wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence
of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty
of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan
People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May,
18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to
exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes
between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff,
thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v.
Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim (sic) for damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now
rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary
care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of
the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents
are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable
for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. 60 The answers of the private
respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this
defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November
1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil
Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984
finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death
must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE
while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-
41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for
death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death
of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Civil Law; Negligence; The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.—As We
held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as
more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, “in the case of independent civil action under the new Civil
Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction,
would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. Same; Same; Definition
of negligence.—Negligence was defined and described by this Court
in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: “x x x Negligence
is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,
930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(T)he failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.’ Same; Same; Same; Under
what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.—On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of
negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would
mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would
be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow
down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.” Same; Same; Definition of
proximate cause.—Proximate cause has been defined as: “x x x ‘that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain difficult to rule that it was the truck driver’s negligence in failing to
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was in law the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person proximate cause of the collision; Employers directly and primarily
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and liable for the resulting damages.—Applying the foregoing doctrine, it
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver’s
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which
therefrom.” Same; Same; Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the
person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.—The truck driver’s Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of
was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris
while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he damage.
was violating any traffic regulation. Same; Same; Doctrine of last
clear chance; The doctrine states that the contributory negligence of Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown Manila
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
EN BANC
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party.—Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by vs.
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes,
followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but
terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as
the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-
to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving
on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would
only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared
in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as
commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders,
judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on
August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before
it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the
possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should
any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead,
on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks
the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that
he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's
residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the
court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his
counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its
order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear
on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed
the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's
aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition
of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable
negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically,
it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an
affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to
his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the
plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this
stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid.
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P.
Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in
fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought
to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence
adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs.
Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive
evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have
to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing
in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant
asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that
"there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for
breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise
to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the
provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not
contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant
applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party
drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased
(Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years
old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never
returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated,
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony
is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded
were excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual
damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of
said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same
could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the
New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... ,
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is
that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification,
the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Damages; Breach of promise to marry; When actionable wrong.—
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the
erring promissor must be held answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Same; Same; Same; Moral
and exemplary damages may be awarded in an actionable breach of
promise suit.—When a breach of promise to marry is actionable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded
under Article 2219(10) of ,the said Code. Exemplary damages may
also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven
that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8721 May 23, 1957
TRANQUILINO CACHERO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
FELIX, J.:
There is no dispute as to the following facts: on December 13, 1952,
Atty. Tranquilino F. Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxicab, with plate
No. 2159-52 driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and owned by the
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. On passing Oroquieta between
Doroteo Jose and Lope de Vega streets, Gregorio Mira Abinion
bumped said taxicab against a Meralco post, No. 1-4/387, with the
result that the cab was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell out of the
vehicle to the ground, suffering thereby physical injuries, slight in
nature.
The chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the City Fiscal and on
February 26, 1963, upon his plea of guilty the Municipal Court of
Manila sentenced him to suffer 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor,
and to pay the costs. On December 17, 1952, Tranquilino F. Cachero
addressed a letter to the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., which was
followed by another of January 6, 1953, which reads as follows:
The MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC.
1338 Arlegui, Manila
Dear Sirs:
As you have been already advised by the letter dated December 17,
1952, on December 13, 1952, while I was a passenger of your taxicab
bearing plate No. 2159 and driven by your chauffeur Gregorio Mira
and through his negligence and the bad condition of the said car, he
bumped the same against the pavement on the street (Oroquieta —
between Doroteo Jose and Lope de Vega streets, Manila) and hit the
Meralco post on said street, resulting in the smashing of the said
taxicab, and as a result thereof I was gravely injured and suffered and
is still suffering physical, mental and moral damages and not being
able to resume my daily calling.
For the said damages, I hereby make a demand for the payment of the
sum of P79,245.65, covering expenses for transportation to the
hospital for medical treatment, medicines, doctors bills, actual
monetary loss, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, etc.,
within 5 days from date of receipt hereof.
I trust to hear from you on the matter within the period of 5 days above
specified.
(Exhibit K)
The Taxicab Co. to avoid expenses and time of litigation offered to
settle the case amicably with plaintiff but the latter only agreed to
reduce his demand to the sum of P72,050.20 as his only basis for
settlement which, of course, was not accepted by said company. So
plaintiff instituted this action on February 2, 1953, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, praying in the complaint that the defendant be
condemned to pay him:
(a) The sum of P72,050.20, the total sum of the itemized losses and/or
damages under paragraph 7 of the complaint, with legal interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint;
(b) The sum of P5,000 as attorney's fee; and the costs of the suit; and
Plaintiff further respectfully prays for such other and further reliefs as
the facts and the law pertaining to the case may warrant.
The defendant answered the complaint setting forth affirmative
defenses and a counterclaim for P930 as damages and praying for the
dismissal of plaintiff's action. After hearing the Court rendered
decision only July 20, 1954, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, sentencing the latter
to pay the former the following: (1) For medicine, doctor's fees for
services rendered and transportation, P700; (2) professional fee as
attorney for the defendant in Criminal Case No. 364, "People vs.
Manolo Maddela et al." of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya, P3,000; (3) professional fees as attorney for the defendant in
Civil Case No. 23891 of the Municipal Court of Manila, "Virginia
Tangulan vs. Leonel da Silva," and for the taking of the deposition of
Gabina Angrepan in a case against the Philippine National Bank, P200;
and(4) moral damages in the amount of P2,000.
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
Defendant shall also pay the costs."
From this decision both parties appealed to Us, plaintiff limiting his
appeal to the part of the decision which refers to the moral damages
awarded to him which he considered inadequate, and to the failure of
said judgment to grant the attorney's fees asked for in the prayer of his
complaint. Defendant in turn alleges that the trial Court erred in
awarding to the plaintiff the following:
(1) P700 — for medicine, doctor's fees and transportation expenses;
(2) P3,000 — as supposedly unearned full professional fees as attorney
for the defendant in Criminal Case No. 364, "People vs. Manolo
Maddela et al.";
(3) P200 — as supposedly unearned professional fees as attorney for
the defendant in Civil Case No. 23891 of the Manila Municipal Court,
"Virginia Tangulan vs. Leonel de Silva", and for failure to take the
deposition of a certain Gabina Angrepan in an unnamed case; and
(4) P2,000 — as moral damages, amounting to the grand total of
P5,900, these amounts being very much greater than what plaintiff
deserves.
In connection with his appeal, plaintiff calls attention to the
testimonies of Dr. Modesto S. Purisima and of Dr. Francisco Aguilar,
a member of the staff of the National Orthopedic Hospital, which he
considers necessary as a basis for ascertaining not only the physical
sufferings undergone by him, but also for determining the adequate
compensation for moral damages that he should be awarded by reason
of said accident.
The exact nature of plaintiff's injuries, their degree of seriousness and
the period of his involuntary disability can be determined by the
medical certificate (Exhibit D) issued by the National Orthopedic
Hospital on December 16, 1952, and the testimonies of Dr. Francisco
Aguilar, physician in said hospital, and of Dr. Modesto Purisima, a
private practitioner. The medical certificate (Exhibit D) lists: (a)
a subluxation of the right shoulder joint; (b) a contusion on the right
chest; and (c) a "suspicious fracture" of the upper end of the right
humerus. Dr. Aguilar who issued the medical certificate admitted,
however, with regard to the "suspicious fracture", that in his opinion
with (the aid of) the x-ray there was no fracture. According to this
doctor plaintiff went to the National 0rthopedic Hospital at least six
times during the period from December 16, 1952, to April 7, 1953; that
he strapped plaintiffs body (see Exhibit E), which strap was not
removed until after a period of six weeks had elapsed Dr. Modesto
Purisima, a private practitioner, testified that
he advised and treated plaintiff from, December 14, 1952, to the end
of March (1953). Plaintiff was never hospitalized for treatment of the
injuries he received in said accident.
Counsel for the defendant delves quite extensively on these injuries.
He says in his brief the following:
Just what is a subluxation? Luxation is another term for dislocation
(Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th
ed.), p. 652), and hence, a sublaxation is an incomplete or
partial dislocation (Ibid., p. 1115). While a dislocation is the
displacement of a bone or bones from its or their normal setting (and,
therefore, applicable and occurs only to joints and not to rigid or non-
movable parts of the skeletal system) (Ibid., p. 358; Christopher, F., A
Textbook of Surgery (5th ed.), p. 342), it should be distinguished from
a fracture which is a break or rupture in a bone or cartilage, usually due
to external violence (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th Ed.)
p. 194; Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical
Dictionary (13th ed.), P.459). Because, unlike fracture which may be
partial (a crack in the bone) or total (a complete break in the bone),
there can be no half-way situations with regard to dislocations of the
shoulder joint (the head or ball of the humerus — the humerus is the
bone from the elbow to the shoulder) must be either inside the socket
of the scapula or shoulder blade (in which case there is no dislocation)
or out of the latter (in which event there is a dislocation), to denote a
condition where due to external violence, the muscles and ligaments
connecting the humerus to the scapula have subjected to strain intense
enough to produce temporary distention or lessening of their tautness
and consequently resulting in the loosening or wrenching of the ball of
the humerus from its snug fit in the socket of the scapula, by using the
terms subluxation or partial dislocation(as used in the medical
certificate), is to fall into a misnomer — a term often used by
"chiropractors" and by those who would want to sound impressive, but
generally unfavored by the medical profession. To describe the above
condition more aptly, the medical profession usually employs the
expression luxatio imperfecta, or, in simple language,
a sprain (Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical
Dictionary (13th ed.), p. 652). The condition we have described is a
paraphrase of the definition of a sprain. Plaintiff suffered this very
injury (a sprained or wrenched shoulder joint) and a cursory scrutiny
of his x-ray plates (Exhibits A and B) by a qualified orthopedic surgeon
or by a layman with a picture or x-ray plate of a normal shoulder joint
(found in any standard textbook on human anatomy; the one we used
was Schemer, J.P., Morris' Human Anatomy (10 ed., p. 194) for
comparison will bear out our claim.
Treatment for a sprain is by the use of adhesive or elastic bandage,
elevation of the joint, heat, effleurage and later massage (Christopher,
F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th ed., p. 116). The treatment given to the
plaintiff was just exactly that Dr. Aguilar bandaged (strapped)
plaintiff's right shoulder and chest (t.s.n., p. 31) in an elevated position
(with the forearm horizontal to the chest (see photograph, Exhibit E),
and certain vitamins were prescribed for him (t.s.n., p. 131). He also
underwent massage for some time by Drs. Aguilar and Purisima. The
medicines and appurtenances to treatment purchased by plaintiff from
the Orthopedic Hospital, Botica Boie and Metro Drug Store were, by
his own admission, adhesive plaster, bandage, gauze, oil and "tintura
arnica" (t.s.n., p. 3 — continuation of transcript ), and Dr. Purisima
also prescribed "Numotizin", a beat generating ointment (t.s.n., p. 23),
all of which are indicated for a sprain, and by their nature, can cure
nothing more serious than a sprain anyway. Fractures and true
dislocations cannot be cured by the kind of treatment and medicines
which plaintiff received. A true dislocation, for instance, is treated by
means of reduction through traction of the arm until the humeral head
returns to the proper position in the scapular socket (pulling the arm at
a 60 degree angle and guiding the ball of the humerus into proper
position, in its socket) while the patient is under deep anaesthesia, and
then, completely immobilizing the part until the injured capsule has
healed (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery, pp. 343 and 344). No
evidence was submitted that plaintiff ever received the latter kind of
treatment. Dr. Purisima even declared that after the plaintiff's first visit
to the Orthopedic Hospital the latter informed him that there was no
fracture or dislocation (t.s.n., p. 26). Dr. Purisima's statement is the
truth of the matter as we have already explained — joints of the
shoulder being only subject to total dislocation (due to their anatomical
design), not to partial ones, and any injury approximating dislocation
but not completely, it being classified as mere sprains, slight or bad.
The second and last injury plaintiff sustained was a contusion. What is
a contusion? It is just a high flown expression for a bruise or the act of
bruising (Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical
Dictionary (13th ed. p. 290). No further discussion need be made on
this particular injury since the nature of a bruise is of common
knowledge (it's a bit uncomfortable but not disabling unless it occurs
on movable parts like the fingers or elbow which is not the case, herein
having occurred in the right chest) and the kind of medical treatment
or help it is also well known. (pp. 10-14, defendant-appellant's brief).
The trial Judge undoubtedly did not give much value to the testimonies
of the doctors when in the statement of facts made in his decision he
referred to the physical injuries received by the plaintiff as slight in
nature and the latter is estopped from discussing the same in order to
make them appear as serious, because in the statement of facts made
in his brief as appellant, he says the following:
The facts of the case as found by the lower court in its decision, with
the permission of this Honorable Court, we respectfully quote them
hereunder as our STATEMENT OF FACTS for the purpose of this
appeal.
Before entering into a discussion of the merits of plaintiff's appeal, We
will say a few words as to the nature of the action on which his demand
for damages is predicated.
The nature of an action as in contract or in tort is determined from the
essential elements of the complaint, taken as a whole, in the case of
doubt a construction to sustain the action being given to it.
While the prayer for relief or measure of damages sought does not
necessarily determine the character of the action, it may be material in
the determination of the question and therefore entitled to
consideration and in case of doubt will open determine character of the
action and indeed there are actions whose character is necessarily
determined thereby. (1 C.J.S. 1100)
A mere perusal of plaintiff complaint will show that his action against
the defendant is predicated on an alleged breach of contract of carriage,
i.e., the failure of the defendant to bring him "safely and without
mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of
defendant's taxicab that plaintiff used when he received the injuries
involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even been made a party
defendant to this case.
Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action in this case, is he
entitled to compensation for moral damages? Article 2219 of the Civil
Code says the following:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34 and 35.
Of the cases enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first
two may have any bearing on the case at bar. We find, however, with
regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in
connection with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries". The one that committed the offense against the plaintiff is
Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already prosecuted and
punished therefor. Although (a) owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are
likewise liable for damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned task (Article 2180 of
the Civil Code); and (c) employers and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies committed
by their employees in the discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised
Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this action under the
provisions of any of the articles of the codes just mentioned and against
all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused, but as a
result of an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against the
defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does
not come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi delict causing
physical injuries" (Art. 2219 par. 2, of the Civil Code). From the report
of the Code Commission on the new Civil Code We copy the
following:
A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a
careful deliberation, it was agreed to use the term "quasi-delict" for
those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts quasi-
contracts or criminal offenses. They are known in Spanish legal
treatises as "culpa aquiliana", "culpa-extra-contractual" or "cuasi-
delitos". The phrase "culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation "extra-
contractual fault" was eliminated because it did not exclude quasi-
contractual or penal obligations. "Aquilian fault" might have been
selected, but it was thought inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as
the "Lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delicts" was chosen, which more nearly
corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obligations, and is in
harmony with the nature of this kind of liability.
The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting the word
"tort" from Anglo-American Law. But "tort" under that system is much
broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising
from non-contractual negligence." "Tort" in Anglo-American
jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but also intentional
criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional
and malicious are governed by the Penal Code, although certain
exceptions are made in the Project. (Report of the Code Commission,
pp. 161-162).
In the case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We
established the distinction between obligation derived from negligence
and obligation as a result of a breach of a contract. Thus, We said:
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond
for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the
breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise
due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and
immediate, differing essentially in the legal view point from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed
by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection or
supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligation arising EX
CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligations or — to use
the technical form of expression, that article, relates only to CULPA
AQUILIANA and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL.
The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab (82 Phil., 359,
46 Off. Gaz., Na. 5, p. 2023); Lilius et al. vs. Manila Railroad, (59
Phil. 758) and others, wherein moral damages, are awarded to the
plaintiffs, are not applicable to the case at bar because said decisions
were rendered before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (August 30,
1950) and for the further reason that the complaints filed therein were
based on different causes of action.
In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral damages
by the trial Court has to be eliminated, for under the law it is not a
compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar.
As to plaintiff's demand for P5,000 as attorney's fees, the Civil Code
provides the following:
ART, 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against
the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident had faith in refusing
to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers
and skilled workers;
(8) in actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and
employers liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a
crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
The present case does not come under any of exceptions enumerated
in the preceding article, specially of paragraph 2 thereof, because
defendant's failure to meet its responsibility was not the plaintiff to
litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interests. The present action
was instituted because plaintiff an exorbitant amount for damages
(P60,000) and naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to
such demand. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of
Article 2208 because the Lower Court did not deem it just and
equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees. As We agree with
the trial Judge on this point, We cannot declare that he erred for not
awarding to plaintiff any such fees in this case.
Coming now to the appeal of the defendant, the Court, after due
consideration of the evidence appearing on record:
(1) Approves the award of P700 for medicine, doctors' fees and
transportation expenses;
(2) Reduces the award of P3,000 as attorney's fees to the sum of
P2,000, as Manolo Maddela, defendant in Criminal Case No. 364 of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya testified that he has
already paid to plaintiff part of the latter's fees of P3,000, the amount
of which was not disclosed, though it was incumbent upon the plaintiff
to establish how much he had been paid of said fees;
(3) Approves the award of P200 as unearned professional fees as
attorney for the defendant in Civil Case No. 238191 of the Municipal
Court of Manila whom plaintiff was unable to represent, and for the
latter's failure to take the deposition of one Agripina Angrepan due to
the automobile accident referred to in this case.
Before closing this decision We deem it convenient to quote the
following passage of defendant's brief as appellant:
Realizing its obligation under its contract of carriage with the plaintiff,
and because the facts of the case, as have been shown, mark it as more
proper for the Municipal Court only, the defendant, to avoid the
expense and time of litigation, offered to settle the case amicably with
plaintiff, but the latter refused and insisted on his demand for
P72,050.20 (Exhibit K) as the only basis for settlement, thus adding a
clearly petty case to the already overflowing desk of the Honorable
Members of this Court.
We admire and respect at all times a man for standing up and fighting
for his rights, and when said right consists in injuries sustained due to
a breach of a contract of carriage with us, sympathy and understanding
are added thereto. But when a person starts demanding P72,050.20 for
a solitary bruise and sprain, injuries for which the trial court, even at
its generous although erroneous best, could only grant P5,900, then
respect and sympathy give way to something else. It is time to fight,
for, in our humble opinion, there is nothing more loathsome nor truly
worthy of condemnation than one who uses his injuries for other
purposes than just rectification. If plaintiff's claim is granted, it would
be a blessing, not a misfortune, to be injured. (p. 34-35)
This case was instituted by a lawyer who, as an officer of the courts,
should be the first in helping Us in the administration of justice, and
after going over the record of this case, we do not hesitate to say that
the demand of P72,050.20 for a subluxation of the right humerus bone
and an insignificant contusion in the chest, has not even the semblance
of reasonableness. As a matter of fact, Dr. Aguilar himself said that the
x-ray plates (Exhibits A, Band C) " did not show anything
significant except that it shows a slight subluxation of the right
shoulder, and that there is a suspicious fracture", which ultimately he
admitted not to exist. The plaintiff himself must have felt embarrassed
by his own attitude when after receiving defendant's brief as appellant,
he makes in his brief as appellee the categorical statement that he
DOES NOT NOW INSIST NOR PRETEND IN THE LEAST to
Collect from the defendant all the damages he had claimed in his
complaint, but instead he is submitting his case to the sound discretion
of the Honorable Court for the award of a reasonable and equitable
damages allowable by law, to compensate the plaintiff of the suffering
and losses he had undergone and incurred of the accident oftentimes
mentioned in this brief in which plaintiff was injured" (p. 17-18).This
acknowledgment comes too late, for plaintiff has already deprived the
Court of Appeals of the occasion to exercise its appellate jurisdiction
over this case which he recklessly dumped to this Court. We certainly
cannot look with at favor at his attitude of plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by
reducing the amount awarded as professional fees from P3,000 to
P2,000 and by eliminating the moral damages of P2,000 awarded by
the Lower Court to the plaintiff. Said decision is in all other respects
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
While under the law, employers are made responsible for the damages
caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned
task, plaintiff, in the present case, does not maintain his action against
all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused but on an
alleged breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant
employer alone. However, the defendant taxicab company has not
committed any criminal offense resulting in physical injuries against
the plaintiff. The one that committed the offense against plaintiff is the
driver of defendant's taxicab but he was not made party defendant to
the case. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for moral
damages as his case does not come within the exception of paragraph Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio
1 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an
excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to
swerve and to his the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the
morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured,
including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right
humerus. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for
treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations; the first on
May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the broken bones
and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint, and
a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears
that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless
Manila imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly.
EN BANC
The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the
G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959 identity of the vehicle as the belonging to the petitioner was rejected
by the appellate court which found, among other things, that is carried
PAZ FORES, petitioner, plate No. TPU-1163, SERIES OF 1952, Quezon City, registered in the
vs. name of Paz Fores, (appellant herein) and that the vehicle even had the
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent. name of "Doña Paz" painted below its wind shield. No evidence to the
contrary was introduced by the petitioner, who relied on an attack upon
Alberto O. Villaraza for petitioner.
the credibility of the two policemen who went to the scene of the
Almazan and Ereneta for respondent.
incident.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March
Defendant-petitioner Paz Fores brings this petition for review of the 21, 1953, or one day before the accident happened, she allegedly sold
decision of the Court of Appeals (C.A. Case No. 1437-R) awarding to the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen
the plaintiff-respondent Ireneo Miranda the sums of P5,000 by way of Sackerman.
actual damages and counsel fees, and P10,000 as moral damages, with
The initial problem raised by the petitioner in this appeal may be
costs.
formulated thus — "Is the approval of the Public Service Commission
necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without
conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?" Assuming
the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the query
in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld.
Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146)
provides:
Sec. 20. Subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving
provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service
or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the previous
approval and authority of the Commission previously had —
(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property,
franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part thereof; or
merge or consolidate its property, franchises, privileges or rights, or
any part thereof, with those of any other public service. The approval
herein required shall be given, after notice to the public and after
hearing the persons interested at a public hearing, if it be shown that
there are just and reasonable grounds for making the mortgage or
encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year maturity, or the sale,
alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be approved and that the
same are not detrimental to the public interest, and in case of a sale,
the date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fixed in the
order of approval: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or
completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease
by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of
its business.
Interpreting the effects of this particular provision of law, we have held
in the recent cases of Montoya vs. Ignacio, *50 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p.
108; Timbol vs. Osias, et al., G. R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955,
and Medina vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 10, p. 4606,
that a transfer contemplated by the law, if made without the requisite
approval of the Public Service Commission, is not effective and
binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise
in relation to the public is concerned. Petitioner assails, however, the
applicability of these rulings to the instant case, contending that in
those cases, the operator did not convey, by lease or by sale, the vehicle
independently of his rights under the franchise. This line of reasoning
does not find support in the law. The provisions of the statute are clear
and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property,
franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the
owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was
designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until
the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle
is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or
operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public
has a right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the effect that nothing
therein shall be construed "to prevent the transaction from being
negotiated or complete before its approval", means only that the sale
without the required approval is still valid and binding between the
parties (Montoya vs. Ignacio, supra). The phrase "in the ordinary
course of its business" found in the other proviso" or to prevent the
sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its property".
As correctly observed by the lower court, could not have been intended
to include the sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to
such property that may be conceivably disposed or by the carrier in the
ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or spare parts.
The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63 Phil., 594, 597) is
enlightening; and there, it was held:
Under the law, the Public Service Commission has not only general
supervision and regulation of, but also full jurisdiction and control over
all public utilities including the property, equipment and facilities
used, and the property rights and franchise enjoyed by every individual
and company engaged i the performance of a public service in the
sense this phrase is used in the Public Service Act or Act No. 3108).
By virtue of the provisions of said Act, motor vehicles used in the
performance of a service, as the transportation of freight from one
point to another, have to this date been considered — and they cannot
but be so considered-public service property; and, by reason of its own
nature, a TH truck, which means that the operator thereof places it at
the disposal of anybody who is willing to pay a rental of its use, when
he desires to transfer or carry his effects, merchandise or any other
cargo from one place to another, is necessarily a public service
property. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, this court has held in the case of Bachrach Motor co. vs.
Zamboanga Transportation Co., 52 Phil., 244, that there may be
a nunc pro tunc authorization which has the effect of having the
approval retroact to the date of the transfer; but such outcome cannot
prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. It appears that no such
approval was given by the Commission before the accident occurred.
The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of
Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals to only P2,000, on the
ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis
for the trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this
point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his expenses and
loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be
denied," the lower court said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur
expenses"' It is well to note further that respondent was a painter by
profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount of P2,000
awarded cannot be said to be excessive (see Arts. 2224 and 2225, Civil
Code of the Philippines). The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also
awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of
First Instance did not provided for the same, and since no appeal was
interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of
Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that
attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the
Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is just
and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code of the Philippines). We see no
reason to alter these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the
same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs.
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil., 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26],
6599; Necesito, et al vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023,
that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted
on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219
and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under
circumstances, such damages are justify due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two article it immediately
becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof
of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious
conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the
descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because
Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by
contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art.
2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
"preexisting contractual relation between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage dome. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is
a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article
1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" (Necesito
vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 84, Resolution on motion to reconsider, September
11, 1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more
evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages
are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of
malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of
the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there
is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral
damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach
of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part
of the defendant, as required by Art. 220, would be to violate the clear
provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
The Court of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Acro
Taxicab Co., G.R. No. 49155, December 14, 1948 and Layda vs. Court
of Appeals, 90 Phil., 724; but these doctrines were predicated upon our
former law of damages, before judicial discretion in fixing them
became limited by the express provisions of the new Civil Code
(previously quoted). Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now inapplicable.
Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing a
carrier for breach of the contract of transportations explains, to some
extent, the limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount of the
recovery. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant
carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the
passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to established the fault
of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the
carrier to prove that it was due to an unforseen event or to force
majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777).
Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape
liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees (Art. 1759, new civil code;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra; Prado vs. Manila Electric Co.,
51 Phil., 900).
The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal
concept of quasi-delict as essentially extracontractual negligence,
compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu, and
actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for
breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort.
Neither can this action be taken as one to enforce on employee's
liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, since the
responsibility is not alleged to be subsidiary, nor is there on record any
averment or proof that the driver of appellant was insolvent. In fact, he
is not even made a party to the suit.
It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safety
transport the passenger involves a breach of the passenger's
confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in
bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages under Art. 2220. This
theory is untenable, for under it the carrier would always be deemed in
bad faith, in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed, and
it would be never accountable for simple negligence; while under the
law (Art. 1756). the presumption is that common carriers
acted negligently (and not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks
of negligence of the common carrier.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in article 1733 and 1755.
ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar
recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause
thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of
damages shall be equitably reduced.
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of
deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere
carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-
1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
ART. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at
the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall
be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of the obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the
contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when
in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of
contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so
gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must be shown in evidence,
and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding
that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's
employees.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5,000.00 by way of
moral damages. (Court of Appeals Resolution of May 5, 1957). In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance. So
ordered.
DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; ATTORNEY'S FEES INCLUDED
IN THE CONCEPT; AWARD BY COURT OF APPEALS MOTU
PROPRIO.—Although the Court of First Instance did not provide for
attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 and no appeal to the 'Court of
Appeals was interposed on the point, it was not an error for the Court
of Appeals to award them motu propio because attorney's fees are
included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and
may be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable.
ID.; MORAL DAMAGES NOT RECOVERABLE IN ACTION ON
BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION.—Moral
damages are generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated
on a breach of contract of transportation in view of the provisions of
Articles 2218 and 2220 of the new Civil Code.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 135802 March 3, 2000
PRISCILLA L. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondent.
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Priscilla L. Tan appeals via certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Appeals 1 affirming with modification 2 the decision of the
trial court, 3 ordering respondent to pay petitioner the following
amounts: (1) P15,000.00, as actual damages; (2) P100,000.00, as moral
damages; (3) P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; (4) P30,000.00, as
and for attorney's fees; and (6) costs.
The case before the Court traces its roots from an action for damages
for breach of contract of air carriage for failure to deliver petitioner's
baggages on the date of her arrival filed on June 29, 1994 with the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 150 against respondent
Northwest Airlines, Inc., a foreign corporation engaged in the business
of air transportation.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1994, Priscilla L. Tan and Connie Tan boarded Northwest
Airlines Flight 29 in Chicago, U. S. A. bound for the Philippines, with
a stop-over at Detroit, U. S. A. They arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) on June 1, 1994 at about 10:40 in the
evening.
Upon their arrival, petitioner and her companion Connie Tan found
that their baggages were missing. They returned to the airport in the
evening of the following day and they were informed that their
baggages might still be in another plane in Tokyo, Japan.
On June 3, 1994, they recovered their baggages and discovered that
some of its contents were destroyed and soiled.
Claiming that they "suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights and great
damage" because of Northwest's failure to inform them in advance that
their baggages would not be loaded on the same flight they boarded
and because of their delayed arrival, they demanded from Northwest
Airlines compensation for the damages they suffered. On June 15,
1994 and June 22, 1994, petitioner sent demand letters to Northwest
Airlines, but the latter did not respond. Hence, the filing of the case
with the regional trial court.
In its answer to the complaint, respondent Northwest Airlines did not
deny that the baggages of petitioners were not loaded on Northwest
Flight 29. Petitioner's baggages could not be carried on the same flight
because of "weight and balance restrictions." However, the baggages
were loaded in another Northwest Airlines flight, which arrived in the
evening of June 2, 1994.
When petitioner received her baggages in damaged condition,
Northwest offered to either (1) reimburse the cost or repair of the bags;
or (2) reimburse the cost for the purchase of new bags, upon
submission of receipts.
After due trial, on June 10, 1996, the trial court rendered decision
finding respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. liable for damages, as
follows:
WHEREFORE judgment is rendered ordering the defendant to pay
the plaintiff the following amounts:
1. P15,000.00, as actual damages;
2. P100,000.00, as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
4. P30,000.00, as and for attorney's fees and
5. Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 10th day of June, 1996 at Makati City.
ERNA FALLORAN ALIPOSA
Judge4
Respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. appealed from the trial court's
decision to the Court of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred
in finding it guilty of breach of contract of carriage and of willful
misconduct and awarded damages which had no basis in fact or were
otherwise excessive.
On September 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
partially granting the appeal by deleting the award of moral and
exemplary damages and reducing the attorney's fees, specifically
providing that:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED partially. The Decision of the lower court dated June 10,
1996 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of moral and
exemplary damages is deleted and the amount of attorney's fees is
reduced to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The issue is whether respondent is liable for moral and exemplary
damages for willful misconduct and breach of the contract of air
carriage.
The petition is without merit.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent was not guilty of
willful misconduct. "For willful misconduct to exist there must be a
showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an intention to
violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must
be evidenced by a flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper
conduct." 7
Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was nothing in the conduct of
respondent which showed that they were motivated by malice or bad
faith in loading her baggages on another plane. Due to weight and
balance restrictions, as a safety measure, respondent airline had to
transport the baggages on a different flight, but with the same expected
date and time of arrival in the Philippines. As aptly explained by
respondent:
To ensure the safety of each flight, Northwest's personnel determine
every flight's compliance with "weight and balance restrictions." They
check the factors like weight of the aircraft used for the flight gas input,
passenger and crew load, baggage weight, all in relation to the wind
factor anticipated on the flight. If there is an overload, i.e., a perceived
safety risk, the aircraft's load will be reduced by off-loading cargo,
which will then be placed on the next available flight. 8
It is admitted that respondent failed to deliver petitioner's luggages on
time. However, there was no showing of malice in such failure. By its
concern for safety, respondent had to ship the baggages in another
flight with the same date of arrival.
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent did not act
in bad faith. 9
"Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it Republic of the Philippines
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious SUPREME COURT
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or Manila
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud." 10
FIRST DIVISION
"Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is
not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for G.R. No. 71929 December 4, 1990
damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have ALITALIA, Petitioner,
reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral
and exemplary damages." 11 vs.
Consequently, we have no reason to reverse the decision of the Court INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELIPA E.
of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for lack of PABLO, Respondents.
merit. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
deleting, however, the award of attorney's fees. No costs. SO DECISION
ORDERED.
NARVASA, J.:

Dr. Felipa Pablo — an associate professor in the University of the

Philippines, 1 and a research grantee of the Philippine Atomic Energy
Agency — was invited to take part at a meeting of the Department of
Research and Isotopes of the Joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic
Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United Nations in Ispra, Italy.
2 She was invited in view of her specialized knowledge in "foreign
substances in food and the agriculture environment." She accepted the
invitation, and was then scheduled by the organizers, to read a paper
on "The Fate of Radioactive Fusion Products Contaminating
Vegetable Crops." 3 The program announced that she would be the
second speaker on the first day of the meeting. 4 To fulfill this
engagement, Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner airline,
ALITALIA.

She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in accordance with
the itinerary and time table set for her by ALITALIA. She was
however told by the ALITALIA personnel there at Milan that her
luggage was "delayed inasmuch as the same . . . (was) in one of the
succeeding flights from Rome to Milan." 5 Her luggage consisted of
two (2) suitcases: one contained her clothing and other personal items;
the other, her scientific papers, slides and other research material. But
the other flights arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on
board.
By then feeling desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate her bags
herself. There, she inquired about her suitcases in the domestic and
international airports, and filled out the forms prescribed by
ALITALIA for people in her predicament. However, her baggage
could not be found. Completely distraught and discouraged, she
returned to Manila without attending the meeting in Ispra, Italy. : nad
Once back in Manila she demanded that ALITALIA make reparation
for the damages thus suffered by her. ALITALIA offered her "free
airline tickets to compensate her for any alleged damages. . . ." She
rejected the offer, and forthwith commenced the action 6 which has
given rise to the present appellate proceedings.
As it turned out, Prof. Pablo's suitcases were in fact located and
forwarded to Ispra, 7 Italy, but only on the day after her scheduled
appearance and participation at the U.N. meeting there. 8 Of course
Dr. Pablo was no longer there to accept delivery; she was already on
her way home to Manila. And for some reason or other, the suitcases
were not actually restored to Prof. Pablo by ALITALIA until eleven
(11) months later, and four (4) months after institution of her action. 9
After appropriate proceedings and trial, the Court of First Instance
rendered judgment in Dr. Pablo's favor: 10
"(1) Ordering the defendant (ALITALIA) to pay . . . (her)
the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, by way of nominal damages;
(2) Ordering the defendant to pay . . . (her) the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
and for attorney's fees; (and)
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit."
ALITALIA appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court but failed to
obtain a reversal of the judgment. 11 Indeed, the Appellate Court not
only affirmed the Trial Court's decision but also increased the award
of nominal damages payable by ALITALIA to P40,000.00. 12 That
increase it justified as follows: 13
"Considering the circumstances, as found by the Trial Court
and the negligence committed by defendant, the amount of
P20,000.00 under present inflationary conditions as
awarded . . . to the plaintiff as nominal damages, is too little
to make up for the plaintiff's frustration and disappointment
in not being able to appear at said conference; and for the
embarrassment and humiliation she suffered from the
academic community for failure to carry out an official
mission for which she was singled out by the faculty to
represent her institution and the country. After weighing
carefully all the considerations, the amount awarded to the
plaintiff for nominal damages and attorney's fees should be
increased to the cost of her round trip air fare or at the
present rate of peso to the dollar at P40,000,00."
ALITALIA has appealed to this Court on Certiorari. Here, it seeks to
make basically the same points it tried to make before the Trial Court
and the Intermediate Appellate Court, i.e.:
1) that the Warsaw Convention should have been applied to
limit ALITALIA'S liability; and
 2) that there is no warrant in fact or in law for the award to
Dr. Pablo of nominal damages and attorney's fees. 14
In addition, ALITALIA postulates that it was error for the Intermediate
Appellate Court to have refused to pass on all the assigned errors and
in not stating the facts and the law on which its decision is based. 15
Under the Warsaw Convention, 16 an air carrier is made liable for
damages for:
1) the death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger
if the accident causing it took place on board the aircraft or
in the course of its operations of embarking or
disembarking; 17
2) the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered
luggage or goods, if the occurrence causing it took place
during the carriage by air;" 18 and
3) delay in the transportation by air of passengers, luggage
or goods. 19
In these cases, it is provided in the Convention that the "action for
damages, however, founded, can only be brought subject to conditions
and limits set out" therein. 20
The Convention also purports to limit the liability of the carriers in the
following manner: 21
1. In the carriage of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger is limited to the sum of 250,000 francs . . .
Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the
passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.: nad
2. a) In the carriage of registered baggage and of cargo, the
liability of the carrier is limited to a sum of 250 francs per
kilogramme, unless the passenger or consignor has made,
at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier,
a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination
and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In
that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that sum is
greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
b) In the case of loss, damage or delay of part of registered
baggage or cargo, or of any object contained therein, the
weight to be taken into consideration in determining the
amount to which the carrier's liability is limited shall be
only the total weight of the package or packages concerned.
Nevertheless, when the loss, damage or delay of a part of
the registered baggage or cargo, or of an object contained
therein, affects the value of other packages covered by the
same baggage check or the same air way bill, the total
weight of such package or packages shall also be taken into
consideration in determining the limit of liability.
3. As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge
himself the liability of the carrier is limited to 5000 francs
per passenger.
4. The limits prescribed . . shall not prevent the court from
awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the
whole or part of the court costs and of the other expenses of
litigation incurred by the plaintiff. The foregoing provision
shall not apply if the amount of the damages awarded,
excluding court costs and other expenses of the litigation,
does not exceed the sum which the carrier has offered in
writing to the plaintiff within a period of six months from
the date of the occurrence causing the damage, or before the
commencement of the action, if that is later.
The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment "of
the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered
to be equivalent to wilful misconduct," or "if the damage is (similarly)
caused . . by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment." 22 The Hague Protocol amended the Warsaw
Convention by removing the provision that if the airline took all
necessary steps to avoid the damage, it could exculpate itself
completely, 23 and declaring the stated limits of liability not
applicable "if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result." The same deletion was effected by the Montreal Agreement of
1966, with the result that a passenger could recover unlimited damages
upon proof of wilful misconduct. 24
The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of
the instances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent
of that liability. Such a proposition is not borne out by the language of
the Convention, as this Court has now, and at an earlier time, pointed
out. 25 Moreover, slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that
it should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the
cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage
to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by
any wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper
conduct on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is
responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of
resulting injury. The Convention's provisions, in short, do not "regulate
or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier" 26 or
misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or
exceptional type of damage. Otherwise, "an air carrier would be
exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute
refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is
absurd." 27 Nor may it for a moment be supposed that if a member of
the aircraft complement should inflict some physical injury on a
passenger, or maliciously destroy or damage the latter's property, the
Convention might successfully be pleaded as the sole gauge to
determine the carrier's liability to the passenger. Neither may the
Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary
sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor
beyond the limits set by said Convention. It is in this sense that the
Convention has been applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar
facts presented by each case.:-cralaw
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. I.A.C., 28 for example, the
Warsaw Convention was applied as regards the limitation on the
carrier's liability, there being a simple loss of baggage without any
otherwise improper conduct on the part of the officials or employees
of the airline or other special injury sustained by the passenger.
On the other hand, the Warsaw Convention has invariably been held
inapplicable, or as not restrictive of the carrier's liability, where there
was satisfactory evidence of malice or bad faith attributable to its
officers and employees. 29 Thus, an air carrier was sentenced to pay
not only compensatory but also moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees, for instance, where its employees rudely put a
passenger holding a first-class ticket in the tourist or economy
section, 30 or ousted a brown Asiatic from the plane to give his seat
to a white man, 31 or gave the seat of a passenger with a confirmed
reservation to another, 32 or subjected a passenger to extremely rude,
even barbaric treatment, as by calling him a "monkey." 33
In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be
ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage
was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but without
appreciable damage. The fact is, nevertheless, that some special
species of injury was caused to Dr. Pablo because petitioner
ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the
time appointed — a breach of its contract of carriage, to be sure —
with the result that she was unable to read the paper and make the
scientific presentation (consisting of slides, autoradiograms or films,
tables and tabulations) that she had painstakingly labored over, at the
prestigious international conference, to attend which she had traveled
hundreds of miles, to her chagrin and embarrassment and the
disappointment and annoyance of the organizers. She felt, not
unreasonably, that the invitation for her to participate at the
conference, extended by the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Atomic
Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United Nations, was a singular
honor not only to herself, but to the University of the Philippines and
the country as well, an opportunity to make some sort of impression
among her colleagues in that field of scientific activity. The
opportunity to claim this honor or distinction was irretrievably lost to
her because of Alitalia's breach of its contract.
Apart from this, there can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent
profound distress and anxiety, which gradually turned to panic and
finally despair, from the time she learned that her suitcases were
missing up to the time when, having gone to Rome, she finally realized
that she would no longer be able to take part in the conference. As she
herself put it, she "was really shocked and distraught and confused."
Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot
under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw
Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.
She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to
her luggage. As already mentioned, her baggage was ultimately
delivered to her in Manila, tardily but safely. She is however entitled
to nominal damages — which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered — and this Court
agrees that the respondent Court of Appeals correctly set the amount
thereof at P40,000.00. As to the purely technical argument that the
award to her of such nominal damages is precluded by her omission to
include a specific claim therefor in her complaint, it suffices to draw
attention to her general prayer, following her plea for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, "for such other and further just
and equitable relief in the premises," which certainly is broad enough
to comprehend an application as well for nominal damages. Besides,
petitioner should have realized that the explicit assertion, and proof,
that Dr. Pablo's right had been violated or invaded by it — absent any
claim for actual or compensatory damages, the prayer thereof having
been voluntarily deleted by Dr. Pablo upon the return to her of her
baggage — necessarily raised the issue of nominal damages.: rd
This Court also agrees that respondent Court of Appeals correctly
awarded attorney's fees to Dr. Pablo, and the amount of P5,000.00 set
by it is reasonable in the premises. The law authorizes recovery of
attorney's fees inter alia where, as here, "the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest," 34 or "where the court deems
it just and equitable." 35
WHEREFORE, no error being perceived in the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals, it appearing on the contrary to be entirely in
accord with the facts and the law, said decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Private
respondent is entitled to an award of nominal damages for the injury
she suffered as a result of the carrier's failure to deliver her luggage
on time.—In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper
conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and
Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is
true, but without appreciable damage. The fact is, nevertheless, that
some special species of injury was caused to Dr. Pablo because
petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to
her at the time appointed—a breach of its contract of carriage, to be
sure—with the result that she was unable to read the paper and make
the scientific presentation (consisting of slides, autoradiograms or
films, tables and tabulations) that she had painstakingly labored over,
at the prestigious international conference, to attend which she had
traveled hundreds of miles, to her chagrin and embarrassment and the
disappointment and annoyance of the organizers. She felt, not
unreasonably, that the invitation for her to participate at the
conference, extended by the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Atomic
Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United Nations, was a singular
honor not only to herself, but to the University of the Philippines and
the country as well, an opportunity to make some sort of impression
among her colleagues in that field of scientific activity. The
opportunity to claim this honor or distinction was irretrievably lost to
her because of Alitalia's breach of its contract. Apart from this, there
can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and
anxiety, which gradually turned to panic and finally despair, from the
time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time when,
having gone to Rome, she finally realized that she would no longer be
able to take part in the conference. As she herself put it, she "was really
shocked and distraught and confused." Certainly, the compensation
for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be
restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in
the transport of baggage. She is not, of course, entitled to be
compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. As already mentioned,
her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily but
safely. She is however entitled to nominal damages—which, as the law
says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered—and this Court agrees that the respondent Court of
Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at P40,000.00.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95536 March 23, 1992
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., MARIA SALVACION SALUDO,
LEOPOLDO G. SALUDO and SATURNINO G.
SALUDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES,
INC., and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 20951 of respondent Court of Appeals1 which affirmed
the decision of the trial court2 dismissing for lack of evidence herein
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No R-2101 of the then Court of
First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch I.
The facts, as recounted by the court a quo and adopted by respondent
court after "considering the evidence on record," are as follows:
After the death of plaintiffs' mother, Crispina Galdo Saludo, in
Chicago Illinois, (on) October 23, 1976 (Exh. A), Pomierski and Son
Funeral Home of Chicago, made the necessary preparations and
arrangements for the shipment, of the remains from Chicago to the
Philippines. The funeral home had the remains embalmed (Exb. D) and
secured a permit for the disposition of dead human body on October
25, 1976 (Exh. C), Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois,
Bienvenido M. Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on October 26, 1976 at the
Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, sealed the shipping case containing a
hermetically sealed casket that is airtight and waterproof wherein was
contained the remains of Crispina Saludo Galdo (sic) (Exb. B). On the
same date, October 26, 1976, Pomierski brought the remains to
C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air Services) at the airport (Chicago)
which made the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc.;
C.M.A.S. is a national service used by undertakers to throughout the
nation (U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch which the casket is enclosed
in, and they see that the remains are taken to the proper air freight
terminal (Exh. 6-TWA). C.M.A.S. booked the shipment with PAL thru
the carrier's agent Air Care International, with Pomierski F.H. as the
shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee. PAL Airway Bill
No. 079-01180454 Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing
was from Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of
October 27, 1976 and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL
Flight No. 107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board
PAL Flight 149 of October 29, 1976 (See Exh. E., Also Exh. 1-PAL).
In the meantime, plaintiffs Maria Salvacion Saludo and Saturnino
Saludo, thru a travel agent, were booked with United Airlines from
Chicago to California, and with PAL from California to Manila. She
then went to the funeral director of Pomierski Funeral Home who had
her mother's remains and she told the director that they were booked
with United Airlines. But the director told her that the remains were
booked with TWA flight to California. This upset her, and she and her
brother had to change reservations from UA to the TWA flight after
she confirmed by phone that her mother's remains should be on that
TWA flight. They went to the airport and watched from the look-out
area. She saw no body being brought. So, she went to the TWA counter
again, and she was told there was no body on that flight. Reluctantly,
they took the TWA flight upon assurance of her cousin, Ani Bantug,
that he would look into the matter and inform her about it on the plane
or have it radioed to her. But no confirmation from her cousin reached
her that her mother was on the West Coast.
Upon arrival at San Francisco at about 5:00 p.m., she went to the TWA
counter there to inquire about her mother's remains. She was told they
did not know anything about it.
She then called Pomierski that her mother's remains were not at the
West Coast terminal, and Pomierski immediately called C.M.A.S.,
which in a matter of 10 minutes informed him that the remains were
on a plane to Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the terminal,
and somehow they were switched; he relayed this information to Miss
Saludo in California; later C.M.A.S. called and told him they were
sending the remains back to California via Texas (see Exh. 6-TWA).
It-turned out that TWA had carried a shipment under PAL Airway Bill
No. 079-ORD-01180454 on TWA Flight 603 of October 27, 1976, a
flight earlier than TWA Flight 131 of the same date. TWA delivered
or transferred the said shipment said to contain human remains to PAL
at 1400H or 2:00 p.m. of the same date, October 27, 1976 (Bee Exh.
1- TWA). "Due to a switch(ing) in Chicago", this shipment was
withdrawn from PAL by CMAS at 1805H (or 6:05 p.m.) of the same
date, October 27 (Exh. 3-PAL, see Exh. 3-a-PAL).
What transpired at the Chicago (A)irport is explained in a memo or
incident report by Pomierski (Exh. 6-TWA) to Pomierski's lawyers
who in turn referred to said' memo and enclosed it in their (Pomierski's
lawyers) answer dated July 18, 1981 to herein plaintiff's counsel (See
Exh. 5-TWA). In that memo or incident report (Exh. 6-TWA), it is
stated that the remains (of Crispina Saludo) were taken to CMAS at
the airport; that there were two bodies at the (Chicago Airport)
terminal, and somehow they were switched, that the remains (of
Crispina Saludo) were on a plane to Mexico City; that CMAS is a
national service used by undertakers throughout the nation (U.S.A.),
makes all the necessary arrangements, such as flights, transfers, etc.,
and see(s) to it that the remains are taken to the proper air freight
terminal.
The following day October 28, 1976, the shipment or remains of
Crispina Saludo arrived (in) San Francisco from Mexico on board
American Airlines. This shipment was transferred to or received by
PAL at 1945H or 7:45 p.m. (Exh. 2-PAL, Exh. 2-a-PAL). This casket
bearing the remains of Crispina Saludo, which was mistakenly sent to
Mexico and was opened (there), was resealed by Crispin F. Patagas for
shipment to the Philippines (See Exh. B-1). The shipment was
immediately loaded on PAL flight for Manila that same evening and
arrived (in) Manila on October 30, 1976, a day after its expected arrival
on October 29, 1976.3
In a letter dated December 15, 1976,4 petitioners' counsel informed
private respondent Trans World Airlines (TWA) of the misshipment
and eventual delay in the delivery of the cargo containing the remains
of the late Crispin Saludo, and of the discourtesy of its employees to
petitioners Maria Salvacion Saludo and Saturnino Saludo. In a separate
letter on June 10, 1977 addressed to co-respondent Philippine Airlines
(PAL),5 petitioners stated that they were holding PAL liable for said
delay in delivery and would commence judicial action should no
favorable explanation be given.
Both private respondents denied liability. Thus, a damage suit6 was
filed by petitioners before the then Court of First Instance, Branch III,
Leyte, praying for the award of actual damages of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
costs of suit.
As earlier stated, the court below absolved the two respondent airlines
companies of liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower court in toto, and in a subsequent resolution,7 denied herein
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
In predictable disagreement and dissatisfaction with the conclusions
reached by respondent appellate court, petitioners now urge this Court
to review the appealed decision and to resolve whether or not (1) the
delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners' mother was
due to the fault of respondent airline companies, (2) the one-day delay
in the delivery of the same constitutes contractual breach as would
entitle petitioners to damages, (3) damages are recoverable by
petitioners for the humiliating, arrogant and indifferent acts of the
employees of TWA and PAL, and (4) private respondents should be
held liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages, aside from
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.8
At the outset and in view of the spirited exchanges of the parties on
this aspect, it is to be stressed that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition filed in this Court to review on certiorari the decision of
the Court of Appeals.9 This being so, the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. The rule, however, admits of established exceptions,
to wit: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;(c) when the inference made is manifestly-mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals
was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings
are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; 10 (g) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; 11 and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts of set forth by
the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 12
To distinguish, a question of law is one which involves a doubt or
controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts; and, a
question of fact, contrarily, is one in which there is a doubt or
difference as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. 13 One test,
it has been held, is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it
is a question of law, otherwise it will be a question of fact.14
Respondent airline companies object to the present recourse of
petitioners on the ground that this petition raises only factual
questions. 15 Petitioners maintain otherwise or, alternatively, they are
of the position that, assuming that the petition raises factual questions,
the same are within the recognized exceptions to the general rule as
would render the petition cognizable and worthy of review by the
Court. 16
Since it is precisely the soundness of the inferences or conclusions that
may be drawn from the factual issues which are here being assayed,
we find that the issues raised in the instant petition indeed warrant a
second look if this litigation is to come to a reasonable denouement. A
discussion seriatim of said issues will further reveal that the sequence
of the events involved is in effect disputed. Likewise to be settled is
whether or not the conclusions of the Court of Appeals subject of this
review indeed find evidentiary and legal support.
I. Petitioners fault respondent court for "not finding that private
respondents failed to exercise extraordinary diligence required by law
which resulted in the switching and/or misdelivery of the remains of
Crispina Saludo to Mexico causing gross delay in its shipment to the
Philippines, and consequently, damages to petitioners." 17
Petitioner allege that private respondents received the casketed
remains of petitioners' mother on October 26, 1976, as evidenced by
the issuance of PAL Air Waybill No. 079-01180454 18 by Air Care
International as carrier's agent; and from said date, private respondents
were charged with the responsibility to exercise extraordinary
diligence so much so that for the alleged switching of the caskets on
October 27, 1976, or one day after private respondents received the
cargo, the latter must necessarily be liable.
To support their assertion, petitioners rely on the jurisprudential
dictum, both under American and Philippine law, that "(t)he issuance
of a bill of lading carries the presumption that the goods were delivered
to the carrier issuing the bill, for immediate shipment, and it is nowhere
questioned that a bill of lading is prima facie evidence of the receipt of
the goods by the carrier. . . . In the absence of convincing testimony
establishing mistake, recitals in the bill of lading showing that the
carrier received the goods for shipment on a specified date control (13
C.J.S. 235)." 19
A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods
and an agreement to transport and deliver them at a specified place to
a person named or on his order. Such instrument may be called a
shipping receipt, forwarder's receipt and receipt for
transportation. 20 The designation, however, is immaterial. It has been
hold that freight tickets for bus companies as well as receipts for cargo
transported by all forms of transportation, whether by sea or land, fall
within the definition. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a bill of
lading includes airway bills of lading. 21 The two-fold character of a
bill of lading is all too familiar; it is a receipt as to the quantity and
description of the goods shipped and a contract to transport the goods
to the consignee or other person therein designated, on the terms
specified in such instrument. 22
Logically, since a bill of lading acknowledges receipt of goods to be
transported, delivery of the goods to the carrier normally precedes the
issuance of the bill; or, to some extent, delivery of the goods and
issuance of the bill are regarded in commercial practice as
simultaneous acts. 23 However, except as may be prohibited by law,
there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the
execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual possession and
control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. There is no law
which requires that the delivery of the goods for carriage and the
issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time
or, for that matter, that the former should precede the latter.
Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete delivery of goods to
the carrier for transportation but, when issued, is competent and prima
facie, but not conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A bill of
lading, when properly executed and delivered to a shipper, is evidence
that the carrier has received the goods described therein for shipment.
Except as modified by statute, it is a general rule as to the parties to a
contract of carriage of goods in connection with which a bill of lading
is issued reciting that goods have been received for transportation, that
the recital being in essence a receipt alone, is not conclusive, but may
be explained, varied or contradicted by parol or other evidence. 24
While we agree with petitioners' statement that "an airway bill estops
the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality
described in the bill," a further reading and a more faithful quotation
of the authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may contain
constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than
a contract between the shipper and the carrier. . . . (However), as
between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have been
delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from
showing the true facts . . . Between the consignor of goods and
receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as to the goods shipped
raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for
shipment. As between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact
must outweigh the recital." 25 (Emphasis supplied)
For this reason, we must perforce allow explanation by private
respondents why, despite the issuance of the airway bill and the date
thereof, they deny having received the remains of Crispina Saludo on
October 26, 1976 as alleged by petitioners.
The findings of the trial court, as favorably adopted by the Court of
Appeals and which we have earner quoted, provide us with the
explanation that sufficiently over comes the presumption relied on by
petitioners in insisting that the remains of their mother were delivered
to and received by private respondents on October 26, 1976. Thus —
. . . Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido M.
Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on October 26, 1976 at the Pomierski & Son
Funeral Home, sealed the shipping case containing a hermetically
sealed casket that is airtight and waterproof wherein was contained the
remains of Crispina Saludo Galdo (sic) (Exh. B). On the same date
October 26, 1976, Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S.
(Continental Mortuary Air Services) at the airport (Chicago) which
made the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc;
C.M.A.S. is a national service used by undertakers throughout the
nation (U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch which the casket is enclosed
in, and they see that the remains are taken to the proper air freight
terminal (Exh. G-TWA). C.M.A.S. booked the shipment with PAL thru
the carrier's agent Air Care International, with Pomierski F.H. as the
shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee. PAL Airway Bill
No. 079- 01180454 Ordinary was issued wherein the requested
routing was from Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA Flight-131
of October 27;1976, and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL
Flight No. 107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains
PAL Flight 149 of October 29, 1976 (See Exh. E, also Exh. 1- in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
PAL).26 (Emphasis ours.) stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of
stoppage in transitu, 29 and terminates only after the lapse of a
Moreover, we are persuaded to believe private respondent PAL's reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or
account as to what transpired October 26, 1976: such other person entitled to receive them. 30 And, there is delivery to
the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the
. . . Pursuant thereto, on 26 October 1976, CMAS acting upon the
exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose
instruction of Pomierski, F.H., the shipper requested booking of the
of their immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted
casketed remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo on board PAL's San
them. 31 Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier,
Francisco-Manila Flight No. PR 107 on October 27, 1976.
the liability of the common carrier commences eo instanti. 32
2. To signify acceptance and confirmation of said booking, PAL issued
Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary diligence
to said Pomierski F.H., PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 dated
statutorily required to be observed by the carrier instantaneously
October 27, 1976 (sic, "10/26/76"). PAL confirmed the booking and
commences upon delivery of the goods thereto, for such duty to
transporting of the shipment on board of its Flight PR 107 on October
commence there must in fact have been delivery of the cargo subject
27, 1976 on the basis of the representation of the shipper and/or CMAS
of the contract of carriage. Only when such fact of delivery has been
that the said cargo would arrive in San Francisco from Chicago on
unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction or
board United Airlines Flight US 121 on 27 October 1976.27
deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent the
In other words, on October 26, 1976 the cargo containing the casketed excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of
remains of Crispina Saludo was booked for PAL Flight Number PR- fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked.
107 leaving San Francisco for Manila on October 27, 1976, PAL
As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the averment
Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 was issued, not as evidence of receipt
that there was delivery of the cargo to the carrier on October 26, 1976.
of delivery of the cargo on October 26, 1976, but merely as a
Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended to be shipped as agreed
confirmation of the booking thus made for the San Francisco-Manila
upon was really placed in the possession and control of PAL on
flight scheduled on October 27, 1976. Actually, it was not until
October 28, 1976 and it was from that date that private respondents
October 28, 1976 that PAL received physical delivery of the body at
became responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in
San Francisco, as duly evidenced by the Interline Freight Transfer
PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454. Consequently, for the switching
Manifest of the American Airline Freight System and signed for by
of caskets prior thereto which was not caused by them, and subsequent
Virgilio Rosales at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M. on said date.28
events caused thereby, private respondents cannot be held liable.
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the
Petitioners, proceeding on the premise that there was delivery of the
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the
cargo to private respondents on October 26,1976 and that the latter's
extraordinary responsibility had by then become operative, insist on
foisting the blame on private respondents for the switching of the two
caskets which occurred on October 27, 1976. It is argued that since
there is no clear evidence establishing the fault Continental Mortuary
Air Services (CMAS) for the mix-up, private respondents are
presumably negligent pursuant to Article 1735 of the Civil Code and,
for failure to rebut such presumption, they must necessarily be held
liable; or, assuming that CMAS was at fault, the same does not absolve
private respondents of liability because whoever brought the cargo to
the airport or loaded it on the plane did so as agent of private
respondents.
This contention is without merit. As pithily explained by the Court of
Appeals:
The airway bill expressly provides that "Carrier certifies goods
described below were received for carriage", and said cargo was
"casketed human remains of Crispina Saludo," with "Maria Saludo as
Consignee; Pomierski F.H. as Shipper; Air Care International as
carrier's agent." On the face of the said airway bill, the specific flight
numbers, specific routes of shipment and dates of departure and arrival
were typewritten, to wit: Chicago TWA Flight 131/27 to San Francisco
and from San Francisco by PAL 107 on, October 27, 1976 to
Philippines and to Cebu via PAL Flight 149 on October 29, 1976. The
airway bill also contains the following typewritten words, as follows:
all documents have been examined (sic). Human remains of Crispina
Saludo. Please return back (sic) first available flight to SFO.
But, as it turned out and was discovered later the casketed human
remains which was issued PAL Airway Bill #079-1180454 was not the
remains of Crispina Saludo, the casket containing her remains having
been shipped to Mexico City.
However, it should be noted that, Pomierski F.H., the shipper of Mrs.
Saludo's remains, hired Continental Mortuary Services (hereafter
referred to as C.M.A.S.), which is engaged in the business of
transporting and forwarding human remains. Thus, C.M.A.S. made all
the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc. — for
shipment of the remains of Crispina Saludo.
The remains were taken on October 26th, 1976, to C.M.A.S. at the
airport. These people made all the necessary arrangements, such as
flights, transfers, etc. This is a national service used by undertakers
throughout the nation. They furnished the air pouch which the casket
is enclosed in, and they see that the remains are taken to the proper air
frieght terminal. I was very surprised when Miss Saludo called me to
say that the remains were not at the west coast terminal. I immediately
called C.M.A.S. They called me back in a matter of ten minutes to
inform me that the remains were on a plane to Mexico City. The man
said that there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they
were switched. . . . (Exb. 6 — "TWA", which is the memo or incident
report enclosed in the stationery of Walter Pomierski & Sons Ltd.)
Consequently, when the cargo was received from C.M.A.S. at the
Chicago airport terminal for shipment, which was supposed to contain
the remains of Crispina Saludo, Air Care International and/or TWA,
had no way of determining its actual contents, since the casket was
hermetically sealed by the Philippine Vice-Consul in Chicago and in
an air pouch of C.M.A.S., to the effect that Air Care International
and/or TWA had to rely on the information furnished by the shipper
regarding the cargo's content. Neither could Air Care International
and/or TWA open the casket for further verification, since they were
not only without authority to do so, but even prohibited.
Thus, under said circumstances, no fault and/or negligence can be
attributed to PAL (even if Air Care International should be considered
as an agent of PAL) and/or TWA, the entire fault or negligence being ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
exclusively with C.M.A.S.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
What was your participation with the transfer of the cargo?
It can correctly and logically be concluded, therefore, that the
switching occurred or, more accurately, was discovered on October 27, MICHAEL GIOSSO:
1976; and based on the above findings of the Court of appeals, it
I manifested the freight on a transfer manifest and physically moved it
happened while the cargo was still with CMAS, well before the same
to PAL and concluded the transfer by signing it off.
was place in the custody of private respondents.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
Thus, while the Air Cargo Transfer Manifest of TWA of October 27,
197634 was signed by Garry Marcial of PAL at 1400H, or 2:00 P.M., You brought it there yourself?
on the same date, thereby indicating acknowledgment by PAL of the
transfer to them by TWA of what was in truth the erroneous cargo, said MICHAEL GIOSSO:
misshipped cargo was in fact withdrawn by CMAS from PAL as
Yes sir.
shown by the notation on another copy of said manifest35 stating
"Received by CMAS — Due to switch in Chicago 10/27-1805H," the ATTY. JUAN COLIAS, JR.:
authenticity of which was never challenged. This shows that said
misshipped cargo was in fact withdrawn by CMAS from PAL and the Do you have anything to show that PAL received the cargo from TWA
correct shipment containing the body of Crispina Saludo was received on October 27, 1976?
by PAL only on October 28, 1976, at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M., per
American Airlines Interline Freight Transfer Manifest No. MICHAEL GIOSSO:
AA204312.36
Yes, I do.
Witness the deposition of TWA's ramp serviceman, Michael Giosso,
(Witness presenting a document)
on this matter:
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
For purposes of clarity, Exhibit I is designated as Exhibit I-TWA.
On that date, do (sic) you have occasion to handle or deal with the
transfer of cargo from TWA Flight No. 603 to PAL San Francisco? xxx xxx xxx
MICHAEL GIOSSO: ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
Yes, I did. This Exhibit I-TWA, could you tell what it is, what it shows?
MICHAEL GIOSSO: Okay. Now, upon receipt of that query from your Manila office, did
you conduct any investigation to pinpoint the possible causes of
It shows transfer of manifest on 10-27-76 to PAL at 1400 and verified mishandling?
with two signatures as it completed the transfer.
ALBERTO A. LIM:
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
Yes.
Very good,. Who was the PAL employee who received the cargo?
xxx xxx xxx
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
The name is Garry Marcial." 37
What is the result of your investigation?
The deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL's cargo supervisor at San
Francisco, as deponent-witness for PAL, makes this further ALBERTO A. LIM:
clarification:
In the course of my investigation, I found that we received the body on
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY: October 28, 1976, from American Airlines.

You mentioned Airway Bill, Mr. Lim. I am showing to you a PAL ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
Airway Bill Number 01180454 which for purposes of evidence, I
would like to request that the same be marked as evidence Exhibit I for What body are you referring to?
PAL.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
ALBERTO A. LIM:
In what circumstances did you encounter Exhibit I-PAL?
The remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo.
ALBERTO A. LIM:
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
If I recall correctly, I was queried by Manila, our Manila office with
Is that the same body mentioned in this Airway Bill?
regard to a certain complaint that a consignee filed that this shipment
did not arrive on the day that the consignee expects the shipment to ALBERTO A. LIM:
arrive.
Yes.
ATTY CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
What time did you receive said body on October 28, 1976?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
If I recall correctly, approximately 7:45 of October 28, 1976.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
Do you have any proof with you to back the statement?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes. We have on our records a Transfer Manifest from American
Airlines Number 204312 showing that we received a human remains
shipment belong to Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo or the human remains of
Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo.
ATTY. CESAR P. MAIALAYSAY:
At this juncture, may I request that the Transfer Manifest referred to
by the witness be marked as an evidence as Exhibit II-PAL.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Lim, yesterday your co-defendant TWA presented as their Exhibit
I evidence tending to show that on October 27, 1976 at about 2:00 in
the, afternoon they delivered to you a cargo bearing human remains.
Could you go over this Exhibit I and please give us your comments as
to that exhibit?
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
That is a vague question. I would rather request that counsel propound
specific questions rather than asking for comments on Exhibit I-TWA.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
In that case, I will reform my question. Could you tell us whether TWA
in fact delivered to you the human remains as indicated in that Transfer
Manifest?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes, they did.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
I noticed that the Transfer Manifest of TWA marked as Exhibit I-TWA
bears the same numbers or the same entries as the Airway Bill marked
as Exhibit I-A PAL tending to show that this is the human remains of
Mrs Cristina (sic) Saludo. Could you tell us whether this is true?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
It is true that we received human remains shipment from TWA as
indicated on this Transfer Manifest. But in the course of investigation,
it was found out that the human remains transferred to us is not the
remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo this is the reason why we did not
board it on our flight. 38
Petitioners consider TWA's statement that "it had to rely on the
information furnished by the shipper" a lame excuse and that its failure
to prove that its personnel verified and identified the contents of the
casket before loading the same constituted negligence on the part of
TWA.39
We upbold the favorable consideration by the Court of Appeals of the
following findings of the trial court:
It was not (to) TWA, but to C.M.A.S. that the Pomierski & Son Funeral
Home delivered the casket containing the remains of Crispina Saludo.
TWA would have no knowledge therefore that the remains of Crispina
Saludo were not the ones inside the casket that was being presented to
it for shipment. TWA would have to rely on there presentations of
C.M.A.S. The casket was hermetically sealed and also sealed by the
Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago. TWA or any airline for that matter
would not have opened such a sealed casket just for the purpose of
ascertaining whose body was inside and to make sure that the remains
inside were those of the particular person indicated to be by C.M.A.S.
TWA had to accept whatever information was being furnished by the
shipper or by the one presenting the casket for shipment. And so as a
matter of fact, TWA carried to San Francisco and transferred to
defendant PAL a shipment covered by or under PAL Airway Bill No.
079-ORD-01180454, the airway bill for the shipment of the casketed
remains of Crispina Saludo. Only, it turned out later, while the casket
was already with PAL, that what was inside the casket was not the
body of Crispina Saludo so much so that it had to be withdrawn by
C.M.A.S. from PAL. The body of Crispina Saludo had been shipped
to Mexico. The casket containing the remains of Crispina Saludo was
transshipped from Mexico and arrived in San Francisco the following
day on board American Airlines. It was immediately loaded by PAL
on its flight for Manila.
The foregoing points at C.M.A.S., not defendant TWA much less
defendant PAL, as the ONE responsible for the switching or mix-up of
the two bodies at the Chicago Airport terminal, and started a chain
reaction of the misshipment of the body of Crispina Saludo and a one-
day delay in the delivery thereof to its destination.40
Verily, no amount of inspection by respondent airline companies could
have guarded against the switching that had already taken place. Or,
granting that they could have opened the casket to inspect its contents,
private respondents had no means of ascertaining whether the body
therein contained was indeed that of Crispina Saludo except, possibly,
if the body was that of a male person and such fact was visually
apparent upon opening the casket. However, to repeat, private
respondents had no authority to unseal and open the same nor did they
have any reason or justification to resort thereto.
It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part of those
persons who deliver goods to be carried, or enter into contracts with it,
and inasmuch as the freight may depend on the value of the article to
be carried, the carrier ordinarily has the right to inquire as to its value.
Ordinarily, too, it is the duty of the carrier to make inquiry as to the
general nature of the articles shipped and of their value before it
consents to carry them; and its failure to do so cannot defeat the
shipper's right to recovery of the full value of the package if lost, in the
absence of showing of fraud or deceit on the part of the shipper. In the
absence of more definite information, the carrier has a the right to
accept shipper's marks as to the contents of the package offered for
transportation and is not bound to inquire particularly about them in
order to take advantage of a false classification and where a shipper
expressly represents the contents of a package to be of a designated
character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask for a repetition of the
statement nor disbelieve it and open the box and see for
itself. 41 However, where a common carrier has reasonable ground to
suspect that the offered goods are of a dangerous or illegal character,
the carrier has the right to know the character of such goods and to
insist on an inspection, if reasonable and practical under the
circumstances, as a condition of receiving and transporting such
goods.42
It can safely be said then that a common carrier is entitled to fair
representation of the nature and value of the goods to be carried, with
the concomitant right to rely thereon, and further noting at this juncture
that a carrier has no obligation to inquire into the correctness or
sufficiency of such information. 43 The consequent duty to conduct an
inspection thereof arises in the event that there should be reason to
doubt the veracity of such representations. Therefore, to be subjected
to unusual search, other than the routinary inspection procedure
customarily undertaken, there must exist proof that would justify cause
for apprehension that the baggage is dangerous as to warrant
exhaustive inspection, or even refusal to accept carriage of the same;
and it is the failure of the carrier to act accordingly in the face of such
proof that constitutes the basis of the common carrier's liability. 44
In the case at bar, private respondents had no reason whatsoever to
doubt the truth of the shipper's representations. The airway bill
expressly providing that "carrier certifies goods received below were
received for carriage," and that the cargo contained "casketed human
remains of Crispina Saludo," was issued on the basis of such
representations. The reliance thereon by private respondents was
reasonable and, for so doing, they cannot be said to have acted
negligently. Likewise, no evidence was adduced to suggest even an
iota of suspicion that the cargo presented for transportation was
anything other than what it was declared to be, as would require more
than routine inspection or call for the carrier to insist that the same be
opened for scrutiny of its contents per declaration.
Neither can private respondents be held accountable on the basis of
petitioners' preposterous proposition that whoever brought the cargo to
the airport or loaded it on the airplane did so as agent of private
respondents, so that even if CMAS whose services were engaged for
the transit arrangements for the remains was indeed at fault, the
liability therefor would supposedly still be attributable to private
respondents.
While we agree that the actual participation of CMAS has been
sufficiently and correctly established, to hold that it acted as agent for
private respondents would be both an inaccurate appraisal and an
unwarranted categorization of the legal position it held in the entire
transaction.
It bears repeating that CMAS was hired to handle all the necessary
shipping arrangements for the transportation of the human remains of
Crispina Saludo to Manila. Hence, it was to CMAS that the Pomierski
& Son Funeral Home, as shipper, brought the remains of petitioners'
mother for shipment, with Maria Saludo as consignee. Thereafter,
CMAS booked the shipment with PAL through the carrier's agent, Air
Care International. 45 With its aforestated functions, CMAS may
accordingly be classified as a forwarder which, by accepted
commercial practice, is regarded as an agent of the shipper and not of
the carrier. As such, it merely contracts for the transportation of goods
by carriers, and has no interest in the freight but receives compensation
from the shipper as his agent. 46
At this point, it can be categorically stated that, as culled from the
findings of both the trial court and appellate courts, the entire chain of
events which culminated in the present controversy was not due to the
fault or negligence of private respondents. Rather, the facts of the case
would point to CMAS as the culprit. Equally telling of the more likely
possibility of CMAS' liability is petitioners' letter to and demanding an
explanation from CMAS regarding the statement of private
respondents laying the blame on CMAS for the incident, portions of
which, reading as follows:
. . . we were informed that the unfortunate a mix-up occurred due to
your negligence. . . .
Likewise, the two airlines pinpoint the responsibility upon your agents.
Evidence were presented to prove that allegation.
On the face of this overwhelming evidence we could and should have
filed a case against you. . . . 47
clearly allude to CMAS as the party at fault. This is tantamount to an
admission by petitioners that they consider private respondents
without fault, or is at the very least indicative of the fact that petitioners
entertained serious doubts as to whether herein private respondents
were responsible for the unfortunate turn of events.
Undeniably, petitioners' grief over the death of their mother was
aggravated by the unnecessary inconvenience and anxiety that
attended their efforts to bring her body home for a decent burial. This
is unfortunate and calls for sincere commiseration with petitioners.
But, much as we would like to give them consolation for their
undeserved distress, we are barred by the inequity of allowing recovery
of the damages prayed for by them at the expense of private
respondents whose fault or negligence in the very acts imputed to them
has not been convincingly and legally demonstrated.
Neither are we prepared to delve into, much less definitively rule on,
the possible liability of CMAS as the evaluation and adjudication of
the same is not what is presently at issue here and is best deferred to
another time and addressed to another forum.
II. Petitioners further fault the Court of Appeals for ruling that there
was no contractual breach on the part of private respondents as would
entitle petitioners to damages.
Petitioners hold that respondent TWA, by agreeing to transport the
remains of petitioners' mother on its Flight 131 from Chicago to San
Francisco on October 27, 1976, made itself a party to the contract of
carriage and, therefore, was bound by the terms of the issued airway
bill. When TWA undertook to ship the remains on its Flight 603, ten
hours earlier than scheduled, it supposedly violated the express
agreement embodied in the airway bill. It was allegedly this breach of
obligation which compounded, if not directly caused, the switching of
the caskets.
In addition, petitioners maintain that since there is no evidence as to
who placed the body on board Flight 603, or that CMAS actually put
the cargo on that flight, or that the two caskets at the Chicago airport
were to be transported by the same airline, or that they came from the
same funeral home, or that both caskets were received by CMAS, then
the employees or agents of TWA presumably caused the mix-up by
loading the wrong casket on the plane. For said error, they contend,
TWA must necessarily be presumed negligent and this presumption of
negligence stands undisturbed unless rebutting evidence is presented
to show that the switching or misdelivery was due to circumstances
that would exempt the carrier from liability.
Private respondent TWA professes otherwise. Having duly delivered
or transferred the cargo to its co-respondent PAL on October 27, 1976
at 2:00 P.M., as supported by the TWA Transfer Manifest, TWA
faithfully complied with its obligation under the airway bill. Said
faithful compliance was not affected by the fact that the remains were
shipped on an earlier flight as there was no fixed time for completion
of carriage stipulated on. Moreover, the carrier did not undertake to
carry the cargo aboard any specified aircraft, in view of the condition
on the back of the airway bill which provides:
CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
xxx xxx xxx
It is agreed that no time is fixed for the completion of carriage
hereunder and that Carrier may without notice substitute alternate
carriers or aircraft. Carrier assumes no obligation to carry the goods by
any specified aircraft or over any particular route or routes or to make
connection at any point according to any particular schedule, and
Carrier is hereby authorized to select, or deviate from the route or
routes of shipment, notwithstanding that the same may be stated on the
face hereof. The shipper guarantees payment of all charges and
advances.48
Hence, when respondent TWA shipped the body on earlier flight and
on a different aircraft, it was acting well within its rights. We find this
argument tenable.
The contention that there was contractual breach on the part of private
respondents is founded on the postulation that there was ambiguity in
the terms of the airway bill, hence petitioners' insistence on the
application of the rules on interpretation of contracts and documents.
We find no such ambiguity. The terms are clear enough as to preclude
the necessity to probe beyond the apparent intendment of the
contractual provisions.
The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts consecrates the
primacy of the intention of the parties, the same having the force of
law between them. When the terms of the agreement are clear and
explicit, that they do not justify an attempt to read into any alleged
intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as
they appear on the face of the contract.49 The various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together50 and such a construction is to be
adopted as will give effect to all provisions thereof.51 A contract cannot
be construed by parts, but its clauses should be interpreted in relation
to one another. The whole contract must be interpreted or read together
in order to arrive at its true meaning. Certain stipulations cannot be
segregated and then made to control; neither do particular words or
phrases necessarily determine the character of a contract. The legal
effect of the contract is not to be determined alone by any particular
provision disconnected from all others, but in the ruling intention of
the parties as gathered from all the language they have used and from
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. 52
Turning to the terms of the contract at hand, as presented by PAL Air
Waybill No. 079-01180454, respondent court approvingly quoted the
trial court's disquisition on the aforequoted condition appearing on the
reverse side of the airway bill and its disposition of this particular
assigned error:
The foregoing stipulation fully answers plaintiffs' objections to the
one-day delay and the shipping of the remains in TWA Flight 603
instead of TWA Flight 131. Under the stipulation, parties agreed that
no time was fixed to complete the contract of carriage and that the
carrier may, without notice, substitute alternate carriers or aircraft. The
carrier did not assume the obligation to carry the shipment on any
specified aircraft.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of plaintiffs-appellants, the
conditions of the Air Waybill are big enough to be read and noticed.
Also, the mere fact that the cargo in question was shipped in TWA
Flight 603, a flight earlier on the same day than TWA Flight 131, did
not in any way cause or add to the one-day delay complained of and/or
the switching or mix-up of the bodies.53
Indubitably, that private respondent can use substitute aircraft even
without notice and without the assumption of any obligation
whatsoever to carry the goods on any specified aircraft is clearly
sanctioned by the contract of carriage as specifically provided for
under the conditions thereof.
Petitioners' invocation of the interpretative rule in the Rules of Court
that written words control printed words in documents, 54 to bolster
their assertion that the typewritten provisions regarding the routing and
flight schedule prevail over the printed conditions, is tenuous. Said rule
may be considered only when there is inconsistency between the
written and printed words of the contract.
As previously stated, we find no ambiguity in the contract subject of
this case that would call for the application of said rule. In any event,
the contract has provided for such a situation by explicitly stating that
the above condition remains effective "notwithstanding that the same
(fixed time for completion of carriage, specified aircraft, or any
particular route or schedule) may be stated on the face hereof." While
petitioners hinge private respondents' culpability on the fact that the
carrier "certifies goods described below were received for carriage,"
they may have overlooked that the statement on the face of the airway
bill properly and completely reads —
Carrier certifies goods described below were received for
carriage subject to the Conditions on the reverse hereof the goods then
being in apparent good order and condition except as noted
hereon. 55(Emphasis ours.)
Private respondents further aptly observe that the carrier's certification
regarding receipt of the goods for carriage "was of a smaller print than
the condition of the Air Waybill, including Condition No. 5 — and
thus if plaintiffs-appellants had recognized the former, then with more
reason they were aware of the latter. 56
In the same vein, it would also be incorrect to accede to the suggestion
of petitioners that the typewritten specifications of the flight, routes
and dates of departures and arrivals on the face of the airway bill
constitute a special contract which modifies the printed conditions at
the back thereof. We reiterate that typewritten provisions of the
contract are to be read and understood subject to and in view of the
printed conditions, fully reconciling and giving effect to the manifest
intention of the parties to the agreement.
The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier's liability for delay is that in
the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an insurer against
delay in transportation of goods. When a common carrier undertakes
to convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be delivered
at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any
agreement as to the time of delivery. 57 But where a carrier has made
an express contract to transport and deliver property within a specified
time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no
matter from what cause it may have arisen. 58 This result logically
follows from the well-settled rule that where the law creates a duty or
charge, and the party is disabled from performing it without any default
in himself, and has no remedy over, then the law will excuse him, but
where the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon
himself, he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident or
delay by inevitable necessity because he might have provided against
it by contract. Whether or not there has been such an undertaking on
the part of the carrier to be determined from the circumstances
surrounding the case and by application of the ordinary rules for the
interpretation of contracts.59
Echoing the findings of the trial court, the respondent court correctly
declared that —
In a similar case of delayed delivery of air cargo under a very similar
stipulation contained in the airway bill which reads: "The carrier does
not obligate itself to carry the goods by any specified aircraft or on a
specified time. Said carrier being hereby authorized to deviate from
the route of the shipment without any liability therefor", our Supreme
Court ruled that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and
to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to
prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the
obligation. Said rights and obligations are created by a specific
contract entered into by the parties (Mendoza vs. PAL, 90 Phil. 836).
There is no showing by plaintiffs that such a special or specific contract
had been entered into between them and the defendant airline
companies.
And this special contract for prompt delivery should call the attention
of the carrier to the circumstances surrounding the case and the
approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case of delay (See
Mendoza vs. PAL, supra). There was no such contract entered into in
the instant case.60
Also, the theory of petitioners that the specification of the flights and
dates of departure and arrivals constitute a special contract that could
prevail over the printed stipulations at the back of the airway bill is
vacuous. To countenance such a postulate would unduly burden the
common carrier for that would have the effect of unilaterally
transforming every single bill of lading or trip ticket into a special
contract by the simple expedient of filling it up with the particulars of
the flight, trip or voyage, and thereby imposing upon the carrier duties
and/or obligations which it may not have been ready or willing to
assume had it been timely, advised thereof.
Neither does the fact that the challenged condition No. 5 was printed
at the back of the airway bill militate against its binding effect on
petitioners as parties to the contract, for there were sufficient
indications on the face of said bill that would alert them to the presence
of such additional condition to put them on their guard. Ordinary
prudence on the part of any person entering or contemplating to enter
into a contract would prompt even a cursory examination of any such
conditions, terms and/or stipulations.
There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of
lading without dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein were
brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him, and in
the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying
that he assented to such terms. This rule applies with particular force
where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of its
contents, and acceptance under such circumstances makes it a binding
contract. In order that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a
bill of lading limiting the liability of a carrier may arise, it must appear
that the clause containing this exemption from liability plainly formed
a part of the contract contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation
printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers attached
to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed on its face, if it is
shown that the consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper
accepts a receipt which states that its conditions are to be found on the
back, such receipt comes within the general rule, and the shipper is
held to have accepted and to be bound by the conditions there to be
found. 61
Granting arguendo that Condition No. 5 partakes of the nature of a
contract of adhesion and as such must be construed strictly against the
party who drafted the same or gave rise to any ambiguity therein, it
should be borne in mind that a contract of adhesion may be struck
down as void and unenforceable, for being subversive of public policy,
only when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the
dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it
or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing. 62However, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et
al 63 instructs us that contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited.
The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it
entirely; if he adheres, be gives his consent. Accordingly, petitioners,
far from being the weaker party in this situation, duly signified their
presumed assent to all terms of the contract through their acceptance
of the airway bill and are consequently bound thereby. It cannot be
gainsaid that petitioners' were not without several choices as to carriers
in Chicago with its numerous airways and airliner servicing the same.
We wish to allay petitioners' apprehension that Condition No. 5 of the
airway bill is productive of mischief as it would validate delay in
delivery, sanction violations of contractual obligations with impunity
or put a premium on breaches of contract.
Just because we have said that condition No. 5 of the airway bill is
binding upon the parties to and fully operative in this transaction, it
does not mean, and let this serve as fair warning to respondent carriers,
that they can at all times whimsically seek refuge from liability in the
exculpatory sanctuary of said Condition No. 5 or arbitrarily vary
routes, flights and schedules to the prejudice of their customers. This
condition only serves to insulate the carrier from liability in those
instances when changes in routes, flights and schedules are clearly
justified by the peculiar circumstances of a particular case, or by
general transportation practices, customs and usages, or by
contingencies or emergencies in aviation such as weather turbulence,
mechanical failure, requirements of national security and the like. And
even as it is conceded that specific routing and other navigational
arrangements for a trip, flight or voyage, or variations therein,
generally lie within the discretion of the carrier in the absence of
specific routing instructions or directions by the shipper, it is plainly
incumbent upon the carrier to exercise its rights with due deference to
the rights, interests and convenience of its customers.
A common carrier undertaking to transport property has the implicit
duty to carry and deliver it within reasonable time, absent any
particular stipulation regarding time of delivery, and to guard against
delay. In case of any unreasonable delay, the carrier shall be liable for
damages immediately and proximately resulting from such neglect of
duty. 64 As found by the trial court, the delay in the delivery of the
remains of Crispina Saludo, undeniable and regrettable as it was,
cannot be attributed to the fault, negligence or malice of private
respondents,65 a conclusion concurred in by respondent court and
which we are not inclined to disturb.
We are further convinced that when TWA opted to ship the remains of
Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight, it did so in the exercise of sound
discretion and with reasonable prudence, as shown by the explanation
of its counsel in his letter of February 19, 1977 in response to
petitioners' demand letter:
Investigation of TWA's handling of this matter reveals that although
the shipment was scheduled on TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976,
it was actually boarded on TWA Flight 603 of the same day,
approximately 10 hours earlier, in order to assure that the shipment
would be received in San Francisco in sufficient time for transfer to
PAL. This transfer was effected in San Francisco at 2:00 P.M. on
October 27, 1976. 66
Precisely, private respondent TWA knew of the urgency of the
shipment by reason of this notation on the lower portion of the airway
bill: "All documents have been certified. Human remains of Cristina
(sic) Saludo. Please return bag first available flight to SFO."
Accordingly, TWA took it upon itself to carry the remains of Crispina
Saludo on an earlier flight, which we emphasize it could do under the
terms of the airway bill, to make sure that there would be enough time
for loading said remains on the transfer flight on board PAL.
III. Petitioners challenge the validity of respondent court's finding that
private respondents are not liable for tort on account of the humiliating,
arrogant and indifferent acts of their officers and personnel. They posit
that since their mother's remains were transported ten hours earlier
than originally scheduled, there was no reason for private respondents'
personnel to disclaim knowledge of the arrival or whereabouts of the
same other than their sheer arrogance, indifference and extreme
insensitivity to the feelings of petitioners. Moreover, being passengers
and not merely consignors of goods, petitioners had the right to be
treated with courtesy, respect, kindness and due consideration.
In riposte, TWA claims that its employees have always dealt politely
with all clients, customers and the public in general. PAL, on the other
hand, declares that in the performance of its obligation to the riding
public, other customers and clients, it has always acted with justice,
honesty, courtesy and good faith.
Respondent appellate court found merit in and reproduced the trial
court's refutation of this assigned error:
About the only evidence of plaintiffs that may have reference to the
manner with which the personnel of defendants treated the two
plaintiffs at the San Francisco Airport are the following pertinent
portions of Maria Saludo's testimony:
Q When you arrived there, what did you do, if any?
A I immediately went to the TWA counter and I inquired about
whether my mother was there or if' they knew anything about it.
Q What was the answer?
A They said they do not know. So, we waited.
Q About what time was that when you reached San Francisco from
Chicago?
A I think 5 o'clock. Somewhere around that in the afternoon.
Q You made inquiry it was immediately thereafter?
A Right after we got off the plane.
Q Up to what time did you stay in the airport to wait until the TWA
people could tell you the whereabouts?
A Sorry, Sir, but the TWA did not tell us anything. We stayed there
until about 9 o'clock. They have not heard anything about it. They did
not say anything.
Q Do you want to convey to the Court that from 5 up to 9 o'clock in
the evening you yourself went back to the TWA and they could not tell
you where the remains of your mother were?
A Yes sir.
Q And after nine o'clock, what did you do?
A I told my brother my Mom was supposed to be on the Philippine
Airlines flight. "Why don't" we check with PAL instead to see if she
was there?" We tried to comfort each other. I told him anyway that was
a shortest flight from Chicago to California. We will be with our
mother on this longer flight. So, we checked with the PAL.
Q What did you find?
A We learned, Yes, my Mom would be on the flight.
Q Who was that brother?
A Saturnino Saludo.
Q And did you find what was your flight from San Francisco to the
Philippines?
A I do not know the number. It was the evening flight of the Philippine
Airline(s) from San Francisco to Manila.
Q You took that flight with your mother?
A We were scheduled to, Sir.
Q Now, you could not locate the remains of your mother in San
Francisco could you tell us what did you feel?
A After we were told that my mother was not there?
Q After you learned that your mother could not fly with you from
Chicago to California?
A Well, I was very upset. Of course, I wanted the confirmation that my
mother was in the West Coast. The fliqht was about 5 hours from
Chicago to California. We waited anxiously all that time on the plane.
I wanted to be assured about my mother's remains. But there was
nothing and we could not get any assurance from anyone about it.
Q Your feeling when you reached San Francisco and you could not
find out from the TWA the whereabouts of the remains, what did you
feel?
A Something nobody would be able to describe unless he experiences
it himself. It is a kind of panic. I think it's a feeling you are about to go
crazy. It is something I do not want to live through again. (Inting, t.s.n.,
Aug. 9, 1983, pp. 14-18).
The foregoing does not show any humiliating or arrogant manner with
which the personnel of both defendants treated the two plaintiffs. Even
their alleged indifference is not clearly established. The initial answer
of the TWA personnel at the counter that they did not know anything
about the remains, and later, their answer that they have not heard
anything about the remains, and the inability of the TWA counter
personnel to inform the two plaintiffs of the whereabouts of the
remains, cannot be said to be total or complete indifference to the said
plaintiffs. At any rate, it is any rude or discourteous conduct,
malfeasance or neglect, the use of abusive or insulting language
calculated to humiliate and shame passenger or had faith by or on the
part of the employees of the carrier that gives the passenger an action
for damages against the carrier (Zulueta vs. Pan American World
Airways, 43 SCRA 397; Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., 18 SCRA
155; Lopez, et al. vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431;
Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cuenca, 14 SCRA 1063), and none of the
above is obtaining in the instant case. 67
We stand by respondent court's findings on this point, but only to the
extent where it holds that the manner in which private respondent
TWA's employees dealt with petitioners was not grossly humiliating,
arrogant or indifferent as would assume the proportions of malice or
bad faith and lay the basis for an award of the damages claimed. It must
however, be pointed out that the lamentable actuations of respondent
TWA's employees leave much to be desired, particularly so in the face
of petitioners' grief over the death of their mother, exacerbated by the
tension and anxiety wrought by the impasse and confusion over the
failure to ascertain over an appreciable period of time what happened
to her remains.
Airline companies are hereby sternly admonished that it is their duty
not only to cursorily instruct but to strictly require their personnel to
be more accommodating towards customers, passengers and the
general public. After all, common carriers such as airline companies
are in the business of rendering public service, which is the primary
reason for their enfranchisement and recognition in our law. Because
the passengers in a contract of carriage do not contract merely for
transportation, they have a right to be treated with kindness, respect,
courtesy and consideration. 68 A contract to transport passengers is
quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation,
and generates a relation attended with public duty. The operation of a
common carrier is a business affected with public interest and must be
directed to serve the comfort and convenience of
passengers. 69 Passengers are human beings with human feelings and
emotions; they should not be treated as mere numbers or statistics for
revenue.
The records reveal that petitioners, particularly Maria and Saturnino
Saludo, agonized for nearly five hours, over the possibility of losing
their mother's mortal remains, unattended to and without any assurance
from the employees of TWA that they were doing anything about the
situation. This is not to say that petitioners were to be regaled with
extra special attention. They were, however, entitled to the
understanding and humane consideration called for by and
commensurate with the extraordinary diligence required of common
carriers, and not the cold insensitivity to their predicament. It is hard
to believe that the airline's counter personnel were totally helpless
about the situation. Common sense would and should have dictated
that they exert a little extra effort in making a more extensive inquiry,
by themselves or through their superiors, rather than just shrug off the
problem with a callous and uncaring remark that they had no
knowledge about it. With all the modern communications equipment
readily available to them, which could have easily facilitated said
inquiry and which are used as a matter of course by airline companies
in their daily operations, their apathetic stance while not legally
reprehensible is morally deplorable.
Losing a loved one, especially one's, parent, is a painful experience.
Our culture accords the tenderest human feelings toward and in
reverence to the dead. That the remains of the deceased were
subsequently delivered, albeit belatedly, and eventually laid in her
final resting place is of little consolation. The imperviousness
displayed by the airline's personnel, even for just that fraction of time,
was especially condemnable particularly in the hour of bereavement of
the family of Crispina Saludo, intensified by anguish due to the
uncertainty of the whereabouts of their mother's remains. Hence, it is
quite apparent that private respondents' personnel were remiss in the
observance of that genuine human concern and professional
attentiveness required and expected of them.
The foregoing observations, however, do not appear to be applicable
or imputable to respondent PAL or its employees. No attribution of
discourtesy or indifference has been made against PAL by petitioners
and, in fact, petitioner Maria Saludo testified that it was to PAL that
they repaired after failing to receive proper attention from TWA. It was
from PAL that they received confirmation that their mother's remains
would be on the same flight to Manila with them.
We find the following substantiation on this particular episode from
the deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL's cargo supervisor earlier
adverted to, regarding their investigation of and the action taken on
learning of petitioner's problem:
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
Yes.
Mr. Lim, what exactly was your procedure adopted in your so called
investigation?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
I called the lead agent on duty at that time and requested for a copy of
airway bill, transfer manifest and other documents concerning the
shipment.
ATTY ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
Then, what?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
They proceeded to analyze exactly where PAL failed, if any, in
forwarding the human remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo. And I
found out that there was not (sic) delay in shipping the remains of Mrs.
Saludo to Manila. Since we received the body from American Airlines
on 28 October at 7:45 and we expedited the shipment so that it could
have been loaded on our flight leaving at 9:00 in the evening or just
barely one hour and 15 minutes prior to the departure of the aircraft.
That is so (sic) being the case, I reported to Manila these
circumstances. 70
IV. Finally, petitioners insist, as a consequence of the delay in the
shipment of their mother's remains allegedly caused by wilful
contractual breach, on their entitlement to actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and legal
interest.
The uniform decisional tenet in our jurisdiction bolds that moral
damages may be awarded for wilful or fraudulent breach of
contract 71 or when such breach is attended by malice or bad
faith. 72 However, in the absence of strong and positive evidence of
fraud, malice or bad faith, said damages cannot be awarded.73 Neither
can there be an award of exemplary damages 74 nor of attorney's
fees 75 as an item of damages in the absence of proof that defendant
acted with malice, fraud or bad faith.
The censurable conduct of TWA's employees cannot, however, be said
to have approximated the dimensions of fraud, malice or bad faith. It
can be said to be more of a lethargic reaction produced and engrained
in some people by the mechanically routine nature of their work and a
racial or societal culture which stultifies what would have been their
accustomed human response to a human need under a former and
different ambience.
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners' right to be treated with due
courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to
be exercised by every common carrier was violated by TWA and this
entitles them, at least, to nominal damages from TWA alone. Articles
2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that nominal damages
are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the
vindication or recognition of a right violated of invaded. They are
recoverable where some injury has been done but the amount of which
the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the
discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.76 In
the exercise of our discretion, we find an award of P40,000.00 as
nominal damages in favor of, petitioners to be a reasonable amount
under the circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that an award of P40,000.00 as
and by way of nominal damages is hereby granted in favor of
petitioners to be paid by respondent Trans World Airlines, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33836 March 16, 1987
DRA. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO, petitioner,
vs.
ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INC. and JOSE LEYSON,
et al., respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals dated May 4,1971 in CA-G.R. No. 34832R entitled Dra.
Sofia L. Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. and Jose
Leyson, which modified the decision 2 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-5235 reducing the amount of
moral damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees but granting actual damages of
P2,451.27.
The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified,
ordering appellants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of
P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost of the repair of the
car of Plaintiff; (2) the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages. No
pronouncement as to costs.
The antecedent facts of this case as found by the trial court and by the
Court of Appeals are as follows:
At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado was
driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with the
intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left, to go to the
Philippine Normal College Compound where she would hold classes.
She claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph; that
before crossing Taft Ave. she stopped her car and looked to the right
and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side
she slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same, but when she was
almost at the center, near the island thereof, Jose Leyson who was
driving People's Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance Transport
System, Inc., suddenly bumped and struck Dra. Prudenciado's car,
thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body,
suffering more particularly brain concussion which subjected her to
several physical examinations and to an encephalograph test while her
car was damaged to the extent of P2,451.27. The damage to the taxicab
amounted to P190.00 (Decision in Civil Case No. Q-5235, CFI, Rizal;
Record on Appeal, pp. 63-64; Decision, CA-G.R. No. 34832-R, Rollo,
pp. 37-38).
Dra. Prudenciado filed a complaint for damages at the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City against the Alliance Transport System
and Jose Leyson docketed as aforestated, Civil Case No. Q-5232
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
found Jose Leyson guilty of negligence in the performance of his
duties as taxicab driver which is the proximate cause of the accident in
question. On the other hand, defendant Alliance Transport System, Inc.
failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the
required diligence of a good father of the family in the selection,
supervision and control of its employees including defendant Leyson.
Consequently, both defendants were held jointly and severally liable
for the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff Dra. Sofia L.
Prudenciado as well as for the damage to her car, in addition to the
other consequential damages prayed for. The dispositive portion of
said decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS judgment is
rendered, one in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, by
ordering the said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost for the
repair of the car of plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00
as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's
fees, with costs against the defendants. (Record on Appeal, pp. 71-73).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision on May
14, 1971 and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its
resolution dated July 20, 1971.
Hence, this petition.
The petition was given due course in the resolution of this Court dated
September 6, 1971 and petitioner filed her brief on November 10, 1971
(Rollo, p. 69) while respondents filed their brief on January 24, 1972
(Rollo, p. 86). Petitioner filed her Reply Brief on March 1, 1972
(Rollo, p. 96); after which the case was considered submitted for
decision on the same date (Rollo, p. 99).
In her brief, petitioner raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REDUCING THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES TO THE
PETITIONER FROM P25,000.00 AWARDED BY THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, QUEZON CITY, TO
P2,000.00 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS
NO FINDING THAT THE AWARD WAS PALPABLY AND
SCANDALOUSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS
THE RESULT OF PASSION OR CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT;
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF
P5,000.00 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
FINDING OF THE SAID COURT ON THE EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW APPLICABLE JUSTIFIED THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AS HELD BY THE SAID TRIAL COURT;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT HER
DEMOTION IN RANK AS A PROFESSOR IN THE UNITED
STATES WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED AND IN MAKING THIS
FINDING A BASIS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE AWARD OF
MORAL DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT IS
ALREADY TOO FAR FETCHED AND IT MERELY CONFIRMS
THE TRUTH OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED SUFFERED
LOSS OF HER USUAL LIVELINESS; VIVACITY ACTIVITY
SELF-CONFIDENCE AND THAT SHE FEELS UNCERTAIN AND
INSECURE AND THAT SHE WAS SUBJECTED TO EXTREME
FRIGHT AND SERIOUS ANXIETY, SERIOUS APPREHENSION
OF LOSING HER LIFE OR HER SENSES OR REASON AND OF
HER PHYSICAL MOBILITY ANYTIME AND THAT SHE
SUFFERED GREAT SHOCK AND SEVERE PAINS ON HER
BACK NEAR THE LEFT SIDE OF HER SPINAL COLUMN OF
THE LUMBAR REGION;
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN
ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE
PETITIONERS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID
AWARD IS LEGAL AND PROPER;
V
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ELIMINATING THE COSTS TAXED AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID
COSTS ARE LEGAL AND PROPER;
VI
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE CLAIM OF DR. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO OF HER
LOSS OF HER USUAL LIVELINESS, VIVACITY ACTIVITY
AND HER USUAL SELF CONFIDENCE, SUCH THAT SHE NOW
FEELS UNCERTAIN AND INSECURE... EXTREME FRIGHT
AND SERIOUS ANXIETY, SERIOUS APPREHENSION OF
LOSING HER LIFE OR HER SENSES OR REASON; OF HER
PHYSICAL MOBILITY ANYTIME ... GREAT SHOCK AND
SEVERE PAINS ON HER BACK NEAR THE LEFT SIDE OF HER
SPINAL COLUMN IN THE LUMBAR REGION IS
UNCORROBORATED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT OF
THE CERTIFICATE, EXHIBIT "G" OF DR. DOMINADOR
VERGARA, OF THE VETERANS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND
DR. CONRADO ARAMIL, BRAIN SPECIALIST AND THE
CORROBORATING TESTIMONY OF THE LATTER AFTER
EXAMINATION AND TREATMENT OF PETITIONER;
VII
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SO
MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAD NO POWER TO
DO SO UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF APPEALS;
VIII
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECISION OF
SAID TRIAL COURT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court are in accord in the finding
that the accident was caused by the negligence of the taxi driver. The
bone of contention is however in the award of damages, which
crystalizes the errors assigned into one issue, which is whether or not
the Court of Appeals is justified in modifying or changing the grant of
damages by the trial court.
It is well settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
binding on the Supreme Court, but said findings are subject to scrutiny
if such are diametrically opposed to those of the trial court (Samson v.
CA, et al. G.R. No. L-40071, January 29, 1986).
The Court of Appeals concedes that a concussion of the brain was
suffered by Dra. Prudenciado but as to how serious was the concussion
or how it had later become, and the disastrous extent of the injuries
which she alleges to have sustained as a result of the accident, are
seriously doubted by said Appellate Court.
Specifically, said Court finds that Dra. Prudenciado's claim (which was
sustained b the trial court) that because of aforesaid concussion, she
eventually lost her usual liveliness, vivacity activity and her usual self-
confidence, to the extent that now she feels uncertain and insecure, not
to mention a sense of extreme fright and serious anxiety, serious
apprehension of losing her life, or her senses or reason or her physical
mobility momentarily, plus experiences of great shock and severe
pains on her back near the left side of her spinal column in the lumbar
region, was not supported by the deposition of Dr. Conrado Aramil the
list who attended to the plaintiff from May 14 to May 26, 1960 (TSN,
July 13, 1960, pp. 72-73). From said deposition, it was gathered that
Dra. Prudenciado suffered a mild abnormality, compatible with mold
concussion of the brain (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 47-48); that the
symptoms of any brain concussion usually are headache, dizziness,
voting and lack of pep or alertness; and that the possible after effects
that may be produced are persistent or irregular headaches, fluctuating
dizziness. Accordingly, Dra. Prudenciado was advised "Just to watch
herself if she would develop any alarming symptoms such as headache,
dizziness or vomitings, to have her re-checked after several months for
her to be sure." (Ibid, pp. 51-52). It might also produce intellectual
deterioration or lessening of intelligence, and even insanity.
Dra. Prudenciado sought to establish that she had precisely suffered
are those after effects except insanity; but the Court of Appeals ruled
that her proof consisted merely in her own uncorroborated testimony.
In support of her allegation she could not show any medical certificate
tending to prove that she was indeed medically treated abroad for her
brain ailment nor was there any showing in the documents presented
that she was demoted to the rank of technical assistant because the San
Francisco State College does not believe in her mental capacity any
more.
Finally, her statements that she is almost completely losing her voice,
that she has a terrible headache when her head is pressed, that she has
lost her sense of taste, that she is nervous and temperamental and that
she has lapses of memory, are belied by the deposition of Dr. Aramil
that the patient's EEG was already normal on May 26, 1960; and on
cross-examination he declared that she was clinically symtomless
when she was discharged from the hospital (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp.
75-76; 78-79).
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act
or omission (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 [1984]).
In the same manner, it is undisputed that the trial courts are given
discretion to determine the amount of moral damages Alcantara v.
Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or
change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously
excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice
or corruption on the part of the trial court (Gellada v. Warner Barnes
& Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co.,
Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636 and Adone v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G.
656). But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and
exemplary damages are far too excessive compared to the, actual
losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they
should be reduced to more reasonable amounts.
Thus, in the case of San Andres v. Court of Appeals (116 SCRA 85
[1982]) the Supreme Court ruled that while the amount of moral
damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of a court, the
same when found excessive should be reduced to more reasonable
amounts, considering the attendant facts and circumstances. Moral
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category
of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
In a much later case (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 578-
579 [1985]), the Supreme court, reiterating the above ruling, reduced
the awards of moral and exemplary damages which were far too
excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved
parties and where the records show that the injury suffered was not
serious or gross and, therefore, out of proportion to the amount of
damages generously awarded by the trial court.
In any case the Court held that "moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They
are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action." The award
of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted & B
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 745 [1984] citing Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr.,
94 SCRA 966).
Coming back to the case at bar, a careful review of the records makes
it readily apparent that the injuries sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are
not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the
damages awarded by the trial court. In fact, a closer scrutiny of the
exhibits showing a moderate damage to the car can by no stretch of the
imagination produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous effects
of the accident sought to be established, actually took place, not to
mention the fact that such were not supported by the medical findings
presented. Unquestionably, therefore, the damages imposed' by the
lower court should be reduced to more reasonable levels.
On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction of the damages
made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic, to
pass the test of reasonableness, which appears to be the underlying
basis to justify such reduction.
While the damages sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily
established to the extent desired by the petitioner, it was nonetheless
not disputed that an accident occurred due to the fault and negligence
of the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion
which although mild can admittedly produce the effects complained of
by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and can
lead to some, serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other
sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 52-54). Being a doctor by
profession, her fears can be more real and intense than an ordinary
person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral
damages which are proportionate to her suffering.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides:
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with grave negligence.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good
(Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
The findings of the trial court in the case at bar which became the basis
of the award of exemplary damages are to the effect that it is more
apparent from the facts, conditions and circumstances obtaining in the
record of the case that respondent driver was running at high speed
after turning to the right along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala
Boulevard, considering that the traffic was clear. Failing to notice
petitioner's car, he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve
to the right to avoid the collision (Record on Appeal, pp. 69-70).
The Court of Appeals conforms with aforesaid findings of the trial
court but is not prepared to accept that there was gross negligence on
the part of the driver to justify the imposition of exemplary damages.
However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on a slippery
road in complete disregard of the hazards to life and limb of other
people cannot be said to be acting in anything less than gross
negligence. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused
by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the award of damages is
concerned; and respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay the
petitioner; (1) the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing
the cost of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) the
sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
Civil Law; Damages; Judgment; Factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court but they are subject to
scrutiny if such are diametrically opposed to those of the trial court.—
It is well settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
binding on the Supreme Court, but said findings are subject to scrutiny
if such are diametrically opposed to those of the trial court (Samson v.
CA, et al., G.R. No. L-40071, January 29,1986).
 Same; Same; Moral damages, concept of.—There is no
argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission
(People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 [1984]).
Same; Same; Same; Trial courts are given the discretion to
determine the amount of moral damages, and that the Court of Appeals
can only modify or change the amount awarded when they are
palpably and scandalously excessive; Awards of moral and exemplary
damages which are far too excessive, compared to the actual losses of
the aggrieved party, should be reduced to more reasonable amounts.—
In the same manner, it is undisputed that the trial courts are given
discretion to determine the amount of moral damages (Alcantara v.
Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or
change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously
excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice
or corruption on the part of the trial court (Gellada v. Warner Barnes
& Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co.,
Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636 and Adone v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G.
656). But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and
exemplary damages are far too excessive compared to the actual losses
sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be
reduced to more reasonable amounts.
Same; Same; Same; Purpose of award of moral damages.—
In any case the Court held that "moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They
are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action." The award
of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (R
& B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 745 [1984] citing Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino,
Jr., 94 SCRA 966). Same; Same; Same; Reduction of damages by the
Court of Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic and cannot pass
the test of reasonableness.—On the other hand, it will be observed that
the reduction of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too
drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness, which
appears to be the underlying basis to justify such reduction.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner, a doctor by profession, is undeniably
a proper recipient of moral damages which are proportionate to her
suffering.—While the damages sought to be recovered were not
satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the petitioner, it was
nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the fault and
negligence of the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain
concussion which although mild, can admittedly produce the effects
complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after
several years and can lead to some serious handicaps or predispose the
patient to other sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 5254). Being a
doctor by profession, her fears can be more real and intense than an
ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient
of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering.
Same; Same; Exemplary or corrective damages; Rationale behind the
award of said damages.—The rationale behind exemplary or
corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or
correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World
Airways, 16 SCRA 431). Same; Same; Same; Gross negligence by
taxi driver in case at bar; Frequent incidence of accidents caused by
taxi drivers demands corrective measures.—The Court of Appeals
conforms with aforesaid findings of the trial court but is not prepared
to accept that there was gross negligence on the part of the driver to
justify the imposition of exemplary damages. However, a driver
running at full speed on a rainy day, on a slippery road in complete
disregard of the hazards to life and limb of other people cannot be said
to be acting in anything less than gross negligence. The frequent
incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed
demands corrective measures.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22415 March 30, 1966
FERNANDO LOPEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Plaintiffs and defendant appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Since the value in controversy exceeds P200,000 the
appeals were taken directly to this Court upon all questions involved
(Sec. 17, par. 3[5], Judiciary Act).
Stated briefly the facts not in dispute are as follows: Reservations for
first class accommodations in Flight No. 2 of Pan American World
Airways — hereinafter otherwise called PAN-AM — from Tokyo to
San Francisco on May 24, 1960 were made with
PAN-AM on March 29, 1960, by "Your Travel Guide" agency,
specifically, by Delfin Faustino, for then Senator Fernando Lopez, his
wife Maria J. Lopez, his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., and his
daughter, Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., (Milagros Lopez
Montelibano). PAN-AM's San Francisco head office confirmed the
reservations on March 31, 1960.
First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were subsequently
issued by
PAN-AM on May 21 and 23, 1960, in favor of Senator Lopez and his
party. The total fare of P9,444 for all of them was fully paid before the
tickets were issued.
As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest
Airlines on May 24, 1960, arriving in Tokyo at 5:30 P.M. of that day.
As soon as they arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of
the Philippine Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding
their first class accommodations for that evening's flight. For the given
reason that the first class seats therein were all booked up, however,
PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed Minister Busuego that PAN-AM
could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first
class passengers. Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets
to Minister Busuego for him to show the same to PAN-AM's Tokyo
office, but the latter firmly reiterated that there was no accommodation
for them in the first class, stating that they could not go in that flight
unless they took the tourist class therein.
Due to pressing engagements awaiting Senator Lopez and his wife, in
the United States — he had to attend a business conference in San
Francisco the next day and she had to undergo a medical check-up in
Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, on May 28, 1960 and needed three
days rest before that in San Francisco — Senator Lopez and party were
constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to San Francisco as
tourist passengers. Senator Lopez however made it clear, as indicated
in his letter to PAN-AM's Tokyo office on that date (Exh. A), that they
did so "under protest" and without prejudice to further action against
the airline.1äwphï1.ñët
Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party
against PAN-AM on June 2, 1960 in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant, plaintiffs
asked for P500,000 actual and moral damages, P100,000 exemplary
damages, P25,000 attorney's fees plus costs. PAN-AM filed its answer
on June 22, 1960, asserting that its failure to provide first class
accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees.
It also interposed a counterclaim for attorney's fees of P25,000.
Subsequently, further pleadings were filed, thus: plaintiffs' answer to
the counterclaim, on July 25, 1960; plaintiffs' reply attached to motion
for its admittance, on December 2, 1961; defendant's supplemental
answer, on March 8, 1962; plaintiffs' reply to supplemental answer, on
March 10, 1962; and defendant's amended supplemental answer, on
July 10, 1962.
After trial — which took twenty-two (22) days ranging from
November 25, 1960 to January 5, 1963 — the Court of First Instance
rendered its decision on November 13, 1963, the dispositive portion
stating:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, which is
accordingly ordered to pay the plaintiffs the following: (a)
P100,000.00 as moral damages; (b) P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (c) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of this action.
So ordered.
Plaintiffs, however, on November 21, 1963, moved for reconsideration
of said judgment, asking that moral damages be increased to P400,000
and that six per cent (6%) interest per annum on the amount of the
award be granted. And defendant opposed the same. Acting thereon
the trial court issued an order on December 14, 1963, reconsidering the
dispositive part of its decision to read as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, which is
accordingly ordered to pay the plaintiffs the following: (a)
P150,000.00 as moral damages; (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; with legal interest on both from the date of the filing of the
complaint until paid; and (c) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs of this action.
So ordered.
It is from said judgment, as thus reconsidered, that both parties have
appealed.
Defendant, as stated, has from the start admitted that it breached its
contracts with plaintiffs to provide them with first class
accommodations in its Tokyo-San Francisco flight of May 24, 1960.
In its appeal, however, it takes issue with the finding of the court a
quo that it acted in bad faith in the branch of said contracts. Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, raise questions on the amount of damages awarded
in their favor, seeking that the same be increased to a total of P650,000.
Anent the issue of bad faith the records show the respective
contentions of the parties as follows.
According to plaintiffs, defendant acted in bad faith because it
deliberately refused to comply with its contract to provide first class
accommodations to plaintiffs, out of racial prejudice against Orientals.
And in support of its contention that what was done to plaintiffs is an
oftrepeated practice of defendant, evidence was adduced relating to
two previous instances of alleged racial discrimination by defendant
against Filipinos in favor of "white" passengers. Said previous
occasions are what allegedly happened to (1) Benito Jalbuena and (2)
Cenon S. Cervantes and his wife.
And from plaintiffs' evidence this is what allegedly happened;
Jalbuena bought a first class ticket from PAN-AM on April 13, 1960;
he confirmed it on April 15, 1960 as to the Tokyo-Hongkong flight of
April 20, 1960; PAN-AM similarly confirmed it on April 20, 1960. At
the airport he and another Oriental — Mr. Tung — were asked to step
aside while other passengers - including "white" passengers —
boarded PAN-AM's plane. Then PAN-AM officials told them that one
of them had to stay behind. Since Mr. Tung was going all the way to
London, Jalbuena was chosen to be left behind. PAN-AM's officials
could only explain by saying there was "some mistake". Jalbuena
thereafter wrote PAN-AM to protest the incident (Exh. B).
As to Cenon S. Cervantes it would appear that in Flight No. 6 of PAN-
AM on September 29, 1958 from Bangkok to Hongkong, he and his
wife had to take tourist class, although they had first class tickets,
which they had previously confirmed, because their seats in first class
were given to "passengers from London."
Against the foregoing, however, defendant's evidence would seek to
establish its theory of honest mistake, thus:
The first class reservations of Senator Lopez and party were made on
March 29, 1960 together with those of four members of the Rufino
family, for a total of eight (8) seats, as shown in their joint reservation
card (Exh. 1). Subsequently on March 30, 1960, two other Rufinos
secured reservations and were given a separate reservation card (Exh.
2). A new reservation card consisting of two pages (Exhs. 3 and 4) was
then made for the original of eight passengers, namely, Senator Lopez
and party and four members of the Rufino family, the first page (Exh.
3) referring to 2 Lopezes, 2 Montelibanos and 1 Rufino and the second
page (Exh. 4) referring to 3 Rufinos. On April 18, 1960 "Your Travel
Guide" agency cancelled the reservations of the Rufinos. A telex
message was thereupon sent on that date to PAN-AM's head office at
San Francisco by Mariano Herranz, PAN-AM's reservations employee
at its office in Escolta, Manila. (Annex A-Acker's to Exh. 6.) In said
message, however, Herranz mistakenly cancelled all the seats that had
been reserved, that is, including those of Senator Lopez and party.
The next day — April 1960 — Herranz discovered his mistake, upon
seeing the reservation card newly prepared by his co-employee Pedro
Asensi for Sen. Lopez and party to the exclusion of the Rufinos (Exh.
5). It was then that Herranz sent another telex wire to the San Francisco
head office, stating his error and asking for the reinstatement of the
four (4) first class seats reserved for Senator Lopez and party (Annex
A-Velasco's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office replied on April 22,
1960 that Senator Lopez and party are waitlisted and that said office is
unable to reinstate them (Annex B-Velasco's to Exh. 6).
Since the flight involved was still more than a month away and
confident that reinstatement would be made, Herranz forgot the matter
and told no one about it except his co-employee, either Armando
Davila or Pedro Asensi or both of them (Tsn., 123-124, 127, Nov. 17,
1961).
Subsequently, on April 27, 1960, Armando Davila, PAN-AM's
reservations employee working in the same Escolta office as Herranz,
phoned PAN-AM's ticket sellers at its other office in the Manila Hotel,
and confirmed the reservations of Senator Lopez and party.
PAN-AM's reservations supervisor Alberto Jose, discovered Herranz's
mistake after "Your Travel Guide" phone on May 18, 1960 to state that
Senator Lopez and party were going to depart as scheduled.
Accordingly, Jose sent a telex wire on that date to PAN-AM's head
office at San Francisco to report the error and asked said office to
continue holding the reservations of Senator Lopez and party (Annex
B-Acker's to Exh. 6). Said message was reiterated by Jose in his telex
wire of May 19, 1960 (Annex C-Acker's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head
office replied on May 19, 1960 that it regrets being unable to confirm
Senator Lopez and party for the reason that the flight was solidly
booked (Exh. 7). Jose sent a third telex wire on May 20, 1960
addressed to PAN-AM's offices at San Francisco, New York (Idlewild
Airport), Tokyo and Hongkong, asking all-out assistance towards
restoring the cancelled spaces and for report of cancellations at their
end (Annex D-Acker's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office reiterated
on May 20, 1960 that it could not reinstate the spaces and referred Jose
to the Tokyo and Hongkong offices (Exh. 8). Also on May 20, the
Tokyo office of PAN-AM wired Jose stating it will do everything
possible (Exh. 9).
Expecting that some cancellations of bookings would be made before
the flight time, Jose decided to withhold from Senator Lopez and party,
or their agent, the information that their reservations had been
cancelled.
Armando Davila having previously confirmed Senator Lopez and
party's first class reservations to PAN-AM's ticket sellers at its Manila
Hotel office, the latter sold and issued in their favor the corresponding
first class tickets on the 21st and 23rd of May, 1960.
From the foregoing evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that
defendant — through its agents — first cancelled plaintiffs,
reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and
intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of
said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class
reservations stood valid and confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into
purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed
reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant
wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to
breach its a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-
minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned
out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been
prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in
holding on to Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its flight and
foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that
may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the
time, in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in
bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some
motive of interest or ill-will (Spiegel vs. Beacon Participations, 8 NE
2d 895, 907). As stated in Kamm v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62,
99 A.L.R. 1, 7: "Self-enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal
ill-will, may well have been the motive; but it is malice nevertheless."
As of May 18, 1960 defendant's reservations supervisor, Alberto Jose
knew that plaintiffs' reservations had been cancelled. As of May 20 he
knew that the San Francisco head office stated with finality that it
could not reinstate plaintiffs' cancelled reservations. And yet said
reservations supervisor made the "decision" — to use his own, word
— to withhold the information from the plaintiffs. Said Alberto Jose
in his testimony:
Q Why did you not notify them?
A Well, you see, sir, in my fifteen (15) years of service with the air
lines business my experience is that even if the flights are solidly
booked months in advance, usually the flight departs with plenty of
empty seats both on the first class and tourist class. This is due to late
cancellation of passengers, or because passengers do not show up in
the airport, and it was our hope others come in from another flight and,
therefore, are delayed and, therefore, missed their connections. This
experience of mine, coupled with that wire from Tokyo that they would
do everything possible prompted me to withhold the information, but
unfortunately, instead of the first class seat that I was hoping for and
which I anticipated only the tourists class was open on which Senator
and Mrs. Lopez, Mr. and Mrs. Montelibano were accommodated.
Well, I fully realize now the gravity of my decision in not advising
Senator and Mrs. Lopez, Mr. and Mrs. Montelibano nor their agents
about the erroneous cancellation and for which I would like them to
know that I am very sorry.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So it was not your duty to notify Sen. Lopez and parties that their
reservations had been cancelled since May 18, 1960?
A As I said before it was my duty. It was my duty but as I said again
with respect to that duty I have the power to make a decision or use
my discretion and judgment whether I should go ahead and tell the
passenger about the cancellation. (Tsn., pp. 17-19, 28-29, March 15,
1962.)
At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in
breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe that their reservation
had not been cancelled. An additional indication of this is the fact that
upon the face of the two tickets of record, namely, the ticket issued to
Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. on May 21, 1960 (Exh. 22) and that issued to
Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., on May 23, 1960 (Exh. 23), the
reservation status is stated as "OK". Such willful-non-disclosure of the
cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood — and
not simply the erroneous cancellation itself — is the factor to which is
attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as above-stated,
in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad faith.
As if to further emphasize its bad faith on the matter, defendant
subsequently promoted the employee who cancelled plaintiffs'
reservations and told them nothing about it. The record shows that said
employee — Mariano Herranz — was not subjected to investigation
and suspension by defendant but instead was given a reward in the
form of an increase of salary in June of the following year (Tsn., 86-
88, Nov. 20, 1961).
At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the defendant, there
would at least be negligence so gross and reckless as to amount to
malice or bad faith (Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163, March 4, 1959;
Necesito v. Paras, L-10605-06, June 30, 1958). Firstly,
notwithstanding the entries in the reservation cards (Exhs. 1 & 3) that
the reservations cancelled are those of the Rufinos only, Herranz made
the mistake, after reading said entries, of sending a wire cancelling all
the reservations, including those of Senator Lopez and party (Tsn., pp.
108-109, Nov. 17, 1961). Secondly, after sending a wire to San
Francisco head office on April 19, 1960 stating his error and asking for
reinstatement, Herranz simply forgot about the matter.
Notwithstanding the reply of San Francisco head Office on April 22,
1960 that it cannot reinstate Senator Lopez and party (Annex B-
Velasco's to Exh. 6), it was assumed and taken for granted that
reinstatement would be made. Thirdly, Armando Davila confirmed
plaintiff's reservations in a phone call on April 27, 1960 to defendant's
ticket sellers, when at the time it appeared in plaintiffs' reservation card
(Exh. 5) that they were only waitlisted passengers. Fourthly,
defendant's ticket sellers issued plaintiffs' tickets on May 21 and 23,
1960, without first checking their reservations just before issuing said
tickets. And, finally, no one among defendant's agents notified Senator
Lopez and party that their reservations had been cancelled, a
precaution that could have averted their entering with defendant into
contracts that the latter had already placed beyond its power to
perform.
Accordingly, there being a clear admission in defendant's evidence of
facts amounting to a bad faith on its part in regard to the breach of its
contracts with plaintiffs, it becomes unnecessary to further discuss the
evidence adduced by plaintiffs to establish defendant's bad faith. For
what is admitted in the course of the trial does not need to be proved
(Sec. 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court).
Addressing ourselves now to the question of damages, it is well to state
at the outset those rules and principles. First, moral damages are
recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, New Civil Code). Second, in
addition to moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
breach of contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Articles 2229, 2232, New
Civil Code). And, third, a written contract for an attorney's services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).
First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's
breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered
social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental
anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by
defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs,
they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those
awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist
passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it
is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is
rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International
carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. For the
Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but
the nation's treaty-ratifying body. It may also be mentioned that in his
aforesaid office Senator Lopez was in a position to preside in
impeachment cases should the Senate sit as Impeachment Tribunal.
And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. Senator Lopez
was going to the United States to attend a private business conference
of the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his aforesaid rank and
position were by no means left behind, and in fact he had a second
engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by
Filipino friends in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore (Tsn.,
pp. 14-15, Nov. 25, 1960). For the moral damages sustained by him,
therefore, an award of P100,000.00 is appropriate.
Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared his prestige and
therefore his humiliation. In addition she suffered physical discomfort
during the 13-hour trip,(5 hours from Tokyo to Honolulu and 8 hours
from Honolulu to San Francisco). Although Senator Lopez stated that
"she was quite well" (Tsn., p. 22, Nov. 25, 1960) — he obviously
meant relatively well, since the rest of his statement is that two months
before, she was attackedby severe flu and lost 10 pounds of weight and
that she was advised by Dr. Sison to go to the United States as soon as
possible for medical check-up and relaxation, (Ibid). In fact, Senator
Lopez stated, as shown a few pages after in the transcript of his
testimony, that Mrs. Lopez was sick when she left the Philippines:
A. Well, my wife really felt very bad during the entire trip from Tokyo
to San Francisco. In the first place, she was sick when we left the
Philippines, and then with that discomfort which she [experienced] or
suffered during that evening, it was her worst experience. I myself,
who was not sick, could not sleep because of the discomfort. (Tsn., pp.
27-28, Nov. 25, 1960).
It is not hard to see that in her condition then a physical discomfort
sustained for thirteen hours may well be considered a physical
suffering. And even without regard to the noise and trepidation inside
the plane — which defendant contends, upon the strengh of expert
testimony, to be practically the same in first class and tourist class —
the fact that the seating spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower
than in first class, there beingsix seats to a row in the former as against
four to a row in the latter, and that in tourist class there is very little
space for reclining in view of the closer distance between rows (Tsn.,
p. 24, Nov. 25, 1960), will suffice to show that the aforesaid passenger
indeed experienced physical suffering during the trip. Added to this,
of course, was the painfull thought that she was deprived by defendant
— after having paid for and expected the same — of the most suitable,
place for her, the first class, where evidently the best of everything
would have been given her, the best seat, service, food and treatment.
Such difference in comfort between first class and tourist class is too
obvious to be recounted, is in fact the reason for the former's existence,
and is recognized by the airline in charging a higher fare for it and by
the passengers in paying said higher rate Accordingly, considering the
totality of her suffering and humiliation, an award to Mrs. Maria J.
Lopez of P50,000.00 for moral damages will be reasonable.
Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as immediate
members of the family of Senator Lopez. They formed part of the
Senator's party as shown also by the reservation cards of PAN-AM. As
such they likewise shared his prestige and humiliation. Although
defendant contends that a few weeks before the flight they had asked
their reservations to be charged from first class to tourist class —
which did not materialize due to alleged full booking in the tourist class
— the same does not mean they suffered no shared in having to take
tourist class during the flight. For by that time they had already been
made to pay for first class seats and therefore to expect first class
accommodations. As stated, it is one thing to take the tourist class by
free choice; a far different thing to be compelled to take it
notwithstanding having paid for first class seats. Plaintiffs-appellants
now ask P37,500.00 each for the two but we note that in their motion
for reconsideration filed in the court a quo, they were satisfied with
P25,000.00 each for said persons. (Record on Appeal, p. 102). For their
social humiliation, therefore, the award to them of P25,000.00 each is
reasonable.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for public good.
Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as
stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to moral
damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code).
In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to
sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the
future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we find it just to
award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages.
Now, as to attorney's fees, the record shows a written contract of
services executed on June 1, 1960 (Exh. F) whereunder plaintiffs-
appellants engaged the services of their counsel — Atty. Vicente J.
Francisco — and agreedto pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees
upon the termination of the case in the Court of First Instance, and an
additional sum of P25,000.00 in the event the case is appealed to the
Supreme Court. As said earlier, a written contract for attorney's
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by
the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. A consideration of the
subject matter of the present controversy, of the professional standing
of the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and of the extent of the service
rendered by him, shows that said amount provided for in the written
agreement is reasonable. Said lawyer — whose prominence in the legal
profession is well known — studied the case, prepared and filed the
complaint, conferred with witnesses, analyzed documentary evidence,
personally appeared at the trial of the case in twenty-two days, during
a period of three years, prepared four sets of cross-interrogatories for
deposition taking, prepared several memoranda and the motion for
reconsideration, filed a joint record on appeal with defendant, filed a
brief for plaintiffs as appellants consisting of 45 printed pages and a
brief for plaintiffs as appellees consisting of 265 printed pages. And
we are further convinced of its reasonableness because defendant's
counsel likewise valued at P50,000.00 the proper compensation for his
services rendered to defendant in the trial court and on appeal.
In concluding, let it be stressed that the amount of damages awarded
in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering the
official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties
on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on
the other (Domingding v. Ng, 55 O.G. 10). And further considering the
present rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount of damages
awarded would approximately be in U.S. dollars, this Court is all the
more of the view that said award is proper and reasonable.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified so as to
award in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, the following: (1)
P200,000.00 as moral damages, divided among plaintiffs, thus:
P100,000.00 for Senate President Pro Tempore Fernando Lopez;
P50,000.00 for his wife Maria J. Lopez; P25,000.00 for his son-in-law
Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.; and P25,000.00 for his daughter Mrs.
Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.; (2) P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective
damages; (3) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral
and exemplary damages aforestated, from December 14, 1963, the date
of the amended decision of the court a quo, until said damages are fully
paid; (4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (5) the costs. Counterclaim
dismissed.So ordered.
Same; Moral damages and exemplary are recoverable for breach of
contract of carriage in bad faith.—As a proximate result of
defendant’s breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter
suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and
mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets
issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At
stopovers, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers
by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist
passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it
is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is
rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. The
rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for public good.
Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court may
award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages (Articles
2229, 2232, New Civil Code). In view of its nature, it should be
imposed in such amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar
breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines.
Same; Factors considered in fixing damages.—In the case at bar the
damages were determined by considering the official, political, social
and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand and the
business and financial position of the offender on the other
(Dominding vs. Ng, 55 O.G. 10).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11037 December 29, 1960
EDGARDO CARIAGA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
DIZON, J.:
At about 1:00 p.m. on June 18, 1952, Bus No. 133 of the Laguna
Tayabas Bus
Co. — hereinafter referred to as the LTB — driven by Alfredo
Moncada, left its station at Azcarraga St., Manila, for Lilio, Laguna,
with Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth-year medical student of the University
of Santo Tomas, as one of its passengers. At about 3:00 p.m., as the
bus reached that part of the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, where the
national highway crossed a railroad track, it bumped against the engine
of a train then passing by with such terrific force that the first six
wheels of the latter were derailed, the engine and the front part of the
body of the bus was wrecked, the driver of the bus died instantly, while
many of its passengers, Edgardo among them, were severely injured.
Edgardo was first confined at the San Pablo City Hospital from 5:00
p.m., June 18, 1952, to 8:25 a.m., June 20 of the same year when he
was taken to the De los Santos Clinic, Quezon City. He left that clinic
on October 14 to be transferred to the University of Santo Tomas
Hospital where he stayed up to November 15. On this last date he was
taken back to the De los Santos Clinic where he stayed until January
15, 1953. He was unconscious during the first 35 days after the
accident; at the De los Santos Clinic Dr. Gustilo removed the fractured
bones which lacerated the right frontal lobe of his brain and at the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital Dr. Gustilo performed another
operation to cover a big hole on the right frontal part of the head with
a tantalum plate.
The LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the hospital, medical and
miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18, 1952 to April, 1953.
From January 15, 1953 up to April of the same year Edgardo stayed in
a private house in Quezon, City, the LTB having agreed to give him a
subsistence allowance of P10.00 daily during his convalescence,
having spent in this connection the total sum of P775.30 in addition to
the amount already referred to.
On April 24, 1953 the present action was filed to recover for Edgardo
Cariaga, from the LTB and the MRR Co., and total sum of
P312,000.00 as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
and for his parents, the sum of P18,00.00 in the same concepts. The
LTB disclaimed liability claiming that the accident was due to the
negligence of its co-defendant, the Manila Railroad Company, for not
providing a crossing bar at the point where the national highway
crossed the railway track, and for this reason filed the corresponding
cross-claim against the latter company to recover the total sum of
P18,194.75 representing the expenses paid to Edgardo Cariaga. The
Manila Railroad Company, in turn, denied liability upon the complaint
and cross-claim alleging that it was the reckless negligence of the bus
driver that caused the accident.
The lower court held that it was the negligence of the bus driver that
caused the accident and, as a result, rendered judgment sentencing the
LTB to pay Edgardo Cariaga the sum of P10,490.00 as compensatory
damages, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint,
and dismissing the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company.
From this decision the Cariagas and the LTB appealed.
The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred: in awarding only
P10,490.00 as compensatory damages to Edgardo; in not awarding
them actual and moral damages, and in not sentencing appellant LTB
to pay attorney's fees.
On the other hand, the LTB's principal contention in this appeal is that
the trial court should have held that the collision was due to the fault
of both the locomotive driver and the bus driver and erred, as a
consequence, in not holding the Manila Railroad Company liable upon
the cross-claim filed against it.
We shall first dispose of the appeal of the bus company. Its first
contention is that the driver of the train locomotive, like the bus driver,
violated the law, first, in sounding the whistle only when the collision
was about to take place instead of at a distance at least 300 meters from
the crossing, and second, in not ringing the locomotive bell at all. Both
contentions are without merits.
After considering the evidence presented by both parties the lower
court expressly found:
. . . While the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing,
the engineer sounded two long and two short whistles and upon
reaching a point about 100 meters from the highway, he sounded a long
whistle which lasted up to the time the train was about to cross it. The
bus proceeded on its way without slackening its speed and it bumped
against the train engine, causing the first six wheels of the latter to be
derailed.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . that the train whistle had been sounded several times before it
reached the crossing. All witnesses for the plaintiffs and the defendants
are uniform in stating that they heard the train whistle sometime before
the impact and considering that some of them were in the bus at the
time, the driver thereof must have heard it because he was seated on
the left front part of the bus and it was his duty and concern to observe
such fact in connection with the safe operation of the vehicle. The other
L.T.B. bus which arrived ahead at the crossing, heeded the warning by
stopping and allowing the train to pass and so nothing happened to said
vehicle. On the other hand, the driver of the bus No. 133 totally ignored
the whistle and noise produced by the approaching train and instead he
tried to make the bus pass the crossing before the train by not stopping
a few meters from the railway track and in proceeding ahead.
The above findings of the lower court are predicated mainly upon the
testimony of Gregorio Ilusondo, a witness for the Manila Railroad
Company. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the LTB to assail his
credibility, we do not find in the record any fact or circumstance
sufficient to discredit his testimony. We have, therefore, no other
alternative but to accept the findings of the trial court to the effect,
firstly, that the whistle of locomotive was sounded four times — two
long and two short — "as the train was approximately 300 meters from
the crossing"; secondly, that another LTB bus which arrived at the
crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo Cariaga was a passenger,
paid heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing", while —
as the LTB itself now admits (Brief p. 5) — the driver of the bus in
question totally disregarded the warning.
But to charge the MRR Co. with contributory negligence, the LTB
claims that the engineer of the locomotive failed to ring the bell
altogether, in violation of the section 91 of Article 1459, incorporated
in the charter of the said MRR Co. This contention — as is obvious —
is the very foundation of the cross-claim interposed by the LTB against
its
co-defendant. The former, therefore, had the burden of proving it
affirmatively because a violation of law is never presumed. The record
discloses that this burden has not been satisfactorily discharged.
The Cariagas, as appellants, claim that the award of P10,000.00
compensatory damages to Eduardo is inadequate considering the
nature and the after effects of the physical injuries suffered by him.
After a careful consideration of the evidence on this point we find their
contentions to be well-founded.
From the deposition of Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a neurosurgeon, it appears
that, as a result of the injuries suffered by Edgardo, his right forehead
was fractured necessitating the removal of practically all of the right
frontal lobe of his brain. From the testimony of Dr. Jose A. Fernandez,
a psychiatrist, it may be gathered that, because of the physical injuries
suffered by Edgardo, his mentality has been so reduced that he can no
longer finish his studies as a medical student; that he has become
completely misfit for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk around
without someone helping him, and has to use a brace on his left leg
and feet.
Upon the whole evidence on the matter, the lower court found that the
removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of Edgardo reduced his
intelligence by about 50%; that due to the replacement of the right
frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a
quite and retired life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed in or
dented it would cause his death."
The impression one gathers from this evidence is that, as a result of the
physical injuries suffered by Edgardo Cariaga, he is now in a helpless
condition, virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally.
Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the
damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who
acted in good faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had forseen
or could have reasonably forseen at the time the obligation was
constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the
same Code, have been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims that
only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo Cariaga consisting of
medical, hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are
within this category. We are of the opinion, however, that the income
which Edgardo Cariaga could earn if he should finish the medical
course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be
deemed to be within the same category because they could have
reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus
No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB. At that time he was already
a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his
scholastic may not be first rate (Exhibits 4, 4-A to 4-C), it is,
nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have
passed the board test in due time. As regards the income that he could
possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr.
Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could
easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had
he finished his studies.
Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned heretofore this Court is
of the opinion, and so holds, that the compensatory damages awarded
to Edgardo Cariaga should be increased to P25,000.00.
Edgardo Cariaga's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees was
denied by the trial court, the pertinent portion of its decision reading
as follows:
Plaintiffs' claim for moral damages cannot also be granted. Article
2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages
may be covered and the case under consideration does not fall under
any one of them. The present action cannot come under paragraph 2 of
said article because it is not one of the quasi-delict and cannot be
considered as such because of the pre-existing contractual relation
between the Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Edgardo Cariaga.
Neither could defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company be held liable
to pay moral damages to Edgardo Cariaga under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because said
defendant did not act fraudulently or in bad faith in connection
therewith. Defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company had exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees like the
drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their duties and
so it must be considered an obligor in good faith.
The plaintiff Edgardo Cariaga is also not entitled to recover for
attorney's fees, because this case does not fall under any of the
instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
We agree with the trial court and, to the reason given above, we add
those given by this Court in Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc.(101 Phil., 523, 530, 533):
A mere perusal of plaintiff's complaint will show that this action
against the defendant is predicated on an alleged breach of contract of
carriage, i.e., the failure of the defendants to bring him "safely and
without mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that the
chauffeur of defendant's taxicab that plaintiff used when he received
the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even made a party
defendant to this case.
Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action in this case, is he
entitled to compensation for moral damages? Article 2219 of the Civil
Code says the following:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
Of course enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first two
may have any bearing on the case at bar. We find, however, with regard
to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in connection
with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical injuries". The
one that committed the offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira,
and that is why he has been already prosecuted and punished therefor.
Altho (a) owners and managers of an establishment and enterprise are
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions; (b) employers are likewise liable for damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned task (Article 218 of the Civil Code); and (c) employers
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry are subsidiary civilly
liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of
their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not
maintain this action under the provisions of any of the articles of the
codes just mentioned and against all the persons who might be liable
for the damages caused, but as a result of an admitted breach of
contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. We,
therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come within the exception
of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi-delict causing
physical injuries" (Art. 2219, par. 2 of the Civil Code). From the report
of the Code Commission on the new Civil Code. We copy the
following:
A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a
careful deliberation, it was agreed to use the term "quasi-delict" for
those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-
contracts, or criminal offenses. They are known in Spanish legal
treaties as "culpa aquiliana", "culpa-extra-contractual" or "cuasi-
delitos". The phrase "culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation "extra-
contractual-fault" was eliminated because it did not exclude quasi-
contractual or penal obligations. "Aquilian fault" might have been
selected, but it was thought inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as
the "Lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delict" was chosen, which more nearly
corresponds to the Roman Law classification of the obligations and is
in harmony with the nature of this kind of liability.
The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting the word
"tort" from Anglo-American law. But "tort" under that system is much
broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising
from non-contractual negligence. "Tort" in Anglo-American
jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but also intentional
criminal act, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional
and malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code, although certain
exceptions are made in the Project. (Report of the Code Commission,
pp. 161-162).
In the case of Cangco, vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We
established the distinction between obligation derived from negligence
and obligation as a result of a breach of contract. Thus, we said:
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond
for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the
breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise
due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and
immediate, differing essentially in the legal viewpoint from the
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed
by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection of
supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising EX
CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use
the technical form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA
AQUILIANA' and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL.lawphil.net
The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., (82 Phil.,
359; 46 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 2023); Lilius, et al. vs. Manila Railroad,
59 Phil., 758) and others, wherein moral damages were awarded to the
plaintiffs, are not applicable to the case at bar because said decision
were rendered before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (August 30,
1950) and for the further reason that the complaints filed therein were
based on different causes of action.
In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 was awarded as moral
damages by the trial court has to be eliminated, for under the law it is
not a compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar.
What has been said heretofore relative to the moral damages claimed
by Edgardo Cariaga obviously applies with greater force to a similar
claim (4th assignment of error) made by his parents.
The claim made by said spouses for actual and compensatory damages
is likewise without merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the
LTB is concerned, the present action is based upon a breach of contract
of carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and neither can they
premise their claim upon the negligence or quasi-delict of the LTB for
the simple reason that they were not themselves injured as a result of
the collision between the LTB bus and train owned by the Manila
Railroad Company.
Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the appealed judgement is
hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellant LTB.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA
A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. QUINTOS, respondents
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth in said decision
of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote: "At about 1:30 in the
morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned
and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan
and driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for
Manila. Among its paying passengers was the
deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row,
right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was
nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national
highway in barrio Sto. Domingo, municipalityof Minalin, Pampanga,
it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the
end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart
to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus. The
protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of
the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the
face of PolicronioQuintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his
seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye
and the bone of the left side of his face was fractured. He suffered
other multiple wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among
other causes to severe cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca passenger
bus going in the opposite direction towards San Fernando, Pampanga,
reached the scene of the mishap and it was stopped by
Patrolman Felino Bacani of the municipal police force
of Minalin who, in the meantime, had gone to the scene to
investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and
three other injured men who rode on the bullcart aboard the
La Mallorca bus and brought them to the provincial hospital
of Pampanga at San Fernando for medical as-
sistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr.
died at 3:15 p.m. on the same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic
shock due to cerebral injuries.” The private respondents, Trinidad,
Prima and Junta, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and only
surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos, Jr., who died single, leaving no
descendants nor ascendants. Said respondents herein brought this
action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., as owner and
operator of said passenger bus, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan,
for breach of the contract of carriage between said petitioner and the
deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the aggregate sum of
P63,750.00 as damages, including attorney's fees. Said petitioner -
defendant in the court of first instance - contended that the mishap was
due to a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the accident
and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus
driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage
with the deceased. In the language of His Honor, the trial Judge: "The
mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable fortuitous event or
emergency but was the direct result of the negligence of the driver of
the defendant. The defendant must, therefore, respond for damages
resulting from its breach of contract for carriage. As the complaint
alleged a total damage of only P63,750.00 although as elsewhere
shown in this decision the damages for wake and burial expenses, loss
of income, death of the victim, and attorneys fee reach the aggregate
of P79,615.95,this Court finds it just that said damages be assessed at
total of only P63, 750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs' amended
complaint.” The dispositive part of the decision of the trial Court
reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P63,750.00 as damages
for breach of contact of carriage resulting from the death
of Policronio Quintos, Jr.” which, as above indicated, was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari, filed by Villa ReyTransit, Inc. The only issue raised in this
appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents
herein. The determination of such amount depends, mainly upon two
(2) factors, namely: (1) the number of years on the basis of which the
damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by said respondents should be fixed. The first factor was
based by the trial court - the view of which was concurred in by the
Court of Appeals - upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.,
which was placed at 33-1/3 years - he being over 29 years of age (or
around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the time of his demise
- by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-30] = life expectancy) adopted in
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial or
Combined Experience Table of Mortality. Upon the other hand,
petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting said
formula and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro[1] in
which the damages were computed on a four (4) year basis, despite the
fact that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of his death,
and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years.
The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at bar. In
the Alcantara case, none of the parties had questioned the propriety of
the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of
damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards
the amount thereof. The plaintiffs assailed the non-inclusion, in its
computation, of the bonus that the corporation, which was the victim's
employer, had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based
upon the profits earned less than two (2) months before the accident
that resulted in his death. The defendants in turn, objected to the sum
awarded for the fourth year, which was treble that of the previous
years, based upon the increases given, in that fourth year,
to other employees of the same corporation. Neither this objection nor
said claim for inclusion of the bonus was sustained by this
Court. Accordingly, the same had not thereby laid down any rule on
the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. On the
contrary, it declared: "The determination of the indemnity to be
awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed
basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral
and material damages involved, and so it has been said that '(t)here can
be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life
and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy
of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an
important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other factors that are usually
considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S.
1243-1250); (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss of
service (25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-
1255); (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259);
and (6) medical and funeral expenses (25 C.J.S., 1254-1260).” Thus,
life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in
fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Although
it is not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent
reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the
case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In
short, the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of
petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed,
petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that
the damages awarded therein will have to be paid now, whereas most
of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This
argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why
the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the
ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at
bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein
is offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at
bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the
liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of
P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of PolicronioQuintos,
Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in
the Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike
the Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not
consider, in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity
toincrease his future income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of
his training period, he was supposed to have a better job and be
promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not -
considering the growing importance of trade, commerce and industry
and the concomitant rise in the income level of officers and employees
therein - much more. At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We
are mainly concerned with the determination of the losses or damages
sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs
of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount
of his earnings, but of the support they received or would have received
from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of peti-
tioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon
with the "necessary expenses of his own living", which should be
deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that
earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death
by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity
to acquire money, 'less the necessary expense for his own
living."[3] Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not the loss of
the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings
which the beneficiary would have received.[4] In other words, only net
earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered,[5] that is, the total of
the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings
or income[6] and less living and other incidental expenses.
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and
reasonable to fix the deductible living and other expenses of the
deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month,
and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly
estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his
life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be
added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed
and applied by this Court;[8] (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private
respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fees,
which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of
the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and
later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other
words, the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be
reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at
the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of
the decision of the trial court. Thus modified, said decision and that
of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other respects, with
costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 114061 August 3, 1994
KOREAN AIRLINES CO., LTD., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITO C. LAPUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 113842 August 3, 1994
JUANITO C. LAPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES CO.,
LTD., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Sometime in 1980, Juanito C. Lapuz, an automotive electrician, was
contracted for employment in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a period of one
year through Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. Lapuz was
supposed to leave on November 8, 1980, via Korean Airlines. Initially,
he was "wait-listed," which meant that he could only be
accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at
the airport before departure. When two of such passengers did not
appear, Lapuz and another person by the name of Perico were given
the two unclaimed seats.
According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in with one suitcase and
one shoulder bag at the check-in counter of KAL. He passed through
the customs and immigration sections for routine check-up and was
cleared for departure as Passenger No. 157 of KAL Flight No. KE 903.
Together with the other passengers, he rode in the shuttle bus and
proceeded to the ramp of the KAL aircraft for boarding. However,
when he was at the third or fourth rung of the stairs, a KAL officer
pointed to him and shouted "Down! Down!" He was thus barred from
taking the flight. When he later asked for another booking, his ticket
was canceled by KAL. Consequently, he was unable to report for his
work in Saudi Arabia within the stipulated 2-week period and so lost
his employment.
KAL, on the other hand, alleged that on November 8, 1980, Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services Inc. coordinated with KAL for the departure of 30
contract workers, of whom only 21 were confirmed and 9 were wait-
listed passengers. The agent of Pan Pacific, Jimmie Joseph, after being
informed that there was a possibility of having one or two seats
becoming available, gave priority to Perico, who was one of the
supervisors of the hiring company in Saudi Arabia. The other seat was
won through lottery by Lapuz. However, only one seat became
available and so, pursuant to the earlier agreement that Perico was to
be given priority, he alone was allowed to board.
1
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, adjudged
KAL liable for damages, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is
hereby rendered sentencing the defendant Korean Air Lines to pay
plaintiff Juanito C. Lapuz the following:
1. The amount of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SIXTY (P272,160.00) PESOS as
actual/compensatory damages, with legal interest thereon from the
date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
2. The sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as
and for attorney's fees; and
3. The costs of suit.
The case is hereby dismissed with respect to defendant Pan Pacific
Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc.
The counterclaims and cross-claim of defendant Korean Air Lines Co.,
Ltd. are likewise dismissed.
On appeal, this decision was modified by the Court of Appeals 2 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: the amount of
actual damages and compensatory damages is reduced to P60,000.00
and defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant
the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of
moral and exemplary damages, at 6% interest per annum from the date
of the filing of the Complaint until fully paid.
KAL and Lapuz filed their respective motions for reconsideration,
which were both denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petitions
for review which have been consolidated because of the identity of the
parties and the similarity of the issues.
In G. R. No. 114061, KAL assails the decision of the appellate court
on the following grounds:
1. That the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioner
committed a breach of contract of carriage notwithstanding lack of
proper, competent and sufficient evidence of the existence of such
contract.
2. That the Court of Appeals erred in not according the proper
evidentiary weight to some evidence presented and the fact that private
respondent did not have any boarding pass to prove that he was
allowed to board and to prove that his airline ticket was confirmed.
3. That the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the standby
passenger status of private respondent Lapuz was changed to a
confirmed status when his name was entered into the passenger
manifest.
4. That the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in awarding moral
and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 in favor of
private respondent notwithstanding its lack of basis and private
respondent did not state such amount in his complaint nor had private
respondent proven the said damages.
5. That the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the counterclaims.
6. That the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the counterclaim of
petitioner against Pan Pacific.
7. That the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the 6% per annum
legal interest on the judgment shall be computed from the filing of the
complaint.
In G. R. No. 113842, Lapuz seeks: (a) the setting aside of the decision
of the Court of Appeals insofar as it modifies the award of damages;
b) actual and compensatory damages in the sum equivalent to 5 years'
loss of earnings based on the petitioner's monthly salary of 1,600 Saudi
rials at the current conversion rate plus the cost of baggage and
personal belongings worth P2,000 and the service fee of P3,000 paid
to the recruiting agency, all with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; c) moral damages of not less than P1 million
and exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00, both with
interest at 6% per annum from the filing of the complaint; and d)
attorney's fees in the sum equivalent to 30% of the award of damages.
It is evident that the issues raised in these petitions relate mainly to the
correctness of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
award of damages. The Court has consistently affirmed that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the other lower courts are
as a rule binding upon it, subject to certain exceptions. As nothing in
the record indicates any of such exceptions, the factual conclusions of
the appellate court must be affirmed.
The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a
confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the passenger
manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through
immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been
confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed
a breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to
bring Lapuz to his destination.
This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different
in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 3 The business
of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to
avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract
of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. 4 So it is that any
discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
The breach of contract was aggravated in this case when, instead of
courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed" passenger, a
KAL officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him,
thus causing him embarrassment and public humiliation.
KAL argues that "the evidence of confirmation of a chance passenger
status is not through the entry of the name of a chance passenger in the
passenger manifest nor the clearance from the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, because they are merely means of
facilitating the boarding of a chance passenger in case his status is
confirmed." We are not persuaded.
The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in
at the departure counter, passed through customs and immigration,
boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft.
In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be
flown with him to Jeddah. The contract of carriage between him and
KAL had already been perfected when he was summarily and
insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.
KAL's allegation that the respondent court abused its discretion in
awarding moral and exemplary damages is also not tenable.
The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary damages because:
The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has
committed breach of contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton,
disregard of plaintiff-appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis and
justification of an award for moral damages.
xxxx
In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner when it "bumped off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8,
1980, and in addition treated him rudely and arrogantly as a "patay
gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines," which clearly
shows malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to moral
damages.
xxxx
Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages
has been fully established by oral and documentary evidence,
exemplary damages may be awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may
be awarded, even though not so expressly pleaded in the complaint
(Kapoe vs. Masa, 134 SCRA 231). By the same token, to provide an
example for the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also
proper (Armovit vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
On the other hand, Lapuz's claim that the award of P100,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages is inadequate is not acceptable either.
His prayer for moral damages of not less than P1 million and
exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00 is overblown.
The well-entrenched principle is that moral damages depend upon the
discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. 5 This
discretion is limited by the principle that the "amount awarded should
not be palpably and scandalously excessive" as to indicate that it was
the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial
court. 6 Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to alleviate the moral
suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. 7 There is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.
A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by
Lapuz is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5
million. The assessment of P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages
in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.
Lapuz likewise claims that the respondent court could not rule upon
the propriety of the award of actual damages because it had not been
assigned as an error by KAL. Not so. The rule is that only errors
specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief will be
considered except errors affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter
and plain as well as clerical errors. 8 But this is not without
qualification for, as the Court held in Vda. de Javellana vs. Court of
Appeals: 9
. . . [T]he Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.
A similar pronouncement was made in Baquiran vs. Court of
Appeals 10 in this wise:
Issues, though not specifically raised in the pleading in the appellate
court, may, in the interest of justice, be properly considered by said
court in deciding a case, if they are questions raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
which the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignored.
The Court of Appeals was therefore justified in decreasing the award
of actual damages even if the issue was not assigned as an error by
KAL. Consideration of this question was necessary for the just and
complete resolution of the present case. Furthermore, there was
enough evidence to warrant the reduction of the original award, as the
challenged decision correctly observed:
A perusal of the plaintiff-appellant's contract of employment shows
that the effectivity of the contract is for only one year, renewable every
year for five years. Although plaintiff-appellant intends to renew his
contract, such renewal will still be subject to his foreign employer.
Plaintiff-appellant had not yet started working with his foreign
employer, hence, there can be no basis as to whether his contract will
be renewed by his foreign employer or not. Thus, the damages
representing the loss of earnings of plaintiff-appellant in the renewal
of the contract of employment is at most speculative. Damages may
not be awarded on the basis of speculation or conjecture (Gachalian
vs. Delim, 203 SCRA 126). Hence, defendant-appellant's liability is
limited to the one year contract only. Plaintiff-appellant is, therefore,
entitled only to his lost earnings for one year, i.e., P60,000.00, which
is 1/5 of P300,000.00, the total amount of actual damages, representing
lost earnings for five years prayed for in the Complaint.
Plaintiff-appellant's contention that in computing his lost earnings, the
current rate of the Saudi Rial to the Philippine Peso at the time of
payment should be used, is untenable, considering that in his
Complaint, plaintiff-appellant has quantified in Philippine Peso his lost
earnings for five years.
We disagree with the respondent court, however, on the date when the
legal interest should commence to run. The rule is that the legal interest
of six percent (6%) on the amounts adjudged in favor of Lapuz should
resume from the time of the rendition of the trial court's decision
instead of November 28, 1980, the date of the filing of the complaint.
On this matter, the Court has held:
If suit were for payment of a definite sum of money, the contention
might be tenable. However, if it is for damages, unliquidated and not
known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the
courts after proof, interest should be from the date of the decision. The
obligation to pay interest on a sum filed in a judgment exists from the
date of the sentence, when so declared; for until the net amount of the
debtor's liability has been determined, he cannot he considered
delinquent in the fulfillment of his obligation to pay the debt with
interest thereon. 12
Finally, we find that the respondent court did not err in sustaining the
trial court's dismissal of KAL's counterclaim against Pan Pacific
Overseas Recruiting Services Inc., whose responsibility ended with the
confirmation by KAL of Lapuz as its passenger in its Flight No. 903.
This is still another case of the maltreatment of our overseas contract
workers, this time by the airline supposed to bring the passenger to his
foreign assignment. Our OCW's sacrifice much in seeking
employment abroad, where they are deprived of the company of their
loved ones, the direct protection of our laws, and the comfort of our
own native culture and way of life. This Court shall exert every effort
to vindicate their rights when they are abused and shall accord them
the commensurate reparation of their injuries consistent with their
dignity and worth as members of the working class.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED, but with the
modification that the legal interest on the damages awarded to private
respondent should commence from the date of the decision of the trial
court on November 14, 1990. The parties shall bear their own costs.
SO ORDERED.
Common Carriers; Breach of Contract; The contract of air carriage
generates a relation attended with a public duty and any discourteous
conduct on the part of the carrier’s employees toward a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.—This Court
has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. The business of the carrier
is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves
of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the
right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on
the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier. The breach of contract was
aggravated in this case when, instead of courteously informing Lapuz
of his being a “wait-listed” passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted
“Down! Down!” while pointing at him, thus causing him
embarrassment and public humiliation.
Same; Same; Damages; Damages are not intended to enrich the
complainant at the expense of the defendant and there is no hard-and-
fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.—
The well-entrenched principle is that moral damages depend upon the
discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. This
discretion is limited by the principle that the “amount awarded should
not be palpably and scandalously excessive” as to indicate that it was
the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of
the defendant. They are awarded only to alleviate the moral suffering
that the injured party had undergone by reason of the defendant’s
culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar facts.
Damages; Interests; Legal interest of six percent (6%) on the amount
of damages adjudged in favor of a litigant should commence from the
time of the rendition of the trial court’s decision instead of the date of
the filing of the complaint.—We disagree with the respondent court,
however, on the date when the legal interest should commence to run.
The rule is that the legal interest of six percent (6%) on the amounts
adjudged in favor of Lapuz should resume from the time of the
rendition of the trial court’s decision instead of November 28, 1980,
the date of the filing of the complaint. On this matter, the Court has
held: If suit were for payment of a definite sum of money, the
contention might be tenable. However, if it is for damages,
unliquidated and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and
determined by the courts after proof, interest should be from the date
of the decision. x x x The obligation to pay interest on a sum filed in a
judgment exists from the date of the sentence, when so declared; for
until the net amount of the debtor’s liability has been determined, he
cannot be considered delinquent in the fulfillment of his obligation to
pay the debt with interest thereon.