G.R. No.

199595 April 2, 2014

PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC.,
Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
issuance of an order commanding the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Court Sheriff of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218, to cease and desist from
implementing the Court Resolutions dated July 21, 20102 and September 15, 20103 in G.R. No.
190193 denying with finality Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc.'s
(PWCTUI) petition for review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision4 dated November 6, 2009
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90763 which affirmed the Decision5 dated January 24, 2008 of the RTC in
LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No.
20970 T-22702 and issue in lieu thereof a new title in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and
3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. free from all liens and encumbrances.

SO ORDERED.6

PWCTUI also prays, as ancillary remedy, for the re-opening of LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and
as provisional remedy, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.

The Antecedents

On May 19, 2004, respondent Teodoro R. Yangco (2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs) Foundation,
Inc. (TRY Foundation) filed before the RTC of Quezon City, acting as a Land Registration
Court, a Petition for the Issuance of New Title in Lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
20970 T-22702 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City docketed as LRC Case No.
Q-18126(04).7

TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation heirs and successors-
in-interest to the first generation testamentary heirs of the late philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco
(Yangco) who donated on May 19, 1934 a 14,073-square meter parcel of land (subject property)
located at 21 Boni Serrano Avenue, Quezon City in the following manner,8 viz:

a) the property shall be used as a site for an institution to be known as the Abierrtas
House of Friendship the purpose of which shall be to provide a Home for needy and
unfortunate women and girls, including children of both sexes and promote, foster all
efforts, work and activities looking toward their protection from the ravages of all forms
of immoralities;

b) Should the property herein be used for any other purpose or purposes not herein
specified, the present gift shall become ipso facto null and void and property given shall
automatically revert to the donor, his heirs and assigns, but any improvement or
improvements placed, constructed and/or maintained on said premises by the Donee,
shall remain the property of said Donee to be by it removed there[f]rom (sic) at its
expense after reasonable notice from the donor, his heirs and assigns.9
The property was registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT No. 20970 at the back of
which the above-quoted conditions of the donation were annotated. PWCTUI is a non-stock,
non-profit corporation originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
in 1929 under SEC Registration No. PW-959.10

PWCTUI’s corporate term expired in September 1979.11 Five years thereafter, using the same
corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration No. 12208812 and forthwith applied for
the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the subject property thru
LRC Case No. 22702. The application was granted and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT No.
20970 T-2270213 which, however, bore only the first condition imposed on the donation.

Recounting the foregoing episodes, TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUI’s
corporate term in 1979 effectively rescinded the donation pursuant to the "unwritten resolutory
condition" deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code14 prescribing that the Corporation
Code, specifically Section 12215 thereof, be read into the donation. Interestingly the latter
provision mandates dissolved corporation to wind up their affairs and dispose of their assets
within three years from the expiration of their term. Being comprised of the heirs of the donor,
TRY Foundation claimed that it is entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in their name
pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.16 TRY Foundation prayed for
the issuance of a new title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-
22702.

PWCTUI opposed the petition arguing that: (1) TRY Foundation has no legal personality to
bring the action because the donation has never been revoked and any right to demand for its
revocation already prescribed; (2) although PCWTUI’s corporate term was not extended upon its
expiration in 1979, it nonetheless registered anew and continued the operations, affairs and social
work of the corporation; it also continued to possess the property and exercised rights of
ownership over it; (3) only the appropriate government agency and not TRY Foundation or any
other private individual can challenge the corporate life and existence of PCWTUI; (4) TRY
Foundation and its counsel are guilty of forum shopping because they have already questioned
PWCTUI’s corporate personality in a different forum but failed to obtain a favorable relief; (5)
TRY Foundation is guilty of fraud for failing to include PWCTUI as an indispensable party and
to furnish it with a copy of the petition; and (6) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition
because PWCTUI is unaware of its publication.17

In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the RTC denied the Opposition18 of PWCTUI. According
to the trial court, when the corporate life of PWCTUI expired in 1979, the property ceased to be
used for the purpose for which it was intended, hence, it automatically reverted to Yangco. As
such, TRY Foundation, being composed of his heirs, is considered "other person in interest"
under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 with a right to file a petition for the issuance of title over the
property.

Hearings were thereafter held for the reception of evidence of TRY Foundation. On January 24,
2008, the RTC rendered its Decision19 sustaining TRY Foundation’s petition.

The RTC ruled that PWCTUI, with SEC Registration No. PW-959 in whose name the property
was registered is separate and distinct from oppositor PWCTUI with SEC Registration No.
122088. The legal personality of PWCTUI (PW-959) ipso facto ended when its registration
expired in September 1979. The new PWCTUI (122088) has its own personality separate and
distinct from PWCTUI (PW-959) hence the latter is not the donee and thus has no claim to the
property. As such, the reversion clause in the donation came about and the property must revert
to the donor or his heirs, thus:

It is clear that Don Teodoro R. Yangco is the primary reversion owner of the property. He is
succeeded as reversion owner by the first generation heirs or those testamentary heirs named in
his Last Will and Testament which will was admitted to probate by the Supreme Court in the
abovecited case. The second generation heirs are the nieces and nephews of Don Teodoro R.
Yangco and the sons/daughters of the "strangers" named in the will. The second generation heirs
succeeded the first generation/testamentary heirs in their own right. x x x.20 (Citations omitted)

The RTC granted TRY Foundation’s petition by ordering the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT
No. 20970 T-22702 and the issuance of a new title in the name of TRY Foundation.21

PWCTUI appealed to the CA, arguing, among others, that it must be determined whether the
condition imposed in the donation has already occurred or deemed fulfilled. The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 90763. In its Decision22 dated November 6, 2009, the CA
affirmed the RTC’s findings. The CA added that the subsequent re-registration of PWCTUI
(122088) did not revive or continue the corporate existence of PWCTUI (PW-959). Hence,
PWCTUI (122088) is not the real donee contemplated in the donation made by Yangco and as
such any issue on revocation of donation is improper. The CA Decision disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against [PWCTUI].

SO ORDERED.23

PWCTUI sought recourse with the Court thru a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 190193. In a Resolution24 dated July 21, 2010, we denied the petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision. PWCTUI moved for
reconsideration but its motion was denied with finality in another Resolution25 dated September
15, 2010. An entry of judgment was thereafter issued stating that the Court Resolution dated July
21, 2010 became final and executory on October 20, 2010.26

On December 23, 2011, PWCTUI filed the herein petition captioned as one for "Prohibition &
Certiorari and to Re-Open the Case with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) &/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction."27 PWCTUI prayed for the following reliefs:

a.) a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued preventing and/or enjoining
public respondents, Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Sheriff of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 218 from executing the RTC Decision dated January 24, 2008;

b.) to make the injunction permanent by annulling and setting aside all orders, decisions,
resolutions and proceedings issued and taken in relation to LRC Case No. Q-18126(04)
before the trial and appellate courts for having been promulgated in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion; and

c.) LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) be re-opened, re-considered and re-studied in the interest
of true and fair justice.

In support of its pleas, PWCTUI submitted the following arguments:

a. based on the deed of donation, the expiration of PWCTUI’s corporate term is not stated
as a ground for the nullification of the donation and the operation of the reversion clause;

b. the commercial leasing of portions of the donated land did not violate the condition in
the donation because the lease contract with Jelby Acres was pursued for the generation
of funds in order for PWCTUI to carry on the charitable purposes of the Abiertas House
of Friendship;

c. TRY Foundation has no legal standing or cause of action to claim the land because its
members are not the true heirs of Yangco who died single and without descendants. His
only relatives are his half-siblings who are the legitimate children of his mother, Doña
Ramona Arguelles Corpus and her first husband Tomas Corpus, hence, no right of
inheritance ab intestato can take place between them pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil
 Code; and d. Even assuming that TRY Foundation has a cause of action for the
revocation of the donation, the same has already prescribed because more than 40 years
has lapsed from the date the donation was made in May 19, 1934.

The Court’s Ruling

On its face, it is immediately apparent that the petition merits outright dismissal in view of the
doctrine of immutability attached to the Court’s final and executory Resolutions dated July 21,
2010 and September 15, 2010 in G.R. No. 190193.

The doctrine postulates that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it is made by the court that rendered
it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be
struck down.28

A long and intent study, however, of the arguments raised in the present recourse vis-à-vis the
proceedings taken in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) disclose that it is necessary, obligatory even,
for the Court to accord affirmative consideration to the supplications tendered by PWCTUI in the
petition at bar.

While firmly ingrained as a basic procedural tenet in Philippine jurisprudence, immutability of

final judgments was never meant to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial
circumstances. The doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness and substantial justice.

Hence, it’s application admits the following exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments;
and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.29

Here, the third exception is attendant. The nullity of the RTC judgment and all subsequent
rulings affirming the same, render inoperative the doctrine of immutability of judgment, and
consequently justify the propriety of giving due course to the present petition.

To expound, the RTC judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and all proceedings taken in
relation thereto were void because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the fundamental
subject matter of TRY Foundation’s petition for the issuance of a title which was in reality, a
complaint for revocation of donation, an ordinary civil action outside the ambit of Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529.

The petition filed by TRY

Foundation was a disguised
complaint for revocation of
donation.

It has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is
determined by the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the
light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.30 Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues
or questions that is the subject of the controversy.31

The petition is premised on allegations that the deed of donation from whence PWCTUI derived
its title was automatically revoked when the latter’s original corporate term expired in 1979.
Consequently, reversion took effect in favor of the donor and/or his heirs. As relief, TRY
Foundation sought the cancellation of TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and the issuance of a new title in
its name, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed of the Hon. Court that after
due hearing, the Hon. Court render judgment:

Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and issue in
lieu thereof a new title in the name of TRY Heirs (2nd and 3rd Generation) Heirs Foundation,
Inc. free from all liens and encumbrances.32

The above contentions and plea betray the caption of the petition. Observably, TRY Foundation
is actually seeking to recover the possession and ownership of the subject property from
PWCTUI and not merely the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702. The propriety
of pronouncing TRY Foundation as the absolute owner of the subject property rests on the
resolution of whether or not the donation made to PWCTUI has been effectively revoked when
its corporate term expired in 1979. Stated otherwise, no judgment proclaiming TRY Foundation
as the absolute owner of the property can be arrived at without declaring the deed of donation
revoked.

The Court made a similar observation in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (now P.D. Monfort North),
Municipality of Dumangas,33 the facts of which bear resemblance to the facts at hand. In Dolar,
the petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages
involving a land he had earlier donated to the respondent. The petitioner claimed that the
donation had ceased to be effective when the respondent failed to comply with the conditions of
the donation. As relief, the petitioner prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of the
property. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the petitioner’s cause
of action for revocation has already prescribed and as such, its claim for quieting of title is
ineffective notwithstanding that the latter cause of action is imprescriptible. In sustaining such
dismissal, the Court remarked:

As aptly observed by the trial court, the petitory portion of petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case
No. 98-033 seeks for a judgment declaring him the absolute owner of the donated property, a
plea which necessarily includes the revocation of the deed of donation in question. Verily, a
declaration of petitioner’s absolute ownership appears legally possible only when the deed of
donation is contextually declared peremptorily revoked.

xxxx

It cannot be overemphasized that respondent barangay traces its claim of ownership over the
disputed property to a valid contract of donation which is yet to be effectively revoked. Such
rightful claim does not constitute a cloud on the supposed title of petitioner over the same
property removable by an action to quiet title. Withal, the remedy afforded in Article 476 of the
Civil Code is unavailing until the donation shall have first been revoked in due course under
Article 764 or Article 1144 of the Code.34

An action which seeks the recovery

of property is outside the ambit of
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

Whether the donation merits revocation and consequently effect reversion of the donated
property to the donor and/or his heirs cannot be settled by filing a mere petition for cancellation
of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 which reads:

Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. – No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall
be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum
thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper
Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having interest in the registered
property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of
Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interest
of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate,
have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or
been created; or that an omission or an error was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate: or that the same or any person in the
certificate has been changed or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married,
that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not yet
convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground;
and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum
upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security
and bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not
be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that
nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a
purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns without his or
their written consent. Where the owner’s duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition
may be filed as provided in the preceding section.

All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any other provision of this decree after
original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered.

A parallel issue was encountered by the Court in Paz v. Republic of the Philippines,35 which
involved a petition for the cancellation of title brought under the auspices of Section 108 of P.D.
No. 1529. The petition sought the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 684 issued thru
LRC Case No. 00-059 in favor of the Republic, Filinvest Development Corporation and Filinvest
Alabang, Inc., and the issuance of a new title in the name of the petitioner therein. The petition
was dismissed by the RTC.

The dismissal was affirmed by the CA and eventually by this Court on the following reasons:

We agree with both the CA and the RTC that the petitioner was in reality seeking the
reconveyance of the property covered by OCT No. 684, not the cancellation of a certificate of
title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, his petition did not fall under any
of the situations covered by Section 108, and was for that reason rightly dismissed.

Moreover, the filing of the petition would have the effect of reopening the decree of registration,
and could thereby impair the rights of innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. To reopen
the decree of registration was no longer permissible, considering that the one-year period to do
so had long ago lapsed, and the properties covered by OCT No. 684 had already been subdivided
into smaller lots whose ownership had passed to third persons. x x x.

xxxx

Nor is it subject to dispute that the petition was not a mere continuation of a previous registration
proceeding. Shorn of the thin disguise the petitioner gave to it, the petition was exposed as a
distinct and independent action to seek the reconveyance of realty and to recover damages.
Accordingly, he should perform jurisdictional acts, like paying the correct amount of docket fees
for the filing of an initiatory pleading, causing the service of summons on the adverse parties in
order to vest personal jurisdiction over them in the trial court, and attaching a certification
against forum shopping (as required for all initiatory pleadings). He ought to know that his
taking such required acts for granted was immediately fatal to his petition, warranting the
granting of the respondents’ motion to dismiss.36

By analogy, the above pronouncements may be applied to the controversy at bar considering that
TRY Foundation’s exposed action for revocation of the donation necessarily includes a claim for
the recovery of the subject property.
The circumstances upon which the ruling in Paz was premised are attendant in the present case.
The petition of TRY Foundation had the effect of reopening the decree of registration in the
earlier LRC Case No. 20970 which granted PWCTUI’s application for the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970. As such, it breached the caveat in Section 108 that
"this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree
of registration." The petition of TRY Foundation also violated that portion in Section 108 stating
that "all petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any other provision of this decree
after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered." The petition of TRY Foundation in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) was
clearly not a mere continuation of LRC Case No. 20970.

Further, the petition filed by TRY Foundation is not within the province of Section 108 because
the relief thereunder can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is
no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.37 Records show that in
its opposition to the petition, PWCTUI maintained that it "remains and continues to be the true
and sole owner in fee simple of the property" and that TRY Foundation "has no iota of right"
thereto.38

More so, the enumerated instances for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title under
Section 108 are non-controversial in nature. They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial
as not to be genuine issues. The proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating
insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial issues.39
Undoubtedly, revocation of donation entails litigious and controversial matters especially in this
case where the condition supposedly violated by PWCTUI is not expressly stated in the deed of
donation. Thus, it is imperative to conduct an exhaustive examination of the factual and legal
bases of the parties’ respective positions for a complete determination of the donor’s desires.
Certainly, such objective cannot be accomplished by the court through the abbreviated
proceedings of Section 108.

In fact, even if it were specifically imposed as a ground for the revocation of the donation that
will set off the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor and/or his heirs, court
intervention is still indispensable.

As ruled in Vda. de Delgado v. CA,40 "[a]lthough automatic reversion immediately happens

upon a violation of the condition and therefore no judicial action is necessary for such purpose,
still judicial intervention must be sought by the aggrieved party if only for the purpose of
determining the propriety of the rescission made."41 In addition, where the donee denies the
rescission of the donation or challenges the propriety thereof, only the final award of the court
can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not.42 Here, PWCTUI unmistakably
refuted the allegation that the expiration of its corporate term in 1979 rescinded the donation.

Lastly, the issues embroiled in revocation of donation are litigable in an ordinary civil
proceeding which demands stricter jurisdictional requirements than that imposed in a land
registration case.

Foremost of which is the requirement on the service of summons for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. Without a valid service of summons, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it.
Service of summons is a guarantee of one’s right to due process in that he is properly apprised of
a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit.43

In contrast, jurisdiction in a land registration cases being a proceeding in rem, is acquired by

constructive seizure of the land through publication, mailing and posting of the notice of
hearing.44 Persons named in the application are not summoned but merely notified of the date of
initial hearing on the petition.45
The payment of docket fees is another jurisdictional requirement for an action for revocation
which was absent in the suit filed by TRY Foundation. On the other hand, Section 111 of P.D.
No. 1529 merely requires the payment of filing fees and not docket fees.

Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of
supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man
hours used in handling of each case. Docket fees, on the other hand, vest the trial court
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of action.46

The absence of the above jurisdictional requirements for ordinary civil actions thus prevented the
RTC, acting as a land registration court, from acquiring the power to hear and decide the
underlying issue of revocation of donation in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04). Any determination
made involving such issue had no force and effect; it cannot also bind PWCTUI over whom the
RTC acquired no jurisdiction for lack of service of summons.

"Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for
hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties."47

Conclusion

All told, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the actual subject
matter contained in TRY Foundation’s petition for issuance of a new title. TRY Foundation
cannot use the summary proceedings in Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to rescind a contract of
donation as such action should be threshed out in ordinary civil proceedings. In the same vein,
the RTC had no jurisdiction to declare the donation annulled and as a result thereof, order the
register of deeds to cancel PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and issue a new one in favor of
TRY Foundation.

The RTC, acting as a land registration court, should have dismissed the land registration case or
re-docketed the same as an ordinary civil action and thereafter ordered compliance with stricter
jurisdictional requirements. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for revocation of
donation disguised as a land registration case, the judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) is
null and void. Being void, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. It
can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.48 It may even be
considered as a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.49

Resultantly, the appellate proceedings relative to LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and all issuances
made in connection with such review are likewise of no force and effect. A void judgment
cannot perpetuate even if affirmed on appeal by the highest court of the land. All acts pursuant to
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.50

The Court Resolutions dated July

21, 2010 and September 15, 2010 do
not bar the present ruling.

It is worth emphasizing that despite PWCTUI’s incessant averment of the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction over TRY Foundation’s petition, the trial court shelved the issue, took cognizance of
matters beyond those enveloped under Section 108 and sorted out, in abridged proceedings,
complex factual issues otherwise determinable in a full-blown trial appropriate for an ordinary
civil action.

PWCTUI no longer raised the jurisdiction issue before the CA and limited its appeal to the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC on its corporate existence and capacity as the
subject property’s uninterrupted owner. The matter reached the Court thru a petition for review
under Rule 45, but with the question of jurisdiction absent in the appellate pleadings, the Court
was constrained to review only mistakes of judgment.

While PWCTUI could have still challenged the RTC’s jurisdiction even on appeal, its failure to
do so cannot work to its disadvantage. The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel; no laches will even attach to a judgment rendered without jurisdiction.51

Hence, since the Court Resolutions dated July 21, 2010 and September 15, 2010 in G.R. No.
190193 disposed the case only insofar as the factual and legal questions brought before the CA
were concerned, they cannot operate as a procedural impediment to the present ruling which
deals with mistake of jurisdiction.1âwphi1

This is not to say, however, that a certiorari before the Court is a remedy against its own final
and executory judgment. As made known in certain cases, the Court is invested with the power
to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to
promulgate the same.52 Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla53 discussed the rationale for this tenet,
viz:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.54 (Citation omitted and italics supplied)

Here, the grave error in jurisdiction permeating the proceedings taken in LRC Case No. Q-
18126(04) deprived PWCTUI of its property without the very foundation of judicial proceedings
– due process. Certainly, the Court cannot let this mistake pass without de rigueur rectification
by suspending the rules of procedure and permitting the present recourse to access auxiliary
review.

If the Court, as the head and guardian of the judicial branch, must continuously merit the force of
public trust and confidence — which ultimately is the real source of its sovereign power — and
if it must decisively discharge its sacred duty as the last sanctuary of the oppressed and the weak,
it must, in appropriate cases, pro-actively provide weary litigants with immediate legal and
equitable relief, free from the delays and legalistic contortions that oftentimes result from
applying purely formal and procedural approaches to judicial dispensations.55

WHEREFORE, all things studiedly viewed in the correct perspective, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. All proceedings taken, decisions, resolutions, orders and other issuances made in
LRC Case No. Q-18126(04), CA-G.R. CV No. 90763 and G.R. No. 190193 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL any Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs
Foundation, Inc. as a consequence of the execution of the disposition in LRC Case No. Q-
18126(04), and to REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20970 T-22702 in the name of
Philippine Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, Inc.

SO ORDERED.
Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-30.

2 Id. at 32.

3 Id. at 33.

4 Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with Associate Justices Rosalinda

Asuncion-Vicente and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring; id. at 134-143.

5 Issued by Judge Hilario L. Laqui; id. at 103-114.

6 Id. at 114.

7 Id. at 81-85.

8 Id. at 103-104.

9 Id. at 82.

10 Id. at 34-38.

11 Id. at 87.

12 Id. at 51-60.

13 Id. at 61-66.

14 Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.

15 Sec. 122. Corporate liquidation. – Every corporation whose charter expires by its own
limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other
purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body
corporate for three (3) years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the
purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and
close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not
for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established.

At any time during said three (3) years, the corporation is authorized and
empowered to convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of stockholders,
members, creditors, and other persons in interest. From and after any such
conveyance by the corporation of its property in trust for the benefit of its
stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all interest which the
corporation had in the property terminates, the legal interest vests in the trustees,
and the beneficial interest in the stockholders, members, creditors or other persons
in interest.

Upon the winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable to any
creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot be found shall be
escheated to the city or municipality where such assets are located.
 Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by this Code, no
corporation shall distribute any of its assets or property except upon lawful
dissolution and after payment of all its debts and liabilities.

16 Otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.

17 Rollo, pp. 88-91.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 103-114.

20 Id. at 113.

21 Id. at 114.

22 Id. at 134-143.

23 Id. at 142.

24 Id. at 32.

25 Id. at 33.

26 Id. at 144.

27 Id. at 3-30.

28 FGU Insurance Corporation v. RTC of Makati City, Branch 66, G.R. No. 161282,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50, 56.

29 Id.

30 Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12,
2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400.

31 Figueroa v. People, 580 Phil. 58, 78 (2008), citing Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and
Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 475 SCRA 743, 756.

32 Rollo, p. 84.

33 G.R. No. 152663, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 458.

34 Id. at 471-472.

35 G.R. No. 157367, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 74.

36 Id. at 81-82.

37 Hilaria Bagayas v. Rogelio Bagayas, Felicidad Bagayas, Rosalina Bagayas, Michael

Bagayas and Mariel Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013.

38 Rollo, p. 88.

39 Quevada v. Glorioso, 356 Phil. 105, 118 (1998). The provision referred to in the case
is Section 112 of Land Registration Act, the previous version of Section 108 before P.D.
No. 1529 took effect.
40 416 Phil. 263 (2001).

41 Id. at 273.

42 Supra note 33, at 470.

43 Manotoc v. CA, 530 Phil. 454, 467-468 (2006).

44 Republic of the Phils. v. Herbieto, 498 Phil. 227, 239 (2005).

45 P.D. No. 1529, Section 23.

46 Dela Paz v. CA, 385 Phil. 441, 446 (2000).

47 Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No. 179488,
April 23, 2012, 670 SCRA 343, 355.

48 Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan, G.R. No. 182185, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 739, 746.

49 Leonor v. CA, 326 Phil. 74, 88 (1996).

50 Supra note 48.

51 Figueroa v. People, supra note 31, at 71.

52 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(5):

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.

53 500 Phil. 303 (2005).

54 Id. at 311.

55 Leonor v. CA, supra note 49, at 82.

J. CASIM CONSTRUCTION G.R. No. 168655
SUPPLIES, INC.,

Petitioner,

Present:
-versus-

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF LAS
PIAS, PERALTA,

Respondent. ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF BRUNEO Promulgated:

F. CASIM,

(Purported) Intervenor.
July 2, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, taken
directly on a pure question of law from the April 14, 2005 Resolution1[1] and June

1[1] Rollo, pp. 31-33A.

24, 2005 Order2[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City,
Branch 253 in Civil Case No. LP-04-00713[3] one for cancellation of notice of
lis pendens. The assailed Resolution dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition
filed by J. Casim Construction Supplies Inc. for cancellation of notice of lis
pendens annotated on its certificate of title, whereas the assailed Order denied
reconsideration.

The facts follow.

Petitioner, represented herein by Rogelio C. Casim, is a duly organized

domestic corporation4[4] in whose name Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
49936,5[5] covering a 10,715-square meter land was registered. Sometime in 1982,
petitioner acquired the covered property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale6[6]
and as a result the mother title, TCT No. 30459 was cancelled and TCT No. 49936
was issued in its stead.7[7]

On March 22, 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch
253 an original petition for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as
of all the other entries of involuntary encumbrances annotated on the original copy
of TCT No. 49936. Invoking the inherent power of the trial court to grant relief
according to the petition, petitioner prayed that the notice of lis pendens as well as

2[2] Presided by Judge Elizabeth Yu-Garay; id. at 34.

3[3] The case was entitled, In the Matter of Cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens and
Other Entries in TCT No. 49936.

4[4] Rollo, p. 54.

5[5] Id. at 55.

6[6] Id. at 78-80.

7[7] Id. at 85.

all the other annotations on the said title be cancelled. Petitioner claimed that its
owners duplicate copy of the TCT was clean at the time of its delivery and that it
was surprised to learn later on that the original copy of its TCT, on file with the
Register of Deeds, contained several entries which all signified that the covered
property had been subjected to various claims. The subject notice of lis pendens is
one of such entries.8[8] The notations appearing on the titles memorandum of
encumbrances are as follows:

Entry No. 81-8334/T-30459 ADVERSE CLAIM In an affidavit duly subscribed

and sworn to, BRUNO F. CASIM claims, among other things, that he has the
right and interest over the property described herein in accordance with Doc. No.
336; Page No. 69; Book No. 1; s. of 1981 of Not. Pub. of Makati, M.M., Romarie
G. Villonco, dated August 4, 1981.
Date of inscription Aug. 5, 1981 2:55 p.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds

Entry No. 82-4676/T-49936 CANCELLATION OF ADVERSE CLAIM inscribed

hereon under Entry No. 81-8334/T-30459 in accordance with Doc. No. 247; Page
50; Book No. CXLI; s. of 1982 of Not. Pub. of Pasay City, M.M., Julian G.
Tubig, dated April 21, 1982.
Date of inscription April 21, 1982 8:40 a.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds

Entry No. 82-4678/T-49936 AFFIDAVIT In accordance with the affidavit duly

executed by the herein registered owners, this title is hereby cancelled and in lieu
thereof TCT No. 49936/T-228 has been issued in accordance with Doc. No. 249;
Page No. 80; Book No. CXLI; s. of 1982 of Not. Pub. of Pasay City, M.M., Julian
G. Tubig, dated April 21, 1982.
Date of inscription April 21, 1982 8:44 a.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds

Entry No. 81-12423/T-30459 NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS: By virtue of the

notice of Lis Pendens presented and filed by CESAR P. MANALAYSAY,
counsel for the plaintiff, notice is hereby given that a petition for review has been
commenced and now pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXIX, Pasay, M.M, in Civil Case No. LP-9438-P, BRUNEO F. CASIM,
Plaintiff, vs. SPS. JESUS A. CASIM & MARGARITA CHAVEZ and Sps.
Urbano Nobleza and Cristita J. Nobleza, and Filomena C. Antonio, Defendants,
involving the property described herein.
Date of the instrument - Sept. 17, 1981
Date of the inscription - Sept. 18, 1981 - 3:55 p.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds9[9]

8[8] Id. at 38, 43-45.

9[9] Id. at 86.

 To justify the cancellation, petitioner alleged that the notice of lis pendens,
in particular, was a forgery judging from the inconsistencies in the inscribers
signature as well as from the fact that the notice was entered non-chronologically,
that is, the date thereof is much earlier than that of the preceding entry. In this
regard, it noted the lack of any transaction record on file with the Register of
Deeds that would support the notice of lis pendens annotation.10[10]

Petitioner also stated that while Section 59 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 requires the carry-over of subsisting encumbrances in the new issuances of
TCTs, petitioners duplicate copy of the title did not contain any such carry-over,
which means that it was an innocent purchaser for value, especially since it was
never a party to the civil case referred to in the notice of lis pendens. Lastly, it
alludes to the indefeasibility of its title despite the fact that the mother title, TCT
No. 30459, might have suffered from certain defects and constraints.11[11]

The Intestate Estate of Bruneo F. Casim, representing Bruneo F. Casim,

intervened in the instant case and filed a Comment/Opposition12[12] in which it
maintained that the RTC of Las Pias did not have jurisdiction over the present
action, because the matter of canceling a notice of lis pendens lies within the
jurisdiction of the court before which the main action referred to in the notice is
pending. In this regard, it emphasized that the case referred to in the said notice
had already attained finality as the Supreme Court had issued an entry of judgment
therein and that the RTC of Makati City had ordered execution in that case.13[13]
It cited the lack of legal basis for the petition in that nothing in the allegations hints

10[10] Id. at 40-43.

11[11] Id. at 43-49.

12[12] Id. at 191-210.

13[13] Id. at 192-193, 195-196.

at any of the legal grounds for the cancellation of notice of lis pendens.14[14] And,
as opposed to petitioners claim that there was no carry-over of encumbrances made
in TCT No. 49936 from the mother title TCT No. 30459, the latter would show
that it also had the same inscriptions as those found in TCT No. 49936 only that
they were entered in the original copy on file with the Register of Deeds. Also, as
per Certification15[15] issued by the Register of Deeds, petitioners claim of lack of
transaction record could not stand, because the said certification stated merely that
the corresponding transaction record could no longer be retrieved and might,
therefore, be considered as either lost or destroyed.

On April 14, 2005, the trial court, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over
the action, resolved to dismiss the petition and declared that the action must have
been filed before the same court and in the same action in relation to which the
annotation of the notice of lis pendens had been sought. Anent the allegation that
the entries in the TCT were forged, the trial court pointed out that not only did
petitioner resort to the wrong forum to determine the existence of forgery, but also
that forgery could not be presumed merely from the alleged non-chronological
entries in the TCT but instead must be positively proved. In this connection, the
trial court noted petitioners failure to name exactly who had committed the forgery,
as well as the lack of evidence on which the allegation could be based.16[16] The
petition was disposed of as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.17[17]

14[14] Id. at 194.

15[15] Id. at 75.

16[16] Id. at 33-33A.

17[17] Id. at 33A.

 Petitioner moved for reconsideration,18[18] but it was denied in the trial
courts June 24, 2005 Order.19[19]

Now, raising the purely legal question of whether the RTC of Las Pias City,
Branch 253 has jurisdiction in an original action to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the subject title as an incident in a previous case, petitioner, in this
present petition, ascribes error to the trial court in dismissing its petition for
cancellation. An action for cancellation of notice of lis pendens, petitioner
believes, is not always ancillary to an existing main action because a trial court has
the inherent power to cause such cancellation, especially in this case that petitioner
was never a party to the litigation to which the notice of lis pendens relates.20[20]
Petitioner further posits that the trial court has committed an error in declining to
rule on the allegation of forgery, especially since there is no transaction record on
file with the Register of Deeds relative to said entries. It likewise points out that
granting the notice of lis pendens has been properly annotated on the title, the fact
that its owners duplicate title is clean suggests that it was never a party to the civil
case referred to in the notice.21[21] Finally, petitioner posits that TCT No. 49936
is indefeasible and holds it free from any liens and encumbrances which its mother
title, TCT No. 30459, might have suffered.22[22]

The Intestate Estate of Bruneo F. Casim (intervenor), in its Comment on the

present petition, reiterates that the court a quo does not have jurisdiction to order
the cancellation of the subject notice of lis pendens because it is only the court
exercising jurisdiction over the property which may order the same that is, the

18[18] Id. at 293-300.

19[19] Id. at 34.

20[20] Id. at 8-12.

21[21] Id. at 14-17.

22[22] Id. at 23-24.

court having jurisdiction over the main action in relation to which the registration
of the notice has been sought. Also, it notes that even on the assumption that the
trial court had such jurisdiction, the petition for cancellation still has no legal basis
as petitioner failed to establish the grounds therefor. Also, the subject notice of lis
pendens was validly carried over to TCT No. 49936 from the mother title, TCT
No. 30459.

In its Reply,23[23] petitioner, in a semantic slur, dealt primarily with the

supposed inconsistencies in intervenors arguments. Yet the core of its contention is
that the non-chronological annotation of the notice stands to be the best evidence
of forgery. From this, it advances the notion that forgery of the notice of lis
pendens suffices as a ground for the cancellation thereof which may be availed of
in an independent action by the aggrieved party.

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

Lis pendens which literally means pending suit refers to the

jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over the property involved in
a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.24[24]
Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the
properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation.25[25] Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular

23[23] Id. at 366-372.

24[24] St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No.
174290 and G.R. No. 176116, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 713, 730; Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 186; Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142406, May 16, 2005,
458 SCRA 483, 492.

25[25] Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, supra; Romero v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing
Lim v. Vera Cruz, 356 SCRA 386, 393 (2001).
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property.26[26]

A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial
court before which the action involving the property is pending. This power is said
to be inherent in the trial court and is exercised only under express provisions of
law.27[27] Accordingly, Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes the trial court to cancel a notice of lis pendens where it is properly
shown that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that
it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated.
Be that as it may, the power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only
under exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable
to the party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged
to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by
petitioner; where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was
dismissed for non prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was
rendered against the party who caused such a notation. In such instances, said
notice is deemed ipso facto cancelled.28[28]

In theorizing that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has the inherent
power to cancel the notice of lis pendens that was incidentally registered in relation
to Civil Case No. 2137, a case which had been decided by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 62 and affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal, petitioner advocates that
the cancellation of such a notice is not always ancillary to a main action.

26[26] Yared v. Ilarde, 391 Phil. 722, 730 (2000).

27[27] St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, supra note 24;
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 205, 216 (2000).

28[28] Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 217, citing Regalado, Justice Florenz D.,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 5th Revised Edition, p. 145, 1988.
 The argument fails.

From the available records, it appears that the subject notice of lis pendens
had been recorded at the instance of Bruneo F. Casim (Bruneo) in relation to Civil
Case No. 213729[29] one for annulment of sale and recovery of real property
which he filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 against the spouses Jesus
and Margarita Casim, predecessors-in-interest and stockholders of petitioner
corporation. That case involved the property subject of the present case, then
covered by TCT No. 30459. At the close of the trial on the merits therein, the RTC
of Makati rendered a decision adverse to Bruneo and dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.30[30] Aggrieved, Bruneo lodged an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54204, which reversed and set aside the
trial courts decision.31[31] Expectedly, the spouses Jesus and Margarita Casim
elevated the case to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 151957, but their
appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time.32[32]

A necessary incident of registering a notice of lis pendens is that the

property covered thereby is effectively placed, until the litigation attains finality,
under the power and control of the court having jurisdiction over the case to which
the notice relates.33[33] In this sense, parties dealing with the given property are
charged with the knowledge of the existence of the action and are deemed to take

29[29] The case was initially docketed as Civil Case No. 9134-P at the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, but was re-docketed accordingly when it was re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
62, following the effectivity of the Judiciary Reorganization Act.

30[30] CA rollo (CA-G.R. CV No. 54204), pp. 902-905.

31[31] Id. at 696-710.

32[32] Id. at 768.

33[33] Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, supra note 24; Romero v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 24, at 495.
the property subject to the outcome of the litigation.34[34] It is also in this sense
that the power possessed by a trial court to cancel the notice of lis pendens is said
to be inherent as the same is merely ancillary to the main action.35[35]

Thus, in Vda. de Kilayko v. Judge Tengco,36[36] Heirs of Maria Marasigan

v. Intermediate Appellate Court37[37] and Tanchoco v. Aquino,38[38] it was held
that the precautionary notice of lis pendens may be ordered cancelled at any time
by the court having jurisdiction over the main action inasmuch as the same is
merely an incident to the said action. The pronouncement in Heirs of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, citing Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,39[39] is equally instructive

The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the

intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an
incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits
thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who
deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever
rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to
the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which
may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may
be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. x x
x40[40]

34[34] St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City,
supra note 24; Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, supra note 24; Romero v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 24.

35[35] Vda. de Kilayco v. Judge Tengco, G.R. No. 45425 and G.R. No. 45965, March 27, 1992,
207 SCRA 600; Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60323,
April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 325, 330.

36[36] Supra.

37[37] G.R. No. L-69303, July 23 1987, 152 SCRA 253.

38[38] 238 Phil. 1 (1987).

39[39] Supra note 35.

40[40] Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, supra note 24. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Clearly, the action for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in this case
must have been filed not before the court a quo via an original action but rather,
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 as an incident of the annulment case in
relation to which its registration was sought. Thus, it is the latter court that has
jurisdiction over the main case referred to in the notice and it is that same court
which exercises power and control over the real property subject of the notice.

But even so, the petition could no longer be expected to pursue before the
proper forum inasmuch as the decision rendered in the annulment case has already
attained finality before both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court on the
appellate level, unless of course there exists substantial and genuine claims against
the parties relative to the main case subject of the notice of lis pendens.41[41]
There is none in this case. It is thus well to note that the precautionary notice that
has been registered relative to the annulment case then pending before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 62 has served its purpose. With the finality of the decision
therein on appeal, the notice has already been rendered functus officio. The rights
of the parties, as well as of their successors-in-interest, petitioner included, in
relation to the subject property, are hence to be decided according the said final
decision.

To be sure, petitioner is not altogether precluded from pursuing a specific

remedy, only that the suitable course of action legally available is not judicial but
rather administrative. Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529 provides the appropriate
measure to have a notice of lis pendens cancelled out from the title, that is by
presenting to the Register of Deeds, after finality of the judgment rendered in the

41[41] See Garchitorena v. Director of Lands, 91 Phil. 157 (1952), where the Court suggested
than an original action be brought for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in that case
because the parties appeared to have substantial claims against each other relative to the civil
case which is the subject of the notice.
main action, a certificate executed by the clerk of court before which the main
action was pending to the effect that the case has already been finally decided by
the court, stating the manner of the disposal thereof. Section 77 materially states:

SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary
to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused
the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff
in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon
the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof. 42[42]

Lastly, petitioner tends to make an issue out of the fact that while the
original TCT on file with the Register of Deeds does contain the annotations and
notice referred to in this petition, its owners duplicate copy of the title nevertheless
does not reflect the same non-chronological inscriptions. From this, petitioner
submits its puerile argument that the said annotations appearing on the original
copy of the TCT are all a forgery, and goes on to assert the indefeasibility of its
Torrens title as well as its supposed status as an innocent purchaser for value in
good faith. Yet we decline to rule on these assumptions principally because they
raise matters that call for factual determination which certainly are beyond the
competence of the Court to dispose of in this petition.

All told, we find that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has committed
no reversible error in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order dismissing for lack
of jurisdiction the petition for cancellation of notice of lis pendens filed by
petitioner, and in denying reconsideration.

42[42] Emphasis supplied.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 14, 2005 Resolution
and the June 24, 2005 Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City,
Branch 253, in Civil Case No. LP-04-0071, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Land registration

For legal research purposes of lawyers visiting this blog, may I simplify hereinbelow the basic
things to do in handling a petition or application for original and cadastral land registration
before the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) of the Philippines.

Original Land Registration (ordinary and cadastral);

Simplified Procedures.

Ref.:

1. 2002 Rev. Manual for Clerks of Court; see Appendix “B” (LRA Manual of Instructions [for
clerks of courts]);
2. PD 1529, Sec. 14, et. seq. (Prop. Reg. Decree of 1978 [Orig. Reg.]);
3. Act 2259 (Cadastral Act);
4. CA No. 141 (Public Land Act).

Format of application/petition: read Sec. 15, PD 1529.

Attachments to the petition (3 copies of petition to be filed with RTC OCC):

1. Orig. plan in tracing cloth or diazo polyester film duly approved by the DENR Reg. Tech. Dir.
2. In lieu thereof, a true copy of the said orig. plan attested and certified correct by the Reg.
Tech. Dir. or his duly authorized official.
3. Two white or blue print copies of the plan.
4. Orig. And two copies of the technical descriptions certified by the Reg. Tech. Dir. or his
authorized official. Not merely signed by the Geod. Engr.
5. Orig. and two copies of the Geod. Engr.’s certificate. In lieu thereof, a certification (orig. and
two copies) from the Reg. Tech. Dir. as to its non-availability.
6. Tax Dec. or in lieu thereof, an affid. of 3 disinterested person as to the market value of the
land (Jud. Form 81).
7. All orig. muniments of title of the petitioner which prove his ownership of the land. Not
mandatory as along as the docs can be produced before the court during the trial.

Work to do before filing petition (secure orig. copies of the attachments to the petition):

1. Work out with the ofc. of the DENR Reg. Tech. Dir. All the approved plans, tech. descrip.,
certif.. of non-availability of Geod. Engr.’s certificate.
2. Work out with priv. Geod. Engr. the orig. copy of his Certif.
3. Work out with the local Assessor the orig. copy of the Tax Dec.
4. Gather all proofs of ownership – deeds, contracts, special powers of attorney, etc.
5. Gather all proofs of payments of taxes - local real estate and transfer taxes and all
BIR/national revenue taxes involving the land and all related transactions.
6. Others.

The petitioner must submit proof of service of a copy of the petition and its annexes on the Reg.
Exec. Dir. of the DENR (by way of Copy Furnished). Allege in the petition. Attach affid. of
service. (Sec. 17, Pd 1529).

Court docket and filing fees – pay to RTC OCC.

Publication fees (notice of initial hearing) – pay to LRA docket section. Bring certified copy of
the order. The initial hearing is set not earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of
the issuance of the order. (Sec. 23, PD 1529).
Initial hearing:

1. Follow up the order of initial hearing.

2. Follow up the publications of the order.
3. During the initial hearing, move for general default
4. Later on, get copy of the order of gen. default.
5. During the initial hearing in open court, mark the proofs of juris. facts (see the Record of the
case), to wit:
5.1. Order of initial hearing
5.2. Letter of RTC BCC forwarding the case to the LRA and the OSG
5.3. Notices to the petitioner, adjoining owners, creditors, et. al.
5.4. Sheriff’s certificate of posting
5.5. Proofs of notice of initial hearing addressed to concerned govt agencies: CENRO, PENRO,
DENR Reg. Off., OSG, LRA, RD, et. al.
5.6. Two certificates/affids. of publication (Off. Gaz. and a national newspaper). With orig.
copies of the printed issue/s.
5.7. Others (see the Record of the case and mark all notices/orders related to the initial hearing,
as well as all proofs of service thereof).

Order of initial hearing must be issued within 5 days from filing of petition (after raffle to the
court branch).

Two copies of order of initial hearing are served on the LRA within 15 days from issuance
thereof. LRA shall arrange for its publication in the Off. Gaz. and in a national newspaper (once
only). Petitioner must pay publication fee to LRA docket section cashier. Get OR.

Fees – see Sec. 111, PD 1529. To be collected by RTC OCC. Based on assessed value of land
and improvements, per Tax Dec. or per joint affid. of 3 disinterested person as to its market
value. Get OR. (See also new Rule 141, Legal Fees; and Rule 142, Costs of Suit).

Cost of publications. – To be paid to the LRA, approx. P1, 000 (Off. Gazz.). Fees of national
newspaper vary. Go to LRA docket section with certif. copy of order of initial hearing, with
court case/docket number, for ref. of LRA cashier.

Upon gen. default, petitioner may move for ex parte presentation of evid. before the BCC as
commissioner. (Rule 32, Rules of Court).

The court’s LRC Case No. (court docket no.) is different from the LRA’s Rec. No. The LRA
Rec. No. is set by LRA, not by the court.

After trial, the final steps are:

1. Decision. Get certified copies.

2. Get Certificate of Finality of Judgment from the court staff.
3. File a motion for issuance of decree of reg. Attach certificate of finality of judg. Notice of
hearing.
4. Follow up the order granting the motion.
5. Follow up the Decree of Reg. (to be issued by the LRA). Get certif. copy of the Decree from
LRA.
6. LRA forwards orig. of the Decree to local RD concerned. Follow up status. Get certif. copy of
Decree from RD (optional).
7. Follow up with RD the issuance of OCT. Pay the RD reg. fees.
8. Get owner’s duplic. copy of OCT from the RD.
Legend:

BCC – Branch Clerk of Court

BIR - Bureau of Internal Revenue
CA – Commonwealth Act
CENRO – Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
DENR – Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Geod. Engr. – Geodetic Engineer
LRA – Land Registration Authority
LRC – Land Registration Commission (old name of LRA)
Off. Gaz. – Official Gazette
OCC – Office of the Clerk of Court
OCT – Original Certificate of Title
OR – Official Receipt
OSG – Office of the Solicitor General
PD – Presidential Decree
PENRO – Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
RTC – Regional Trial Court
RD – Register of Deeds
Reg. Exec. Dir. – Regional Executive Director
Reg. Tech. Dir. – Regional Technical Director
Reg. Off. _ Regional Office
Tax Dec. – Tax Declaration