Consti 1

Blaquera vs Alcala
G.R. 109406 (September 11,1998)
Facts:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent
to 30% of the employee’s one-month basic salary but which
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year
1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and
financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future
years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive
benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO
268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits
without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed
all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment
of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of
P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
of the government concerned caused the deduction from
petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the alleged overpayments.
Issue:
Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
exercise of presidential control over the executive departments
https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

Page 1 of 58
Held:
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power
and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His
power includes the control of executive departments as provided
under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his
subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices
under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive
benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the
refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was
just exercising his power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel
by committing limited resources of government for the equal
payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only
exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the
heads of the government agencies who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from
the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources.
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional
origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/blaquera-vs-
alcala-gr-no-109406.html

Page 2 of 58
Hutchison Ports vs SBMA
G.R. No. 131367 (August 31, 2000)
FACTS OF THE CASE

The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA) advertised in
leading national daily newspapers and in one international
publication, an invitation offering to the private sector the
opportunity to develop and operate a modern marine container
terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of seven
bidders who responded to the published invitation, three were
declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after passing the pre-
qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMA’s Technical
Evaluation Committee (or SBMA-TEC). Among these is the
petitioner.
Thereafter, the services of three (3) international consultants
recommended by the World Bank for their expertise were hired
by SBMA to evaluate the business plans submitted by each of
the bidders, and to ensure that there would be a transparent and
comprehensive review of the submitted bids. The SBMA also
hired the firm of Davis, Langdon and Seah Philippines, Inc. to
assist in the evaluation of the bids and in the negotiation process

Page 3 of 58
after the winning bidder is chosen. All the consultants, after such
review and evaluation unanimously concluded that HPPL’s
Business Plan was “far superior to that of the two other bidders.”
However, even before the sealed envelopes containing the
bidders’ proposed royalty fees could be opened at the appointed
time and place, RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally
barred from operating a second port in the Philippines based on
Executive Order No. 212 and Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) Order 95-863.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner HPPL has the legal capacity to seek
redress from the Court.
RULING
Yes. Admittedly, petitioner HPPL is a foreign corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of the British Virgin
Islands. While the actual bidder was a consortium composed of
petitioner, and two other corporations, namely, Guoco Holdings
(Phils.) Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc., it is only
petitioner HPPL that has brought the controversy before the
Court, arguing that it is suing only on an isolated transaction to
evade the legal requirement that foreign corporations must be
licensed to do business in the Philippines to be able to file and
prosecute an action before Philippines courts.
There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to

what constitutes “doing” or “engaging in” or “transacting”
business in the Philippines. Each case must be judged in the
light of its peculiar circumstances. Thus, it has often been held
that a single act or transaction may be considered as “doing
business” when a corporation performs acts for which it was
created or exercises some of the functions for which it was
organized. The amount or volume of the business is of no
moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or
casual if it indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do
business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business”
because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage in

Page 4 of 58
business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an
exercise of the corporation’s reason for creation or existence.
Thus, it has been held that “a foreign company invited to bid for
IBRD and ADB international projects in the Philippines will be
considered as doing business in the Philippines for which a
license is required.”
Source: https://joparcon.blogspot.com/2015/10/hutchison-ports-
v-sbma.html
NEA vs COA
377 SCRA 233 (2002)
n/a

Page 5 of 58
Pimentel vs Aguirre
G.R. 132988 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the
President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce
their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin
respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
HELD:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy.
Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to

Page 6 of 58
ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent
with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been
issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision
over local governments. A directory order cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is
intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will
help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not
contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to
interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites
are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation
of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of
the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local
fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs
in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which
orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Source: https://jamesmamba.blogspot.com/2012/05/political-
law-digests-2.html
Bermudez vs Torres
G.R. No. 131429 (August 4, 1999)
Facts:

Page 7 of 58
Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of
Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of
Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor.
Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of
then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac.
Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit
took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit,
performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial
Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of
Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title
III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
“all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be
appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the
Secretary.”
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the
appointment of Quiaoit
Held:
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of
designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of
an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions
of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once
the last act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The
appointing authority has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the
power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be

Page 8 of 58
understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of
whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose
authority includes the power of control over all “executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority
of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set
aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of
his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as
and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has
the power to assume directly the functions of an executive
department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that
the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials
under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in
Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in
character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom
it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than
advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the
action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise
of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as
having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/bermudez-vs-
torres-gr-no-131429-august.html

Page 9 of 58
Sarmiento vs Mison
156 SCRA 549 (1987)
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino.
The said appointment made by the President is being questioned
by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are
both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law
professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since
the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On
Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President
without the confirmation from COA is valid.
HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed
from the list of officers that needed confirmation from the
Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups
whom the President shall appoint:
Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public
minister or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank
of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose

Page 10 of 58
appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where
the appointment made by the President that requires approval
from the COA and the following instances are those which does
not require approval from COA:
All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided by law;
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
and
Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
Source:
https://letstalkaboutthelaw.blogspot.com/2015/04/sarmiento-v-
mison-g-r-no-79974-december.html
Concepcion-Bautista vs Salonga
172 SCRA 160 (1989)
FACTS:
On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed
petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath of office on
December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and
immediately acted as such.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her
presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on
January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review
hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino
appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his
appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her
post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure

Page 11 of 58
of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be
at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be
subsequently removed as well.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the President's appointment is considered
constitutional.
2) Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
3) Whether or not President should extend her appointment on
January 14, 1989.
HELD:
The Court held that the it is within the authority of the President,
vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoints Executive
officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16,
Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to
appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government
officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which
are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore
follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the
President is to be made and finalized even without the review or
participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of
CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took
her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance,
expressly stated in her oath.
Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is
unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The
Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must
have a term of office.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is thus GRANTED and the
restraining order for Mallillin was made permanent.
Source: https://reeseisreal.blogspot.com/2012/11/bautista-vs-
salonga.html

Page 12 of 58
Calderon vs Carale
G.R. No. 91636 (April 23, 1992)
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the
Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the
NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall
come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as

Page 13 of 58
the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC,
the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its
confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that
w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in
violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may,
by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President
additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by
the CoA of appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the CoA.
RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is
required exclusively for the heads of executive departments,
ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint,
no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required.
Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16,
Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress
and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil

Page 14 of 58
Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints
other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights).
Source: https://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/calderon-vs-
carale.html
Manalo vs Sistoza
G.R. 107369 (August 11, 1999)
Facts:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino
signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of
Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the
PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15
police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National
Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The
said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their
respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and
Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez
III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other
emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to
assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements
made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 6975 requires
confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of
senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin
to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires
confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in
allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent
officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their
appointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.

Page 15 of 58
Issues:
1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA
confirmation
2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are
constitutional
Held:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are
four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the
President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging
to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa
vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under
Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, “The Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed
force which shall undergo military training and service, as may
be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for
the security of the State.”

Page 16 of 58
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the
Constitution ordains that: “The State shall establish and maintain
one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police
units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
The police force is different from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the
Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police
officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the
Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of
public officials whose appointments are not required by the
Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when
provisions of law declared void are severable from the main
statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would
not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions,
the statute remains valid without its voided sections.
Source:
https://politicallawcasedigests.blogspot.com/2016/05/manalo-vs-
sistoza.html
Soriano vs Lista
G.R. No. 153881 (March 24, 2003)

Page 17 of 58
Facts:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were
promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral,
Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office,
which requires confirmation of the COA.
Held:
Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit
challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show
not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has
sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant
petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s suit because
petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve
the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was
transferred from the Department of National Defense to the
Office of the President, and later to the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
Source: https://researchcasedigest.blogspot.com/2007/01/2006-
political-law-case-digests.html

Page 18 of 58
Pimentel vs Ermita
G.R. No. 164978 (October 13, 2005)
Facts:
Gloria Arroyo issued appointments as acting secretary to Arthur
Yap (Agriculture), Alberto Romulo (Foreign Affairs), Raul
Gonzales (Justice), Florencio Abad (Education), Avelino Cruz Jr
(National Defence), Rene Villa (Agrarian Reform), Joseph
Durano (Tourism) and Michael Defensor (Environment and
Natural Resources) on 23 August 2004 except Yap on 15 August
2004. The respondents took their oaths and assumed duties. The
Congress commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and
Senators Aquilino Pimintel, Edgardo Angara, Juan Ponce Enrile,
Luisa Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo LAcson, Alfredo Lim,
Jamby Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III filed petition for
certiorari and prohibition against respondents. The Senators
contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292
the undersecretary shall be designated as acting secretary in case
of vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while Congress is in
session there can be no appointments without first obtaining
consent from Commission on Appointments. When Congress
adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria Arroyo issued ad
interim appointments to the same respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the President may appoint in an acting secretary
without the consent of the Commission on Elections while
Congress is in session.
Decision:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the
appointment of Gloria Arroyo to the respondents as ad interim
immediately after the recess of the Congress, the petition has
become moot. However, as an exemption to the rule of
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Source: https://chanrac08.wordpress.com/2015/03/11/pimentel-

Page 19 of 58
vs-ermita-gr-no-164978-13-october-2005/
In re Valenzuela,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (Nov. 9, 1998)
Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by
the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City
and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear
prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision
prohibits the President from making any appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution
“two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that
Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is
required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This
prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6

Page 20 of 58
years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were
unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come
within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments.
While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in
the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/in-re-
appointments-of-hon-mateo.html
De Rama vs CA
G.R. No. 131136 (Febuary 28, 2001)
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, petitioner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC
seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the
allegation that the appointments of said employees were
“midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation
of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied
petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14
employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s
allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out
that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials.
The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue
appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee
meets the qualification standards for the position.

Page 21 of 58
Issue:
Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor
are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
Held:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on
so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made
within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/de-rama-vs-ca-
gr-no-131136-february-28.html
Matibag vs Benipayo
G.R. No. 149036 (April 2, 2002)
Facts:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en
banc as “Acting Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed
twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile,
then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein
respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments
were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency
of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of
Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their
appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC
Chairman, issued a memorandum removing petitioner as Acting

Page 22 of 58
Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment
and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming
that their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on
the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments
of its Chairman and members.
Issue:
(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were
prohibited under the Constitution
(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were
temporary in character
Ruling: NO.
(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall
be independent”, this provision should be harmonized with the
President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate
the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter
to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original
draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the
nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
appointments. The original intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments
because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess.
However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential
government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it
wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present
Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President
was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital

Page 23 of 58
government services that otherwise would result from prolonged
vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her
constitutional power to make ad interim appointments prevented
the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the
President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under
the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in
appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee,
and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the
recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim
appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify
and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate
the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is
a matter within the prerogative of the President because the
Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire
into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the
exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her
part, which has not been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the
President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute
temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the

Page 24 of 58
next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such
disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer
be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable
except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a
temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting
appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how
briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent
Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject
only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent
appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The
ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the
President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments
that take effect immediately.
Source:
https://thestudentandthelaw.wordpress.com/2018/07/13/matibag-
v-benipayo-g-r-no-149036/
Larin vs Exec. Secretary

G.R. 112745 (October 16, 1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the

Page 25 of 58
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a co-
accused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the
National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019.
Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was reported to
the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the
authority of the president issued Memo order 164 creating an
executive committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper
with regard to the charges against him, the petitioner complied,
and however his statement was that he cannot comment on the
merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the
court. Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesn’t have
any jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly
filed without violating res judicata, his rights against double
jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be
redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending,
the president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in
which case the office of the petitioner was abolished by the
order. His office being abolished, the petitioner was not
reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another
Administrative order was issued in which it stated that he is
being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in
connection to the criminal cases filed against him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a.
Who has the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due
process observed c. What is the effect of the petitioner’s
acquittal in the criminal case d? Does the president have the
power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad
faith?
HELD:
The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the
category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the
president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the
president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the
fact that the constitution grants the president the power to
appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not

Page 26 of 58
without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987, career
services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore
the petitioner is protected from being willfully removed by the
president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly
removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the
procedural due process. According to the Court it found that,
although the procedural due process was followed and complied
with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to
start with the committee was created to investigate the
administrative aspect of the criminal cases being faced by the
petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the
petitioner was acquitted from the criminal cases, the court
believes that there is no ground for the administrative case to
continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative
cases usually progress independently, however in this case it was
proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed
any of the alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative
case was also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any
valid cause for the removal of the petitioner.
As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the
court ruled that the president has the authority to do so, as seen
in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its
issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had the power
to reorganize the BIR, the court stated that such power is not
limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in good
faith. In the instant case the court found that the reorganization
was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of bad
faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and
investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence
and Investigation service to do the same functions of the
abolished office. Most importantly is the non-reappointment of
the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service,
should have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to
new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the
petitioner was never reappointed instead he was dismissed from
service without any separation benefits at all. The court ruled
that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and
is entitled to back wages.

Page 27 of 58
Source: https://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/07/case-
digest-larin-vs-executve-secretary/
Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
G.R. L-1278 (January 21, 1949)
Facts:
Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the
crime of murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment
while Barrioquinto remained at large. Before the period for
appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation
No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the
period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area
of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was
liberated from enemy control and occupation. Jimenez decided
to apply for amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same. The Amnesty Commission returned
the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of

Page 28 of 58
Zamboanga, without deciding on the case saying that since the
Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime,
they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Issue:
Is admission of guilt necessary in amnesty?
Held:
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or
character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
pardon
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,"
and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"; while
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that

Page 29 of 58
the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession
and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or
not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with
which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or
requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of
the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since
the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as
the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of
the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted
therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction,
whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such
offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused
is entitled to said benefits.
Source:
https://politicallawcasedigests.blogspot.com/2016/05/barrioquint
o-vs-fernandez.html

Page 30 of 58
Vera vs People
7 SCRA 152 (1963)
Facts:
Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and 92 others (97 in all)
were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder of Amadeo Lozanes. They invoked the benefits of the
amnesty proclamation of the president and the case was referred
to the 8th guerilla amnesty commission. none of the petitioners
admitted having committed the crime. Vera was the only one
who took the witness stand and denied having killed lozanes.
The commission said it could not take cognizance of the case
because the benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by
defendants in a criminal case who, admitting commission of the
crime, plead that the said crime was committed in pursuance of
the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who
aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied the
appeal, adding that the facts of the case showed that the victim
was a member of another guerilla group and that the murder
seemed to have stemmed from a rivalry between the two groups.
Vera brought the case to the Court of Appeals, asking the CA to
also rule, one way or another, of the murder case. But the CA
ruled that amnesty applies only to those who had admitted the
fact but said they should not be punished for the crime done was
in pursuance of resistance to the enemy. It also said it could not
take cognizance of the murder case because that came from the
amnesty commission, which had no jurisdiction over the murder
case.
The case was brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People
vs Llanita, which said that it was inconsistent for an appellant to

Page 31 of 58
justify an act or seek forgiveness for something which he said he
has not committed.
Held: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and

when the accused maintains that he has not committed a crime,
he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty
proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such
conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea
of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader
admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor
on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring
the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.
Source:
https://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/09/27/executive-
clemency/
Cristobal vs Labrador
71 Phil. 34 (1941)
Facts:
Santos was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to six months
of imprisonment. Notwithstanding his conviction, he continued
to be a registered elector and was even seated as the municipal
president of Malabon. In 1938, the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357) was passed, sec. 94 (b) of which
disqualifies Santos from voting for having been declared by
final judgment guilty of any crime against property. Because of
this, Santos applied for absolute pardon with the President. This
was granted and he was restored to his full and civil political
rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office
or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving
no money or property responsibility.

Page 32 of 58
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos
from the list of voters on the ground that he was disqualified
under the Election Code. The trial court denied; hence, Cristobal
filed a petition for certiorari. Cristobal contends that the pardon
granted by the President did not restore Santos to the full
enjoyment of his political rights because: a) the pardoning
power does not apply to legislative prohibitions; b) the
pardoning power would amount to an unlawful exercise by the
President of a legislative function, and c) Santos having served
his sentence and all accessory penalties imposed by law, there
was nothing to pardon.
Issue:
Whether the presidential power of pardon applies to legislative
prohibitions
Held:
There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power
be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not
extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed
by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the
sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the
present case, the disability is the result of conviction without
which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting.
Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes
upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends
to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is
left of the consequences of conviction.
In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent
Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is

Page 33 of 58
absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and
political rights."
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph
(b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall
within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief
Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power
of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution,
and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no
way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature
except through legislative action.
Source: https://legalvault.blogspot.com/2017/05/labrador-vs-
cristobal-case-digest.html
Pelobello vs Palatino

Page 34 of 58
72 Phil. 441 (1941)
Facts:
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which
he was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, four mos and one
day, disqualified from voting and being voted upon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the
Governor General and on Dec 25, 1940, an absolute pardon by
the President.
Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings questioning his
right to hold office as mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque
province. It was based on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from
the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under
paragraph a of sec 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having
been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law
for assuming office.
Ratio:
Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning
power is only subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative
action.
HELD:
Thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected
councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921;
was elected municipal president of that municipality three times
in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the
municipality in the election for local officials in December,
1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose
in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the
position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was
thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the
date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office.
We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the

Page 35 of 58
Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action
and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AFFIRMED.
Source:
clemency/
In re Lontok
43 Phil. 293 (1923)
Facts:
Marcelino Lontok, a lawyer, was convicted of bigamy and
sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment on February 27 1918. This
was confirmed by the Supreme Court on September 18, 1919.
On February 9, 1921, he was pardoned by the Governor General
“on the condition that he shall not again be guilty of any
misconduct.”
A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred
because he has convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Lontok however argued that pardon “reaches the offense and
blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.”
Ratio:
When proceedings to strike an attorney’s name from the rolls are
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a
conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held
that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to
any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the
pardon has been granted.
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the
professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has
culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while
the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal
consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the
disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may
nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a

Page 36 of 58
good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain
his license to practice law.
Ex parte Garland was cited, in which a lawyer pardoned by the
president being a member of the confederate congress during the
secession of the South was allowed to practice law, although
lawyers were supposed to take an oath saying they have never
aided any government hostile to the US.
It was held that the exclude the petitioner from the practice of
law for the offense would be to enforce a punishment for the
offense, when he has already been pardoned for it. This the court
had no right to do.
HELD:
Petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and the
proceedings must be dismissed.
Source:
clemency/
Torres vs Gonzales
152 SCRA 273 (1987)
FACTS:
Original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner
Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at National Penitentiary
in Muntinlupa.
Sometimes before 1979, petitioner was convicted by the Court
of First Instance of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from 11 years, 10
months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. The
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000.
On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioned would not again violate any of the penal laws.
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to
the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon. The

Page 37 of 58
evidence before the board showed that on March 22, 1982 - June
24, 1982, petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa,
which cases were then pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal (Quezon City). It also showed that on June 26, 1985, he
had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of
sedition. The said conviction was then pending appeal before the
Appellate Court. There also letters report from the NBI that a
long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner for
the last 20 years.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not conviction of crime by final judgment of a court
is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence?
HELD:
The Grant and Determination of breach of condition of pardon is
purely executive acts and it is no subject to judicial scrutiny
under Sec. 64 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Violation of conditional pardon - prior conviction by final
judgment of subsequent crime necessary before parolee or
convict may suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Source: https://saudilawstudent.blogspot.com/2010/03/torres-vs-
gonzales.html
IBP vs Zamora
G.R. No. 141284 (august 15, 2000)
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the

Page 38 of 58
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach
of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in
this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in
the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide
the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian

Page 39 of 58
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Source: https://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/ibp-vs-
zamora.html
Sanlakas vs Exec. Sec.

G.R. No. 159085 (Feb. 2, 2004)

Page 40 of 58
Facts:
In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and
enlisted men of AFP, heavily armed stormed the Oakwood
Premiere in Makati demanding for the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and Chief of the PNP. By virtue
of Proclamation 427 dated 27 July 2003, state of rebellion was
declared and General Order No 4 of the same date, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion pursuant to
Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution. The soldiers returned
to barracks on the same night and the declaration of state of
rebellion was lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation
No 435. In the interim, several petitions were filed before the
Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4. Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state
of rebellion to call out the armed forces. Because of the
cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient
factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of
rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that
the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration.
Issue:
Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare
General Order No 4?
Decision:
Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist
and has rendered the case moot.
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it
is capable of repetition yet evading review. The case at bar is
one such case. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple
declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these

Page 41 of 58
conditions. The presidential issuances themselves call for the
suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights
Source: https://chanrac08.wordpress.com/2015/03/11/sanlakas-
vs-executive-secretary-reyes-gr-no-159085-03-february-2004/
Aquino vs Enrile
59 SCRA 183 (1974)
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners
having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of
Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held
pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and
to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2
was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he
assumed by virtue of Proclamation1081 placing the entire
country under martial law.
ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise
of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the
declaration of martial law?
HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not
subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is
a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the
present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and
academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons
arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the

Page 42 of 58
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or
rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger
thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes
precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically
suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in
this case.
Source: https://www.coursehero.com/file/p4hcedo/CASE-3-
Aquino-v-Enrile-59-SCRA-183-FACTS-The-cases-are-all-
petitions-for-habeas/
Olaguer vs MC No. 4
150 SCRA 144 (1987)
FACTS:
Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of
subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created
a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try
criminal case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted
and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from
taking further action on their case for the tribunal should be
considered null and void. Respondents invoked that the creation
of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a
previous case – Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2.- as
decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners
contend that such ruling must be overturned because the ruling
is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be
abandoned and/or modified in so far as the case at bar is

Page 43 of 58
concerned?
HELD:
Yes.
REASONING:
First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been
lifted during the case is still pending, military tribunals, which
were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void
already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on
the dissenting views of some justices in Aquino v. MilComm,
stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner placed on tiral for
civil offenses under general law are entitled o trial by judicial
process, not by executive or military process…xxx..Judicial
power exist only in courts’. Moreover, the Court emphasized
that “Reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot
prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand
otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or
modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all,
more important than anything else is that this Court should be
right.’
Source: https://dennieidea.wordpress.com/2014/07/14/olaguer-
etal-v-military-commission-case-digest/
Navales vs Abaya
G.R. No. 162318 (October 25, 2004)
FACTS
Petitioners consisting of more than three hundred junior officers
and enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP who all
took part in a failed coup attempt in Oakwood Suites, Makati,
filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court
questioning the jurisdiction of the Judge Advocate General in
filing charges against them for violations of the Articles of War
Sections 67, 96, and 97. The Regional Trial Court acquitted 290
of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the mutiny.

Page 44 of 58
Petitioners contend that the Judge Advocate General due to the
fact that their participation in the mutiny was not service
connected. The present petitions for prohibition and for habeas
corpus were then filed with the Supreme Court. Acting on the
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order in the
petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court directed the parties
to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can divest the military
courts of jurisdiction.
HELD:
RA 7055 provides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall
be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as
determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-
connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in
the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected
crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles
54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the
penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take
into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised
Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.
The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies
what are considered “service connected crimes or offenses”
under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also
known as the Articles of War. Section 1 of RA 7055 vests on the
military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. In

Page 45 of 58
view of the clear mandate of RA 7055, the Regional Trial Court
cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over
those charged with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97
of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as
“service connected offenses or crimes” under Section 1 thereof.
Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have
jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual
and legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to rule that
violations of said articles of the Articles of War were committed
in furtherance of coup d’etat and, as such, absorbed by the latter
crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of
Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup d’etat against
Navales, et al., and recommended the dismissal of the case
against them. The trial court approved the recommendation and
dismissed the case as against Navales et al. There is, as yet, no
evidence on record that the Navale et al., committed the
violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in
furtherance of coup d’etat. In fine, in making the sweeping
declaration that these charges were not service-connected, but
rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat,
the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Such declaration is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and
void and does not exist. WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/375150069/Navales-
v-Abaya-Gr162318

Page 46 of 58
Lansang vs Garcia
42 SCRA 448 (1971)
FACTS:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party
caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP
889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist
groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et
al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring
that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD:
The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that
it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by
Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground
could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to
receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door
sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged
by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected
lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that
there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-

Page 47 of 58
oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as
claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Source:
https://lawskooliscool.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/teodosio-
lansang-vs-garcia-g-r-no-l-33964/
In Re De Villa
G.R. No. 158802 (November 17, 2004)
FACTS:
This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de
Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a
two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify
the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa;
and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs
are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence,
gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child
born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found
petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza when she was 12
years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the
offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit,
and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child
born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Petitioner’s defense, at

Page 48 of 58
the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old
age and sickness had rendered him incapable of having an
erection. On automatic review, the court found that the date of
birth of Aileen’s child was medically consistent with the time of
the rape.
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there was a
question of Reynaldo de Villa’s guilt or innocence. Petitioner-
relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that
there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if
Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn.
Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the
automatic review of petitioner’s case that DNA testing could
resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently
furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for
petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought
the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to
determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a
result of the rape and the relief was implicitly denied. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision,
wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted and
it was denied with finality in a Resolution. Petitioner-relator was
undaunted by these challenges, for having been informed that
DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva,
petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of
Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask
Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as a sample.
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren
of Reynaldo de Villa. Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to
conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza,
those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that
given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors
of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa,
were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report
and showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of
the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a
match between the pertinent genetic markers.

Page 49 of 58
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus
and new trial?
HELD:
No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained
via some the legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that
review of judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty
has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
This court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus
is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may
be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trail even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably
change the judgment.
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence
of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight
with this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA
testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or
on the part of petitioner’s counsel. In either instance, however,
this negligence is binding upon petitioner.
Source: https://jeffsarabusing.wordpress.com/2017/01/11/case-
brief-in-re-the-writ-of-habeas-corpus-for-de-villa-v-the-director-
of-new-bilibid-prisons/

Page 50 of 58
David vs Arroyo
G.R. No. 171390 (May 3, 2006)
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members
and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5.
The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA
I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and
other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the
Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided
by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles
and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency
(Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded
on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions
against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because
of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA
issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen
averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis
and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power
is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a

Page 51 of 58
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that
PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected
and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017
by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred
that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD:
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason
of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged
violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part
and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual
basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and
do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless

Page 52 of 58
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech
cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom
of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it
is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared
PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017
for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise
of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’
the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has

Page 53 of 58
been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution
(He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated
legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in
Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC
ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1,
Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws
but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private
corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without
any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word
emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC
made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national
emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from
Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the
following:
1 There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.

Page 54 of 58
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law
Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and
is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out
power of the president by the president.
Source: https://ulandi-digest.blogspot.com/2012/04/david-v-
arroyo.html
Constantino vs Cuisia
G.R. No. 106064 (October 13, 2005)
Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a
scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The solution
resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts –
they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion
programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor
children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred
that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and
they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee”
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And

Page 55 of 58
assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers
which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to
incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in
the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which
the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires
that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue
that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity
specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–
reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President
“alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they
would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power
to the respondents.
HELD:
There is no question that the president has borrowing powers
and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in
behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a
debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand,
the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance
implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-
relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing a strategy for managing the
government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of
the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required
amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet
any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President
were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the
country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming
detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans,
studying and choosing among the many methods that may be
taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal

Page 56 of 58
to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place
of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet
positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof
are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s
effectivity in running the government. The act of the
respondents is not unconstitutional
Source:
https://thelawiscool.wordpress.com/2012/10/26/constantino-v-
cuisa/

Page 57 of 58
People’s Movement for Press Freedpm, et al vs Hon. Raul
Manglapus
G.R. No. 84642, En Bamc Resolution dated April 13, 2988
FACTS:
Petitioners, consisted of members of the mass media, were
seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the
state of the then ongoing negotiations of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement
A collision between governmental power over the conduct of
foreign affairs and the citizens right to information.
ISSUE:
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public
concern and are still covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege?
HELD:
The Court adopted the doctrine in US vs Curtis-Wright Export
Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its
negotiations with foreign countries
The Court denied the petition, stressing that "Secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press
nor of the freedom of access to information."
Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/326344792/PMPF-
vs-Manglapus

Page 58 of 58

Consti 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Consti 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Blaquera vs Alcala

G.R. 109406 (September 11,1998)

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

FACTS OF THE CASE

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

Larin vs Exec. Secretary

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

Held: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

Sanlakas vs Exec. Sec.

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/46841053_1971118…c3uFVVZh2B3hz5L1QXFVZoUnIq8ETzQkhVA5Q1kCw9JS6g-Jfo 16/12/2018, 10U19 AM