RULE 31: CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE 1

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA
(substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA
R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO
(substituted by his heirs), respondents.

DOCTRINE:

Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote
this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues
within those cases.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the alleged illegally manipulated purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited
in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), by the respondents. On July 22, 1987, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint against the respondents for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages before the Sandiganbayan for said purchase. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0009. Civil Case 0009
spawned numerous cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130. Respondents are not parties to the latter case. In Civil Case 0310,
Victor Africa filed a petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan seeking to nullify the orders of the PCGG. Said orders
directed Victor Africa to account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on
the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’ meeting, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent
of ETPI, and from participating in the management of ETPI.

During the pendency of Civil Case 0310, Africa filed a motion to Sandiganbayan praying for the issuance of an order for the
calling and holding of ETPI annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the court’s control and supervision. The motion was
granted. PCGG assailed the resolution of Sandiganbayan granting Africa’s motion. In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993
resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0120 with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as
the main case. PCGG filed a very urgent petition for authority to hold special stockholder’s meeting. The Sandiganbayan
included the urgent petition in Civil Case No. 0130. In the proceedings of the urgent motion, the testimony of Maurice Bane
was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition). Sandiganbayan granted the urgent motion of the
PCGG to hold a stockholder’s meeting. From this ruling, Africa went to the court via petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court. The SC remanded the case to Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence. In Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner offered
to present its witnesses together with a motion to admit the Bane Deposition. SB denied said motion. Petitioner filed a 2 nd and
3rd motion for the admission of the Bane deposition, but both were denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the Bane Deposition, which was already admitted as evident in Civil Case No. 0130, is admissible as part of
petitioner’s evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 (main case).

RULING: The Bane deposition is inadmissible as part of petitioner’s evidence in Civil Case No. 0009

Rule 31 of the Rules of Court permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the
consolidation of issues within those cases. However, Tule 31 is silent on the effects of consolidation with regard to the causes
of action involved and on the evidence presented. Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order to consolidate several incident
cases does not provide a hint on the extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the consolidation, a deeper
analysis of the proceedings shows that there is nothing that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan intended a merger of causes
of action, parties and evidence. In fact, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation to be merely a consolidation for trial by
presenting other witnesses in the main case. To impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find
no clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioner’s right
to due process, especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases,
but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions
on our rules on evidence.

In addition to that, the consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 did not dispense with the usual requisites of
admissibility. Since the consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original case, the admissibility of the Bane
deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides
for the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. Even Section 4, Rule 23 of Rules of Court
makes a reference to Section 47, Rule 130 by providing that before a party can make use of the deposition taken at
the trial of a pending action, Rule 23 does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as
a condition for admissibility, compliance with “the rules on evidence.” The Court does not see any reason why the Bane
Deposition could not have been taken in Civil Case No. 0009 while Bane was still here in the PHILIPPINES. Fundamental
fairness dictates that the petitioner should have moved for the taking of the Bane deposition upon securing a favorable ruling
thereon.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
RULE 31: CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE 2

DEUTSCHE BANK AG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and STEEL CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GR. No. 193065; 27 February 2012

DOCTRINE:

It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters,
they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues
involved. In other words, consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different
suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing
the suits together.

FACTS:

This case stems from the Resolutions issued by Court of Appeals for ordering the consolidation of the Deutsche Bank Ag
Petition (CA-GR SP No. 111556) with the Vitarich Petition (CA-GR SP NO. 107535) on the ground that the two cases involve
a common question of law.

On December 7, 1995, private respondent SteelCorp entered into a loan agreement with a consortium of lending banks and
other financial institutions for the construction of its steel mill project. One of the lenders was Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC). Upon failure of SteelCorp to pay its loan, Equitable PCI Bank (now BDO) filed a creditor-initiated
petition to place the former under corporate rehabilitation which was granted by RTC-Batangas.

Pending the Rehabilitation Plan, RCBC entered into a deed of assignment, assigning to petitioner Deutsche Bank all of its
rights, obligations, title to, and interest in the loans extended to SteelCorp with an outstanding amount of P94,412,862.58. A
notice of transfer was sent to SteelCorp by RCBC. Deutsche Bank subsequently informed the RTC-Batangas of said assignment
of loan obligations. Upon motion of SteelCorp, RTC-Batangas issued an Order (October 28 Order) directing the assignees to
disclose the actual price paid by them for the SteelCorp debts assigned to them. From this Order, Deutsche Bank filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA. Two other petitions for certiorari were filed by other creditors of SteelCorp before the CA from said
October 8 Order.

SteelCorp filed a Motion for Consolidation of the Deutsche Bank Petition with the Investments 2234 Petition and EPCIB
Petition, with the Vitarich Petition on the ground that these cases involved the same question of law – whether creditors could
be compelled to disclose the assignment price for credits which were assigned to them. CA ordered the Consolidation of
Deustche Bank Petition with the Vitarich Petition. Dutsche Bank filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that its petition and
the Vitarich petition were not related that would merit consolidation. The motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the consolidation of Deutsche Bank AG Petition and the Vitarich Petition was proper.

RULING: The consolidation was not proper; common question of law alone would not warrant consolidation.

The petition is already moot and academic in light of the Motion to Withdraw the motion for consolidation filed by SteelCorp.
However, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.

While Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the consolidation of actions involving a common question of
law or fact, Section 3, Rule III of the 2009 IRCA requires that the cases sought to be consolidated must be related for the
consolidation to be proper. In the present case, there is no sufficient justification to order the consolidation inasmuch as the
Deutsche Bank AG Petition has no relation whatsoever to the Vitarich Petition. the Deutsche Bank AG Petition is an appeal on
certiorari from the Order dated October 28, 2009 of the RTC Batangas in Sp. Proc. No. 06-7993. Vitarich case, on the other
hand, is an appeal on certiorari and mandamus from the Order dated January 19, 2009 of the RTC Bulacan in Civil Case No.
592-M-2006. The fact that Deutsche Bank AG is a party to both cases does not make the proceedings intimately related. There
is no factual relation between the two proceedings. SteelCorp proceedings originated from SteelCorp’s rehabilitation
proceedings which have nothing to do with the Vitarich proceeding that originated from Vitarich’s rehabilitation proceeding.

In addition to that, there are no interconnected transactions, nor identical subject matter in the Deutsche Bank Petition and
Vitarich Petition. The two petitions having no factual relationship with and no interconnected transactions on the same subject
matter, they cannot be deemed “related cases.” As such, the consolidation by the CA was not proper. The order of consolidation
by the CA on the sole ground that the cases involved a common question of law was, therefore, not in order. The reliance of
the CA in the case of Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, Inc. was also misplaced because said case, what is involved is a joint trial of
two cases which both arose out of the same Dealership Agreement, warranting the consolidation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 12, 2010 and the July 19, 2010 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 111556 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.