GRP 3encisogarciatabuzo Digest

Written Output on
Logical Analysis of Supreme Court Cases from 2015 to 2019

(Persons and Family Relations)
A PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE COURSE

LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC
SUBMITTED BY
ENCISO, ALDRIN MARK

GARCIA, CARLA JUNE
TABUZO, JANELLE KRISTEN
JD4103
SUBMITTED TO
Atty. Enee Abrenica- Orillosa

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Juego-Sakai v. Republic G.R. No. 224015 July 23, 2018

2. Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.,G.R. No. 199194,February 10, 2016
3. Social Security Commission v. Azote G.R. No. 209741,April 15, 2015
4. Tadeo-Matias v. RepublicG.R. No. 230751April 25, 2018
5. Republic vs Manalo,G.R. No. 221029April 24, 2018
6. CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No.
223477,February 14, 2018
7. GLENN VIÑAS vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS,G.R. No. 208790
,January 21, 2015.
8. SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., vs Atty. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,G.R. No.
193719,March 21, 2017
9. GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN v. ERNESTO SALES,G.R. No. 189289,
August 31, 2016
10. MIRASOL CASTILLO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FELIPE
IMPAS,G.R. No. 214064,February 06, 2017
11. LONTOC-CRUZ VS CRUZ,GR 201988,OCTOBER 11, 2017
12. MALLILIN VS JAMESOLAMIN,GR 192718,FEBRUARY 18,2015
13. Republic of the Philippines vs Danilo A. Pangasinan,GR NO 214077,August
10,2016
14. Valerio E. Kalaw vs Ma. Elena Fernandez,GR 166357,JANUARY 14,2015
15. CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN- CADIZ VS BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES,GR
187417FEBRUARY 24, 2016
16. LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO VS MORISONIO LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR,GR 226013,JULY 02,2018
17. RENALYN A MASBATE AND MARILYN MASBATE VS RICKY JAMES
RELUCIO,GR 235498,JULY 30, 2018
18. Republic of the Philippines vs Edna Orcelino-Villanueva,GR 210929,JULY 29,
2015
19. Jerrysus L. Tilar, Republic of Philippines,Gr No. 214529,July 12,2017
20. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO,GR
218630,JANUARY 11, 2018
21. Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017
22. Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
23. Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
24. Moreno v. Kahn, G.R. No. 217744, July 30, 2018
25. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS Edna Villanueva
26. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER AND
MICHELLE K. MERCADO-JAVIER
27. MIRASOL CASTILLO vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS
28. RENATO A. CASTILLOvLEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent
29. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
30. Republic vs Cote GR. 212860, March 14, 2018
Juego-Sakai v. Republic
G.R. No. 224015
July 23, 2018
Facts:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married in Japan.

After two (2) years, the parties obtained a divorce decree in said country. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the
Regional Trial Court Camarines Norte. In its Decision, the RTC granted the petition and
recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine
Laws. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
However, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its previous
decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites under
Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. This is because the
divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not
by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce
herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the court the divorce decree of the said parties is valid.
Ruling:
P1: Under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, “where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
P2: The court observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce
proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true
intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not make a
distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place
and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding.
Conclusion: Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court
similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings
in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed
to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently,
since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the
divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry,
petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Therefore, their
divorce decree is valid.
Analysis: The court used the deductive and inductive reasoning. It used deductive
reasoning by applying the provisions of Art. 26 (2) of the Civil Code and by using the
rules on statutory construction through the interpretation of such provision.
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.,

G.R. No. 199194,
February 10, 2016
Facts:
Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. filed a Petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon. Jose testified that he first met Netchie in 1991. They later
became sweethearts and got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they
lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he
did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her
whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He
returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and
friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because of
these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition
before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code.
The RTC granted the petition under Article 41 of the Family Code. However, the
Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari on the ground that the court
erred in ruling that the respondent’s evidence in locating his missing wife supports a
“well-founded belief” under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in granting the respondent’s petition for
declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
Ruling:
P1: Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
P2: Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case
invites extended discussion), the holding is that the –
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news
that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or
invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not
suffice.
P3: Here, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches
below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside
from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to
Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or
persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the
pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook
a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years
(and what those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities,
barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific
persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
Conclusion:Thus, there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition
complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-
founded belief" standard.
Analysis: The court used the deductive reasoning. The conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden
of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which
can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
Social Security Commission v. Azote
G.R. No. 209741
April 15, 2015
Facts:
Respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System (SSS),
were married. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna
and their three older children as designated beneficiaries. On September 7, 2001,
Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children
as additional beneficiaries.
On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her
claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared,
however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4
on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote
(Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), as dependent, born on October
9, 1982. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as
beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children.
On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death
benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the
legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting
information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a
newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the
publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default.
The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. Consequently, it opined that
Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first
marriage had been dissolved. The SSC stated that there must be a judicial
determination of nullity of a previous marriage before a party could enter into a second
marriage. It further opined that Rosemarie could not be merely presumed dead, and
that death benefits under the SSS could not be considered properties which may be
disposed of in a holographic will.
The CA reversed the order of the SSC. It held that the SSC could not make a
determination of the validity or invalidity of the marriage of Edna to Edgardo considering
that no contest came from either Rosemarie or Elmer.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in deciding THAT THE DESIGNATION OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS WIFE-BENEFICIARY IS VALID.
Ruling:
P1: The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282,
the amendatory law of R.A. No. 1161 or the “Social Security Law.” It is a tax-exempt
social security service designed to promote social justice and provide meaningful
protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or
financial burden. As a social security program of the government, Section 8 (e) and (k)
of the said law expressly provides who would be entitled to receive benefits from its
deceased-member, to wit:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age,
or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the
primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children
shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent
legitimate, legitimated children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children
shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the
dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the
absence of all the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her
secondary beneficiary.
P2: Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse
of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In
this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with
another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even
acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating
Rosemarie as his spouse.
P3: It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at
the time when the Family Code was already in force. Article 41 of the Family Code
expressly states:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
P4: For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Conclusion: Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna,
without doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment
was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled
is the rule that “whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.” Edna could not adduce
evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved
or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her
marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo.
Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a
deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the
death benefits of Edgardo.
Thus, private respondent could not be considered as a valid wife-beneficiary.
Analysis: The court used a deductive reasoning by applying the existing legal
principles on the interpretation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
Tadeo-Matias v. Republic
G.R. No. 230751
April 25, 2018
Facts:
Petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed a petition for the declaration of

presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo). She alleged that after
their marriage, Wilfredo set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of
the Philippine Constabulary; that on September 15, 1979, he never came back from his
tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with the [p]petitioner nor to his relatives; that according to the his service
record issued by the National Police Commission, he was already declared missing
since 1979; that Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any
news regarding Wilfredo, but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his
whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was
he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army; that weeks became
years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after
more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times
had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age,
it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order
to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or
at least declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
The RTC granted the petition by declaring Wilfredo Matias absent or

presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC. Accordingly, the CA set aside the
decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis
of Article 41 of the Family Code instead of Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
P1: The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an
action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the
presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
P2: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
P3: Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed
"not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a
amended.
P4: Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the
purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death
under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her
petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
Conclusion: Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the
declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code,
and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Analysis: The court used an inductive reasoning by first applying the real intention of
the legal principle of Article 41 of the Civil Code. thereafter, it proceeded through the
interpretation of the Articles 390 and 391 of the same code which was the basis of this
petition.
Republic vs Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018
Facts:
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and
captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
● Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHIDO MINORO;
● Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due
proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country”
and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws
shall have control over issues related to Filipino family rights and duties, together with
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with
Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of
the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative
intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential.
Issue: Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Ruling:
P1: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of
the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter
of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
P2: The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address the anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under
the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should
not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.
Conclusion: Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Analysis: The court used an inductive reasoning by first applying the real
intention behind the meaning of Article 26(2) of the Family Code. By applying
such, the court inferred that there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
an alien land.
CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 223477
February 14, 2018
Facts:
AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB,
an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by
the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar
with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an
affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar
stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually
granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As
such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.
The RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e)
of RA 9262 for to having committed economic abuse against AAA and their son, BBB,
when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was supposed to
answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed to the
CA. The CA afirmed Melgar's conviction. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.
Ruling:
P1: Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes
acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse. The said law defines
economic abuse as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. -
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article
73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation
of support of a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such
common child is legitimate or not.26 This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA
9262, pertinent portions of which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other hann, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling
or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her

children of financial support legally due her or her family,
or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her

child of a legal right;
xxxx
P2: Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children. In this case, the courts a
quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are
present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship,
resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c)
Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and
(d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third
party his property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-
arrears to BBB.
Conclusion: Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.
Analysis: The court used a deductive reasoning by applying the elements of Section 5
(e) of RA 9262. The absence of case laws allowed the court to resort into the real
intention and interpretation of the words of the said Act.
GLENN VIÑAS vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS

G.R. No. 208790
January 21, 2015
Facts:
Glenn and Mary Grace got married in civil rites. Mary Grace was already
pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth. Glenn alleged that the infant’s death
was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy. The
couple lived together under one roof. Mary Grace left the home which she shared with
Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the
time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace. He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and
prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly
enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even when she was pregnant.
Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential household chores of
cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing
traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of
the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her
husband’s needs. She was self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted
her about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left their home without
informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas employment in
Dubai.
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed him that Mary Grace
came from a broken family and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The
foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in
adjusting to married life.
The RTC declared the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void
on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On appeal before the CA, the OSG
claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from
a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital
obligations. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace.
Ruling:
P1: The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage.
P2: Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and

to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
Conclusion: It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for
more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that
living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s
departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not
absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Analysis: The court used the legal principles behind Article 36 of the Family Code while
also considering the testimony of a psychologist to balance the circumstances. The
evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to
perform household chores.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., vs Atty. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS

G.R. No. 193719
March 21, 2017
Facts:
Pacasum and Zamoranos were married on December 28, 1992. However,
Pacasum discovered that Zamoranos was previously married to De Guzman on July 30,
1982. Pacasum filed an administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct
against Zamoranos on the ground that she had contracted a bigamous marriage.
Zamoranos raised as a defense the dissolution of her previous marriage under
the Muslim Code. Prior to her marriage with De Guzman, she had converted to Islam.
In 1983, however, she and De Guzman divorced in the Shari'a Circuit Court of Isabela.
The CSC dismissed the complaint because Pacasum failed to assail the existence,
much less validity, of the Decree of Divorce. The CSC ruled that since Zamoranos'
supposedly subsisting marriage with De Guzman is the sole basis for Pacasum's charge
of immorality, the existence of the Decree of Divorce is fatal to Pacasum's complaint.
Pacasum moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CSC. On appeal, the
CA initially granted the petition. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Zamoranos is guilty of bigamy.
Ruling:
P1: The Muslim Code recognizes divorce in marriages between Muslims, and mixed
marriages wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or the Muslim Code in any part of the Philippines.At
present, this is the only law in the Philippines that allows domestic divorce.
P2: The divorce between Zamoranos and De Guzman was issued by Judge Kaudri L.
Jainul of the Shari 'a Circuit Court. It states that both Zamoranos and De Guzman
appeared when the case was called for hearing. It further recites that both parties
converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding, and that it was Zamoranos
who sought divorce by tafwid, with De Guzman having previously delegated his
authority to exercise talaq.Thus, on its face, the divorce appears valid, having been
issued for a cause recognized under the applicable law by a competent court having
jurisdiction over the parties. And, as neither party interposed an appeal, the divorce has
attained finality.
P3: Here, Pacasum's administrative complaint is wholly dependent on the continuing

validity of the marriage between Zamoranos and De Guzman. However, we have
already recognized that this marriage was dissolved in accordance with the Muslim
Code in the case of Zamoranos v. People, which also involved the herein parties.
Conclusion: Following the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the parties are

already bound by our previous ruling on that specific issue, that is, Zamoranos' divorce
from De Guzman was valid which enabled her to contract the subsequent marriage with
Pacasum. As a result, Pacasum's complaint for immorality based on Zamoranos'
alleged bigamy has no leg to stand on.
Analysis: The court used a deductive to inductive reasoning. By first establishing the
validity of Muslim Codes in accordance with the Family Code, the court thereafter went
to the basis of their previous ruling in Zamoranos and De Guzman’s validity of marriage.
GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN v. ERNESTO SALES
G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016
Facts:
Brothers Teodoro Sales (now deceased) and Ernesto Sales (collectively, the
plaintiffs) filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate
children of the late Louis C. Fernandez. They are the illegitimate children of Louis and
his common-law wife named Epitacia Sales. Louis and his legal wife, Marie Louise
Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), a French national, did not have any child. According
to the plaintiffs, Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public
documents bearing his thumb marks, viz: (1) a notarized document jointly executed by
Louis and Epitacia formally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a
document solely executed by Louis dominated as Acknowledgement of Children.
The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez,

directed the action against unknown defendants. However, the petitioner raised her
opposition. She alleged that she is the niece of Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez
informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years old. She insisted that
the father of the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former houseboy of the
Fernandez household.
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of the recognition of the plaintiffs as the
illegitimate children of Louis.
The CA gave due weight to the deeds of acknowledgment executed by Louis. The self-
serving denial of the petitioner did not prevail over the presumption of regularity
accorded to the deeds of recognition in favor of the plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the deeds of
acknowlegment executed by Louis.
Ruling:
P1: The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children.
P2: A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of signature. The
Court, in the case of Dr. Yason v. Arciaga, held that a signature may be made by a
person's cross or mark.
Conclusion: Petition denied. The court did not err in ruling the validity of the deed of
acknowldgment by Louis. Sales brothers are the legitimate children of Louis.
Analysis: The court used the deductive to inductive reasoning. By first establishing the
principles under Art. 172 of the Civil Code, the court also used its ruling in the case of
Dr. Yason vs Arciaga to support its conclusion.
MIRASOL CASTILLO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FELIPE IMPAS

G.R. No. 214064
February 06, 2017
Facts:
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe
started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol
discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's
relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents,
they reconciled. They got married were blessed with two (2) children.
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. Mirasol
alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe that
the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe
resumed philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. One
time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to
her consternation, she caught him in a compromising act with another woman. He did
not bother to explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal
dwelling and stopped any communication with him.Felipe's irresponsible acts like
cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their
children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason, constitute a
severe psychological disorder.
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie

Montefalcon who concluded that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The RTC then rendered their marriage as null and void.
However, the OSG through a motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC’s decision on declaring Mirasol and Felipe’s marriage is
void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
P1: In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18 this Court laid down the
more definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to:show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved a favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. x x x
P2: Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
P3: In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the

respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful
to his spouse.
Conclusion: The marriage of Mirasol and Felipe do not warrant the sufficient evidence
to conclude is as void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Analysis: The court used an inductive to deductive reasoning. By first applying the
guidelines of declaring a marriage based on psychological incapacity, the court used its
ruling in the case of Molina vs CA. Thereafter, it explained the real intention behind the
legal principle under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
LONTOC-CRUZ VS CRUZ
GR 201988
OCTOBER 11, 2017
Facts :
Marivi met Milo sometime in March 1986. The two became steady in August of
the same year. Nilo, who was then working in Hong Kong convinced Marivi to marry him
so that she could join him there. Marivi agreed so they later got married in a civil
ceremony and then sometime later in church.
However. Sometime on July 7,2005, Marivi filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against her husband. She
alleges that both of them are suffering from psychological incapacity that warrants the
annulment of their marriage. According to Marivi, her husband was suffering from
“inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with
unresolved oedipal complex”. While she herself was suffering from a personality
disorder of a mixed type, Histrionic Narcissistic with Immaturity.
Marivi further alleged the following, acts imputed to Milo : 1. Infidelity and non-
commitment to the marriage by acting like a single man even though she was married.
2. The lack of oneness in the marriage as Nilo would often make decisions without
consulting or considering her suggestions. 3. Nilo would often treat her as a housemate,
by keeping from her his whereabouts such as when he would come home or how much
was his income4. The lack of sexual encounter between them as Nilo would often make
excuses to avoid intercourse. 5. Putting up a façade in front of others depicting himself
as a caring and concerned husband. 6. Preference towards his company of his peers
and friends.
Nilo on the other hand alleged that, Marivi was also suffering from psychological
incapacity due to the following grounds. 1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways
he was not accustomed to or inconsistent with his career position;2. Marivi was jealous
of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions that he was having an affair with
other women;3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way;
would not admit mistakes, and blame others instead;4. Marivi would make decisions
impulsively, such as changing an item she gets tired of, or demanding that Milo change
a motor vehicle simply because she did not like it; and5. She lacked respect for Milo,
and would speak to him degradingly, and even accuse him of being gay or a
homosexual.
Issue : Whether or not the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of
the Family code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
RULING: NO. the petition for declaration of nullity cannot be granted.
As stated under Article 36 of the Family Code :
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The court laid down guidelines with regard to determining psychological
incapacity. As stated in the case of Santos v.Court of Appeals, "that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)."
The court ruled that the personality disorders evaluated by the witness is not the
personality disorder that are grave or serious or that the personality disorder which are
incurable or permanent and to render the parties psychologically incapacitated to
perform his or her marital obligation. The court ruled that the case at bar only pertains to
mere incompatibility and that both spouse can still perform his or her marital obligation
towards each to her.
The court also further emphasized that so called “psychological disorder of Milo cannot
pertain to such psychological incapacity as stated under the law, but can be imputed to
his work, marital stress and only as a result of his ordinary human feelings. The root
cause in this case was also not alleged. Marivi’s family history shows that she grew up
in a well-functioning healthy family environment. Even nilo said that she was a good
wife and mother to her children and her demand for love and attention were only results
of a legitimate reaction as a wife.
Premise 1: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
Premise 2: The court laid down in the case of Santos v.Court of Appeals, "that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).
Premise 3 : According to Marivi, her husband was suffering from “inadequate
personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal
complex”. While she herself was suffering from a personality disorder of a mixed type,
Histrionic Narcissistic with Immaturity.
Premise 4: 1. Infidelity and non-commitment to the marriage by acting like a single man
even though she was married. 2. The lack of oneness in the marriage as Nilo would
often make decisions without consulting or considering her suggestions. 3. Nilo would
often treat her as a housemate, by keeping from her his whereabouts such as when he
would come home or how much was his income4. The lack of sexual encounter
between them as Nilo would often make excuses to avoid intercourse. 5. Putting up a
façade in front of others depicting himself as a caring and concerned husband. 6.
Preference towards his company of his peers and friends.
Conclusion: The court also further emphasized that so called “psychological disorder
of Milo cannot pertain to such psychological incapacity as stated under the law, but can
be imputed to his work, marital stress and only as a result of his ordinary human
feelings. The root cause in this case was also not alleged. Marivi’s family history shows
that she grew up in a well-functioning healthy family environment. Even nilo said that
she was a good wife and mother to her children and her demand for love and attention
were only results of a legitimate reaction as a wife.
Reasoning: Inductive and deductive reasoning
In this case, the reasoning that the court used is INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE
reasoning. The law regarding psychological incapacity is deducted from Article 36 of the
Family code. The standards are further enunciated by inductive reasoning through
application of cases having similar facts such as the case therein “ Santos vs Court of
appeals”
MALLILIN VS JAMESOLAMIN
GR 192718
FEBRUARY 18,2015
Facts :
Robert and Luz were married on September 6,1972 bearing three children. On
March 16,1994 Robert filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC. In the complaint, Robert alleged that Luz was suffering from psychological and
mental incapacity thus making her incapable of fulfilling her marital obligation. He
alleges that Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of
independent rational judgment and inability to cope with her obligation as a parent.
Luz contested the complaint she said that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity in their marriage. There was due notice that was sent to her
but Luz did not appear in trial. According to Robert, Luz was already living in California
and had married an American citizen. He further emphasized that during the time
wherein they were engaged, Luz was unfaithful to him because he was seeing another
man. He also claimed that Luz was remiss in her obligation as shown in the following
circumstance:
(1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep
order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who
washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was
also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and
looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5)
he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he
was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their
house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
Issue :
Whether or not the circumstances above warrant the psychological incapacity
against Luz that should result to declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Ruling: No. As stated under Art 36 of the Family code, A marriage contracted by any
party who at the time of the celebration was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligation of marriage shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity manifested only after the solemnization of marriage. The court further
emphasized that psychological incapacity must be characterized by a. gravity b. juridical
antecedence and c. incurability. The incapacity which the law speaks about is such
incapacity that is so grave that the parties would not be able to fulfil their essential
marital obligations.
Applying the necessary requirements in the present case, Robert failed to
overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage. Other than his testimony,
there was no other evidence to corroborate the same. Also, the root cause was not
alleged in the present case. The court ruled that the incapacity must be “downright
incapacity” to perform his or her marital obligation. In the present case, it is mere refusal
or neglect to perform one’s duty. Hence, the fact attributed to Luz does not warrant
psychological incapacity to grant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
PREMISE 1: Art 36 of the Family code, A marriage contracted by any party who at the
time of the celebration was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligation of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity manifested
only after the solemnization of marriage.
PREMISE 2: The court further emphasized that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by a. gravity b. juridical antecedence and c. incurability. The incapacity
which the law speaks about is such incapacity that is so grave that the parties would not
be able to fulfil their essential marital obligations.
PREMISE 3: He further emphasized that during the time wherein they were engaged,
Luz was unfaithful to him because he was seeing another man.
PREMISE 4: He further alleged the following grounds as psychological incapacity (1) it
was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order;
(2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed
their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at
the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he
received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was
not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their
house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
CONCLUSION:The court ruled that the incapacity must be “downright incapacity” to
perform his or her marital obligation. In the present case, it is mere refusal or neglect to
perform one’s duty. Hence, the fact attributed to Luz does not warrant psychological
incapacity to grant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Reasoning: Inductive and deductive reasoning
appeals which enumerated several grounds for psychological incapacity
Republic of the Philippines vs Danilo A. Pangasinan

GR NO 214077
August 10,2016
Facts :
Danilo and Josephine first met at the Philippine Plaza hotel in Manila where they
were both working sometime in the year 1981. After a three month courtship, Josephine
got pregnant hence because of this they got married. The early years of marriage was
blissful, however this moment does not end there. They started to have major problems
when Danilo’s business started to slow down. After 30 years of marriage, Danilo filed a
petition in the RTC praying for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Josephine
alleging psychological incapacity.
According to Danilo, barely a few months into their boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship, Josephine was already exhibiting certain negative traits. After marrying her,
he eventually found out that his wife is a competitive, domineering, headstrong, and
always determined to get what she wanted in a relationship. To support his claim,
Danilo presented Doctor dayan a psychologist which concluded that both Josephine
and Danilo as psychologically incapacitated to perform his and her marital obligation
Issue : Whether the circumstances above warrants the declaration of nullity due to
psychological incapacity?
Ruling: No. The evidence presented by Danilo fails to establish psychological

incapacity on the part of Josephine. As stated under Article 36 of the Family code, the
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental and not a psychical
incapacity of failure to fulfil the essential marital obligation. The benchmark for the
same is further emphasized in the case of Santos vs Court of appeals; it must be
characterized by: 1. Gravity, 2. Juridical antecedence and 3. Incurability. Further used
by the court is a more definite guideline in the case of Molina vs court of appeals
(1)Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
explained in the decision.
marriage.
incurable.
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
respect by our courts.
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
Hence, the psychological incapacity should exist from the time of the celebration
of marriage. In the present case, the totality of evidence presented fails to establish the
psychological incapacity of the parties. Though there was a declaration of Dr Dayan
that both the couple are psychologically incapacitated, her statements cannot be given
credit mainly because it is clothed with generalities and lacking in factual basis.
A careful reading of Dr. Dayan's testimony, however, reveals that it is replete with
generalities and wanting in factual bases. In this case, only Danilo’s side was heard,
there is no reliable and independent evidence to establish Josephine’s psychological
incapacity aside from what Danilo himself relayed to Dr Dayan. The examination of Dr.
Dayan was not sufficient it merely showed that the two personalities of the couple are
different and that their frequent arguments and differences were money related and not
psychological.
The court ruled that the mere showing of irreconcilable difference and conflicting
personality does not constitute psychological incapacity that art 36 of the family code
warrants. Therefore, such is not a ground for the declaration of nullity, because these
are mere problems that couples ordinarily go through in their marriage.
PREMISE 1: As stated under Article 36 of the Family code, the psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental and not a psychical incapacity of failure to fulfil the
essential marital obligation.
PREMISE 2: The case of Santos vs Court of appeals; it must be characterized by: 1.
Gravity, 2. Juridical antecedence and 3. Incurability.
PREMISE 3:In the case of Molina vs court of appeals
(1)Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
marriage.
incurable.
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
respect by our courts.
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. wred
PREMISE 4 Josephine was already exhibiting certain negative traits. After marrying her,
he eventually found out that his wife is a competitive, domineering, headstrong, and
always determined to get what she wanted in a relationship. To support his claim,
Danilo presented Doctor dayan a psychologist which concluded that both Josephine
and Danilo as psychologically incapacitated to perform his and her marital obligation
PREMISE 5 To support his claim, Danilo presented Doctor dayan a psychologist which
concluded that both Josephine and Danilo as psychologically incapacitated to perform
his and her marital obligation
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that the mere showing of irreconcilable difference and
conflicting personality does not constitute psychological incapacity that art 36 of the
family code warrants. Therefore, such is not a ground for the declaration of nullity,
because these are mere problems that couples ordinarily go through in their marriage.
In this case, only Danilo’s side was heard, there is no reliable and independent
evidence to establish Josephine’s psychological incapacity aside from what Danilo
himself relayed to Dr Dayan. The examination of Dr. Dayan was not sufficient it merely
showed that the two personalities of the couple are different and that their frequent
arguments and differences were money related and not psychological.
REASONING:
appeals which enumerated several grounds for psychological incapacity and Molina vs
Ca were also used to strengthen the argument.
Valerio E. Kalaw vs Ma. Elena Fernandez
GR 166357
JANUARY 14,2015
Facts:
In the present case, the petitioner alleged that respondent was remiss in her
obligation as a wife for she was constantly playing mah-jong and neglected their
children as a result. According to the respondent, she was merely playing two or three
times a week. She further stated that her children was not abandoned at home because
during the time she would play mah-jong, her children was left in their relatives home.
Petitioner’s experts relied on the allegation that if the respondent would continue with
her habits such as “ going to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery and
constant neglect of their children”, it would constitute as a detriment to the quality of
time that she would devote as a mother and wife that will further constitute to
psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling :
Yes. The marriage should be declared as null and void.
The act of the respondent in bringing her children with her to her mah-jong
session has an impact to her family especially to the children. Her wilful exposure of her
children to the culture of gambling in every occasion constitutes as a grave and serious
act of subordinating their needs for parenting. The act of the respondent in this case
shows her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development for she
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children .
The court ruled that there is no straight method in determining psychological incapacity
it should be determined in a case to case basis. Article 36 of the Family code should be
liberally read and applied. Hence the court should approach the issue of nullity not on
the basis of generalization but according to its own facts.
Premise 1: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
Premise 2: petitioner alleged that respondent was remiss in her obligation as a wife for
she was constantly playing mah-jong and neglected their children as a result. According
to the respondent, she was merely playing two or three times a week. She further stated
that her children was not abandoned at home because during the time she would play
mah-jong, her children was left in their relatives home.
Premise 3: She further stated that her children was not abandoned at home because
during the time she would play mah-jong, her children was left in their relatives home.
Petitioner’s experts relied on the allegation that if the respondent would continue with
her habits such as “ going to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery and
constant neglect of their children”, it would constitute as a detriment to the quality of
time that she would devote as a mother and wife that will further constitute to
Conclusion: The act of the respondent in bringing her children with her to her mah-jong
session has an impact to her family especially to the children. Her wilful exposure of her
children to the culture of gambling in every occasion constitutes as a grave and serious
act of subordinating their needs for parenting. The act of the respondent in this case
shows her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development for she
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children
REASONING:
FALLACY: Argumentum Ad Hominem. In the present case, it attacks the personal

characteristics of the mother arguing that Mahjong makes her an incompetent mother. It
presupposes the fact that since she frequently plays mahjong, she cannot perform her
duties as a mother or as a wife thereby equating such with psychological incapacity.
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN- CADIZ VS BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES

GR 187417
FEBRUARY 24, 2016
Facts:
In the present case, Cadiz a Human Resource Office of the respondent Brent
Hospital and Colleges was indefinitely suspended. The cause of her suspension was
Cadiz’s unprofessionalism and Unethical behavior resulting from a pregnancy out of
wedlock. Her suspension would only be lifted until she marries her boyfriend in
accordance with law.
Issue: Whether or not marriage as a condition for reinstatement is a valid condition?
Ruling : No.
As stated under Article 136 of the Labor code, “it shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee by
reason of her marriage. Hence, this law protects a woman against discrimination in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations which includes the right to choose
freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their full consent. Therefore, Cadiz
should be reinstated. The condition of Brent is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory
and compelling Cadiz to marry deprives her the freedom to choose her status which is a
privilege granted to every human being.
PREMISE 1 :Article 136 of the Labor code, “it shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee by reason of
her marriage
PREMISE 2: Cadiz a Human Resource Office of the respondent Brent Hospital and
Colleges was indefinitely suspended
PREMISE 3: The cause of her suspension was Cadiz’s unprofessionalism and
Unethical behavior resulting from a pregnancy out of wedlock.
PREMISE 4:Her suspension would only be lifted until she marries her boyfriend in
accordance with law.
CONCLUSION:Hence, this law protects a woman against discrimination in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations which includes the right to choose freely a
spouse and to enter into marriage only with their full consent. Therefore, Cadiz should
be reinstated. The condition of Brent is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory and
compelling Cadiz to marry deprives her the freedom to choose her status which is a
privilege granted to every human being.
REASONING : Deductive. The court applied several principles of the labor code in
the present case.
FALLACY: Argumentum ad Hominem. It attacks the personality of a woman out of
wedlock equating such into incapacity to perform her obligation as a teacher.
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO VS MORISONIO LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

GR 226013
JULY 02,2018
Facts :
Luziminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono in Quezon City.
They lived together in Japan for one year and three months but were not blessed with a
child. In the course of their married life, they would constantly quarrel due to the fact
that Ryoji was a philanderer adding to the fact that he was significantly older than
Luzviminda. She and her husband submitted a divorce agreement before the city hall of
Nagoyaga Japan. Therefore, this present case is a petition for the recognition of foreign
divorce decree obtained by her and her past husband so that she can use her old
surname and also for her to marry again.
Issue : Whether or not the foreign divorce decree should be granted in the Philippines?
Ruling :
The court partially grants the petitioner’s petition.
As stated under article 26 of the family code, “When a marriage between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce decree is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to marry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have the capacity to marry under Philippine laws. In the case of
Republic vs Orbercido, the following elements must concur in order for Art 26(2) to
apply. First, there must be a valid marriage between the Filipino spouse and the alien
spouse, second, there must be a valid divorce decree obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. As stated in this case, it does not apply when
it is the Filipino who procures the divorce decree abroad.
This rule was reversed in the recent case of Republic vs Manalo, the court ruled
that the Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine laws after initiating
a divorce. This would mean that the Filipino spouse can initiate the divorce however that
divorce must be proven as a fact in the Philippines.
In the present case, the request of the Filipino spouse Luzminda of the foreign
divorce decree in Japan is valid. However, in order to be recognized here in the
Philippines it must be proven as a fact.Luzminda needs to prove her “divorce by
agreement” here in the Philippines before her divorce be validly recognized.
PREMISE 1 :Article 26 of the family code, “When a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce decree is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to marry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have the capacity to marry under Philippine laws.
PREMISE 2: Republic vs Orbercido, the following elements must concur in order for Art
26(2) to apply. First, there must be a valid marriage between the Filipino spouse and the
alien spouse, second, there must be a valid divorce decree obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. As stated in this case, it does not apply when
it is the Filipino who procures the divorce decree abroad.
PREMISE 3:Republic vs Manalo, the court ruled that the Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine laws after initiating a divorce. This would mean that
the Filipino spouse can initiate the divorce however that divorce must be proven as a
fact in the Philippines.
PREMISE 4: they would constantly quarrel due to the fact that Ryoji was a philanderer
adding to the fact that he was significantly older than Luzviminda. She and her husband
submitted a divorce agreement before the city hall of Nagoyaga Japan
PREMISE 5: Luziminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono in Quezon
City. They lived together in Japan for one year and three months but were not blessed
with a child
CONCLUSION: In the present case, the request of the Filipino spouse Luzminda of the
foreign divorce decree in Japan is valid. However, in order to be recognized here in the
Philippines it must be proven as a fact.Luzminda needs to prove her “divorce by
agreement” here in the Philippines before her divorce be validly recognized.
REASONING:
reasoning. The court applied the Deductive reasoning under Article 26 of the Family
Code. It also further strengthen its argument by using jurisprudence such as Republic
vs Manalo
RENALYN A MASBATE AND MARILYN MASBATE VS RICKY JAMES RELUCIO
GR 235498
JULY 30, 2018
FACTS
Queenie was born to parents Renalyn and Ricky JAmes who had been living
together with Renalyn’s parents without the benefit of marriage. Three years later, the
custody of Queenie was left to the father of Renalyn because she went to Manila.
According to Ricky, the father of Queenie, the parents of Renalyn took Queenie from
school. The parents of Renalyn did not allow him to get Queenie back unless there be a
special power of authority given by Renalyn which grants him full parental rights,
authority and custody of queenie to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ricky should have the custody of Queenie
RULING:
Yes the petition is partially granted. Ricky James can take possession of Queenie
provided that it has the written consent of Renalyn. As stated under the law, the
custody of the illegitimate child should be with the mother. Under article 214, of the
Family code, it mandates that the substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparents or in default, the other brother or sister over 21 years of age, the
child’s actual custodian over 21 years of age in case the mother becomes incapacitated.
Therefore, as a general rule, the custody of the illegitimate minor belongs to the
mother unless she is unfit to be one.Though,in the present case,Ricky has the actual
physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left for Manila. Therefore, without proof that
Marilyn cannot fulfil her obligation as a mother, Ricky cannot assume full custody.
PREMISE 1 :Under article 214, of the Family code, it mandates that the substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparents or in default, the
other brother or sister over 21 years of age, the child’s actual custodian over 21 years of
age in case the mother becomes incapacitated.
PREMISE 2:Queenie was born to parents Renalyn and Ricky JAmes who had been
living together with Renalyn’s parents without the benefit of marriage
PREMISE 3:Three years later, the custody of Queenie was left to the father of Renalyn
because she went to Manila. According to Ricky, the father of Queenie, the parents of
Renalyn took Queenie from school.
PREMISE 4: The parents of Renalyn did not allow him to get Queenie back unless
there be a special power of authority given by Renalyn which grants him full parental
rights, authority and custody of queenie to him.
CONCLUSION:Therefore, as a general rule, the custody of the illegitimate minor
belongs to the mother unless she is unfit to be one.Though,in the present case,Ricky
has the actual physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left for Manila. Therefore,
without proof that Marilyn cannot fulfil her obligation as a mother, Ricky cannot assume
full custody.
REASONING : DEDUCTIVE. The court applied the principles as stated under the law
regarding custody.
Republic of the Philippines vs Edna Orcelino-Villanueva

GR 210929
JULY 29, 2015
FACTS
Edna Orcelino-Villanueva was a domestic helper based in Singapore. In the year
1993, she came home after hearing the news that her husband Romeo left the conjugal
dwelling. For 15 years she endured the absence of her husband. Within those years she
had never heard anything from him. Edna alleges that she did not merely limit her
search to her parents in law and to common friends in Illigan. Edna went back to
Romeo’s birthplace she tried to inquire about her husband’s whereabouts however
there was no avail. After 15 years, Edna alleges that she has the well founded belief
that her husband was presumptively dead. Therefore, she filed a judicial declaration of
presumptive death.
ISSUE Whether or not the judicial declaration of presumptive death should be granted.
RULING:
YES. The petition should be granted. A strict standard must be upheld in

declaring an absent spouse to be presumptively dead. As stated under Article 41 of the
Family code, “a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse has a well founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. This article
requires a “well founded belief” this would mean that it requires a reasonable basis to
uphold such. The determination of a well founded belief depends upon the overt act of
the person depending on the circumstances.
In the present case, Edna’s efforts should be appreciated. There was reasonable
effort on her part to look for her spouse. She cannot be faulted for not using the aids or
policemen or radio and television programs because this would be economically
wasteful. In this case, edna does not have the sufficient resources to look for her
husband and she cannot be faulted for not trying hard enough to do so. were not
enough.She could have asked for help of the police officer by filling a missing person’s
report or announce the absence of Romeo in the radio or television program.
PREMISE 1 :As stated under Article 41 of the Family code, “a marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the present spouse has a well founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead.
PREMISE 2: This article requires a “well founded belief” this would mean that it
requires a reasonable basis to uphold such. The determination of a well founded belief
depends upon the overt act of the person depending on the circumstances.
PREMISE 3:Edna Orcelino-Villanueva was a domestic helper based in Singapore. In
the year 1993, she came home after hearing the news that her husband Romeo left the
conjugal dwelling.
PREMISE 4: For 15 years she endured the absence of her husband. Within those years
she had never heard anything from him. Edna alleges that she did not merely limit her
search to her parents in law and to common friends in Illigan. Edna went back to
Romeo’s birthplace she tried to inquire about her husband’s whereabouts however
there was no avail.
PREMISE 5 : After 15 years, Edna alleges that she has the well founded belief that her
husband was presumptively dead. Therefore, she filed a judicial declaration of
presumptive death.
CONCLUSION: There was reasonable effort on her part to look for her spouse. She
cannot be faulted for not using the aids or policemen or radio and television programs
because this would be economically wasteful. In this case, edna does not have the
sufficient resources to look for her husband and she cannot be faulted for not trying
hard enough to do so. were not enough.She could have asked for help of the police
officer by filling a missing person’s report or announce the absence of Romeo in the
radio or television program.
REASONING: Deductive. In the present case, relevelant principles of law are applied
with regard to the definition of a well founded belief.
Jerrysus L. Tilar, Republic of Philippines

Gr No. 214529
July 12,2017
Facts :
On November 4,2010, the petitioner filed a case for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. He alleged that he and the
respondent were married in a Catholic Church in Poro, poro with Rev Igot as a
solemnizing officer. A son was born of their marriage, their marriage was doing well for
the first few months but later the respondent becomes extremely jealous with violent
tendency which results to frequent quarrels. They eventually separated in 2002 and the
respondent is now living another man in cebu.The main issue discussed in the RTC is
whether it can validly pass upon the validity of the church marriage in the light of
separation of church and state as enunciated in section 6 of Article 2 of the constitution.
ISSUE : Whether or not the court can validly pass upon the validity of church marriage
in light of separation of the church and state.
HELD : Yes.
As stated under Article 1 of the family code, Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
The contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and
formalities prescribed by law. Hence the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent
which was solemnized by a catholic priest and was held in the catholic church. Although
marriage is considered a sacrament in the catholic church it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the family code.As petitioner correctly pointed
out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties
as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the
parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Therefore,
the proceedings in the church is not binding upon the state as the couple is still
considered to be married in civil law even though they are deemed separated in Canon
laws.
PREMISE 1 :Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man

and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
PREMISE 2:He alleged that he and the respondent were married in a Catholic Church
in Poro, poro with Rev Igot as a solemnizing officer.
PREMISE 3:A son was born of their marriage, their marriage was doing well for the first
few months but later the respondent becomes extremely jealous with violent tendency
which results to frequent quarrels. They eventually separated in 2002 and the
respondent is now living another man in cebu
PREMISE 4:The main issue discussed in the RTC is whether it can validly pass upon
the validity of the church marriage in the light of separation of church and state as
enunciated in section 6 of Article 2 of the constitution.
CONCLUSION:Therefore, the proceedings in the church is not binding upon the state
as the couple is still considered to be married in civil law even though they are deemed
separated in Canon laws.
REASONING: DEDUCTIVE. In the present case, the court use the doctrine of marriage
in a civil law as different from a marriage in cannon laws arguing that the separation of
church and state cannot apply in this case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO

GR 218630
JANUARY 11, 2018
FACTS :
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through mutual friends. After a brief
courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as
both their parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not take the news
well, as he was worried how it will affect his image and how his parents will take the
situation. According to Katrina, Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their
child. He was also very dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree
of immaturity. From time to time, lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with
him. In the year 2003, due to their frequent fight, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his
parent’s home and never come back and that they have been separated ever since.
Katrina then filed a declaration of nullity due to psychological incapacity.
Issue : Whether the circumstance warrants the declaration of Nullity based on

Ruling : No. The following are standards which warrants psychological incapacity.
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated. The
examination of the psychiatrist cannot be given credence because the information
obtained was only from her side. Also, with regard to the behavior of Lawrence,
“insensitivity, immaturity and etc” such acts cannot give rise to psychological incapacity.
The law requires outright incapacity to perform the essential marital obligation and not
mere difficulty of fulfilment.
PREMISE 1 : The following are standards which warrants psychological incapacity.

(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
PREMISE 2 According to Katrina, Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their
child. He was also very dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree
of immaturity. From time to time, lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with
him. In the year 2003, due to their frequent fight, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his
parent’s home and never come back and that they have been separated ever since.
Katrina then filed a declaration of nullity due to psychological incapacity.
PREMISE 3: Katrina and Lawrence got married after she got pregnant
CONCLUSION:Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence was psychologically
incapacitated. The examination of the psychiatrist cannot be given credence because
the information obtained was only from her side. Also, with regard to the behavior of
Lawrence, “insensitivity, immaturity and etc” such acts cannot give rise to psychological
incapacity. The law requires outright incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligation and not mere difficulty of fulfilment.
REASONING:
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 222541,
February 15, 2017
Facts:
Rachel and Jose met in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya when they were teenagers in
December 1983. Eventually, they became sweethearts.
On December 28, 1989, the couple decided to be married in a civil rite in San Jose,
Nueva Ecija. They were blessed a child, named Wesley.
On December 23, 1993, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the
Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as a domestic worker. Through her
efforts, she was able to buy a home unit at Rufino Home Subdivision in San Jose,
Nueva Ecija.
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. To support her petition, she assailed that during
their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and
father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the
shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused
to pay for the transportation expenses of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe,
causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house
where they were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle
of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus
terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent himself
as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when
Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly). On one
occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman
with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse
any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.
Rachel stated that their marriage was smooth in early years of their marriage not until
Jose became drunkard in latter year.
On the part of Jose, he responded that he had dutifully performed all of his marital and
parental duties and obligations to his family; he had provided for his family's financial
and emotional needs; and he contributed to the building and maintenance of their
conjugal home. He claimed that although they occasionally had misunderstandings,
they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first major argument
was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to
communicate through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of
Rachel and would advise her to give her family the financial aid that they need so long
as she would not sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital
affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity can be invoked
Rule: (Analysis)
Premise 1: According to Jurisprudence, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify

the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code should refer to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental - not
merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.
Premise 2: Rachel assailed that during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid
discharging his duties as husband and father.
Premise 3: Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt
openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent
a text message to her sister.
Conclusion: The court ruled that Psychological Incapacity cannot be invoked because
there must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet
the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the
Reasoning: Deductive Reasoning by applying the Jurisprudence of Psychological

Incapacity. It is Deductive because the conclusion is impossible to be false since the
court already ruled in the past cases that psychological incapacity is not just mere
difficulty and refusal
Fallacy: No fallacy
Ocampo v. Ocampo
G.R. No. 198908
August 3, 2015
Facts:
On January 16, 1978, Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot. On September 10,
1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity. The petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage of the couple was granted by the regional trial court.
The decision became final since no party appealed the judgement of the annulment of
the marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of
their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the
factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of
partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced
evidence in support of their respective stand.
6
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the
properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
On February 2, 2004, Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
On February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of
Appeal
On February 20, 2004, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or
dismiss the notice of appeal for lack of merit.
On March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 22, 2004,
the trial court denied anew the motion for reconsideration.
In the disputed Decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Virginia's
appeal. Virginia moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated
October 5, 2011.
Issue:
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
Rule:
Analysis:
Premise 1: Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code
shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus,
under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they
are presumed conjugal.
Premise 2: The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 147 of the Family Code.
Premise 3: The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article
147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
. Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Premise 4: Virginia petitioned that the marriage between them must be declared null
and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code. However, The status
of their children shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby awarded to the
Virginia.
Conclusion: The court ruled that While it may be true that management of the
businesses referred to herein may have been actively undertaken by the petitioner, it
cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was able to do so without the invaluable help of
respondent. Even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take care of
the household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to
a share in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or properties acquired by
the marriage. In the same breadth, respondent must be considered to be entitled to the
same extent. Petitioner's claim that the seed money in that business was provided by
her mother and that, had it not been for that reason, the properties now subject of
controversy could not have been acquired. That may be true but the Court is not prone
to believe so because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's
self-serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible
and unfaithful husband, as well as family man were made but the testimonies adduced
towards that end, failed to fully convince the Court that respondent should be punished
by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his indiscretion.
Reasoning: Deductive by Applying the Rules of Conjugal Partnership Liquidation of the

Family Code
Fallacy: No Fallacy
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.,

G.R. No. 199194,
February 10, 2016
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon (Netchie).
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial
hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a
newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in
the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition. Trial then followed.
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later
became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rite at the Manila
City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because
he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For
three months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no
idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents,
but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home
after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about
her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had
to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC
so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Regional Trial Court granted his petition on the ground that Netchie has
disappeared more than 4 years. Hence, she is presumed to be dead.
However, the Republic assailed that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in
locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is
probably dead It maintains that even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts
to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the relevant
government agencies like the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration. It likewise points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person
to corroborate his allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found.
It also contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or
situations that would prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for
Netchie. The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary
about the propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the Family
Code for the purpose of terminating their marriage. Finally, the Republic submits that
Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively
dead because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of Article 41 of the
Family Code.
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic’s Petition because the
latter’s petition is erected upon the ground that the CA did not correctly weigh or
calibrate the evidence on record, or assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or
significance; and that such a ground does not avail in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Jose also contends that the Republic should have
instead filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s Decision of January 31, 2011,
reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in law. Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
granting his petition because it even dutifully complied with the publication requirement.
He moreover argues that to sustain the present petition would allow the executive
branch to unduly make inroads into judicial territory. Finally, he insists that the trial
court’s factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect as these were arrived
after due deliberation.
Issue: Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code can be invoked?
Rule:
Premise 1: Under Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse
Premise 2: The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends
upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains
on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse
must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort
Premise 3: Jose inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts,
but they also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that
his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could
contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
Conclusion: The Court ruled that its imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that
there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the
requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief"
standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie
are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by
jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends
and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or
quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show
that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at
least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places,
provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying
the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
Reasoning: Inductive Method by applying the intention as to the meaning of well-

founded believe
Fallacy: Fallacy of Equivocation since there is ambiguity of well-founded belief. The

court should have defined well-founded belief
Moreno v. Kahn,
G.R. No. 217744,
July 30, 2018
Facts
Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he and his family
have been occupying two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. 181516 and 1815176 (subject lands) co-owned by his full-blooded sister,
Consuelo and his nephews and nieces (Consuelo's children), respondents Rene, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine.
Around April or May 2003, through numerous electronic mails (emails) and letters,
respondents offered to sell to Jose the subject lands for the amount of US$200,000.00
(US$120,000.00 to be received by Consuelo and US$20,000.00 each to be received by
her children), which Jose accepted. Notably, the agreement was made verbally and was
not immediately reduced into writing, but the parties had the intention to eventually
memorialize the same via a written document. Over the next few years, Jose made
partial payments to respondents by paying off the shares of Rene, Luis, Philippe and
Claudine, leaving a remaining balance of US$120,000.00 payable to Consuelo.
However, in July 2010, Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and thereafter,
informed Jose of her intent to convert the earlier partial payments as rental payments
instead. In response, Jose expressed his disapproval to Consuelo's plan and demanded
that respondents proceed with the sale, which the latter ignored. He then claimed that
on July 26, 2011, without his consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold their
shares over the subject lands to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership of the
subject lands to him. Consequently, TCT Nos. 181516 and 181517 were cancelled and
new TCTs were issued in Rene's name. Upon learning of such sale, Jose sent a
demand letter to Rene, and later on to Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine, asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale agreed upon.
As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay lupon for
conciliation proceedings between him and Rene only, since Consuelo, Luis, Philippe,
and Claudine are all living abroad. As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose was
constrained to file the subject complaint for specific performance and cancellation of
titles with damages and application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction.
The RTC dismissed Jose's complaint for failure to allege compliance with the provision
of Article 151 of the Family Code.
Jose moved for reconsideration, arguing that the RTC cannot order the dismissal of a
case on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent ; Article 151 does not
apply to the instant case, contending that while Consuelo is indeed his full-blooded
sister, her co-defendants namely his nephews Rene, Luis, and Philippe, and niece
Claudine are not considered members of the same family as him and Consuelo and
assuming Article 151 of the Family Code applies, he has complied with the earnest
efforts requirement as he tried convincing Consuelo to change her mind through email
correspondences, and even underwent barangay conciliation proceedings with Rene.
In an Order dated October 11, 2012, the RTC denied Jose's motion
Aggrieved, Jose filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.
Undaunted, Jose moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution
Issue: Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable to this case
Rule:
Premise 1: Article 151 of the Family Code states that no suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Premise 2: For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively
between or among "members of the same family." Once a stranger becomes a party to
such suit, the earnest effort requirement is no longer a condition precedent before the
action can prosper
Premise 3: In this relation, Article 150 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants: and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Premise 4: Case law states that Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed
strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. Hence, any person having a collateral
familial relation with the plaintiff other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the
Family Code is considered a stranger who, if included in a suit between and among
family members, would render unnecessary the earnest efforts requirement under
Article 151.
Conclusion: It is undisputed that Jose and Consuelo are full-blooded siblings; and
Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, which make them
nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine are considered "strangers'' to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is
concerned. In this relation, it is apt to clarify that whi1e it was the disagreement between
Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains that
Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully impleaded as co-defendants Jose’s
complaint as they are co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In view of the inclusion
“strangers" to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full-blooded siblings, the
Court concludes that the suit is beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code.
Reasoning: Deductive Reasoning in not applying the Article 151 since it is not
applicable in this case.
Fallacy: No Fallacy
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDNA ORCELINO VILLANUEVA
GR 210929
JULY 29, 2015
Facts:
Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.
In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a
mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children
that Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason or information as to his
whereabouts. Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the country to
look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and common friends in Iligan City.
Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She also went to his
birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives.
On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition 5 to declare Romeo
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The RTC granted the petition on the basis of her well-founded belief of Romeo’s death
under Article 41 of the Family Code
However, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that
Edna had a well-founded belief that Romeo.
The CA dismissed the petition, holding that the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed decision having been expressly clothed with the power to determine
the case.
Issue: Whether or not Article 41 can be invoked
Rule:
Premise 1: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Premise 2: Article 41’s requirement of a "well-grounded belief" calls for an inquiry into a
spouse’s state of mind. Otherwise abstract, one’s state of mind can only be ascertained
through overt acts. Article 41 requires this belief to be "well-grounded." It therefore
requires nothing more than for a spouse to have a "reasonable basis for holding to such
belief."
Premise 3: Article 41 relies on a basic and plain test: rationality. What is rational in each
case depends on context. Rationality is not determined by the blanket imposition of pre-
conceived standards. Rather, it is better determined by an appreciation of a person’s
unique circumstances. Moreover, all that Article 41 calls to sustain is a presumption. By
definition, there is no need for absolute certainty. A presumption is, by nature, favorable
to a party and dispenses with the burden of proving. Consequently, neither is there a
need for conduct that establishes such a high degree of cognizance that what is
established is proof, and no longer a presumption.
Conclusion: Concededly, Edna could have engaged in other efforts—asking for the
help of police officers, filing a formal missing-person report, announcing Romeo’s
absence in radio or television programs—as would show how painstakingly she
endeavored to search for Romeo. Insisting on Edna to have also made these efforts,
however, is to insist that she act in an ideal manner. It takes her away from her own
reality and requires her to fulfill pre-conceived notions of what satisfies notice. It fails to
appreciate the merit of the lengths she actually went through to search for Romeo.
Unless Edna had the ability to gain access to radio or television programs with
nationwide coverage or ensure that her notices were posted in all precincts, then
requiring this type of search would have been futile and economically wasteful. If we are
to lend truth to the concept of social justice, we have to make judgments based on her
context. To reiterate, she is one of the millions who had to go abroad to earn a more
prosperous life for herself and her children. She had to cut short her employment to
come home and make an honest search for her husband. To require her to squander
more time and money to reach media and the police would have been economically
expensive for her. The law should be interpreted in the context of reality—and ours is
different from Edna’s. Edna was an abandoned wife whose husband was missing for 15
or 16 years. Her search for Romeo began more than two decades ago in a province in
Mindanao, far removed from this nation’s capital. She was an overseas Filipino worker,
a domestic helper, who was compelled to return to the Philippines to tend to a missing
husband. Twenty-two years ago, when she embarked on her search, she could not
have been aided by the convenience of ready access to communication networks. To
go to her husband’s birthplace and inquire from his relatives, she could not have merely
boarded an hour-long flight; she must have endured hours, even days at sea. It is in
light of these human realities that Edna’s efforts must be appreciated. This court must
realize that insisting upon an ideal will never yield satisfactory results.
Reasoning: Inductive Reasoning in applying the intent of well-founded belief
Fallacy: No Fallacy
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER AND

MICHELLE K. MERCADO-JAVIER, Respondents.
Facts:
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002.
On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. In order to support the
allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own behalf, and presented the
psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos (Dr. Adamos) (i.e., Psychological
Evaluation Report on Martin and Psychological Impression Report on Michelle).In the
Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos diagnosed her with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Likewise, Dr. Adamos concluded in the Psychological
Evaluation Report that Martin suffered from the same disorder. Their disorder was
considered grave and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Adamos further testified before the
RTC to provide his expert opinion, and stated that with respect to the Psychological
Impression Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin and the respondents'
common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra (Jose Vicente). He was unable to evaluate
Michelle because she did not respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in for
psychological evaluation.
The RTC dismissed the petition for failure to establish a sufficient basis for the
declaration of nullity of the respondents' marriage. Martin moved for the reconsideration
of the RTC's decision on May 18, 2011. Finding the arguments in the motion
unmeritorious, the RTC denied the motion.
Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, Martin appealed the denial of his petition to the CA. In
his Appellant's Brief, Martin submitted that it is not necessary for the psychologist to
personally examine the incapacitated spouse, or Michelle in this case, before the court
may rule on the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He also argued that, at the
very least, there was sufficient evidence to support his own diagnosis of psychological
incapacity. Martin thus claimed that the RTC committed a reversible error in dismissing
his petition.
The Republic filed its own brief opposing the appeal of Martin. Arguing that there was
no basis for Dr. Adamos' findings as to Michelle's psychological incapacity, the Republic
asserts that there was no independent proof to establish this claim. Furthermore, the
Republic argued that Martin supported his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with self-serving testimonies and hearsay evidence.
On review, Martin's appeal was granted. Aggrieved, the Republic filed its motion for
reconsideration from the CA's Decision. The CA denied the motion in its Resolution for
being a mere rehash of its earlier arguments. The Republic is now before this Court,
arguing that there was no basis for the CA's ruling granting the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. It argues that the testimony of Martin was self-serving, especially in
relation to Dr. Adamos' diagnosis that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. According to the
Republic, there were no other witnesses that were presented in court, who could have
testified on Michelle's behavior.
Issue: Whether Article 36 can be invoked on Part of Martin
Rule:
Premise 1: The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a)

gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which the Court discussed
in Santos v. CA, et al. as follows:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
Premise 2: The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that for purposes of
establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not required that a physician
conduct an actual medical examination of the person concerned. It is enough that the
totality of evidence is strong enough to sustain the finding of psychological incapacity. In
such case, however, the petitioner bears a greater burden in proving the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other spouse's psychological
incapacity.While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v.
Molina, these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined on a case-to-case basis, as
no case is on all fours with another.
Conclusion: These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential

characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As such, insofar as the
psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible
error in declaring the marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Ruling: Deductive Reasoning in applying the jurisprudences on the part of Martin since
these jurisprudence is part of the law of the Philippines
Fallacy: No Fallacy
MIRASOL CASTILLO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FELIPE IMPAS
GR 214064
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their
courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend.
The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of
their parents, they reconciled. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984
and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992 and in 2001.
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to
believe that the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with
different women. One time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned home to
surprise her family. But to her consternation, she caught him in a compromising act with
another woman. He did not bother to explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's
infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with him.
Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with
her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without
any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie

Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report, concluded that
Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
The RTC declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. However, the
Republic (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by RTC. The
Republic appealed on the Court of Appeals which was granted and reversed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the
RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Rule:
Premise 1: "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the

most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and
(c) incurability,
Premise 2: In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, this Court laid down
the more definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x
assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x
respect by our courts. x x x
to appear as counsel for the state.
Premise 3: The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based

strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to
show the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have
automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base
their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Premise 4: Montefalcon relied heavily on the result of the psychological evaluation.

There was no assessment of the veracity of such allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence presented. Also, there were no
factual findings which can serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological
incapacity. Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however,
admitted that she evaluated respondent's psychological condition indirectly from the
information gathered from Mirasol and her witness.
Conclusion: The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA against
the dissolution and nullity of the parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence
presented. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.
Reasoning: Deductive for applying the jurisprudence on psychological incapacity
Fallacy: No Fallacy
RENATO CASTILLO VS LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO
GR 189607
On 25 May 1972, Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).
On 6 January 1979, Lea married Renato A. Castillo (Renato). On 28 May 2001, Renato
filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its
Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the
RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to
Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of
them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista
void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision declaring that
Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio.
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the proof
adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, petitioner countered that whether
or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had
belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that
at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and
subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its Order.
The RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when
she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not
obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior
marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her
second marriage with Renato.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned. His motion, however, was denied by the. Thereafter, both petitioner and
Respondent filed their respective Notices of Appeal. The CA reversed and set aside the
RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned
CA Resolution
Issue: Whether validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration
Rule:
Premise 1: The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in
force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the
parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985.
Premise 2: Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while
in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable
marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural
children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in
a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.
Premise 3: The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of
her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there
was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Conclusion: Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent
marriage to Renato is valid.
Reasoning: Inductive Reasoning in applying the rules since it didn’t follow strictness
since they ruled it based on the year of the marriage
Fallacy: No Marriage
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL
VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). Born into their union
were three (3) children. After some time, Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was
previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced
by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently
filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as
evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor
and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential
requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the
legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the
first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
Issue: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no
record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first
wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the
bigamy charge.
Ruling:
Premise: Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the
absence of any of which renders the marriage void from the beginning:
No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
Conclusion: The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record
of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically
prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved
through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before
his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage
declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.
Reasoning: Deductive Reasoning in applying Article 53 of the Family Code

Fallacy: NONE
Republic vs Cote
GR 212860
MARCH 14, 2018
The Facts
As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel and Florie were married in Quezon City. At the time of their
marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and were already blessed with a son,
Christian Gabriel Manongdo who was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of
America (USA).
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably broken. It was
granted by First Circuit of Hawaii.
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
granting the divorce before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated to
remarry after the RTC's decision attained finality and a decree of absolute nullity has
been issued. The RTC ruled] that Rhomel was already an American citizen when he
obtained the divorce decree
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the RTC, believing that
the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied
Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded by
a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
In a Decision dated January 21, 2014, the CA denied the petition.
Issue: whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in a case involving
recognition of a foreign decree of divorce
Rule:
Premise 1: A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as

defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers void and voidable
marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Premise 2:Void and voidable marriages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or
at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never existed. Divorce, on the
other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising
after the marriage.
Premise 3: It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal
Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Conclusion: Since Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil
registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Reasoning: Deductive Reasoning for applying the Rule 21 of Rules of Court
Fallacy: No Fallacy

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Logical Analysis of Supreme Court Cases from 2015 to 2019

A PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE COURSE

ENCISO, ALDRIN MARK

Atty. Enee Abrenica- Orillosa

1. Juego-Sakai v. Republic G.R. No. 224015 July 23, 2018

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married in Japan.

Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.,

(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:

Thus, private respondent could not be considered as a valid wife-beneficiary.

Petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed a petition for the declaration of

The RTC granted the petition by declaring Wilfredo Matias absent or

The petition alleged, among others, that:

● Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

P1: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

3. destroying household property;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her

GLENN VIÑAS vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS

P2: Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., vs Atty. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS

P3: Here, Pacasum's administrative complaint is wholly dependent on the continuing

Conclusion: Following the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the parties are

The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez,

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

MIRASOL CASTILLO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FELIPE IMPAS

In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

P2: Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

P3: In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the

Republic of the Philippines vs Danilo A. Pangasinan

Ruling: No. The evidence presented by Danilo fails to establish psychological

FALLACY: Argumentum Ad Hominem. In the present case, it attacks the personal

CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN- CADIZ VS BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES

Issue: Whether or not marriage as a condition for reinstatement is a valid condition?

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO VS MORISONIO LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

As stated under article 26 of the family code, “When a marriage between a

ISSUE: Whether or not Ricky should have the custody of Queenie

Republic of the Philippines vs Edna Orcelino-Villanueva

YES. The petition should be granted. A strict standard must be upheld in

Jerrysus L. Tilar, Republic of Philippines

PREMISE 1 :Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO

Issue : Whether the circumstance warrants the declaration of Nullity based on

PREMISE 1 : The following are standards which warrants psychological incapacity.

Del Rosario v. Del Rosario

Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity can be invoked

Premise 1: According to Jurisprudence, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify

Reasoning: Deductive Reasoning by applying the Jurisprudence of Psychological

Reasoning: Deductive by Applying the Rules of Conjugal Partnership Liquidation of the

Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.,

Issue: Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code can be invoked?

Reasoning: Inductive Method by applying the intention as to the meaning of well-

Fallacy: Fallacy of Equivocation since there is ambiguity of well-founded belief. The

G.R. No. 217744,

July 30, 2018

Undaunted, Jose moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution

Premise 3: In this relation, Article 150 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;