On the Dialectics of Shibdas Ghosh

In Reply to Comrade Ashoke Mukherjee‘s

36-Page Document

Comrades! Two years back I had e-mailed 22 comments to you all and in response to those
Comrade Ashoke Mukherjee e-mailed a 36-Page document giving a name ‗A Marxist Study on
Absolute Truth-I‘ and titled as ‗A Brief Study on Some Fundamental Concepts Of DIALECTICS
IN MARXIST LITERATURE, An Open Monologue‘.
Comrades! Although Comrade A.M. has described his 36-Page document as an open monologue
but this monologue is definitely a document circulated in the debate initiated by my 22 comments.
So, I beg your pardon for the long and undue delay on my part in sending the reply to Comrade
A.M.‘s ‗monologue‘. No doubt that the subject matter under the debate is the fundamental concepts
of materialist dialectics in Marxist Literature but on my part I want to be more specific and with due
regard to him, my well-considered position is that the dialectics of Shibdas Ghosh is no dialectics at
all. The most fundamental and basic concept on which the materialist dialectics hinges upon is the
concept of matter itself. The ‗concept matter‘, as understood and taught by Shibdas Ghosh, places
him basically in the camp of nominalist materialist philosophers. And if the very foundation of the
materialist dialectics is opposed to dialectics then how can any of the basic concepts of dialectics be
correct? To prove my allegations I will proceed ahead chapter-wise and point-wise. There are four
chapters in all. Chapter- I, deals with the concept MATTER; Chapter-II, deals with DIALECTICS;
Chapter-III, deals with the LAWS OF DIALECTICS AND THEIR INNER INTER-
CONNECTION; and Chapter-IV, deals with the concept of TRUTH and then APPENDIX. In
context of the concept of matter, I will begin with the point as to what is meant by Nominalism and
what is the conception of matter in nominalist philosophy and how does Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought, in
the name of dialectical materialism teach nominalism to his disciples.

CHAPTER—I
MATTER

Point no. 1
What is Nominalism and How Shibdas Ghosh a Nominalist?
In their joint work The Holy Family Marx and Engels write:
―Materialism is the natural-born son of Great Britain. Already the British schoolman, Duns
Scotus, asked, ‗whether it was impossible for matter to think?‘ In order to effect this miracle, he took
refuge in God‘s omnipotence, i.e., he made theology preach materialism. Moreover, he was a
nominalist. Nominalism, the first form of materialism, is chiefly found among the English
schoolmen.‖ (Chapter VI, bold added)

―Nominalists: The Nominalists were adherents of a trend in medieval scholasticism, generally

considered heretical and dangerous, which maintained that only individual or particular things exist
and that generality belongs only to words. They criticized the traditional ―realists‖ doctrine, derived
from Plato, that universals or ―ideas‖ have real existence above and independent of individual things,
and likewise the ―conceptualist‖ view that while universals do not exist outside the mind they do
exist in the mind as general conceptions. The doctrine of Nominalism was later forcefully taken up
and developed by the English materialist philosopher Thomas Hobbes.‖ (Note 81, THE HOLY
FAMILY)

The crux of the matter is that Nominalism is the first form of materialism, which was chiefly found
among the English schoolmen and the Nominalists maintained that only individual or particular
things exist and that generality belongs only to words. And Shibdas Ghosh follows the nominalists in
his approach towards matter. Shibdas Ghosh recognizes matter only as diverse particular or

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individual things and holds ‗matter in general‘ to be just an empty phrase or word. For Shibdas
Ghosh general matter or matter in general is no physically existing or real material entity. Shibdas
Ghosh denies the aspect of eternity and absoluteness of matter and motion. He also dismisses the
existence of any eternal laws of motion of matter. Shibdas Ghosh, in his book titled as ON THE
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE under the bold heading ―Concept of matter or of its dialectical
principles of Change is not eternal or absolute‖, writes as follows:

―A question has been put to me that when we are saying everything is material, there is no extra-
material entity then could we not say that matter itself is the eternal truth? Similarly, what is wrong if
we say that the three basic principles which work behind all changes are the eternal truth? It should
be understood that when we talk of a particular material entity, we mean it to be some matter which
has mass or mass equivalence, occupies some space and all that; but by this matter we do not mean
matter as a whole. Because, there is no particular matter which is the origin of all matter. Then how
are we to view the entire universe or the whole of the material world? We shall view the universe and
the material world on the basis of our concept of matter in general. We should realize that matter is
created from matter itself; there is no existence of supra-matter entity. In this sense, a particular
matter is simultaneously matter and not-matter. Lenin gave a beautiful expression to matter
concept. He said: matter is a philosophical category. With this Lenin wanted to emphasize that
whatever man did conceive in the past, is conceiving at present and will conceive in future are all
based on matter, never supra-matter. By calling matter a philosophical category he did not mean
any particular matter or material entity.

―But is matter eternal, abstract, absolute? No, such a conception is not correct. Why do I say this?
In which sense is matter not eternal or absolute? It is because the matter we are knowing is
continuously changing; change goes on in it at every moment, arising from conflicts and
contradictions of opposite forces. We are also knowing and comprehending this change and
transformation in matter. In this sense matter is not eternal or absolute. The matter concept is not
that matter is unchangeable—that is not the correct idea. All changes are, therefore, verifiable and
are subject to verification. So matter which pervades everywhere—and there is no extra-material
entity at that – does have no possibility to be eternal. Because, matter is ever-changing. But looking at
this all material world many people may yet keep asking; since we find matter everywhere then what
is wrong in regarding matter as eternal? Actually, instead of calling matter absolute or eternal we
should call it here universal. Whatever we find in the universe is matter, no extra-material entity is
there. All our thinking, thoughts, acts are based on matter. Again, this matter is not static, fixed,
immutable. Matter is matter in motion, ever-changing matter. Therefore, matter is by no means
unchangeable, absolute or eternal. So also man‘s thinking is changing, his cognition developing
through the process of interaction with the changing material world.

―Hence the understanding and comprehension of the three basic governing principles of change is
also developing together with the advancement of knowledge in all spheres – it is becoming
clearer, deeper, more lucid and ever-more penetrating. In this case, the three basic principles do
not present themselves as something absolute and eternal. Our philosophy is materialist philosophy
for the cardinal reason that nowhere in the universe there is any entity independent of matter. And
our philosophy is dialectical materialism because the matter we cognise itself is dialectical; it is
changing through conflicts and contradictions. Because of this fundamental dialectical character of
matter our philosophy is dialectical materialism.‖ (ON THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, VOL. IV,
Page, 181-83, bold added)

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If we now analyse and understand the bolded portions of the above passage then it will become
hundred per cent clear that the conception of matter of Shibdas Ghosh is fully based on nominalism.
Let us take one by one:

(i) ―A particular matter is simultaneously matter and not-matter‖.

Amazing! According to Shibdas Ghosh every particular form of matter is a dialectical unity of
matter and not-matter; not-matter resides within every single particular form of matter and hence,
‗not-matter‘ according to Shibdas Ghosh, is the generality of matter. So, according to Shibdas Ghosh
the generality of matter is nothing but an empty word, because, it only represents the ‗not-matter‘
supposed to be existing in the world of matter; specifically supposed to be residing equally within all
particular forms of matter. We know that general is that which is common to all individuals and
according to Shibdas Ghosh, common to all individual forms of matter comes out to be nothing as
the presumed ‗not-matter‘ by him is bound to be equal to nothing. Is this position of Shibdas Ghosh
any different from that of the Nominalists who maintained that only individual or particular things
exist and that generality belongs only to words? Hence, to assert that: ―A particular matter is
simultaneously matter and not-matter‖, is totally absurd and totally incorrect from the point of view
of materialist dialectics. The correct formulation should be ‗a particular form of matter is
simultaneously particular matter and general or universal matter‘. The general or universal resides
within the individual or particular. In dialectical materialism both individual or particular and
general or universal are of material nature; the individual or particular aspect of matter is conditional
or relative hence, finite or transient and the general or universal aspect of matter is unconditional or
absolute hence, infinite and eternal. It is only on the basis of these two contradictory aspects of
matter that we unite two contradictory statements about matter into one namely, ‗matter is ever-
changing and matter ever remains the same‘. It is not on the basis of particular aspect of matter that
we proclaim that matter ever remains the same rather it is the general aspect of matter or in other
words ‗matter in general‘ that ever remains the same. So, beware of nominalism!

(ii) ―By calling matter a philosophical category he (Lenin - S.S.) did not mean any particular
matter or material entity.‖

It is true that when Lenin conceives matter as a philosophical category, he certainly does not
mean any particular form or structure of matter, but to say that by philosophical category Lenin did
not mean even any material entity is tantamount to dragging Lenin too into nominalism. Matter as
philosophical category for Lenin is the common objective reality or common material entity, equally
present within all different particular forms of matter i.e., unity in diversity; but matter as
philosophical category for Shibdas Ghosh is not any material entity, because, according to Shibdas
Ghosh the common entity residing within all different particular forms of matter is itself ‗not-matter‘,
in other words nothing. Now, according to Shibdas Ghosh as, there is nothing in common of
material nature associated with all the particular different forms of matter so, no unity in diversity
can be conceived in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought. And when you yourself are unable to conceive any
unity in diversity in the material world then certainly you are bound to conceive ‗matter as
philosophical category‘ to be of non-material nature.

(iii) ―But is matter eternal, abstract or absolute? No‖

So, for Shibdas Ghosh matter is neither eternal, nor abstract, nor absolute. What is the root cause of
this kind of approach of Shibdas Ghosh towards matter? Why can‘t he conceive matter as eternal and
absolute? The reason lies in his fundamental flaw i.e., conceiving particular form of matter as a
dialectical unity of matter and not-matter. And thus when the general objective aspect of matter gets
replaced subjectively by some ‗not-matter‘ then the natural result will necessarily be the throwing
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away the aspect of absoluteness and eternity of matter; because, the aspect of absoluteness and
eternity of matter is associated with the general objective aspect of matter. The knowledge of the
general aspect of matter or matter in general or matter itself is the consequence of abstraction of
matter; and this abstraction of matter is not, ―not-matter‖ but real material entity and this real
material entity which has been termed by Lenin, as philosophical category, ever remains the same; it
was the same in the past and it will be the same in future, hence, absolute and eternal. Matter as
philosophical category resides equally within all particular forms of matter, in other words all relative
and transient particular forms of matter contain within them matter in general, the absolute and
eternal. The great founder of dialectical materialism Karl Marx acknowledges it. Proudhon, when
attempted to establish land as ‗eternal capital‘ then Karl Marx criticising him wrote in his work The
Poverty of Philosophy that earth as land-capital cannot be eternal but as matter it is so. Read, what Karl
Marx writes:

―…M. Proudhon‘s land as matter is the earth in its limitation. As for the eternity he attributes to
land, we grant readily it has this virtue as matter. Land as capital is no more eternal than any other
capital.‖ (The Poverty of Philosophy, Chapter II, section 4)

Marx has clearly stated in his above quotation that land ‗as capital‘ is not eternal but land as
matter is eternal which implies that every form of matter, as matter, is eternal. Every finite form of
matter being conditional and relative is perishable but it contains within it the imperishable, the
eternal. So to argue: ‗‗as matter is changeable and hence cannot be eternal‖ is not proper from the
point of view of Karl Marx himself; Karl Marx knew very well more than any other, that matter is
ever-changing. It is as simple as that, that matter is both mortal and immortal; mortal means relative
and transient whereas, immortal means absolute and eternal. Mortal and immortal are opposites and
they both constitute a dialectical unity of matter. They are the two contradictory aspects of matter.
So, in every respect matter has two contradictory aspects—relative and absolute; transient and
eternal; perishable and imperishable; finite and infinite; particular and universal; and so on and so
forth. The immortal resides within the mortal; the imperishable resides within the perishable; the
general resides within the concrete; the universal resides within the particular or individual; the
infinite resides within the finite; the unconditional resides within the conditional; the absolute resides
within the relative; the eternal resides within the temporary or transient; and so on and so forth.

But one more point needs to be clarified here and that point is regarding the motion of matter. The
pertinent question is that if matter as such or matter in general is absolute and eternal then there must
be the corresponding absolute and eternal motion as such or motion in general; because, motion is
the mode of existence of matter. And Karl Marx and Engels did not forget to make a mention of the
immutable, absolute or universal motion too. Engels writes:
―…hence into a history in which at each stage different laws, i.e., different phenomenal forms of
the same universal motion, predominate, and so nothing remains as absolutely universally valid
except—motion.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, p-239)
This ‗absolutely universally valid—motion‘ has also been acknowledged by Karl Marx as
‗immutable‘ i.e., absolute. In his same work i.e. The Poverty of Philosophy Karl Marx writes as follows:

―There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of

formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement—morsimmortalis.‖
(Ibid, Chapter-II, Fifth observation, Bold added)

This above cited quotation of Marx has also been quoted by Stalin in his Dialectical and Historical
Materialism to show that motion as such is immutable.

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 So, now there must not remain any doubt in the minds of the adherents of Shibdas Ghosh
regarding the recognition in materialist dialectics of Marx and Engels, of the existence of the absolute
and eternal, matter and motion.

(iv) ―So matter which pervades everywhere‖

If all the particular forms of matter are different from each other then what is all pervading or
omnipresent? Can we call any particular form of matter to be all-pervading or omnipresent? No. All-
pervading or omnipresent can be the general only which resides within all concretes; in other words
matter as philosophical category can only be accorded the status of all-pervading or omnipresent.
The omnipresent, which was omnipresent in the past too and which will remain omnipresent in all
future, cannot be something which is it-self temporary, transient, perishable, mortal and relative. The
omnipresent can only be something which is imperishable, immortal, infinite, universal, absolute and
eternal; and it can be nothing except matter as philosophical category.

(v) ―Hence the understanding and comprehension of the three basic governing principles of
change is also developing together with the advancement of knowledge in all spheres – it is
becoming clearer, deeper, more lucid and ever-more penetrating. In this case, the three basic
principles do not present themselves as something absolute and eternal.‖

It is a complete muddle. Two separate issues have been mixed together. First issue is: whether the
laws that govern the general material process of the material world are eternal or not? The second
issue is: whether the eternal laws that govern the universe have been cognized completely or in their
entirety or not? I have already quoted above Marx and Engels, who hold that all particular things as
matter are eternal and they also acknowledge the corresponding absolute and eternal motion of
matter. So, if both matter and its motion are eternal then the laws of motion of matter are bound to
be eternal; and both Marx and Engels (see my comment no.9) have acknowledged them to be so. In
this regard, I repeat here Engels‘ quotation from his Dialectics of Nature which is as follows:

―It is an eternal cycle in which matter moves… a cycle in which every finite mode of existence of
matter, whether it be sun or nebular vapour, single animal or genus of animal, chemical combination
or dissociation, is equally transient, and wherein nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally
moving matter and the laws according to which it moves and changes...we have the certainty that
matter remains eternally the same in all its transformation, that none of its attribute can ever be
lost…‖ (Introduction to Dialectics of Nature)

Engels here did not list or described the eternal laws. He only stated that the laws according to
which matter moves and changes are eternal. But Com. Ashoke Mukherjee in his document has
raised a doubt as to the reliability of Dialectics of Nature which holds matter and its laws of motion to
be eternal giving the curious logic that Engels‘ Dialectics of Nature is not worthy to be relied upon as it
was according to him not written for publication. Let us judge about the reliability of Dialectics of
Nature from what has been written in its Preface itself. It reads as follows:

―Dialectics of Nature was the culmination of profound scientific studies by Engels over many
years….In a letter he wrote from London to Marx in Manchester on May 30, 1873, he informed
Marx of his intention to write Dialectics of Nature. Marx showed the letter to K. Schorlemmer, a
prominent chemist. The original of that letter shows comments by Schorlemmer, who approved of
the main points of Engels‘ plan. In the years that followed Engels did a colossal amount of work in
line with his plan, but he was unable to carry it through to the end.‖ (Preface)

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 So, to say that Engels did not intend to publish Dialectics of Nature is quite groundless and untrue.
Explaining the role of labour in the development of man‘s power of thinking, Shibdas Ghosh writes
about the significance of Dialectics of Nature as follows:

―…There is an excellent reference to this all-important role of human brain in the introduction to
the invaluable treatise of Engels entitled Dialectics of Nature.‖ (On Theory of Knowledge, SW-IV,
Page 91, bold added)

So Comrade A.M. is entirely incorrect when he says that the contents of Dialectics of Nature cannot
be relied upon as it was not intended to be published by Engels. Moreover, Com. Ashoke Mukherjee
did not touch upon the other quotation to the same effect from the Communist Manifesto. It is very
strange for me as to why Com. Ashoke Mukherjee passed this quotation of Marx and Engels in
complete silence. For the consideration of Com. Ashoke Mukherjee I repeat that quotation too here,
which is as follows:

―The selfish misconception that induces you (the bourgeoisie—S.S.) to transform into eternal
laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and
form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this
misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the
case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden
to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.‖(Communist Manifesto, Chapter-2,
bold added)

What are these ‗eternal laws of nature‘? They are the laws of eternal motion of matter. The general
and eternal motion of matter is the motion of matter as philosophical category. Now the question
is whether matter as philosophical category or the entire material world viewed philosophically, is
governed by the different set of general laws in different times? Whether the entire material world
was being governed in the remote past by the different set of general laws or will the entire material
world be governed by a different set of general laws in the remote future? In fact Shibdas Ghosh has
no idea of the eternity of matter and its motion as discussed above and therefore, he cannot have any
idea of eternal laws of the eternal motion. Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought knows only particular motions of
the material world that is why it defines matter to be as ‗particular, concrete and relative‘. When all
the particular motions are transient and relative then it was obvious that Shibdas Ghosh has defined
matter to be particular and relative. General motion of matter is absolute and eternal that is why the
laws of this motion which govern the entire activities of the material world are also eternal. Shibdas
Ghosh could not comprehend that matter as philosophical category is the objective reality, i.e., real
material entity in motion.

Point no. 2

Eternity of Matter does not mean any Eternal Immutable Particles of Matter

But when Karl Marx recognizes matter to be eternal it does not mean that matter is composed of
some kind of eternal, immutable particles or matter has some kind of eternal structure. No,
dialectical materialism does not recognize any immutable element or any immutable substance
composed of some kind of immutable structure. Rather, the eternity of matter is based on its eternal
motion itself. Matter is an objective reality whose mode of existence is its own eternal motion; a
philosophical category which can only be conceptualised through abstraction. From Marx to Mao all
have rejected such eternity of matter as based on some kind of immutable particles, but they all have
acknowledged the aspect of eternity and absoluteness of matter. Lenin himself wrote:
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 ―The recognition of immutable elements, ―of the immutable substance of things,‖ and so forth, is
not materialism, but metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialism.‖ [Materialism and Empirio-
criticism, Chapter 5, Section 2; italics in the original]

Com. A.M. has cited this quotation of Lenin in his 36-page document at Page 13 in his support to
disprove the eternity of matter but this quotation of Lenin only denounces the metaphysical
conception of eternity or immutability of matter according to which all the material things are
considered to be composed of some immutable elements. Lenin, here only emphasises that there are
no such smallest immutable elements or smallest immutable particles of matter which may be the
eternal foundation or the building blocks of nature. Such immutable smallest particles are considered
to be the foundation of metaphysical materialism. Just after this above quotation Lenin continues to
write:

―That is why J.Dietzgen emphasized that the ‗subject-matter of science is endless‘, that not only
the infinite, but the ‗smallest atom‘ is immeasurable, unknowable to the end, inexhaustible, ‗for nature
in all her parts has no beginning and no end‘.‖ (Ibid)

Lenin also clarified that:

―…The ‗essence‘ of things, or ‗substance‘, is also relative; it expresses only the degree of profundity
of man‘s knowledge of objects; and while yesterday the profundity of this knowledge did not go
beyond the atom, and today does not go beyond the electron and ether, dialectical materialism insists
on the temporary, relative, approximate character of all these milestones in the knowledge of nature
gained by the progressing science of man. The electron is as inexhaustible as the atom, nature is
infinite but it infinitely exists.‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter 5 section 2, page 249)

But Com. A.M. thinks that there can be no recognition of eternity in dialectical materialism, as it is
taught in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought, fights the metaphysical conception of eternity in the name of
dialectics; whereas in dialectical conception of eternity of matter there is nothing immutable and
eternal except the motion of matter itself. Matter has its immutability or eternity in being ever
remaining the same and being ever governed by the eternal laws of its eternal motion. Describing the
immutability of matter as philosophical category Lenin writes:

―From Engels‘ point of view, the only immutability is the reflection by the human mind (whence
there is a human mind) of an external world existing and developing independently of the mind. No
other ‗immutability‘, no other ‗essence‘, no other ‗absolute substance‘, in the sense in which these
concepts were depicted by the empty professorial philosophy, exists for Marx and Engels.‖ (Ibid,
bold added)

Thus the dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin recognises matter itself or matter as
philosophical category to be immutable. In this above quotation of Lenin the only immutability has
been acknowledged matter as such, which, when human mind is present gives its reflection. This
‗only immutability‘ is nothing but abstraction of matter. But in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought there is no
concept like ‗abstraction of matter‘. In fact, in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought there is no place for abstract
real matter cognised by the method of abstraction. According to Shibdas Ghosh abstract cannot be
real

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 Point no. 3

In Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought there is no place for Scientific Abstraction

The use of power of abstraction in comprehending matter or nature is almost absent in Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought and on account of this reason Shibdas Ghosh defines matter as to be particular,
concrete and relative which is totally one-sided, because it is only the perceptual, finite and relative
aspect of matter. The basis for the philosophical concept of matter is the sameness or commonness or
unity of all its particular infinite forms which can only be known by abstraction. Every concrete or
particular form of matter differs from all others but as matter all the concrete or particular forms of
matter are identical or same. This sameness of all the particular forms of matter never changes and
always remains the same. It was the same in the past and it will ever be the same in future, hence,
eternal; and one can view matter and its motion as eternal and absolute only if one has the power of
abstraction. Abstraction may be without reality as of God and abstraction may be with reality as of
matter and laws of nature etc.

Lenin has distinguished two kinds of abstractions as follows:

―Let us recall the excerpt from Feuerbach already quoted, where he rebukes Kant because for the
latter the ‗thing-in-itself‘ is an ‗abstraction without reality‘. For Feuerbach the ‗thing-in-itself‘ is an
‗abstraction with reality‘, that is, a world existing outside us, completely knowable and
fundamentally not different from ‗appearance‘.‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Chapter-2,
section-3)

Lenin writes at another place as follows:

―…Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract (provided it is correct…) does not get
away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the
abstraction of value, etc. in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature
more deeply, truly and completely. From living perception to abstract thought and from this to
practice,--such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality….‖
(Conspectus of Hegel‘s science of logic, Vol. 38, page 171)

Engels has made a mention of the emergence or development of the power of abstraction of human
brain in his Part Played By Labour In Transition From Ape To Man as follows:

―The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the
increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of judgement, gave both labour and
speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development…‖

It was Marx who for the first time discovered two-fold nature of labour or two aspects of labour by
dint of his power of abstraction. Marx discovered the common social reality of abstract human
labour residing within all the particular and concrete forms of labour. He showed that the use value
of any commodity comes out from some particular, concrete or specific kind of labour but the
exchange value of a commodity is only created by the abstract human labour which is the same in
quality and which resides equally within all specific, concrete forms of labour. Making a modest and
honest claim about his discovery of human labour in abstract, Marx writes:

―I was the first to point out and to examine critically this two-fold nature of labour contained in
commodity. As this point is the pivot on which a clear comprehension of Political Economy
turns,…‖ (Capital, chapter-1st, p.49)

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Thus we see Marx gave a leap to the political economy after Ricardo by discovering of abstract
human labour which worked as the pivot on which political economy began to revolve. Explaining
the abstract human labour Marx writes:

―Productive activity, if we leave out of sight its special form, viz., the useful character of labour is
nothing but the expenditure of human labour-power. Tailoring and weaving though qualitatively
different productive activities, are each a productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and
muscles, and in this sense are human labour. They are but two different modes of expending human
labour-power. Of course, this labour-power, which remains the same under all its modifications,…‖
(Ibid, p.51)

Thus to have the basic elementary knowledge concerning the process of abstraction one must go
through the very first chapter of Capital wherein discussing the use value and exchange value of a
commodity Marx showed that every commodity as use value is a product of a particular or concrete
form of labour. Without particular or concrete forms of labour the production of different kinds of
use values is impossible. But the exchange value of any commodity as Marx showed is not measured
by any concrete form of labour. Using the method of abstraction Marx discovered the homogenous
abstract human labour, residing within all concrete or particular forms of labour. For Shibdas Ghosh
and Ashoke Mukherjee human labour can only be concrete and particular labour like sewing,
spinning, sowing or the labour of a joiner or a mason and there can be no abstract human labour.
Without employing the yardsticks of abstract human labour which is common within all concrete
forms of labour one cannot understand and measure the exchange value of commodities. How Marx
discovered the homogenous human labour or human labour in abstract by the method of abstraction.
Marx himself writes:

―…Alongwith the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful
character of the various kinds of labour embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labour;
there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of
labour, human labour in the abstract.‖(Capital, Chapter-1st, p-46, Italics added)

Marx further writes:

―Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the same unsubstantial
reality in each, a mere-congelation of homogenous human labour, of labour-power expended without
regard to the mode of its expenditure. All that these things now tell us is that human labour power
has been expended in their production that human labour is embodied in them. When looked at as
crystals of this social substance common to them all, they are—Values.‖ (Ibid)

Marx further writes:

―…The labour, however, that forms the substance of value, is homogenous human labour,
expenditure of one uniform labour-power…‖ (Ibid, page-46)

Thus Marx established that commodities as exchange value are not the product of qualitatively
different kinds of concrete labour but of abstract human labour i.e. labour as the expenditure of
human energy manual and mental. It is this qualitatively identical abstract human labour that can
compare the value of most diverse commodities for their exchange; because, this qualitatively
identical human labour resides equally within all concrete, particular or specific kinds of labour. Here
we can conceive how the abstract resides within the concrete. It clarifies the dialectical relationship of
abstract and concrete, which Shibdas Ghosh could never understand. There is no place for
homogenous or abstract human labour in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought. Had Marx kept sticking to the

9
metaphysical or one-sided way of thinking like his predecessors that labour is only particular,
concrete and relative he could not have discovered the abstract human labour i.e. the measuring
yardstick of value in commodities. Consequently, he could not have discovered surplus value, profit,
the law of average rate of profit and the law of value etc. etc. The great economists like Adam Smith
and Ricardo even could not discover the two fold nature of labour. They only kept confined to the
qualitatively different, concrete and particular forms of labour, But Marx discovered in all the
concrete particular forms of labour the reality of homogenous human labour or the human labour in
abstract by way of abstraction. Showing the significance of abstraction, Marx wrote:

―…The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple.
Nevertheless, the human mind has for 2000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it; because,
the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of
economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of
abstraction must replace both.‖ (Preface To The First German Edition Of The First Volume of
Capital, July 25, 1867, bold added)

Karl Marx wrote about his method of analysis based on method of abstraction, which he employed
in his Capital in the following words:

―The method of analysis which I have employed, and which had not previously been applied to
economic subjects makes the reading of the first chapters rather arduous, and it is to be feared that
the French public, always impatient to come to a conclusion, eager to know the connection between
general principles and the immediate questions that have aroused their passions, may be disheartened
because they will be unable to move on at once.‖ (Preface to the French Edition, March 18, 1872)

In no piece of literature or speeches delivered by Shibdas Ghosh we find any mention of two-fold
nature of labour and the concept of human labour in abstract. The outlook and attitude of Shibdas
Ghosh as we study is based everywhere on ‗particular, concrete and relative‘ and abstract reality or
abstract existence and corresponding abstract truth is not found in the ‗dialectical‘ dictionary of
Shibdas Ghosh. I am afraid if Shibdas Ghosh understood the very first chapter of Marx‘s Capital.
Lenin also wrote:

―It is impossible completely to understand Marx‘s Capital, and especially its first chapter, without
having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel‘s Logic. Consequently, half a century
later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!‖ (Conspectus of Hegel‘s Science of Logic, CW-38, p-
180, Italics added)

The first chapter of Capital has been held by Marx himself to be difficult to understand because its
understanding requires a very high degree of power of abstraction. Marx developed the political
economy into a science and he himself writes:

―Every beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences. To understand the first chapter, especially, the
section that contains the analysis of commodities, will, therefore, present the greatest difficulty.‖
(Preface To The First German Edition Of The First Volume of Capital, July 25, 1867)

Thus to understand Marx it is essential to understand the first chapter of Capital and to
understand the first chapter of Capital it requires an adequate power of abstraction because without
that one cannot understand the two-fold nature of labour namely the concrete labour and the abstract
human labour and the relationship of the two i.e. how the abstract resides within concrete. Let us
now discuss the abstraction of matter.

10
 Point no. 4

If Abstraction of ‗Capital‘ Remains Unaltered

Why not ‗Abstraction of Matter‘?

To understand the abstraction of matter and motion let us read how Karl Marx defined and
described the abstraction of ‗capital‘. About the abstraction of capital, Marx writes:

―Capital consists not only of means of subsistence, instruments of labour and raw materials, not
only of material products; it consists just as much of exchange values. All the products of which it
consists are commodities. Capital is, therefore, not only a sum of material products; it is a sum of
commodities, of exchange values, of social magnitudes. Capital remains the same whether we put
cotton in place of wool, rice in place of wheat or steamships in place of railways, provided only that
the cotton, the rice, the steamships—the body of capital—have the same exchange value…The body
of capital can change continually without the capital suffering the slightest alteration.‖ (Wage
Labour and Capital, Italics original, bold added)

We see here that capital has two aspects. One aspect is of its particular or concrete forms and the
other aspect of its being abstract. From the point of view of its particular forms capital is alterable and
changeable but from the point of view of its abstract aspect it remains unalterable and unchangeable.
Now to understand the objective reality i.e. matter from the point of view of its two aspects like
capital we have apply the same method as Marx has applied in his Capital, to understand the
underlying social reality of commodity, capital, labour, value etc. etc. and likewise the abstract aspect
of capital, as shown above by Marx, the abstract aspect of matter also remains unaltered or
unchanged in spite of the fact that the forms of matter go on changing continually. Particular forms
of matter go on transforming into higher forms without matter itself suffering the slightest alteration
or change. And therefore, according to the Dialectical Materialism as founded by Marx and Engels
both matter and its motion from the point of view of their abstract aspect are eternal and absolute.
But Shibdas Ghosh is deadly opposed to call matter to be eternal and absolute on the ground that it is
continually changing. Like all metaphysicians Shibdas Ghosh also remained incapable of viewing
anything as to be constituted by two contradictory aspects. According to metaphysics if a thing is
continually changing it cannot be eternal at the same time; either a thing is changeable or
unchangeable but cannot be both; either a thing is mutable or immutable but cannot be both. But
dialectics has bombarded such kind of approach or method of thinking. According to dialectical
materialism of Marx and Engels matter which is itself in eternal motion is viewed to be possessing
two contradictory aspects i.e. the aspect of ever-changing and the aspect of ever remaining the same.
Even a school-student can well understand that the aspect of matter of being ever remaining the same
is diametrically opposed to the aspect of being ever-changing. Shibdas Ghosh acknowledges only one
aspect of matter i.e. the aspect of its changeability and leaves out of consideration the other aspect i.e.
the aspect of its un-changeability owing to which it ever remains the same. Matter despite ever being
in motion ever remains the same because, the motion of matter is itself eternal and absolute.

Point no. 5

How Abstraction of Matter and Motion is Made

In point no. 1 above I have discussed a long quotation of Shibdas Ghosh from his On Theory of
Knowledge wherein he writes: ―But is matter eternal, abstract, absolute? No,‖. Here it is clear beyond
any doubt that according to Shibdas Ghosh, matter is not abstract which clearly proves that
according to Shibdas Ghosh abstraction of matter is not real but ‗unreal‘ which he terms ‗not-matter‘
11
as already has been discussed in point no. 1. Shibdas Ghosh and his adherents have no conception of
abstraction of matter and motion. Abstraction of matter is called matter as such and abstraction of
motion is known as motion as such. And if one has no conception of matter and motion as such, one
cannot understand the true conception of universal matter and universal motion and consequently,
the conception of the absoluteness and eternity of matter and motion. So, to know matter and
motion as such it needs the power of abstraction. The power of abstraction of Marx as we have seen
above discovered two-fold nature of labour i.e. concrete and abstract. The abstract residing within the
concrete and this was done by Marx by way of ignoring all the specific differences of the concrete
forms of labour and reaching the residue namely abstract human labour. Likewise applying this
power of abstraction to matter Engels writes in his Anti-Duhring:

―Matter as such is a pure creation of thought and an abstraction. We leave out of account the
qualitative differences of things in lumping them together as corporeally existing things under the
concept matter. Hence matter as such, as distinct from definite, existing pieces of matter, is not
anything sensuously existing. If natural science directed its effort to seeking out uniform matter as
such, to reducing qualitative differences to merely quantitative differences in combining identical the
smallest particles, it would be doing the same thing as demanding to see fruit as such instead of
cherries, pears, apples or the mammal as such instead of cat, dogs, sheep, etc., gas as such, metal,
stone, chemical compound as such, motion as such.‖ {Appendix (end page), bold added}

Regarding the Abstraction of Both Matter and Motion Engels writes:

―…Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted,
and motion as such nothing but the totality of all sensuously perceptible forms of motion; words like
matter and motion are nothing but abbreviations in which we comprehend many different sensuously
perceptible things according to their common properties. Hence matter and motion can be known in
no other way than by investigation of the separate material things and forms of motion, and by
knowing these, we also pro tantono matter and motion as such. Consequently, in saying that we do not
know what time …Nageli merely says that first of all we make abstractions of the real world through
our mind, and then cannot know these self-made abstractions because they are creations of thought
and not sensuous objects, while all knowing is sensuous measurement! This is just like the difficulty
mentioned by Hegel; we can eat cherries and plums, but not fruit, because no one has so far eaten
fruit as such.‖ (Dialectics of Nature,page 236, bold added)

Thus the concept matter has been abstracted from the totality of material things so the concept of
matter is distinct from the totality of material things. No doubt that without knowing the totality of
material things one by one through scientific experimentation we cannot know and we cannot
abstract this common characteristics or oneness or unity of matter and motion. The unity or oneness
of matter is itself matter as such and the unity and oneness of all the particular motions is termed
motion as such or universal motion. But Com. A.M. ignoring the significance of abstraction of
matter and motion defends and justifies Shibdas Ghosh. Giving subjective explanation to the above
cited quotation from Engels, Com. A.M. writes in his 36-page document as follows:

―…So recognition of matter as a whole as the sum/conglomerate/ensemble of all specific forms of

matter does not go against or undermine the concept of matter in general. Comrade Ghosh did not
commit any error on this score.‖(Page 26)

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has confused the abstraction or unity or oneness of matter with the
totality of all material things which are sensually perceivable whereas matter as such cannot be
sensually perceived and which can only be conceived by knowing the common properties and by
way of ignoring all the specific characteristics. Materialist dialectics is not just empiricism. To
12
understand matter merely as totality of all material things without knowing their unity is nothing but
empiricism and is tantamount to the abandoning of unity in diversity and the dialectical relationship
of abstract and concrete; general and particular. Karl Marx did not equate the abstraction of labour to
the totality of all kinds of concrete forms of human labour. Had he done so he would have remained
in the bounds of classical political economy. Engels also did not limit himself to the empirical
understanding of matter by just saying that ‗matter is nothing but totality of all material things‘ rather
he went ahead to add ‗from which the concept matter is abstracted‘. But Com. A.M. stops Engels
half way according to his own convenience. If ‗matter is nothing but the totality of all material
things‘ then what was the need for Engels and Marx to make abstraction of matter from the totality
of all these material things. In fact the ‗philosophical matter‘ of Shibdas Ghosh is just the totality of
all different material things without any kind of unity among them. Unity among them all can only
be known by way of abstraction. In fact, the empiricists, nominalists and the rationalists renounce
dialectics of matter. The former two view or define matter just from the point of view of its
perceptual or particular aspect i.e., without its rational aspect and the rationalists define it just
keeping in view its rational aspect i.e., without its particular or perceptual aspect. In fact Shibdas
Ghosh is a Nominalist. Marx and Engels in their THE HOLY FAMILY have stated that:
―Nominalism, the first form of materialism, is chiefly found among the English schoolmen.‖
(Ch.VI). The Nominalists maintained that only individual or particular things exist and that
generality belongs only to words. Here I want to put some straight questions to Com. A. M. which
are as follows: is the generality of matter just an empty word? Does the generality of matter not
correspond to any objective reality? Is there no generality of the totality of all particular material
things? Is there any way other than abstraction to discover or know the generality of the totality of
all material things? Does the generality of matter not reside equally within all its individualities?
Does the generality of matter changes with the change in circumstances? Was the generality of
matter different in the past from what it is today or will it be different in future from what it is today?
And if not then what is the nature of the generality or general aspect of matter? Is not the generality
of matter then absolute and eternal? And lastly, does the absolute and eternal generality of matter not
reside within each particular, concrete and relative individual? Only a Nominalist can find an escape
route from all these questions by running away pronouncing that ‗the generality belongs only to
words‘.

Point no. 6

The Unity or Generality of the World is Eternal

Comrades! We see around us infinite diverse forms of matter. Sun, stars, planets, Moon, ocean,
mountains, forests and animals etc. all are different forms of matter at different levels of its existence.
The question arises that on what basis we call them all as forms of matter? If they all are forms of
matter then matter must be the unity or general reality or the oneness of all. The sum total of all the
infinite diverse forms of matter constitutes the universe. The entity which is common in all the
infinite different forms of the universe can only be termed as ‗universal‘ or general. Universal or
general is the unity or the sameness of all the infinite different forms. The universality, generality
and the unity of the material world or matter as philosophical category, all are synonymous concepts.
Regarding the unity of the material world in response to Duhring‘s concept, Engels wrote:

―The unity of the world does not consist in its being, although the being is a pre-condition of its
unity, as it must certainly first be before it can be one. Being, indeed, is always an open question
beyond the point where our sphere of observation ends. The real unity of the world consists in its
materiality, and this is proved not by a few juggled phrases, but by a long and wearisome
development of philosophy and natural science.‖ (Anti-Duhring, Part 1st, ch.4th, emphasis added.)
13
 Duhring claimed himself to be a materialist but his conception of the unity of the world was
idealistic. According to Duhring the unity of the world was in its being i.e. in its objective existence.
Engels exposed this concept unity because if unity of the world lies in its being or in its objective
existence then there will be no difference between the objective idealists and the materialists qua the
concept of unity of the world. Because the objective idealists like Hegel also acknowledge the ‗being‘
or the objective existence of the material world but only as the external manifestation of the Absolute
Idea and consequently the idea or spirit becomes or forms the unity of the material world and as a
result the material world becomes bereft of its eternity. And to defend the eternity of the material
world Engels wrote: “The unity of the world does not consist in its being, although the being is a pre-condition
of its unity,……… The real unity of the world consists in its materiality,”

Comrade Ashoke Mukherjee nowhere in his 36-page document wrote a single word regarding
the unity or universality of matter. He only says that matter is universal but does not tell us on what
ground is matter universal? He says matter is universal and infinite but does not tell us how and why?
No particular form of matter can be universal, omnipresent or infinite because the quality and
properties of every particular mode of matter are different from the other. Even if he considers that at
everywhere in space and time some particular form of matter whatsoever is present and on this
ground matter is universal, omnipresent and infinite then he is totally wrong because in that case
different particular things become present at different places and at different points of time and no
single entity can be called to be present everywhere in all times. Position of Duhring on this issue was
that the unity of the material world lies in its existence or in its being. Engels criticized Duhring
saying that the existence of the material world itself does not prove its unity or its oneness. The
oneness or unity of the material world Engels stated lies in its materiality which means that every
particular form of matter which is different from every other possesses the common property of
materiality. And this common property of materiality of all the particular things is the oneness or the
unity or the universality of the material world. On the basis of this oneness alone matter is called to
be omnipresent or universal. Universal or omnipresent is that which exists universally or everywhere.
If all the particular things do not have any common property or do not have any sameness then
matter cannot be called universal or omnipresent. The collection or summation of different kinds of
things which have no oneness cannot be termed as universal because they are all different. To be
universal they all must have some common characteristics or some kind of oneness or unity. This
unity or oneness or universality can only be known through a long process of scientific
experimentations and investigation. And then only the unity or oneness can be abstracted from all
the different things by the method of abstraction. The abstraction of matter ever remains the same, as
has already been stated it was the same in the past; it is same at the present and it will be same in the
future. And this matter as such like the abstract human labour resides within all its transitory,
particular, concrete and relative forms. In other words eternal resides within the transitory; absolute
within the relative; abstract within concrete or universal within the individual so on and so forth.
Without the correct philosophical understanding of matter we cannot understand the eternal and
absolute aspect of matter. And that is why Lenin has defined matter as a ‗philosophical category‘
which can never become obsolete.

Point no. 7

Fundamental drawback of Shibdas Ghosh‘s conception of matter

In fact, the fundamental drawback of Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought lies in his one-sided definition
of matter itself. Shibdas Ghosh defines matter as to be ‗particular, concrete and relative‘, which is
completely wrong and one-sided from the dialectical point of view. Even Shibdas Ghosh could never
conceive the contradiction i.e. two contradictory aspects contained in his own definition of matter.
14
The question is: on what basis Shibdas Ghosh has used the helping verb ‗is‘ while defining matter as
to be ‗particular, concrete and relative‘. The use of the helping verb ‗is‘ for defining matter itself
implies that matter always is singular in number and not plural. It connotes that one and the same
entity called matter is manifested in all its infinite particular, concrete and relative forms. The basis of
philosophical definition of matter can only be its universality equally residing within its all particular,
concrete and relative or in one word finite forms. All the particular or finite forms of matter are
sensually perceivable and observable but matter itself is a conceptually conceivable objective or
physical reality residing within all particular forms. Thus it is sheer empiricism to define matter as to
be ‗particular, concrete and relative‘. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao nowhere defined matter
like Shibdas Ghosh as to be particular, concrete and relative. What does it mean when we say that
matter is ever-changing? And what does it mean when we say that matter ever remains the same? We
see by our experience that no particular or finite form of matter ever remains the same. Every
particular or finite form of matter, in its process of change at some nodal point necessarily transforms
into other, hence every finite without exception is transitory. And because every particular or finite
form of matter is transitory so no transitory or finite form of matter can be accorded the status of
being termed as ever remaining the same. Then the fundamental question arises: if no particular or
finite form of matter has the attribute of ever remaining the same then what remains in matter which
can ever remain the same? It must be something opposite to the transitory because no transitory can
ever remain the same. Hence, there must be something eternal residing within every transitory. The
great founder of dialectical materialism Karl Marx acknowledges it. Both Marx and Engels have
acknowledged matter and motion and the laws of its motion to be eternal and absolute.

Point no. 8

Matter and its forms

Only a dialectician can distinguish between matter and its particular forms. Only a dialectician
possesses the capability of viewing matter in all its contradictory aspects a metaphysician does not.
Owing to its transient motion every particular form of matter gets transformed qualitatively into
another but matter as such owing to its eternal motion, never gets transformed qualitatively into
anything other, it always remains the same. every particular form of matter is transitory but matter
itself is not transitory, it is permanent or eternal; the existence of any particular form of matter is
conditional because it requires certain specific and external conditions for its existence so it is relative
but the existence of matter as such is unconditional because it exists in all conditions, its existence is
not relative because, its existence is not subject to any external conditions, hence, absolute; every
particular form of matter comes into being and goes out of being but matter itself never comes into
being and goes out of being, it was there it is there and it will be there forever; every particular form
of matter has its birth and death but matter itself has no birth and no death, it is immortal and eternal
; the particular form of matter is destructible but matter itself is indestructible; the particular form has
its limited duration of existence but matter itself is eternal; the existence of every particular form of
matter is finite in time and space but matter itself is infinite; so on and so forth, such are the
contradictory aspects of matter. Though Shibdas Ghosh, acknowledges matter and its forms as two
different concepts but he is quite unable to combine these two aspects dialectically in a single unity.
For example Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―…We have it from science that matter begets matter. Matter can neither be created nor
destroyed. It has neither origin nor end, although a particular matter has both origin and end.‖(Some
Aspects of Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, SW-2, p 153)

15
 After reading this excerpt of Shibdas Ghosh we come to know that every particular form of
matter has both origin and end whereas matter itself has no origin and end. But Shibdas Ghosh and
his adherents are totally incapable to conceive the dialectics of particular form of matter and matter
itself; of that which has both origin and end and that which has no origin and no end i.e. of transient
and eternal. The transient and relative is that which has both origin and end, and eternal is that
which has no origin and no end. Matter as philosophical category has no origin and no end but if
Shibdas Ghosh refuses to recognize matter as philosophical category itself to be a material entity then
who can make his adherents to understand that matter and its laws of motion are absolute and
eternal. These are the alphabets of dialectics.

Point no. 9

Matter is ever changing but matter ever remains the same.

These two contradictory statements regarding the nature of matter, that matter is ever changing
and matter ever remains the same, are opposed to each other i.e., they both together constitute a
contradiction. The above described two contradictory statements relating to the nature of matter
express nothing but the two contradictory aspects of motion of matter namely the transient and
eternal as discussed above. Matter always simultaneously exists in two modes i.e., in transient mode
and in eternal mode corresponding to its two aspects of motion, transient and eternal. In terms of its
transient mode of existence matter is finite and relative but in terms of its eternal mode matter is
eternal, absolute and infinite. Hence, in terms of its former mode matter is ever-changing and in
terms of its latter mode matter ever remains the same. But Shibdas Ghosh acknowledges only the
relative aspect of matter and renounces its absolute and eternal aspect saying that because, matter is
ever-changing so it cannot be eternal. it only reveals his utter ignorance of dialectics itself as he
acknowledges only the relative without the absolute. In fact, Shibdas Ghosh could never understand
the dialectical unity of particular and general aspects of matter. The generality of matter is nothing
but that commonality or unity or sameness which resides in all its particular forms. When a
particular form of matter gets transformed into a qualitatively different particular form, it does not
take place with a complete break from the former form of matter, rather, the discontinuity or break is
always associated or accompanied with the continuity. The aspect of continuity of matter in its ever
changing process never gets broken. In the process of constant and eternal change of matter the
aspect of its continuity always remains there and it is this aspect of continuity of its movement which
keeps matter ever the same or eternal.

Point no. 10

Matter is not only Discrete but Continuous too.

According to Dialectical Materialism, matter is both discrete and continuous. But the answer
regarding this fundamental question that we find impliedly in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought is that matter
is only discrete, not continuous. Because Shibdas Ghosh defines matter as to be particular, concrete
and relative. According to this definition, matter cannot be held to be continuous because every
particular, concrete, relative form of matter has its own boundary in space and time. So there is no
place for continuity of matter in this concept of matter. And because every distinct form of matter is
qualitatively different from other nothing can be presumed to be present everywhere in space and
time. Thus when we define matter as to be particular concrete and relative then matter cannot be said
to be universal or omniscient in space and time. The universe becomes an agglomeration or
collection of different things, one here and the other there. Every particular, concrete and relative
along with its particular form of motion and its particular laws exists between two nodal points in
space and time. At every nodal point of change one particular form of matter and its motion takes a
16
leap into another particular form of matter and its motion and in this view neither matter nor its
motion can be said to be of continuous nature.

According to the dialectical conception of change and movement, matter moves with leaps or
breaks with continuity. No leap or break can happen in the movement of matter without its
continuity. Here again we find that two contradictory aspects of motion namely break and
continuity, form a dialectical unity. The meaning of the concept ‗break‘ or discontinuity is: that a
particular form of motion takes a leap into some other particular form of motion. And the concept
‗continuity‘ connotes that along with the break in a particular form of motion the general motion of
matter maintains its continuity as it is. At some nodal point one particular form of matter and its
motion gets transformed into other particular form of matter along with its corresponding form of
motion but along with its particular form matter itself does not get transformed into any other thing
or entity, in other words matter as such remains unaffected and uninfluenced at every nodal point of
its change. Forms of matter go on transforming but matter continues to be the same. The dialectical
principle of continuity with the break clearly shows that the aspect of break only refers to the
particular form of matter and the aspect of continuity refers to matter as such or the abstraction of
matter and motion. So we can clearly comprehend that matter and its motion have two aspects i.e.
the aspect of changeability with leaps and the aspect of continuity or un-changeability. But Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought acknowledges only one aspect of matter and its motion i.e. the aspect of its
changeability and abandons its another aspect i.e. the aspect of its continuity or un-changeability.
Continuity of matter is eternal because it never gets broken in the continual process of its change.
The continuity of matter never gets altered and that is why Dialectical Materialism holds that matter
is immortal. All the forms of matter are mortal but matter itself is immortal; all the forms of matter
appear and disappear but matter itself never appears and disappears; in the process of its change all
its forms die but matter itself never dies. The comprehension of these two opposite aspects of matter
and its motion i.e. the aspect of mortality and immortality or the aspect of changeability and un-
changeability depends solely on the comprehension of abstraction of matter and motion, i.e. the
comprehension of these two opposite aspects needs the power of abstraction and Shibdas Ghosh‘s
thought has a total lack of the power of abstraction. So the aspect of un-changeability of matter is
totally missing in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought and Com. Ashoke Mukherjee also understands only one
aspect of matter i.e. the aspect of its change and changeability. I do not blame Com. Ashoke
Mukherjee for his limitation to view the aspect of un-changeability of matter and its motion because
this limitation is embedded in ‗Shibdas Ghosh‘s dialectics‘. The aspect of continuity or un-
changeability of matter and its motion represents the aspect of eternity and absoluteness of matter
and its motion whereas the aspect of discontinuity or discreteness of matter represents the particular,
concrete and relative forms of matter and its motion. The aspect of discontinuity connotes that
matter is ever changing and transforms itself from one form into another i.e. it appears and
disappears or comes into being and passes away, whereas the aspect of continuity connotes that
matter with its motion ever remains the same. The following quotation of Marx may help to
understand the aspect of perpetuity or eternity of matter:

―The owner of labour-power is mortal. If then his appearance in the market is to be continuous,
and the continuous conversion of money into capital assumes this, the seller of labour-power must
perpetuate himself, ‗in the way that every living individual perpetuates himself by procreation.‘….‖
(Capital, Vol. 1, chapter-VI)

Matter also perpetuates itself by its own way of procreation i.e. by its continuity after every break.
Break represents mortality of forms of matter; continuity represents immortality or eternity of matter.

17
 Point no. 11

Matter as Philosophical Category is Eternal

Marx has termed earth as matter to be eternal (see) which implies nothing but that matter as
philosophical category is eternal. Classification of things, species etc. is impossible without
abstraction. When we put many things into one class we do it on the basis of their oneness or unity.
For example the classification of reptiles, birds, fish, animals, fruit etc. etc. all have been formed on
the basis of their oneness and this oneness existing in many things is philosophically drawn off from
them by way of abstraction. When we say dog, then we do not mean any particular dog rather we
mean only the oneness that exists in all the dogs equally. Every particular dog is different from all
other dogs and at the same time is one with all. The oneness of animal kingdom is more general than
the oneness of species bird. Bird is also a member of animal kingdom because it possesses the same
oneness as all the member of animal kingdom do but every animal is not a bird. Thus there is class
within class or category within category. The ultimate and final category encircling all that exist is
termed as matter. Everything that exists objectively has oneness or is in unity with all others. In the
preceding point I have shown that the unity or oneness of all the members of category matter ever
remains the same hence absolute and eternal. If anybody who holds that the unity or oneness of the
material world also changes with time and circumstances is not a dialectical materialist. The
fundamental tenet of dialectical materialism is that the unity or oneness of the material world ever
remains the same which means it never changes which further means it is absolute and eternal and it
is only on the basis of this fundamental tenet Lenin wrote:

―This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is
given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations,
while existing independently of them. Therefore, to say, that such a concept can become
―antiquated‖ is childish talk, a senseless repetition of the arguments of fashionable reactionary
philosophy.‖(Materialism and Emprio-criticism, chapter 2, section 5)

Thus the concept matter denotes the unity or oneness of all the things existing in the universe and
this unity or oneness of the material world never gets changed or antiquated. This unity or oneness of
the material world has been described by Lenin as follows:

―…the sole ‗property‘ of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is
the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside the mind.‖ (ibid, section 2, emphasis
original)

As the oneness or the unity of the material world is described in singular number so it should be
conceptualized as a singular entity. The material world is the movement of this single entity.

Lenin describes the movement of the single entity as follows:

―…The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the
movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matterexpresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given us in sensation...‖
(Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter 5, section 3, emphasis added)

But Lenin has clearly stated that no development of science now can change the concept of matter
established by philosophical materialism. In this regard Lenin has clearly stated:

(a) ―…The teachings of science on the structure of matter, on the chemical composition
of food, on the atom and the electron, may and constantly do become obsolete, but
18
 the truth that man is unable to subsist on ideas and to beget children by Platonic love
alone never becomes obsolete…‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter 3,
section 5)

(b) ―…―Matter disappears‖ means that the limit within which we have hitherto known
matter disappears and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter
are likewise disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary
(impenetrability inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and
characteristic only of certain states of matter…‖(ibid, chapter 5, section 2)

Shibdas Ghosh says in his book Marxism and Dialectical Materialism under the subheading ‗Cause of
motion is inherent in matter‘ as follows:

―…The concept of matter that has developed on the basis of knowledge gathered from the splitting
of atom, from radioactivity and the theory of relativity is such that one no longer has to look for the
basic cause of motion outside of matter….Modern science has concluded that the basic cause of
motion of matter is within matter itself; that is, basic cause of motion of matter is internal, not
external.‖ (SW-2, p.140)

When Shibdas Ghosh says that ‗the concept of matter that has developed on the basis of knowledge
gathered from the splitting of atom, from radioactivity and the theory of relativity‘ then he forgets
that the splitting of atom took place in Lenin‘s time and on the splitting of atom a great hue and cry
was raised by the enemies of dialectical materialism that matter has disappeared and the concept
matter gone to the winds. On such a hue and cry Lenin wrote his celebrated book titled as
Materialism and Empirio-criticism in which he dealt with such people harshly and took a strong
position in favour of the dialectical materialistic concept of matter as established by Marx and
Engels. Lenin rebuked those who were crying that the concept of matter has been done away with
and called such type of hue and cry as childish talks.

By holding that the modern science has developed the concept of matter and gave it a dialectical
character by discovering its self-movement Shibdas Ghosh either has purposely given a covert blow
to the dialectics and dialectical concept of matter established by Marx and Engels or he is absolutely
ignorant of the dialectics of Marx and Engels. To hold that the discoveries of modern science have
developed the concept of matter to a new height is tantamount to that the materialistic and dialectical
concept of matter established by Marx and Engels had become antiquated and in that case Shibdas
Ghosh also falls within the circle of those reactionary philosophers whom Lenin has so designated.
Lenin rebuked those in plane words who cried that the concept of matter has become antiquated and
a new concept as to be formulated. The definition of matter which Lenin gave on the basis of the
teachings of Marx and Engels can never become obsolete as Lenin himself in plain and unambiguous
terms has declared it. By asserting that the modern science has given a dialectical concept of matter
based on its self-movement, Shibdas Ghosh has utterly disregarded Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Point no. 12

Does Comrade A.M. Understand

What Matter as Philosophical Category Is?

Let me now discuss the understanding of Com. A.M. as to what is meant by matter as a
philosophical category, but prior to that it would be proper to place here his admission as to the

19
drawback of Shibdas Ghosh‘s view as to the concept of matter as philosophical category. He writes at
page-14 of his 36-page document as follows:

―It is true that the way Comrade Ghosh discussed the question of matter is very clumsy, murky and
jumbled up. Its basic shortcoming is that the presentation does not differentiate between the
philosophical concept of matter (as a category in materialist philosophy) and specific forms of matter
dealt with in the special sciences. He discussed all things together without regard to the specificity of
the separate issues…‖

Here, Com. A.M. patently, seems to be giving concession to Shibdas Ghosh and has made a
vain try to save him from complete disaster. It is not only, that Shibdas Ghosh, ―does not
differentiate between the philosophical concept of matter and specific forms of matter‖, he does not
recognize matter as philosophical category even of material nature. I have shown in the very
beginning that according to Shibdas Ghosh the abstraction of matter is ―not-matter‖, which is
associated with all particular forms of matter. According to Shibdas Ghosh matter as philosophical
category is -- ‗not-matter‘. Comrade A.M., in contrast of Shibdas Ghosh does view matter as
philosophical category to be of material nature but without motion. in fact, owing to his
metaphysical approach towards viewing matter as a philosophical category, Com. Ashoke
Mukherjee has got trapped in an insoluble paradox. On the one hand he disregards the property of
even change or motion of matter in addition to the specific properties of matter when considering it
as a philosophical category; on the other hand he holds that despite the property of change of matter
being disregarded, matter should not be viewed as unchangeable. Is it not paradoxical and
ridiculous? When once, in your imagination, you disregard or ignore the property of motion of
matter then how can you imagine it still to be in motion? To clarify the paradox let us read some
passages from Com. Ashoke Mukherjee‘s 36-page document. He writes:

(i) ―When matter is defined as a philosophical category in dialectical materialism, all other
properties of matter or material bodies—physical, chemical, biological, geological,
astronomical, etc.—are disregarded, including the property of its mutability, motion,
evolution, interaction, concatenation, and so on. When these separate properties are to
be discussed, we have to lay our hands on to the cogent and specific forms of
matter.‖(page-14, bold added)
(ii) ―…First we have to keep in mind that when we approach the material world just as such
with no regard to the question of its development, it only exists; we simply acknowledge
this existence as a fact and define it as a philosophical category. We do not look for any
unity of opposites in it.‖(Page 23)
(iii) ―Matter is uncreatable and indestructible, and is therefore, universal in both space and
time (in the large scale you cannot separate space from time). But matter is changeable
and hence cannot be eternal. The fact that we disregard the changeability of matter (in
addition to its other properties) when considering it as a philosophical category does
not make matter unchangeable and eternal.‖ (From sr.no. 9, p.2, bold added)

Thus it is a clear cut paradox in Com. A.M.‘s thinking. On the one hand he says, ‗We
disregard the changeability of matter when we consider it as a philosophical category‘ but on the
other hand he says that this disregard of the property of changeability of matter ‗does not make
matter unchangeable and eternal‘. (?) It simply means that we cannot disregard the property of
motion of matter even when we consider it as a philosophical category. How can it be, that by its
definition matter as a philosophical category is viewed without motion and beyond its definition
matter is always in motion? In fact the root cause of this absurd paradox lies in the denial of

20
 absolute aspect of motion, which can never be disregarded or separated from matter even when it
is considered as a philosophical category.

(iv) ―To disregard all the specific properties of matter, however, when viewing it as a
philosophical category, is not tantamount to viewing matter as unchangeable, immutable,
static, or inert. By taking matter as an absolute entity, Comrade Shyam Sundarji has
probably concluded such an equation. Hence he raised the objection: since matter as a
philosophical category is absolute it cannot change.‖ (Page-14, bold original)

Thus, first Comrade A.M. acknowledges motion to be a specific property of matter and disregards it
along with other specific properties of matter while considering it as a philosophical category, then
gets upset and pronounces in the very same breath that it ‗is not tantamount to viewing matter as
unchangeable, immutable, static, or inert‘. Then, perfectly confident in himself Comrade A.M.
throws his own paradox at me inferring and opining that ―By taking matter as an absolute entity,
Comrade Shyam Sundarji has probably concluded such an equation. Hence he raised the
objection: since matter as a philosophical category is absolute it cannot change.‖ But the truth is
quite otherwise. I hold matter as philosophical category to be absolute not because that it is devoid of
motion but because it is always in absolute motion. In Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought there is no
recognition of absolute motion and this creates the whole problem. So, the most fundamental and
serious question that arises from the above cited passages is about Comrade A.M.‘s conception of
motion itself. Comrade A.M. thinks that motion too is a specific property of specific forms of matter,
which can be disregarded or ignored along with other specific properties. In fact Comrade A.M. is in
total agreement with Shibdas Ghosh‘s concept of matter and motion. According to Shibdas Ghosh,
both matter and its motion are particular, concrete and relative. And when motion itself is
acknowledged to be particular, concrete and relative associated with corresponding particular,
concrete and relative forms of matter then obviously one is obliged to disregard all the specific forms
of motions too along with all other specific properties related to specific forms of matter. Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought does not know at all that dialectics cannot stand upon the ‗particular, concrete and
relative‘ concept of motion; Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought does not know at all that the emergence or
discovery of materialist dialectics is historically connected with the discovery of Universal Motion.
Marx and Engels discovered that all the particular forms of motion are the manifestations of the
same universal motion. Engels writes:

―…The unity of all motion in nature is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific
fact.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, Ch- From the history of science, p-197)

Engels writes:

―…the transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces
operative in the first instance in inorganic nature—mechanical force and its complement, so-called
potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical
energy—are different forms of manifestation of universal motion, which pass into one another in
definite proportions so that in place of a certain quantity of the one which disappears…‖(Ludwig
Feuerbach, Page-46, Bold added)

Referring to the particular forms of motion Engels again writes:

―…they themselves prove in action that they are forms of one and the same motion by passing into
one another under given condition.‖(Dialectics of Nature, p-78)

Distinguishing motion as such from the particular forms of motion, Engels writes:
21
 ―[Motion as the Mode of Existence of Matter] –Motion is the mode of existence of matter, hence more
than a mere property of it. There is no matter without motion, nor could there ever have
been….Neither motion as such nor any of its forms, such as mechanical force, can therefore, be
separated from matter nor opposed to it as something apart or alien, without leading to an
absurdity.‖ (Anti-Duhring, Page 388, emphasis added)

Here I want to put a straight question to Com. A.M.: What is the distinction between motion as
such and its forms? The crux of dialectics wholly lies in the answer to this question. Have you read
anywhere in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought regarding motion as such? This is the fundamental handicap
of Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought and it is the fundamental reason that Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought and his
adherents like Com. A.M. vehemently oppose the conception of absoluteness and eternity of matter
and motion. They should learn that no particular form of motion is absolute but motion as such is
absolute.

Thus forms of motion and motion as such have to be conceived differently like matter as such and
particular forms of matter. When we say that matter ever remains the same; matter is indestructible;
matter has neither origin nor end; matter was always there and will always be there then we refer
specifically to matter as such or matter as philosophical category and not to its any particular form or
all its particular forms jointly. We talk of universal matter but universal matter cannot exist without
its corresponding universal motion. Just as matter is a philosophical category in the same way
motion is also a philosophical category called as universal motion and it is this universal motion
associated with universal matter that renders it the attribute of absoluteness and eternity.Matter and
motion are not two different entities rather motion is the attribute of matter. Matter without motion
cannot be conceived and in the same way motion without matter is also inconceivable. They are
inseparable. And thus when we abstract universal matter from all its particular forms, we also
abstract general or universal motion from all the particular forms of motion. Universal matter and
universal motion are inseparable. When we talk about the laws of general motion then we mean only
the laws of the universal motion. General or universal motion of the universe remains ever the same
and it is the unity of all motion.

But there is no conception of universal motion in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought and hence, there is no
mention of universal motion in Comrade A.M.‘S 36-page document even. Com. A.M. should have
kept in mind that motion or movement of matter is not any specific property of some specific forms
of matter rather it is the most general, essential and inseparable property of all forms of matter.
Matter without motion and motion without matter cannot exist. So the property of motion or
movement of matter cannot be disregarded rather it has to be abstracted from all the particular forms
of motions, simultaneously with the abstraction of matter.

In fact matter as philosophical category being absolute does not mean that it is static or not in
motion, rather its motion itself is of absolute character. Matter being ever in eternal and absolute
motion, remains ever the same only because it is always in eternal motion. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee
himself on page 14 has quoted Lenin defining the objective reality as follows:

―This is how Lenin expressed it: ‗The recognition of the objective reality of the outer world, the
recognition of the existence outside our mind of eternally moving and eternally changing matter, is
here confused with the recognition of the immutable essence of things.‘ [Ibid, Chapter 5, Section 3;
emphasis added]‖

Here what Lenin refutes is not the eternity of matter itself but the immutable essence of things i.e.
the concept of ultimate immutable structure of matter. What is meant by the eternity of matter? The
answer is very simple. We know that each and every form of matter is mortal but matter itself is
22
immortal. Neither the sun nor the galaxy and nor any meta-galaxy is immortal. So matter has two
aspects mortal and immortal. Corresponding to these two aspects of matter there are two aspects of
motion namely particular or specific form of motion, which is relative and eternal aspect of motion
which keeps matter eternally in motion. Every particular or relative form of motion associated with
particular form of matter is also mortal but motion as such or universal motion is immortal. The
immortal aspect of matter is also always in motion but its corresponding motion is motion as such or
absolute motion. So the immortal aspect of matter is absolute and eternal because of its eternal
character of motion. When Lenin writes ‗eternally moving and eternally changing matter‘ then both
matter and its motion have been acknowledged to be immortal or eternal. It is a very simple thing
that if matter is eternally in motion then it only means that both matter and its motion are eternal.
The eternal motion of matter is the opposite aspect to all transient motions of matter. All transient
forms of matter and their respective particular transient motions are mortal but the motion of matter
itself is eternal, immortal or immutable. That is why Lenin has retorted to Bogdanov that ―eternally
moving and eternally changing matter, is here confused with the recognition of the immutable
essence of things‖.

Com. A.M. writes in defence of Shibdas Ghosh: ―So when Comrade Ghosh showed matter to be
changeable, active, dynamic, moving, etc., in this particular case he did not deviate from the
established Marxist tradition, as already shown in the salient excerpts I have cited from Engels,
Lenin and Stalin above.‖(Page-14, underlined by Com. A.M.)

When we only say that matter is changeable, active, dynamic, moving etc. is not sufficient rather
half-truth in dialectics because in its process of change matter also ever remains the same. And when
we say that matter ever remains the same it can only mean that during its eternal motion it ever
remains unchanged as matter. It means that matter in its eternal motion goes on transforming its
forms from one to another and from next to next but in all its forms it ever remains the same. If we
only hold that matter is changeable then it implies that matter does not remain matter in the process
of its change. Every particular form of matter in its process of change transforms into another. But
matter itself never transforms into any other during its eternal motion. So we must not confuse and
muddle the two aspects of matter.

Point no. 13

Universality of Matter in Shibdas Ghosh‘s Thought

As to his understanding of matter and its truth Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―…Now, be it a minute particle of matter or be it an event, it exists means it exists in the midst of
concrete situation. So, when the existence of matter is concrete and particular, truth too is bound to
be concrete truth, particular truth…‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, SW-2, page 105-106,
edition 1992)
Thus, there is no distinction in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought between matter and forms of matter.
Shibdas Ghosh nowhere discusses with clarity the unity or oneness or universality of matter as
abstracted from all particular forms of matter except where he says that every form of matter is
simultaneously is ‗not-matter‘. And because, the existence of every particular form of matter is
conditional and relative so Shibdas Ghosh holds matter itself to be relative; although he uses the
terminology like universal matter or philosophical matter etc., but he does not understand their real
materialistic import as according to him matter as philosophical category non-material. He writes:

―According to dialectical materialism, the material world is the only truth. Everything is the
creation of matter. This matter is universal matter—it has neither origin nor end. By universal matter

23
I mean the entire category of matter comprised of each and all particular forms of matter which is
omnipresent and is the very basis of our matter concept. This matter is philosophical matter, it
defines a philosophical category. None has created it—matter exists and exists by itself. So also exists
the material world. This matter or the material world is ever-changing. Every moment it is
undergoing change and developing. And this matter is dialectical matter…‖ (Marxism and
Development of Human Society, SW-2, p38)

Let us now analyze this understanding of Shibdas Ghosh which is a complete muddle with no
distinct clarity between particular and universal:

i. ―Everything is the creation of matter‖:

This phrase contains a contradiction which Shibdas Ghosh does not notice and that contradiction
is between the universal and particular. For instance when I say that ‗every utensil is the creation of
metal‘ then term ‗metal‘ expresses the sameness or oneness or unity or the universality of the material
of all the particular utensils made from bronze, brass, copper, steel, silver, gold etc. in different sizes
and shapes and to serve different purposes. In concrete form the substance ‗metal‘ does not exist
anywhere rather it is a creation of thought. Creation of thought does not mean here something
imaginary or unreal. Metal, the creation of thought is very much real and having objective existence
in every particular form of matter. Metal has been created by thought after going through a great deal
of study and experimentations and abstraction. Metal here denotes a philosophical category i.e. a
class or a category of numerous particular forms which possess some common characteristics. And
those common characteristics are contained without exception by all the individual members
categorized in that class. Likewise, ‗Fruit‘ denotes a name of a class and every member of the
category ‗fruit‘ possesses within it those common characteristics on the basis of which the category
fruit has been created by thought. ‗Fruit‘ represents the oneness or sameness or unity or universality
of all the separate and different particular fruits. The truth of the universality of any philosophical
category is always different from the truths of its particularities. But Shibdas Ghosh showed no
ability to discuss and describe the truths of particularities and their universality separately. The
reason, being that Shibdas Ghosh has no ability to dialectally distinguish between the particularity
and universality.

ii. ―This matter is universal matter—it has neither origin nor end‖:

This statement made by Shibdas Ghosh is very correct but he does not understand the meaning
inherent in it. The universal matter having no origin and no end is opposed to all the particular forms
of matter which have both origin and end. The status of truth of the universal matter must be
different in nature from the truths of the particular forms of matter. When Shibdas Ghosh contends
that universal matter has no origin and no end he must have understood that it refers to the
universality or unity or oneness residing within all particular forms or things which is necessarily
continuous, absolute and eternal as opposed to its particular forms. But as oneness of all particular
forms Shibdas Ghosh can view nothing but ‗not-matter‘.

iii. ―By universal matter I mean the entire category of matter comprised of each and all the
particular forms of matter which is omnipresent and is the very basis of our matter
concept‖:

Here, again Shibdas Ghosh is totally confused when he says ‗By universal matter I mean the
entire category of matter comprised of each and all the particular forms of matter which is
omnipresent and is the very basis of our matter concept‘. In the former half of the statement Shibdas
Ghosh considers that universal matter is ‗comprised of each and all the particular forms of matter‘
24
i.e. just the summation of all the particular forms which is hundred percent incorrect. Because,
universal matter is the oneness or sameness possessed by all the particular forms. But Shibdas Ghosh
does not refer to any kind of oneness or sameness or unity of all the particular forms except the ‗not-
matter‘. The oneness or sameness of matter can only be called as omnipresent or universal; because,
omnipresence of matter refers to its oneness or universality and not to its particularities or the
summation of all its particularities. Shibdas Ghosh talks about that universal matter is ‗omnipresent
and is the very basis of our matter concept‖. But he does not himself understand that he is talking
about the oneness or sameness, possessed by all the particular forms of matter and that sameness or
oneness of matter, which is equally present within all particular forms, can only be termed as
universal and omnipresent which is continuous, having no breaks in space and time; without
beginning and end and hence eternal as opposed to the particular forms of matter. A dialectician
does not muddle the status and nature of existence of discrete and transitory particular forms of
matter with the status and nature of existence of universal aspect of matter. But the omnipresence,
universality and oneness of matter in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought is –not-matter.

iv. ―This matter is philosophical matter, it defines a philosophical category‖:

So according to Shibdas Ghosh and rightly so universal matter is philosophical matter but no
concrete or particular form of matter can be conferred on the title of ‗philosophical matter‘.
Philosophical matter can only be the creation of thought or abstraction of matter which is the
oneness or sameness of all the diverse forms of matter. The ‗philosophical matter‘ as mentioned by
Shibdas Ghosh cannot be perceived by the sense organs as such, it can only be known by the method
of abstraction which Shibdas Ghosh is completely ignorant of. Shibdas Ghosh could never know that
‗philosophical matter‘ is nothing but the oneness of all the infinite diverse forms of matter
constituting the universe. When we say that ‗matter is ever changing‘ and ‗matter ever remains the
same‘ then this contention signifies and refers to the two contradictory aspects of matter i.e. its
concrete or particular aspect and its philosophical aspect representing the unity or oneness of all the
particular forms of matter. The concrete or particular aspect of matter is finite, transitory, emerging
and dying down hence relative and the philosophical or general or universal aspect of matter is
infinite, continuous, without beginning and without end hence eternal and absolute. But the
fundamental problem with Shibdas Ghosh is that he does not consider the ‗philosophical matter‘ to
be of material nature. The reason for this is that he does not view anything of material nature to be
common within all particular forms of matter. For Shibdas Ghosh common to all particular forms of
matter is ‗non-matter‘ only.

At one place Shibdas Ghosh also writes that ―…Marxism holds that everything in the universe
is but the manifestation of dialectical matter in diversity…‖(Marxism and Dialectical Materialism,
SW-2, p-137)

Although, this assertion of Shibdas Ghosh also implies that all diverse forms of sensually
perceptible matter are the manifestations of the one and the same entity which he termed as
‗dialectical matter‘. According to this assertion of Shibdas Ghosh the concept ‗dialectical matter‘ is
the sole property which is inherently associated with all the diverse forms of matter. The one and the
same entity is manifested in infinite diverse forms. One is that which gets manifested and others are
its manifestations. But owing to his ignorance to dialectics Shibdas Ghosh is totally incapable of
viewing the two (the manifested and its manifestations) in a dialectical unity, the unity of eternal and
temporary and that of absolute and relative. Actually Shibdas Ghosh is incapable of making
abstraction of the most general or common property from many individuals or particulars. Shibdas
Ghosh utterly failed to grasp the meaning of Lenin‘s definition of matter as a philosophical category,
as he views it to be a non-material entity. Shibdas Ghosh writes:
25
 ―…We have come to know that matter cannot be created out of nothing. But matter cannot be
called absolute or eternal because of that. It is wrong to consider matter as something absolute,
unchangeable or eternal, because matter itself undergoes changes all the time. Therefore, it is proper
to view matter as universal, not absolute. Lenin expressed this brilliantly when he said that matter
was a philosophical category. That is, our concept of matter is that nothing exists outside or
independently of matter.‖(Some Aspects of Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, p-153)

Lenin has clearly stated that this concept of matter as objective reality can never become
obsolete. Actually Shibdas Ghosh‘s concept of matter is nothing but viewing all the material things in
totality which he termed as universal matter and which is neither eternal nor absolute. Shibdas
Ghosh is trapped only in the entanglement of diverse forms of matter and could not conceive matter
as such or matter in general or matter as a philosophical category i.e., the material oneness residing
within each and every particular thing. Shibdas Ghosh has used the term ‗dialectical matter‘
referring to the concept of matter but he could never know that dialectical means having two
contradictory aspects in every respect.

It would be relevant to point out here that Shibdas Ghosh himself was in utter confusion with his
concept of matter. On the one hand he bases his concept of matter on the basis of summation of all
particular things and on the other hand he talks about philosophical matter. But he never knew that
the matter which he calls to be philosophical is not the summation of all particular things but the
unity or oneness of all particular material things which can only be known by way of abstraction of
matter and motion. Here is a passage from Shibdas Ghosh‘sthought which clearly reveals his
confusion regarding concept of matter as discussed above.

―…But it should be understood that we cannot acquire a comprehensive matter concept simply
from a knowledge of these different particular properties and laws, nor can we get correct solutions to
the various problems concerning human society, its ethics, morals, progress or reaction…‖ (Marxism
and Dialectical Materialism, SW-2, page 100)

It is clear from this quote of Shibdas Ghosh that the concept matter cannot be based on the
specific or particular properties of particular, concrete and relative forms of matter as he himself
holds but does not reaches to the point of abstraction of the sole property or oneness residing within
all particular forms of matter. In utter confusion Shibdas Ghosh wrongly reached the conclusion that
every ‗particular matter is simultaneously matter and not matter‘. And on account of this wrong
conclusion Shibdas Ghosh could never knew what matter as philosophical category is?

Point no. 14

For the materialists Matter is not only Universal, it is Eternal too

Comrade Ashoke Mukherjee in full agreement with Shibdas Ghosh asserts that it is sufficient to call
matter as universal and there is no need to call it eternal as the universality of the material world is
extended in both space and time. He writes in his document as follows:

―Moreover, we have to remember that in the large-scale the universality of the material world is
extended in both space and time, and not only in space, as Comrade Shyam Sundarji thought.‖
(Section II, Sub Section [F])

So, the argument is that if the universality of the material world is acknowledged to be extended
in both space and time then there remains no need to call matter as eternal. No, it is not, because
universality of matter even if it is accepted to be extended in space and time, the question of the
beginning and end of matter remains to be unsettled. All the Idealist philosophers like Hegel
26
recognized matter to be objective and universal both in space and time. But the space and time
according to Hegel had a beginning. The Absolute Idea of Hegel as presumed by him existed before
space and time and space and time came into existence only when the so-called Absolute Idea
manifested itself externally and objectively into nature. Thus, nature though objective and universal
in space and time is not everlasting rather, has a beginning in objective idealist philosophy. The same
is the position of the Realist Philosophers. Maurice Cornforth writes:

―The ‗realist‘ philosophers say that the external material world really exists independent of our
perceptions and is in some way reflected by our perceptions. In this the ‗realists‘ agree with the
materialists in opposition to subjective idealism; indeed, you cannot be a materialist unless you are a
thorough-going realist on the question of the real existence of the material world.

―But merely to assert that the external world exists independent of our perceiving it, is not to be a
materialist. For example, the great Catholic philosopher of the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas, was in
this sense a ‗realist‘. And to this day most catholic theologians regard it as a heresy to be anything but
a ‗realist in philosophy. But at the same time they assert that the material world, which really exists,
was created by God, by a spiritual power. So far from being materialists, they are idealists.‖(Maurice
Cornforth, Chapter: Materialism and Idealism)

So, the recognition of matter as being objective, independent of consciousness and universal in space
and time can be no criterion of being a materialist. To be a materialist is to recognise matter, its
motion and laws of its motion to be eternal. Both Marx and Engels have given this recognition to
matter and laws of its motion. When Lenin defined the material world to be ‗eternally moving
matter or matter in eternal motion‘, he only meant that both matter and its motion are eternal. The
concept ‗eternal‘ in philosophy signifies that which has no beginning and no end; that which was
never brought into existence and which will never go out of existence; that which is everlasting and
immortal and totally free from any kind of external influence. Hence, matter is not only universal or
omnipresent, it is eternal too.

Point no. 15

Universal Resides within the Individual

Universal can be known only through Abstraction

Shibdas Ghosh nowhere in his thought dealt with the categories of dialectics. In fact Shibdas
Ghosh was quite unacquainted with the categories of dialectics like unity and diversity; general and
concrete; universal and individual; cause and effect; necessity and chance; form and content;
appearance and essence; possibility and reality; part and whole; truth and error etc.etc.Shibdas
Ghosh has stressed at many places that matter is universal but not eternal because it goes on
changing every moment but being devoid of dialectical approach he could never knew that the
oneness, unity or abstraction of matter or matter as a philosophical category always remains
unchanged which is the another aspect of matter as has been discussed above and for this reason
Shibdas Ghosh constantly kept on repeating that matter is not eternal. Shibdas Ghosh either did not
read The Poverty of Philosophy of Marx or did not apply his mind to the words of Marx where he has
recognised land as matter to be eternal and abstraction of motion to be immutable as quoted
above.The sole reason is that Shibdas Ghosh is quite devoid of the power of abstraction. And
without this capability of making abstraction, Shibdas Ghosh could not even know what universal
matter is and what matter as philosophical category is? Lenin showed that the universal is the
oneness or commonness in all diverse particular forms of any category. Taking an example of a

27
particular dog named ‗Fido‘ Lenin describes that the universality or sameness of species ‗dog‘ resides
in every individual member. Lenin writes:

―Such must also be the method of exposition (i.e. study) of dialectics in general (for with Marx
the dialectics of bourgeois society is only a particular case of dialectics). To begin with what is the
simplest, most ordinary, common, etc. with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a
man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel‘s genius recognised): the individual
is the universal (…). Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are
identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists
only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a
universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every
individual only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters
incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions
with other kinds of individual (things, phenomena, and processes), etc. Here already we have the
elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we
have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a
man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., wedisregard a number of attributes as contingent; we
separate the essence from the appearance, and counter-pose the one to the other.

―Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a ―nucleus‖ (―cell‖) the germs of all the
elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in
general. And natural science shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in any simple
instance) objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the
universal, of the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal
connection of opposites. Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the
―aspect‖ of the matter (it is not an ―aspect‖ but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanove, not
to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention.‖ (On the Question of Dialectics, CW-38, p.359-60,
underline added)

What a wonderfully lucid piece of dialectics indeed showing the dialectical relationship of
individual and universal has been presented by Lenin here. The universal can reside nowhere else
except within the individual or particular. But here Com. Ashoke Mukherjee would raise the
objection that if universal is within the individual then the individual must also be within the
universal. But about the reciprocal relationship between the two, Lenin wrote: ―…the individual
exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual
and through the individual.‖

What is universal? The universal is the oneness or unity that exists in many different kinds of things,
hence omnipresent in the context of any category. And when the universality is viewed in context of
philosophical category of matter then it implies the omnipresence of matter. Matter is omnipresent
because it is universal and matter is universal because the same objective reality resides within all its
particular forms. No particular form of matter can be omnipresent because every particular is finite
and it has its boundaries or limitation in space and time but the omnipresent is infinite without any
limitation in space and time though it also exists in space and time. As I said the universal can only
be relevant in reference to a class or category and the individual members thereof. Without a class or
category the concept ‗universal‘ has no relevance. The universal cannot be sensually perceptible but
only a creation of mind by way of disregarding the specific differences of the things which we want to
lump together in a class. For example dog is a class of particular kind of animals. The formation of
the class dog has been made by the human mind by way of abstracting the common characteristics
from each and every dog leaving out of account their specific differences or properties. That is why
28
the simple proposition that ‗Fido is a dog‘ becomes in itself a contradiction having two contradictory
aspects. The aspect of the individuality of ‗Fedo‘ and the aspect of the universality of the whole class
called ‗dog‘. That is why Lenin stated: ―The universal exists only in the individual and through the
individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal.‖ Here in this particular example
of category ‗dog‘, the universal dog is abstraction from all particular dogs hence a creation of mind
which represents the dog ‗as such‘. Discussing the universality of contradiction in his essay On
Contradiction Mao-Tse-Tung rebukes the dogmatists because: ―They do not understand that it is
precisely in the particularity of contradiction that the universality of contradiction resides.‖ Mao-Tse-
Tung in his essay above cited has at several places held that the terms universality and absoluteness
of contradiction are synonymous and equal in connotation and has explained as to where the
universality of contradiction resides. Describing as to on what ground the contradiction is universal
he writes, ―Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of development of all
things and permeates every process from beginning to end.‖ In Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought it has been
repeatedly asserted that matter is universal without knowing where and how does this universal
matter exist. Nowhere in the entire thought is explained what is the relationship between the
universal and particular as Lenin has explained it taking the example of a particular dog ‗Fedo‘.
Mao-Tse-Tung has shown the relationship of the universal and particular in his above cited essay in
the following words:

―Since the particular is united with the universal and since the universality as well as the
particularity of contradiction is inherent in everything, universality resides in particularity we should,
when studying an object try to discover both the particular and the universal and their
interconnection, to discover both particularity and universality and also their interconnection within
the object itself, and to discover the interconnections of this object with the many objects outside it.‖

Mao-Tse-Tung further writes:

―…To deny contradiction is to deny everything. This is a universal truth for all times and all
countries, which admits of no exception. Hence the general character, the absoluteness of
contradiction. But this general character is contained in every individual character; without
individual character there can be no general character. All individual character were removed, what
general character would remain? It is because each contradiction is particular that individual
character arises. All individual character exists conditionally and temporarily, and hence is relative.

―This truth concerning general and individual character, concerning absoluteness and relativity is
the quintessence of the problem of contradiction in things; failure to understand it is tantamount to
abandoning dialectics.‖ (Bold added)

Engels also describes the universal phenomena of life: ―which are equally present among all living
organisms‖, He writes:

―Life is the mode of existence of albuminous bodies, and this mode of existence essentially consists
in the constant self- removal of the chemical constituents in these bodies. …The lowest living being
known to us are in fact nothing but simple particles of albumin, and they already exhibit all the
essential phenomena of life. But what are these universal phenomena of life which are equally
present among all living organisms? …‖ (Anti Duhring, Part-1, ch.VIII, bold added)

So the dialectical relationship between the universal and particular in other words is the
relationship between the unconditional and conditional or between the absolute and the relative and
in this relationship the universal resides within the particular or the unconditional within the
conditional or the absolute within the relative.
29
 Point no. 16

Universal is Unconditional, Individual is Conditional:

Lenin has cited a proposition ―Fido is a dog‖, and has shown that this simple proposition
contains a contradiction constituted by universal and individual. Here ‗dog‘ is a category created by
mind through abstraction. Every single individual member of the category ‗dog‘ contains within itself
the commonness or the universality of the category or species ‗dog‘. Every individual dog is a
concrete or particular dog possessing within itself the universality. As the universality of the species
‗dog‘ has been discovered by way of abstraction of the common characteristics from all the members
of the category ‗dog‘, so we say that ‗the abstract resides within the concrete‘. Every individual dog
exists in some particular conditions so the existence of every particular or individual dog is
conditional but the ‗universal dog‘ being present within every particular dog exists in all the
conditions required for the existence of the species or category ‗dog‘. So the universality of dog is
unconditional within the limits of the category ‗dog‘. If we take into consideration the ‗genus‘ of
which the species ‗dog‘ is a constituent member then the limits of universality get expanded. We
know that in nature the species and genesis also appear and disappear hence the individuality and
universality of those also appear and disappear. But when we take into consideration the
individuality and universality of the final and ultimate philosophical category called ‗matter‘ then we
find that the philosophical category matter never appears and disappears like the categories fruit, tree,
dog etc. etc.. Without universality there can be no category and universality is nothing but the
common reality of each and every member of the category. When we say that ‗matter is a
philosophical category‘ then it only means that each and every individual particular member of the
category ‗matter‘ possesses the same universal matter within it. Every individual member of the
category ‗matter‘ exists only in some particular conditions. But the universal matter exists in all
conditions and the entity which exists in all conditions is known as unconditionally existing entity.
We can make disappear any particular member of the category matter but we cannot do that with the
matter itself or matter itself which resides equally within every particular form of matter. Every
particular form of matter is different from all others. But all the different infinite forms of matter
contain within themselves identical universal matter. No particular form of matter which exists
conditionally can be omnipresent. But the identical universal matter being equally present in all the
different infinite particular forms of matter is termed as all-pervading or omnipresent. The
omnipresent is present within all individual forms hence existing unconditionally. That is why in
dialectics we say that the unconditional is present within the conditional; the absolute is present
within the relative; the infinite is present within the finite; the eternal is present within the transient.
Matter is ever changing but it remains ever the same because its universality, unity or oneness
remains the same or unchanged forever. It is on this ground of dialectical relationship between
abstract and concrete or universal and individual Lenin wrote:

―The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is
that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For
objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the
relative is only relative and excludes the absolute.‖ (On the Question of Dialectics, bold added)

But Com. A.M. in his 36-page document writes at page 2 in point no.5 raises an objection to this
kind of relationship i.e. absolute being within the relative as follows: ―…If there is an absolute within
the relative, there must be a relative within the absolute (in the dialectical sense).‖

30
 This kind of objection raised by Com. A.M. clearly shows that he wants to prove that opposites
can exist independent of each other; in isolation to each other; that one can exist without the other;
that they do not have any reciprocal relation between them. But to view opposites independent of
each other is nothing but sheer metaphysics. Could Com. A.M. tell us as to what is the distinction
between the metaphysical and the dialectical view of opposites? Do the metaphysics and the
dialectics view the opposites in the same way? If not, then what is the distinction? According to
metaphysics plus is plus and minus is minus, both are independent of each other i.e. one can exist
without the other and if you are striving to prove the same thing then on what ground you claim
yourself to be a dialectician? The reciprocal relationship of relative and absolute can be understood
by the example of the reciprocal relationship of the individual and the universal as has been described
by Lenin as follows: ―…the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The
universal exists only in the individual and through the individual.‖ (See above)

In fact there is no capability of making abstractions of matter and motion in the entire Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought. Had Shibdas Ghosh understood the first chapter of Capital he must have learnt as
to how abstract human labour resides within the concrete or particular labour. Then he must also
have known that abstract and concrete are interrelated in such a way that abstract resides within the
concrete and inseparable from the concrete. Dialectics teaches us to view things as they are and not
as per our subjective wishes.

Point no. 17

No entity can be infinite without being absolute

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee in his 36-page document writes that matter needs no concept of
absoluteness as it is infinite in space and time and further declares that the concept of infinity is itself
relative. The relevant passage reads as under:

―When we say that matter is infinite in space and time, it needs no concept of absoluteness of
matter. For the concept of infinity is itself relative [See Engels, Anti-Dühring; Chapter 5].
Mathematically speaking, an infinity may or may not have an origin but can have no end. That is to
say, it may be an infinity with one end open, or both ends open. So the actual question now boils
down to which kind of infinity the material world corresponds to. If we can solve this problem, the
problem of origin and end of the universe as well as of divine creation or supernatural intervention
will be smoothly removed.‖ (Page 26)

Let me begin my discussion on this passage pointwise. Com A. M. writes:

(a) ―When we say that matter is infinite in space and time, it needs no concept of
absoluteness of matter. For the concept of infinity is itself relative. [See Engels, Anti-
Dühring; Chapter 5]…‖

First of all it is totally wrong and baseless to say that the concept of infinity itself is relative. Any
comrade himself can read chapter-5 of Anti-Duhring as has been mentioned by Com. A.M. in this
connection. In fact what Engels means here by ‗relative‘ is that in dialectics every concept with
respect to its opposite is without exception relative because it can only exist in relation to its
opposite. Positive is relative because it can only exist in the relation to negative; absolute is also
relative because it can only exist in relation to its opposite the relative; relative itself is also
relative because it can only exist in relation to its opposite the absolute. Likewise infinite is
relative because it can only exist in relation to its opposite finite and finite is also relative because
it can be designated as finite in relation to its opposite the infinite. Infact infinity is a
31
 contradiction. Let us read how Engels describes the concepts of infinity to the metaphysician
Duhring:

―For that matter, Herr Duhring will never succeed in conceiving real infinity without
contradiction. Infinity is a contradiction, and is full of contradictions. From the outset it is a
contradiction that an infinity is composed of nothing but finites, and yet thsis is the case. The
limitedness of the material world leads no less to contradictions than its un-limitedness, and
every attempt to get over these contradictions leads, as we have seen, to new and worse
contradictions. It is just because infinity is a contradiction that it is an infinite process, unrolling
endlessly in time and in space. The removal of the contradiction would be the end of infinity.
Hegel saw this quite correctly, and for that reason treated with well-merited contempt the
gentlemen who subtilized over this contradiction.‖(Anti-Duhring, ch-5)

Now from the simple reading of this passage of Engels any comrade can well grasp about the nature
of the relativity of infinity. Engels has explicitly stated that ‗infinity‘ is a contradiction as it is
composed of ‗finites‘. So the ‗infinite‘ and the ‗finite‘ can exist only in relation to each other. Without
the finite there is no infinite and without the infinite there is no finite. This is the dialectical
relationship of the finite and the infinite. Finite and infinite are opposite to each other. One cannot
exist without the other. In this sense the existence of each is relative because the existence of each
depends on the existence of its opposite. Engels referring Hegel wrote:

―‗In essence everything is relative‘ (e.g. positive and negative, which have meaning only in their
relation, not each for itself)‖ (Dialectics of Nature, Ch-Dialectics, p.213)

Thus even relative is also relative because it can only exist and can be so designated in relation to
its opposite the absolute. If you will attempt to establish the existence of relative without the
existence of its opposite absolute then your ‗relative‘ would itself become absolute in the
metaphysical sense i.e. without contradiction. All the metaphysical concepts like absolute, eternal
and infinite etc. are without contradiction. They can exist without their respective opposites but in
dialectics all these concepts have inherent contradiction within them which means they cannot exist
without their opposites.

Secondly, how do you know that the universe is infinite? What is the ground of its being infinite? In
fact, the existence of any entity in our case matter to be infinite, it is must for it first to be
unconditional. Without being unconditional nothing can be infinite. Because any existence if not
unconditional then there must exist something outside it to provide external conditions for its
existence or to support it. Every finite is finite because it is surrounded by something other external to
it. But the infinite can only be such entity which is not surrounded at all by any other entity. And the
existence of the entity which has nothing external to it is called unconditional or absolute existence.
So when dialectical materialism acknowledged that there is nothing outside the universe or there is
nothing external to the universe only then on this ground the universe or the material world has been
given the designation of being infinite. So when Com. A.M. says that when matter or material world
itself is infinite then it does not require to be called absolute, then he totally forgets that rather it is the
absoluteness of matter or unconditional existence of the material world that the material world
acquires the character of being infinite.

Thirdly, in the bigger and later part of his passage quoted above Com. A.M. turns out to be an
idealist. The said later part reads as follows:

―…Mathematically speaking, an infinity may or may not have an origin but can have no end. That is
to say, it may be an infinity with one end open, or both ends open. So the actual question now boils
32
down to which kind of infinity the material world corresponds to. If we can solve this problem, the
problem of origin and end of the universe as well as of divine creation or supernatural intervention
will be smoothly removed.‖

How surprising! For Com. A.M. the question of the origin of the universe still remains unresolved,
whether it was originated at any point of time in the past or not or whether it is a divine or super
natural creation or not depends upon the solution of the riddle as to as to which kind of
mathematical infinity, the universe corresponds to.According to Com. A.M. the solution of the
nature of the infinity of the universe whether it is without beginning or with beginning will settle the
question whether it is a divine creation or not.Com. A.M. being in agreement with Shibdas Ghosh‘s
thought does not recognize existence of nature or universe to be eternal, is still oscillating between
materialism and idealism regarding the origin of the universe,whereas the infinite phenomena of the
universe cannot be reduced to any common origin, universe being eternal and absolute. So here I am
constrained to quote Lenin who wrote: ―…It is mainly because the physicists did not know dialectics
that the new physics strayed into idealism.‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Chapter-5, section
2)

This logic and understanding of Com. A.M. (that when we hold matter as infinite in space and
time then to hold matter as absolute is not needed at all) completely reveals his subjectivism and
eclecticism because no dialectical materialist can conceive the infiniteness of matter or nature
without being conceiving matter as absolute. My straight and direct question to Comrade A.M. is
this: Please tell me your ground for calling or terming matter as infinite in space and time?
Theoretical thought holds that matter or nature without being absolute cannot be infinite. The
infiniteness of material world is completely based on its absoluteness. Question is: What is the
absoluteness of the material world? And it is nothing but its unconditional existence. The
recognition of unconditional existence of the material world is the foundation of dialectical
materialism. Unconditional existence means the existence which is subject to no external conditions.
And when the material world is conceived as being not subject to any external conditions then any
idea of being anything external to it disappears and as a result the material world is conceived as
infinite. So the concept infinite regarding the material world is completely based on its recognition of
existing unconditionally. Com. A.M. has also gave a very clear admission regarding the absoluteness
of matter without knowing the real import of the same. Com. A. M. admits as follows:

―…However, you may call matter absolute in the sense of being objective and self-existent, requiring
no other entity for its being‖.(From section I (9),Page 2)

The status of self-existence of matter is nothing but its status of ‗unconditional existence‘. Lenin has
also described the unconditional existence of material world in the words ‗ultimate objective
reality… in the sense that there is not and cannot be any other‘ as follows:

―…For the materialists our sensations are images of the sole and ultimate objective reality, ultimate
not in the sense that it has already been cognised to the end, but in the sense that there is not and
cannot be any other…‖(Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter 2, section-5)

That is the ultimate objective reality is that objective reality beyond which nothing exists or in
other words whose existence is unconditional and hence unlimited or infinite. So the relationship
between the unconditional existence and the infinite existence is quite unclear to Com. A. M. when
he says that if we call matter infinite in space and time then there is no need to call it absolute. The
infinite existence is the other name for perfect existence in itself or unconditional existence. To
recognise the infinite existence in space and time and to reject the concept of unconditional or

33
absolute existence in space and time becomes self-contradictory. The infinite existence in space and
time cannot be conditional existence and any conditional existence cannot be infinite.

Point no. 18

The Existence of Matter or the Material World as a Whole is absolute

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has acknowledged without any ambiguity in his 36-page document that
the existence of matter may be called absolute. He writes:

―…However, you may call matter absolute in the sense of being objective and self-existent, requiring
no other entity for its being.‖(Point no. 9, page-2)

Now let us discuss the above statement of Com. Ashoke Mukherjee with regard to the
particularity and the universality of matter. Every single particular form of matter is objective but not
self-existent, because the existence of every particular, finite and concrete is conditional or relative,
being subject to external conditions. Hence, no finite can be called absolute. But the existence of
matter or the material world as a whole is unconditional or absolute because it exists by itself i.e.,
without being subject to any external conditions or contradiction. But Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought
makes no such distinction between the conditional and unconditional or between relative and
absolute aspects of the existence of matter or the material world. As Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought defines
matter to be ‗particular, concrete and relative‘ so it visualises the existence of matter only of
conditional or a relative nature. Though Shibdas Ghosh asserts at many a place that ‗matter exists by
itself‘ i.e. it is self-existent yet he nowhere recognises the existence of this objective and self-existent
matter to be absolute as has been acknowledged by Com. A.M.. Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought recognises
matter existing to be in both internal and external contradictions. Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―The characteristic of this material world is that there is an internal contradiction in each and
every thing and everything is at the same time in an external contradiction with its environment.
Each and everything is in the vortex of contradiction, both internal and external. This is how matter
exists and this is its character. Matter is not inert, static, unchangeable or mechanical. Matter is
dynamic, ever-changing and dialectical, that is it exists in both internal and external contradiction
and this contradiction makes matter dynamic and everchanging…‖(Marxism and Development of
Human Society, SW-2, p38, emphasis added)

This kind of conception of matter or material world as a whole as given by Shibdas Ghosh is not
perfectly materialistic because idealism penetrates into it. Matter or material world itself has been
viewed here existing in both internal and external contradiction whereas the basic tenet of
philosophical materialism is that matter or the material world is self-existing entity having nothing
outside of it to provide it with any kind of assistance as external contradiction. Matter or material
world as a whole has no external contradiction at all. Internal and external contradictions apply only
to the particular forms of matter and not to matter or material world as a whole. Every particular
form of matter is conditional and relative because it has internal contradiction inside it and external
contradiction outside it. But all the infinite particular forms when go to make an infinite material
world then the existence of any external contradiction disappears. So when you say that matter or
material world exists both in internal and external contradictions, you make the existence of material
world conditional or relative and you fall into the camp of reactionary philosophy known as idealism
and relativism despite being your repeated assertions that the material world exists ‗by itself‘. If one
says that the material world exists by itself it only connotes that the material world or matter does not
depend on anything else which again means that it requires no external conditions, no external

34
contradictions for its existence. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has also supported this view of mine in his
36-page document but attaching a great blunder to the said support. The supportive part is as follows:

―However, Comrade ShyamSundarji has rightly objected to the generalized application of

internal and external contradictions by Ghosh to the philosophical category of matter. There is
nothing external to matter as a whole, to nature or the universe.‖(Page 14-15)
Up to here Com. A.M. gives his full support to the view that matter as a whole has no external
contradiction because there is nothing external to matter as a whole. But Com. A.M. makes just
ahead adds firstly:
―Not only that. While discussing matter as a philosophical category, its other properties are to be
kept in mental abeyance.‖(Page 15)
I must clarify here again that matter as a philosophical category is nothing but abstraction of
matter. And while doing abstraction of matter only the specific properties of diverse forms of matter
are to be disregarded or ignored and not the general its general attributes like motion, space and time
which are inseparable and un-ignorable attribute and forms of matter. Secondly, Com. A.M.
continues to write:
―There is a third factor too. Internal and external contradictions are relevant for discussion only
in the context of the social and human systems. In the natural sphere, it has no general applicability.
You can fruitfully discuss these things in respect of a social problem or in connection with a problem
of a human being. It helps to understand and solve the problem. But what is the internal and external
contradiction of an electron? Such specification does not help us to explain any feature any the better
or solve any real problem. It reduces dialectics to an absurdity.
―We often seem to forget that historical materialism is a particular application of dialectical
materialism in history and society. So, all principles of historical materialism cannot be projected
back to nature.
―Comrade Shyam Sundarji too has ignored this third factor. So he also attributed internal and
external contradictions to specific forms of matter. Thereby he, like Ghosh, simply transferred some
sociological categories on to natural phenomena indiscriminately.‖(Page-15)
All the above comments made by Com. Ashoke Mukherjee are deeply deplorable. He holds that
the dialectics of external and internal contradictions is applicable only to social or human problems
and not to the natural phenomena. He has given an example of ‗electron‘ the existence of which
according to him contains no relevance to external and internal contradictions. Let me assert with
full force that the dialectics of internal and external contradictions is the fundamental and the most
basic thing applicable to every phenomenon or thing existing in nature and from nature it gets
extended to social and human phenomena and not vice-versa. Let us now discuss the example of
electron. Does the electron have its own internal contradiction? Yes, it does have. Because according
to materialist dialectics the cause of motion or movement of matter or any of its forms is internal
contradiction. If we presume that electron has no internal contradiction then the cause of its motion
will be wholly external and thus, with this presumption we slip into mechanistic materialism
abandoning dialectical materialism. When dialectics hold that the basic cause of all things is internal
contradiction then how can the electron be an exception to this most fundamental tenet of dialectics?
As we know that every contradiction is constituted by two contradictory aspects, which generate
motion so the electron also must have two contradictory aspects within it, though the scientists may
not have succeeded in discovering those two contradictory aspects as yet. So without slipping into
mechanistic materialism one cannot claim that the electron does not have any internal contradiction.
The second question is whether the electron has any external contradiction too? The answer is: it
does have. What is meant by external contradiction? It means nothing but the external influence
upon anything. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee agrees with me that there is no external contradiction to the
material world as a whole because there exists nothing external to the material world as a whole to
influence it from outside. Now the question is: Is there no external existence to the electron to
influence it? Is the electron self-existent like the material world as a whole? Is the electron itself is not
a constituent part of a bigger structure called atom? Does not the number of electrons in any neutral
atom depend upon the number of protons present in the nucleus of that atom? Is there no influence
of the nucleus of the atom on the electrons around it? Is there no influence on the electron of the
electric and magnetic fields external to the electron? Do not the electric and magnetic fields behave as
external agents in the study of electrons? Does not the velocity of electrons get accelerated or
35
retarded by external fields? All these and other such questions prove beyond doubt that the electrons
do exist amidst internal and external contradictions. According to dialectical materialism the
material world is interconnected and every phenomenon in it is inter-dependent so no natural
phenomenon can exist independently by itself or without being depending on other phenomena of
nature. Every particular form of matter no matter how small or how big is finite and every finite is
bounded externally from all around and what is bounded or surrounded from all around is said to be
existing in external contradiction. I wonder on what ground Com. A.M. can claim that the dialectics
of internal and external contradictions has no relevance in the case of natural phenomena and is only
applicable to social problems! Every phenomenon of nature exists conditionally or relatively because
its existence depends upon conditions external to it. Only the material world or nature as a whole
does not exist in any external conditions. Nature exists by itself or unconditionally or absolutely.
That is why Mao-Tse-Tung wrote:
―…Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe, the
development of each particular process is relative…‖ (On Practice)

But the dialectical sense of Com. A.M. does not conform to the dialectical sense of Mao-Tse-Tung
only because Com. A.M. does not see any relevance of the dialectical relationship between internal
and external contradictions in the processes of nature and between the particular processes of nature
and the general process of nature. Let me give one more citation here which clarifies the relationship
between the absolute and relative processes of nature, which is as follows:

―… The only absolute is the material world as a whole. While all its forms, manifestations, etc. are
relative in one sense or another. So Lenin was quite right in emphasizing that dialectical materialism
did not recognize any absolute with the exception that there exists the material world and be reflected
in our consciousness, which ascends from one relative truth to another, perceiving in this movement
an ever greater share of objective absolute truth.‖ (Lenin and Modern Natural Science—Progress
Publishers 1978, Page 239)

Hence from the above discussion it is more than clear that Shibdas Ghosh did not show his
capability to understand matter and its motion dialectically by way of abstraction and without
abstraction matter can only be viewed as ‗particular, concrete and relative‘ as Shibdas Ghosh has
defined. Thus Shibdas Ghosh could not understand matter truly dialectically. And it is the teaching
of Shibdas Ghosh himself that one who does not understand matter in its true character is bound to
be an idealist. Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―…Say, for instance, I do not believe in almighty God but my idea about matter is untrue; then
even without believing in God I may be an idealist…‖(Marxism and Development of Human
Society, SW-2, 1992, Page 30)

Point no.19

Independence of Matter is Absolute not Relative

Shibdas Ghosh holds:

―Independence of idea is not absolute, it is relative.‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, SW2,
p.126)

The independence of idea according to Shibdas Ghosh is relative because idea comes into
existence and develops in the midst of material condition or environment. And because the idea
depends upon matter so the independence of idea cannot be absolute. But it is surprising why
Shibdas Ghosh criticized Hegel when he based his philosophical system on Absolute Idea, which
according to Hegel did not depend at all on matter or nature or any other entity. The independence
36
of the philosophical idea of Hegel was absolute and it is only on this ground Hegel claimed his idea
to be absolute. According to Shibdas Ghosh too, the absolute or relative status of any entity can only
be determined by the nature and quality of independence of that entity. If the independence of any
entity is absolute then the entity itself gets the status of being absolute and if the independence of any
entity is relative then the said entity will be assigned the status of being relative. Now in the light of
above quoted one line from Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought, matter or the material world as a whole
qualifies to be assigned the status of being absolute, because the independence of matter or material
world is absolute and not relative. It is a very pertinent question that if idea is relative because of its
independence being relative then why Shibdas Ghosh did not apply the same yardstick to judge the
status of matter? Is the independence of matter or material world as a whole is relative? If you say,
yes, then you are beyond doubt a relativist and not a materialist.

Point no. 20

Part and Whole is a Dialectical Unity

To understand the aspect of absoluteness and eternity of the material world it is essential to
understand the true dialectical relationship between the parts and the whole of the material world.
Com.A.M. thinks that the character of the material world as a whole is the same as that of its parts.
He writes in the beginning of point no. 5 at page 2 of his 36-page document as follows:

―If parts make the whole, and parts are changeable, then the whole is also so….‖

Here it is quite evident that Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has completely muddled the character of
motion or ‗change‘ of the parts with the character of the motion or ‗change‘ of the whole. But which
are qualitatively different indeed. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee must have taken into consideration the
fact that every ‗part‘ without exception is finite, limited and bounded hence, conditioned from
outside. But the whole is infinite, unlimited and not bounded and conditioned from outside. The
period or duration of existence of every finite is limited and that is why every finite is short-lived or
transient. So every finite has its beginning and end; every part or finite comes into being and ceases
to exist. But in contrast to the finite or the part the period or duration of existence of the whole is
unlimited or infinite; hence being the opposite of the short-lived part the whole is ever-lasting or
eternal. The entity which lasts forever is called eternal. All the parts are discrete but the whole is
continuous. Discrete and continuous are fundamental opposites. Thus the whole and its parts are of
qualitatively different nature and so the change of the two must not be muddled together; rather it is
the quality or the kind of the change itself, that makes the whole eternal and the parts transient.
When Com. Ashoke Mukherjee says that ―If parts make the whole, and parts are changeable, then
the whole is also so….‖, then he forgets that during the process of change every part transforms into
its other at some nodal point i.e. the parts get qualitatively changed, during their forward journey.
The journey of every part comes to an end at some nodal point and during their change parts do not
remain themselves i.e. the quality of every part is short-lived, temporary, transient and relative. But
the journey of the whole faces no nodal point during its infinite course of change. Like its parts the
journey of the whole never comes to an end. The whole suffers no qualitative change. The quality of
the whole ever remains the same and that is why the whole ever remains itself. No doubt the whole
also exists in constant motion but the motion or ‗change‘ of the whole has no bearing on its quality.
The quality of the whole like that of its parts is not short-lived, temporary, transient and relative. The
quality of the whole is ever-lasting. Under no conditions or circumstances whatsoever the whole
loses its quality. The quality of the whole is absolute and eternal. Motion is the mode of existence of
matter and the character of the motion of the whole unlike the character of motion of its parts, is
eternal and absolute. Motions of all the parts of nature are of transient nature and that is why the

37
parts appear and disappear but the motion of the whole is eternal in its character and keeps the
‗whole‘ eternally in motion. All the transient motions are bound to meet their respective end at their
respective nodal points but the eternal motion of the ‗whole‘ never meets any such nodal point where
it may come to its end. And not understanding this difference of characters of motions of the parts
and that of the whole, Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has repeatedly asserted at many places that the
universe as a whole being under constant change is bound to be relative. Below are discussed two
such instances from his 36-page document:

(i) ―What we can define, identify and specify is the relative aspect of the material world,
which is related with its ever changing character, that is, with the fact that at every
moment it is different from what it was just earlier. This change and motion refer not
only to the individual parts of the universe, the separate forms of matter within the
universe, but also to the universe as a whole.‖ (Page-23)

No, it is not correct; the relative aspect of the material world is related to its relative aspect of
motion. Motion of the material world has two aspects relative as well as absolute. Com. Ashoke
Mukhrjee ignores the absolute aspect of motion when he holds that ‗the relative aspect of the
material world is related to its ever changing character‘. Com. Ashoke Mukhrjee says ‗that at every
moment it is different from what it was just earlier‘. It is again a one sided statement. Dialectical
Materialism holds two contradictory aspects of matter or the material world namely (i) matter is ever
changing and (ii) matter ever remains the same. And the material world is nothing but matter in
motion. But when you one-sidedly assert that ‗at every moment it is different from what it was just
earlier‘ then it is tantamount to say that Matter does not ever remain the same; or that matter as
matter was different in the past from what it is today. Let us come to one more passage which is as
follows:

(ii) ―A man is identified by his name in whatever age and condition. In spite of much of
visible changes with time in his figure, height, weight, hair complexion, etc., his name
remains in his whole of life. He is identified by others without mistakes. Similarly,
Matter and nature (in the most general sense) change; but even then, what comes out of
the change is still matter and nature, in the philosophical sense of the terms. In spite of
the changes, the outcome never goes beyond or apart from matter or nature. The
universe in our time is not the same as the universe of Engels‘ time. But we call it
universe all the same. In our understanding of its attributes it has undergone change; in
our definition of matter or nature, it has not. Since matter can neither be created nor
destroyed, no attribute of matter can get lost ever in this material world—mass, energy,
density, elasticity, viscosity, inertia, chemical affinity, electrical polarity, momentum, and
so on. They (are merely transformed into different forms and/or transferred to one
another.‖) (Page 14 bold added )

The passage cited above from Com. A.M.‘s document is perfectly appropriate to comprehend the
dialectics of two contradictory aspects namely the aspect of change and the aspect of no change in
any entity. The dialectics of these two contradictory aspects i.e. of change and no change in the same
thing is well known as the dialectics of Identity and Difference. The aspect of ‗identity‘ signifies that
the thing under consideration is same as it was before; the aspect of ‗difference‘ signifies that the
thing under consideration has changed or is not the same as it was before. To take into account only
one aspect is metaphysics and to take into account both aspects is dialectics. In the above quoted
passage Comrade A.M. takes into account only one aspects namely the aspect of change and ignores
the aspect of no change in relation to both the referred entities i.e. ‗Man‘ and ‗Universe‘. Before

38
dealing with the above quoted passage I feel it necessary to present here two relevant pieces of
teachings from Engels‘ works. Regarding the dialectics of identity and difference Engels writes:

(a) ―… every organic being is every moment the same and not the same; every moment it
assimilates matter supplied from without, and gets rid of other matter; every moment some cells of its
body die and others build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time the matter of its body is
completely removed, and is replaced by other molecules of matter, so that every organic being is
always itself, and yet something other than itself.‖ (Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, SW Marx-
Engels, p. 407 bold added)

(b) ―…if a thing is saddled with its antithesis it is in contradiction with itself, and so is its expression
in thought. For example, there is a contradiction in a thing remaining the same and yet constantly
changing, being possessed of the antithesis of ‗inertness‘ and ‗change‘. ‖ (Anti-Duhring, Appendix,
part I, ch. 12, p.396, bold added)

Thus, there is an inseparable dialectical unity of ‗identity and difference‘ or ‗change and inertness‘.
So, dialectics demands that every entity in the process of change be also viewed simultaneously, as
accompanied with its identity or inertness. Identity and difference; change and inertness go together.
Let us now come to the change of the ‗MAN‘ of the above quoted passage of Comrade A.M., where
he writes:

―A man is identified by his name in whatever age and condition. In spite of much of visible
changes with time in his figure, height, weight, hair complexion, etc., his name remains in his
whole of life.‖

Here, it is clear from the simple reading of the above portion taken from the passage of Comrade
A.M. that while considering the aspect of change in the life of a man, he has ignored the opposite
aspect of change i.e. the aspect of the identity or inertness of the ‗man‘ under consideration. But
Comrade A.M. holds that in spite of huge changes in him the man continues to be identified by his
name, to the end of his life. The question is why? Why the man despite having been undergone huge
change, continues to be identified by the same name? Because the name of the man is not just an
empty word rather the name represents or corresponds to the objective reality namely the identity or
the inertness of the man. The identity of the man remains objectively the same throughout his life. In
fact, the identity or inertness of any entity is nothing but the quality of that entity and during the
process of change so long as the quality of any entity remains the same the identity of that entity
remains the same. The phase of quantitative change of any entity is nothing but the phase of change
of its properties based on its quality. A baby is born and a particular name is assigned to it. It gets
older and becomes adult, suppose a male. Many visible changes take place in his figure, height,
weight, hair complexion with the passage of time but his same name remains in his whole of life and
he is identified by others without mistake. In fact the name or designation of a thing or process
represents the aspect of stability or identity with itself of a thing. So long a as a thing or process
qualitatively remains the same its name or designation remains as it is despite being a huge change
might have taken place in its properties. With his death his name ceases to identify the quality of the
material biological process which it did before the death of that particular man. The quality of the
material process identified by that name has now become a thing of past. The same thing happens
with all the material processes which appear and disappear. For example capitalism has much
changed during the past hundred years but it is keeping maintained its quality, identity, or in other
words stability. And the capitalism of Lenin‘s time is still being called by the same designation. Lenin
writes:

39
 ―Capitalism creates its own grave-digger, itself creates the elements of a new system, yet, at the
same time, without a ‗leap‘ these individual elements change nothing in the general state of affairs
and do not affect the rule of capital.‖ (Differences in the European Labour Movement, Vol. 16)

So unless and until the change or to be specific the quantitative change of any material process
reaches its nodal point or the point of leap, it keeps maintaining its quality or identity or the aspect of
its inertness or its stability. All the finite material processes of the universe have their respective finite
durations of stability, but the infinite general process of the universe has its stability or duration of life
too infinite.

Let us now take the question of change in relation to the universe. Comrade Ashoke Mukherjee
writes:

―The universe in our time is not the same as the universe of Engels‘ time. But we call it universe
all the same. In our understanding of its attributes it has undergone change; in our definition of
matter or nature, it has not.‖

It is not correct to say that the universe in our time is not the same as the universe of Engel‘s time.
It is one-sided statement. Comrade A.M. should have explained from the dialectical point of view as
to why do we call the universe by the same name i.e. ‗universe‘ despite being different from Engels‘
time? The dialectics of identity and difference or that of change and inertness as discussed above also
applies to the universe and this dialectics tells us that: Change in relation to any entity whatsoever
can only be of two kinds. Either it is a change mere in properties of the entity i.e. a quantitative
change or it is a change in the quality itself of the entity. There is no third kind of change. Regarding
the nature of change of the universe Comrade A.M. says: ‗In our understanding of its attributes it has
undergone change‘. It is a thoroughly vague statement. The question is: in terms of what attribute(s)
the universe has undergone the change? We must not confuse the attributes of some particular
process or processes of the universe with that of the universe as a whole itself, just as we must not
confuse the births and deaths of individual/particular cells in any human body with the birth and
death of the human body itself. About the attributes of matter, Engels has stated that ―we have the
certainty that matter remains eternally the same in all its transformation, that none of its attribute can
ever be lost…‖ (Introduction to Dialectics of Nature). Now the question arises that if none of the
attribute of matter or universe can ever be lost then how can any new attribute of matter or universe
appear after Engels death? Comrade A.M. also writes in his above given long passage:

―Since matter can neither be created nor destroyed, no attribute of matter can get lost ever in this
material world—mass, energy, density, elasticity, viscosity, inertia, chemical affinity, electrical
polarity, momentum, and so on. They (are merely transformed into different forms and/or
transferred to one another.‖(Bold added)

So, if ‗no attribute of matter can get lost ever in this material world‘, then could Comrade A.M.
explain to us as to how in our understanding of the attributes the universe itself has undergone change?
Let us examine the matter some more closely. Comrade A.M. himself writes about the two
contradictory aspects of the universe i.e. the aspect of its change and the aspect of no change, as
follows:

―In our understanding of its attributes it has undergone change; in our definition of matter or nature, it has not.”

Is it not the dialectics of the Identity and difference of the universe, which implies that at every
moment the universe is different from what it was a moment earlier and yet the same as it was
before, in terms of its definition? Thus according to Comrade A.M. too the universe in terms of its
40
definition ever suffers no change or in other words it ever remains unchanged. But in dialectical
materialism definitions are not just mere words. If you consider them to be so, then it would be
idealism or nominalism as discussed before. Definitions invariably correspond to some objective
reality or objective material attributes existing in material processes themselves. So, when we say that
the universe of the present times is different from the times of Engels then we acknowledge only the
one side of the objective reality. The other or opposite side of the reality is that it suffered no change
from Engels‘ times. When we assert that ‗matter is ever-changing and matter ever remains the same‘,
then we do nothing but express the dialectics of the Identity and Difference of matter itself. Matter is
ever-changing is only one aspect. The other aspect is that matter never changes. Obey dialectics. Any
entity which never loses its identity, quality or stability is eternal.

Point no. 21

General and Particular Processes of the Material World:

Every particular process of the material world is governed by a particular motion and its laws and
likewise the general process of the universe is governed by its general motion and its laws. When the
general process of the universe is governed by the general motion or motion as such which is itself
immutable, absolute and eternal and so being its general laws then the general process itself is bound
to be absolute and eternal. Consequently the truth or the reflection of the general process of the
universe must have the element or aspect of absolute and eternal truth, because the reflection in
human mind of the material world is not confined or limited to its particular motions but also
extends to the general process. In this view all the processes of the material world are conditional,
transient, relative and finite only with one exception and that exception is the general process of the
material world which is governed by its general motion. And it is in this light we have to understand
the following quotation of Engels which I had cited in my comment no. 2:

――…so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of
absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final,
absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can
endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless
ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the
mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it
recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and
circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its
revolutionary character is absolute—the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits.‖(Ludwig
Fuererbach, bold added)

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee could not understand the dialectics of the above cited quotation of
Engels. In this passage Engels has clearly mentioned two types of material processes in nature. All
the particular processes have to come into being and pass away which means they all have to go
through interruptions. No particular process can emerge or cease without interruption. On either side
of any particular process, there is an interruption or discontinuity. But the general process of the
universe is continuous and suffers from no discontinuity or interruption and that is why Engels has
clearly described this general process to be as the ―uninterrupted process‖. This ―uninterrupted
process‖ (or the general process) is governed by general motion or motion as such or abstraction of
movement which has been held by Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels as immutable, absolute and
eternal. Here again I would like to put a questions to Com. Ashoke Mukherjee as to whether there
can be any ‗uninterrupted process‘ without being governed by a corresponding ‗uninterrupted
motion‘? The answer must be an emphatic NO. So the general process of nature is uninterrupted,

41
continuous, absolute and eternal. And it is on this understanding of the dialectics of the general and
particular processes Mao-tse-tung wrote in his essay On Practice in clear words as follows:

―…Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe, the
development of each particular process is relative…‖

So nature has two aspects namely general and particular. The general process of nature is nature
itself whereas the particular processes of nature are the parts of nature. As we have discussed above
the general process of nature is governed by its general motion and its laws, which have been
recognized as absolute and eternal, consequently every single part of nature which is particular and
relative being its part must reflect through it the nature of nature as a whole. Every relative part is the
part of the absolute whole. That is why referring to J.Dietzgen Lenin writes:

―Hence, we can know nature and her parts only relatively; since even a part though only a
relation of nature, possesses nevertheless the nature of the absolute, the nature of nature as a
whole…which cannot be exhausted by knowledge…How then, do we know that behind the
phenomenon of nature, behind the relative truths, there is a universal unlimited, absolute nature
which does not reveal itself to man completely?...‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter II,
section 5, emphasis added)

CHAPTER: II

DIALECTICS

Point no. 1

Distinction between Metaphysics and Dialectics

In point no. 8 of section-1 at page 2 of his 36-page document Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has
distinguished dialectics from metaphysics as follows:

―The most fundamental difference of dialectics from metaphysics (in the Hegelian parlance)
underlie in its total emphasis on change and changeability of things. From Heraclitus to Hegel this is
the most important criterion of a dialectical worldview. The only absolute and unalterable concept
of dialectics is the aphorism that nothing is absolute and unalterable. So Ghosh was quite right in
emphasizing the ever-changing characteristics of the material world. His presentation is defective in
the detail, but not in the underlying idea.‖ (Emphasis original)
This kind of distinction between dialectics and metaphysics put forward by Com. Ashoke
Mukherjee is very simplistic. To contend that ‗change and changeability of things‘ distinguishes
dialectics from metaphysics is not sufficient at all; because metaphysics is not altogether devoid of
motion i.e. change and changeability of things. For instance, metaphysical materialism is nothing but
mechanistic materialism and in mechanistic materialism the motion of the material world is external
and of mechanistic character. So, mere change or changeability of things cannot be the criterion to
distinguish between metaphysics and dialectics because change or changeability is there in both
metaphysics and dialectics. But when Com. Ashoke Mukherjee distinguishes dialectics from
metaphysics just by ‗total emphasis on change or changeability of things‘ then this kind of distinction
gives the impression that the metaphysical view of nature does not recognise any kind of motion,
change or changeability in nature, which is not true. In the metaphysical world view, nature is also
considered in constant and eternal motion, but that motion is metaphysical in its character and not

42
dialectical. The metaphysical or mechanical conception does not conceive the reciprocal relation of
quantity and quality i.e. as a relation of unity of opposites. The mechanical or metaphysical
conception explains all qualitative differences in the material world on the basis of quantitative
differences of place and atoms etc., which is sheer one sidedness. Criticising this one-sided
metaphysical or mechanistic approach Engels writes:

―Yet the ‗mechanical‘ conception amounts to nothing else. It explains all changes from change of
place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones and overlooks that the relation of quality and
quantity is reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as quantity
into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place.‖ (Anti-Duhring, appendix page 428)

Thus, to make distinction between metaphysics and dialectics it is not correct and sufficient just
to remain confined to the criterion of change and changeability, rather we need to distinguish
between the metaphysical character of motion and the dialectical character of motion.

Point No. 2

Distinction between Metaphysical Motion and Dialectical Motion:

Lenin writes:
―…The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development
(evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of
opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).
―In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains
in the shade (or this source is made external—God, subject etc.). In the second conception the chief
attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of ―self‖ –movement. The first conception
is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the ―self –
movement‖ of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the ―leaps,‖ to the ―break in
continuity,‖ to the ―transformation into the opposites,‖ to the destruction of the old and the
emergence of the new.‖ (On The Question of Dialectics bold added).

Thus there are two conceptions of motion namely metaphysical and dialectical. The source of
motion in nature, according to metaphysics is external and according to dialectics is internal. In
metaphysics the development is viewed only as ‗decrease and increase, as repetition‘. Consequently
the whole difference between metaphysics and dialectics gets reduced to the issue as to how does
nature move or work? Constant movement of nature has been recognised in both the worldviews,
metaphysical as well as dialectical. Describing the metaphysical view on nature based on
metaphysical motion Engels writes:
(i) ―…It is true that nature was obviously in constant motion, but this motion appeared as an
incessant repetition of the same processes….‖ (Anti-Duhring, Chapter-VI, Natural
Philosophy)
(ii) ―…Nature, so much was known, was in eternal motion. But according to the idea of that
time, this motion turned also eternally, in a circle and therefore never moved from the
spot; it produced the same results over and over again. This conception was at that time
inevitable…‖ (Ludwig Feuerbach, page-28)

So it is amply clear from the above two citations of Engels that prior to the dialectical view the
nature was also known to be in eternal and constant motion but this motion turned eternally in a
circle. It produced the same results over and over again. This means that every particularity in nature
was viewed as eternal. When the scientific discoveries demolished the metaphysical outlook of
understanding nature i.e. the movement of nature in perpetually recurring circle, Engels wrote:
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 ―Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished
this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, nature
works dialectically and not metaphysically;‖ [Anti-Dühring; Introduction, General].
Engels stated in the above quotation that ―nature works dialectically and not metaphysically;‖.
This clearly shows that nature can be viewed moving or working either metaphysically or
dialectically. So to say that ‗change and changeability‘ is the crux of dialectics is not sufficient to
distinguish dialectics from metaphysics because the concept of change and changeability is not
altogether absent in metaphysics. The central point of distinguishing between dialectics and
metaphysics is not the movement of nature but the distinction between the two kinds of motion i.e.
the dialectical motion and the metaphysical motion. That is why referring to Lenin, Stalin wrote
about the world picture in his celebrated pamphlet Dialectical and Historical Materialism as follows:
―The world picture is a picture of how matter moves and of how matter thinks.‖
Stalin‘s words: ―how matter moves and how matter thinks‖ clearly refer to the dialectical
character of motion as opposed to metaphysical motion. According to metaphysical view the motion
of matter was external but according to dialectics matter moves by itself or by its self-movement. The
cause of motion according to metaphysics was not the struggle of opposites whereas the cause of
motion of matter is internal and matter moves through the struggle of opposites. Motion in matter is
generated by unity of opposites; the generated motion moves ahead through opposites and the
direction of motion or development is also determined by the struggle of opposites. Thus the
dialectical worldview does not simply rest on that ‗matter moves‘ rather it rests upon its dialectical
character of motion. Because matter can be viewed as moving constantly in both the world views
metaphysical as well as dialectical.
In metaphysical view matter is not at all static, but moves in eternal circles. Take for instance
the example of the crop of barley which has been given by Engels himself in his Anti-Duhring, to give
an illustration of the dialectical motion of the growth and development of barley. According to the
metaphysical world view a grain of barley when sown in a suitable soil and it grows into a plant and
the plant gives again many grains of barley, but these grains of barley are exactly of the same kind of
which the original grain was. It means that the grains of barley ever remain the same and move in a
circle. The circle meets at the same point where it began from. The grain of barley repeats itself every
time when sown. According to this metaphysical view a grain of barley remains the same even after
it has been sown and repeated itself billions and billions of times. Metaphysical worldview admits no
development in the grain of barley, it remains ever the same. So barley is held to be an eternal
particularity, it moves eternally in a circle and it cannot come out from its circle. Barley can come
only from barley and barley can produce only barley i.e. eternal repetition over and over again of the
same barley. The movement of barley ends exactly where it started from. No change in barley can
take place ever, irrespective of how many times you sow it and the same thing applies without
exception to all the particular species or objects in nature. According to metaphysical view every
particularity in nature moves eternally in its own particular circle and there is no force to unite all
these eternal particular circles into one single or integral whole. The eternal circle of the species ‗fish‘
is absolutely independent from the any other species. According to this view the species ‗fish‘ cannot
develop into any other species. Fish can only produce fish and nothing else. There is no place of
development of one thing into another under this worldview. Snake can come from snake, lion from
lion, cow from cow, monkey from monkey, man from man etc. etc. . Everything moves in its own
particular eternal circle. There is a well-known metaphysical riddle as to what came first whether the
hen or the egg? Because the metaphysical view cannot view things evolving or transforming one into
another. The metaphysical view is totally incapable of thinking that a hen could have come out from
an egg which was laid not by a hen but by some other creature. This kind of metaphysical conception
regarding the eternity of particular species suffered a death blow by the theory of evolution
discovered by Darwin and the theory of cell and that of transformation of one kind of motion into
44
another. And after such prominent scientific discoveries it became clear that no particularity is
eternal and Engels wrote about the movement of nature ―that she does not move in the eternal
oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.‖ [Socialism:
Utopian and Scientific; ―Dialectics‖]
Thus according to Metaphysical view of nature, every particularity of nature was viewed in
eternal and constant motion but this motion was in a ‗perpetually recurring circle‘ and all the
particular ‗perpetually recurring circles‘ of nature had no interconnection with one another and thus
according to metaphysical world view seemed to be an agglomeration or conglomeration of
independent and unconnected particular things moving in their respective perpetual circular motions.
The motion associated with every particularity was of its own kind, eternal but circular producing the
same results again and again. There was no interconnecting or universal motion. Thanks to the three
great discoveries as discussed above when the universal motion was discovered, the science of
interconnections itself got discovered. That is why Engels defined dialectics to be the ―science of
interconnections‖. Engels writes:
―The general nature of dialectics to be developed as the science of inter-connections, in contrast to
metaphysics.‖(Dialectics of Nature, chapter-Dialectics)
Thus dialectics in contrast to metaphysics studies the aspect of inter-connections in the universe
i.e. how the infinite particularities are connected and united in one single whole. Corresponding to
inter-connecting science there must be an inter-connecting motion and that motion is called universal
motion or motion as such. The universal or general motion has its own laws which are equally
applicable to all the particular motions. The discovery of dialectics is nothing but the discovery of
inter-connecting or universal motion and its laws. The discovery of universal motion is the
fundamental foundation of materialist dialectics but in the thought of Shibdas Ghosh, one does not
find any mention whatsoever regarding the universal motion. Shibdas Ghosh is totally and utterly
unaware regarding the universal motion of the universe. Shibdas Ghosh‘s universe is without
universal motion. The dialectical motion of Shibdas Ghosh is completely devoid of universal motion.
Universal motion is the self-motion of matter, it is the unity of all motions which unites and binds all
the particularities of the universe into a single coherent whole. Without having knowledge or
understanding of any interconnecting or universal motion one cannot comprehend dialectical motion
at all and Shibdas Ghosh is one of them. Engels has defined dialectics as shown above to be the
science of interconnections but Shibdas Ghosh talks about some ‗comprehensive science‘ or ‗the
science of all sciences‘ as follows:
―…Is there any science in the world that can analyse, correlate and integrate all the particular
laws, all the particular truths of the whole material world? I have to say in reply that in the annals of
mankind no such science had developed prior to dialectical materialism. After attainment of a
particular stage of scientific development in the course of human civilization dialectical materialism
has developed as such a comprehensive science; this alone has led to a comprehensive, consistent
concept of the world and some general truths by coordinating the particular truths and knowledges
culled from the different branches of science. This is why dialectical materialism is called the
‗coordination of sciences‘ or the ‗the science of all sciences‘. And this dialectical materialism is the
philosophical foundation of Marxism. It is a philosophy whose outlook is universal, which treads the
whole world.‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, SW-2, p.99, edition 1992)
Thus Shibdas Ghosh has termed dialectical materialism to be the ‗coordination of sciences‘ or the
‗comprehensive science‘ or ‗the science of all sciences‘. We know that generally every science studies
some kind of specific motion of matter. For example, Mechanics studies the mechanical motion of
matter; Physics studies the physical motion of matter; Chemistry studies the chemical motion of
matter; Biology studies the biological motion of matter; the nuclear science studies the nuclear
motion of matter etc. etc.. Likewise the ‗comprehensive science‘ as mentioned by Shibdas Ghosh
must have its corresponding ‗motion‘ of study and it must be nothing but the ‗comprehensive
45
motion‘ itself or in other words motion of all motions. If you do not recognise or acknowledge the
objective existence of any ‗comprehensive motion‘ or motion of all motions in the universe itself then
your talk of comprehensive science becomes baseless, subjective or idealistic. We cannot create or
manufacture the concept of any kind of science by the power of our brain if that science has no
material basis in the universe itself or which has no objective motion existing in the universe to be
studied by that science. Dialectical Materialism acknowledges that ‗comprehensive motion‘ by the
nomenclature, Universal Motion and the laws of this universal motion are called laws of dialectics.
And dialectics has been defined as ‗the science of the most general laws of all motions‘.

Point no. 3
Definition of Dialectics
Engels has defined dialectics at several places as follows:
(i) dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motions. This
implies that its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature and human
history as for the motion of thought…‖(Anti-Duhring, Notes to Anti-Duhring , p-
421)
(ii) ―…dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all
motions.This implies that its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature
and human history as for the motion of thought.…‖ (Chapter-Mathematics,
Dialectics of Nature, page267)

‗The most general laws of all motions‘ are the universal laws of universal motion. In fact the
discovery of universal motion and its universal laws negated the metaphysical view of nature.

Point no.4
How Metaphysical View Got Negated

In his 36-page document Com. A.M. has cited several passages from John Lewis (ed.): A
Textbook of Marxist Philosophy. One of those passages describes as to how the metaphysical view
of the world got negated by the dialectical viewpoint. John Lewis has clearly and correctly shown
that the emergence of dialectical view of nature took place with the discovery of universal motion of
matter and the laws of this universal motion. The discovery of this universal motion proved that all
the particular motions of the universe (which were thought to be independent and isolated from each
other) are the manifestations of the same universal motion. The said passage reads as follows:

―In the field of philosophy the old metaphysical view of the world has been set at nought by the
science of the universal laws of the development of nature, of society and human thought—
dialectical materialism. Indeed the latter, the most scientific reflection of actuality, is itself all the
time being enriched and developed on the basis of our experiences in the construction of socialism as
well as by the latest discoveries of the different sciences. ... [pp. 95-97]‖ (page 32)
Had Com. A.M. been able to understand the real implications of this above cited passage from
John Lewis‘s textbook he must not have clung to the phrase ‗change and changeability‘ as to be the
essence of dialectics. The fundamental basis of dialectics as John Lewis has shown is the discovery of
universal motion and its laws. In Shibdas Ghosh‘s entire thought one cannot find the concept of
universal motion and so is the case with Com. A.M.‘s document. Nowhere is his 36-page document
Com. A.M. has described or explained or even mentioned the concept of universal motion. His
concept of ‗change and changeability asserted to be the essence of dialectics is totally devoid of the
recognition of universal motion. Though he repeatedly like Shibdas Ghosh asserts that matter is
universal but his understanding of universal matter is also totally without its corresponding universal
46
motion. Without understanding the conception and reality of universal motion it is impossible to
understand the real nature and character of universal matter itself because to understand the
conception of matter one must have to understand the conception of its motion, as motion is the
mode of existence of matter. In the succeeding point I would like to show that the discovery of the
Dialectics of Marx and Engels is historically connected with the discovery of universal motion.

Point no.5
Universal Motion and its Laws

Referring to the different and particular forms of motion Engels writes:

―…they themselves prove in action that they are forms of one and the same motion by passing into
one another under given condition.‖(Dialectics of Nature, p-78)
Engels writes:
―…hence into a history in which at each stage different laws, i.e., different phenomenal forms of the
same universal motion, predominate, and so nothing remains as absolutely universally valid
except—motion.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, p-239)
As to the unity of all motions Engels again writes:
―…The unity of all motion in nature is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific
fact.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, Ch- From the history of science, p-197)
In his Anti-Duhring Engels writes:
―[Motion as the Mode of Existence of Matter] –Motion is the mode of existence of matter, hence more
than a mere property of it. There is no matter without motion, nor could there ever have
been….Neither motion as such nor any of its forms, such as mechanical force, can therefore, be
separated from matter nor opposed to it as something apart or alien, without leading to an
absurdity.‖ (Page 388, emphasis added)

In his 36-page document Com. A.M. has cited several passages from John Lewis (ed.): A
Textbook of Marxist Philosophy. One of those passages describes as to how the metaphysical view
of the world got negated by the dialectical viewpoint. John Lewis has clearly and correctly shown
that the emergence of dialectical view of nature took place with the discovery of universal motion of
matter and the laws of this universal motion. The discovery of this universal motion proved that all
the particular motions of the universe (which were thought to be independent and isolated from each
other) are the manifestations of the same universal motion. The said passage reads as follows:
―In the field of philosophy the old metaphysical view of the world has been set at nought by the
science of the universal laws of the development of nature, of society and human thought—
dialectical materialism. Indeed the latter, the most scientific reflection of actuality, is itself all the
time being enriched and developed on the basis of our experiences in the construction of socialism as
well as by the latest discoveries of the different sciences. ... [pp. 95-97]‖ (page 32)
Had Com. A.M. been able to understand the real implications of this above cited passage from
John Lewis‘s textbook he must not have clung to the phrase ‗change and changeability‘ as to be the
essence of dialectics. The fundamental basis of dialectics as John Lewis has shown is the discovery of
universal motion and its laws. In Shibdas Ghosh‘s entire thought one cannot find the concept of
universal motion and so is the case with Com. A.M.‘s document. Nowhere is his 36-page document
Com. A.M. has described or explained or even mentioned the concept of universal motion. His
concept of ‗change and changeability asserted to be the essence of dialectics is totally devoid of the
recognition of universal motion. Though he repeatedly like Shibdas Ghosh asserts that matter is
universal but his understanding of universal matter is also totally without its corresponding universal
motion. Without understanding the conception and reality of universal motion it is impossible to
understand the real nature and character of universal matter itself because to understand the

47
conception of matter one must have to understand the conception of its motion as motion is the
mode of existence of matter. Shibdas Ghosh throughout his life remained quite ignorant and
unaware of the universal motion working in nature, the basis of materialist dialectics and this is the
fundamental cause that kept Shibdas Ghosh and his adherents far away from dialectics. Engels
writes:
―…dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motions. This implies that
its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature and human history as for the motion of
thought.…‖ (Chapter-Mathematics, Dialectics of Nature, page267)
So Engels has repeatedly defined dialectics as the science of universal interconnections or the
science of the most general laws of all motions. And Engels has clearly mentioned above that the
laws of all motions are the laws of dialectics. Hence the laws of dialectics are the laws of universal
motion or motion as such which keeps united all the particular forms of motion or particular material
processes into one single coherent whole. Though Shibdas Ghosh and Com. Ashoke Mukherjee talk
much about the universal character of matter but they nowhere talk about the universal motion
whose laws have been termed by Engels as laws of all motions namely the laws of dialectics
mentioned above. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has also cited in his 36-page document a definition of
dialectics given by Engels without understanding its inherent dialectical meanings. The said
quotation is as follows:
―Engels said: ‗Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of
the external world and of human thought—two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but
differ in their expression ... . Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious
reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world ...‘ [Ludwig Feuerbach ...; Chapter 4; emphasis
added]‖ (from page-13, emphasis by Com. A.M.)
Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has given emphasis on the word ‗motion‘. But the question is which
motion is this? Is this ‗motion‘ any particular motion namely mechanical, heat, electricity, chemical,
biological or the like? No, this motion which Engels has referred to here is not any particular motion
but the general motion of the universe which resides within all particular motions and which
connects all particular processes of nature into one single coherent whole. All the particular motions
are just the manifestations of the same universal motion. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee should have
discussed the nature of the motion the laws of which are the laws of dialectics.
The purpose of this above citation of Engels here is nothing but to show that ‗motion as such‘ and
its ‗specific forms‘ are two aspects of universal motion. Universal motion has been termed by Engels
as ‗motion as such‘. There is no concept of motion as such or of universal motion in Shibdas Ghosh‘s
thought, nor Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has made any reference to universal motion or motion as such
in his 36-page document and this kind of ignorance amounts to utter ignorance of dialectics.

Point No. 6
Discovery of Universal Motion is Discovery of Dialectics

As I have already discussed that owing to the lower stage of the development of natural sciences,
there could be no concept or recognition of universal motion in the metaphysical view of nature.
There was no concept of interconnecting motion and the corresponding science in the metaphysical
worldview. That is why nature was viewed as the eternal repetition of the same particular processes.
Nothing was general or universal. But after the advancement of natural sciences three important and
decisive discoveries took place which became the basis of the discovery of interconnecting/ universal
motion and emergence of materialist dialectics. These three discoveries which have been described
by Engels are as follows:

48
 ―But, above all, there are great discoveries which have enabled our knowledge of the
interconnection of natural processes to advance by leaps and bounds: first, the discovery of the cell
as the unit from whose multiplication and differentiation the whole plant and animal body
develops,…Second, the transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called
forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature—mechanical force and its complement, so-
called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical
energy—are different forms of manifestation of universal motion, which pass into one another in
definite proportions so that in place of a certain quantity of the one which disappears, a certain
quantity of another makes its appearance and thus the whole motion of nature is reduced to this
incessant process of transformation from one form into another. Finally, the proof that Darwin first
developed in connected form that the stock of organic products of nature environing us today,
including man, is the result of a long process of evolution from a few originally unicellular germs,
and that these again have arisen from protoplasm or albumin, which came into existence by chemical
means.‖ (Ludwig Feuerbach, Page-46-47, Bold added)

Showing the significance of the above mentioned three discoveries Engels further writes:

―Thanks to these three great discoveries and the other immense advance in natural science, we
have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes
in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on the
whole, and so can present in an approximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the
interconnection in nature by means of the fact provided by empirical natural science itself….Today,
when one needs to comprehend the results of natural scientific investigation only dialectically, that
is, in the sense of their own interconnection, in order to arrive at a ‗system of nature‘ sufficient for
our time; when the dialectical character of this interconnection is forcing itself against their will even
into the metaphysically-trained minds of the natural scientists, today natural philosophy is finally
disposed of. Every attempt at resurrecting it would be not only superfluous but a step
backwards.‖(Ibid, p.47, Bold added)
Thus the interconnection among all the particularities of nature has been discovered by the above
said three discoveries of science. And this interconnection is further based on the motion which
interconnects them all and that motion is universal motion. All other particular motions are nothing
but the manifestations of the same universal motion. As has been cited above that Engels has
described the general nature of dialectics as the science of interconnections which in turn means the
science of interconnecting motion which resides within all particular motions which has been termed
as universal motion. Shibdas Ghosh being governed by metaphysical worldview was quite unaware
of the existence or concept of universal motion. Nowhere in his speeches and writings, he whispered
any word as to universal motion. Being ignorant and unaware of the discovery of universal motion
and its laws, Shibdas Ghosh subjectively created the concept of ‗comprehensive science‘ as discussed
above. And when Shibdas Ghosh does not know anything about the universal motion (discovered by
the three scientific discoveries) then how can he view the world or nature in its interconnections?
And when Shibdas Ghosh does not know the connection between the universal motion and the three
above discussed scientific discoveries then how could he claim that he knew the dialectics of Marx
and Engels? Distinguishing the dialectical character of natural science from that of its metaphysical
character before the emergence of dialectics Engels writes:
―…And in fact, while natural science up to the end of last century was predominantly a collecting
science, a science of finished things, in our century it is essentially a systematising science, a science
of the processes, of the origin and development of these things, and of the interconnection which
binds all these natural processes into one great whole…‖ (Ludwig Feuerbach, Chapter-4, bold
added)
49
 Point No. 7
Emergence of Dialectics According to Shibdas Ghosh

Shibdas Ghosh says in his book Marxism and Dialectical Materialism under the subheading ‗Cause of
motion is inherent in matter‘ as follows:
―…The concept of matter that has developed on the basis of knowledge gathered from the
splitting of atom, from radioactivity and the theory of relativity is such that one no longer has to look
for the basic cause of motion outside of matter….Modern science has concluded that the basic cause
of motion of matter is within matter itself; that is, basic cause of motion of matter is internal, not
external.‖ (SW-2, p.140)
Thus according to Shibdas Ghosh the self-movement of matter came to be discovered only in
1896 when the phenomenon of radioactivity showed that atom also has its internal structure
consisted of one nucleus surrounded by electrons. The splitting of atom, the phenomenon of
radioactivity and the theory of relativity all the three events of modern science mentioned by Shibdas
Ghosh took place after the death of both Marx and Engels and if these above stated three events of
modern science established the truth that the cause of motion of matter is internal and not external
then what was the basis of the dialectics of Marx and Engels? Both Marx and Engels had no chance
in their life time to know the said conclusion of the modern science which according to Shibdas
Ghosh proved that motion is the internal attribute of matter, not external. Then the question arises
that what was the scientific basis of Materialist Dialectics discovered by Marx and Engels before the
emergence of the said three events or discoveries of the modern science? How could Marx and
Engels establish the materialist dialectics without knowing the ‗scientific conclusion‘ of the modern
science that the cause of motion of matter is internal not external? Was the dialectics of Marx and
Engels just based on speculations? According to Shibdas Ghosh prior to the above stated three
discoveries of modern science the cause of motion of matter had to be viewed outside of matter
which means that prior to these three discoveries the Materialism was bound to be mechanistic and
not dialectical. If Shibdas ghosh is correct in saying that the discoveries of modern science which
took place after the death of Marx and Engels and which established that the cause of motion of
matter is internal and not external then the emergence of dialectical materialism prior to these three
discoveries of modern science cannot be explained. Because the materialist dialectics of Marx and
Engels is itself based on the hard fact and the incontrovertible truth that matter moves dialectically
and not metaphysically and that the cause of motion of matter is internal and not external. It clearly
shows that Shibdas Ghosh is totally ignorant of those discoveries in different branches of science
during the life-time of Marx and Engels on the basis of which dialectical motion of matter and nature
got discovered. In the life-time of Marx and Engels the development of science had already reached
such a height that the dialectical outlook on nature had become fully complete. In this regard Engels
writes:
―…The new outlook on nature was complete in its main features: all rigidity was dissolved, all
fixity dissipated, all particularity that had been regarded as eternal became transient, the whole of
nature was shown as moving in eternal flux and cyclical course.‖(Introduction to Dialectics of
Nature)
Now the fundamental question to be pondered over by the adherents of Shibdas Ghosh is: If the
cause of internal motion of matter was discovered after the death of Marx and Engels as is stated by
Shibdas Ghosh then how could the new or dialectical outlook on nature got completed during the
life-time of Marx and Engels themselves? If the cause of internal motion of matter was discovered
after the death of Marx and Engels as is stated by Shibdas Ghosh then on what scientific basis could
Engels write in his Anti-Duhring that ―Motion is the Mode of Existence of Matter‖? Shibdas Ghosh
has displayed his total ignorance of the materialist dialectics as discovered by Marx and Engels by
50
asserting that the cause of internal motion of matter was discovered after the atom got split in 1896
i.e. after the death of both Marx and Engels. Let us now discuss as to what were those three basic
discoveries of natural science which gave birth to dialectical and historical outlook about nature and
society.

Point No. 8
Three Great Scientific Discoveries
It was not the splitting of atom or the discovery of radioactivity in 1896 or theory of relativity
which Shibdas Ghosh considers to be the basis for the discovery of self-movement or the dialectical
motion of matter, rather the scientific basis of the discovery of materialist dialectics is the discovery
of universal motion of matter. And the discovery of universal motion of matter which finds no
mention in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought, is based upon three great discoveries regarding which Engels
writes:
―…It is true that Feuerbach had lived to see all three of the decisive discoveries—that of the cell,
the transformation of energy and the theory of evolution named after Darwin. But how could the
lonely philosopher, living in rural solitude, be able to sufficiently to follow scientific development in
order to appreciate at their full value discoveries which natural scientists themselves at that time
either still contested or did not know how to make adequate use of it?...‖( Ludwig Feuerbach, p.29)
After discussing the significance of the above mentioned three great discoveries from the
dialectical point of view Engels further writes:
―Thanks to these three great discoveries and the other immense advance in natural science, we
have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes
in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on the
whole, and so can present in an approximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the
interconnection in nature by means of the fact provided by empirical natural science itself….Today,
when one needs to comprehend the results of natural scientific investigation only dialectically, that
is, in the sense of their own interconnection, in order to arrive at a ‗system of nature‘ sufficient for
our time; when the dialectical character of this interconnection is forcing itself against their will even
into the metaphysically-trained minds of the natural scientists, today natural philosophy is finally
disposed of. Every attempt at resurrecting it would be not only superfluous but a step
backwards.‖(Ibid, p.47)
Had Shibdas Ghosh studied and understood the meaning of the above quote of Engels, he must not
have said that before the discoveries of modern science namely splitting of atom etc. ‗the cause of
motion of matter had to be looked into outside matter‘.
Now the big question is that how the dialectical view of nature could become finally complete
without having been known that the cause of motion of matter is internal and not external? The
second aspect of Shibdas Ghosh‘s claim that the discoveries of modern science namely splitting of
atom and radioactivity etc. has shown that the cause of motion of matter is internal is also
groundless. Had it been so, Lenin also must have so concluded. The splitting of atom and
radioactivity took place in Lenin‘s times and when a section of philosophers and scientists
interpreted the splitting of atom as the disappearance of matter itself, Lenin refuted it strongly and
simply said that only the limit within which the matter was hither to known had disappeared, atom is
broken and that limit extended up to electron. Lenin had reminded at that time that the electron is
not without inner structure or contradiction. But the physicist, till today claim that particle electron
has no internal structure or contradiction. And when it is held that the electron has no internal
contradiction as Com. A.M. is also of the same view then the cause of motion of electron becomes
wholly external. The cause of self-movement of matter cannot be said to be discovered by such
events of science like splitting of atom rather the dialectics or self-movement of matter could be
discovered by the methodology of thinking which Marx and Engels had acquired. When the cause of
51
internal motion of matter or the emergence of dialectical motion itself according to Shibdas Ghosh
begins with the discoveries of modern science then how can one expect that Shibdas Ghosh
understood the dialectics of Marx and Engels? To understand the dialectics of Marx and Engels we
must first understand the basic distinction between the metaphysical motion and dialectical motion.
In Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought we nowhere find such distinction.

Point No. 9
General Laws of the Material World as per Shibdas Ghosh‘s Thought:
Shibdas Ghosh also talks about general laws of the material world. But he does not
acknowledge any general motion existing in the material world. As relating to the concept of God
there is no corresponding objective reality in the material world likewise according to Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought there is no corresponding real, objective general motion working in the material
world. Let me remind you here again that according to Shibdas Ghosh the discovery of self-
movement of matter or the discovery of dialectics took place only with the discovery of the
phenomenon of radioactivity in 1896 i.e. after the death of both Marx and Engels. According to
Shibdas Ghosh the internal cause of motion of matter came to be discovered after the atom got split.
Shibdas Ghosh discussed nowhere the scientific discoveries on the basis of which the dialectics of
Marx and Engels rests upon. About the general laws Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―…Till science attained a certain stage of development it was not possible for a genius even to
know the general laws of development of the material world. It would be wrong to hold that it was
possible for Marx alone to achieve this task because before him no genius of his stature was born in
the world. This is no logic. It can be clearly understood that the then democratic thoughts and ideas,
the humanist concepts of the bourgeoisie, coupled with the birth of proletariat, the development of
science paved the path for the emergence of the philosophy of Marxism. It was in this background
that Marxism or dialectical materialism came into existence.‖ (Marxism and Development of
Human Society SW, Vol.2, 1992 ed. page 30)

Thus according to Shibdas Ghosh without knowing the internal cause of motion of matter which
could only be known after the splitting of matter in 1896, Marx and Engels discovered the general
laws of development of the material world. In fact Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought itself is not based on the
materialist dialectics discovered by Marx and Engels. The question is how could Marx and Engels
discovered the general laws of development of the material world if they first have not discovered the
general or the universal motion inseparably linked with the material world or matter? According to
Shibdas Ghosh the general principles can be produced by the human mind by way of coordinating
and integrating the particular laws working in the different domains of the material world. Shibdas
Ghosh writes:

―…What does dialectical materialism do, which I am calling a science? What does it study?
Marxism or dialectical materialism studies the general laws of matter which the different disciplines
of science, namely physics, chemistry, etc., study in their respective domains. In other words,
Marxism or dialectical materialism studies the general laws, which govern the entire activity of the
material world. So the different branches of science study and try to know the particular aspect of the
material world, and dialectical materialism, coordinating these particular truths arrives at general
truths—the general truths which govern conduct and guide all the activities of the material world and
science as well. So, the task of dialectical materialism is to arrive at these fundamental principles or
general truths denying which this material world cannot exist or move about.‖ (Ibid, page 35)

Thus according to Shibdas Ghosh the general laws of development of material world need no
corresponding objective general motion working in the material world itself. Comrades! If dialectical
52
materialism is a science then question is what this science studies? Any science studies some motion.
A particular science studies a particular motion e.g. Mechanics studies the mechanical motion of
matter likewise Chemistry studies its chemical motion. Now Shibdas Ghosh has stated that
‗dialectical materialism studies the general laws of matter‘ but laws of matter are nothing but the laws
of its motion. Matter has no laws except the laws of its motion. So when ‗dialectical materialism
studies the general laws of matter‘ then there must be the general motion of matter. But Shibdas
Ghosh nowhere mentions or refers to the general motion of matter. Without general motion of
matter how can there be general laws of matter? The other thing is that Shibdas Ghosh has used the
phrase ―the entire activity of the material world‖ instead the general process of the material world
because Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought has no conception of the general process rather it views the world
as a conglomeration of all the particular things which is a metaphysical conception. Anyway,
According to Shibdas Ghosh Dialectical Materialism coordinates the particular truths obtained from
particular sciences. He writes:

―The general truths that develop by coordinating and integrating the particular truths or
knowledge, derived experimentally in the different branches of science, namely physics, chemistry,
mathematics, biological sciences, sociology and economics, form the basis of dialectical materialism
…‖ (Marxism and Development of Human Society—SW, vol.2, 1992 ed. Page 35)

It clearly shows that for Shibdas Ghosh, apart from particular motions there is no general
motion and general laws or general truths are only created in mind by coordinating the particular
laws or truths. He holds that the three basic general principles that guide every change have been
concluded (not abstracted) by studying particular processes. And then those general principles or
truths created by mind by way of conclusion, are imposed on the entire activities of the material
world, which is sheer idealism. Shibdas Ghosh writes: ―By studying the process of changes in this
material world dialectical materialism has concluded that there are three basic general principles
that guide every change. These are known as the three principles of dialectics. …‖ (Marxism and
Dialectical Materialism SW-2, 1992 ed. Page 159, bold added) But Engels in his Dialectics of Nature
writes: ―It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are
abstracted. (Chapter- Dialectics, page 62-63, bold added)

So, according to Shibdas Ghosh the general laws of dialectics are not the real laws of real
general motion governing the real general process of nature. I want to give here one more example
from Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought which shows that general principles of dialectics are not real laws of
any real general process. He writes:

―Now I want to discuss whether the principle of unity of opposites can be described as the basic
law of dialectics. In my opinion, ‗principle‘ should not be considered synonymous with ‗basic law‘—
because, sometimes that creates hindrance to grasping a phenomenon correctly. However, as for
myself and our Central Committee we do not find it anything very objectionable. We think if
correctly understood there is nothing to object to when we speak of a law, since we mean by it a
particular law. When the term ‗law‘ is used to connote a general law, it implies a principle. Other
than this, a law always means a particular law which appears and disappears, comes into being and
goes out of being. That is, in a particular situation, a particular law becomes operative in accordance
with the specific situation and, in the same way, when, in course of development, a completely new
situation arises, the old law becomes inadequate and can no longer govern the new situation; it
becomes invalid, ineffective, and a new law in conformity with the new situation comes into being
and governs it…‖ (9th Congress of CPC, SW-1, page 398-399)

53
 One thing is clear from the above cited passage from Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought that there are
general laws which govern the activity of the entire material world. Now the question is whether the
entire material world is governed by the different set of general laws in different times? Whether the
entire material world was being governed in the remote past by the different set of general laws or
will the entire material world be governed by a different set of general laws in the remote future?
Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought knows only particular sciences or particular motions of the material world
that is why it defines matter to be as ‗particular, concrete and relative‘. When all the particular
motions are transient and relative then it was obvious that Shibdas Ghosh has defined matter to be
particular and relative. General motion of matter is absolute and eternal that is why the laws of this
motion which govern the entire activities of the material world are also eternal. Comrade Ashoke
Mukherjee must take my direct and simple question as to whether there can be any general laws of
matter without being any general motion of matter? If Com. Ashoke Mukherjee admits that general
laws of matter cannot exist without the general motion of matter then the core issue of the whole
debate gets resolved. Because if we admit the existence of general motion of matter then another
question crops up where does this general motion reside? Or what is the relationship of this general
motion with all the particular motions of the universe? The answer is that the general motion has no
place to reside except within all the particular motions. Then for Com. Ashoke Mukherjee it will
become very very easy to comprehend the following quotation of Lenin which I had sent in my
comment no. 14:

―…For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the
relative is only relative and excludes the absolute.‖(On the Question of Dialectics)

Point No.10

Dialectical Motion Binds the Nature into A Single Coherent Whole

As has already been discussed that Engels has described the fundamental contrast between
dialectics and metaphysics by distinguishing dialectics from metaphysics as the science of
interconnections, as follows:―The general nature of dialectics to be developed as the science of
interconnections, in contrast to metaphysics.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, Chapter-Dialectics) And
distinguishing the dialectical character of natural science from that of its metaphysical character
before the emergence of dialectics Engels writes:

―…And in fact, while natural science up to the end of last century was predominantly a collecting
science, a science of finished things, in our century it is essentially a systematising science, a science
of the processes, of the origin and development of these things, and of the interconnection which
binds all these natural processes into one great whole…‖ (Ludwig Feuerbach, Chapter-4)
According to the metaphysical worldview as I have already discussed nature could not be viewed
to be an integrated whole because according to metaphysical view all the particular things, species
etc. were seen to be moving independent of each other in their eternal circles. In the course of
metaphysical motion one thing could not be viewed as to be transforming into another. All the
particular motions were viewed to be eternal in their own circles and the world picture could not be
anything but a conglomeration of particular things independent and isolated or unconnected from
each other. Shibdas Ghosh and Com. A.M. do not understand this character of metaphysical
motion. According to them, from Heraclitus to Hegel and then to Marx-Engels dialectics is just based
upon ‗total emphasis on change and changeability of things‘. If it is so then Com. Ashoke Mukherjee
must explain as to why the dialectics founded by Heraclitus got superseded and replaced by the
metaphysical worldview later on. Why the dialectical view of Heraclitus got replaced by the
54
metaphysical view in the development of philosophy? Can the dialectical materialistic worldview
founded by Marx and Engels be again defeated by the metaphysical outlook as has happened in case
of Heraclitus? No, it cannot happen. The dialectical worldview founded by Heraclitus was not as
strong as that of Marx and Engels. This can be understood from the comparison of primitive
communism and the scientific communism of modern days. The ancient dialectical world-view of
Heraclitus was just based on the contemplative or speculative philosophy and not on scientific
achievements as the sciences themselves were not much advanced. In this regard Engels has pointed
out the basic weakness of Greek philosophy from Heraclitus to Aristotle as follows:
―… Among the Greeks (just because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect, analyse nature)
nature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The universal connection of natural phenomenon is
not proved in regard to particulars; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation. Herein lies
the inadequacy of Greek philosophy, on account which it had to yield later to other modes of
outlook on the world…‖ (Appendix to Anti-Duhring, page 381, bold added) If we analyse this
citation of Engels we come to the following conclusions:
(i) The worldview as the term itself suggests is nothing but the mode of outlook on the
world.
(ii) That according to dialectical worldview, the world must be viewed as a whole or in
general and on this account the Greeks were right.
(iii) In dialectical worldview the universal connection of particular natural phenomenon has
to be proved scientifically but in case of Greek philosophers it was just based on
contemplation. And this was the inadequacy of Greek philosophy.
Thus as a result of ‗change or changeability of things‘ the two most fundamental requirements
must be achieved and incorporated in the world view viz (i) the world must be viewed as a
harmonious whole or a general process (ii) the universal connection of the particular natural
phenomena must be established so that the world may be viewed as an interconnected integral whole
and these two requirements can only be achieved on the basis of scientific discoveries. Hegel
achieved the above stated two achievements idealistically but he did succeed in viewing the world as
an integral and coherent whole. And so he became the founder of dialectical world view though
idealistically. On this achievement of Hegel Engels wrote:
―Systematics impossible after Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent
whole, but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all nature and history, which
man will never attain…‖ (Anti- Duhring, Appendix, part I, chapter 3)
Thus Hegel again viewed the world to be a single coherent whole on the basis of the motion of
his so-called dialectical absolute idea. Marx and Engels turned upside down the idealistic-dialectical
worldview of Hegel and after having discarded the so-called absolute idea of Hegel viewed the world
materialistically as a single coherent whole. Marx and Engels discarded the absolute idea of Hegel
but retained its kernel i.e. its dialectical motion and they showed on the basis of scientific discoveries
that the dialectical motion was not the motion of any so-called absolute idea but the universal motion
of matter itself. Engels writes elsewhere:
―This new German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system –and herein is
its great merit –for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a
process, i.e., in constant motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to
trace out the internal connections that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and
development.‖ (Socialism: Utopian and Scientific)
So it is amply clear that as a result of dialectical motion and dialectical viewpoint the world picture
becomes of a coherent whole, a single system, a general process and a continuous whole. To say that
―total emphasis on change and changeability of things‖ is the crux of dialectics which distinguishes
dialectics from metaphysics is quite vague. If the ―total emphasis on change and changeability of
things‖ as Com. Ashoke Mukherjee asserts, does not create the world picture of a single coherent
55
whole then this above stated phrase becomes meaningless. The concept of change and changeability
is itself divided into two, metaphysical and dialectical. When on the basis of scientific discoveries,
Marx and Engels overturned the idealistic dialectics of Hegel and placed on its feet then the world
picture in real terms or materialistically turned out to be of a coherent, harmonious, integral and
interconnected continuous single system. Engels wrote:
(i) ―Thus we have once again returned to the mode of contemplation of the great founder
of Greek philosophy: that all nature, from the smallest things to the biggest, from grains
of sand to suns, from protista to man has its existence in eternal coming into being and
going out of being, in ceaseless flux,…‖ ( Introduction to Dialectics of Nature, bold
added )
(ii) ―The new outlook on nature was complete in its main features: all rigidity was dissolved,
all fixity dissipated, all particularity that had been regarded as eternal became transient,
the whole of nature was shown as moving in eternal flux and cyclical
course.‖(Introduction to Dialectics of Nature, emphasis added)
(iii) ―In theoretical natural science, however, which as far as possible builds up its view of
nature into a harmonious whole, and without which now a days even the most
thoughtless empiricist cannot get anywhere.…‖(Introduction to Dialectics of Nature,
bold added )
Lenin also wrote:
(iv) ―The Marxian doctrine is omnipotent because it is true, it is complete and harmonious
and provides men with an integral world conception which is irreconcilable with any
form of superstition, reaction or defence of bourgeois oppression.‖ (Lenin: The Three
Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, bold added)
Stalin also wrote the same:
(v) ―Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental
agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with isolated from and independent
of each other but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are
organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by each other.‖ (Stalin:
Dialectical and Historical Materialism, bold added)
Mao-Tse-Tung has also viewed the world as a whole to be a single general process. He writes:
(vi) ―…Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the
universe, the development of each particular process is relative…‖ (On Practice)

Thus the crux and result of viewing the world dialectically is to view the world in a ceaseless
single eternal flux or as an interconnected harmonious or integral or coherent whole. And if you are
unable to view the world as a single eternal process or single coherent or integral whole then you
cannot claim at all that your world view is a dialectical one. The Pre-Marxian metaphysical or
mechanistic materialism could not view the world dialectically as a single coherent whole because
the dialectical motion of the world itself was not got yet discovered. Shibdas Ghosh has utterly failed
to view the world as a whole to be a single harmonious or coherent or integral whole and Com.
Ashoke Mukherjee also finds basically no fault with this view of Shibdas Ghosh. Everywhere in his
thought Shibdas Ghosh views matter or the material world as a whole to be a conglomeration of
things as was being viewed before the discovery of dialectical motion.
In fact, in metaphysical view, nature can never be conceived as a single coherent whole
because in that view the nature is constituted by separate particularities which are in eternal circular
motion producing same results over and over again, and which are not interconnected by any
interconnecting or universal motion. But when scientific discoveries revealed that all the particular
motions are the manifestations of the same universal motion and are of transient nature which come
into being and pass away and all are inter-connected by the universal motion, only then the world
56
could be viewed as a single coherent whole. The single coherent whole is the ultimate general
material process of nature which has no beginning and no end like its constituent particularities. That
is why Engels has termed the ultimate general process of nature to be an eternal flux governed by
eternal universal motion. We know that motion is an inseparable property of matter and also that
motion is the mode of existence of matter. This means that the character and status of matter is
decided by motion. If the motion of any material process is transient, conditional and relative then
the character and status of that form of matter or process will also be transient, conditional and
relative. But when the character of motion of any material process is itself eternal, unconditional and
absolute then the process itself be of the same status and character. Particular forms or processes of
matter are all transient and relative; appearing and disappearing because of their motion and its laws
being so. The universal matter as opposed to the particular was always there and will always be there
because it is associated with the universal motion which was always there and will always be there.
Hence the ultimate general process is nothing but the eternal movement of matter. When Lenin
wrote in his Materialism and Empirio-criticism that ―Whether we say the world is moving matter, or
that the world is material motion,‖ he meant universal matter in eternal motion and not its
particularities as no particularity of matter can be said to be in eternal motion. Matter can never be
conceived in static state. When Lenin defined matter as a philosophical category then it only meant
the universal aspect of matter leaving aside all its particularities. But motion being the universal
attribute of matter and the motion being the mode of existence of matter whether particular or
universal is inseparable from matter.

Point No. 11
Shibdas Ghosh‘s Conception of the Material World as a Whole is Fragmentary

Shibdas Ghosh views the material world as a whole not as an interconnected single, indivisible
general process as discussed above but a mere conglomeration of particular forms of matter. I am
compelled to cite here a long quotation for your perusal, from his literature where he writes as
follows:
―…The idea of origin or end of the material world as a whole is no longer tenable in science. It
will be easier to follow if the point is explained from another angle. Take the case of frontside and
backside of a thing. If someone asks which our frontside is and which the backside, there is no
difficulty in understanding that he is meaning the front or back of something particular here. If we
start, say, with those of us sitting on the dais in this hall—which is our front? It can be indicated with
an arrow that those of you, who are listening me sitting with your faces towards the dais, are in our
front. Again, if we start with those of you who are listening to the discussion sitting in the
auditorium, which is your front? That too, can be indicated with an arrow to show that we on the
dais are in front of you. So you see, the concept of front or back has a meaning when viewed with
respect to or in relation to a particular position. That is, the concept is relative, there is nothing as
front or back as such in an absolute sense. Similarly, there are no such things as beginning or end in
an absolute sense. A particular matter or phenomenon has its beginning and end. So, as it would be
meaningless to ask which is the frontside of all the people of the world, so also it would be absurd to
ask what is the origin of the material world as a whole…
―…If we start with hydrogen and oxygen and combine them in a particular process and in definite
proportions, we shall obtain water through a combination of the two gases. What is the starting point
now? We start with hydrogen and oxygen. And what do we end up with? We end up with water.
This is the point. If, after this, one asks what is the common origin of all things in the world—
inorganic matter, organic matter, plants, animals, insects, hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, electron,
proton, etc. etc.—naturally it not difficult to understand that the framing of the question is
57
unscientific and reflects a wrong conception. What I have been trying to impress upon is that a
particular matter or phenomenon has an origin, but there can be no common origin of all things
taken together. You should understand that concepts like front or back, origin or end, are all
relative.‖(Some Aspects of Marxism.., SW-2, p143-44)
It is more than clear from the above cited quotation of Shibdas Ghosh that he has no conception
whatsoever of the material world as a whole to be a single general process or a single coherent whole.
According to Shibdas Ghosh, ―…The idea of origin or end of the material world as a whole is no
longer tenable in science.‖ Though it is correct that the material world as a whole has no origin and
end being a single eternal and infinite process and consequently the idea of its origin and end
becomes ridiculous. But Shibdas Ghosh has no sense of the material world as a single material
eternal process, he dismisses the idea of origin and end of the material world being entangled in a
maze of different particular things. The view of Shibdas Ghosh, as to the material world as a whole,
is no different from that of metaphysical materialists. Regarding the view of metaphysical
materialism Engels writes:
―The second specific limitation of this materialism lay in its inability to comprehend the universe
as a process, as matter undergoing uninterrupted historical development. This was in accordance
with the level of the natural science of that time, and with the metaphysical, that is, anti-dialectical
manner of philosophizing connected with it. (Ludwig Feuerbach, Chapter-II)
It is clear from the above quotation of Engels that Shibdas Ghosh could not get rid of the
metaphysical view of the material world being devoid of dialectics. The science imbibed with
materialist dialectics views the world as a single material process and not as a conglomeration of
particular processes. Material world is a single coherent whole. The fundamental question that crops
up is about the root cause of the incapability of Shibdas Ghosh as to why he could not view the
material world as a whole to be a single coherent general process or a harmonious whole or an
integrated whole? The simple answer to this question is that to view the world or universe as a single
coherent whole one needs a dialectical outlook, which Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought is totally lacking.
Instead of a coherent, harmonious or an integral whole Shibdas Ghosh views the world to be a
simple conglomeration of particular things. When Shibdas Ghosh argues that there can be no
common origin of all the particular things of the world then the word ‗common‘ becomes
meaningless when we view the world to be a single and integral material process. The word
‗common‘ becomes meaningful only when we view the world to be the conglomeration or
agglomeration of many particular things. From the Greek philosophers like Heraclitus to Hegel and
from Hegel to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao all viewed the world as a single coherent whole or
as a harmonious integral or general infinite process but the talented Comrades like Ashoke
Mukherjee and Ramesh Patnaik are unable to view it so nor they find any flaw in Shibdas Ghosh‘s
thought when it views the world to be a conglomeration of particular things. The reason is: they
could not break the fetters of the so-called dialectics of Shibdas Ghosh. In fact the dialectics as taught
by Shibdas Ghosh is no dialectics at all. I will revert to the fundamental distinction between
dialectics and metaphysics later but first I want to deal with the ‗skilful‘ way employed by Com.
A.M. to defend and justify the worldview of Shibdas Ghosh as discussed above. Defending Shibdas
Ghosh‘s view Com. A.M. writes in his 36-page document:

―Comrade Shibdas Ghosh always tried to offer in his own way some simple explanation of every
problem in theory. This he did without consulting either the available science texts, or the Marxist
classics. As a result the examples he selected for corroborating his thesis, were in many cases
inaccurate, or inappropriate. By showing, for instance, the separateness or relativity of spatial positions
of separate things, which denies any common positional direction for all things taken together, he
transferred the same idea directly on time and thereby refuted the idea of a common origin of
everything. It was done with the logic of analogy, which he himself discouraged the indiscriminate
58
use of. The entire mode of transfer here is totally unjustified. For time you have to show the same
kind of different references of beginning of different things to establish the point.
―Had he been able to do so, that is, to show the relativity of beginning and end of everything
separately, there being no common or absolute beginning of all things taken together, it would have
been a great achievement in Marxist philosophy. The example of combination of hydrogen and
oxygen to form water is a poor and completely irrelevant one to show the relativity of beginning in
terms of time. Unfortunately, he could not do so. The approach was not wrong but the procedure
surely was.‖ (Page 25-26, underline original)
Comrades can see themselves that how skillfully Com. A.M. has defended Shibdas Ghosh‘s
thought. Totally confusing the question of viewing the world as a single process, Com. A.M. has
raised another question in the name of ‗great achievement‘ had Shibdas Ghosh been able ‗to show
the relativity of beginning and end of everything separately‘. Actually Com. A.M. himself is quite
unable to view the world as a single material process. Had it not been so, he must not have written in
his above quoted passage: ―there being no common or absolute beginning of all things taken
together‖. The understanding of the universe as a whole as to be ―all things taken together‖ is
tantamount to view the world as an agglomeration of all particular things and not as a single
coherent, harmonious whole as has been discussed above. Every particular process is the product of
the coherent whole or the general process of nature as a whole but nature as a whole itself is not a
product of any other process because the general process of nature as a whole is without beginning
and end i.e. eternal or everlasting. So this general process called nature cannot have any beginning
being not a product of any other process. Lenin wrote:
―A philosophy which teaches that physical nature itself is a product, is a philosophy of clericalism
pure and simple.‖ (Materialism and Emprio-criticism, Chapter-4, section-5)
Lenin further wrote: ―…If nature is a product, it is obvious that it can be a product only of
something that is greater, richer, broader, mightier than nature, of something that exists; for in order
to ‗produce‘ nature, it must exist independently of nature. That means that something exists outside
nature, something which moreover produces nature. In plain language this is called God…‖ (Ibid)
So it is clear that the question as to the beginning is not the question of the beginning of ‗all things
taken together‘ as Shibdas Ghosh and Com. Ashoke Mukherjee reduce it to, but the question of the
beginning of the single coherent whole or the question of the beginning of the general harmonious
material single process called nature.

Point no. 12
What is meant by viewing the World as a Whole?
A Single Coherent General Process
The implication of viewing the world by Shibdas Ghosh to be just a simple conglomeration
of particular objects can be judged by the limitation displayed by the intellectual disciple of Shibdas
Ghosh like Com. Ramesh Patnaik who went to the extent to say that it is rather problematic to view
the world as a whole in the first place. He writes:
―The very expression ‗whole‘ is problematic as the material world is infinite both in space and
time. The word whole can be used to only those entities which are bounded by time and space.‖
Here it is amply clear that Com. Ramesh Patnaik is totally incapable to view the material
world as a whole, reason being the limitation of Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought itself and the consequent
conditioning of its adherents. It is sheer empiricism. To view the world as a whole does not mean at
all to view it sensually as we view the sun and the moon. The infinite world as a whole can only be
viewed philosophically i.e. at the level of thought which is qualitatively higher level than the sensual
one. But the empiricist in their thinking cannot go beyond the sensual boundary of thought. To view
the world as a whole or as a single general process simply means that no particular process is just a
product of its preceding particular process, rather every particular thing or every particular process is
59
a product of the general process as a whole. To understand this let us take the example of an apple on
a tree. No doubt we observe in front of us that the apple is produced by a particular process working
inside the tree and in an appropriate climate outside. But there was a time that there was no tree on
earth surface. So for the origin and history of the tree we have to go far behind to investigate the
history of the earth surface or the soil which could produce a tree of apple. By our investigation if we
could know the real history of the development of appropriate soil on earth surface then there also
matter does not end. Next question before us will be as to where the earth itself came from? The
climate on earth is created by the whole solar system, sun being its central force and source of energy.
How the solar system came into existence and what is its history of development? Without the solar
system the apple on a tree on earth could not have been produced. So the process of production of an
apple on earth goes to the general process of the solar system and matter also does not end here
because the solar system itself has its own history of coming into existence. And thus the connection
of an apple‘s production goes to the process of the galaxy of which our solar system is a part and this
series of sequence ends at the general process of the universe. That is why Engels writes:
(i) ―Life is, of course, not the product of a chemical process, nor in general is it the product
of an isolated natural forces or phenomenon, to which the metaphysical materialist
reduces it; it is a result of the whole of nature.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, page 199, note 128)
(ii) ―That life is a result of the whole of nature in no way contradicts defect that protein,
which is the exclusive independent bearer of life, arises under definite condition
determined by the whole inter-connection of nature, but arises precisely as the product of
a chemical process. …‖ (ibid)
Thus every particular thing or process is the result of the general process of nature as a whole,
though it seems to be coming out from another particular process. Every particular process or
thing of the universe comes into existence from the general process of the universe and
disappears into it. Without the particular processes there can be no general process and from the
view point of dialectics without the general process there can be no particular process. All the
particular processes of the universe are appearing and disappearing as a result of the single
general process of nature.

Point No.13
Shibdas Ghosh: Regarding the nature of organization of a communist party
Shibdas Ghosh does possess the sense of a single coherent whole. In this regard Shibdas Ghosh
writes as follows:
―…Moreover, the party is not just the conglomeration of its members. It is not merely the sum of
the party organization. The party, at the same time, represents a single system of these organizations,
their amalgamation into a single organic whole. The leader in the party occupies the same position as
is occupied by the center of the nerves in a human body. …‖ (On Steps against Stalin—SW, Vol.-1st)
Comrades can compare themselves the understanding of Shibdas Ghosh regarding the material
world as a whole and that of the party organization as a whole. So Shibdas Ghosh‘s conception of
material world as a whole is nowhere near to the dialectical conception.

Point No. 14

Interconnection of General and Particular Processes of Nature

Shibdas Ghosh writes:
―…Dialectics teaches us to study the contradiction of the particular with the general. Every
serious communist knows that the general policy of the international communist forum gives the
general guiding principle, which is to be applied differently in different countries. The concrete
60
 analysis of concrete conditions which differs from country to country and concrete application of
the general guiding principle in different countries with different objective conditions constitutes
the living soul of Marxism. Without these, Marxism would become a dogma. It is because of the
difference in conditions in different countries that there exists a contradiction between the general
programme of international proletarian revolution and the particular programme and revolution
in a given country. Anyone who loses sight of this contradiction between the general and the particular
commits the error of formalism. …‖ (ibid pages 74-75, Italics added)

Shibdas Ghosh here has raised the question as to the relationship of the general and particular
processes in context of international communist movement. But he totally fails to apply this view in
relation to matter or the material world. When he asserts that matter is particular, concrete and
relative then he totally abandons the general process of the material world and thus he himself falls
into the pit of one-sidedness and formalism. As I have discussed in the preceding point that every
particular material process or thing is the product of the whole or the general process of nature so no
particular process or thing can be viewed in itself or in isolation of the whole. The general process of
nature or matter has been termed by Engels and Lenin as to be the eternal flux or eternally moving
matter. It means that the general or universal motion of matter or the eternal flux is itself universal.
The general or universal process is not any temporary or conditional material process rather this
process is eternal in its duration and unconditional in its character as this process is not conditioned
by any other external conditions. So every particular process being conditional and temporary comes
into being and passes away and every particular process is the integral part of the uninterrupted i.e.
continuous general process of the universe. The ultimate uninterrupted, general process of the
universe is unconditional or absolute and eternal. Engels wrote:

――…so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute
states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final, absolute,
sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before
it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from
the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of
this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it recognizes that definite
stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The
conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute—the only
absolute dialectical philosophy admits.‖(Ludwig Fuerbach, bold added)

And it is on this basis that Mao-Tse-Tung wrote:

―…Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe,
the development of each particular process is relative…‖ (On Practice)

But for Shibdas Ghosh and his adherents there is no absolute and general process of matter because
according to them matter is only particular, concrete and relative so every material process, is bound
to be particular, concrete and relative. For them every motion is particular, concrete and relative and
there can be no general or universal motion which can be absolute and eternal. But after the
discovery of universal motion all the particularities which previously in metaphysical world view had
been considered as moving in eternal circles, have now become transient i.e. of appearing and
disappearing nature and a single eternal flux of matter came to be discovered. And this single eternal
flux of matter is governed not by any particular, transient motion but by the universal motion of
which all the particular forms of motion are transient manifestations. This universal motion
governing the eternal flux of matter can neither be particular nor transient nor relative but opposite to
all of them. An eternal flux of matter must be governed by an eternal motion having its own eternal

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laws. An eternal flux or process cannot be governed or regulated by any transient or temporary
motion.

But the dialectics of Shibdas Ghosh in the name of dialectical view just gives ‗total emphasis on
change and changeability of things‘ without basing the change and changeability on the universal
motion. As has already been discussed Shibdas Ghosh neither views the material world as a single
general process nor does he recognise the existence of universal motion which unites or binds all the
particular things or processes into a single coherent whole. Because Shibdas Ghosh repeatedly asserts
that matter is ‗particular, concrete and relative‘ that is why he could not view the material world to
be a single general process or a single coherent whole. Whenever a dialectician talks about matter
then he never means any particular forms of matter instead he means the material commonness
residing within all particular forms and which is nothing but the universality of matter. Shibdas
Ghosh makes no distinction between universal and particular forms of matter. ‗Change and
changeability of things‘ is the only ‗dialectical‘ mantra of Shibdas Ghosh. And the dialectical
understanding of Com. Ashoke Mukherjee is also based upon the GK of Shibdas Ghosh and not on
any text of the Marxist Classics.
What is dialectics, how it came to be discovered or what are the specific scientific discoveries on
the basis of which dialectics got emerged, what is the dialectical view of nature and how does it differ
from its metaphysical view, what is the basic difference between metaphysics and dialectics etc. etc.
are some most fundamental questions need to be discussed. The understanding given in Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought as to these issues has no relation whatsoever to the understanding given in the
works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. Let us first know how Shibdas Ghosh views the
question of emergence of dialectics.

Point No.15

Dialectical Relationship of Polar Opposites

Any two concepts which are fundamentally opposed to each other and which together make a pair of
opposites are called polar opposites. Maurice Cornforth in his Dialectical Materialism writes:

―… Fundamental opposites are polar opposites. A magnet, for example, has two poles, a north pole
and a south pole. But these poles, opposite and distinct, cannot exist in separation. If the magnet is
cut in two, there is not a north pole in one half and a south pole in the other, but north and south
poles recur in each half. The North Pole exists only as the opposite of the south, and vice versa; the
one can be defined only as the opposite of other.‖(Chapter-Dialectics and Metaphysics)

So in any pair of polar opposites the existence of one is only in relation to the other or in other
words one conditions the existence of the other; one can be defined only as the opposite of other. In
his Dialectics of Nature, referring to Hegel, describing the relationship of polar opposites Engels writes:

―‗In essence everything is relative‘ (e.g. positive and negative, which have meaning only in their
relation, not each for itself)‖ (Ch-Dialectics, p.213)

Here Engels has given a special example of polar opposites namely positive and negative which can
only exist in relation to each other and not in isolation to or independent of each other. As we know
that mathematics is purely an abstract science but every science including mathematics is nothing but
the ideal reflection of the real material world. And because the real material world is nothing but a
material process or matter in motion so the positive and negative concepts of mathematical science
are bound to express some material process of the universe i.e. matter in motion. So we cannot view

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positive and negative concepts which are reflections of the moving matter, as fixed, frozen or
stagnant rather positive and negative are fluid categories. Fluid categories mean that in their
movement when carried to extreme they pass or transform into one another; the antagonism between
them is not absolute but relative or conditional. But according to the old non-dialectical or
metaphysical way of thinking positive is positive and negative is negative and the antagonism
between them is permanent. According to metaphysics positive and negative exist independent from
and in isolation to each other and positive and negative can never be transformed into each other.
According to metaphysics the antagonism between the polar opposites is irreconcilable and insoluble
and according to metaphysics polar opposites are fixed and frozen and not fluid as they have fixed
lines of demarcation between them. Distinguishing the dialectical view from the metaphysical view
over the polar antagonism between polar opposites Engels writes:

―…it is however precisely the polar antagonisms put forward as irreconcilable and insoluble, the
forcibly fixed lines of demarcations and class distinctions, which have given modern theoretical
natural science its restricted, metaphysical character. The recognition that these antagonisms and
distinctions, though to be found in nature, are only of relative validity, and that on the other hand
their imagined rigidity and absolute validity have been introduced into nature only by our reflective
minds—this recognition is the kernel of the dialectical conception of nature.‖ (Anti-Duhring, Preface to the
Three Editions, Sep.23, 1885, Italics added)
Thus the kernel of dialectical conception of nature as described by Engels is to view the antagonism
of every pair of polar opposites to be relative and not absolute which implies that the polar opposites
should be viewed mutually dependent, conditioned by each other and in their movement
transforming into each other. According to dialectical conception every pair of polar opposites
constitutes a unity of opposites described by Maurice Cornforth as follows:
―This unity of opposites—the fact that opposites cannot be understood in separation one from
another, but only in their inseparable connection in every field of investigation—is strikingly
exemplified in mathematics. Here the fundamental operations are the two opposites, addition and
subtraction. And so far is it from being the case that addition and subtraction can be understood each
apart from the other, that addition can be represented can be represented as subtraction and vice
versa; thus the operation of subtraction (a-b) can be represented as an addition (-b+a). Similarly a
division a/b can be represented as multiplication ax(1/b).‖ (Chapter-Dialectics and Metaphysics)

Giving more examples as to how the polar opposites are inseparable from each other Maurice
Cornforth writes:

―Thus in physics we find that attraction and repulsion are involved in every physical process in such
a way that they cannot be separated or isolated the one from the other. In considering living bodies,
we do not find in some cases the building of the organic compounds and in other cases their breaking
down, but every life process involves the building up and breaking down of organic compounds. In
capitalist society the increasing socialisation of labour is inseparable from its opposite, the increasing
centralisation of capital.‖ (Ibid)

According to the dialectical conception of nature, the motion everywhere is generated by two
contradictory aspects called polar opposites. And the dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the
motion through opposites Engels writes:
―Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective
dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts
itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final
passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.‖ (Dialectics of Nature,
Ch. Dialectics, p.212, bold added)
It is very simple to understand that when the objective dialectics of nature is nothing but motion
through opposites then the subjective dialectics or the dialectical thought is bound to be the reflection
of objective dialectics. For instance the conception of two polar opposites i.e. positive and negative in
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the human mind is bound to be the reflection of the corresponding two motion generating
contradictory aspects i.e. interconnected and interdependent or in other words existing inseparably in
the real objective world. When the motion is itself generated or caused by two contradictory aspects
then how can it be that the two do not exist inseparably or interdependently? If we view the polar
opposites to be existing in isolation or one without the other then we cannot explain the cause of
motion in nature to be the internal one because the opposites existing independently of each other
cannot produce any motion. So, when someone attempts to prove that the opposites can exist
independent of each other e.g. positive without negative, then he only disproves the internal cause of
motion of matter. Hence in dialectical view no polar opposites or no two contradictory aspects can
exist without one another.

But being swayed by metaphysical way of thinking Com. A.M. writes:

―There are many concepts in the arena of human knowledge so fundamental that you may
not find their opposites outside of them, viz., redness, height, area, surface, wave, earth, water,
sun, galaxy, tree, fruit, man, animal, stone, etc. Similarly, there is no anti-thesis of matter. Anti-
particles together cannot be clubbed as anti-matter, for they are also matter in the philosophical
sense. You have to locate thesis and anti-thesis as some forces/elements/tendencies in each case
within the very entities themselves.‖ (From brief comments, sr.no. 10, p-2)

We are only concerned here with the pairs of polar opposites no matter whether they exist
‗inside or outside‘. The subject matter under debate is that every pair of polar opposites can only
exist inter-connectedly or interdependently i.e. neither aspect can exist without its opposite. But
Com. Ashoke Mukherjee is saying quite the other thing which is not relevant at all to the debate.
He says that there are many concepts which do not have their respective opposites like ‗redness,
height, area, surface, wave, earth, water, sun, galaxy, tree, fruit, man, animal, stone, etc.‘. We
may enumerate many more such concepts which do not have their opposites or which do not
exist in pairs like the pairs of positive and negative; above and below etc. etc.. Our debate
confines only to the concepts which occur as pairs of opposites. Dialectical view holds that in the
pair of opposites neither of the two aspects of the pair can exist without the other. So, it is not the
requirement of dialectics that each and every concept must form a pair of polar opposites with
other. On the contrary the essential requirement of dialectics is that the concepts which have a
fundamental opposition between them cannot exist in isolation from each other e.g. positive and
negative; life and death; universal and particular; finite and infinite; absolute and relative; eternal
and transient etc. etc.. But it is also true that the concept redness is nothing but a reflection of
some objective material process constituted by a movement through opposites. In a certain limit
that process gives the reflection of redness and if that process moves backward or forward it gives
the reflection of some other colours and the same thing applies to all concepts. The concept
height has its polar opposite as the concept of depth. Height and depth constitute a pair of polar
opposites and when anybody climbs up at the top of Kutub Minar and sees below he fears from
depth. So height and depth are interconnected dialectically and one cannot be conceived in the
absence of the other. While ascending on some building or some tree every point of height goes
on transforming into depth or every point previously called ‗above‘ goes transforming into its
opposite ‗below‘ for the climber. Thus we have to view the pair of opposites in motion and not
static. Distinguishing dialectical view of the opposites from its contrary i.e. metaphysical view
Maurice Cornforth writes:

―But contrary to metaphysics, not only are fundamental opposites involved in every subject-
matter, but these opposites mutually imply each other, are inseparably connected together, and, far
from being exclusive, neither can exist or be understood except in relation to the other.‖ (Chapter-
Dialectics and Metaphysics)
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Truth and error form a pair of polar opposites and discussing the interconnection, interdependence
and inseparability of the dialectical unity of truth and error Engels writes in his Anti-Dhuring as
follows:

―This shows that, truth and error, like all concepts which are expressed in polar opposites,
have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field…As soon as we apply the anti-thesis
between truth and error outside that narrow field…both poles of the antithesis change into their
opposites, truth becomes error and error truth.‖(Part 1st chap.9, Bold added)

Thus it is amply clear from this above quoted passage from Anti-Duhring that our point of debate is
limited to the concepts which can be expressed in polar opposites and not otherwise like water, earth,
stone, ocean, chair, table, stool etc. etc. as Com. Ashoke Mukherjee muddles with. The subject
matter of our debate confines only to the pairs of mutually contradictory aspects. If water and table
are not mutually contradictory aspects then they do not constitute a pair of polar opposites and the
dialectical law of unity of opposites or interpenetration of opposites does not apply to them.
According to dialectics neither of the contradictory aspects of a pair of polar opposites can exist in
isolation or independent of its opposite. Mao-Tse-Tung writes:

―The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each
loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a
concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without
death, there would be no life. Without ‗above‘ there would be no ‗below‘; without ‗below‘, there
would be no ‗above‘. Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune,
there would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; Without difficulty, there
would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants
there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the
proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be
no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semi-colonies, there would be no imperialist
oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are
opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating
and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory
aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But
they also possess the character of identity and hence are inter-connected. This is what Lenin means
when he says that dialectics studies ‗how opposites can be …identical.‘ How then can they be identical ?
Because each is the condition for the other‘s existence.‖(From- On Contradiction)
But Com. Ashoke Mukherjee objects as follows:

―The examples given by Mao are, first of all, not of a homogeneous nature. If we enquire what
kind of unity plus and minus constitute, we shall see that there are very few quantities in
mathematics, which are plus and minus at the same time. There are lots of operations in
mathematics where people deal with only positive quantities and not negatives.‖ (Page 22)

This is sheer metaphysics because according to this view of Com. Ashoke Mukherjee plus and
minus or positive and negative can exist in isolation to and independent from each other. Plus and
minus are abstractions from the real world. They represent some real material process in motion. In a
limited time and space one can view plus as plus and minus as minus but in their movement they
transform into each other. Plus and minus represent the two contradictory aspects of some material
process and both these aspects are united in struggle as a unity of opposites and each aspect is
conditioned by the other and each aspect is determined and affected by the other and when their
struggle is carried to extreme they transform into each other. According to metaphysical view
positive and negative can exist in isolation to each other but according to dialectical view they are

65
inseparable and they interpenetrate into each other. Let us read how Engels views the dialectical
unity of positive and negative. Engels writes:

―Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis, positive and
negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they
mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which
only hold good in their applications to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual
cases in their general connections with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they
become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and
effect are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then,
and vice-versa.‖ (Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, SW Marx-Engels, p. 407)
Thus to view as to how the opposites mutually interpenetrate and how they are inseparable we
must view the individual cases of opposites in their connections with the universe as a whole;
because, only then we can see how they run into each other like cause and effect as shown above by
Engels. The big question is as to why the positive numbers have been termed as ‗positive numbers‘ in
the first place? What is the ground for this terminology given to them? In relation to what the positive
numbers are positive? Had there been no existence of negative numbers could there be any existence
of positive numbers? In the system of co-ordinates, every positive number has two sides namely, left
and right. The left side is negative and the right side is positive. Take for example three positive
numbers 1, 2, 3. These three positive numbers are in ascending order. The number 1 is to the
negative side of 2 and the number 3 is to the positive side of number 2. The ascending and
descending order inherently imply that every positive number and every negative number have their
positive and negative sides. Dialectics is the study of motion. So when we study the numbers in their
motion only then we can understand their dialectics of their being positive and negative. The law of
dialectics From Quantitative Change to Qualitative Change and vice-versa also applies to the
movement of numbers. If we move from the positive number 9 to its left then the positive magnitude
of every number goes on quantitatively decreasing and a sudden qualitative change occurs when we
cross the number zero. The number zero is neutral that is non-positive and non-negative. These two
aspects of zero i.e. non-positive and non-negative are themselves opposite to each other; hence zero
itself is a contradiction in itself. So in the movement of numbers also we find that quantity
transforms into quality. Quantitatively the positive number 2 is less positive than the positive number
3 which is quantitatively more positive than 2. So positive and negative are inseparable and can only
exist in relation to each other. Neither can exist in isolation from the other rather they interpenetrate
into each other. In this regard Engels teaches us:
― To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one
after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigations fixed, rigid, given once for all.
He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. ‗His communication is ‗yea, yea; nay, nay‘; for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil‘ for him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing
cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.‖(Socialism: Utopian and
Scientific p. 406, SW. Marx-Engels)

To say plus is plus and minus is minus is tantamount to formal logic. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee
himself has given a pictorial example to illustrate the difference between formal logic and dialectical
logic at page 18 of his document and which I have cited earlier and now again want to repeat here.
Com. A.M. writes:
―Aristotle, the father of formal logic, had proposed three basic laws of thinking, as follows:
1. Law of identity: a = a;
2. Law of contradiction: a ≠ not-a; and
3. Law of excluded middle: there is nothing that is neither a nor not-a.
These laws were good for the metaphysical method of thinking, for static things, for identification
and classification, etc. A tree is a tree; a seed is a seed; a seed is not the tree; there is no such thing
which is neither tree nor non-tree, etc.
Hegel pointed out for the first time that these laws, quite sufficient in the identification of an
unchanging entity, fail to describe a moving thing. Suppose, as in the following diagram, an arrow
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has been shot form a bow and it is going to cross the post marked A. If somebody asks, if the arrow is
at A, what will be the correct answer? Is there any single answer to this question? No. Because you
may have noted that the gradually changing position of the moving arrow forbids any unique and
fixed answer to the query. On the one hand, you cannot say that the arrow is not at A because quite
soon the arrow will pass by the point A; and again, you cannot say that the arrow is at A, for it is
then leaving the position corresponding to A. You have to describe its position in terms of
opposites—here and not-here. Logically it is moving because it is continuously resolving the
contradiction of these opposites.‖ (Underline added)

Thus in the real life of the universe ‗here‘ and ‗not-here‘ constitute a pair of polar opposites.
Neither of these two contradictory aspects can exist in isolation to and independent from the other.
They both interpenetrate into each other and transform into each other but the trouble is that Com.
A.M. does not view the contradictory aspects of the pair of polar opposites constituted by ‗plus‘ and
‗minus‘ in their movement in the real world. Identity and difference is itself a pair of polar opposites
about which Engels writes:

―The law of identity in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the old outlook: a=a.
Each thing is equal to itself. Everything was permanent,…most natural scientist imagine that identity
and difference are irreconcilable opposites instead of one-sided poles which represent the truth only
in their reciprocal action, in the inclusion of difference within identity.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, Ch-
Dialectics, Italics original)

Regarding identity and difference Engels elsewhere writes:

―In like manner, every organic being is every moment the same and not the same; every moment it
assimilates matter supplied from without, and gets rid of other matter; every moment some cells of its
body die and others build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time the matter of its body is
completely removed, and is replaced by other molecules of matter, so that every organic being is
always itself, and yet something other than itself.‖ (Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, SW Marx-
Engels, p. 407)

Positive and Negative are also polar opposites. Engels writes:

―Positive and negative. Can also be given the reverse names: in electricity, etc.; North and South ditto.
If one reverses this and alters the rest of the terminology accordingly, everything remains correct. We
can call West East and East West…Indeed in Physics we call the real South pole of the magnet
which is attracted by the North pole of the earth‘s magnetism, the North pole, and it does not
matter.‖ (Ibid)

Life and death are opposite to each other hence neither can be conceived in isolation i.e. without
its opposite. Life and death constitute a pair of opposites, hence meaning only in relation to with
each other. Engels writes:

―Life and death. Already know physiology is held to be scientific if it does not consider death as an
essential element of life…the Negation of life as being essentially contained in life itself, so that life is
always thought of in relation to its necessary result, death, which is always contained in it in germ.
The dialectical conception of life is nothing more than this…living means dying.‖(Dialectics of
Nature, ch-Biology, Bold added)

Rest and Motion

Engels writes:

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 ―…Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change of position can only come
about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another
place, being in one and the same place and not in it. And the continuous origination and
simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is.‖ (Anti-Duhring, part I, ch.12,
p.139)

So motion is a contradiction constituted by two opposite aspects of rest and motion. Duhring
who had been asserting that there is no bridge whatever from the strictly static to the dynamic then
Engels replied:

―…the mind which thinks metaphysically is absolutely unable to pass from the idea of rest to the
idea of motion because the contradiction pointed out above blocks its path. To it, motion is simply
incomprehensible because it is a contradiction…‖ (Ibid, p.140)

But Engels clarified: ―…All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to
one or other definite form of motion. On the earth, for example, a body may be in mechanical
equilibrium, may be mechanically at rest; but this in no way prevents it from participating in the
motion of the earth and in that of the whole solar system,‖(Ibid, part-1,ch-6, p.72-73)

Engels further clarifies that rest and motion being a pair of opposites, motion can be conceived
through its opposite i.e. rest. He writes:

―…From the dialectical standpoint the possibility of expressing motion in its opposite, in rest,
presents absolutely no difficulty. From the dialectical standpoint the whole antithesis, as we have
seen, is only relative; there is no such thing as absolute rest unconditional equilibrium.‖ (Ibid, p.75)

Thus even motion which is absolute has its opposite rest. But the opposite aspect rest is only
relative. Com. A.M.‘s wish is that the aspect of rest must also be absolute if the aspect of motion is
absolute. But according to Engels there is no such requirement in dialectics that both the aspects of
the contradiction must be of absolute status. The requirement of dialectics is fulfilled if both the
aspects of a pair of opposites are present in an interconnected way.

Change and Inertness constitute a pair of polar opposites and dialectics does not view even the
concept of change without its opposite, the inertness. Engels writes:

―If a thing is saddled with its antithesis it is in contradiction with itself, and so is its expression in
thought. For example, there is a contradiction in a thing remaining the same and yet constantly
changing, being possessed of the antithesis of ‗inertness‘ and ‗change‘. ‖ (Anti-Duhring, Appendix,
part I, ch. 12, p.396)

Unity and Plurality also constitute a pair of polar opposites about which Engels writes in his
Dialectics of Nature as follows: ―…that unity and plurality are inseparable, mutually penetrating
concepts and that plurality is not less contained in unity than unity is in plurality….‖(Chapter-
Mathematics)

Chance and Necessity also constitute a pair of polar opposites. In Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought there is
no place for any occurrence to happen by chance. So Shibdas Ghosh does not acknowledge the
dialectical unity of necessity and chance, but see what Engels writes:

―Another opposition in which metaphysics is entangled is that of chance and necessity. What can
be more sharply contradictory than these two thought determinations? How is it possible that
both are identical, that the accidental is necessary and the necessary is also accidental? Common

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 sense, and with it the majority of natural scientists, treats necessity and chance as determinations
that exclude each other once for all. A thing, a circumstance, a process is either accidental or
necessary, but not both. Hence both exists side by side in nature; nature contains all sorts of
objects and processes, of which some are accidental, the others necessary, and it is only a matter
of not confusing to sorts with each other….‖ (Ibid)

Thus according to the metaphysical view the opposites do not condition each other. They exist side
by side, independent of each other they are fixed and frozen and cannot penetrate or transform into
each other. Regarding this kind of approach towards opposites Engels writes:

―The old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls, ‗metaphysical‘, which preferred
to investigate things as given, as fixed and stable, a method the relics of which still strongly haunt
people‘s minds, …‖ (Ludwig Feuerbach p. 45)
To understand the difference clearly between metaphysical and dialectical methodology I deem it
necessary to cite here two more excerpts from Engels‘ Dialectics of Nature which are as follows:
(a) ―Two philosophical tendencies, the metaphysical with fixed categories, the dialectical (Aristotle
and especially Hegel) with fluid categories; the proofs that these fixed opposites of basis and
consequence, cause and effect, identity and difference, appearance and essence are untenable, that
analysis shows one pole already present in the other in nuce, that at a definite point the one pole
becomes transformed into the other, and that all logic develops only from these progressing
contradictions. –This mystical in Hegel himself, because the categories appear as pre-existing and the
dialectics of the real world as their mere reflection. In reality it is the reverse: the dialectics of the
mind is only the reflection of the forms of motion of the real world, as their, both of nature and of
history. Until the end of the last century, indeed 1830, natural scientists could manage pretty well
with the old metaphysics, because real science did not go beyond mechanics –terrestrial and cosmic.‖
(Dialectics of Nature, Page 202-203)
(b) ―For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps,
and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of
thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no
unconditional, universally valid ‗either –or‘ and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences,
and besides ‗either –or‘ recognizes also in the right place ‗both this –and that‘ and reconciles the
opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for
everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity.‖ (Ibid,
Page 212-213)
Thus we see the basic difference between metaphysical and dialectical methodology is that of
fixed and fluid categories. Shibdas Ghosh and his adherents suffer from metaphysics. For them
positive is positive and negative is negative; straight is straight and curved is curved. For
metaphysicians a geometrical line can either be straight or curved but cannot be both, whereas for
dialecticians straight and curve are fluid categories, they interpenetrate into each other. The straight
contains in itself its opposite, the curve and vice-versa. That is why, Engels wrote:

―The character of mutual opposites belonging to the thought determinations of reason:

polarisation. Just as electricity, magnetism, etc., become polarised and move in opposites, so do
thoughts. Just as in the former it is not possible to maintain any one-sidedness, and no natural
scientist would think of doing so, so also in the latter.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, Ch-Dialectics, p.213)

Beginning and End is a pair of polar opposites hence they too are identical and interpenetrate into
each other and one cannot exist without the other. Engels writes:

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 ―It is clear that an infinity which has an end but no beginning is neither more nor less infinite than
that which has a beginning but no end. The slightest dialectical insight should have told Herr
Duhring that beginning and end necessarily belong together, like the North Pole and the South Pole,
and that if the end is left out, the beginning just becomes the end_the one end which the series has;
and vice versa.‖ (Anti Duhring Part 1st, ch. V)

‗In essence everything is relative‘. Finite and infinite have meaning only in their relation not each for
itself. And it applies to all the concepts of such nature like absolute and relative; eternal and transient
etc. etc. In the dialectical way of thinking absolute has no meaning without its opposite the relative,
and relative loses its meaning without absolute. Eternal without transient and transient without
eternal lose their respective meanings. So like infinity, absolute and eternal are also contradictions in
themselves. Their existence can only be possible in relation to their respective opposites. According
to the metaphysical way of thinking the ‗opposites‘ mutually exclude each other i.e. anything cannot
be itself and its opposite at the same time. According to metaphysics ‗Life is life‘ and ‗Death is
death‘, both cannot exist together. But dialectics has overcome this limitation of metaphysics and it
has transformed all the metaphysical concepts based on the principle of non-contradiction into the
dialectical ones which recognises the contradiction within the concept itself. It will be relevant to
remind here that dialectics has not eliminated or abolished completely the old concepts of
metaphysics but it has only changed them into dialectical concepts. As per the thinking of Shibdas
Ghosh all the metaphysical concepts, with the emergence of dialectics, got disappeared in such a way
that they did not leave any trace behind, which is a totally wrong notion. Dialectics did not abolish
completely the concepts themselves which were understood previously in metaphysical way, but it
has only negated them and has upgraded their understanding to a higher level. The philosophical and
scientific concepts which were viewed by metaphysics in a non-contradictory way, dialectics views
them as contradictions. The concepts like ‗absolute‘, ‗universal‘, ‗eternal‘ and ‗infinite‘ were
previously understood in metaphysical way basing on the principle of non-contradiction, but now
after the emergence of materialist dialectics these concepts are understood in dialectical way basing
on contradiction within them.

Com. A. M. further writes:

―…North Pole and South Pole are an inseparable unity of opposites within a magnet; but positive
and negative charges are always opposites in separate entities. Good and bad aspects may jointly
reside in a man‘s character. But ‗above‘ and ‗below‘ are geometrically meaningful only with respect
to a third party, an outside figure.‖ (Page 22-23)

Com. A.M. is confusing the universality of the unity of opposites with its particularity. He wants to
see all unity of opposites strictly in the same fashion i.e. with no difference. According to him all
opposites are not inseparable like the north and south poles of a magnet. He argues ‗positive and
negative charges are always opposites in separate entities‘. But he forgets that the so-called separate
entities form a single system together. One cannot exist without the other. Neither aspect of the two
of unity of the opposites can exist without the existence of the other. North and South Pole of a
magnet and the positive and negative electricity in any phenomenon of electrostatic can behave
differently but they are so interconnected that one cannot exist without the other. Both positive and
negative electricity are produced in one and the same process i.e. from some electrically neutral
entity e.g. in a capitalist society both prosperity and poverty are produced in the same process of
capitalistic production. Prosperity without poverty and poverty without prosperity cannot exist. But
prosperity and poverty like the positive and negative charges reside at different places. When, there
will be no poverty there will be no prosperity either. In dialectical materialism every pair of polar
opposites invariably represent some material process. And as the material processes are themselves
different to each other the polar opposites representing them are bound to differ with each other. We
must always keep in mind the difference of the particularity of polar opposites with its universality.
Maurice Cornforth writes:
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 ―Each kind of process has its own dialectic, which can be grasped only by the detailed study of that
particular process. The dialectic of the sub-atomic world is not the same as that of the bodies directly
perceptible to our senses. The dialectic of living organisms is not the same as that of the processes of
inorganic matter. The dialectic of human society is a new law of motion. And each phase of human
society brings with it again its own particular dialectic.‖ (Chapter: Contradiction)

Com. A.M. writes in the above passage:

―Good and bad aspects may jointly reside in a man‘s character. But ‗above‘ and ‗below‘ are
geometrically meaningful only with respect to a third party, an outside figure.‖ (Page 22-23)

It is again a question of universality and particularity of pair of polar opposites. Com. A. M. says
that: ―Good and bad aspects may jointly reside in a man‘s character. But ‗above‘ and ‗below‘ are
geometrically meaningful only with respect to a third party, an outside figure.‖ The question is: who
is this third party? This third party is nothing except the thinking human brain through which all
reflections of the objective dialectics take place. The aspects of good and bad character in a man
being related to his consciousness and which can only be reflected by the behaviour of the man under
question are also observed by the so called ‗third party‘. Like the good and bad character of a man‘s
character‘, the opposite aspects above and below also reside jointly and inseparably. As we go higher
and higher, the higher or the above goes on transforming continuously at every point of space into
lower or below. Height goes on transforming into its opposite the depth. And the reflection of this
objective dialectics of high and low is termed as subjective dialectics which can only take place
through a ‗third party‘.

Bourgeoisie without proletariat? Com. A.M. makes a vain try to prove that in the past bourgeoisie
existed alone without any trace of its opposite the proletariat. He writes:

―In modern capitalism there are both bourgeoisie and proletariat; but in mercantile period of
capitalism there was only the incipient bourgeoisie but no trace of proletariat—a fact which renders
this example valid only under specific condition and with much qualification. In mechanics, action
and reaction are involved in the same phenomenon; in chemical reactions, combination and
dissociation of atoms may or may not occur in the same case. So on and so forth.‖(From p. 23)

So according to Com. A. M. the bourgeoisie was there in its incipient form but there was no trace
of proletariat. This kind of thinking of Com. A. M. is absolutely contrary not only to the dialectics
but also the hard fact of historical materialism. Let us see what Engels writes in this regard:

―As is well known, however, from the moment when the bourgeoisie emerged from feudal
burgherdom, when this estate of the Middle Ages developed into a modern class, it was always and
inevitably accompanied by its shadow, the proletariat. And in the same way bourgeois demand for
equality were accompanied by proletarian demands for equality. From the moment when the
bourgeois demand for the abolition of class privileges was put forward, alongside it appeared the
proletarian demand for the abolition of the classes themselves.—at first in religious form, leaning
towards primitive Christianity, and later drawing support from the bourgeois equalitarian theories
themselves. …‖ (Anti Dhuring part 1st ch. 10 p-124)

―…Bourgeoisie and proletariat both arose in consequence of a transformation of the economic

conditions, more precisely, of the mode of production. The transition, first from guild handicrafts to
manufacture, and then from manufacture to large-scale industry, with steam and mechanical power
had caused the development of these two classes.‖ (Ludwig Feuerbach, Chapter-IV)

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―…And just as the burghers from the beginning brought into being an appendage of propertyless
urban plebeians, day labourers and servants, of all kinds, belonging to no recognised social estate,
precursors of the later proletariat,…‖ (Ibid)

Thus incipient bourgeoisie and incipient proletariat also existed together. There was never an
incipient bourgeoisie without its opposite the incipient proletariat as Com. A.M. has asserted. One is
the condition for the existence of the other. Marx wrote:

―…capital presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition the existence
of each other; they reciprocally bring forth each other.” (Wage Labour And Capital, italics original)

In fact both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are the two sides of one and the same relation and
the said relation appeared in human history with the appearance or emergence of productive capital.
Karl Marx further writes:

―…If the whole class of wage-workers were to be abolished owing to machinery, how dreadful
that would be for capital which, without wage labour, ceases to be capital!‖ (Ibid)

Thus Marx writes that wage labour and capital are the two sides of the one and the same relation
as follows:

―To say that the interests of capital and those of the workers are one and the same is only to say that capital
and wage labour are two sides of one and the same relation. The one conditions the other, just as usurer and
squanderer condition each other.‖ (Ibid, italics original)

So there is no force in Com. A.M.‘s assertion that ―In modern capitalism there are both bourgeoisie
and proletariat; but in mercantile period of capitalism there was only the incipient bourgeoisie but no
trace of proletariat…‖. Likewise owing to his non-Marxist understanding of dialectics Com. A.M. is
unable to understand the dialectical relationship of all other opposites whether they belong to the
field of nature or history. Had Shibdas Ghosh understood the Dialectical and Historical Materialism
as taught by Marx & Engels, Com. A. M. would not have stated that the bourgeoisie was present
without any trace of the proletariat etc..

Com. A. M. further writes explicitly challenging the validity of the unity of the opposites as follows:

―Secondly, these are all anyway very simple examples. With ever more complex cases, it
becomes difficult to apply the law of unity of opposites in so easy a manner. For instances, study of
geometry, topology, complex number, functions, gravity, and so forth, presents increasing
difficulty in validating the law of unity of opposites.‖ (Page 23)

In this regard I have already discussed that geometry and topology etc. etc. may not exist in the
relationship of the nature of polar opposites but in themselves nothing can exist without the two
contradictory aspects within itself. To view any kind of existence or thing above contradiction or
without having two contradictory aspects is tantamount to abandoning dialectics. Com. A. M. also
writes that the dialectics of the unity of the opposite does not work in constant opposition in nature
like society. He writes as follows:

―There are, thirdly, some other problems too. In society and history, opposites are in constant
opposition and act towards elimination of one another. In nature, there is no such scope to view
opposites in a similar manner owing to the laws of symmetry, conservation and invariance operating
within the physical systems.‖(p.23, sub-section-F)

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 But Mao-Tse-Tung writes:

―Marxist philosophy holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the
universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man‘s
thinking. Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this
that impels things to move and change…in any given phenomenon or thing, the unity of opposites is
conditional, temporary and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is
absolute. Lenin gave a very clear exposition of this law…‖ (On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions among the People, Section I)

So, it goes against the very foundation of materialist dialectics when Com. A.M. says that in nature
the opposites do not operate as in society. We must learn that Historical Materialism has been
defined as the extension of the dialectical principles of nature to society. If the principles of dialectics
as applicable to society have not been extended from nature then the society cannot be stated to be
the projection of nature. The particularity of unity of opposites teaches us that each and every
particular unity of opposites is different from other. So it is meaningless to search and find differences
in the unity of opposites of one domain from that of the other domain. The universality of unity of
opposites works in nature, society and human thought without any exception. We must not confuse
the aspect of universality of unity of opposites with the aspect of the particularity of the unity of
opposites. The phenomenon of replacement of the old by the new operates everywhere. In nature the
phenomenon of elimination of the old by the new does operate as well through the struggle of
opposites like action and counteraction, attraction and repulsion etc. Otherwise how can you explain
the emergence of the new and the vanishing away of the old in the field of nature if there is no
struggle of the opposites in nature? Maurice Cornforth writes:

―The existence of fundamental polar opposition, manifesting themselves in every department of

nature and society expresses itself in the conflict and struggle of opposed tendencies, which, despite
phases of temporary equilibrium, lead to continual motion and development, to a perpetual coming
into being and passing away of everything in existence, to sharp change of state and
transformations.‖ (M.C. page 58-60)

Mao-Tse-Tung writes:

―We often speak of ‗the new superseding the old‘. The supersession of the old by the new is a
general, eternal and inviolable law of the universe. The transformation of one thing into another…‖
(On Contradiction)

Without the constant opposition between the opposites the eternal law i.e. the new superseding the
old cannot operate in nature but Comrade A.M. holds that the fact of constant opposition between
the opposites does not exist for nature and according to him it only holds good for society.

And the subjective dialectics i.e. the concepts in human mind without exception are the reflections of
the objective reality in motion, which is constituted everywhere by the unity of the opposites. So if
natural scientists including Com. A.M. are facing the difficulty in viewing the processes of nature as
the unity of the opposites then it must be due to the lack or absence of dialectics from their outlook.

Gravity beyond Dialectics?

Com. A. M. has cited one more example as to the force of gravity claimed to have no opposite. He
writes:

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 ―Lastly, without the visible polarities opposed to one another, these and so many other special
cases may appear to contradict one of the basic laws of dialectics. There are attraction and repulsion
in the cases of magnetism and electricity. There is only attraction in the case of gravity. Should we
therefore call gravity something beyond dialectics? (Page 24)‖

But let us see what Engels writes in this regard:

―Gravity as the most general determination of materiality is commonly accepted. That is to say,
attraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as
inseparable as positive and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that
the true theory of matter must assign as important a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a
theory of matter based on mere attraction is false, inadequate, and one-sided. …‖ [Dialectics of
Nature (ch. Forms of Motion of Matter, Classification of the Sciences p. 243-44)]

Engels further writes:

―Attraction and gravitation. The whole theory of gravitation rests on saying that attraction is the
essence of matter. This is necessarily false. Where there is attraction, it must be complemented by
repulsion. Hence already Hegel was quite right in saying that the essence of matter is attraction and
repulsion. And in fact we are more and more becoming forced to recognise that the dissipation of
matter has a limit where attraction is transformed into repulsion, and conversely the condensation of
the repelled matter has a limit where it becomes attraction.‖ (ibid)

Engels further adds:

―The transformation of attraction into repulsion and vice-versa is mystical in Hegel, but in
substance he anticipated by it the scientific discovery that came later. …‖ (Ibid)

Let us take the example of a pair of opposites which is quite different from all others i.e. the pair of
light and darkness. Darkness is nothing but the absence of light-rays. There are no rays of darkness
emanating from any source. But the darkness is the opposite of light and both are interconnected.
When night starts falling light starts transforming into darkness and at the day break darkness gets
transformed into light. Had there been no darkness anywhere all around the world and no human
mind had ever experienced any darkness then the concept of light also would not have come into
existence because the notion of light can only be conceived in terms of its opposite darkness and vice-
versa. And it applies to all the pair of opposites. But Frederick Engels does not satisfy himself with
the just negative existence of darkness i.e. the absence light. His dialectical genius goes beyond it i.e.
to the positive existence of dark-light rays.

Engels writes: ―Light and darkness are certainly the most conspicuous and definite opposites in
nature; they have always served as a rhetorical phrase for religion and philosophy from the time of
the fourth Gospel to the luimieres of the eighteenth century. (…) Hence there exist dark light-rays, and
the famous opposition between light and darkness disappears from natural science as an absolute
opposition. Incidentally, the deepest darkness and the brightest, glaring light have the same effect of
dazzling our eyes, and in this way are for us identical.‖ (Dialectics of Nature chap. Physics, page 287)

War and Peace are also Polar Opposites

War and peace are polar opposites. They both are the product of the same social process and one
cannot exist without the other. When in future the conditions of war will disappear from society in
communism then the concept of peace would also totally lose its meaning. The existence of both is
conditioned by each other. Mao-tse-tung has discussed the transformation of war and peace into each
other as follows:
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 ―War and peace, as everybody knows, transform themselves into each other. War is
transformed into peace; for instance, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace,
and the civil war in China was now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into
war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into war in 1927, and
today‘s situation of world peace may be transformed into a second world war. Why is this so?
Because in class society such contradictory things as war and peace have an identity in given
conditions.‖ (On Contradiction)

In society, justice and injustice both are the product of the same social process and both are polar
opposites; the existence of each is conditioned by the existence of the other; no one can exist without
the other. But certainly they do not exist as per the wishes of Comrade A.M. i.e. like the North and
South poles of a magnet, as every pair of polar opposites has its own particularity or particular
manner of existence or coming into existence. In nature or more specifically in the animal kingdom
the existence of each of the predator and the prey is conditioned by each other. The existence of the
predator cannot even be imagined without the existence of its opposite the prey but they do not exist
like the opposite poles of a magnet. Every pair of opposites produced by nature has its own
particularity. But the universality of the polar opposites lies in the fact that the polar opposites cannot
exist without each other.

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee in his 36-page document in Section II, Sub-section [F], writes:

―Just as a Marxist cannot be both a materialist and an idealist and cannot have in his/her
thinking process both the metaphysical and the dialectical modes of thinking but should
consciously entertain only one (while, although unawares, both may work in his/her thinking
process), similarly, he or she should select in his/her conscious mind from among the given pairs
of opposed categories regarding truths.‖

―Lastly, in respect of understanding of all these matters, we can hardly confine ourselves within
the texts and concepts of the Marxist classics alone. Those are where we start from, not where we
end up. We have to go forward and beyond them as and wherever necessary.

―We acknowledge with humility and sorrow that Comrade Shibdas Ghosh had started the job well,
but unfortunately, in a wrong manner with a personalized style, and because of his long-pursued
wrong method left it unfinished in the midway. It is high time that we locate the errors at various
points of history and finish the job through to the end.‖ (Section II, p.24-25, emphasis original)

What a candid admission by Com. A. M.! ‗Comrade Shibdas Ghosh had started the job well‘. What
kind of job? I see no other job but the job of destroying the dialectical relationship between the
opposites; the job of isolating the negative from its opposite the positive; the job of isolating the
bourgeoisie from its opposite the proletariat; the job of restoration of metaphysics i.e. the old anti-
dialectical method of viewing the opposites in isolation to and independent from each other.
According to the metaphysical view, the opposites do not condition each other. They exist side by
side, independent of each other, they are fixed and frozen and cannot penetrate or transform into
each other. Engels writes:

―Two philosophical tendencies, the metaphysical with fixed categories, the dialectical (Aristotle
and especially Hegel) with fluid categories; the proofs that these fixed opposites of basis and
consequence, cause and effect, identity and difference, appearance and essence are untenable, that
analysis shows one pole already present in the other in nuce, that at a definite point the one pole
becomes transformed into the other, and that all logic develops only from these progressing
contradictions. –This mystical in Hegel himself, because the categories appear as pre-existing and the

75
dialectics of the real world as their mere reflection. In reality it is the reverse: the dialectics of the
mind is only the reflection of the forms of motion of the real world, as their, both of nature and of
history. Until the end of the last century, indeed 1830, natural scientists could manage pretty well
with the old metaphysics, because real science did not go beyond mechanics –terrestrial and cosmic.‖
(Dialectics of Nature, Page 202-203)
Engels further writes:
―For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps,
and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of
thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no
unconditional, universally valid ‗either –or‘ and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences,
and besides ‗either –or‘ recognizes also in the right place ‗both this –and that‘ and reconciles the
opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for
everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity.‖ (Ibid,
Page 212-213)

At one more place Engels writes:

―The old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls, ‗metaphysical‘, which preferred
to investigate things as given, as fixed and stable, a method the relics of which still strongly haunt
people‘s minds, …‖ (Ludwig Feuerbach p. 45)
From the above discussion it becomes quite clear that for Comrade A.M., there is no difference
at all between the metaphysical and dialectical ways of looking at the relationship of opposites. If
there is any Comrade A.M. should make us understand the same.

Thus we see here that opposites are identical because one is the condition for the existence of the
other and at some nodal point in their movement they interpenetrate into each other. At some nodal
point the light rays of the solar spectrum transform into dark light rays.

Whereas the second meaning of the unity or identity of opposites is that when carried to extreme
they get transformed into each other and explaining the same Mao wrote:
―The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each
loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can anyone contradictory aspect of a thing or of a
concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without
death, there would be no life. Without ‗above‘ there would be no ‗below‘; without ‗below‘, there
would be no ‗above‘. Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune,
there would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there
would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants
there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the
proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be
no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semi-colonies, there would be no imperialist
oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are
opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, inter-permeating
and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory
aspe cts possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But
they also possess the character of identity and hence are inter-connected. This is what Lenin means
when he says that dialectics studies ‗how opposites can be …identical.‘ How then can they be identical ?
Because each is the condition for the other‘s existence. This is the first meaning of identity.‖
―But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the
other existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can co-exist in a
single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their
existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given
conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite,
changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of identity of contradiction.‖
(From- On Contradiction)

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 CHAPTER: III

LAWS OF DIALECTICS

AND

THEIR INNER INTER-CONNECTION

Point No. 1

Dialectics and Inner Inter-Connection of its Laws

Defining dialectics Engels wrote:

―…dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motions. This implies
that its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature and human history as for the motion of
thought…‖(Anti-Duhring, Notes to Anti-Duhring , p-421, bold added)
Note: In entire Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought there is no conception of dialectics as to be the science of
the most general laws of all motions.
Defining dialectics as ―the science of universal inter-connection‖, Engels writes about its three
main laws as follows:

―Main laws: Transformation of quantity and quality –mutual penetration of polar opposites and
transformation into each other when carried to extremes –development through contradictions or
negation of the negation –spiral form of development.‖ (Dialictics of Nature, Plan Outline, page 1st)
Note:-- In entire Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought there is no sense of dialectics as ―the science of universal
inter-connection‖
Engels at another place in his Dialectics of Nature lists the laws of dialectics as follows:
―It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are
abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical
development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three:

―The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice-versa;

―the law of the interpenetration of opposites;

―the law of the negation of the negation.

―All three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought…‖ (chap.
Dialectics page 62-63)

And then Engels mentions about the inner interconnection of the laws of dialectics and he writes:

―We are not concerned here with writing a handbook of dialectics, but only with showing that
the dialectical laws are real laws of development of nature, and therefore, are valid also for
theoretical natural science. Hence we cannot go into the inner inter-connection of these laws with
one another.‖ (Ibid, bold added)

Note: -- In the entire Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought before November, 2008, there was no mention or
even a whisper of ‗the inner inter-connection‘ of the laws of dialectics ‗with one another‘; but in
one publication of November, 2008, a mention has been made of the interrelation among them but a
very superficial mention.

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 From the above passage of Engels it is very much clear that there is an inner inter-connection
among the three laws of dialectics. But sadly, Engels could not deal with that inner inter-connection
and left the task unaccomplished. And it was Lenin who dealt with the inner inter-connection of the
laws of dialectics. Lenin defined dialectics in a new way. Engels had defined dialectics as ‗the science
of the most general laws of all motions‘ but Lenin wrote:

―In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the
essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.‖ (Conspectus of Hegel‘s Science
of Logic, vol. 38, p. 222)

Again, Lenin wrote, ―Development is the struggle of opposites‖. (On The Question Of Dialectics)

Mao-Tse-Tung followed Lenin and wrote:

―The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of
materialist dialectics. Lenin said, ‗Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the
very essence of objects.‘ Lenin often called this law the essence of dialectics; he also called it the
kernel of dialectics.‖ (On Contradiction, page-1)

Not only that, Lenin defined dialectics as ‗the doctrine of the unity of opposites‘; that ‗the law
of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics‘; that ―Development is the struggle
of opposites‖ etc.. Lenin, in line with the basic teachings of materialist dialectics taught that in the
‗struggle of opposites‘, unity is relative struggle is absolute. In this regard in my Comment No. 22, I
had quoted Lenin, who wrote as under:

―The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, transitory, and
relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute.‖ (On the Question of Dialectics)
Mao-Tse-Tung has also cited the above quotation of Lenin in his On Contradiction and has
explained it‘s meaning in its true sense to which I will come a little later. At the moment I need to
cite here one other relevant passage from Mao‘s literature which is in full agreement with Lenin,
Mao wrote:

―Marxist philosophy holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the
universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man‘s
thinking. Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this
that impels things to move and change…in any given phenomenon or thing, the unity of opposites is
conditional, temporary and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is
absolute. Lenin gave a very clear exposition of this law…‖ (On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions among the People, Section I)

But Com. A. M. has dismissed the teachings of Lenin and Mao contained in the above cited
quotations. He writes in his document as follows:

―In fact, identity or unity of opposites is another philosophical category of dialectical materialism.
Like other categories, it also cannot be revised, changed or rephrased at will. Not even by Lenin, or
Mao; neither by Ghosh. If any of them had done so, I think, that was done almost inadvertently,
without much conscious plan or desire. On the other hand, even if you rephrase the terms to clarify
something better, it does not essentially change the philosophical connotation of the category.‖
(Page-21, underline original)

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The charge levelled against Lenin and Mao in the above passage is very serious. They have been
charged of revising, changing and rephrasing at will a ‗philosophical category‘ of dialectical
materialism to the effect of changing its philosophical connotation. The charge levelled is totally
groundless as no philosophical connotation of any category has been changed. But Com. A.M. is so
confident of his position that to clarify and establish the same he further writes:

―This position of mine will be clearer if we recall, following Shyam Sundarji, Comrade Mao‘s
presentation of the case: ―The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites,
is the basic law of materialist dialectics. Lenin said, "Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of
contradiction in the very essence of objects." [Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks] Lenin often called this law
the essence of dialectics; he also called it the kernel of dialectics. [Ibid]‖ [Mao, On Contradiction;
emphasis in Lenin‘s original]
―Mao then also said: ―The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning.
One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the
process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.‖ [Ibid;
emphasis added by A.M.]
Comrade A.M. continues:
―Here again—note very carefully—both Lenin, and following him Mao, identified the law of
contradiction in things with the law of unity of opposites, disregarding the other two laws. Lenin
wrote it in a private note, not for public circulation. But Mao brought it to the notice of the
public.‖(Ibid)

I have noted very carefully, what has been said by Lenin and Mao above. What has been said
by Lenin is the outcome of his study of the inner inter-connection of the laws of dialectics. Engels has
defined dialectics as quoted above, as ―the science of universal inter-connection‖ or as ‗the science of
the most general laws of all motions‘ and the source of ‗all motions‘ is nothing but contradiction.
And if contradiction is the source of all motions, then what is the wrong committed by Lenin when
he stated that "dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of
objects."? Again when Mao said that, ―The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a
twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the
other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from
beginning to end‖ then nobody can find any point of objection in it. But since, Shibdas Ghosh‘s
thought does not understand dialectics as ―the science of universal inter-connection‖ and has no
sense whatsoever of inner inter-connection of laws of dialectics, Com. A.M. continues to write:
―Surely, neither could Lenin nor Mao have forgotten that the laws of contradiction are three-
fold. It was a momentary slip on their part—but a slip no doubt. We should not focus on the wrong
perception of dialectics by any authority, be it Lenin or Mao. With due respects to them we should
have the revolutionary audacity to stand up and declare—―No comrade, we don‘t agree. You have
all taught us that there are three basic laws of dialectics which govern the entire course of a
contradiction. Now if you declare that there is only one basic law and the other two are just corollary
to it, we feel embarrassed. Please don‘t be inconsistent.‖
But Com. Ashoke Mukherjee forgets that it was Engels who taught us that there are three main
laws of dialectics; that dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motions;
that dialectics should be conceived as the science of universal inter-connection and that there is an
inner inter-connection of these laws with one another. Lenin just studied the laws of dialectics in
their inner inter-connection with one another and found that the law of unity of opposites is the
kernel or essence of dialectics. If this is the case, then where is the question of the alleged
‗momentary slip‘ on his part? And where is the question of ‗wrong perception of dialectics‘ and the
question of Lenin and Mao being inconsistent? In fact, the problem with Com. Ashoke Mukherjee is
that Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought itself has no sense of dialectics as the ‗science of universal inter
connection and of the inner inter-connection of the laws of dialectics. That is why Com. Ashoke
Mukherjee too having no sense of the inner inter-connection of the laws of dialectics, views them as
formally placed side by side and parallel to each other with equal degree of operational force. He
continues to write:

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 ―It is in this context that I fully agree with Comrade Shibdas Ghosh when he said that it is
wrong to single out one of the laws of dialectics as basic; all the three laws of dialectics are basic
laws with equal degree of operational force. (Page 21, bold original)

But when Com. Ashoke Mukherjee holds that all the three laws of dialectics have equal degree
of operational force and there is no inner inter-connection of all of them it becomes fully clear is
fundamentally governed by formal logic. So, I feel the necessity to deal here with the distinction
between dialectical logic and formal logic.

Point No. 2
Distinction between Dialectical and Formal Logic

Have Lenin and Mao committed a momentary slip in holding the law of unity of the opposites as the
basic law of dialectics? The answer to this question, according to dialectical logic is no but according
to formal logic is yes. When dialectics itself is ‗conceived as the science of universal inter-connection‘
meaning that all the processes of nature are interconnected and are not placed side by side or parallel
to each other. According to the dialectical worldview all things in nature are inter-connected,
interdependent, one arising from the other, higher form developing from the lower and hence, one
thing is subordinated to the other and not parallel to the other. For instance the domain of Quantum
Mechanics is not parallel to the domain of Newtonian Mechanics; rather the domain of Newtonian
Mechanics is subordinate to the domain of Quantum Mechanics. The laws of Quantum Mechanics
are also valid and applicable to the domain of Newtonian Mechanics but not vice versa. Engels
describing the dialectical logic writes:

―Dialectical Logic, in contrast to the old, merely formal logic, is not, like the latter, content with
enumerating the forms of motion of thought, i.e., the various forms of judgement and conclusion,
and placing them side by side without any connection. On the contrary, it derives these forms out of
one another, it makes one subordinate to another instead of putting them on an equal level, and it
develops the higher forms out of the lower….‖ (Dialectics of Nature, ch. Dialectics, page 223).

As proof of corroboration of dialectical materialism and of dialectical logic, Lenin gives an example
of relation of subordination as follows:

―…The fact that the mechanical laws of motion are confined only to a single sphere of natural
phenomena and are subordinated to the more profound laws of electromagnetic phenomena, and so
forth—all this is but another corroboration of dialectical materialism.‖ (Materialism and Empirio-
criticism, Chapter 5, Section 2, Page 248)

Thus metaphysical or formal logic is the outcome of metaphysical worldview, according to

which all the particular things in the universe are independent and isolated from each other in other
words no one is subordinated to the other; all existing side by side and parallel to each other without
having any inter-connection and any relationship of being lower and higher; primary and secondary
among them. Contrary to metaphysical logic, dialectic logic is the outcome of the dialectical
worldview. According to the dialectical worldview unity and plurality are inter-connected; dialectics
of plurality in unity and unity behind plurality works everywhere in nature. Showing that behind the
plurality of all particular motions there exists a unity, Engels writes:

―…The unity of all motions in nature is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific
fact.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, Chapter- From the history of science, p-197)

Referring to the different and particular forms of motion Engels again writes:

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 ―…they themselves prove in action that they are forms of one and the same motion by passing into
one another under given condition.‖(Dialectics of Nature, p-78)

But in entire Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought we nowhere find the concept of unity of all motions. Shibdas
Ghosh nowhere mentions that all the different particular motions are the forms of the same universal
motion. The laws of dialectics are nothing but the laws of all motions i.e. of universal motion. Engels
defined dialectics as follows:

―…dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motions. This implies that
its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature and human history as for the motion of
thought.…‖ (Chapter-Mathematics, Dialectics of Nature, page267)
Can Com. Ashoke Mukherjee show anywhere in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought such definition of
dialectics that it is a science of the most general laws of all motions? Certainly not. All the different
sciences are nothing but the sciences of particular motions and because all particular motions are the
different forms of the same universal motion so there is a unity behind all sciences too. One science
arises out of another or in other words one is subordinate to the other. Showing the relations and
interconnections of different sciences Engels writes:
―…Just as one form of motion develops out of anther, so their reflections. The various sciences
must arise necessarily out of one another.‖ (ibid, Ch-Forms of Motion, page250)

But in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought the material world has not been conceived as a single infinite
coherent material process, i.e. as a unity. For Shibdas Ghosh matter everywhere is particular, relative
and concrete and these particular relative and concrete forms nowhere constitute a single process and
there is n concept of unity behind plurality in Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought. Marx and Engels have
conceived the whole material world as a single process. Engels writes: ―That life is a result of the
whole of nature …‖ (Dialectics of Nature)

Now let us compare what Shibdas Ghosh says about the various sciences? He views all the different
sciences side by side to each other and not as to be emerging out from one another. Shibdas Ghosh
says:

―Now, what do we understand by ‗science‘? By science we mean physics, chemistry, life

science, mathematics, social science, etc. Why do we call them science? Because they seek truth by
experiments and verification. What sort of truth do these branches of science seek? They investigate
and study the particular laws which govern a particular set of properties of matter or a particular
phenomenon by classifying them into different branches. For example, chemistry deals with
chemical properties and activities of matter and the chemical laws. Again, physics studies the
physical laws governing matter. In the same way, the science that tries to comprehend the different
changes and activities of the living world is life science. And the science that helps us to understand
and influence the course of social changes is social science.

―So, we see that these branches of science try to know and make use of the particular
properties, activities and laws of matter and phenomena. One thing must be borne in mind in this
connection. Although these branches of science are apparently or formally separate, in reality they
are not. They are related to one another, strung upon a common thread, so to say, somewhat like a
necklace….‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism)

Thus we see that view of Shibdas Ghosh regarding the interrelation of different sciences is not at
all dialectical but rather metaphysical. Shibdas Ghosh does not view the different branches of science
internally connected i.e. emerging out one from the other and in subordination to one of the other,
instead he views their relation just as external, puts them side by side, one after the other like the

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beads of a necklace. The relationship of beads of a necklace is not at all internal but just mechanical
and external i.e. imposed upon them from outside. The different beads of a necklace do not emerge
from one another. They all have been made to be connected with a thread which cannot be viewed as
an interconnection. Whereas in reality all the branches of science like physics, chemistry etc. are
internally connected because they are just the reflection of the particular forms of the same universal
motion. In metaphysical worldview there is no concept of universal motion which interconnects all
other different motions. And when all the forms of motion are interconnected being the forms of
same universal motion, so the laws of these different particular forms of motion must also be
interconnected. Even the laws of the same branch of science are also internally connected and not
parallel and equal to each other in degree. Take for example the most famous three laws of
mechanical motion discovered by Newton. We know that among these three laws of mechanical
motion the second law is the most basic one. The scientists today are striving to get to unified field
theory. And from the point of view of dialectics the approach is correct because the four known fields
namely gravitational, electro-magnetic, and strong and weak interactions cannot exist parallel to
each other. They must be interconnected. And there must be a unity behind the plurality. When the
things or the processes are interconnected then there can be no question of existing those side by side
to each other, one must be primary and the other must be secondary and subordinate. For instance if
matter and consciousness are interconnected then one must be and is bound to be primary and the
other secondary. That is why dialectical materialism holds matter to be primary and basic whereas
consciousness to be secondary. Likewise if Physics and Chemistry are interconnected then one must
be basic as compared to another and we know that the science of chemical motion has emerged from
the physical motion. Likewise the biological motion on earth emerged as a consequence of prior
motions namely physical and chemical. That is why biological science emerged after the science of
chemical motion. The sciences like Physics, Chemistry and Biology are interconnected and not just
externally connected like the beads of a necklace. Hence the laws of these sciences cannot be placed
side by side with equal force like the beads of a necklace. To do so is to suffer from formal logic of
metaphysics. Here, as an example, I think it will be appropriate to bring under debate a passage from
an article written by Com. Ashoke Mukherjee and published in „The Other Mind‟. The said passage
reads as under:
―In a sense every generalisation is a kind of reduction. We can generalize certain classes of facts
into a common supra class only by subsuming the specific laws of the separate classes into some set
of general laws and disregarding the uncommon peculiarities since there are limits to reducibility of
laws, there are similar limits to generalizability. Biology cannot be totally reduced to Physics and
Chemistry; the whole of Chemistry cannot be reduced to Physics; all the laws of sciences cannot be
subsumed into some generalised system of mathematical relations. Even the periodic functions
describing sound waves cannot be absorbed into the electromagnetic wave equations. We have no
common law (or a common set of laws) which may entail all the other laws of science in order to
explain all phenomena of the world. Naturally we cannot expect a common explanation for all laws
of science. The vast edifice of scientific knowledge seems to be an in-built federal system.‖ (From
Article ‗Can Science Explain Why Things Are As They Are?‘, Nov. 2014, p-105)

No doubt that ‗in a sense every generalisation is a kind of reduction‘. But this reduction is a
result of abstraction. Abstraction means drawing off the common properties, common characteristics
or common laws from different things, processes or motions of nature and not ‗by subsuming the
specific laws of the separate classes into some set of general laws‘. Generalisation means nothing but
to discover unity in diversity. If objectively, there is no unity in diversity then we cannot
generalisation anything from the diversity. Only the generality, residing objectively in many
particularities can be generalised or drawn off. The limit to generality is determined by the limit,
magnitude or degree of the unity in diversity in the objective world. And if we talk in terms of
reduction then the limit of reducibility is also determined by the limit or degree of unity contained in
diversity itself. So to say that, ‗since there are limits to reducibility of laws, there are similar limits to
generalizability‘ is tautology. Reduction can never be more than the amount of unity contained in
diversity. Unity and diversity are the two contradictory aspects of the same material world and the
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world cannot be reduced totally to any of its one single aspect either of unity or of diversity, at will;
because, unity without diversity and diversity without unity cannot exist. And just as in the real
material world, all the diversity cannot get reduced into unity so in human mind, all the particular
laws cannot be reduced into just general laws by mental skills and exercises. We can study matter or
nature only by studying its diverse motions and there is no other way to study matter. Different
sciences study the different motions of matter and different motions of matter have their own
different respective laws. Development of matter or nature is the emergence of new higher motion by
way of ‗leap‘, from the lower ones. Higher motions come out of the lower ones. There is no chemical
or biological motion in the sun today and there was no chemical or biological motion on the earth at
a point of time in the past. So, all the different motions of matter have a unity behind them. All the
different motions and their respective laws cannot be reduced into one but they have a unity behind
them. But what does it mean when we say that all the motions have a unity behind them? It only
means that apart from their respective particular laws they all are governed by some common laws
also i.e. by such laws which apply equally to all of them. And these laws are the laws of dialectics.
That is why Engels defined dialectics as: Engels had defined dialectics as ‗the science of the most
general laws of all motions‘. So, to conclude as Com. A.M. has done that: ―The vast edifice of
scientific knowledge seems to be an in-built federal system‖ is quite wrong from the point of view of
materialist dialectics; being fundamentally against the scientifically proved fact of the unity of all
motions, as discussed above. When the material world itself is an inter-connected, harmonious,
single coherent whole then how can there be ‗an in-built federal system‘ of motions within it? Of
course, the world is an in-built system of unity and diversity but unity of all motions makes it a
harmonious and single coherent whole.

Let us take another example of formal logic from Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought. Discussing ‗How to
view four major contradictions‘ Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―Another question raised is: which of the four major world contradictions is the principal
contradiction? In my opinion, this question itself is wrong. For, it must be noted that all the four
contradictions have been called major contradictions, meaning that they must be considered together
in order to understand the character of the main contradiction of the world today. This is the correct
understanding. It is not that one of these four contradictions is principal and the others revolve
round it. No, this is not the case. None of these four contradictions can be singled out as the
principal contradiction…‖ (9th Congress of CPC, SW-1, Page 408, Bold added)

Here also Shibdas Ghosh being devoid of dialectical logic views all the four major
contradictions parallel to each other or existing side by side i.e. without any interconnection among
them and without being one arising out from the other. According to dialectical logic there is always
a unity behind the plurality and there is a plurality contained in every unity. Engels writes:

―…that unity and plurality are inseparable, mutually penetrating concepts and that plurality
is not less contained in unity than unity is in plurality.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, ch.-Mathematics)

The material unity behind all the contradictions of the world, despite national boundaries, is
its integrated capitalist economy; the single world economic system of production, trade and
commerce. Hence there must be a unity behind plurality of the major contradictions operating at
global level. True all the major contradictions cannot be reduced into one but they have a unity
behind them. However, within national boundaries Shibdas Ghosh has a different view. He writes:

―…we must always remember that the individual is not the focal point of social contradiction.
Rather, it is just the reverse. Among the various contradictions between various opposite forces in a
particular society, at a particular historical stage of development of production, there exist a
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contradiction between two main opposite forces, which is the principal contradiction, and the
principal aspect of that contradiction is the focal point of all the contradictions of that society. All
other contradictions of society are revolving centring round this principal contradiction, an
individual entity is appearing in newer and newer forms.‖ (Cultural Movement and Our tasks, SW -
2, page-330, Bold added)

The dialectical logic that applies to the various contradictions at national level also applies to the
global level. It reveals the eclectic approach of Shibdas Ghosh being not consistent in the method of
thinking. For national level one approach and for global level different logic or approach. That is
why, Com. Ashoke Mukherjee being basically guided by Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought writes:

―… I fully agree with Comrade Shibdas Ghosh when he said that it is wrong to single out one
of the laws of dialectics as basic; all the three laws of dialectics are basic laws with equal degree
of operational force. (Page 21, bold original)

But in his Conspectus of Hegel‟s Science of Logic (Vol. 38, page 221-222), Lenin, enumerating the 16
elements of dialectics, has written at the end that ―the transition of quantity into quality and vice
versa‖ and ―the struggle of content with form…the transformation of the content‖ are the special
cases or examples of the 9th i.e. the law of ‗unity of opposites‘. In fact Com. Ashoke Mukherjee
forgets that all the three laws operate through the unity of opposites. Can the law namely from the
quantitative change to qualitative change become operational without the struggle of opposites? And
can the law namely negation of negation become operational without a series of struggle of
opposites? But Com. Ashoke Mukherjee honestly and sincerely feels that his understanding of
dialectics based upon the dialectics of Shibdas Ghosh is perfectly correct and Lenin and Mao have
committed a ‗momentary slip‘ in acknowledging the law of unity of opposites to the essence of
dialectics and out of his good intentions he claims:
―International communist movement has suffered a lot from such and many other careless
statements over the decades. Marxists all over the globe have popularized these inconsistent
statements without proper judgement and necessary discretion, blindly following and copying the
masters. Anybody who dared to point to the inconsistencies was dubbed as anti-communist, anti-
Lenin, anti-Stalin, and so on and so forth. That a communist writer may be respectful to an authority
and still express his/her differences with him on some point has been forgotten. That a Marxist
leader, however great a thinker and theoretician he may be, is not infallible and may have committed
some mistakes, however minor, and that it is not a sin for an ordinary communist to point it out, if or
when he/she discovers it—has been sadly glossed over. We are paying the high price for all this. I
would request the comrades to seriously ponder over the matter with an open mind. Even there may
be a wrong criticism by such a person of the authority. But the critical processes must be kept alive to
preserve the strength of the movement.‖ (Page 21)

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee should first reconsider and should revisit the ‗dialectics‘ of Shibdas
Ghosh and only then should judge the causes or reasons of the predicament of international
communist movement. At least the groundlessly alleged ‗inconsistencies‘ in Lenin‘s and Mao‘s
thought cannot be the reasons of the condition of the international communist movement rather it is
exactly the opposite. The so-called Marxist philosophers who destroyed Marxist Leninist
understanding of dialectical materialism in the name of its development and enrichment are more to
be blamed and are more responsible for the failure of communist movement.

Anyway, Com. Ashoke Mukherjee writes:

―In fact, the first law prescribes the cause or source of change, the second law describes
the entire course or process of change and the third implies the general direction and outcome of
change.‖ (Page 20)

Thus from the perusal of the respective significance of the three laws of dialectics as given by Com.
Ashoke Mukherjee above, it becomes fully clear that the three laws of dialectics cannot be placed
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parallel to each other. Let us take all the three one by one in terms of their respective functions as
stated above:

(i) The cause or source of change: happens through the struggle of opposites.
(ii) The entire course or process of change: that is, both the processes of quantitative change
and the qualitative change take place through the struggle of opposites.
(iii) The general direction and outcome of change: also takes place through the struggle of
opposites.

Shibdas Ghosh also writes about the interrelation among the three laws but without knowing the
same as follows:
―Another important aspect of the unity of opposites should also be discussed. We should
understand that all the three principles of dialectical materialism operate simultaneously. They are
interrelated among themselves and that is why none of the three can be understood fully in isolation
from the other two. Even so, I do not see much reason for objection if one puts special and additional
emphasis on the principle of unity of opposites out of the three on the ground that the basic cause of
all changes, including motion, is the contradiction of opposite forces. However, I maintain that the
other two principles also operate simultaneously.‖ (On Theory of Knowledge, Vol. IV, page 176)

Thus there is utter confusion in the mind of Shibdas Ghosh. (i) He admits the interrelation among
the three laws; (ii) he admits that none of the three can be understood fully in isolation from the other
two; (iii) he also does not see much reason for objection if one puts special and additional emphasis
on the principle of unity of opposites out of the three on the ground that the basic cause of all
changes, including motion, is the contradiction of opposite forces; but (iv) he says, however, I
maintain that the other two principles also operate simultaneously. Nobody questions the
simultaneous operation of the three laws. The question is: whether the one among them is basic or
not or are the three laws placed side by side or the two come out of the third? There can be two kinds
of interrelation among things namely mechanical and dialectical. In dialectical relationship one arise
or comes out from the other whereas in the mechanical relationship things are viewed as placed side
by side. Lenin viewed the inter-connection of the three laws in a dialectical way and that is why he
concluded: ―unity of opposites is the essence of dialectics‖; or ―Development is the struggle of
opposites.‖ etc. etc. And from this it also comes out that struggle is continuous and absolute.

Point No. 3

How Unity is Relative and Struggle is Absolute

In my Comment No. 22, I had quoted Lenin, who wrote as under:

―The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, transitory, and
relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute.‖ (On the Question of Dialectics)

Mao-Tse-Tung has also quoted this passage of Lenin in his On Contradiction and has explained it as
follows:
―What does this passage mean? All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transforms
themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability
manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute. There are two states of
motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the
struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first
state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently
presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion,
the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to
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the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the
appearance of a conspicuous change….‖ (Bold added)
What is meant by ‗the dissolution of the thing as an entity‘? It means status quo or stability or
constancy of the thing comes to an end but struggle goes on during the qualitative phase of change.
Now the problem is very simple to understand. First of all it should be clarified that a contradiction is
divided in two stages but not in the stages of unity and struggle. Then what are the two stages? The
two stages are: (i) the stage of quantitative change and (ii) the stage of qualitative change. Both these
two stages are relative, transient and conditional. Neither is absolute, neither is continuous and
neither is relentless. Then the fundamental question that arises is that: is there anything that remains
continuous and relentless during both the stages? The answer is yes. And that thing is the struggle of
the opposites. The struggle of the opposites keeps on going without any break, continuously and
relentlessly during both the stages or phases namely quantitative as well as qualitative. The stability,
constancy, or the interdependence of the opposites is maintained only during the quantitative phase
of the contradiction but the struggle of opposites goes on during both the phases of the contradiction.
In terms of unity and struggle Lenin or Mao did not divide the contradiction into two stages as
Comrade A.M. accuses them of. It is not like that at all. They only stated that the aspect of mutual
interdependence of the opposites, remains maintained only during the quantitative stage of the
contradiction and does not remain maintained during the qualitative stage, hence relative; the other
point that they stated is that the struggle between the opposites is continuous and goes on during both
the conditions, hence absolute. I think, the whole confusion lies, in not understanding the meaning of
the term ‗unity‘ itself, which Lenin used for ‗mutual interdependence‘ of the opposites. In his 36-
page document Com. Ashoke Mukherjee at page 18 under sub-section [E] discusses the dialectical
conception of unity of opposites. He writes:
―Whereas in the old logical framework, contradiction meant something to be avoided, i.e.,
contradictoriness of statements or positions, in this new logical system, contradiction became the
normal order of the things and processes. For unity of opposites is nothing but a contradiction. But
here this contradiction meant the relentless interaction between opposites and its resolution…‖ (Bold
original, underline added)
Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has described a contradiction as nothing but a unity of opposites but he
has also added in the description of the contradiction saying: ‗this contradiction meant the relentless
interaction between opposites and its resolution‘. But ‗relentless interaction between opposites‘ is
nothing but continuous struggle between opposites all-through and the term ‗resolution‘ of
contradiction refers to nothing but the qualitative phase of contradiction through which the
contradiction is resolved. But Comrade A.M. has left the aspect of ‗mutual interdependence‘ of the
opposites untouched, as to whether the ‗mutual interdependence‘ of the opposites is relentless and
continuous throughout the entire course of contradiction or is just limited only to the quantitative
phase of the contradiction as has been discussed above. Lenin when writes that ‗unity of the
opposites is relative‘ then he only refers to their ‗mutual interdependence‘. In fact, by way of it Lenin
wants to show the dialectics of ‗stability and struggle‘ with in a contradiction and shows that the
stability of a system or entity is relative and struggle within it, is absolute. Actually, Lenin has a
history behind him when he deals with dialectics of stability and struggle with respect to a
contradiction. When Hegel came to the reactionary conclusion as to his philosophical system that his
philosophy represents the perfect knowledge or absolute truth and the then corresponding Prussian
state is the perfect form of society, then Engels caught the glaring contradiction between his
dialectical method and his philosophical and reactionary political conclusion. According to the
dialectical method of Hegel no stage of knowledge and society or state can be perfect. According to
the dialectical method or approach of Hegel every form of society or state can only be justified for its
time and circumstances i.e. for a specific temporary period but Hegel had declared Prussian state to
be perfect for all times. And in this very context Engels declared that from the point of view of
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Hegalian dialectics the stability or status quo of any entity or system is relative and the struggle to
overthrow the system is absolute. ‗The only absolute dialectical philosophy admits‘. Engels
recognised the conservative aspect of Hegalian dialectics and that conservative aspect is the relative
aspect of every contradiction. And the relative aspect of every contradiction is its status quo or
stability, which is represented by the mutual interdependence of the opposites. Engels wrote in his
Ludwig Feuerbach:
――…so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute
states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final, absolute,
sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before
it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the
lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this
process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it recognizes that definite
stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far.
The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute—the
only absolute dialectical philosophy admits.‖(Bold added)

Can Com. Ashoke Mukherjee explain as to what is meant by the conservative side of Hegelian
dialectics and why it is relative? If Com. Ashoke Mukherjee could explain this simple question
successfully only then he can come to know about the relative aspect and the absolute aspect of a
contradiction. What Engels means when he writes ―the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits‖?
The answer is simple that the motion or struggle between the opposites is relentless or unconditional
whereas the status quo or the stability of the unity of the opposites is conditional or relative and not
relentless. The ‗only absolute‘ as recognized by Engels in dialectics is nothing but motion or struggle.
So Lenin and Mao did not introduce in dialectics either the ‗only absolute‘ or the conservative aspect
as acknowledged by Engels. Therefore, Com. Ashoke Mukherjee is totally misplaced when he
asserts: ―It is unnecessary, and actually redundant to add the term ―struggle‖ into the formulation. In
the early Marxist philosophical literature it was not inserted into it.‖ Because the term ‗struggle‘ is
already there as an absolute aspect of a contradiction ‗in the early Marxist philosophical literature‘.
Lenin has only identified it and explained it. So every contradiction possesses two contradictory
aspects namely the conservative and the revolutionary; the aspect of temporary unity or equilibrium
which is relative and the aspect of continual motion which is absolute. Maurice Cornforth writes:

―The existence of fundamental polar opposition, manifesting themselves in every department of

nature and society expresses itself in the conflict and struggle of opposed tendencies, which, despite
phases of temporary equilibrium, lead to continual motion and development, to a perpetual
coming into being and passing away of everything in existence, to sharp change of state and
transformations.‖ (M.C. page 58-60, bold added)

Comrade A.M. himself acknowledges the fact of ‗struggle‘ as being covered by the law of dialectics
‗from quantitative change to qualitative change and vice versa‘. He writes:

―In order to describe the process of transition to a new quality at the philosophical plane,
dialectics has in its arsenal another principle, the law of quantitative change to qualitative
change. There is no need to incorporate the word ―struggle‖ in the first law for this purpose.‖
(Page- 18 bold original, underline added)

Thus according to Comrade A.M. the fact of ‗struggle‘ should not be viewed as associated with the
law ‗unity of the opposites‘. And now from this it has also become fully clear as to why Comrade

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A.M. prefers to the formulation of this law as ‗unity of the opposites‘, instead of Leninist formulation
‗unity and struggle of the opposites‘. In fact, he wants to view the opposites without any struggle
between them as according to him ‗struggle‘ is the function of the ‗second‘ law of dialectics.
According to Comrade A.M. the ‗word‘ ‗struggle‘ has been incorporated in the law ‗unity of the
opposites‘ ‗In order to describe the process of transition to a new quality‘. Whereas according to
him there is another law for this purpose. It is quite interesting. The question is that if one law of
dialectics can serve the purpose of two, just by incorporating one more word into it then what is the
need of one more extra law at all? In fact it is an indirect admission by Com. A.M. that ‗unity and
the struggle of opposites‘ is the most basic law of dialectics.
Comrade Ashoke Mukerjee Raising one More Point and Writes at page 22 as Under :
―Side by side, most of the readers have overlooked what Lenin commented in one of his Notes
on dialectics: ―The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be tested by the history
of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the
identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of examples; ―for example, a seed,‖ ―for example,
primitive communism.‖ The same is true of Engels. But it is ―in the interests of popularisation...‖
and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world).
―In mathematics: + and —. Differential and integral.
―In mechanics: action and reaction.
―In physics: positive and negative electricity.
―In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.
―In social science: the class struggle.‖ [On the Question of Dialectics; italics in the original; bold
fonts introduced by me]
―Mao (and many others following him) cited this paragraph from this Note of Lenin‘s but
probably failed to see the underlying significance of the above (bold faced) mid-paragraph sentence.
Lenin thought that although good for ―popularization‖, these examples failed to satisfy the earmark
of cognition ―as a law of the objective world‖.
―Lenin did not elaborate the matter. We don‘t know what he actually thought about the problem.
But the point, to my mind, as much as I have understood it, is highly important.‖ (Page 22)

So far we have read what Com. A. M. has written. He has put before us the limitation of
Plekhanov and Engels regarding their description of the law of unity of opposites, as pointed out by
Lenin. Com.A. M.says: ―We don‘t know what he (Lenin—S.S.) actually thought about the problem.
But the point, to my mind, as much as I have understood it, is highly important.‖
The chief ‗problematic‘ portion of the above quotation of Lenin, for Com. A. M.is as
follows: ―This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the
identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of examples; ―for example, a seed,‖ ―for example,
primitive communism.‖ The same is true of Engels. But it is ―in the interests of popularisation...‖
and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)‖

Here the limitation of Plekhanov and that of Engels pointed out by Lenin refers to having not
been recognised by them the law of unity of opposites as to be the most basic law in dialectics or the
essence of dialectics. Lenin pointed out that the examples chosen by Plekhanov to explain the law of
identity of opposites are limited only to the purpose of its being popularised, ‗and not as a law of
cognition (and as a law of the objective world)‘ i.e. as the basic law of the objective world and the
theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism. ‗Law of cognition‘ means theory of knowledge i.e.
the law of subjective dialectics and ‗law of the objective world‘ means the law of objective
dialectics. But Comrade A. M. distorting the wording of Lenin writes: ―Lenin thought that although
good for ‗popularization‘, these examples failed to satisfy the earmark of cognition „as a law of the objective
world‟ ”. We can find the discrepancy if we compare the italics of com.A. M. with those of Lenin‘s
bold letters. Among others the major distortion is that com. A. M. has conveniantly dropped the
conjunction ‗and‘ appearing between the phrases ‗law of cognition‘ and ‗law of the objective world‘.
In this regard to make the things clear I need to quote here V.FOMINA,who is the author of the
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY of Volume I (of Georgi Plekhanov‘s Selected Philosophical Works, in

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Five Volumes), published by PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW, 1960, wherein V.Fomina
writes:
―The study of development as the dialectical contradiction in processes and phenomena of
reality did not, however, lead Plekhanov to understand the law of the unity and struggle of opposites
as the basic law in dialectics. Although he recognised that law, Plekhanov did not consider it as the
essence of dialectics. He held that the distinctive feature and the axis of dialectics was development
in the form of leaps. That was why Lenin, who highly assessed Plekhanov‘s defence of Marx‘s
dialectical method, repeatedly noted that he did not pay enough attention to the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites, the most important law of the objective world and of knowledge. Lenin also
noted that in expounding the laws of dialectics, Plekhanov, in his wish to popularise them, reduced
them to an aggregate of examples and did not devote due attention to dialectics as the theory of
knowledge in Marxism.‖(Second revised edition 1974, page. 45)

Thus, it is for this reason that although Plekhanov had recognised the law of unity of opposites as
one of the laws in dialectics, but he did not consider it as the most basic law or the essence of
dialectics, instead he held that the distinctive feature and the axis of dialectics was development in
the form of leaps.

A Necessary Clarification:-- The material of Dialectics of Nature was never published in Lenin‘s
lifetime. It was published in 1925, i.e. after the death of Lenin. So Lenin was totally unaware that
Engels had mentioned about the inner inter-connection of the laws of dialectics. Had Lenin known it,
he would have never joined the name of Engels along with Plekhanov as has been done in the above
quoted passage, by Com. Ashoke Mukerjee. Actually, what Lenin had expected of Plekhanov was
the establishment of the inner inter-connection of the three laws of dialectics. It is again stated that
Engels had already made a mention of the task of inner inter-connection of the three main laws of
dialectics but he left the task unfinished. This task was accomplished by Lenin by way of establishing
the law of unity and struggle of opposites to be the essence of dialectics. Thus Lenin accomplished
the job of establishing the inner inter-connection of the laws of dialectics without knowing about the
mention or indication made by Engels in this regard.

Point No. 4

How Shibdas Ghosh Interpreted the Law

Unity and Struggle of the Opposites

Shibdas Ghosh describes the law of unity and struggle of the opposites as follows:
―As there is continuous conflict and contradiction within matter we observe another feature of
matter and that is, amidst these conflicts and contradictions, there is unity and identity of opposites.
In other words, an aspect of unity exists within contradiction itself. Where the opposite forces are
existing in contradiction, opposing each other, that is, the contradiction is antagonistic in nature;
where one is trying to annihilate the other, they, too, in a specific condition and till the annihilation
of one, exist in unity despite this antagonistic character of contradiction. Guided by this principle the
change of every moment is taking place. This feature of unity even amidst antagonism exists in this
change. This principle operates everywhere in this material world.‖ (Marxism and Development of
Human Society, vol. 2, p. 39, bold added)
From the quoted passage of Shibdas Ghosh it can be easily seen that the interpretation of the law
under discussion is quite different from that of Engels, Lenin and Mao. Let me discuss the above
quotation by way of taking portions from it. Shibdas Ghosh writes:
(i) ―amidst these conflicts and contradictions, there is unity and identity of opposites‖.
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 (ii) ―In other words, an aspect of unity exists within contradiction itself.‖ (bold added)
These two phrases clearly show that according to Shibdas Ghosh too unity is just one aspect of a
contradiction and besides unity there is something more in a contradiction and that something more
is nothing but continuous conflict throughout the contradiction which has been mentioned in the
very beginning by Shibdas Ghosh. This situation can only mean: unity (status quo or stability) in a
contradiction is relative, struggle is absolute.
(iii) ―Where the opposite forces are existing in contradiction, opposing each other, that is,
the contradiction is antagonistic in nature; where one is trying to annihilate the other, they,
too, in a specific condition and till the annihilation of one, exist in unity despite this
antagonistic character of contradiction.‖
This statement of Shibdas Ghosh clearly shows that the law: unity and struggle of opposites or
unity of opposites is applicable only to antagonistic contradictions and not to non-antagonistic
contradiction. Question arises is there any other law that deals with non-antagonistic contradictions?
The answer is emphatic NO. In fact the very same law applies to both antagonistic and non-
antagonistic contradictions. In antagonistic contradiction the transformation of the opposites into
each other takes place through violent means or with the application of force whereas in the case of
non-antagonistic contradiction the transformation of the opposites into each other takes place in a
peaceful way or in a friendly manner like during the criticism and self-criticism in any genuine
communist party.
(iv) ―where one is trying to annihilate the other‖
According to this conception of Shibdas Ghosh the opposites try to annihilate each other and it
cannot be said for certain which one will be successful in the annihilation of the other. Suppose in the
capitalist system if the ruling bourgeoisie and the ruled proletariat are struggling to annihilate each
other then how can we say which side will be victorious? But if we say that the opposites are
transformed into each other i.e. into each other‘s position then the law itself makes certain that now
the dominated proletariat will transform into the dominating or ruling position and now the
dominating or ruling bourgeoisie will get transformed into the now dominated position of the
proletariat. In fact such kind of understanding as has been provided by Shibdas Ghosh above that the
opposite aspects of a contradiction or antithesis struggle to annihilate each other goes contrary even
to the layman‘s commensense. For instance, capital and proletariat make a contradiction of
antagonistic nature. No doubt the proletariat struggles to annihilate the capital, to annihilate itself as
proletariat. But the capital does not struggle to annihilate its opposite, the proletariat, because if the
proletariat is annihilated then the capital itself will get annihilated. Capital always wants to preserve
itself and without preserving its opposite, the proletariat, capital cannot preserve itself. And it applies
to every antagonistic contradiction. The conservative or the positive aspect in every antagonistic
contradiction struggles to preserve the contradiction, hence, to preserve its opposite. Whereas the
destructive or the negative aspect of the contradiction struggles to destruct or abolish the
contradiction, hence, it needs to annihilate its opposite. Let us read what Marx and Engels write in
their joint work titled as THE HOLY FAMILY.
―Proletariat and wealth are opposites; as such they form a single whole. They are both creations of
the world of private property. The question is exactly what place each occupies in the antithesis. It is
not sufficient to declare them sides of a single whole.
―private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain itself, and thereby its
opposite, the proletariat, in existence. That is the positive side of the antithesis, self-satisfied private
property.
―The Proletariat, on the contrary, is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite,
private property, which determines its existence, and which makes it proletariat. It is the negative
side of the antithesis, its restlessness within its very self, dissolved and self-dissolving private
property.‖(Chapter- IV)
Marx further writes:

―Within this antithesis the private property-owner is therefore the conservative side, the proletarian
the destructive side. From the former arises the action of preserving the antithesis, from the latter the
action of annihilating it.‖(ibid)

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 Thus from a plain reading of the above citations of Marx it is clear that the nature of struggle
between the opposite aspects of a contradiction is not of one annihilating each other rather its nature
is both of preservation and annihilation. Struggle for preservation by the conservative or positive
aspect and struggle for annihilation by the progressive or destructive or negative aspect. But
according to the dialectics of Shibdas Ghosh the struggle between the two opposite aspects is of
annihilating each other. Now let me discuss one more point what Shibdas Ghosh Shibdas Ghosh
says about this law of dialectics. He acknowledges:
( iv) ―This principle operates everywhere in this material world.‖
If this principle operates everywhere in this material world then it must also operate within a
genuine communist party too as a genuine communist party does not exist in isolation of this
material world. But according to Shibdas Ghosh the inner struggle within any genuine communist
party cannot be characterized as a struggle of unity of the opposites.

Point No. 5
Character of Inner-Party Struggle of a Genuine Communist Party

Shibdas Ghosh says that the inner struggle of a communist party, ―cannot be a struggle to
overthrow each other like the struggle between labour and capital.‖ (9th congress of CPC, SW-1, page
406)
He further says:
―…Nobody with even an elementary knowledge of materialist dialectics could come to such a
conclusion, or to formulate that contradiction means necessarily contradiction of an antagonistic
nature, there is no such thing as a non-antagonistic contradiction. I think, this confusion has arisen
from the attempt to apply in the inner-party struggle Mao‘s thesis that the unity of opposites is
the basic law of dialectics.‖ (Ibid, page 407, bold added)
Thus it is as clear as noon day that according to Shibdas Ghosh the law ‗unity of opposites‘ does
not apply to the inner struggle of a communist party. Then is there any divine law which governs the
‗unity of opposites‘ or contradictions of the non-antagonistic nature? In fact Shibdas Ghosh could not
understand the application of this general law of dialectics to the contradiction of non-antagonistic
nature because by ‗unity of opposites‘ he only understands ―where one is trying to annihilate the
other‖. He does not understand the law ‗unity of opposites‘ in its true dialectical sense as Engels
taught according to which opposites interpenetrate into each other and transform into each other
when carried to extreme. There is a difference of heaven and earth between the phrases
‗transformation into each other and annihilating each other. This law of dialectics is a universal law
and regarding the universality of laws of dialectics Engels wrote:
―…dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motions. This implies that
its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature and human history as for the motion of
thought…‖(Anti-Duhring, Notes to Anti-Duhring , p-421)
Thus laws of dialectics being laws of all motions also apply to the development of thought or ideas
and being laws of all motions must also apply to the motion or development of a communist party.
How the thought and ideas within a communist party develop? Or how the motion of a communist
party proceeds ahead? Is the motion of a communist party is not generated by the unity of the
opposites? If not then what is the source of motion of a communist party? Does the non-antagonistic
contradiction operating within a communist party not based upon unity of the opposites? What is the
nature of the inner party struggle of a communist party? Is this struggle not against bourgeois
ideology, bourgeois sentiments and emotions, bourgeois individualism, opportunism, economism,
revisionism, non-Marxist political theories and ideas etc. etc.? Can the ideology of the working class
keep gaining and retaining its dominance in the party without any struggle against its opposite
ideology? Is not the inner struggle of every individual member and leader of a communist party
against the bourgeois wishes, ambitions and ideas? If not then what is the need of time to time
rectification drive within a communist party? Does not the principal contradiction of the society
influence a communist party? Shibdas Ghosh writes:
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 ―But the life and death struggle going on every moment between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat in the political, economic and cultural fields, constitutes the principal contradiction of the
present society. And this principal contradiction is continuously influencing the internal
contradiction of the working class. So it must be always kept in mind that in the working class
movement the concept of socialism, scientific socialism always comes from without.‖ (Cultural
Movement and Our tasks, SW -2, page-333, bold added)
The question is if the principal contradiction between labour and capital influences the whole
working class then is the party of working class is not a part of working class? Does the principal
contradiction between labour and capital not influence the individual leaders and the party as a
whole of the working class? If you say NO, then it is sheer idealism and if you say yes then the inner
party struggle of the party of working class becomes a class-struggle in the sphere of philosophy,
ideology, culture, art, politics etc. etc.. Why do we say that there is no final test of any individual
howsoever high his standard may be? Why do we say that no one is infallible? Does the degradation
of any leader purely comes from without or the germs of degradation are there in the leader himself?
So every individual leader of a communist party is nothing but an inter penetration of the opposites
and he has to rise higher and higher by way of overcoming the bourgeois vices and limitations by
way of mutual transformation of the opposites i.e. if the bourgeois vice is strong in comparison to its
opposite revolutionary aspect then this strong negative aspect must be fought and must be
transformed to the weaker position of the erstwhile revolutionary aspect. The collective inner struggle
of the party likewise is the struggle between opposite aspects. Hence the dialectical law of progress
namely unity of the opposites also operates even within a genuine communist party but not
antagonistically between the individuals but by way of transformation of mutual opposites as
discussed above. Let me cite one more passage from Shibdas Ghosh where he objects calling the
principle of unity of opposites as the basic law of dialectical materialism. He says:

―But some people exclusively emphasize the principle of unity of opposites as the basic law of
dialectical materialism. In certain cases this has created problem. From a mechanical understanding
of unity of opposites a group of theoreticians consider that the struggle between two lines—the
bourgeois and the proletariat—go on constantly within the working class party also, as if this struggle
between two lines is conducted from two different centers within the same party. These are
misconceived notions arising from an erroneous understanding of Marxism.‖ (On Theory of
Knowledge, Vol. IV, page 176, bold added)

Firstly, I have embolden the word ‗exclusively‘ in the above passage of Shibdas Ghosh to show that
he is opposed to call the law unity of opposites alone to be basic, which means that for him all the
three laws are equally basic; all the three are placed side by side with equal force. And thus their
interrelationship as mentioned by Shibdas Ghosh above is just mechanical and not dialectical.

Secondly, it is highly objectionable that Shibdas Ghosh, out of his own mechanical understanding,
surreptitiously levels a charge against Lenin and Mao (a group of theoreticians) of being possessed
with the mechanical understanding of the law of unity of the opposites.
Thirdly, Lenin and Mao nowhere stated that the struggle of opposites within any Communist Party
is always conducted from two respective centres as alleged; they only hold that the law of unity of
opposites is universally applicable, and consequently, to the struggle within a Communist Party too.
Engels has defined dialectics to be ―the science of the most general laws of all motions.‖ In view of
this definition of dialectics given by Engels, a very fundamental question arises as to whether the
motion within a Communist Party is out of the sphere of ―all motions‖ to which laws of dialectics
apply? Is the motion within a Communist Party, eclipse on the universality of the law ‗unity of
opposites‘? No, the law of unity of opposites apply equally to the motion or struggle within a
Communist Party, but in a friendly way so long as the leadership of the party remains a genuine
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Marxist leadership. But if the leadership of the Party passes into the hands of revisionists then what
the adherents of Shibdas Ghosh think, would be the nature of struggle within that Party? The law:
unity of opposites equally to both antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions otherwise the law
will lose its universality.
Point No. 6
How Engels Described the Law

Engels neither used the formulation of the law as unity of opposites nor as unity and struggle of the
opposites but he has used the same formulation as was used by Hegel himself. Engels described the
law in short as to be the ‗interpenetration of the opposites‘. Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has also
mentioned it in his document but this is only one aspect of the law. Engels has described it in its full
form in the beginning of his book Dialectics of Nature as follows:
―Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: Transformation of quantity and
quality –mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to
extremes –development through contradictions or negation of the negation –spiral form of
development.‖ (Dialictics of Nature, Plan Outline, page 1st, bold added)
These the two aspects of the law are as follows:
(i) mutual penetration of polar opposites
(ii) transformation into each other when carried to extreme
The mutual penetration of polar opposites signifies that in every pair of polar opposites one
penetrates into the other. For instance Engels in his Dialectics of Nature, giving an illustration of the
interpenetration of the opposites and their transformation into each other, writes:
―The negation of life as being essentially contained in life itself, So that life is always thought of
in relation to its necessary results, death, which is always contained in it in germ. The dialectical
conception of life is nothing more than this.‖ (Chapter-Biology).
From this illustration of life and death which is a pair of polar opposites wherein one is already
penetrated into the other in germ, we can comprehend the dialectical conception of every pair of
polar opposites. One is already present in germ within its opposite and when carried to extreme i.e.
to the nodal point, one gets transformed into the other. Those who do not understand as to how the
polar opposites interpenetrate into each other and how they transform into each other when carried
to extreme, cannot understand the law ‗unity and struggle of the opposites‘ at all or in other words
dialectics itself at all. The mutual transformation of the polar opposites of a contradiction takes place
during the phase of qualitative change or during the phase of the resolution of the contradiction
because every contradiction gets resolved only through the phase of its qualitative change.
Qualitative change itself connotes the resolution of the contradiction. No aspect of a polar opposites
can exist in isolation i.e. without the penetration of its opposite into it in germ. And this is one of the
two meanings of the identity or unity of opposites.

Point No. 7
The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice-versa

The law of Quantitative Change to Qualitative Change and vice-versa has been erroneously
understood and interpreted by Shibdas Ghosh. This law tells us that motion in its eternal journey
alternatively passes through two phases namely the quantitative phase and qualitative phase. During
the quantitative phase of motion only a change in the properties of any quality (thing) takes place and
when the change in properties or quantitative change of anything reaches a nodal point then the
change in the quality of the thing under question begins to change and thus the qualitative phase of
motion begins. When the process of qualitative change gets completed and qualitatively a new thing
comes into existence then again the quantitative process of change starts i.e. the change in properties
of the new quality. The simple and straight meaning of the term vice versa here is that a quantitative
phase of motion is followed by a qualitative phase and then the qualitative phase is followed by the
next quantitative phase. It is just like to say that the day follows night and vice versa i.e. the night
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follows the day but this day is the next day, not the previous one which has already passed. During
the quantitative phase of motion the quality of the thing remains the same hence no qualitative
change takes place. Let us read what Mao-Tse-Tung has written about the alternative two states of
motion:

―There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change.
Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When
the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change
and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second
state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and
gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence
the appearance of a conspicuous change….‖ (On Contradiction)

This is the correct description of the two phases of motion. In the quantitative phase the thing or
process under question qualitatively remains the same the change takes place only quantitatively i.e.
confining to the properties of that quality. For instance since Lenin‘s times the properties of
capitalism have been going on changing but its quality is still the same. The qualitative process of
change in capitalism only begins with the beginning of socialistic revolution. Thus before the nodal
point the quality of the thing under question remains fully unchanged hence no qualitative change
takes place qua that thing. Shibdas Ghosh does not understand at all the reciprocal relationship
between quality and its properties. Quantitative change is only the other name of change in
properties of any quality. From the founders of materialist dialectics namely Marx and Engels to
their worthy successors Lenin, Stalin and Mao have taught repeatedly that during the quantitative
phase of change, the change remains confined merely, purely, simply, solely and only to the
quantitative aspect of the quality under study. But in opposition to all the Marxist authorities named
above, Shibdas Ghosh states that the change during the quantitative phase mainly confines to the
quantitative aspect and some qualitative change also takes place. Thus Shibdas Ghosh has replaced
merely, purely, simply and only with mainly and that too in the name of enriching and developing
dialectical materialism. Now let me cite in this relation some quotations from the celebrated works of
Marxist authorities:

Karl Marx writes: ―Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by
Hegel (in his ‗Logic‟), that merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into
qualitative changes.‖ (Capital vol. 1st, page 292)

Karl Marx writes: ―You are quite right about Hoffmann. Incidently, You will see from the
conclusion to my chapter III, where I outline the transformation of the master of a trade into a
capitalist –as a result of purely quantitative changes –that in the text where I quote Hegel‘s discovery
of the law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change into a qualitative one as being
attested by history and natural science alike.‖ (Letter of Marx to Engels, 22 June, 1867)

Engels writes: ―We have already seen, when discussing world schematism that in connection with
this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations –in which quantitative difference suddenly pass at
certain points into qualitative change…we gave there one of best-known examples –that of the
change of the aggregate state of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0 degree
c. from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100 degree c. from the liquid into the gaseous state, so
that at both these turning points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a
qualitative change in the condition of the water.‖ (Anti-Dhuring part 1st chap. 12 page 145-46)

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 Engels further writes: ―In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar facts
from nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole of part IVth of Marx‘s
Capital –production of relative surplus value –deals, in the field of co-operation, division of labour
and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative
change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of the things under
consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression so hated by Herr During, quantity is
transformed into quality and vice-versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of
people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx‘s phrase, a ‗new power‘,
which is essentially different from the sum of it separate forces.‖ (ibid page 146)

Engels writes:

―Here therefore we have a whole series of qualitatively different bodies, formed by the simple
quantitative addition of elements, and in fact always in the same proportions.‖ (ibid page 147)

Engels writes: ―Thus we see that the purely quantitative operation of division has a limit at which
it becomes transformed into a qualitative difference: the mass consists solely of molecules, but it is
something essentially different from the molecule, just as the latter is different from the atom.‖
(Dialectics of Nature chap. Dialectics page 64)

Engels writes: ―…In short, the so-called physical constants are for the most part nothing but
designations of the nodal points at which quantitative addition or subtraction of motion produces
qualitative change in the state of the body concerned, at which, therefore, quantity is transformed
into quality.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, chap. Dialectics page 65)

―States of Aggregation –nodal points where quantitative change is transformed into qualitative.‖
(Dialectics of Nature, Chapter- Physics, page285)

All the above teachings of Marxist authorities in relation to the law: quantitative change into
qualitative change and vice versa, it is amply clear that before the nodal point the change remains
merely, purely, simply and only quantitative. But Shibdas Ghosh interprets the phrase ‗vice versa‘
contained in this law quite in opposition to the interpretation of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and
Mao. Let us see how.

Shibdas Ghosh writes: ―The process of quantitative change, gradual change, evolutionary change
proceeds to a nodal point, yielding place to a new thing. In every material particle changes are
occurring at every movement. But through these changes the basic character of matter does not alter
despite these changes of every moment, so long as the basic character of the thing does not change,
we call these changes of every moment quantitative change. But whenever through these quantitative
changes a situation arises when, say, the state of matter changes or a completely new thing is born,
we call this change a qualitative change, a basic change, a revolutionary change, etc. There remains
no doubt a continuity of this new matter with the old one, but since a completely basic change has
taken place in the character or quality of matter there exists a break with the old, the past.‖ (Marxism
and Development of Human Society SW2 page 39)

Shibdas Ghosh raising a question writes: ―… Now, one may ask; is there no change in the water
in the early stages after the heating started? The answer is: Yes, even then there is change within the
water, but that is quantitative change mainly. The change is quantitative in the sense that the
temperature of the water gradually increases on being heated and the water gets hot more and
more….‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism SW2 page 160)

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 Even a high school student can understand that the concept ‗mainly‘ is not at all in conformity
with the concepts ‗merely, purely, simply and only‘. Is this the development of materialist dialectics
by Shibdas Ghosh or destruction of it? In fact Shibdas Ghosh is quite unclear as to what is meant by
the phrase ‗vice versa.‘ Raising the question as to what is meant by vice-versa Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―The question may arise as to what is meant by „vice versa‟. It should be noted that the term vice
versa here is not used in its usual sense. That is, vice versa here does not signify the reverse process of
going back from qualitative change to quantitative change. It is not like that at all. This point may be
discussed in the context of the example cited. Students of science know that whereas the whole of the
water is not converted into steam unless the temperature reaches 100 degree c., but it is not true to
say that no amount of water gets vaporised or can vaporise prior to reaching that temperature
throughout the whole of water. It is well known that vapour forms from water even at ordinary
temperatures. That is, as the temperature of water increases, which is a quantitative change amounts
of water get transformed into steam undergoing a qualitative change before the whole of water
reaches 100 degree c.. Again, as molecules of steam are formed, this qualitative change in turn
helps in increasing the temperature of the residual water and thus accelerates the process of
quantitative change. This is what is meant by ‘vice versa’. (ibid page 160-161, bold added)

This kind of interpretation of the term vice versa by Shibdas Ghosh i.e. in the example of water,
some amount of qualitative change before the nodal point is reached clearly shows that Shibdas
Ghosh confuses the property of water with its quality. Evaporation is the property not only of water
but almost of all liquids in general. The phenomenon of evaporation goes on at all temperatures. This
property of water gets accelerated with the increase of temperature. And on account of this property
alone the whole of water can be converted from the liquid state to the gaseous state without heating
the water up to 100 degree Celsius. If it is so then what is the need of heating the water up to 100
degree Celsius? In this circumstance a non-Marxist or a Gandhian may argue that if the whole of
water under experiment can be converted into gaseous state without heating it up to its nodal point
i.e. the point of its qualitative change then where is the need of the nodal point? And thus the nodal
point loses all significance. The same example of heating water has also been used as an illustration
of quantitative change to qualitative change and vice versa by Engels and Lenin also but according to
them the change in water up to the nodal point remains purely and merely quantitative. They do not
acknowledge any amount of qualitative change in water before reaching its temperature up to 100
degree Celsius. Here are two quotations:

Engels writes: ―This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain
definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease given rise to a qualitative leap; for
example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes
at which –under normal pressure --the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where
consequently quantity is transformed into quality.‖ (Anti-Dhuring part 1st chap. 4)

Lenin writes: ―Water on being cooled does not little by little become hard, gradually reaching the
constancy of ice after having passed through the consistency of paste, but is suddenly hard, when it
already has quite attained freezing-point it may (if it stands still) be wholly liquid, and a slight shake
brings it into the condition of hardness.) (Conspectus of Hegel‘s Science of Logic vol. 38 page 124)

Thus both Engels and Lenin did not confuse the property of water i.e. the property of its
evaporation at all temperatures, with its quality of being water. Question is: what is the quality of
water that does not get changed before the boiling point? The quality of everything without exception
is determined by its unity of opposites. For example, the quality of capitalism is determined by the
unity of opposites formed by the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Unless until the unity of opposites
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of anything gets dissolved there can be no qualitative change in that thing. All other changes amount
to the change in its properties. The quality of water must also be composed of some unity of
opposites. Stalin has indicated towards the said unity of opposites that determines the quality of
water. Discussing the same example of heated water Stalin writes:

―For example, the temperature of water has at first no effect on its liquid state, but as the
temperature of liquid water rises or falls, a moment arrives when this state of cohesion changes and
the water is converted in one case into steam and in the other into ice.‖ (Dialectical and Historical
Materialism, bold added)

The state of cohesion of water is the unity of opposites formed by two contradictory aspects
working among the molecules of water, i.e. the aspect of attraction and repulsion between its
molecules. At the boiling point the aspect of repulsion overcomes the aspect of attraction between
them whereas at the freezing point the aspect of attraction gets domination or overcomes the aspect
of repulsion between them. But at the surface of water its molecules experience less force of
attraction and due to that they go on flying into the air. The phenomenon of evaporation is merely
the property based on the quality of water. So Shibdas Ghosh has confused the property of water
with its quality when he says that some amount of qualitative change does take place before the
heating of water reaches its boiling point.

One more example

Shibdas Ghosh has erroneously given one more example of simultaneous qualitative change
discussing the process of change in a society. According to him the life of a man as an individual can
get qualitatively changed before the qualitative change of the society. Shibdas Ghosh says:

―When communist revolutionary workers trained up through class-struggle and conscious efforts
within this very capitalist system are judged individually, it would be found that a qualitative change
has come about in their life –in sense of values, outlook, ideology and aim of life…‖ ((Marxism and
Dialectical Materialism SW2, page 162)

It is sheer idealism, nothing but the idealistic conception of life of men based on their
consciousness. Shibdas Ghosh has presumed the consciousness, ideology, aim and outlook of men as
to be the basis of their life. The materialistic conception of life of men is based on their conditions of
production and unless a qualitative change takes place in their conditions of production the life of
any person who is living as a part of those conditions of production cannot get qualitatively changed
merely on the basis of change in his/her ideology, consciousness, values or aim. Let us read what
Marx writes in this regard:

―Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like.
They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their
means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their
means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life.‖ (German Ideology, Vol.-1,
Chapter 1st)

―…It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness. For the first
manner of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; for the second
manner of approach, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individual themselves, and
consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.‖(Ibid)

Thus according to the materialistic conception, the quality of life of every person is determined by
the social order or the conditions of production in which he lives. The quality of life of every person
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is independent of his or her thinking. A person can change can become a revolutionary under
capitalism, or can become a progressive personality but the quality of his/her life is determined by
the capitalistic mode of production. The scientific conception of quality of life can only be the
materialistic conception and not the idealistic one. But Shibdas Ghosh in this respect falls prey to
idealism. In fact Shibdas Ghosh like Feuerbach could not understand what a man is? The man of
Shibdas Ghosh has emerged from consciousness not from the production process of his means of
subsistence. Regarding the emergence of society or man as a social being Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―…There was a time when man was not organized in society even. Like other animals, primitive man of
the jungle was also completely slave to the natural laws. Little difference was there between man and
animal then. The unique power of thinking which man alone possesses by virtue of his brain has
made him distinctly different from the animal, So he is capable of getting to know and overcoming
the forces of nature and environment and solving the problem confronting life. The primitive man at
that very early stage, even with whatever little thinking power he possessed, realized that it was futile
to try to live alone; he could not survive that way. Braving all the odds of nature for bare existence,
collective living was a must. The first element of consciousness, even at its budding, which dawned
on man with his urge for better living and engaged him in the struggle for existence against the
hostile forces of nature surrounding him was this: We must unite to survive, we cannot live alone; we will
have to struggle unitedly, and collectively, we will have to try to survive. This was the first element of
consciousness in human civilization. This was the basic consciousness underlying the human civilization. On this
consciousness human society was built and man became a social being. That we are no more savage, we are social
being – at its root lies the realization that we cannot live alone, and collectively we have to survive, struggling
collectively against forces of nature. And through this collective struggle we can bring under control the forces of
nature and use them for better living. The primitive man came to learn this through his practical experience.‖
(Marxism and Development of Human Society, SW-2, page 4, Italics added)

At another place, Shibdas Ghosh criticising Sartre writes, ―…Sartre, like Feuerbach failed to
realise the objective process of emergence of idea from matter. So, even while accepting dialectical
materialism as the only correct philosophy Sartre had been following the bourgeois idealist outlook
and thinking, opposed to dialectical materialist outlook and thinking, and was unable to realise the
objective process through which idea developed form matter itself as also the dialectical interrelation
between matter and idea. And thus it was not possible for him to realise that idea was a product of
matter,…‖ (Cultural Movement and Our Tasks, SW-2, page 320-21)

It is idealism of Shibdas Ghosh who explains the formation and begnning of society or the
beginning of human practice from consciousness or idea whereas the materialistic conception of
history explains idea and consciousness from practice i.e. the productive activity of human beings.
The materialistic conception of history writes Karl Marx: ―…does not explain practice from the idea
but explains the formation of ideas from material practice,…‖ (German Ideology, Vol-I, Chapter 1,
page 61)s.‖ (Vol. 2, p. 3-4)

Point No. 8

Law of the Negation of Negation

Shibdasa Ghosh writes:

―Negation of Negation: Negation in course of development and development following negation _

this is the law of development and growth in case of society, material world and every phenomenon.

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The material world is always in a process of change and development. How does this development
take place? Continually negating self, negating its own existence, through the destruction of the old a
new one is born. The new is born through constant annihilation of the old.‖ (Marxism and
Development of Human Society- S.W.-2 page 39-40)

This above given description of the law of the negation of negation is quite meaningless. The given
description has nothing to do with the said law. The crux of the law of the negation of negation,
according to Shibdas Ghosh is: ―The new is born through constant annihilation of the old.‖

But describing negation of negation Lenin writes:

―A development that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them differently, on
a higher basis (negation of negation) a development so to speak, in a spiral, not in a straight line,….‖
(On Karl Marx)
Enumerating the elements of dialectics Lenin writes at serial no. 13th and 14th as follows: ―13
) The repetition at a higher stage of certain feature, properties, etc. of the lower and 14) the apparent
return to the old (negation of the negation)…‖ (Conspectus of Hegel‘s Science of Logic vol 38, page
221-222)
Again Lenin writes: ―… From assertion to negation from negation to unity with the asserted
–without this dialectics becomes empty negations, a game of scepsis.‖ (ibid page226)
But Shibdas Ghosh completely dismisses this kind of understanding of the law: negation of the
negation as described by Lenin above. Shibdas Ghosh denies and dismisses with full force any kind
of, ―repetition at a higher stage of certain feature, properties, etc. of the lower and the apparent return
to the old‖, as has been taught buy Marx, Engels and Lenin. Rejecting the conception of spiral
development, i.e., the ―repetition at a higher stage of certain feature, properties, etc. of the lower and
the apparent return to the old‖ Shibdas Ghosh writes:
―…The very concept of onward and upward development has developed in order to uphold the
truth that in the course of change in the material world the same phenomenon is not repeated, does
not come in cycles, which means that in the course of change we may reach from one stage to
progressively higher stages, but in the process of change the old thing is not repeated.‖ (ON
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, SW IV, Page- 156)

Now let me cite here a number of examples from various fields given by Engels in his Anti
Duhring, (Part I, Chapter, XIII, Negation of Negation)

Engels writes: ―But what then is this fearful negation of the negation, which makes life so bitter for
Herr Duhring and with him plays the same role of the unpardonable crime as the sin against the
Holy Ghost does in Christianity?

―A very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can
understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist
philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless Metaphysicians of Herr Duhring‘s calibre
to keep it enveloped.

―Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grain of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then
consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal of it, if it falls on
suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it
germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which
has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It
grows, flowers, is fertilized and finally once more produces grains of barley, as soon as these have
ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negate. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once
again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-,twenty- or thirty-fold. Species of
grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it was a century
ago.‖

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Engels continues: ―But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and
treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener‘s art, we get as a result of
this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which
produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the
negation enhances this process of perfection.‖

Engels further writes: ―With most insects, this process follows the same line as in the case of the
grain of barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg by a negation of the egg, pass through
certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon
as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs. We are not
concerned at the moment with the fact that with other plants and animals the process does not take
such a simple form, that before they die they produce seeds, eggs or offspring not one but many
times; our purpose here is only to show that the negation of the negation really does take place in
both kingdoms of the organic world.‖

Engels further writes: ―It is the same in mathematics. Let us take any algebraic quantity whatever: for
example, a. if this is negated, we get –a (minus a) if we negate that negation, by multiplying –a by –a
, we get +a square , i.e., the original positive quantity, but at a higher degree, raised to its 2 nd power.
…‖

―It is the same in history, as well. All civilized peoples begin with the common ownership of the
land. With all peoples who have passed a certain primitive stage, this common ownership becomes in
the course of the development of agriculture a fetter on production. It is abolished, negated, and
after a longer or shorter series of intermediate stages is transformed into private property. But at a
higher stage of agricultural development, brought about by private property in land itself, private
property conversely becomes a fetter on production, as is the case today both with small and large
land ownership. The demand that it, too, should be negated, that it should once again be transformed
into common property, necessarily arises. But this demand does not mean the restoration of the
aboriginal common ownership, but the institution of a far higher and more developed form of
possession in common, which, far from being hindrance to production, on the contrary for the first
time will free production from all fetters and unable it to make full use of modern chemical
discoveries and mechanical inventions.‖

―Or let us take another example: the philosophy of antiquity was primitive, natural materialism. As
such, it was incapable of clearing up the relation between mind and matter. …The old materialism
was therefore, negated by idealism. But in the course of the further development of philosophy,
idealism too became untenable and was negated by modern materialism. This modern materialism,
the negation of the negation, is not the mere re-establishment of the old, but adds to the permanent
foundations of this old materialism the whole thought-content of two thousand years of development
of philosophy and natural science, as well as of the history of these two thousand years. It is no
longer a philosophy at all, but simply a world outlook which has to establish its validity and be
applied not in a science of sciences standing apart, but in the real sciences. Philosophy is therefore
‗sublated‘ here, i.e., ‗both overcome and preserved‘; overcome as regards its form and preserved as
regards its real content. …‖

―Finally: even the Rousseau doctrine of equality-of which Duhring‘s is only a feeble and distorted
echo- could not have seen the light but for the midwife‘s services rendered by the Hegelian negation
of the negation-though it was nearly twenty years before Hegel was born. … In the state of nature
and savagery men were equal; and Rousseau regards even language as a perversion of the state of
nature, his fully justified in extending the equality of animals within the limits of a single species also

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to the animal-men …speechless. But these equal animal-men had one quality which gave them an
advantage over the other animals: perfectibility, the capacity to develop further; and this became the
cause of inequality. So Rousseau regards the rise of inequality as progress. But this progress
contained an antagonism: It was at the same time retrogression. …Each new advance of civilization
is at the same time a new advance of inequality. All institutions set up by the society which has
arisen with civilization change into the opposite of their original purpose. … And nevertheless the
chiefs necessarily become the oppressors of the peoples, and intensify their oppression up to the point
at which inequality, carried to the utmost extreme, again changes into its opposite, becomes the
cause of equality: before the despot all are equal – equally ciphers. … And so inequality once more
changes into equality; not, however, into the former natural equality of speechless primitive men, but
into the higher equality of the social contract. The oppressors are oppressed. It is the negation of the
negation.‖

―Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist
or destroying it in any way one likes‖

Again in the APPENDIX to Chapter XIII, Engels writes:

―…All Indo-Germanic peoples began with common property. Among almost all of them it was
abolished, negated, in the course of social development, extruded by other forms—private property,
feudal property, etc. To negate this negation, to restore common property on a higher plane of
development, is the task of the social revolution.‖ (Page 396)

―The philosophy of antiquity was originally spontaneous materialism. The latter gave rise to
idealism, spiritualism, negation of materialism, first in the shape of the antithesis of soul and body,
then in the doctrine of immortality and in monotheism. This spiritualism was universally
disseminated through the medium of Christianity. The negation of this negation is the reproduction
of the old on a higher plane, modern materialism, which, in contrast with the past, finds its
theoretical conclusion in scientific socialism. …‖(Page--396)

―Even Rousseau‘s way of looking at history—original equality, deterioration through inequality,

restoration of equality on a higher plane—is a negation of the negation.‖(Page—397)

In fact, Shibdas Ghosh comprehends the law of negation of negation as a continuous process of
negation in a contradiction as has been cited above. He views all the three laws of dialectics to be
taking place simultaneously during the course of every contradiction. But it is not like that. Marx and
Engels write:
―…But this illusion arises only if one takes politics as the basis of empirical history, or if, like Hegel,
one wants everywhere to demonstrate the negation of negation,…‖(German Ideology, Vol. I, page 323,
Italics added)

Accusing Lenin and Mao Com. Ashoke Mukerjee has also stated:
―You have all taught us that there are three basic laws of dialectics which govern the entire course of a
contradiction.‖
But I question the veracity of this above statement of Com. Ashoke Mukherjee. Nowhere in
the textbooks of Marxism and dialectical materialism can Com. Ashoke Mukherjee show this kind of
statement being made by any of the Marxist authorities namely Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and
Mao. It is the subjective understanding of Com. Ashoke Mukherjee himself that the three basic laws
of dialectics are confined to the ‗entire course of a contradiction‘. Rather these are the general laws of
all motions of matter. It is true, that the two laws of dialectics complete their role during the course of
every single contradiction but the law of negation of negation which describes the development from
simple to complex; from lower to higher and from straight to spiral is not confined to the span or
course of a single contradiction. Let me give one illustration of the law of negation of negation from
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the texts of Marx and Engels. Engels in his Anti-During quoting from the Volume-III of Capital of
Karl Marx writes:
―The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces
capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on
labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its
own negation. It is the negation of negation. (Page 154) … This re-establishes individual property,
but on the basis of the acquisitions of the capitalist era. (Page 150)‖ (Anti-During part 1st chap. 13)
Thus here it is fully clear that the operation of the law: negation of negation does not get
completed during a single course of contradiction. The individual private property founded on the
labour of proprietor (i.e. serf in feudalism) gets negated with the overthrow of feudalism and with the
coming into existence with the capitalist mode of production. Again when the capitalist mode of
production gets replaced by socialism the individual property of the erstwhile proprietor is restored
not in the form of means of production but in the form of means of subsistence. And this restoration
of individual property takes place at a higher stage. The negation of the private property of the feudal
serf has been held here to be the first negation and when as a result of negation of the capitalist
property, individual property again reappears in the form of means of subsistence in socialism i.e. on
a higher plane a spiral of development is said to be completed. This spiral of development does not
happen as a consequence of a single entire course of any contradiction as Com. Ashoke Mukherjee
holds. So, Shibdas Ghosh denies the spiral nature of development.

CHAPTER: IV
TRUTH
Point No. 1
Definition of Truth

According to dialectical materialism consciousness or idea is the reflection of the objective material
world. But this consciousness or idea may be true or false. If the idea corresponds with the objective
reality, only then the idea is called true or in other words the idea contains truth otherwise not.
Maurice Cornforth in his Dialectical Materialism has described truth as follows:

―Truth is correspondence between ideas and objective reality. Such correspondence is usually only
partial and approximate. The truth we can establish always depends on our means for discovering
and expressing truth, but at the same time the truth of ideas, though relative in this sense, depends on
the objective facts to which ideas correspond. We can never attain complete, full, absolute truth, but
are always advancing towards it.‖ (Chapter- Truth, page 418)

Point No. 2

What is absolute truth?

Regarding absolute truth, Comrade A.M. raises questions as follows:

―The concept of absolute truth is not always properly clarified in the Marxist classics.
Moreover, I would like to remind the readers that it is not always possible to identify opposites in
each and every case in a straightforward manner. Ideas of man can be right or wrong; knowledge
may be true and erroneous, depending on whether it is subjective or objective. There is thus a
relentless contradiction in our cognitive process. But truth, to be proper, must be objective and not
subjective. Does it mean that truth lacks dialectical content on this score? Similarly, truth is unique
and not plural; is it a violation of dialectics?‖ (Section II, Sub section [F])

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 It is true that in Marxist classics the concept of absolute truth has been used in more than one
sense, mainly in three senses or ways, namely (i) in the sense of complete, full and final knowledge
of nature as a whole; (ii) in the sense of polarity as opposed to relative in context of attained
knowledge, ideology or any single truth; (iii) in the sense of any single grain of truth which cannot be
refuted, falsified or demolished in future. Let us now discuss these three senses of absolute truth one
by one.

(i) Can Mankind Ever Attain Absolute Truth in Terms of Complete, Full and Final
Knowledge of the Universe as a Whole? Answer is NO.

In my Comment No. 2, I had discussed how Hegel ceased to be a dialectician when he presumed
that the Absolute Idea had reached its logical culmination in the form of his dialectical philosophy
and the Prussian state. According to Hegel‘s philosophical system Absolute Idea was presumed to be
existing prior to nature and this Absolute Idea was dialectical. It got transformed into nature and
then it went on developing dialectically to come to itself again and according to Hegel through nature
and human history the Absolute Idea came to itself in the form of Hegel‘s philosophy. Thus the
‗absolute knowledge‘ was pronounced to be attained and there remained nothing further to cognise.
The movement of history reached its end. No further progress. Thus the philosophical system of
Hegel came into direct contradiction with its dialectical methodology. In simple terms the question is
that when the dialectical Absolute Idea got transformed into nature then how could it come to itself
in the form of absolute knowledge without overcoming and cognizing all the contradictions of
nature? Logically the absolute knowledge represented by so-called Absolute Idea can only be the
complete and final knowledge of nature when nothing can remain unknown in nature and about
nature. Thus in this respect mankind can never attain absolute truth because absolute truth is the
complete knowledge of nature, which is infinite in space and time. The dialectical methodology of
Hegel was revolutionary because it acknowledged nothing to be final. But the wish and desire of
Hegel like other philosophers required his philosophical system to be completed in the form of his
philosophy representing absolute knowledge. Knowledge or truth being the reflection of nature in
human mind cannot ever reach its end because nature itself is infinite. So knowledge or truth will
always remain in the process of its development from lower to ever higher. It is continuously
proceeding to its completion but never will be get completed. And it is in this sense that Engels wrote
about absolute truth as follows:

―…Truth lay now in the process of cognition itself, in the long historical development of science
which mounts from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge without ever reaching by discovering so-called
absolute truth, a point at which it can proceed no further where it would have nothing more to do than
to fold its hands and gaze with wonder at the absolute truth to which it had attained…‖ (Ludwig
Feuerbach, Chapter I, Italics added)

And it is in this light we have to understand the following quotation of Engels which I had cited in
my comment no. 2:

―…so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of
absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final,
absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can
endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless
ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the
mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it
recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and
circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary

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character is absolute—the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits.‖(Ludwig Feuerbach, bold
added)

Engels further clarifies:

―…With all philosophers it is precisely the ‗system‘ which is perishable; and for the simple reason
that it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind—the desire to overcome all
contradictions but if all contradictions are once for all disposed of we shall have arrived at so-called
absolute truth—world history will be at an end…‖ (Ibid, bold added)

Karl Marx also sarcastically wrote:

―…Hitherto philosophers have had the solution of all riddles lying in their writing-desks, and the
stupid, exoteric world had only to open its mouth for the roast pigeons of absolute knowledge to fly
into it.‖ (Letters from the Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher, CW-3, page 142)

So it is amply clear that the concept of absolute truth connotes the complete and final knowledge
of nature as a whole which can never be attained though mankind is continuously approaching to it,
i.e. getting closer and closer to it. So cognition of truth is an endless process. Nature is knowable by
its nature because nature is not a mystery, but nature is so vast being infinite that it is impossible to
know nature completely in any future; and in this respect we can say that nature is unknowable.
Unknowable not in the sense that nature is a mystery but because of the impossibility of its being
fully and completely cognised, as it is infinite and the process of cognition of the infinite is also
infinite; it is unknowable in the sense that its knowledge has no end. Referring to J. Dietzgen Lenin
writes:

―That is why J.Dietzgen emphasized that the ‗subject-matter of science is endless‘, that not only
the infinite, but the ‗smallest atom‘ is immeasurable, unknowable to the end, inexhaustible, ‗for nature
in all her parts has no beginning and no end‘.‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter II,
section-5)

Thus Marxism or dialectical materialism holds that it is impossible for mankind to ever attain
absolute truth being the complete knowledge of nature as a whole, though mankind is continually
approaching to it.

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee has also cited a passage from Engels‘ Anti-Duhring, in denial of absolute
truth. But the quoted passage also relates to the denial of absolute truth in its sense of full, final and
complete knowledge of nature as a whole and not in the sense, Shibdas Ghosh denies it.The quoted
passage of Engels in his 36-page document as follows:
―Besides, it is also true that Engels had offered a criticism more or less similar to Ghosh‘s: ‗The
Hegelian system, in itself, was a colossal miscarriage—but it was also the last of its kind. It was
suffering, in fact, from an internal and incurable contradiction. On the one hand, its essential
proposition was the conception that human history is a process of evolution, which, by its very
nature, cannot find its intellectual final term in the discovery of any so-called absolute truth. But, on
the other hand, it laid claim to being the very essence of this absolute truth. A system of natural and
historical knowledge, embracing everything, and final for all time, is a contradiction to the
fundamental laws of dialectic reasoning.‘ [Anti-Dühring, Introduction, General; emphasis added]‖
(Page-4)

So, readers can judge themselves that the above quotation of Engels does not dismiss the least
admission of absolute truth, as Shibdas Ghosh does, it denies absolute truth only in its sense of
complete knowledge of nature as a whole. At one or two places Lenin has also used the phrase
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‗objective truth‘ in place of ‗absolute truth‘ to denote the complete and exhaustive knowledge of
nature as a whole. One such example is given as follows:

―…The sole conclusion to be drawn from the opinion held by Marxists that Marx‘s theory is an
objective truth is that by following the path of Marxian theory we shall draw closer and closer to
objective truth (without ever exhausting it); but by following any other path we shall arrive at nothing
but confusion and lies.‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Page-130)

(ii) Absolute Truth, as one Aspect in the Dialectical Unity with Relative Truth:

Shibdas Ghosh does not view truth as a dialectical unity of relative and absolute truth. He writes:
―Another point to be remembered is that truth changes with change in the circumstances and so the
concept of truth of a particular issue also changes. That is why the concept of absolute truth is
untenable. It is not that there is no truth, but there is no such thing as absolute truth. The concept of
absolute truth is the great lie that confuses the pursuit of truth in life. It should be understood that just
as truth is concrete truth, and there is no existence of absolute or abstract truth, the concept of truth
in this ever-changing world is that of a relative truth.‖ (SW-2 print 1992 p.106)
Maurice Cornforth writes about the dialectical unity of relative and absolute in more simple way
as follows:

―Therefore while the expression of truth and the limits of its approximation to objective reality
depend on us, its content, what it is about, the objective reality to which it corresponds does not
depend on us.

―In this sense there is an element of both relativity and absoluteness, of subjectivity and
objectivity, in every truth. Truth is relative inasmuch as it is expressed in terms depending on the
particular circumstances, experience and means of arriving at truth of the people who formulate it. It
is absolute inasmuch as what is expressed or reproduced in these terms is objective reality, existing
independently of man‘s knowledge of it.‖ (Chapter Truth)

Thus every truth contains both aspects i.e., the aspects of relativity and absoluteness or the aspects
of subjectivity and objectivity. The relative or subjective aspect of truth is associated with the
particular circumstances, degree of experience of mankind and the means of knowing and expressing
truth. When Shibdas Ghosh raises the question as to why, ―Gautama Buddha, Hazrat Muhammad
and Jesus Christ, despite being great personalities failed to discover the Theory of Relativity in their
times. Is it that Einstein was a great genius than all of them? None would agree.‖

Then Shibdas Ghosh himself answers the question as follows: ―…I reiterate that it is the social
situation, the concrete conditions prevailing at the age which principally define the limits to their
thoughts and ideas.‖ (Page- 112, SW-IV)

But the problem is that Shibdas Ghosh and his adherents do not know this simple thing that the
aspect of social situation, nature of instruments and devices of knowing, searching and expressing
truth or in other words the concrete conditions in which the knower of the truth lives and does his
work of discovering and expressing truth, determine the limits of truth or the subjective and relative
aspect of truth, discovered and expressed by him. And it is on this very basis, truth is called
historically conditional, circumstantial or relative and subjective. But there is one other aspect also
which does not depend on circumstances or social conditions of the age and that aspect relates to the
content of the truth i.e., what has been reflected in those circumstances and this aspect is the aspect
of objectivity and absoluteness of truth. Let us try to understand these two opposite aspects of a
single truth by taking an example of Galileo‘s discovery as to the revolving of the Earth around the
Sun. The one aspect of the truth discovered by Galileo is that the discovery of the truth that ‗Earth
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revolves around the Sun‘, is historically conditional as it could not have been discovered in any
historical conditions at anybody‘s sweet will. Had it been so, it could have already been discovered
by Gautama Buddha or Aristotle as they were not less genius than Galileo. So, the truth that Earth
revolves around the Sun is historically conditional i.e., the discovery of this truth is based on some
particular circumstances and conditions. Therefore, one aspect of truth discovered, is that it is
historically conditional. But the other aspect of the discovery is that what has been discovered i.e.,
‗the Earth revolves around the Sun‘, does not depend at all on any set of social circumstances
whatsoever. The fact of revolving of the Earth around the Sun is absolutely independent and free
from all social circumstances; so much so the Earth had already been revolving around the Sun
before the society or social circumstances themselves appeared on Earth. Therefore, the content of
truth does not depend on or is not conditional to social circumstances. Hence, unconditionally true.
Thus, the development of truth lies in the removal of the previous historical limitation on truth and
in this process the earlier aspect of limitation or in other words of relativity passes into its opposite
the absolute. That is why, Lenin writes:

―…For dialectical materialism there is no impassable boundary between relative and absolute
truth…From the standpoint of modern materialism, i.e., Marxism, the limits of approximation of our
knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is
unconditional, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional….In a word,
every ideology is historically conditional, but it is unconditionally true that to every scientific
ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology) there corresponds an objective truth,
absolute nature.‖( Empirio-criticism, chapter II, section- 5, italics original)

Take for instance the concept of space and time. The Newtonian concept of space and time
had a historical limitation, associated with it. This concept also had two aspects; the aspect of
subjectivity or relativity being historically conditional. It had also the aspect of objectivity or
absoluteness owing to which it provided absolute results in practice. The discoverer of the Relativistic
concept of space and time were placed in different social and historical conditions, so they freed the
Newtonian conception of space and time of its limitation and took it one step ahead towards its final
or absolute conception. It‘s earlier relative aspect represented by its limitation got transformed into its
opposite the absolute aspect. Has the Newtonian conception of space and time been proved wholly
wrong by theory of relativity? No, it is not so. Only the subjective aspect of Newtonian conception of
space and time owing to which its validity was only limited to the domain of mechanical motion has
been proved to be relative and is overcome. The subjective aspect of Newtonian conception of space
and time was that space and time were considered to be independent of each other and space was
considered to be flat; but despite its historical limitation this conception of space and time was
sufficiently objective for the domain of Newtonian Mechanics. So, Newtonian conception of space
and time had both aspects. The aspect of objectivity of truth of Newtonian space and time proved to
be less in extent as compared to the aspect of objectivity discovered by Theory of Relativity. So,
development of truth is nothing but to overcome the earlier limitation or relative aspect and to move
ahead to absoluteness of truth. But when it is said that truth is always objective then we keep in mind
only the objective aspect of truth; because when we apply truth in practice, only the objective aspect
of truth plays its positive role; and the subjective aspect of the truth only gets revealed when the limits
of the domain, for which the objectivity of the truth is valid, are crossed. In the course of
development of knowledge the subjective or relative aspect of truth goes on being overcome and
mankind gets closer and closer to absolute truth. Regarding the journey to the absolute truth of ‗space
and time‘, Lenin writes:

―Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions go to
compound absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, move towards absolute
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truth and approach nearer and nearer to it…‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Chapter-3,
Section-5, page 162)

Thus the objective aspect of every truth proves itself to be absolutely true in practice within its
domain and this domain gets broader and broader as the relative truth gets closer closer to the
absolute truth. Lenin writes:

―…The mastery of nature manifested in human practice is a result of an objectively correct reflection
within the human head of the phenomena and processes of nature, and is proof of the fact that this
reflection (within the limits of what is revealed by practice) is objective, absolute, eternal truth.‖
(Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter 3, Section 6, page 177)

But Shibdas Ghosh being not a dialectician tears apart the two contradictory aspects of truth. He
views the two dialectically interrelated aspects of truth namely the aspect of its relativity or
subjectivity and the aspect of its absoluteness or objectivity in isolation to or independent from each
other. At one place he declares: ―…according to modern science all truths are relative truths.‖ (Cultural
Movement and Our Task, SW-2, p. 324) But at another place he would pronounce ‗all truths are
objective truths‘, without conceiving any dialectical unity of opposites between the two. The
‗relative‘ attains or acquires its meaning only as the opposite of ‗absolute‘ and likewise the meaning
of ‗objective‘ cannot be understood without its opposite i.e., ‗subjective‘. I have already shown the
inseparable unity of subjective and objective aspects of truth with the help of two examples, one, the
example of truth that ‗the Earth revolves around the Sun‘ and two, in context of truth contained in
the Newtonian conception of space and time.

What distinguishes Engels from Duhring?

If one claims oneself to be a materialist then he must acknowledge absolute truth. Lenin says that if
one acknowledges objective truth then ‗in one way or another‘ he acknowledges absolute truth. Let
us read what Lenin writes:

―To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-

organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind is, in one
way or another, to recognise absolute truth. And it is this ‗one way or another‘ which distinguishes
the metaphysical materialist Duhring from the dialectical materialist Engels.‖ (Materialism and
Empirio-criticism, Chapter-Two, Section-5 Absolute and Relative Truth or the Eclecticism of Engels
as Discovered by A. Bogdanov, page-120)
And if Shibdas Ghosh does not allow the phrase, ‗one way or another‘ to apply to himself then he
must be placed in the camp of Duhring and not in the camp of Engels.

Objective truth can only be acquired by subjective efforts, observations and means. It is just like
the objective and subjective factors of revolution. Truth is not only objective it is historically
conditioned also. Now at present we know that idealist philosophy is useless in terms of truthfulness
or truth. But can we say that it was always so? Has religion in the past played no role in the progress
of society and truth? Even Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―…Christianity helped the slaves in a way to organise struggles against the injustice and oppression
by the slave masters and in that sense helped in social progress at that time. Similar was the case with
the adherents of Islam as well.‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, SW-2, Page 122)

But on the ground of total falsehood no positive role of social progress can be played. Truths of
religion are today considered not to be scientific but they played their positive role in the past.
Maurice Cornforth has clarified it giving a concrete example from history. He writes:

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 ―…The Puritan in the English Revolution said they were the elect of God. But even this
contained a germ of truth—namely, that they were in fact that rising progressive social force which
was bound to overthrow the decaying forces of the old society. Their ideas about being ‗the elect of
God‘ were certainly erroneous; but this was their way of expressing something which was
undoubtedly the case.‖ (Dialectical Materialism, Chapter-Truth, bold added)

Thus the subjective and objective or relative and absolute aspects are dialectically united into one and
a dialectical materialist must understand the dialectical relationship between the two. Here are some
quotations to be pondered over:

a. ―…The reason for Bogdanov‘s distortion of materialism lies in his failure to understand the
relation of absolute truth to relative truth…‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter 2,
section-5)

b. ―Why does Engels speak here of ‗platitudes‘? Because he refutes and ridicules the dogmatic,
metaphysical materialist Duhring who was incapable of applying dialectics to the relation
between absolute and relative truth….‖(Ibid)

c. ―…we must learn to put, and answer, the question of the relation between absolute and
relative truth dialectically. It was on this issue that the fight between Duhring and Engels was
waged thirty years ago…‖ (Ibid)

d. ―…For Bogdanov (as for all the Machists) recognition of the relativity of our knowledge
excludes even the least admission of the absolute truth. For Engels absolute truth is
compounded from relative truths. Bogdanov is a relativist; Engels is a dialectician.‖ (Ibid)

e. ―…This is materialism. But Helmholtz is not clear as to the relation between absolute and
relative truth.‖ (Ibid, Section 4, chapter 6)

f. ―…the Humean Rey has no conception whatever of dialectics, of the difference between
dialectical materialism and metaphysical materialism, in Engels‘ meaning of the term. Hence
the relation between absolute and relative truth, for example, is absolute unclear to Rey.‖
(Ibid, Chapter 5, section 1)

Comrade A.M. has raised one more question as under:

―Truth is unique and not plural; is it a violation of dialectics?‖ (Section II, Sub section [F])

No, it is no violation of dialectics; rather it is the confirmation of dialectics. The recognition of

unique truth concerning any phenomenon or objective process can be nothing but the final or
absolute truth concerning that very phenomenon, which can only be attained through a series of
several or many relative truths. Can Com. A.M. tell us as to what is the ‗unique‘ truth concerning
‗Space and Time‘? Regarding space and time, which of the two truths is unique: whether Newtonian
or Einsteinium? Let us once more read in this regard what Lenin writes:

―Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions go to
compound absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, move towards absolute
truth and approach nearer and nearer to it…‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Chapter-3,
Section-5, page 162)

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So, all the unique truths like the one of space and time can only be attained by attaining several
relative truths. Thus behind every ‗unique‘ truth there is a plurality of relative truth.

(iii) Absolute Truth in the Sense of Grains of Absolute Truth

According to Shibdas Ghosh all the truths are relative truths because according to him all truths
depend on circumstances and change with the change in circumstances; every truth gets replaced
with change in circumstances. In other words this position of Shibdas Ghosh implies that every truth
relating to one set of particular circumstances gets turned into error when new truth relating to new
circumstances comes into existence. So, according to this understanding no portion of erstwhile
attained truth remains to be un-falsifiable and irreplaceable. And when every truth becomes
replaceable and falsifiable; nothing remains permanent as true which is sheer relativism. This is the
result of viewing matter one-sidedly as particular concrete and relative. As the concept of matter of
Shibdas Ghosh is based upon its particular forms which are all relative so it is because of this
erroneous, one sided non-dialectical concept of matter, the concept of truth of Shibdas Ghosh
completely rules out the absolute aspect of truth. Shibdas Ghosh being not a dialectician abandons
the absolute aspect of the material world and takes into account only the relative aspect of its
particular relative processes. Likewise, in respect of truth, Shibdas Ghosh acknowledges only one
aspect i.e., the aspect of its change with the change in circumstances; but truth does not only change,
it develops too. And development includes continuity with the break. According to the principle of
continuity with the break, the positive achievements of the earlier period pass on ahead and truth
develops from lower to higher and thus, in the course of development of truth the aspect of
continuity leads the truth closer and closer to absolute truth. And thus truth not only changes it
develops too. But Shibdas Ghosh, one-sidedly talks only about the aspect of change of truth with the
change in circumstances and leaves out of account the aspect of the continuity and development of
truth from lower to higher. We must always keep in mind that the terms ‗Change‘ and
‗Development‘ have different connotations in dialectics; truth does not only change it develops too.
Truth develops through the dialectics of continuity and discontinuity; absolute and relative. The
higher truth can only be achieved by way of overcoming the limitation or relative aspect of the lower
truth. Expressing the same Lenin writes:

―Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is
compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new
grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are
relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge.‖ (Materialism and Empirio-
criticism, chapter II, section- 5, bold added)

Here the grain of absolute truth means any single element of truth contained in the whole
knowledge which cannot be falsified or overthrown or refuted by the subsequent development of
science or circumstances. If you hold that there are no elements of permanent truth in our
knowledge which are irrefutable or which will never be falsified by subsequent development of
science or circumstances then you are a relativist because you then absolutise the relativity of
knowledge. Such position would be meaning that our todays‘ truth is wholly relative or subjective
and is bound to be proved as error in the future circumstances. Some examples of absolute truths
have also been given by Shibdas Ghosh himself. Shibdas Ghosh has recognised some tenets of
science and Marxism as to be so basic that they cannot get changed or done away with in the name
of development of science. He writes:
―…But we must keep it in mind that there are some fundamentals or basic tenants in science and
Marxism which cannot be done away with. In science, these have been accepted as the fundamentals
on the basis of investigation, experimentation and experience for a long time. That matter is both
mass and energy, and even particles of matter, however small, exists in space and time and any

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matter is subject to changes all the time and such changes are law-governed—no student of science
can deny these. If anybody seeks to deny these fundamentals on any ground, or even in the name of
development of science we must say that such thinking goes against science and nothing to do with
science.‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, p-107-108, vol. 2)

Thus as per the understanding of Shibdas Ghosh four fundamentals or tenets of science and
Marxism can never be falsified. They will always remain true. They were true in the past and they
will be true in the future hence absolute and eternal because these four truths cannot be changed or
done away with on any ground even in the name of development of science. And these everlasting or
eternal four truths are as under:

(i) Matter is both mass and energy

(ii) And even particles of matter, however small, exists in space and time

(iii) And any matter is subject to changes all the time

(iv) And such changes are law-governed—no student of science can deny these.

So if according to Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought ‗there are some fundamentals or basic tenants in
science and Marxism which cannot be done away with… even in the name of development of
science‘, then are these truths not eternal? Because according to him these truths are true today and
their truthfulness cannot be refuted or done away with in future even in the name of development of
science. I had also given some such examples of truth in my comments which are true today and
which will only be enriched and confirmed more and more in future and can never be demolished in
future by any amount of development of science or by any amount of change in circumstances. But
these absolute truths have been simply dismissed saying that these truths are just expression of facts
and can‘t be treated as absolute truths. A few of them are as follows:

(a) Matter and motion are un-creatable.

(b) Matter and motion are inseparable.
(c) Motion is the mode of existence of matter.
(d) Contradiction is the cause of motion in matter.
(e) Matter has no origin and no end.
(f) Matter exists by itself. etc. etc.
Firstly, Can the truth contained in the above statements from (a) to (f) get falsified with the change
of circumstances in any future? If you say not then they are eternal truths and if you say yes then you
are an idealist. Secondly these truths cannot be termed as mere expression of facts like such and such
person died on such and such date, because they are the achievements of thousands of years of
struggle of mankind against nature. Had these truths been just a simple expression of facts like one
pointed out above then all these truths would not have been under debate or dispute. If these truths
are just simple expressions of facts then why the Idealists and the bourgeois ideologues all over the
world refute them day and night with full force? or contestable at all. Will the law of conservation of
mass and energy get falsified in any future? If not, then certainly the law of conservation of mass and
energy is an eternal and absolute truth. Engels describes a grain of absolute truth as follows: ―…that
under the same conditions everywhere the same must take place, at a distance to the right or the left
of us that is a million, million times as great as the distance from the earth to the sun.‖ (Dialectics of
Nature, chapter-Dialectics, p, 239)

Point No. 3

According to Shibdas Ghosh three principles of dialectics are also eternal

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 Apart from these above mentioned four basic tenets of science and Marxism Shibdas Ghosh has
also unknowingly recognised the three principles of dialectics to be eternal. Shibdas Ghosh has
subjectively differentiated between laws and principles. He states that the concept law always refers
to some particular law which appears and disappears but when we refer to a general law it means
principle. So according to Shibdas Ghosh unlike a particular law the principle never appears and
disappears. And the general laws which according to Shibdas Ghosh should be called principles ever
remain in existence hence eternal. The relevant passage from Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought is as follows:

―Now I want to discuss whether the principle of unity of opposites can be described as the basic
law of dialectics. In my opinion, ‗principle‘ should not be considered synonymous with ‗basic law‘—
because, sometimes that creates hindrance to grasping a phenomenon correctly. However, as for
myself and our Central Committee we do not find it anything very objectionable. We think if
correctly understood there is nothing to object to when we speak of a law, since we mean by it a
particular law. When the term „law‟ is used to connote a general law, it implies a principle. Other than this, a
law always means a particular law which appears and disappears, comes into being and goes out of being. That
is, in a particular situation, a particular law becomes operative in accordance with the specific
situation and, in the same way, when, in course of development, a completely new situation arises,
the old law becomes inadequate and can no longer govern the new situation; it becomes invalid,
ineffective, and a new law in conformity with the new situation comes into being and governs it…‖
(9th Congress of CPC, SW-1, Page 398-399, Italics added)

Point No. 4

Shibdas Ghosh‘s Concept of General Truth is Without the Corresponding General Material
Process:

Shibdas Ghosh describing the concept of general truth writes:

―… Today many Marxists and communists even do not realize that according to the dialectical
materialist method of analysis the general truth established through generalization of particular
truths of science is in reality a particular category of understanding of that general truth in a given
condition. As a result, they consider these general truths of science and the concepts of dialectical
materialism as absolute truths. For example, the general truths deduced by dialectical materialism—
like ‗things in themselves‘, ‗matter is a philosophical category‘, ‗existence of objective reality
independently of consciousness‘, ‗contradiction within contradiction‘, etc…‖(Cultural Movement
and Our Tasks, SW-2, 1992 ed. Page 325, Bold added)
By a careful reading of the above passage of Shibdas Ghosh one can easily understand that
according to the ‗dialectical materialist method‘ of Shibdas Ghosh the general truth are just
established through generalization of particular truths of science. Question arises as to what is the
materialistic ground which permits a dialectician to coordinate and generalize the particular truths of
science? The only basis of generalizing the particular truths of science is nothing but the
generalization of the particular material processes themselves in nature to constitute a general
coherent whole or a general uninterrupted real material process, governed by an uninterrupted
general motion. But Shibdas Ghosh nowhere in his writings mentions about any general material
process and corresponding general motion. The general principles of dialectics according to Shibdas
Ghosh do not correspond to any real general motion rather they are established only through the
generalization of the particular truths of particular processes, which is nothing but idealism i.e.
general principles without general motion. In the above given passage when Shibdas Ghosh talks
about matter and describes it as ‗matter is a philosophical category‘ then he only means an empty
generalization of particular forms of matter because Shibdas Ghosh does not recognize any entity to
be ‗matter as such‘. As has already been shown, Shibdas Ghosh does not even recognize matter as
philosophical category to be any material entity. He has subjectively supplied, ―not-matter‖ as a new
basis for viewing matter as philosophical category. So, the question is that, without the existence of

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real general matter or ‗matter as such‘ how can there be any general motion and the corresponding
real general material process of the material world?

Point No. 5

Matter and its Laws of Motion are Eternal

(The Laws of Uninterrupted General Process)

The general laws of dialectics, which Shibdas Ghosh term as principles, are nothing but the
general laws of eternal motion of matter as such and not of any particular form of matter. But
Shibdas Ghosh neither understands what matter is as such nor what motion is as such. And when
Engels holds matter and its laws of motion to be eternal, he only keeps in mind matter as such
associated with its motion i.e. motion as such. The basic laws of dialectics which Shibdas Ghosh
term as principles are nothing but the general laws of motion as such. Now it will be appropriate to
repeat here Engels‘ quotation from his Dialectics of Nature which is as follows:

―It is an eternal cycle in which matter moves… a cycle in which every finite mode of existence of
matter, whether it be sun or nebular vapour, single animal or genus of animal, chemical combination
or dissociation, is equally transient, and wherein nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally
moving matter and the laws according to which it moves and changes...we have the certainty that
matter remains eternally the same in all its transformation, that none of its attribute can ever be
lost…‖ (Introduction to Dialectics of Nature)

Marx and Engels in their joint work Communist Manifesto have acknowledged laws of nature as
eternal. They write as follows:

―The selfish misconception that induces you (the bourgeoisie—S.S.) to transform into eternal
laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and
form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this
misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the
case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden
to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.‖(Communist Manifesto, Chapter-2,
bold added)

What are these ‗eternal laws of nature‘? They are the laws of eternal motion of matter.

Point No. 6

More on Eternal Truth

Now let me discuss one more quotation cited by Com. A.M. which is very simple to understand but
for Com. A.M. is very hard, owing to his one-sidedness inherited from Shibdas Ghosh. Com. A.M.
writes:

―Let me remind you an interesting fact. Bogdanov complained that Marxists were dogmatic when
they used such static concept as matter as eternal truth. Lenin rebuffed: ‗If the world is eternally
moving and developing matter (as the Marxists think), reflected by the developing human
consciousness, what is there ―static‖ here?‘ [Op. Cit.; Chapter 2, Section 5]‖ (page-14)

Actually matter is never static at all. When we say that matter is eternal then it only means that its
mode of existence is itself eternal motion as opposed to transient motion or any particular form of
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motion. Now the difficulty with Com. A.M. is that he had been so deeply engrossed in Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought that he cannot even think that any eternally moving entity if eternally remains the
same can be termed to be eternal. A metaphysical mind can only conceive any entity to be eternal if
that entity remains eternally in a static mode of existence. That is why Bogdanov also having the
same kind of metaphysical mind accused the Marxists of being dogmatists because of their
recognition of matter being eternal. According to Bogdanov eternal means static but in dialectics the
concept eternal in relation to matter only means that matter remains eternally the same in its eternal
motion. That is why Lenin in his reply rebuffed Bogdanov replying that when matter is eternally in
motion what is there to be static here? Bogdanov was not a dialectician so he was justified to view
any entity as eternal to be in static mode of existence only, but if we have some sense of dialectics
then we must have to renounce the Bogdanov‘s way of thinking, i.e. the metaphysical way of
thinking. According to dialectical way of thinking any entity which exists in the eternal mode of
motion then that entity is itself viewed as in eternal mode of existence. If the motion of any thing is
transient then the thing is short lived and said to be in the transient mode of existence but if an entity
like matter is in eternal mode of existence then it becomes ever lasting and its duration becomes
eternal because of its eternal mode of motion. It is a very minor and simple thing to be understood
but becomes much difficult for a metaphysical mind to be grasped.

The second thing is that Com. A.M. has tried here to show that Lenin rebuffed Bogdanov, with a
view to deny the recognition of eternal truth by the Marxists. No, it is not the case at all. So it has
become necessary to be clarified here that Lenin did not do that. Engels in his Anti-Duhring has given
an example of eternal truth in the historical sciences saying that ―Napoleon died on May 5, 1821‖.
Citing this example of Engels of eternal truth, Bogdanov charged Engels to be a victim of eclecticism
and in return Lenin rebuffing Bogdanov and defending Engels gave the definition or criterion of
eternal truth. Lenin writes:

―…If you cannot assert that the proposition ‗Napoleon died on May 5, 1821‘ is false or inexact,
you acknowledge that it is true. If you do not assert that it may be refuted in the future, you
acknowledge this truth to be eternal.‖(Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Chapter 2, Section 5)

For the illustration of this definition of eternal truth given by Lenin I am giving an example here
which is as follows: ‗cause of motion of matter is its internal contradiction‘. If you acknowledge that
this given proposition is true and do not assert that it may be refuted in future then you acknowledge
this truth to be eternal. And many more such examples regarding the eternal truths can be given.

Point No. 7
Comrade A.M. Admits Properties of Matter are Eternal
On what ground Com. Ashoke Mukherjee admits that matter possesses some such properties which
never get lost or are everlasting or in other words eternal when he writes in his 36-page document as
follows?
―Since matter can neither be created nor destroyed, no attribute of matter can get lost ever in this
material world—mass, energy, density, elasticity, viscosity, inertia, chemical affinity, electrical
polarity, momentum, and so on. They are merely transformed into different forms and/or transferred
to one another.‖ (Page-14, bold added)

Can Com. Ashoke Mukherjee tell us that the proposition: ―no attribute of matter can get lost ever‖
refers to which particular form of matter? Com. A.M. will not be able to reply to this question
because the said proposition refers to no single particular form of matter but it only refers to matter as
such which resides within its all particular forms. It refers to the eternal aspect of matter which
resides within all particular transient and relative forms. Without matter being eternal no attribute of

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it can be everlasting. In this regard one more passage from Com. A.M.‘s document is also relevant,
which is as follows:

―Moreover, we have to remember that in the large-scale the universality of the material world is
extended in both space and time, and not only in space, as Comrade Shyam Sundarji thought.‖
(Section II, Sub Section [F])

If the material world is universal in space and time then the motion and properties of the material
world must also be universal in space and time and the true reflection in the human mind, of the laws
of motion of universe, must also be universal in space and time. And being a materialist, if I
acknowledge that matter is universal; motion of matter is universal; laws of motion of matter are
universal, then it is tantamount to acknowledge that matter and its laws of motion are eternal. Apart
from this if matter is universal in space and time then there must be its corresponding reflection in
human mind meaning thereby that there must be the corresponding truth equally universal in space
and time. Universal Truth in space and time must be the same everywhere for all times. But Shibdas
Ghosh admits no universal truth; for him truth is only particular, concrete and relative. He asserts:

―…Now, be it a minute particle of matter or be it an event, it exists means it exists in the midst of
concrete situation. So, when the existence of matter is concrete and particular, truth too is bound to
be concrete truth, particular truth…‖ (Marxism and Dialectical Materialism, SW-2, page 105-106,
edition 1992).

Point No. 8

Criticism by Comrade A.M. of those who have acknowledged absolute truth

Marx, Engels and Lenin as discussed above all recognise the dialectical relationship between
absolute and relative and none of ‗John Lewis, Howard Selsam, Maurice Cornforth, Ovshi Yakhot,
V. Gott, and so on‘ has challenged or refuted Marx, Engels and Lenin in this respect. But Com.
Ashoke Mukherjee in his document has blamed them of cowardice. He writes:

―The problem is that, when we go through other author‘s works on Marxist philosophy (John
Lewis, Howard Selsam, Maurice Cornforth, Ovshi Yakhot, V. Gott, and so on), an interesting
feature is quite palpably discernible. Although these authors seemed to be very much inclined to
abrogate absolute truths in the fields of Marxist epistemology for all practical purposes [see citations
extracted from their works in the Appendix], they could not do so but acknowledge such truths only
because they could not ultimately dare to go beyond the contours of Lenin‘s above-cited observations
on the subject. Being eager somehow to save Lenin‘s formulations more than to frankly utter the
truth, they have been busy to show the existence of absolute truth side by side relative truths. But
in all cases they referred to some most general, universal, totally irrefutable, objective facts and
cognitive processes as the vague and distant samples of absolute truths. And whenever they
referred to actual moments of knowledge of facts, they came round to relative truths, the truths
proper. With some courage hindsight and foresight derived from Lenin himself, they could have
been able to accomplish this job and set a good example before the communist movement.‖ (Section
II, sub section [F])
The basis of this kind of criticism of those who have acknowledged the existence of absolute truth
is nothing but the strong prejudices in favour of Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought.Like Shibdas Ghosh Com.
A.M. is also unable to conceive and comprehend the objective dialectical interconnection between
absolute and relative truth. He writes:
―Naturally, if we choose to apply this polarity in the concepts of absolute and relative truths, we
have to decide where we intend to place them—together within in the same body of a cognitive
result, or in separation in different results of cognition. If we define matter in general (as a
philosophical category) as the example of an absolute truth, and place truths relating to specific
forms of matter as examples of relative truths, the philosophical problem is: which particular relative
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truth is the opposite of the absolute truth thereby constituting a unity of opposites. On the other
hand, if we apply the polarity in the same cognitive result, then the same matter or the material
world has to be viewed as a unity of an absolute and a relative truth (as opposites), i.e., in some
respect it is absolute, in certain other respect it is relative.‖ (Ibid, bold added)
The fundamental problem with Comrade A.M. is that he views matter as philosophical category
to be motionless or dead i.e., matter without motion; because, Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought does not
acknowledge the absolute and eternal aspect of motion of matter. When Shibdas Ghosh defines
matter and its motion as to be ‗particular, concrete and relative‘ and throws away the absolute aspect
of matter and its motion then the dialectical unity of absolute and relative of the material world gets
disappeared. In fact, the material world itself is absolute in one respect and relative in other. All
particular processes of the material world are relative. They come into being and pass away being
governed by respective relative particular motions; they exist in some specific conditions. But the
general material process or the uninterrupted ultimate process known as universe is unconditional,
absolute and eternal being governed by the eternal and absolute motion. For Com. Ashoke
Mukherjee the required recognition of the material world itself as to be viewed absolute in one
respect and relative in another has become a tangle and he searches for the way out of escaping from
this tangle. But there is no need to find any escape route. The world is objectively absolute in one
respect and relative in another and these two contradictory aspects of the material world i.e. absolute
and relative are reflected in the truth: Matter is ever-changing but it ever remains the same. Com.
Ashoke Mukherjee finds the first escape route in the following way:
―…First we have to keep in mind that when we approach the material world just as such with no
regard to the question of its development, it only exists; we simply acknowledge this existence as a
fact and define it as a philosophical category. We do not look for any unity of opposites in it.‖(Ibid)
When we go through above passage it becomes clear that the ground of metaphysical or non-
dialectical approach of Com. A.M. is embedded in his inert and motionless conception of matter as a
philosophical category. He can conceive matter as a philosophical category without any motion.
Shibdas Ghosh‘s thought being completely devoid of power of abstraction is incapable of making
abstraction of matter and its motion simultaneously or jointly and owing to this incapability it can
only view matter as philosophical category without motion. The basic reason is that in Shibdas
Ghosh‘s thought motion of matter has not been recognised to be absolute which cannot be
disregarded as some specific or particular property. The question is if motion is the mode of existence
of matter then how can matter as a philosophical category be viewed without any motion? Even then
Com. A.M. finds the escape route through the philosophical category viewed by him totally inert as
discussed above. He describes the second escape route as follows:
―Secondly, however, when we have to deal with the question of our idea about the development of the
material world, we must consider it to be a unity of opposite of absolute and relative truths. But this
unity is internal with respect to the world of reality and hence a unity of absolute and relative truths.‖
(Ibid)

No doubt the unity of absolute and relative aspects of the material world is internal and the same is
reflected in subjective dialectics, in consciousness. The internal and objective unity of opposites of
absolute and relative aspects of the material world is certainly reflected in human knowledge. Human
knowledge does contain the aspect of absolute truth. Human knowledge in its totality is relative and
will always remain relative but this relative human knowledge does contain grains of absolute truth
i.e. such truths which cannot be falsified refuted demolished or overthrown in future as a result of
development of science. Shibdas Ghosh has also listed some such truths as has been shown above.

Point No. 9

The absoluteness of the material reality

Com. A.M. further writes:

―The absoluteness of the material reality is its potential knowability, perfect objectivity and total
universality and nothing else [note Mao‘s expression also above quoted with emphasis], which refers
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more to a fact than to a moment of knowledge, that is, truth. One may call it, at best, within certain
limits of cognition, an absolute element, but not absolute truth.‖ (Ibid, bold original)

It is quite vague. The absoluteness of the material reality lies in its continuous or uninterrupted
process.

―…so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of
absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final,
absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can
endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless
ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the
mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it
recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and
circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary
character is absolute—the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits.‖(Ludwig Feuerbach, bold
added)

Only the uninterrupted process is absolute, universal, eternal and infinite; because Its motion is
continuous, absolute, universal and eternal. The laws of its motion are also absolute, universal and
eternal. That is why referring to J.Dietzgen Lenin writes:

―Hence, we can know nature and her parts only relatively; since even a part though only a
relation of nature, possesses nevertheless the nature of the absolute, the nature of nature as a
whole…which cannot be exhausted by knowledge…How then, do we know that behind the
phenomenon of nature, behind the relative truths, there is a universal unlimited, absolute nature
which does not reveal itself to man completely?...‖ (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, chapter II,
section 5, emphasis added)

The ―universal unlimited, absolute nature‖ as has been mentioned in the above quotation by Lenin
refers nothing to but the ―uninterrupted process‖ of nature as has been mentioned by Engels in the
quotation given earlier from Ludwig Feuerbach.

―… In fact all real, exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought
from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the
infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory. The form of universality, however, is the form of
self-completeness, hence of infinity; it is the comprehension of many finites in the infinite. … Hence
when Nageli says that the finite is made impossible to understand by not desiring to investigate
merely this finite, but instead adding something eternal to it, then he denies either the possibility of
knowing the laws of nature or their eternal character. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge
of the eternal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute.‖ (Dialectics of Nature, page 234, bold
added)

The absoluteness of the material reality is based upon the uninterrupted general material process
as has been discussed before and unless we recognise the uninterrupted process of the material world
to be absolute and eternal we cannot understand the dialectical relationship of absolute and relative
truth. Shibdas Ghosh writes:

―…Dialectics teaches us to study the contradiction of the particular with the general. The general
programme of the world proletarian revolution, as every serious communist knows, gives the general
guiding principles of world proletarian revolution, which is to be applied in different countries
creatively, according to the objective and concrete conditions prevailing in the countries…‖ (Call of
the Hour, SW-2, Page 91, bold added)
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 The question is has Shibdas Ghosh discussed anywhere the contradiction of particular with the
general in the context of the material world? Shibdas Ghosh has everywhere defined matter and its
truth as to be particular, concrete and relative but he nowhere taken into consideration that all the
particular, concrete and relative forms or processes of the material world are parts of the general
whole which is an uninterrupted material process as opposed to its all particular processes which are
not uninterrupted. Shibdas Ghosh nowhere recognised the general or universal motion which is
absolute and eternal as opposed to particular relative motions. In fact, as I have shown in the very
beginning Shibdas Ghosh has replaced general matter with ―not-matter‖ and consequently the
dialectical relationship of general and particular, in context of material world as a whole, goes to the
winds. So Com. Ashoke Mukherjee can only come to know the absolute and relative aspects of the
material world only when he takes into account both the aspects of the material world namely
particular and general as real material aspects.

Point No. 10

Relative and Absolute Aspects

Comrade A.M. writes:

―As regards the absolute form, we can theorize and conceptualize but can hardly specify and
define it. What we can define, identify and specify is the relative aspect of the material world, which
is related with its ever changing character, that is, with the fact that at every moment it is different
from what it was just earlier. This change and motion refer not only to the individual parts of the
universe, the separate forms of mater within the universe, but also to the universe as a whole.‖
(Section II, Sub section [F])
No doubt both the material world itself and its parts are ever changing but there is a sharp
distinction between the two. In the process of change no part of the material world remains itself
forever. It necessarily changes into another. Every particular part in the process of change exists only
between the nodal points but the material world as a whole ever remains itself. The universe though
it goes on continuously changing and it is relative in this sense because of its particularities but it ever
remains universe itself because of its absolute and eternal aspect. Why the universe like its parts does
not transform into any other? It is only because the motion of the universe as a whole is itself
absolute and eternal. The particular motion of every particular part necessarily comes to an end but
the motion of the universe never comes to an end and has no beginning either. The duration of
motion of every particular part determines the life or duration of that part. Likewise the duration of
motion of the universe as a whole determines the life or duration of the universe as a whole. The
duration of the uninterrupted material process of the material world as a whole is eternal because the
duration of its motion is itself eternal. That is why the universe is ever changing and ever remains the
same. That is why we call the world as eternally moving matter which means matter in eternal
motion. No particular form of matter is in eternal motion and that is why they appear and disappear
but the material world as a whole being in eternal motion never appears and disappears. It is for this
reason Engels had stated that nothing is eternal except matter and its laws of motion.

Point No. 11

Idealism within Marxism of Shibdas Ghosh:

Com. Ashoke Mukherjee in his document further raises a question. He writes:

―Just as a Marxist cannot be both a materialist and an idealist and cannot have in his/her
thinking process both the metaphysical and the dialectical modes of thinking but should consciously
entertain only one (while, although unawares, both may work in his/her thinking process),
similarly, he or she should select in his/her conscious mind from among the given pairs of opposed
categories regarding truths.‖ (Section II, Sub-section [F], bold added)
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 The answer of the question raised by Com. A.M. has also been given in brackets to which I have
added bold, though he has formed the dialectical unity of being a Marxist and an idealist at the same
time on the basis of conscious and unconscious state of mind. The question is: Can any thinker be
completely free from unconscious state of mind or state of being unaware? Let me give a concrete
example of Shibdas Ghosh ‗the greatest Marxist of post-Lenin era‘ to show how a Marxist and an
idealist are united together. At one place, Shibdas Ghosh accusing Sartre of being idealist writes:
―…Sartre, like Feuerbach failed to realise the objective process of emergence of idea from matter.
So, even while accepting dialectical materialism as the only correct philosophy Sartre had been
following the bourgeois idealist outlook and thinking, opposed to dialectical materialist outlook and
thinking, and was unable to realise the objective process through which idea developed form matter
itself as also the dialectical interrelation between matter and idea. And thus it was not possible for
him to realise that idea was a product of matter,…‖ (Cultural Movement and Our Tasks, SW-2, page
320-21)
But see what Shibdas Ghosh himself is when he writes at another place about the emergence of
idea:
―…There was a time when man was not organized in society even. Like other animals, primitive man of
the jungle was also completely slave to the natural laws. Little difference was there between man and
animal then. The unique power of thinking which man alone possesses by virtue of his brain has
made him distinctly different from the animal, So he is capable of getting to know and overcoming
the forces of nature and environment and solving the problem confronting life. The primitive man at
that very early stage, even with whatever little thinking power he possessed, realized that it was futile
to try to live alone; he could not survive that way. Braving all the odds of nature for bare existence,
collective living was a must. The first element of consciousness, even at its budding, which dawned
on man with his urge for better living and engaged him in the struggle for existence against the
hostile forces of nature surrounding him was this: We must unite to survive, we cannot live alone; we will
have to struggle unitedly, and collectively, we will have to try to survive. This was the first element of
consciousness in human civilization. This was the basic consciousness underlying the human civilization. On this
consciousness human society was built and man became a social being. That we are no more savage, we are social
being – at its root lies the realization that we cannot live alone, and collectively we have to survive, struggling
collectively against forces of nature. And through this collective struggle we can bring under control the forces of
nature and use them for better living. The primitive man came to learn this through his practical experience.‖
(Marxism and Development of Human Society, SW-2, page 4, Italics added)

At one more place Shibdas Ghosh reaffirms that the formation of society began on the basis of the
first element of consciousness:

―…From that point of view, it must be admitted that man‘s first consciousness gained through
experience was that he could not live alone. So, it can be said that the first consciousness of man was
that they would have to struggle unitedly for existence. In this way human beings got united and
became social beings. Many animals, too, live together, but they could not give rise to society
because they did not have the level of consciousness, nor could they ever have it.‖ (On Theory of
Knowledge, Vol. IV, page 184)

So the formation of society according to Shibdas Ghosh is based on man‘s first element of
consciousness that ‗he could not live alone‘ is completely rubbish and sheer idealism, and totally
against the science of historical materialism. According to the basic tenet of historical materialism
man‘s consciousness arose in the process of production and not before it when he was ‗wandering
alone‘. The adherents of Shibdas Ghosh should learn that consciousness without language and
language without consciousness cannot exist and language arose in the process of production. So,
now I ask Com. Ashoke Mukherjee: Is Shibdas Ghosh not an idealist-Marxist?

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 APPENDIX

ATTITUDE TOWARDS MARXIST-CLASSICS

I have studied this 36-page document and I strongly feel that the 36-page document does not
recognise or acknowledge any of the authorities on the issues under debate. The attitude towards
Marxist-Classics is not what it should be. Even the celebrated work of Engels namely Dialectics of
Nature has been adjudged to be unreliable by Com. A.M. and what is dialectical and what is
metaphysical is solely adjudged and decided by Com. A.M. himself. Even Marx, Engels and Lenin
have not been treated as authorities. A sample in this regard is as follows:

―Marx Engels Lenin (and hence Mao) used the phrase ‗absolute truth‘ mostly in the
dialectical sense, i.e., in the objective and universal sense. Most of the citations given by Shyam
Sundarji also indicate that. And, I am sure, a detailed study would confirm that more elaborately.
But there are a few instances where they also used it in the metaphysical sense, may be
inadvertently, and therefore these are not supportable.‖(Page-1, point no.4, bold added)

Thus, Com. A.M. does not bind himself to any of the texts contained in any Marxist
classics. Shibdas Ghosh also did the same thing. Read what Com. Ashoke Mukherjee himself writes
in the very beginning of his document:

―Ghosh rarely studied Marxist classics in his later part of life, and hardly ever made the classics the
basis of his deliberations. He spoke mostly from GK point of view and always tried to achieve much
of simplification. His audience were also mostly satisfied with that. This explains the lack of
correspondence between his words and the contents of the classics.‖ (Point no. 1, section I)

―I also differ with Ghosh on his treatment of dialectics and Hegel. His criticism of Hegel is based
more on a common-sense viewpoint than on an informed reading, which is hardly justified. But even
then I totally agree with him that there is no such thing as an absolute truth, in the metaphysical
sense of the term.‖(Point no. 2)

And to carry forward the task of Shibdas Ghosh Com. A.M., also declares himself to be totally free
from the letters of the Marxist Classics. He declares:

―… in respect of understanding of all these matters, we can hardly confine ourselves within the
texts and concepts of the Marxist classics alone. Those are where we start from, not where we end
up. We have to go forward and beyond them as and wherever necessary.‖ (Section II, p.24, emphasis
original)

So, Com. A.M. fully, reserves his right to discard any of the teachings laid down in the Marxist
classics regarding matter and its truth wherever he himself deems to be necessary and is not bound at
all to the ‗concepts given in Marxist classics alone‘. Com. A.M. holds John Lewis, Howard Selsam,
Maurice Cornforth, Ovshi Yakhot, V. Gott etc. as more profound and more reliable in the
understanding of materialist dialectics than its founders Marx and Engels (read at his page 24-25,
section II). According to Com. A.M., Shibdas Ghosh had finally took up the challenge to set the
concepts of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics right, but he also could not complete the
task and now this historic challenge has fallen upon the shoulders of Com. A.M. He Resolves:
―We acknowledge with humility and sorrow that Comrade Shibdas Ghosh had started the
job well, but unfortunately, in a wrong manner with a personalized style, and because of his long-
pursued wrong method left it unfinished in the midway. It is high time that we locate the errors at
various points of history and finish the job through to the end.‖ (Section II, sub section [F])

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 Defend Marxism—Fight Dogmatism--Fight Revisionism
So, it is emphatically clear that Com. A.M. has taken on his shoulders the responsibility and
mission of Shibdas Ghosh to take it to its ‗logical culmination‘. But sadly, the dialectics displayed
and put forward by Com. A.M. in his 36-page document is nothing but the aggravated form of the
metaphysics of Shibdas Ghosh. I do not mean that dialectical materialism needs no development. It
does need, but safeguarding its foundation. If in the name of development of dialectical materialism
one starts attacking its very foundations then what should we do? Let us read what Lenin writes
about both these above stated aspects namely aspect of development and that of safeguarding
Marxism. Lenin writes:

―We do not regard Marx‘s theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are
convinced that it has only laid the foundation stone of the science which socialists must develop in all
directions if they wish to keep pace with life.‖(Our Programme, Vol.4, p. 211-12)
Lenin is talking here about the development of the Marxist science but he also refers here to the
foundation stone of the science which means that there are some basic tenets of the Marxist science
and which cannot be uprooted or done away with in the name of the development of this science.
Lenin himself has given a caution in this regard as follows:
―…to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to
strengthen bourgeois ideology.‖ (What Is To Be Done?, vol.5, p.384)

No doubt the genuine Marxist have to fight against dogmatism and have to develop the Marxist
science but they must also beware of revisionism, otherwise in the name of fighting dogmatism the
basic tenets of materialist dialectics would get uprooted. Mao-Tse-Tung has also given us a very clear
and balanced teaching in this regard as follows:

―For a long time now people have been levelling a lot of criticism at dogmatism. That is as it
should be. But they often neglect to criticise revisionism. Both dogmatism and revisionism run
counter to Marxism. Marxism must certainly advance; it must develop along with the development
of practice and cannot stand still. It would become lifeless if it remained stagnant and stereotyped.
However, the basic principles of Marxism must never be violated, or otherwise mistakes will be
made. It is dogmatism to approach Marxism from a metaphysical point of view and to regard it as
something rigid. It is revisionism to negate the basic principles of Marxism and to negate its universal
truth. Revisionism is one form of bourgeois ideology…‖ (Mao-Tse-Tung, Speech At The Chinese
Communist Party‘s National Conference On Propaganda Work, March 12, 1957)

With this I end this document expressing my gratitude especially to Comrade Ashoke
Mukherjee who gave birth to this serious debate. I have high regards for Shibdas Ghosh and for
Comrade Ashoke Mukherjee and I hope that I will be forgiven for my harsh criticism of Shibdas
Ghosh‘s dialectics and harsh words if any towards Comrade Ashoke Mukherjee. I also hope that all
comrades will take the debate seriously and would carry it forward to its logical culmination in the
interest of revolution. Thanking you all.

June 7, 2016 Comradely Yours

Shyam Sunder

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