MODERN HISTORY

OF
CHINA (1840-1949)
MODERN HISTORY
OF
CHINA (1840-1949)
Edited by :
K. T. & Sarao

R & R PUBLISHERS New Delhi

Published by:
R & R PUBLISHERS
221, Rama Market, Pitam Pura,
New Delhi-110034
Phone : 7025503
E-mail : rrpublishers@hotmail.com.
First Edition 1999
© K. T. S. Sarao
(No part of this publication can be reproduced in any form or by any means without the
prior written permission of the author and the publishers)
ISBN-81 -87116-10-2
Price : Rs. 120/-
Laser Typeset by:
Macnid Software Services 221, Rama Market, Pitam Pura Delhi - 110034, Phone:
7025503
K.T.S. SARAO
PhD (DU); PhD(Cantab); FRAS(London)
Off: Head, Deptt. of Buddhist Studies University of Delhi, Delhi-110 007
Res: B-194, MP Enclave, Opp. Chander Lok, Pitam Pura Delhi- 110 034
Tel: Res: 7189084
off: 7257725/Extn218
E-mail: ktssarao@hotmail.com

PREFACE
The idea of bringing out an edited text book in Hindi on the Modern History of China,
was mooted more than a decade ago. But unfortunately not many people took any interest
in it. Hardly anybody was prepared to write in Hindi! Finally, I was asked by some
friends to do the job. This was towards the beginning of academic session 1990-91.
About thirty teachers teaching Far Eastern history in various colleges were contacted.
Most of whom agreed to write chapters for the book, but only in English. Only two or
three were prepared to supply the Hindi version of their chapters. Unfortunately even
these commitments were not kept by most. Of the original contributors only five
honoured the promise to submit their chapters. Others simply played a game of hide and
seek till I gave up. This resulted in
terrible time losses apart from the personal difficulty which I had to face in chasing
around some of them. So new contributors and then still more contributors had to be
found. In the end it was felt that promises are basically made to be broken. Two rears
were wasted only in collecting chapters written in English. Sonic of the chapters were
utterly awful and had to be dropped, and still some of the chapters are bad and perhaps
shall have to be dropped in the next edition.

After the material was collected from different contributors, began the work of getting the
chapters translated into Hindi. With the exception of six contributors, others failed to
supply the Hindi translation. Of these six translated chapters, the translation of
only two contributors was acceptable. The translation supplied by other contributors had
to be discarded as careless and nonsensical. No funds were available for getting the
material translated from an expert. Thus, the only way out was that I should
translate the chapters all by myself. Honestly, my Hindi is quite bad. it being my fourth
language. I have taken help from friends, especially my wife Sunita. But still it goes
without saying that there are too many errors. This edition is only a limited one with
300 copies published out of which 200 shall be passed around as complimentary and for
suggestions and comments for improvement. .
To say the least, this book suffers from various shortcomings. Some chapters are
substandard and shall have to be either seriously revised or dropped altogether. Further,
the translation is quite faulty despite my best efforts. I shall be much obliged if you could
please give suggestions for improvement so that a proper usable edition could be brought
out. Critical comments shall be gratefully acknowledged.

Three precious years have been basically wasted in bringing this limited edition out. In
the meanwhile, I have shifted from KM. College to the Department of Buddhist Studies.
There were one or two other very important reasons for-the delay. Most of the
contributors had given the older versions of Chinese proper names. This task was far
more arduous than I thought. It took nearly six months to finalise a table listing different
names with both the versions. A list of new and old spellings of most of the common
names and terms has been provided in the beginning of the book. This was important for
the sake of the users because regretfully it was realised that though it has been many
years since the Chinese names and terms were given proper Romanised spellings, yet
with the exception of a couple of contributors, others had not cared to make themselves
familiar with such changes. Of course, it would have been much too much to expect that
all know that KMT (Kuomintang) could perhaps now be GMD (Guomindang), that
Chinese know Sun Yatsen as Sun Zhong Shan, Chiang Kai-shek as Jiang Jie Shi,
Empress Tz 'u-hsi as Empress Cixi and so on and so forth.
Though, some minor topics in the shape of appendices have been included, there have
been some others, which with some regret, had to be excluded. I must, however, make
one thing quite clear. This book is not and cannot aspire to be a work of scholarship even
in the vaguest sense. No such claims have been made that it is a monograph. It is only a
text-book for B.A. (Hons) students.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Prof (Ms) P Bhatia, the Head of
the Department of History for at least three things. First, for resurrecting the idea of doing
something about the want of a text-book on the Far Eastern History, both in Hindi and
English. Second, making sure that it finally sees the light of the day. Third and above all,
her willingness to help. In this sense major portion of the credit should go to her.
However, needless to say, the errors and fallacies that may have perpetrated this text are
largely mine, and perhaps to an extent that of the individual contributors.

Three others persons without whose help it would have been impossible to complete this
task are my wife Sunita, Dr R.K. Rana (Dept of Buddhist Studies) and Ashwini Shankar
(Deshbandhu College). Their contribution has been simply overwhelming, to say the
least. Of course, I shall be failing in my duty, if I do not record my gratitude to those
colleagues of mine, who have contributed their chapters to this book. Some of my friends
particularly Sharmila Srivastaya (Hans Raj College),
Archana Ojha (Kamla Nehru College), Neeraj Kumar Singh (Maharaja Aggarsen
College, Dept of History), Dr Vijaya Laxmi Singh (Sri Aurobindo College), Dr Anita
Narain (Mata Sundri College), Dr Mani Bhushan (Dayal Singh College), Surendra Singh
Chaw I a (B.R. Ambedkar College), Tarika Uberoi (Hindu College), Shalini Singhal
(Delhi College of Arts) Shalini Saksena, (C.H.M. College), Ashwini Shankar
(Deshbandhu Gupta College), S. K. Srivastava (Hans Raj College), Poonam Mathur
(Deptt. of Chinese & Japanese Studies), Rajiv Verma (Satyawati Co-Ed. Eve. College),
Jaya Verma (Dr. B. R. Ambedkar College). Sreemati Chakrabarti (Deptt. of Chinese &
Japanese Studies) and Tansen Sen (Pennsylvania University). Indra Narain Singh (Deptt.
of Buddhist Studies) took keen interest in the final realization of this project and I much
appreciate their help. My students, including Vaishali Abbi, Shivani Dahiya and Santosh
Kumar Rai also deserve my appreciation for the odd jobs that they did for me in the
preparation of this book.

Lastly, I am indebted to Jarnail, Ami, Neha, Nidhi, Kanika, and above all, Kaniska for
keeping me sane while the book was being prepared.

New Delhi,
K.T.S. SARAO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Old and New Names --- 1
List of New and Old Names --- 13
Chapter: 1--China in the Mid-19th Century --- Archana Ojha:--- 25
Chapter: 2-- he Triangular Trade --- Shalini Saxena --- 47
Chapter: 3 -- The First Opium War --- Anita Narain --- 59
Chapter: 4 -- The Unequal Treaty System --- Vijaya Laxmi Singh --- 71
Chapter: 5 --- The Taiping Movement --- Ashwini Shankar --- 83
Chapter: 6 ---- The Self-Strengthening Movement --- Niraj Kumar Singh --- 115
Chapter: 7 --- Finance Imperialism in China--- Sharmila Shrivastava and Archana Ojha -
-- 135
Chapter: 8 --- The Reform Movements in China --- S.K. Srivastava --- 155
Chapter: 9 --- The Boxer Movement --- Poonam Mathur ---171
Chapter: 10--- The Revolution of--- 1911 ---K.T.S. Sarao ---195
Chapter: 11--- Sun Yatsen & His Three Principles --- Tarika Uberoi---227
Chapter: 12 --- The May Fourth Movement--- Rajiv Verma --- 247
Chapter: 13--- Warlordism in China & Yuan Shikai--- Jaya Verma---261
Chapter: 14-- Rise and Fall of Guomindang--- Sreemati Chakrabarti---275
Chapter: 15-- Rise of Communism in China--- Mani Bhushan--- 287
Appendix:I--Manchuguo-- R.K. Rana -- 323
Appendi:II--Empress Dowager Cixi-- Shalini' Saksena--329
Appendix:III--Open Door Policy --R.K. Rana--333
Appendix:IV-- Kang You we i (1858-1927)-- Tansen Sen--338
Appendix :V-- Manchu Reforms (1901-1905) Shalin Jain & Santosh. Kumar Rai—343
OLD AND NEW VERSIONS OF SOME COMMON WORDS
K.T.S. Sarao
OLD VERSION – NEW VERSION
Amoy -- Xiamen
Anhwei -- Anhui
An-king--Anqing
Antung-- Andong
Canton-- Guangzhou
Changchiakow-- Zhangjiakou
Chang Chih-tung-- Zhang Zhidong
Changchow-- Zhangzhou
Chang-ch’un--Changchun
Chang Hsiao-hs--Zhang xiaoxu
Chang Hseh-liang-- Zhang xueliang
Changkiakow-- Zhangj iakou
Ch’ang-ku-feng-- Changgufeng
Ch’ang-sha-- Changsha
Chang Tso-Iin--Zhang Zuolin
Chang Tzu-p’ingt --- Zhang Ziping
Changye --- Zhangye
Chefoo -- Zhifu/ Yantai
Cheliang --- Zhejiang
Ch’en Ch’u --Chen Chu
Cheng Ch’eng-kung ---Zheng Chenggong
Chengchow --Zhengzhou
2
OLD VERSION --- NEW VERSION
Chengteh -- Chengde
Chengtu -- Chendgu
Ch’en Ming-shu --- Chen Mingshu
Ch’ en T'ien-hua—Chen Tianhua
Ch’ en Tu-hsiu – Chen Duxiu
Chiang Ching – Jiang Jing
Chiang Kai-shek – Jiang Jie Shi
Ch'iao Kuan-hua – Qiao Guanhua
Chi-ch'a – Ji- Cha
Ch'ien lung -- Qianlong
Chien-tao -- Jingezhen
Chihli --- Zhili
Chilung – Jilong
Ch'in -- Qin
Chinchow -- Jinzhou
Ch’ing -- Qing
Chinghai -- Qinghai
Chingtechen -- Jingezhen
Chinkiang -- Zhenjiang
Chong Kuei – zhong Gui
Chou -- Zhou
Chou En-lai – Zhou Enlai
Chou Fo-hai – Zhou Fohai
Chou Hung-ch'ing – Zhou Hongqing
3
OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION
Chou Li --Zhouli
Chou Shu-jen -- Zhou Shuren
Chou Tso-jen -- Zhou Zuoren
Ch' uang-tsao She -- Chuangzao She
Chu Chu-pai -- Qu Qubai
Chufu -- Qufu
Chung-king/ Pahsien -- Chongqing
Chung-kuo -- Zhongguo
Chung-shan -- Zhongshan.
Chu Ten -- Zhu De
Confucius -- kong Zi
Dairen (Jap) --Dalian
Doihara-ch'in -- Doihara-qin
Foochow -- Fuzhou
Formosa -- Taiwan
FengKui-fen -- Feng Guifen
Feng Yu-hsiang -- Feng Yuxiang
Fukian -- Fujiah
Fung Yu-lan -- Feng Youlan
Hangchow -- Hangzhou
Han Yeh P'ing -- Hanyeping
Heilungkiang -- Heilongjiang
Hofei -- Hefei
Honan -- Henan
4
NEW VERSION -- OLD VERSION
Hopeh/ Hopei – Hebei
Ho – umezu – He – umezu
Ho Ying – ch’in – He Yingqin
Hisa – Xia
Hsiao Ch’ao – kuei – Xiao Chaogui
Hsing – Chung – Hui – Xingzhongh Hui
Hsin – hsiang – Xinxiang
Hsinking – Xinmin Hui
Hsan-t’ ung – Xuantong
Hsu Chung- chin – Xu Zhongxi
Hsu Ying Kuei – Xu Yinggui
Huang- ho/ Hwang – ho – Huang He
Huang Hsing –n Huang xing
Huang Tusn – hsien – Huang Zuxian
Hua – pei Kuo – Huabei Guo
Hunan – Hunan
Hung Hsiu – ch’ uan – Hong Xiuquan
Hung Jen – ken – Hong Renjin
Hung men – Hong men
5

OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION

Hupei/Hupeh—Hubei
Hu Shih—Hu Shi
Ichang—Yichang
I-Ching—Yi Jing
Jehol—Rehe
Jen Yu-wen—Ren Youwen
Ju Chiao—RuJiao
Kaiping-Gaibing
Kaohsiung—Gaoxiong
K’ang-hsi—Kangxi
K’ang yu-wei—kang youwei
Kansu – Gansu
Kiangsi—jiangxi
Kiangsu—jiangsu
Kiaochow—jiaozhou
Kiongnan—jiongnan
Kirin—jilin
K’uan-ch’eng-tzu—kuanchengzi
Kuang Hsu—Guangxi
Kuan Yh--Guan yu
Lip,omtamg—Guomindang
kuoMo-jo—Guo Moruo
Kuowen pao—Guowen Bao
Kuyen Wu—Gu Yanwu
6

OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION

Kwangsi—Guangxi
Kwangsi chuang—Guangxi Zhuang
Kwangtung—Guangdong
Kweichow—Guizhou
Kweiling—Guilin
Kweiyang—Guiyang
Lanchow—Lanzhou
Lao-tse—LaoZi
Liang ch’i-ch’ao—Ling Qichao
Liaoning—Liaoning
Liching-fang—Lijingfang
Lienyunkang—Lianyungang
Li Hsiu-ch’eng—Li Xiucheng
Li Hung-chang—Li Hongzhang
Likin—lijin
Li Lieh-chn—LiLiejun
Lin piao—Lin Biao
Lin tin—Ling ding
Lin Tse-hsu—Lin Zexu
Li Ta-chao—Li Dazhao
Lik’un-i—Liu Kunyi
Liu shao-chi—Liu shaoqi
Liu-t’iao-kou—Liutiaogou
7

OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION

Liu Yung-fu—Liu Youngfu
Lochia-lun—Luo jialun
Loyang—Luoyang
Lu Hsun—Lu Xun
Luinghai – Longhai
Lukouchiao – Lugouqiao
Luo Kuan – chung – Luo Guanzhong
Lu – ta/ Huta – Luda
Lu Tsung – yu – Lu Zongyu
Mencius – Menzi
Meng – chiang – Meng – jiang
Mao – Tse – tung – Mao Zebong
Mukden – Shenyang
Nan’ch’ang – Nanchang
Nien – Nain
Ningpo – Ningbo
Ningshia Hui – Ningxia Hui
Niuchuang – Niuzhuang
Pai Ch’ ung – his – Bai Chongxi
Pai Shang Ti Hui – Bai Shang Di Hui
Paoting – Boading
Pao – tow -- Baotou
8

OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION

Peking -- Beijing
P'eng P'ai -- Peng Pai
Penti -- Bendi
P'ing-hsing-kuan -- Pingxingguan
Port Arthur -- Lushun
Shanhaikwan -- Shanhaiguan
Shansi -- Shaanxi
Shantung -- Shandong
sSheng Hsuan-huai -- Sheng xuanhuai
Shen-Kan-Ning -- Shen-Gan-Ning
Shensi -- Shaanxi
Shihchiachuang -- Shijiazhuang
Shin Huiig Ti -- Shi Huangdi
Shihwu Pao -- Shiwu Bao
Sian -- xian
Siangtan --Xiangtan
Sining -- Xining
Sinkiang -- Xinjiang
Sinkiang Uighur -- Xinjiang, Weiwuer
Si Kiang -- Xi jiang
Soochow/Wuhsien -- Suzhou/Wuxien
Spratly Islands -- Nanshan Islands
Suchow -- Xuzhou
Sung Che-yan --Song Zheyuan
9
OLD VERSION NEW VERSION
Sun Ch' uan-fang -- Sun Chuanfang
Sun Yat-sen -- Sun Zhong Shan
Szechuan -- Sichuan
Taierh Chuang -- Taier Zhuang
Tai Hsuan-chih -- Dai Xuanzhi
Taipei -- Taibei
Tai-p'ing -- Taiping
Ta-lien/Dairen -- Dalian
T'ang -- Tang
Tang-ku -- Tanggu
Tan Ssu-t' ung -- Tan Sitong
Tao-kuang -- Daoguang
Ta-tung -- Datong
Teng Hsiao-ping -- Deng Xiaoping
Te wang -- De wang
Tibet -- Xizang
Tientsin -- Tianjin
T'ien-hsia -- Tianxia
T'ien-kuo -- Tianguo
T'ien-tzu -- Tianzi
Ting Ju-ch'ang -- Ding Ruchang
Tong Wen Kuan -- Dong Wen Guan
Ts' ai O -- Cai E
10

Ts' ai T'ing-k'ai -- Cai Tingkai

Ts' ai Wo -- Cai Wo
Ts'ai Yan-p'ei -- Cai Yuanpei
Ts' ao Chan -- Cao Chan
Ts' ao Ju-lin -- Cao Rulin
Tseng Kuo-fan -- Cao Guofan
Tsinan -- Jinan
Tsinghai -- Qingghai
Tsingtao -- Qingdao
Tsinpu -- Jinpu
Tsitsihar -- Qiqihaer
Tsou T'ao-fen -- Zou Taofen
Tsu Chiang -- Xujiang
Tsungli Yamen -- Zongli Yamen
Tsuo Tseng-t' ang -- Zou Zongtang
Tuan Ch'i-jui -- Duan Qirui
Tuiihuang/Tunhwang -- Dunhuang
Tung Chih -- Dong Zhi
T'ung-meng Hui -- Tongmeng Hui
Tz' u-hsi/Tsu His -- Cixi
Urumchi -- Urumqi
Waichow -- Huizhou
Wang Chao -- Wang Zhao
Wang Ching-wei -- Wang Jingwei
11

OLD VERSION – NEW VERSION

Wanghsia -- Wangxia
Wang K' o-min -- Wang Kemin
Wang Tung Ho -- Wang Donghe
Wanhsien -- Wanxian
Wei Ch'ang-hui -- Wei Changhui
Wei-chn -- Weijun
Wenchovv -- Wenzhou
Wen Ti -- Wen Di
Wahampoa -- Huangpu
Wuch'ang -- Wuchang
Wuchow -- Wazhou
Wuhsien -- Wuxien
WuP'ei-fu -- Wu Peifu
X' ian -- Xian/ Zian
Yan'an -- Yanan
Yang Hsiu-ch'ing -- Yang xiuqing
Yang Ming-chai -- Yang Mingzhai
Yangtze -- Yangzi
Yeh Ming-ch'en -- Ye Mingchen
Yen Hsi-shan -- Yan xishan
Yen-t’ai -- yantai
Yenan -- yanan
Yingkow -- Yingkou
Yinju-Keng, --Yin Rugeng
12

OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION

Yan Shih-k' ai -- Yuan Shikai

Yu Hsian -- Yuxian
Yungning -- Nannlng
Yunnan --- Yunnan
13

LIST OF NEW AND OLD VERSIONS OF SOME COMMON WORDS

K.T.S. Sarao

Andong -- Antung
Anhui -- Anhwei
Anqing -- An-king
Bai Chongxi -- Pai Ch'ung-hsi
Bai shang Di Hui -- Pai Shang Ti Hui
Baoding -- Paoting
Baotou -- Pao-two
Beijing -- Peking
Bendi -- Penti
Cai E -- Ts' ai O
Cai Tingkai -- T'ing-k'ai
Cai Wo -- Ts'ai Wo
Cai Yuanpei -- Ts'ai Yan-p'ei
Cao Chan -- Ts'ao Chan
Cao Rulin -- Ts'ao Ju-lin
Changchun -- Chang-ch'un
Changgufeng -- Ch'ang-ku-feng
Changsha -- Ch'ang-sha.
Chen Chu -- Ch'en Ch'u
Chen Duxiu -- Ch'en Tu-hsiu
Chengde -- Chengteh
14

NEW VERSION -- OLD VERSION

Chengdu -- Chengtu
Chen Mingshu -- Ch’en Ming-shu
Chen Tianhua -- Ch’en T’ien- hua
Chuangzao She -- Ch’uang – tsao She
Chongqing -- Chung - king
Chugn-kuo -- Zhongguo
Cixi -- Tz’u-his/ Tsu Hsi
Dai Xuanzhi -- Tai Hsuan - Chin
Dalian -- Ta-lien / Dairen (Jap)
Daoguang -- Tao - kuang
Datong -- Ta - tung
Deng Xiaoping -- Teng Hsiao- ping
De Wang -- Te Wang
Ding Ruchang -- Ting Ju-ch’ ang
Doihara-qin -- Doihara – ch’in
Dong Wen Guan -- Tong Wen Kuan
Dong Zhi -- Tung Chih
Duan Qirui -- Tuan Ch’ i- jui
Dunhuang -- Tunhuang / Tunhwang
FengGuifen -- Feng Kui-fen
Feng Youlan -- Fung Yu-lan
Feng Yuxiang -- Feng Yu - hsiang
Fujian -- Fukian
Fuzhou -- Foochow
15

NEW VERSION --- OLD VERSION

Gaibing --- Kaiping
Gansu --- Kansu
Gaoxiong --- Kaohsiung
Guangdong -- Kwangtung
Guangxi -- Kwangsi
Guangxi Zhuang --- Kwangsi Chuang
Guangxu --- Kuang Hsu
Guangzhou -- Canton
Guan Yu -- Kuan Yu
Guilin -- Kweilin
Guiyang -- Kweiyang
Guizhou -- Kweichow
Guomindang -- Kuomintang
Guo Moruo -- Kuo Mo-jo
Guowen Bao -- Kuowen Pao
Gu Yanwu -- KuYenWu
Hangzhou -- Hangchow
Hanyeping -- Han Yeh Ping
Hebei -- Hopeh/Hopei
Hefei -- Hofei
Henan -- Honan
He-umezu -- Ho-umezu
He Yingqin -- Ho Ying-ch'in
Hongmen -- Hung-men
16
NEW VERSION – OLD VERSION
Hong Renjin -- Hung Jen- ken
Hong Xiuquan -- Hung Hsiu-ch’uan
Huabei Guo -- Hua –pai kuo
Hua Guofeng -- Hua Kuo- feng
Huang He -- Huang –ho/Hwang-ho
Huangpu -- Whampoa
Huang Xing -- Huang Hsing
Huang Zunxian -- Huang Tsun-hsien
Hubei -- Hupei/Hupeh
Huizhou -- Waichow
Hunan -- Hunan
Hu Shi -- Hu Shih
Jiandao -- Chien - tao
Jiang Jie Shi -- Chiang Ching
Jiang Jing -- Kiangsu
Jiangsu -- Kiangsi
Jiangxi -- Kiaochow
Jiaozhou -- Chi-ch’s
Ji-cha -- Kirin
Jilin -- Chilung
Jilong -- Tsinan
Jinan -- Chingtechen
Jinpu -- Tsinpu
17
VERSION -- OLD VERSION

Jinzhou -- Chinchow
Jiongnan -- Kiongnan
Kangxi --K'ang-his
Kang Youwei -- K'ang Yu-wei
Kong Zi --Confucius
Kuanchengzi -- K'uan-ch'eng-tzu
Lanzhou -- Lanchow
LaoNaixuan -- LaoNai-hsuan
Lao Zi -- Lao-tse
Liang Qichao -- Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
Lianyungang -- Lienyunkang
Liaoning – Liaoning
Li Dazhao -- Li Ta-chao
Li Hongzhang -- LiHung-chang
Lijin -- Likin
Li Jingfang -- Li Ching-fang
Lin Biao -- Lin Piao
Lingding – Lintin
Lin Zexu – Lin Tse –hsu
Liu kunyi – Liu K’un-i
18

NEW VERSION – OLD VERSION

Liu Shaoqi -- Liu Shao -chi
Liutiaogou -- Liu-t’iao- Kou
Liu Youngfu -- Liu Hsiu-ch’eng
Li Xiuclieng -- Lunghai
Luda -- Lu-ta/ Huta
Lugouqiao -- Lukouchiao
Luo Guanzhong -- Luo Kuan- chung
Luo Jialun -- Lo Chia - lun
Luoyang -- Loyang
Lushun -- Port Arthur
Lu Xun -- Lu Hsun
Lu Zongyu -- Lu Tsung -yu
Mao Zedong -- Mao Tse-tung
Meng-jiang -- Meng - chiang
Mengzi -- Mencius
Nanchang -- Nan –ch’ang
Nanjing -- Nanking
Nanning -- Yungning
Nanshan Islands -- Spratly Islands
Nian -- Nien
19

NFW VERSION -- OLD VERSION

Ningbo -- Ningpo
Ningxia --Ningshia
Ningxia Hui -- NingshiaHui
Niuzhuang --Niuchuang
Peng Pai --P'engP'ai
Pingxingguan --P'ing-hsing-kuan
Qiandao -- Chien-tao
Qianlong -- Ch'ien-lung
Qiao Guanhua Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Qin -- Ch'in
Qing -- Ch'ing
Qingdao -- Tsingtao
Qinghai -- Chingliai/ Tsinghai
Qiqihaer -- Tsitsihar
Qufu -- Chufu
Qu Qubai -- ChuChu-pai
Rehe -- Jehol
Ren Youwen -- JenYu-wen
Ru Jiao -- JuChiao
Shaanxi -- Shensi
Shandong -- Shantung
20
OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION

Shanhaiguan -- Shanhaikwan
Shanxi -- Shansi
Ning -- Shen- kan -Ning
Sheng Xuanhuai -- Sheng Hsuan-huai
Shenyang -- Makden
Shi Huangdi -- Shih Hung Ti
Shijiazhung -- Shihchiachuang
Shiwu Bao -- Shihwa Pao
Sichuan -- Szechuan
Song Zheyuan -- Sung Che-yan
Sun Chuanfang -- Sun Ch’uan- fang
Sun Yatsen -- Sun Yat-sen
Sun Zhong Shan -- Sun yat Sen
Siizhou -- Soochow
Taibei -- Taipei
Taier Zhuang -- Taierh Chung
Taiping -- T’ai-P’ing
Taiwan -- Formosa
Tanggu -- Tang ku
Tang -- T’ang
Tan Sitong -- Tan Ssu-t’ung
21
Tianguo -- T'ien-kuo
Tianjin -- Tientsin
Tianxia -- T'ien-hsia
Tianzi -- T'ien-tzu
Tongmeng Hui -- T'ung-meng Hui
Urumqi -- Urumchi
Wang Donghe – Wang Tung Ho
Wang Jingwei – Wang Ching-wei
Wang Kemin -- Wang K’o Min
Wangxia -- Wanghsia
Wango Zhao – Wang Chao
Wanxian -- Wanhsia
Wei Changhui – Wei Ch’ang-hui
Weijun – Wei-chn
Wen Di -- Wen Ti
Wenzhou -- Wenchow
Wuchang – Wuch’ang
Wu Peifu – Wu P’ei-fu
Wuxien -- Wuhsien
Wuzhou -- Wuchow
Xia -- Hsia
22

OLD VERSION -- NEW VERSION

Xiamen -- Amoy
Xian -- X'ian/ Sian
Xiangtan -- Siangtan
XiaoChaogui -- Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei
Xi Jiang -- Si Kiang
Xingzhong Hui -- Hsing-Chung-Hui
Xining -- Sining
Xinjiang -- Sinkiang
Xinjiang Weiwuer -- Sinkiang Uighur
Xinjingj -- Hsinking
Xin Qingnias -- Hsin Ch'ing-nien
Xinmin Hui -- Hsin-min Hui
Xinxiang -- Hsin-hsiang
Xizang -- Tibet
Xuantong -- Hsan-t'ung
Xugezhuan -- Hs-ke-chuan
Xujiang -- Tsu chiang
Xu Yinggui -- Hsu Ying Kuei
Xu Zhongxi -- Hsu Chung-chih
Xuzhou -- Hsuchow/ Suchow
Yanan -- Yan'an/ Yenan
23

NEW VERSION -- OLD VERSION

Yang Mingzhai – Yang Ming- chai
Yang X'iuqing – Yang Hsiu-ch’ing
Yangzi -- Yangtze
Yantai – Yen-t’ai/chefoo
Yan Xishan -- Yen Ming-ch’en
Ye Mingchen -- Ichang
Yichang -- Yingkow
Yijing -- Yin Ju-keng
Yingkou -- Yan Shih –ka’i
Yin Rugeng -- Yunnan
Yuan Shikai – Yan Shih-k’ai
Yunnan. -- Yunnan
Yuxian – Yu Hsian
Zeng Guofan – Tseng Kuo -fan
Zhangjiakou -- Changkiakow
Zhangjiakou -- Changkiakow
Zhang Xiaoxu – Chang Hsiao-hs
Zhang Xueliang—Chang Hseh-liang
Zhangye – Changye
Zhang Zhidong – Chang Chin-- tung
Zhangzhou -- Changchow
Zhang Ziping – Chang Tzu-p’ing
24

OLD VERSION – NEW VERSION

Zhang Zuolin – Chang Tso- lin
Zhejiang -- Chekiang
Zheng Chenggong – Cheng Ch’eng-kung
Zhengzhou -- Chengchow
Zhenjing -- Chinkiang
Zhifu -- Chefoo
Zhili -- Chihli
Zhong Gui – Chong Kuei
Zhongshan – Chung -shan
Zhongxi – Chung –chin
Zhou Chou
Zhou Enlai – Chou En-lai
Zhou Fohai – Chou Fo-hai
Zhou Hongqing – Chou Hung – Ch’ing
Zhouli – Chou Li
Zhou Shuren – Chou Shu-jen
Zhu De – Chu Teh
Zongli Yamen—Tsungli Yamen
Zou Taofen – Tsou T’ao-fen
Zuo Zongtang – Tsuo Tseng-t’ang
CHAPTER: 1
CHINA BEFORE THE OPIUM WAR
ARCHANA OJHA
Kamala Nehru College
University of Delhi
Delhi

China's cultural distinctiveness is mainly attributed to its climatic conditions which is

determined by the great land mass of Asia. In winter, the air over Central Asia becomes
very cold and flows outward bringing cool and dry weather to the southern and eastern
fringes. In summer, the air over Central Asia warms up and rises, moist oceanic air rushes
in to take its place and the result is very heavy rains on the continental fringes.

Geographically, China is divided into two regions, the north and the south. In the north,
Chinese civilization had its first flowering. It is a dry land and the main crops are millet
and wheat. In the south, soil is moist and therefore it is possible to grow rice. South China
being hilly and ideal for intensive cultivation, rice is double or triple cropped in a year. In
the north, severe continental winter limits the growing season to about half a year. In both
the regions, the resources and nature are supplemented by human endeavour.

First historical dynasty that existed in China from 1523 to 1027 BC was known as Shang
dynasty. This dynasty was succeeded by Western Zhou dynasty (1027-256 BC). Both
these dynasties were based on slave system where land was owned by the slave-owning
bureaucracy, collective slave labour was employed in agriculture and the labour force
was
26

Modern History of China completely dependent on land.

The period from 772-221 BC was dominated by Eastern Zhou, Spring and Autumn Era
and Warring States dynasties This was a phase of transition from slave to feudal society,
The relations of production in feudal society were the landlords' ownership of the means
of production and their partial ownership of the productive labour class. Apart from
this, individual peasants and artisans owned tools and other means of production on the
basis of their own labour but under the control of landlord. System of local administration
made its appearance and officials were appointed for a limited time period in a succession
at different places, as opposed to the system of hereditary posts practised by the earlier
two dynasties.

From 221 BC to 220 AD, Qin, Former Han, and Later Han dynasties emerged and
feudalism reached its maturity. The emperor became the symbol of political and
economic power with land under his control. Under the emperor, there were numerous
landed aristocrats with hereditary titles but with different kinds of hereditary status and
privileges. All these classes lived off the labour of the peasant class who were
overburdened with land tax, rent and were therefore, the most exploited class.
During the rule of the above mentioned dynasties, there was also gradual development of
religious ideologies. The earliest concrete evidence comes from Shang to Zhou dynasties
which maintained written records. The Shang kings' supreme God was also their first
king who was the son of the lord and thereby gave credence to the theory of divine right
of kingship and after his death, he ruled over the dead. Therefore, elaborate death
ceremonies became
27

essential part of the "Chinese- royal customs. Respect was given to matriarchal
authority— and they were great believers of superstitions and divine will was .sought
through oracle bones. During the Zhou dynasty, the concept of divine right was linked
with heavenly mandate and this worked till the conduct of rulers met with the approval of
heaven. Both the rulers and the masses used this concept to their advantage whenever
they wanted to overthrow a particular dynasty.

The Chinese philosophical thought during the classical period was geared towards the
need of the society rather than the individual. With the emergence of bureaucracy and the
consequent rise of complex political system, a new group of philosophers emerged who
first established their base, then formed a group of followers and finally became teachers
of their own philosophy. This is how the cult of Confucianism developed in China.
Confucianism which is a Western terminology is known as "Ru Jiao" or the "Teachings
of the Learned." Confucius (Kong Zi) was the greatest sage of this cult and after his
death, his statements were compiled in book-form known as 'the Dialects.' The main
object of Confucius was to assist his disciples obtain necessary skills for entry into
politics. Confucianism provided the emerging state, ruling groups and bureaucracy with a
philosophy based on their political needs. It was a bulwark of religious rites in which the
emperor was the religious and political head and respect was given to ancestors. It
developed during the Zhou dynasty or earlier. Taoism was another philosophy which
developed as a protest against the increasing warfare and despotic rulers. It emphasised
the relationship between human beings and nature which would then lea to the growth of
aesthetic sense in the society, they were against feudalism and attacked all types of
knowledge with the belief that it corrupted human society and also went against social
28

advancement. Mencius (Mengzi) developed the concept of benevolence. He believed that

everyone is good by nature and this goodness can be cultivated further. He propagated
that only that person should be called a king who is capable of gaining popular support.
He also supported the idea of self-sufficiency. Buddhism came to China in the first
century AD during the Han dynasty. It was probably brought through merchants and
travellers along the famous silk route. Buddhism emphasised transmigration and
reincarnation and offered salvation to all the politico-social problems. When Buddhism
received royal patronage, many monasteries were erected and functioned as inns, public
bathrooms and even banking institutions.

The period from 221 AD to 907 AD witnessed the emergence of Three Kingdoms Era,
Western Chin Dynasty, Eastern Chin Dynasty, Southern Dynasties Era, Northern
Dynasties Era, Sui Dynasty and Tang Dynasty. This period saw the beginning of peasant
uprisings which uprooted the hereditary landed aristocracy and led to the rise of landlords
of privileged families. These landlords enjoyed political power and hereditary rights not
on the basis of imperial whim but on their traditional position in the society. They owned
vast tracts of land and controlled peasants who attached themselves to these landlords in
return for protection against over-taxation and levies. This period also witnessed
protracted struggles as well as large-scale displacement and migration among the
different races.

From 907 AD to 1368 AD, there were five dynasties and ten kingdoms, followed by
Sung, Chin, Southern Sung and their final reunification under the Yuan dynasty
established by the Mongols. Peasant uprisings continued in this period which finally
resulted in the beginning of the
29

examination system and hereditary landlord was now laced replaced bureaucrat landlord
who obtained his position by passing the examination, through the purchase of the
academic degrees or simply by being granted royal favour. Neo-Confucianism also
emerged in the eleventh century AD and it contained Confucian values and ideas along
with elements of Buddhism and Daoism. During the thirteenth century as a consequence
of Mongol invasions, Mongol Yuan dynasty was established. Under this dynasty Lamaist
Buddhism was patronised, though Neo-Confucianism remained pre-dominant.
Christianity and Islam also made their presence felt during this time although the extent
of their influence was considered very small.

The post-Mongol dynasties were different from the pre-Mongol dynasties in two ways.
Firstly, there was new influence of political structure upon the society and there was a
gradual tendency for essential cultural values to be shaped by political forces. Second, the
Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) empires were fundamentally of different
origins—the Ming was the last indigenous Chinese dynasty, while Qing was a Manchu-
conquered empire.

The Mongol empire was overthrown by peasant rebellions against the exploitation of
landlord class. The secret societies like the White Lotus Society promised the peasants
deliverance from the suffering of the traditional order. By the fourteenth century there
was widespread belief in a Prince of Brightness (Ming Wang) who would appear and
save the world. The doctrine which combined the elements of Maitreya. the popular
Buddha of the future, with traces of Manichaenism was combined by the rebels with the
demand for the restoration of the Sung dynasty. As a result the Ming dynasty was
founded by a member-peasant
30

of a rebel band. After establishing his empire, however, the founder forgot the radical
ideals of peasant movements in favour of an orthodox Confucianism. Thus, potential
social revolution was turned into cultural conservatism once power was established.

Imperial domination over the Chinese society was guaranteed by an elaborate

prescription of the status of all strata of Chinese society. .Rule was the monopoly of the
imperial family. They were given hereditary titles and supported by government stipends.
They were barred from government service. The generals of the original peasant armies
were converted into a hereditary nobility that intermarried with the imperial clan. They
were forced to reside in the capital and became military commanders. Military units were
scattered all over the empire organised on a decimal system of Mongol origin.

The gentry was a degree-holding class which was acquired after passing a government
examination. This system was developed in the eleventh century AD and the
examinations were conducted once in every three years. It was open to those who
possessed mastery of Confucian classics. A candidate who cleared district and provincial
level examinations was appointed as official of the imperial government. Examination
was conducted in a very fair manner so as to procure the best Confucian talent for the
government administration. The career of the official was carefully regulated and no
appointments were made in home districts. There were frequent transfers and efficiency
reports were maintained by the government. This position was not hereditary. According
to Hsu, the examination system was a new way of social advancement, it reduced
nepotism and favouritism, it clearly indicated the social flexibility of the
31

Chinese society and enhanced the bureaucrats' self-respect and prestige in the society and
politics. Bureaucrats were staunch supporters of Confucian ethics and political values.
The net result of recruitment through the examination system was to guarantee the
emperor a continuous supply of talented and willing administrators and to preclude the
development of entrenched opposition. In this way, nobility monopolised command over
military forces and the gentry supplied administrative talent for the bureaucracy.
Elaborate laws specified in detail the clothing and life-style appropriate to each level of
society. Tax and labour-service regulations were specifically favourable to the upper
classes. The common masses were divided into military households as they supplied
troops for service in the armed forces. Artisans and the other masses paid grain and
labour services to the state.

The king was all-powerful and controlled the civil and military powers. In the Confucian
scheme the emperor was considered as the ruler of "all under heaven" (Tian-xia), i.e. area
under his direct as well as indirect control including tributary states. Any foreign
conquests did not mean the breakdown of this system as long as new ruler simply ruled
according to Confucian precepts which Mongols in the thirteenth century and the
Manchus in the seventeenth century did. The Chinese emperor was responsible for the
maintenance of cosmological order, i.e. to maintain social order, political unity, peace
and natural order. Any natural disaster known as "great disorder" was considered as
legitimate sign of rebellion, against the ruling dynasty.

Civil administration was divided into six boards, each under the control of a minister. The
Board of Civil Appointments handled the personnel of the civil service. The Board of
Revenue, collected taxes, took census, maintained
32

financial accounts, and looked after state enterprises. The Board of Rites was responsible
for ceremonies, sacrifices and relations with the foreigners. The Board of War controlled
military affairs. The Board of Justice codified laws, managed courts, captured and
punished criminals. The Board of Public Works did the task of water control, irrigation,
construction and transportation activities and mobilization of man-power.
The military department had five military commissions. The emperor appointed civil
officials to the various administrative offices within the palace and those officials were
called grand secretaries and acted as agents of imperial power.
Various imperial codes were promulgated by the Ming emperors aimed at bringing
Chinese society into conformity with imperial ideas and stabilising it. For general masses
there was a Ming code. Law of succession regulated the movements of the royal princes,
specified distinction between their ranks. Grand pronouncements were concerned with
criminal and economic issues. All the codes were in conformity with Confucian ideas,
views and statements.

During 1630s and 1640s massive peasant uprisings led to decline of the Ming dynasty
and rise of Qing dynasty. The Manchus were initially a loose tribal group who during the
Ming rule, built up power through gradual mobilization of war machine. They created a
hybrid barbarian-civilised administrative structure by judicious and pragmatic blending
of traditional tribal elements, bureaucratic institutions and other innovations. The
geographical extent of their empire was from southern China coast to Manchuria in the
west and from the China Sea in the east to Sinjiang in the west with
33

Tibet and Mongolia under their tributary allegiance. The Manchus were greatly
outnumbered by the Chinese subjects, therefore, the Manchus evolved some new changes
in the administrative system.

This system was in a way Manchu-Chinese diarchy or a dual form of government. In the
central government the heads of six boards were staffed by two officials— one Manchu
and the other Chinese. The Chinese provided bureaucratic expertise while the Manchus
guaranteed political reliability. The highest organ was the grand secretariat. But in the
eighteenth century, a new body was superimposed called the. Grand Council, which
consisted of a select group of grand secretaries who met informally with the emperor to
decide the most sensitive issues. High positions were given only to Manchus, Mongols
and reliable Chinese. For every two provinces a Manchu governor-General was appointed
to control governors of each province. Banner forces under Manchu command were
stationed in the provinces.

The court business was conducted in a bilingual form— both Chinese and Manchus.
Relations with Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan were handed through a
Superintendent of Dependencies and continuous effort was made to expand boundaries.
Imperial patronage was given to Lamaism, a faith which was important to Mongols and
Tibetans. To Chinese, they presented themselves as champions of Confucian ideals.
Imperial patronage of scholarly activity not only bound scholars to the state, it also gave
the state an opportunity to shape the content of learning itself.
34

SOCIETY

The Chinese society had endured for almost 2000 years in a region of vast size,
population, cultural, linguistic and climatic diversity. Agriculture was the main source of
livelihood for masses right from the Neolithic Age, but periodic nomadic incursions and
natural calamities compelled the Chinese people to diversify their economic activity and
from about the tenth century AD onwards there was gradual growth of commercial
farming and inter-regional trade. The ruling class derived its wealth from two sources—
land and commerce, although the former was given more weightage.

There is considerable divergence of opinion among scholars regarding the basic character
of the Chinese society. Marxist scholars consider that exploitation of the peasantry by the
landlords clearly demonstrates that the Chinese society was feudal and bureaucratic. Karl
A. Wittfogel considers Chinese society as an archetype of "Oriental Despotism."
Characterized by a centralised monolithic government which kept the peasant masses in
line by controlling the large-scale public projects. Hsu considers the Chinese state as
despotic autocracy and still others opine that it was a gentry based elite society.

J.K. Fairbank is of the opinion that right from ancient times there had been two Chinas—
town and countryside. He applies the same criterion to the social division. The peasants
representing the rural sector were always in majority, while the gentry and other urban
classes residing in towns were in minority. On the other hand, according to Hsu. Chinese
society was not a simple division of classes but a bi-polarised state of ruler and the ruled,
a multi-class
35

society in which four major "functional orders" co-existed: scholars, peasants, artisans,
and merchants. Above them were the government bureaucrats and below them the
"declassed"' or "'degraded people." Although representing a stratified society, it was
egalitarianism in a sense as there was no caste system and considerable social flexibility
as well as mobility regardless of family, birth or religion. The individual merit was based
on successful passing of the examination which also formed the basis of social
recognition.

The gentry class is categorised by J. Chesneaux as a scholar official ruling class which
possessed power, knowledge and land. This was the product of ancient "Asiatic
Tradition", where a class was defined by three aspects of its position— political,
economic and educational. According to Hsu, the gentry class was composed of scholars
who had passed the government examination but were not part of the ruling bureaucracy.
They acted as intermediaries between the local magistrates and the people; and in this
capacity they enjoyed considerable social prestige and privileges. Fairbank sees the
gentry class in a dual sense—economic and political, in connection with landholding and
office holding position. It was a status confined to those individuals who had passed,
purchased or were recommended for the official degrees by the government. They were
not dependent for their status on economic resources, particularly landowning. They
represented politico-economic dualism because as a local elite they performed certain
functions connected with peasantry who were below them and for officials who were
above them. It is this dualism, according to Fairbank. which has led many scholars to
define the term gentry as a group of families rather than independent degree holders.
36

Barrington Moore, Jr finds a definite link between landed property, degree holding and
political office in China. The mechanism that linked all the three was the family or the
patrilineal lineage. The family as a social mechanism required to invest in land for the
sake of lineage and to maintain their social and political prestige, there was always a
constant need to have a degree holder to maintain the family's material fortune and status
of the lineage. Although the examination system was open to all the social classes, the
absence of any widespread system of popular education meant that the door was open
only for the privileged classes. Therefore, the link between office and wealth through the
lineage was one of the most important features of Chinese society. And for these reasons
it is justifiable to refer to those upper classes of scholar-officials and landlords as the
gentry.

The need to create this new class of gentry arose from the fact that from early Han to
Qing dynastic period, territorial administrative structure did not grow while the
population increased to a considerable extent and expanded to other areas. Therefore, in
the Tang period, this new gentry class was created to fill the vacuum between the early
bureaucratic state and the Chinese society. The gentry class maintained its domination
through four media— by owning land, by performing official functions, by being
educated, and by being proficient in the Chinese language. Passing the three level
examination was considered as the highest achievement possible in traditional Chinese
society. In this way, according to Fairbank, the structure of the gentry class was flexible,
automatically self-perpetuating and stable.

The scholar-gentry class was required to perform certain functions including:

37
1. collection of taxes and other levies;
2. construction and maintenance of hospitals,irrigation projects, local shrines and
upholding Confucian ideals, institutions and morals;
3. acting as unofficial arbitrators in disputes that people wanted to settle outside the
courtroom;
4. acting as intermediaries between local people and administration to maintain peace.
They organised militia in times of need;
5. to maintain peace, order and look after general welfare of their locality. This task was
in the interest of the ruling class to avoid any crisis.

There were regional variations in the condition of the Chinese peasantry. According to
Marxist historians, peasants were generally exploited by the ruling class through high
rents, usury and other exactions. Non-Marxist historians like Ramon Myer opine that it
was low productivity, the old farm economy, improper utilization of farms, insufficient
capital, limited access to new technology, no control over nature, primitive transportation
facilities and increasing marketing costs were reasons for peasants' poverty and
exploitation by the upper classes. This theory is generally not accepted.

There is a consensus among historians that the Chinese peasantry was generally exploited
and poor. As the population increased land became scarce and the peasants. were caught
between the exorbitant demands of the landlords and oppressive burden of state taxation
and forced corvee. The condition did not change even during the peace time because the
demand for taxes increased. During the political upheaval there was no authority to check
government officials and during natural calamities no assistance was given by the
government. All these led to acute discontent
38

and destitution which forced the peasants to form secret groups as the state ruthlessly
suppressed these mushrooming societies. These societies would turn to banditry, peasant
revolts and large-scale rebellions against the officialdom and the ruling dynasty.

Commerce was given low status as a form of economic activity and in the classical
Chinese literature, merchant class was placed at the bottom of the social strata. This
inferior status represented the defensive reaction of an agricultural society against
economic forces that were threatening its equilibrium. To attain social status, the
merchants invested in land, passed examinations or bought degrees. This fact
demonstrated that the Chinese society accommodated them through the back door and
there was close link between merchant, gentry and officialdom. Merchants had no
independent status as the state exercised strict supervision and control over all the
commercial activities. For any big commercial enterprise patronage and support of the
officials was a necessity. Big merchants worked as state agents and the merchant guilds
and associations served as mutual aid societies. It is for this very reason that merchant
guilds could never become centres of struggle.

ECONOMY
There were two sets of patterns of ownership of land: private and collective. Private land
was under the control of the landlords and collective ownership was under royal family,
government estates and monastic control.

Since landlord possessed the land and peasant furnished the labour, it was necessary to tie
the peasant to the land. In this system, over-population always worked to the advantage
39

of the landlord as excess population meant more profit. At the same time landlord
required the assistance of a strong government to keep, order, guarantee safety of his
property rights and ensure of collection of his rents. This task was done by the imperial
bureaucracy. As the landed wealth and bureaucracy were mutually inter-dependent, it
was essential for the landlord to have one son in the bureaucracy.

From about the 8th century to 12th century new agricultural techniques were adopted in
the field of farm tools, husbandry, tea-processing and cultivation, cotton-growing and
plough. In the Sui-Tang period, a new type of plough was introduced which had eleven
parts and was adjustable for working in varying depths. In the Ming period, soldiers
posted at frontier were required to devote 70% of their effort towards cultivation and for
those posted in the interiors the ratio was 80: 20. During the Qing period, there was
considerable increase in the size of agricultural land but land tax also increased. There
were two systems of tax collection. In the first, tax captains were appointed who were
local elite or wealthiest families in each area. The second system was that of rotation
under which households rotated the duties of tax collection and labour services among
their members, relieving the government of the need to extend its own agencies down to
the village level. With such a tax system, Qing period witnessed a series of peasant
rebellions, the most famous being the Great White Lotus Rebellion (1798-1804).

Historians generally agree that the Chinese economy was feudal. According to Fairbank,
the peasant after becoming a tenant was forced to pay taxes, levies and forced labour
service to the state. It is for this reason that the peasant class was extensively exploited
and poor. Chen considers it a
40

feudal economy because the mass of peasant were under the domination, both economic
and extra-economic of a minority class. Joseph Needham has suggested the term
"bureaucratic feudalism" to emphasize the unique combination of economics and political
power. Harold Issacs believes that the backwardness of Chinese economy was
determined by the stagnation of productive forces over a prolonged historical period.
Introduction of the iron plough led some 2000 years ago, to increase in agricultural
productivity. Partially as a result of this impetus, land was converted into private
property. Land became alienable, labour was released and capital thus acquired were
absorbed by the state in the construction of dams, canals, palaces, walls' and
fortifications.

In this way, China actually represented the model of self-sufficient feudal economy
where landlord exploited the peasantry. Increase in production benefitted only the
landlord. The peasant production always remained at the subsistence level and this
restricted the growth of market relations and consequently also hampered commercial
activities and growth of capitalism in China.

The secondary economy in China was made up of handicrafts, trade and commerce,
which were organised under the guild system or associations. These associations
controlled production and marketing and were also mutual insurance societies, religious
fraternities and unofficial arbitrators in trade disputes. Business was a segment of the
whole web of human relationship, kinship obligations and personal relations which
supported Chinese life. Handicraft industry supplied the major supplementary needs of
the community. Since pursuit of profit was frowned upon by Confucianists, the state took
direct part in trade and
41

manufacture. It exercised monopoly over iron, salt, tobacco etc. Both the system of
production and the internal market were controlled by the state bureaucracy. Main area of
investment was land and money-lending. Urban centres of production and commerce
were restricted to luxury products and regional specialities like silk, lacquer, chinaware,
paper industry etc. .

To facilitate trade and commerce canals were constructed, rivers harnessed and major
ports were developed for overseas trade. This factor assisted in the growth of market and
complex exchange system. "Fe qian or flying money was introduced as a bill of exchange
in the Tang period. Paper currency also made appearance during the Yuan dynasty.

NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS AND DECLINE

Qing dynasty ruled over China from 1644 to 1912. During the first about a century and
half, there was relative peace and stability due to efficient administrative system set up by
the Qing rulers. And this very situation later, became the cause of decline.

Initially, it was argued by many historians that it was the Western imperialism which
challenged the traditional Confucian order in all spheres— immediate diplomatic and
military confrontations of mid 19th century merged with fundamental sociological and
economic changes which in turn contributed to intellectual confrontation between the
traditional agrarian society and an emerging urban industrial one. There was consequent
breakdown of the Confucian order which led to the undermining of agricultural economy,
collapse of the family system and rise of rural discontent.
42

But the above argument has been given up as new forms of historical evidence clearly
establish the fact that before the impact of Western imperialism, China was already
showing symptoms of crisis and decay. Between the seventh and nineteenth centuries,
there was two-fold increase in the Chinese population and agriculture being the main
source of livelihood was hard hit. A theory was propounded that increase in population
led to increase in supply of cheap labour and those in city invested in land. This resulted
in escalation of land prices and the number of landless peasants and absentee landlords
also increased. The gentry became more exploitative and peasants were driven to rebel.
This theory has been completely discarded as it has been proved that there was
considerable expansion of agricultural land during the Ming and Qing periods. The
collapse came due to the social system of parcelling out landed property equally among
all the sons. The demographic pressure forced the peasants to migrate to relatively
unpopulated areas farther away from the seat of the imperial government and it was these
"wandering people" who formed secret societies and participated in banditry, smuggling,
revolts and rebellions in China.

Growth of population led to the expansion of urban centres which were administrative
and not trading centres and therefore there were no avenues for investment in productive
enterprises. Chinese cities never created urban trading and manufacturing classes. The
Chinese Examination System also deflected ambitious individuals away from commerce.
Money making activities represented a dangerous threat to the scholar-officials because it
constituted an alternative ladder of prestige and an alternative ground of legitimacy for
high social status. The Chinese landlord-tenant
43

relationship was a political device for squeezing an economic plus out of the peasant and
turning it into the lamentations of civilization. In the absence of big urban trading
markets, there was little incentive to change this system.

The guild system was organised to enable the government to control the handicraft sector,
regulate and limit the development and forestall competition and to keep the peasant tied
to the land. Government had complete monopoly over the mines and opened or closed
them at its whim. Limitations were imposed on production and deliberate attempts were
made to buy products at low prices. Heavy taxes were imposed upon the manufacture of
salt, tea, and liquor. To further hinder capitalist growth, brokers' fee was charged when
the products were traded, a tariff when the. products were transported and a local tax was
charged when the products arrived in the market. Above all, there were extortions by the
local officials. Land was considered as the best source of investment and usury. This
prevented profit from being transformed into industrial capital. Imposition of strict
limitations on foreign trade did not lead to the development of commodity production in
China. The traditional self-sufficient Chinese economy limited the expansion of
commercial market and prevented industrial capitalism from opening up new avenues of
expansion. Peasant rebellions did not change the system, they just replaced one oppressor
with another. In fact, China faced a paradoxical situation. The peasants had the right to
overthrow tyrannical and oppressive rulers but it was difficult for the ruler to change the
traditional system in order to make his position stronger because that would mean change
in traditional Confucian political order which was a very difficult task.
44

The government officials were overworked and underpaid and tended to let the juniors
handle most-of the work and in this way corruption seeped into the lowest level. There
developed a tendency to earn the maximum as long as one was in powerful position.
There was gradual expansion and development of the Qing Empire but without
consequent growth of administrative apparatus.

The Examination System had a very narrow scope and was impractical by nature. It
stifled free expression, encouraged orthodox way of thinking and stressed Confucian
values at the cost of scientific thinking. With the result there was growth in the number of
unemployed educated youth who were demoralised, frustrated and divorced from the
government service. They became the major think-tank and source of rebellion.

A century of peace had weakened the Qing army and its banner forces became parasitic
units and soldiers opium edicts. To curb the power of the military commanders, a
complex military apparatus was developed which was of overlapping command and the
result was internal weakness and laxity. The naval power of the Chinese was no match to
the Western imperialist threat.

Spate of peasant rebellions and rampant corruption reduced the inflow of revenue into the
imperial treasury. Moreover, land revenue was calculated in kind but peasants were
required to pay in copper cash. But the value in silver had to be reckoned in terms of
copper cash. Officials used to increase the silver rate in copper and they usurped the
profit earned in this manner. The fixed official exchange rate which reached the central
government was always lower. The
45

continuous spate of corruption led to serious shortfalls in government revenues which

created further administrative weakness and laxity.

In the nineteenth century, decline in the production of silver and copper metal from local
mines led to reduction in the availability of both the currencies which further complicated
the matters. To make things worse, from the 1820s the major investment of silver was
done to finance the illegal opium trade. As a result sub-standard currency came into
circulation which exagerated the exchange rate mechanism between silver and copper
currency. Financial difficulties created administrative problems as the government did
not have sufficient resources to meet the challenges of wars and rebellions in the mid-
nineteenth century. The final blow was the vicory of Western powers after the Opium
Wars and imposition of huge sums of indemnities which created new financial problems.

The spread of opium, the drain of silver, and the influx of foreign shipping companies,
cotton mills, railways and telegraph lines aggravated the crisis in the rural sector. The
silver shortage caused depreciation of the copper currency and a sharp rise in the cost of
living. Debased coinage came into use. Foreign machine made goods drove Chinese
handicrafts to the wall and natural calamities finally forced the peasants to rise yet in
another revolt which threatened to uproot the Qing dynasty.
46

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu; The Rise of Modern China, Oxford: 1985.
2. J.K. Fairbank, E.O. Reischauer & A.M. Craig; East Asia: Tradition and
Transformation. Boston: 1973.
3. W.T. de Berry (ed); Self and Society in Ming Thought, 4. 5. Columbia University
Press: 1970.
4. Bai Shouyi (ed);.4/7 Outline History of China, Beijing: 1982.
5. D. Twitchett & J.K. Fairbank (ed); The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, London:
1978.
CHAPTER: 2
THE TRIANGULAR TRADE BRITAIN-INDIA-CHINA

SHALINI SAKSENA
Smt. C.H.M. College
Ulhasnagar-3
University of Bombay
Bombay

From very times, a remarkably successful and large scale trade was carried on at
Guangzhou from very early times. After the twelfth century this trade with foreigners,
mostly Arabs, declined. During the sixteenth century the Western powers reached
Guangzhou and revived the sea borne trade. China kept direct contact with the foreigners
at a minimum level and generally pursued an isolationist policy towards traders and
missionaries. China maintained her exclusiveness because of her self-sufficiency and
conservatism coupled with a prejudice against foreigners. Two factors were responsible
for China's closed-door policy; one Portuguese conquests in the East Indies and Spanish
aggression in the Philippines and two, internal conditions in China in early seventeenth
century when Ming dynasty was struggling for survival.

In 1644 the Qing dynasty was established in China. This coincided approximately with
the time when the Dutch and the British made their debut on the Guangzhou scene and
later destroyed Portugal's monopoly of the China trade. The
48

Dutch attempted organised commercial activity through the Netherlands-Indies Company

established in 1602. They tried to secure permission to trade at Guangzhou but failed due
to Portuguese influence. They sent several embassies to Beijing and even consented to be
treated as inferior tribute bearers in the hope of establishing political contact with the
Qing court and getting commercial concessions. They remained largely clandestine
traders until 1762 when they were permitted to build a factory at Guangzhou.

England developed considerable interest in China or Cathay as they called it. Not
successful in their initial attempts to carry on trade, they shifted their activities to the East
Indies which offered great opportunities of spice trade. . The East India Company (EIC)
was chartered in 1600. Its commercial activity in India led to the establishment of
factories in widely distributed centres. From the outset the EIC showed great interest in
seeking commercial relations with China. The Court of Directors of the EIC negotiated a
treaty with the Portuguese Governor of Goa in 1634 by virtue of which the first British
ship was admitted to the port of Macao in 1637. Though British trade in China had
commenced, it languished for some time due to petty international jealousies and the
Qing policy of discouraging trade and treating traders and foreigners with indifference.
The Chinese Emperor Jiangxi (1662-1722) liberalized Qing policy towards the foreigners
and in 1685 opened all the ports to European traders. However, Emperor Qianlong
restricted all commercial transactions to Guangzhou which developed as the largest and
the richest trading depot in the Empire.
49

During the Qing period certain forms, practices and ceremonies of contact were evolved
which constituted the Tributary System.

England had the good fortune of first experiencing the Industrial Revolution during the
late eighteenth century. It added the new motives for overseas expansion and colonial
conquests. England's sound financial structure in the Bank of England, the commercial
power of the EIC, her naval supremacy and extensive colonial empire raised Britain to a
position of unparalleled global influence and power. The primary object of British policy
was to secure potential markets. India and China figured prominently in British eyes
offering limitless prospects for commercial expansion.

There is an intimate connection between the establishment of British empire in India

and the expansion of British trade with China. The process was almost simultaneous. In
1757 Guanzhou emerged as the centre of trading activities in China and Britain the
largest exporter-importer. Also in 1757, the Battle of Plassey paved the way for British
conquest of Bengal. They gained legal recognition of their status by the Treaty of
Allahabad in 1765 when they acquired the 'Diwani' of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Further
imperial annexations eventually led to the conquest of the whole of India. Of particular
significance was the downfall and dissolution of the Maratha Confederacy in 1818 as a
result of which the region of Malwa fell into British hands. Already the opium producing
districts of Bengal and Bihar were secured for the EIC. With the acquisition of Malwa
50

more opium producing areas came under their control. The consequences were dramatic.
India controlled the China trade through its export surplus consisting first of Indian
cotton and later, mainly opium. It was a state monopoly from which the government
derived large profits and therefore was systematically developed by the British. The
China trade became a vehicle for British remittances from India. The EIC sold Indian
cotton to China and from its proceeds brought Chinese tea, silk and other goods for
Britain. This helped to transmit surplus Indian revenue to Britain. The Chinese quite
naturally wanted to keep the most saleable Indian commodity— opium, out because it not
only turned the balance of trade in favour of England but also created a social and moral
problem for the government.

The British trade at Guangzhou was carried on by three distinct groups: the Company, the
private merchants and the country traders. The Company's head quarters were in London;
it exercised overall supervision and control of the entire China trade. The private
merchants were the commanders and officers of the ships plying between England and
China and India and China who were granted licence to trade: The country trade was
trade between India and China carried on by English merchants residing in India or by
native Indian merchants, who were licensed by the EIC. Over the years there was a great
increase in the value of imports and exports, but between the Company and country trade,
a balance was maintained. .Whereas the Company's
51

exports were greater, the country trade's import of merchandise exceeded exports. The
Company utilized the surplus provided by the country and private trades in financing its
extensive exports.

The British trading interests in China were looked after by a Council of Supercargoes.
When trade started in the East it was a practice to have on board every ship an officer
known as Supercargo who was responsible for all commercial and diplomatic business of
the voyage. Later a practice developed whereby the Company had shore-based
Supercargoes who took over each ship's cargo and other trade related affairs when it
arrived at Guangzhou. The Supercargoes organised themselves in a council which helped
them to assert greater authority while negotiating with the Chinese merchants and other
customs and port officials. This was the forerunner of the influential Select Committee
which handled the Company's affairs at Guangzhou during the trading season. When the
monopoly of the Company was terminated in 1834 the Select Committee was replaced by
a Superintendent of trade in China.

The East India Company had extensive powers to protect British trading interests.
Though the Company used its powers to establish a government in India it retained its
mercantile character in China. As an organisation run for profit, it provided its servants
ample opportunity, through patronage and private trade to make a fortune. To balance the
extensive export of tea and silk, the EIC imported woollens, lead, tin and copper from
England. From Bombay
52

it brought raw cotton, from Madras and Bombay sandalwood and small quantities of
redwood and later opium from Bengal. But the trade was never steady because England
was more anxious for Chinese tea than the Chinese were for British goods. The balance
was met in silver and by 1817 an estimated £150,000,000 worth of bullion had been
transferred to China. The Company had to continue paying in bullion for its' tea till the
emergence of 6pium as the largest staple import which reversed the favourable balance of
trade enjoyed by China.

In addition to the Company's traders a large number of private merchants operated at

Guangzhou. Though private trade constituted only about 15 percent of the total British
trade, it was of much consequence. Private trade generally dealt with articles which were
comparatively unimportant for the Company to be concerned about. Some items of trade
were raw cotton, furs, ginseng, dyes, metals, woods, cloth cuttings, pepper, watches,
clocks, knives, cutlery, glassware etc. Cotton was by far the most significant article of
import. China exported the more expensive varieties of tea through the private traders.
Export of Chinaware, silk and nankeen fluctuated but rhubarb and sugar candy increased
consistently. Private trade gave incentive to the Supercargoes and ship officials to earn
extra money. And, it was the means by which an average citizen of Britain could
participate in the China trade.

Country trade, carried by private individuals under licence by the EIC amounted to over
30 percent of the total
53

British trade at Guangzhou in 1800 and continued to increase steadily. The Indian market
for Chinese goods was limited consisting of sugar which was the chief article, and
miscellaneous goods like camphor, cassia, nankeen, vermilion, lacquer. Chinaware,
grass-cloth, fans, writing paper and the sundries imported for Europeans in India. Though
the profits were not good, the Chinese authorities insisted that every foreign importer
purchase a proportion of Chinese goods before his ship be granted the 'grand chop'
permitting her departure.

The bulk of the country merchants' exports from India was in the two staples cotton and
opium. Cotton came mainly from Bombay or Surat and in 1800 constituted at least one-
half of the total merchandise imported through the country trade. Though the exact
figures on opium were not known, it was probably second, tin and pepper occupying the
third and fourth places. The greater amount of country trade was between Bombay and
Guangzhou especially alter the opening of the India trade in 1813. Several firms were
established hoping to take, a bite of the fabulous China trade. The nature of market at
Guangzhou underwent drastic changes. Several articles of imports like clocks, watches,
Prussian blue etc fell off after 1815 whereas there was a marked decline in others like
pepper and tin. The growth of Singapore as a commercial centre in the 1820s contributed
to the glut at Guangzhou. From 1819 the Guangzhou market for Indian cotton faced acute
depression. A fall in the price of cotton caused untold miseries for the Hongists; seven of
them were reduced to a state of insolvency. The cotton slump adversely
54

affected the country trade as a whole, the years 1827-28 being one of the greatest
depressions when, all except opium imports were hardly able to cover their costs^ leave
alone making a profit. In the face of depression the country traders developed the China
trade on new lines, with opium replacing cotton as the main staple.

Opium as a pain-relieving drug was known to the Chinese from very early times. The
Arabs transmitted it to the east, but it was the British who organised opium sales in China
in a way that it not only became the single largest commodity of commerce but
introduced the Chinese to the pernicious addictions of opium smoking. There is a close
link between the British conquest of Bengal and the furtherance of sales of opium in
China, Clive's victory over secured for the EIC the opium producing areas of Bengal and
Bihar. To obviate the dangers of competitions from the Dutch and the French plus to
secure regular revenue, Warren Hastings in 1773 established a monopoly of opium sales
under the Bengal government. The farmers were given advance payments for the
cultivation of poppy and they had to sell it only to the Company. The Government held a
public auction in Calcutta and the purchasers exported it to wherever they liked. Thus,
"the Company concerned itself only with the production, manufacture and sale of the
drug in India." While the Company's own ships were hypocritically forbidden from
trafficking in the drug, opium was transshipped to China by private traders under licence
from the EIC in the "Country ships." The Country merchants were not concerned with the
ethics of the whole transaction, and the trade flourished bringing vast fortunes for all
those
55

involved in it. After the Qing government became aware of the harmful effects of this
injurious drug its import was prohibited in 1796. Opium trade was then carried on
through smuggling. The Company indirectly participated in the opium traffic and
promoted it to such an extent that it became a critical question during the first four
decades of the nineteenth century.

In the early stages of trade China enjoyed a favourable balance and Britain had to pay in
specie for the large quantities of tea she bought through the EIC. In return the British had
little to offer which would be welcome in Chinese markets except Indian raw cotton and
opium. By 1822 the market for raw cotton was considerably reduced due to depression.
From 1823 onwards the opium imports increased consistently; it not only overtook cotton
but turned the balance of trade in favour of Britain. Though cotton was sold on conditions
of barter, opium being contraband was smuggled and dealt with in cash. The EIC did not
itself trade in this forbidden commodity but private trade in opium gave the Company the
silver she needed for the purchase of tea. The Company, not indifferent to the traffic
encouraged it by giving the Patna and Benares varieties of Bengal opium their trademark,
thus ensuring a quality acceptable to the Chinese. Malwa opium, inferior in quality and
therefore, fetching lesser price, was first shipped by the Portuguese but later even the
Company dealt in it.

The spectacular growth of opium smuggling can be divided into three phases, 1800-1820.
1821-1830 and
56

1831-1840. During the first phase all opium imports on British accounts averaged less
than 4500 chests per year (each chest weighed about 60.5 kilos). In the second phase
there was a phenomenon rise averaging 10,000 chests per annum. It is then that Lingding
became the chief depot of smuggling activity. In the third phase there was an enormous
expansion in imports, from 16550 chests in 1831-32 to over 30,000 in 1835-36 and
40.000 in 1839-40. This was due to the well-organised production in India, distribution
system through country traders and the influx of private merchants to Guangzhou when
the Company's charter was abolished. (The EIC's monopoly was abolished after much
lobbying and petitioning from British manufacturers, free traders, private merchants and
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce).

The modus operand of the opium transactions was: after the auction at Calcutta, a fleet of
fast armed ships the notorious opium clippers) carried it to Lingding, the principal base of
operations. There it was transferred to the floating hulks anchored at Lingding called the
receiving ships. The Chinese smugglers of opium paid silver in advance at a Guangzhou
factory and took delivery of opium on the receiving ships at Lingding. The smugglers'
men distributed it to receivers living in the neighbourhood at Guangzhou. Since opium
was a contraband item and its import continued in defiance of Imperial edicts, it was
obvious that there were vested interests at all levels to support the traffic. The middle
men. Chinese officials. Hoppo and Viceroy enjoyed their regular kickbacks. The country
traders and the vast number of private firms engaged in opium smuggling made huge
fortunes.
57

A large number of firms were doing business at Guangzhou. During the nineteenth
century two British firms, Jar dine Matheson & Company and Thomas Dent & Company
were prominent. Like other private traders these firms amassed vast fortunes, the bulk of
which came from opium dealings at Lingding. Although the firm of Jardine and
Matheson came into existence only in 1832, their firm played a dominant role in the
Guangzhou trade after dissolution of the EIC monopoly. It added to its shipping,
insurance and miscellaneous functions as- a house of agency. Dent & Company was their
serious competitor. Both these firms had their correspondents in Calcutta, Bombay and
London, who were often mutual rivals. In fact, their rivalry was best seen in their refusal
to cooperate with each other to tackle common problems of trade.

The characteristic unit of private British trade with the East, both China and India, was
the "Agency Houses." Apart from trading which was their primary concern, the Agency
Houses performed other commercial functions, acting as bankers, bill-brokers,
shipowners, freighters, insurance agents and purveyors. During the nineteenth century
when British machine-made goods exceeded the home demand, the surplus products were
shipped to the Agency Houses in the East who sold them on commission basis. Agency
Houses also carried on banking operations due to the absence of European banks in
China. They undertook many of the subsidiary services of a modern bank, giving credit,
acting as trustees and executors, granting letters of credit to travellers and even acting as
investment brokers, mainly in
58

opium. Agency Houses were the intermediaries between private merchants and the EIC
through which remittances were made. They, were also involved in marine insurance and
shipping. They acquired a fleet of ships, clippers, receiving, ships and coastal vessels.
The Agency Houses, thus, performed a multiplicity of functions in promoting and
expanding Britain-China-India trade.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Michael Greenberg; British Trade and the Opening of China: 1800-41, Cambridge:
1951.
2. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu; The Rise of Modern China; Oxford: 1985.
3. J.K. Fairbank; Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, Harvard: 1964.
4. Tan Chung; Triton and Dragon: Studies on Nineteenth Century China and Imperialism,
Delhi: 1986.
CHAPTER: 3
THE OPIUM WAR (1840-42) ANITA NARAIN

Mata Sundri College

University of Delhi
Delhi

The Opium War was one of the most significant events in the history of the Far East. This
Sino-British conflict, said to be a watershed between traditional and modern China, ended
in the defeat of the Chinese. Consequently, a humiliating treaty was imposed upon her.
The Treaty Port System, which emerged out of the treaty, marks the beginning of China
being absorbed into Pax-Britannica.

There are three different schools of thought on the causes of the Opium War (1840-42).
During the 1950s Karl Marx in his articles in New York Times advanced the view that
the war took place over the issue of the import of opium, hence the term "Opium War"
was used. John K. Fairbank, a veteran of Sino-American relations reached a conclusion
that opium was the occasion and not the real cause of the war. The real cause according
to him was the conflict of two different cultures: Oriental and Occidental. Michael
Greenberg, who adopted a middle of the road interpretation, is of the view that the British
wanted to "open" China to the free enterprise of the world. Such was the influence of two
latter schools that the "opium" factor was relegated to an unimportant and secondary
position as cause of the Opium War. A relatively new research work of Tan Chung is his
two books, China
60

and the Brave New World (1978) and Dragon and Triton (1986) and a couple of articles
that appeared in the magazine China Report in the late 1970s, traces the vital importance
of opium in the expansion of Pax-Britannica. While examining the tensions arising from
Sino-British contacts during the Canton1, Trade Period (1760-1840), he arrives at the
conclusion that the term "Opium War" is not a misnomer.

The cumulative effect of various factors sparked off the war. It is, therefore, necessary to
examine the tensions and clashes between the two nations. One area of tension was the
number of restrictions imposed on foreign traders and their activities.

The Manchu (Qing) government was apprehensive of a collusion between the Han
(Chinese) rebels and the foreign saboteurs. In order to maintain its authority, the
Westerners were allowed to call only at Guangzhou. The British resented that the
Koreans, Japanese, and Russians could call at ports other than Guangzhou also. All the
dealings of the traders regarding trade and otherwise were through Co-hong till their
communications were routed through this organisation. The traders were being exploited
through extortions. Though the customs duties were low, they were normally charged
double and many times triple or quadruple. The Hoppo or the Customs Superintendent of
Guangzhou was notoriously corrupt. Also, trouble arose when Lord Napier, the Chief
Superintendent of British trade at Guangzhou demanded direct negotiations with the
Chinese Viceroy in 1834. The Napier, affair has been described by Hsin-pao Chang as a
'diplomatic crisis'.
61

It was highly inconvenient for the British traders to stay at Guangzhou from August to
March for trade and go back to Macao thereafter. They could not bring their women-folk
or families to Guangzhou. The case of Mrs Bayres in 1 830s did create some tension
when she was forced to leave Guangzhou. Mrs Bayres was the wife of President of East
India Company's Guangzhou Committee. The foreign traders also could not carry arms to
Guangzhou. They were not allowed to use sedan chairs which were the transport of the
privileged. This was socially humiliating for them and a source of ill-will.

Restrictions on trade and other activities were not acceptable to the British traders. In
fact, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a time when the British were drunk
with power and pride. They reacted sharply to various restrictions. This caused tensions
and spoiled relations between the two sides. An observation by a British official in
Bengal Commercial Report of 1820 highlights the British restraint in dealing with the
Chinese "How long are Englishmen to succumb, how long are they to submit to insults,
injustice and extortions from such a race (Chinese)?" The British were prepared for a
showdown during Bayres' Case. The building of quay at Guangzhou continued to create
tension till Napier's Affair of 1834. Other incidents like Lady Hughes' Affair. Neptune
Riot at Huangpu (Whampoa), Royal Charolette Incidents created enough tensions
between the two nations. There was preparedness for a showdown sometimes and the
British were able to judge the military preparedness of the Chinese.
62

In spite of all the extortions at Guangzhou by Co-Hong, the British profits from the trade
were considerable. Their gains could not be institutionalised as China was not a British
colony. They considered it an ideal to have a foothold in China as they had in India
before the Battle of Plassey. For quite some time Macao was contemplated as a foothold.
Later, Macartney and Amherst in their missions asked for the opening of Chushan,
Ningbo and Tianjin. The demands were all refused. The British considered it their right to
get a more favourable treatment by virtue of their superior military power. As the
diplomatic efforts failed, the alternative was military action. The absence of stable
diplomatic relations between the two countries brought them closer to war.

Tan Chung has tried to examine the above contention in his research. He has tried to
show that the British never gave the highest priority to acquiring such an opening. It
would be wrong to interpret the forcing of China to lease Hong Kong during and after the
War for "opening China" as part of the origin of the War. At no stage, Tan argues, during
the Canton (Guangzhou) Trade Period, the British government plan to occupy Hong
Kong or any other "depot" by force. He says that China was already open enough for the
British to make considerable trade profits. Thus, a foothold, though desirable, was not an
absolute necessity. In any case, Lingding was a base enough for escaping the hardships of
the Canton (Guangzhou) System. Tan says that British-priority was to grasp the
opportunities opened up by China and exploit them. He is positive that neither the quest
of a foothold nor the opening of a country was really a tension area which germinated the
seed of Sino-British War.
63

The Sino-British relations also suffered tension on account of judicial controversies from
time to time. The British traders had to abide by Chinese laws for which they had scent
respect. There was a dichotomy between the innate British tendency to slight Chinese law
and to abide by it for the smooth pursuit of trade. The Chinese used this trade embargo to
bring British defaulters to book. Cases like Lady Hughes' Affair (1784), Neptune Riots at
Whampoa (Huangpo) (1807), Royal Charolette Incidents (1810), Topaze Case of 1821 —
all involved judicial controversies and created tension on both sides. Tan argues that
despite these tensions there was period of eighty years of peaceful and smooth bilateral
trade. The British traders did not miss a single trading season at Guangzhou. The mutual
conciliation on both the sides averted any showdown. Sino-British judicial differences,
therefore, did not contribute to the War.

One cause of the War could be seen in the Chinese outmoded manner of treating all
foreign countries as "tributary nations". The evidence for this, as pointed out by J.K.
Faribank, is two-fold. Firstly, China received the British ambassadors Lord Macartney
and Lord Amherst as "tributary envoys". Secondly, Britain was described as a tributary
state in the Qing Collected Statutes and other imperial documents. Also linked is the
issue of kowtow (kotow) which Fairbank sees as a factor in aggravating Sino-British
relations. It was a traditional custom of the Chinese royal court which was followed by all
the foreign officers seeking emperor's audience. It was a kind of genuflexion to the
seniors shown by the juniors. The British ambassadors Macartney and Amherst refused to
abide by it calling it a humiliating
64

practice. This created misunderstanding on both the sides and the emperor considered the
behaviour of the envoys as "extremely obnoxious".

Tan has his own arguments to support the Qing government's policy in regard to the
foreigners. He says that "giving a tributary status to a country by the Chinese did not
downgrade its real status in China's international relations."' Defending the practice of
kowtow, he says that it was a thousand-year old practice, and outward demonstration of
reverence for the emperor rather than an abject humiliation of the person seeking it. With
all the justification Tan Chung offers, the kowtow and tributary issues did accelerate the
hostility between the British and the Chinese.

Other issues also point to the fact that the two nations were poles apart in their conception
of each other. The arrogant British demanded equal if not superior status from the
Chinese. The latter considered their own civilization as superior, their empire as the
"Middle Kingdom" (Zhongguo) and all the non-Chinese as barbarians (yi). The British
were waiting to explode the myth of the superiority complex of. the Chinese. They could
not tolerate a monarch who called himself "Son of Heaven" (Tianzi) and a system where
the merchants were looked down upon in the society.

Thus, the above factors did generate sufficient heat on both the sides. However, even the
cumulative effect of these sporadic factors did not create unprecedented tension leading
to the War. The most significant and immediate cause of the War was, therefore, the
opium question. Like Karl Marx. Tan Chung sees it as the only cause of the War. He is of
the
65

opinion that the Western scholars do not want to give importance to the opium factor
because they wish to ignore the immense suffering caused to the Chinese due to this
trade. It destroyed the country and her people both materially and mentally. It was
essential for the Qing government to put a slop to its import or at least contain it.

Opium as a commodity had been in use in China from earlier times for medicinal
purposes. From seventeenth century onwards opium began to be smoked by Chinese.
Soon it became a vice. The Westerners used the commodity to suit their purpose of
counterbalancing their trade with China. Till 1810 British imports in China were mostly
in gold and silver. 90% of the British exports were in these precious metals. By 1820s the
situation changed dramatically in favour pf the British with growing amount of export of
opium to China. In stead of Guangzhou, Lingding became the base of opium smuggling
into China which grew more and more with the years. The following estimated figures
are given by Tan to explain the amount of opium brought into China and the number of
Chinese hooked to it:

PERIOD --- ANNUAL AVERAGE OF INDIAN OPIUM EXPORTED' TO CHINA---

TOTAL NUMBER Of ADDICTS OF INDIAN OPIUM
1795-1800 -- 2.000 Chests -- 1.71.000 Persons
1 821-1830 -- 11.400 Chests -- 12.61.000 Persons
1831-1840 -- 24.300 Chests -- 28.52.000 Persons

The total number of Chinese addicts of Indian Opium (collected by the British from
Bengal and Malwa) constitute 0.33% of the total population in the 1820s, and 0.7% in the
1830s,- which was alarming. According to Fairbank the rapid
66

increase in opium trade was stimulated by an ever expanding Chinese demand for the
drug. However, it may be said that there is no saturation point in the demand for an
addictive drug like opium. The addict would go on indulging in it even if his family were
deprived of the basic necessities. There is a different law of supply and demand for
narcotics.

The opium smuggling rapidly increased in 1820s as .there was a spurt of enthusiasm to
poison the Chinese race. The evil effects of opium smoking began to eat into the very
vitals of the country. It was definitely a manmade disaster. All men under forty, persons
from rank and file were afflicted by the 'flowing poison'. Around 1835, senior officers
and generals assumed that 90% of their staff were opium smokers. Talented youngmen,
hope of the future, became addicts. They "even died in the examination cells for want of
timely supply of the drug." The inefficiency in government offices and lack of public
welfare activities were due to the vice. There was mismanagement and general social
disorder because of the non-enforcement of law. Business slowed down and the standard
of living fell. Lin Zexu, the official who later played a leading role in the Opium War,
calculated that in 1839, 100 million taels2(One tael was equal to 1,208 English ounce or
34.1864 gms of pure sliver.) were being spent each year by the Chinese opium smokers,
while the government's entire annual revenue was approximately 40 million taels. "If we
continue to allow this trade to flourish ," he wrote "in a few dozen years we will find
ourselves not only with no soldiers to resist the enemy, but also with no money to equip
the army."
67

The tremendous outflow of silver is explained by the fact that in 1835-36, 4.5 million
Spanish dollars in silver were exported by China. This terribly disturbed the exchange
rate between silver and copper cash. It rose from 1 tael: 1700 to 1 tael: 2000 copper
coins. The .depreciation of copper was particularly severe in South China. Soldiers, low
ranking mandarins and the labour whose part income was in copper cash naturally
suffered. Commerce was crippled and the imperial revenue dwindled. The entire country
was on the road to decline. Emperor Dao Guang was naturally worried. He was
determined to put an end to the opium smuggling and issued edicts to this effect. The
intellectuals suggested that the trade of opium be legalised. War on opium would mean
war with the British, which could be disastrous. The ensuing debate among the mandarins
(1836-38) saw the emergence of the hardliners who wanted a vigorous implementation of
the policy of opium prohibition.

In 1839, Lin Zexu, the leader of the hardliners was appointed the Imperial Commissioner
with extraordinary authority to eradicate the opium scourge. Jardine, the leading light of
British opium trade interests, was surprised at the determination of a tough man like Lin.
Lancelot Dent, the proprietor of second largest concern of the opium trade, was arrested.
In spite of the efforts of Elliot, the Chief Superintendent of British trade at Guangzhou, to
bribe Lin with opium, the latter secured the surrender of 3.168,339 lbs of opium mostly
from the British traders. This was the first round of the war which the Chinese had won.
The crisis of 1839-40 was not merely caused by the loss of property by the British opium
traders. The stoppage of
68

opium trade meant the total disruption of the British-India-China trade triangle, which
was so vital to the British exploitation of the Indian colony. The starting point of the trade
triangle was India, and its generating force was the transmission of India's surplus
revenue to Britain via China. A rough estimate of sum total of British economic gain
from various aspects of the China trade during the 1830s was to the tune of 10 million
pounds per year, which was half of India's revenue. The British could never let go an
invisible colony half of India's worth. The opium trade succeeded also because of the
complicity of Chinese officers, coolies, boatmen, banking houses and proprietors of
opium houses. These people were interested in the perpetuation of the opium trade
because it made them prosperous. In any case, it was not easy to exterminate opium
smuggling.

It was naturally of vital important for the British to resort to military action against China.
Queen Victoria virtually declared war against China on 16 January 1840. Tan Chung
regards Lin's military action against the British as struggle against opium smuggling. As
a sequel to this, the British declared war on China.

Hsin-pao Chang is convinced that the basic cause of conflict was the British commercial
expansion versus the Chinese containment of it. Opium trade was an indispensable
vehicle for facilitating British commercial expansion, which might have been substituted
by molasses or rice. Whatever the commodity involved, the War was an inevitability,
whether it was known as Opium War or Molasses or Rice War. Chang has, thus,
converted opium war into X war,
69

with algebraic X standing for any commodity which Britain might have chosen as an
'indispensable vehicle' for commercial expansion. Tan Chung refutes the conclusions of
Hsin-pao Chang and argues that he has not taken into consideration the opium trade
reality in the context of the triangular trade relationship between Britain, India and China.
Opium, he says, is not an ordinary commodity like molasses and rice. Thus, the
interpretation is not acceptable.

The Opium war ended in the defeat of the Chinese. The latter could not stand in front of
the superior British power. Consequently, a humiliating Treaty of Nanjing (1842) was
imposed on them. The Chinese empire entered into a Treaty Port System (also known as
the Unequal Treaty System) with five alien powers (Britain, the United States of
America, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden) within a span of five years. China had to pay a
very heavy indemnity of 210 million silver dollars. She had to open up five of her ports
for trade with the West: Guangzhou. Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai. The island
of Hong Kong was ceded JJO England. According to the supplementary treaty signed at
the Bogue (8 October 1843) customs charges were fixed at 5% ad valorem, which were
very low in comparison with Britain's own customs duties back at home which were as
high as 300-400% on certain items. The Most Favoured Nation Clause was also added.
Surprisingly, the word 'opium' was not used in any term of the treaties.

To conclude, the Opium War was the first massive armed conflict between China and
Britain. A number of various factors continued to create tensions on both the sides. There
were cultural and other differences between the two nations,
70

but the war could hardly be called a "cultural crusade" by the British against the old and
static civilisation of China. The British cultural cause stunk once it was mixed up with
opium smuggling. The 'opium factor' was certainly the most significant factor on which
depended the continuation and expansion of British Raj in India. The war was the first
stage of British imperialism in China. The latter was bled white with serious economic
dislocations. The war was as tragic and decisive as were the battles of Plassey and Buxor
for India. .

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Tan Chung; Triton and Dragon: Studies on Nineteenth-century China and Imperialism;
Delhi: 1986.
2. Tan Chung; China and the Brave New World; a Study of the Origins of the opium War
1840-42, New Delhi: 1978.
3. J.K Fairbank; Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, Harvard: 1964.
4. Michael Greenberg; British Trade and the Opening of China; Cambridge: 1951.
5. Foreign Language Press; The Opium War, Peking; 1976.
6. Hsin-pao Chang; Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, Harvard: 1964.
CHAPTER: 4
THE UNEQUAL TREATY SYSTEM VIJAYA LAXMI SINGH
Sri Aurobindo (E) College
University of Delhi
Delhi

Up to the beginning of the Opium War (1840-42), Western merchants had largely
accepted the conditions of trade laid down by the Chinese. This system had also provided
an institutional frame work for the relationship of the Chinese to the Europeans.
However, the situation completely changed after the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) and the
treaties that followed. These treaties infringed upon the,, national sovereignty of China
through a variety of rights secured by the foreigners. As per these treaties, different ports
were opened. This saw not only the entry of foreign ships for the import-export trade, but
also the consequent foreign control of these places with the setting up of residences,-
foreign consuls and western courts. Through these treaties, the foreigners controlled
institutions like tariff control and customs relating to commerce. In fact, through a
network of treaty ports the imperialist powers ruled China by proxy. As these treaty were
one-sided which became the expression of western dominance in China, they are better
known as Unequal Treaties.

The story begins with the Chinese ignominious defeat in the Opium War (1840-42). As
pointed out by J.S, Galbraith, the Opium War "was a demonstration that Britain in the
free trade era was prepared to use force... to support trade." Under the terms of the Treaty
of Nanjing China was
72

made to open five ports i.e. Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai for
foreign trade. Now the Chinese policy of strict control over Westerners on Chinese soil
came; to an end. The process of extracting concessions and privileges which began with
the Opium War continued unabated. Gallagher and Robinson point to the frequent use of
treaties by Britain as "the most common political technique of British expansion." The
supplementary treaty to the Treaty; of Nanjing was signed at the Bogue (8 October 1843),
which; introduced the first fixed customs charges and filled up some open holes in the
Nanjing document. The Most Favoured Nation Clause was also incorporated. Now for all
practical purposes China had been transformed into a colony of many vested power
interests.

Closely following the British came the Americans and the French insisting on analogous
concessions. As a consequence, China signed the Treaty of Wangxia (1844) with the
United States of America. Besides putting the" British treaty into much more elaborate
and finished form, it also-put that treaty into legal language. Furthermore, it
supplemented the British document in several significant ways. It made the opium traffic
illegal for American citizens— an empty provision neither ever followed nor
implemented. The Treaty of Wangxia also went much more fully into the right of
foreigners to employ Chinese servants for all sorts of jobs without Chinese interference.
The most consequential clause, of course, was the provision for extraterritorial
jurisdiction to Americans and by extension, under the most favoured nation clause to
other foreigners in China. Hence, the Treaty of Wangxia (1844) like the Treaty of
Nanjing, not only provided for the opening of the five ports for American traders, it also
granted them the right to maintain hospitals and churches in them. As a result of the
73

treaty China had to more explicitly oblige the foreigners with regard to extraterritoriality,
fixed-tariff duties and the most favoured nation treatment.

In the same year, France, following the example of Britain and United States, demanded
that China conclude an analogous treaty. Thus, the Sino-French Treaty of Huangpu
(1842) was signed. As its trade with China was not so large as that of Britain and the
United States. France attached special importance to the privilege of propagating
Christianity in China. Both Caholic and Protestant faiths were recognised by the Qing
government as lawful and the missionaries of the western countries, together with their
merchandise, began to infiltrate into China. In this way. as a result of the treaties signed
between 1842 and 1844 the imperialist countries were able to extract a series of
concessions from the Qing government, which in turn enabled them to lay solid
foundations of imperialism in China. .

In 1 845. the British consul extracted an agreement from the Chinese prefect of Shanghai
determining the zone where the British could buy or sell land. France and the United
States of America haggled for similar concessions. By 1854. the British were able to
establish, municipal council, an autonomous political body, on the territory of their
concession. This council had its own budget, levied taxes. kept a police force and carried
out various other municipal and town-planning activities. The fact that the Chinese
sovereignty was being encroached upon became particularly obvious when the
concession territories were allowed to be used for activities by all kinds of Chinese.
Because once a Chinese moved into a concession territory, he was exempt horn the
authority of his own government and, thus, could
74
tread on the legality and morality of his own country with impunity.

But so far in the economic sense, the areas thrown open by law to foreign trade were
limited to five treaty ports. All these ports were situated on the southeast coast. The north
coast and the vast interior were still out of bounds to the foreigners. Between the two
Opium Wars trade did not expand as rapidly and extensively as the promoters of the
Open Door Policy1 had expected. The Chinese market was limited and the economy was
still largely self-sufficient in the basic necessities. Thus, the British and French launched
another war against China (1857-60) called the Second Opium War. As a consequence, a
series of treaties of Tianjin (1858) and Beijing (1860) were signed by China with the
United States, Britain, and France. Other than the already opened five ports, eleven more
ports were opened: Hangzhou, Jiujiang, Nanjing, Niuzhuang, Qiongzhou, Shantou,
Tianjin, Taiwanfu, Tanshui, Zhejiang, and Zhifu. These treaties extended many-fold the
privileges already extracted by the foreigners. Opium trade was legalised. Western
vessels were allowed access to certain inland waterways. Western missionaries and
merchants secured the right to travel about the country and to buy land. Foreign goods
were allowed to circulate in the country and were exempt from transit tax (lijin). In stead,
a lump-sum payment in the form of surtax of 2.5% was to be paid. France and Britain
besides receiving a war indemnity of 8,000,000 taels each, acquired the right to send
permanent missions to Beijing. The Russian acquisition of the territories off the northern
bank of Amur and the eastern bank of Ussuri, was also authenticated. In 1876 another
treaty known as the Sino-British Treaty of

1. See a separate appendix on Open Door Policy.

75

Yantai (the Zhifu Convention) was signed and four more ports were opened. This made
the total number of treaty ports twenty. Through this treaty Britain succeeded in making
further inroads into the Yangzi valley. The area covered by the treaty ports now extended
from Tianjin, the main entre pot in the north, to China's southernmost haven Guangzhou,
and from the upper stream of Yangzi in the west to the coast of Taiwan in the east.

While discussing the origin and nature of the treaty ports, J.K. Fairbank proposes that
these treaties were not an innovation on the part of the Westerners. According to him the
treaty system had its predecessor in the Tributary System and thus, had deep roots in the
traditional form of government. He views the treaty port system as " a case of
collaboration''' — a kind of alliance from which both the Chinese and the foreign partners
drew mutual benefit. Expressing serious disagreement with Fairbank, Tan Chung points
out that though in previous times, the foreigners were allowed to manage their own
affairs on the Chinese soil, but the Chinese were not kept under any undue pressure. But
now the foreigners at gunpoint forced the Chinese to agree to their terms. Thus, it was
indubitably an innovation and a system of this kind had not existed heretofore. The most
unequal aspect of these treaties was the complete absence of reciprocity.

The real nature of the Treaty Port System can best be understood by the fact that the
unequal treaties were the weapons by which the mercantilists hoped to achieve their aim.
The unequal treaties as Pelcovits says were the result of the constant pressure of the
mercantilists on the government "to prize open the Chinese oyster and discover the pearl
within." As Gallagher and Robinson point out the
76

character of imperialism "is largely decided by the various and changing relationships
between the political and economic elements of expansion in any particular region and
time." This implies that as mere economic force may not accomplish the economic goal
of imperialism it has to be helped by the political process, which includes the use of
armed force. The merchants believed that the obstacles that prevented the realization of
the potentialities of Chinese market, were more political than economic. Accordingly,
they prepared a blueprint of action, which they urged upon the Chambers of Commerce
and upon a reluctant government. It was held that only when the whole of China was
converted into one treaty port would China become, what it might be and if the Treaty of
Tianjin (1858) was properly enforced their rights would include every thing from
abolition of internal taxes to a comprehensive privilege of trading and residing
throughout the whole of China. They also believed that in order to secure for Britain the
realities of Chinese market, the British government must force upon Chinese those
administrative and fiscal reforms without which the door would never truly be opened.

The treaties affected China the most in the sphere of trade. The Opium War had shown
the way for growth of Western trade in China. In 1837 the total value of imports into
China was 17 million taels and in 1863 it went up to 69.3 million taels. The import of
opium soared from 3 million taels to 32 million taels in the same period. In 1867, the
imports valued at 69 million taels and exports 57 million taels and the balance of 12
million taels was paid in silver. Foreign trade was almost entirely carried out in the treaty
ports under the control of the foreigners. All those ships that
77

handled trade also belonged to the foreigners. Even the coastal trade was under their
control. Foreign-owned steamers almost totally supplanted the Chinese junks. The
foreigners took keen interest in insurance undertaking, coastal transport and port to. port
shipment of goods. The Chinese banking system to which capital came from small
Chinese depositors, was also controlled by the foreigners. Since paper currency issued by
the foreign banks was as good as the Chinese currency and it could be printed at will, the
foreigners virtually controlled the Chinese economy. In collaboration with the landlords,
compradores and merchant usury capital, in many places the foreigners erected multi-
faceted edifices of domination over China's financial and economic life lines. They
gained control of over 80-90% of the Chinese heavy industry, communications and
transport, and commodity markets. For example, in 1891 more than 30 foreign companies
were engaged in transporting goods between the treaty ports. These firms handled over
70% of the large cargo traffic which in that year reached the figure of 28 million tons,
compared with 18 million tons in 1885. Their armies had garrisons in big and medium
cities of China and strategic points, including Beijing. China retained only a semblance of
independence.

Foreign control over Chinese tariff was another important feature of the Treaty Port
System. From 1854 onwards, the administration of maritime custom duties was carried
out by foreigners. Oppressive tariff rates and corruption among Chinese customs officials
is cited by most Western scholars as the reason behind the foreigners' demand
78

for tariff control. But such an explanation does not appear to be convincing at all. Stanley
Wright has pointed out that "'the foreigners, many of whom were in the wildest sense of
the term, merchant adventurers were, as willing to profit by these abuses as the Chinese
themselves. Besides, in spite of all the corruption, Chinese tariff rates were not very high.
Morrison has shown that the Chinese tariff rate for tea before the Opium War was 2.5
taels per picul, whereas even the cheapest tea was sold at 10 taels per picul. In 1806 the
price of broad cloth in the market was less than taels 4 per yard, the tariff being a mere
10%. Chinese tariff rates were very low as compared with those of Britain. In 1809
British duty on tea was 100% and in 1847 it ranged from 200% to 300% depending upon
the quality. Thus, the real reasons for the demand of control over customs tariff by
foreigners were different. Foreign merchants wanted not only to ensure that the low tariff
imposed on China in 1842 was respected, but they also wanted the coastal navigation set
in order by getting rid of smugglers, military adventurers, and irregular traffic of all
kinds. But the real reason behind the foreign demand for tariff control was it was a very
powerful instrument for the mercantilists to prize open the Chinese oyster with a sword.
The work of customs service did not consist solely of collecting import-export taxes,
harbour dues, and coastal taxes. It also included quarantine, the study of epidemics on the
ports, coastal geographic surveys, the upkeep and improvement of harbours and rivers,
and aids to navigation. From 1858 onwards, import-export duties were levied at a single
fixed rate of 5% ad valorem for all goods. A provision had also been made in the treaties
that once customs duty
79

had been levied on foreign goods, they could not be subjected to any internal tax. The
home goods were not covered by this provision. This meant that foreign goods sold
cheaply. If the Chinese had been allowed protective tariff, then it would have helped
develop China's own industry. Moreover. China was obliged to mortgage her ordinary
and regular revenues as a guarantee for the payment of the indemnities and loans, which
China was required to. pay after the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Boxer Protocol. Thus,
even the small quantities of revenue that were collected, were pocketed by the foreigners.
In every important port well-paid foreign customs commissioner, who was supposed to
be under the supervision of the customs superintendent, a Chinese local official, was
appointed. But, in reality, things were different. Robert Hart, besides taking over as the
Inspector General of Qing government's Directorate of Maritime Customs in 1863,
virtually became China's finance as well as foreign minister. As pointed out by Tan
Chung. Hart and his Maritime Customs Services were like a double-edged sword ,of
imperialism. One edge protected the competitive advantages of Western imports
including opium, and the other pushed China deeper and deeper into indebtedness.

Another important feature of the Treaty Port System was the principle of extra-
territoriality. This meant that the foreigners were subjected only to the jurisdiction of
their own consuls. Extraterritoriality clearly provided an immunity to foreign offenders
from lawful punishment of the land. Moreover, no matter which legal system governed
foreign settlements, the Chinese were theoretically forbidden to live
80

there unless they were employed as servants by the foreigners. It also constituted a
foreign interference in China's internal affairs because of the invocation of the
extraterritorial rights to protect the proteges. Foreigners could name naturalised persons
and even Chinese as their proteges, who could then enjoy the same judicial immunity as.
the foreigners did. The Christian missionaries got a free hand to meddle with legal
disputes between Christian converts and their non-Christian compatriots. Almost all the
Western scholars have made an attempt to justify extraterritoriality on the grounds that
the Chinese judiciary was very backward. Though the backwardness of the Chinese
system cannot be denied, in almost all the cases this was blown out of proportion. The
Chinese had always used their judicial system in regard to the foreigners with
considerable liberalism. For instance, in the "Lady Hughes" affair, the Chinese never
demanded that the British surrender their gunner. The true meaning of the
extraterritoriality clause was not that a foreigner was at liberty to break Chinese laws.
The laws that prevented Chinese from doing a treasonable act were binding on the
foreigners also. But this privilege of exemption from the process of Chinese law and
courts was quite often abused by the foreigners. Criminals and crimes of a very serious
nature often went scot through the misuse of extraterritoriality. It has mostly been
suggested by Western Scholars that a family of Nations governed by international law
was established and China was made its member. However, this does not appear to be a
correct assessment of the situation as China's territorial jurisdiction was flagrantly
violated through the practice of extraterritoriality. Through
81

force and not of her own free choice, was China made a member of the international
community of sovereign states which at that time was exclusively controlled by the West.
China was no longer the centre of the East Asian Family of Nations, but instead, became
a member at first only of an inferior rank of a large Family of Nations centred around
Europe.

The treaty ports symbolised the superiority of the economic, political, and military power
of Western imperialism. They were also regularly reminded of the
cataclysmic wars and mortifying defeats to Li Hongzhang and others, "who were coerced
and coaxed to do the imperialist bidding." The treaty ports not only provided a cover to
the unbridled and pervasive exploitation of China through the warding of local political
interference, but also furnished bases of operation for international enterprises. The
Treaty System was the indirect governance with which the imperialist countries not only,
maintained but developed their interests in China. To conclude in the words of Michael
Edwardes, China became "the victim of imperialism without annexation." where
countries like Britain had indulged in "cooperative pillage" without the "risks of
attempting domination." ,
82

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. J.K. Fairbank; Trade & Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of Treaty Ports,
1842-1854, Harvard: 1953.
2. N.A. Pelcovits; Old China Hands & the Foreign Office, New York: 1948, reprint:
1969.
3. J. Chesneaux et al; China From Opium War to 1911 Revolution (tr. Anne Destony),
New York: 1976.
4. Parker T. Moon; Imperialism and World Politics, New York: 1926.
5. Tan Chung; Triton and Dragon: Studies on Nineteenth Century China and Imperialism,
Delhi: 1986.
6. H. Gilbert; The Unequal Treaties, London; 1976.
7. En-sai Tai; Treaty Ports in China, New York: 1918.
CHAPTER: 5
THE TAIPING MOVEMENT

ASHWINI SHANKAR
Deshbandu College
Kalkaji
New Delhi-110019

Peasant movements have always been a familiar phenomenon in the annals of Chinese
history. The Taiping-Movement stands out as the strongest and most significant of the
peasant movements that swept through China during 1850-1870, in what Jean Chesneaux
calls "probably the greatest wave of peasant wars in history." It was a social crusade
expressing the poor peasants' desire for equality, a national campaign against the foreign
dynasty occupying the throne in Beijing, and a modernist trend that developed in
response to the challenge presented by the West through the Opium Wars.

HONG XIUQUAN
The foundations of the Taiping Movement were laid by Hong Xiuquan. He was born in a.
peasant family of Guangdong province. He worked as a teacher for some time and at the
same time prepared for the Civil Services Examination. He worked quite hard for this
competition and attempted unsuccessfully four times over a period of 15 years. Failure to
get through the Civil Services made Hong anti-establishment and a desperate man. He
often suffered from deep depression and even hallucinations. Hong's contact with
Christian missionaries at this juncture changed his life decisively. He started believing
that he was the younger
84

brother of Jesus Christ and that the visions that he had were a message from God. He
took it upon himself to spreading the gospel and save mankind. He vehemently attacked
indigenous faiths, particularly Confucianism because it was "the religion of feudal lords"
and said that the teachings of Kong Zi (Confucius) were absurd. He was dismissed from
his teaching job in 1844 as the authorities found him too radical. Thereafter, he and a
friend called Feng Yinshan moved to Guangxi and set up the Society of God Worshippers
(Bat Shang Di Hut) by organising thousands of converts from among the poor peasants
and miners of the Hakka community.

Though it is difficult to exactly point out the full details and time of transition of the
Society of God Worshippers into a militant organisation, but by the middle of July 1850
the members of this organization had become bold enough to pose a threat to the
government. Hong Xiuquan's declaration on 11 January 1851 of the establishment of
Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping Tianguo) with himself as the Heavenly King
(Tian Wang) put him in direct confrontation with the Qing rulers in Beijing. This was the
beginning of the Taiping Movement. Now the Taipings began their march to the north.
On the way many clashes between the Taipings and the government troops took place.
Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but the Taipings could not be stopped in their
tracks. The capture of the town of Yungan was the first major victory of the Taipings.
Here the Taipings accumulated strength and built up an army with more than 37.000
fighters. A call was given to the Chinese people to overthrow the alien Qing rulers. The
Qing forces laid siege to the Taipings at Yungan, but the Taipings broke through after a
fierce fight. The Taipings continued to surge northwards and stretched their borders into
Hunan province.
85

The march towards north not only further emboldened the Taipings, but it also helped
them in accumulating resources and man-power. In March 1853 the Taipings swept into
Nanjing, the old capital of the Chinese Empire, which was renamed Tianjin (Heavenly
Capital). After the capture of Nanjing, the Taipings concentrated their military efforts on
capturing the major cities and towns along the Yangzi River, from Wuchang to
Zhenjiang. The demoralised imperial troops with their outmoded organisation were no
match for the highly motivated army of the Taipings. Finally, as a desperate measure, the
Qing- government appointed Zeng Guofan to raise a militia to challenge the Taipings. He
raised a force known as the New Hunan Army. By 1860, the strength of this army rose to
120,000 and Zeng was given the position of Imperial Commissioner. Western powers
though maintained neutrality, but were getting increasingly impatient with the Taipings
as they saw them as a threat to their commercial interests. Western neutrality turned into
active hostility against the Taipings when they launched an attack on Shanghai in 1860.
Equally important was the Western supply of weapons. Internal squabbles and
organizational weaknesses of the Taipings had also weakened them considerably. The
Taipings suffered their first major defeat in 1861. Finally, on 19 July 1864 Nanjing was
conquered by Zeng after a bloody fight.

CAUSES OF THE MOVEMENT

China was an agrarian land-based economy. The largest section of the society was
peasantry which was also the worst hit and most exploited. Land had always been scarce
in China and most of it was concentrated in the hands of a few landlords. The whole
structure rested solidly on the mass of peasants who paid rent to the landlords, interest to
the
86

merchants and moneylenders, and taxes in labour, kind and cash to the state.

The geographical theatre which staged the Taiping Movement, was characterised by
intensive utilization of farmland and dense population. China witnessed an unprecedented
increase in population by the approaching years of the second half of the nineteenth
century. The population rose from 143 million in 1741 to 430 million in 1850, an
increase of 300%, whereas land rose from 549 million mou (1 mou= 1/6 acre) in. 1661 to
737 million in 1833, an increase of only 35%. The discrepancy between population and
land growth resulted in a sharp decrease in per capita cultivation. However, the
population multiplied faster not only because it was in the offing but also because the
landlords had a vested interest in it. This enhanced the landlords' bargaining capacity to
bid up higher rentals. But the population pressure served the landlords' interests only so
long as there was a strong government to keep order, guarantee their property rights and
ensure the collection of rents. By the beginning of the second, half of the nineteenth
century, the rising tide of population broke through the dykes thrown up by the Chinese
society and swept away the entire system.

The life of the landless peasant was wretched. He had to pay 50% of the yield as rental or
share-cropping which resulted in ruthless exploitation. After the 1820s, copper coins
were debased and increased in number due to declining copper supply from Yunnan and.
adverse balance of trade caused by the opium trafficking. Thus, the inability of the
government to check economic ruin of the country manifested itself in two ways. Firstly,
the value of silver got almost doubled in relation to copper. Secondly, since the
agricultural
87

tax was calculated in silver and paid in copper, this change resulted in tremendous
increase in the peasants' burden in terms of taxation. In these circumstances, naturally
they could not eke out a subsistence but had to borrow from usurers.

Due to per capita decrease in arable land and continuous shrinkage of individual
landholdings, the condition of the peasantry further deteriorated and became pitiable.
When the yield of the small acreage could no longer sustain his life, he sold the land and
became the tenant of a landlord. Once the land was sold, the peasant was not likely to buy
it back. The simple reason was that the rich owner would not sell except at a very good
price. This, the impoverished the peasant could never meet. The result of this spiral was
the ever increasing concentration of land among the rich. The high concentration of
arable land is illustrated by the fact that 50% to 60% of it was in the hands of the rich
families. Another 10% was possessed by the bannermen and official villas, leaving only
30% for the rest of the 400 million. This brought about the weeding out process of the
small holdings; and started the progression of proletarianization of the peasantry. On the
other hand, land amalgamation coupled with a proto-capitalist development of
urbanization, created weidespread absentee or parasitic landlordism. Thus, the
concentration of population gave birth to the twin concentration of proletarianized
peasant and parasitic landlords. Social relation between the two were maintained
by the institution of tenancy and other forms of share- cropping marked by ruthless
exploitation. Thus, as pointed out by D.S. Zagoria, such a situation provided "a perfect
correlation between economic grievances and peasant unrest."
88

After the Opium War, the Qing government ruthlessly squeezed the people to pay war
indemnity to Britain. With foreign capital setting in. the native economy was impaired
and rural properties devalued. Under the new pressures, rural exploitation was intensified,
and land annexation increased. During the 1830s. in a province like Guangdong, where
the Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan was born, more than 90% of the paddy fields were
tilled by landless tenants. There were always far more farming hands than adequate land
to employ their labour. This resulted in further competition between the landless peasants
and hence more exploitation. The sociopolitical order of the land strongly protected the
landlords in their exploitation of the tenants. As pointed out by Barrington Moore Jr, "the
government and upper classes performed no function that the peasants regarded as
essential for their way of life. Hence the link between rulers and ruled was weak and
largely artificial, liable to snap under any severe strain.'" Moore also characterizes the life
of the Chinese peasantry as: no property, no family, and no religion. No property.
because land was annexed by the rich. No family, because young male peasants could not
find the means to many a woman and sustain home life. No religion, because the
Confucian ethos did not bother them.

Main displaced and unemployed peasants drifted to the cities as porters, dockyard-
workers, sailors, while others went abroad to seek a new life, and still others became
idlers. rascals and bandits. Since there were no avenues that could consume and absorb
these jobless people, they became a source of unrest in the society. They were a ready
material for an anti-establishment movement like that of the Taipings. in which they saw
the scope of realisation of their hopes and aspirations.
89

China, as aptly remarked by Joseph Needham, had a classic set up of bureaucratic

feudalism, where the main difference from European feudalism was in the role of the
state. In China, essential public functions were not delegated to the lord, but remained
with the state whose demand squeezed the peasant as much or more than the landlord's.
Often the landlords and gentry-official class coincided. At any rate, they operated
together to form a single ruling class, monopolising education and controlling economy
and administration directly and indirectly.

The curse of financial stringency fell on the Chinese society as a result and consequence
of the Opium War. Taking advantage of the fact that the Treaty of Nanjing made no
provisions against the import of opium, the foreign traders intensified their activities in
this illicit but lucrative trade. In the wake of this obnoxious practice, the year 1848
a<lone witnessed the outflow of more than 10 million taels of silver, accentuating the
already grave economic dislocation and copper-silver exchange rate. A tael of silver,
which had exchanged for 1.000 copper coins in the eighteenth century, had a market
value of more than 2,000 in 1845. This 100% rise in the exchange rate virtually reduced a
man's income by half, for although the silver tael and copper coin were both common
currencies of state, it was the latter that was the basic medium of exchange in the market:
rice was bought and wages were paid with the copper coin. The disruptive economic
impact of opium importation was-further confounded by the general influx of foreign
goods in the treaty port areas. Local household industries were swept away and the self-
sufficient agrarian economy suffered dislocation. Those who were adversely affected
became a potential source of trouble and by joining the Taiping Movement, facilitated
this mass upsurge in the realisation of its objectives.
90

The presence of Western traders along the south China coast and its hinterland,
contributed greatly to the spreading lawlessness. This became a hall-mark from the early
nineteenth century onwards when opium became a major item of trade. After the Opium
War, trade in opium shifted to Shanghai. Earlier most of the illicit trade was largely
confined to the Guangzhou area in which thousands of coolies, boatmen, peddlers,
middlemen and others were involved. Now most of them lost the sources of livelihood
and as a result became desperate bandits. Pirates pushed inland by the British navy's
piracy suppression operations also contributed to the drifting populace of reckless and
desperate people willing to act for anything. It is interesting to note, thus, that apart from
the Hakkas, the initial followers of the Taiping Movement came from the ranks of
dislodged middlemen, bootleggers, boatmen and coolies. The suffering of the common
masses and anti-ruling class sentiment is best reflected in one of the proclamations of the
Triad Secret Society (Tian Ti Hui), which raised the banner of revolt against the Qing:

Throughout the Empire, rapacious officials

are worse than bandits, and corrupt
mandarins of the public offices no better than wolves
and tigers. The crimes committed by
the rich are left unpunished, and the wrongs
of the poor never redressed. Deprived of their
means of support, the people are plunged into
darkest depths of suffering.

Certain political circumstances had also helped in a gradual build-up of ariti-Qing

feeling. The First Opium War and the subsequent treaty settlement had given the upper
hand to the West. Many members of the literati were very severe
91

in their criticism. They were quick to realise that the Manchus [were foreigners and by a
systematic method had retained [their exclusive social difference. They feared an erosion
of Chinese culture by the Manchus. Hence, "Rebel Against the. Qing and Restore the
Ming" became the watchwords of the opposition. Also, at this time, actual political power
was held by Empress Dowager Cixi, who followed a strong pro-Qing policy in official
appointments. While masses were left unmoved by these political developments, an anti-
dynastic feeling, led by a section of the literati, with a nationalistic flavour developed.
After the signing of Unequal Treaties, Guangzhou merchants and labour, resenting loss of
importance and prosperity became more and more anti-West. This is not without reason
that Karl Marx remarked: "The Taiping rebellion was caused by British canon and that
the Opium War actually woke up the Chinese people." Indeed, the Opium War did
awaken the Chinese people, but without a national consciousness because they failed to
understand the true nature of imperialism at least till the beginning of the 1911
Revolution.

The government officials could be characterised by superficiality, temporisation and

irresponsibility. Little or no attention was paid to the people's welfare. Of the more
conscientious officials who were relatively free from irregularities, some passed their
time in literary activities, while others read Buddhist scriptures and dabbled in
philanthropic works. They considered themselves lofty and refined, regarding those
officials who busied themselves with administration as vulgar. Official irresponsibility
was also reflected in the rampant selling of offices and extorted contributions. With 3,000
taels a man could purchase a magistracy. All these references reflect that the political
system was on the verge of its collapse and everybody was
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concerned about his own "self and no body was bothered about the nation as these
circumstances naturally instigated people to search for an alternative. This in turn helped
the cause of the Taiping Movement which also had only one ambition: the change of the
present set-up.

All the powers were vested in the Emperor and no body was ready to bother for the swift
execution of administrative affairs. Public functionaries were rarely given an opportunity
to show initiative, independent judgement or satisfactory performance of tasks through
the exercising of adequate authority. On the contrary, all officials were subjected to a
light net of regulations, restrictions, and checks, and threatened with punishment for
derelictions or offenses even in matters beyond their individual control. A situation
eventually prevailed in which the most prudent thing for the average official to do was to
assume as little responsibility as possible— to pay greater attention to formal compliance
with written rulers than to undertakings that were useful to the sovereign or beneficial to
the people.

The bannermen who contributed much to the founding of the dynasty, had long since
become enervated. They had degenerated to such a point as to be unable to suppress the
Revolt of the Three Feudatories and the court had to rely on the Chinese Green Standard
Army. By the time of the White Lotus Rebellion in 1796-1804, the Greeri Standard had
lost its vigour too and the court was forced to use local militia. The bannermen and the
Green Standard Army had forfeited the respect and fear of the people. Moreover, defeat
in the p Opium War exposed the military weakness of the dynasty. Secret societies and
ambitious Chinese were encouraged to intensify their nationalistic and radical movement
against the Manchus. In fact, the whole political and economic
93

situation was ably summarised by Zeng Guofan in the memorial to the Emperor on 7
February 1852: "The first is that the silver price is too high, so it is difficult to pay taxes.
Secondly, the thieves and bandits are too numerous and it is difficult for good people to
live peacefully. Thirdly, the unjustified imprisonments are too many, so it is difficult for
people to redress their grievances." This was an excellent description to the background
that sparked off the Taiping Movement.

The worldly problems were further compounded by natural calamities. The decades of
1840s and 1850s were full of natural calamities. Among the major ones were the severe
drought in Hunan in 1847, the flooding of the Yangzi river over the four provinces of
Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the famine in Guangxi in 1849, and the shifting of
the course of the Huang He river from the southern to the northern route in Shandong in
1852, flooding large areas. Millions of people suffered at the hands of these natural
disasters. Government relief at best was perfunctory, with much of the funds being
embezzled at the same time. In disgust and desperation, the suffering masses were easily
swayed to join an uprising.

The economic distress in the south was complicated and sharpened by the social conflict
between the "natives" (Hans: the original settlers) and the "guest settlers" (Hakkas). The
Hakkas were originally residents of central Asia who had migrated to Guangdong and
Guangxi under the barbarian threat. They were the social "out group" and their different
dialects, habits and mode of life made it difficult for them to mix and assimilate with the
natives. By the middle of the nineteenth century, a new factor of friction was introduced.
Many Hakkas took up Christianity under the leadership of
94

Hong Xiuquan, while the natives persisted with their worship of idols and spirits. The
Hakkas attacked the natives for their superstitions and the natives despised the Hakkas
for accepting a heterodox foreign faith. But, the Christianity that Hong Xiuquan and his
followers took up, was a home made Christianity. He organised the poverty stricken
people to defy the molesting governmental troops who interfered, with their worship of
God. Moreover, the Hakkas were independent, daring and prone to action in comparison
to the natives. They worked in small farms, charcoal making avenues and mines and
these were the places where potential revolutionary leaders recruited their followers. The
feeling of animosity and their energetic physique contributed a lot to the origin of the
Taiping Movement.

Some scholars have tried to explain the outbreak of this movement as part of the well-
known theory of dynastic cycle— the theory itself originating with Mencius in ancient
times. According to this theory of dynastic cycle "a ruling dynasty would lapse political
powers once it exhausted its mandate of heaven." A period of order was inevitably
followed by a period of disorder, and the Chinese believed that a minor disturbance was
to be expected every thirty years and a major one every hundred years. Everything that
has an origin, must come to an end sooner or later and this works in the form of a cycle in
which origin is inevitably tagged with an end. This cycle, however, can be big or small
and it has a peak point which marks the ascending climax and the start of the decline.
Seeing in this universal framework, the Taiping Movement undoubtedly comes under the
preview of this theory. For about 150 years China had experienced relative peace and
prosperity under Kangxi, Yung Zheng and Qianlong, and now a major upheaval was
expected. Thus, as observed by Ssu-yu Teng "Taiping rebellion developed from
95

cyclical decline which periodically occurred in Chinese history." We are also told in this
context by J.K. Fairbank that throughout Chinese history, one dynasty had been replaced
by another in the same circumstances without any fundamental changes. The features of
this loss of mandate were typical and can be listed as political corruption, economic
depression and agrarian distress. But seeing this theory under various conditions like time
and circumstances in the framework of China, it appears to be ambiguous. Moreover, as
pointed out by Tan Chung, the dynastic cycle theory smacks of the long standing Western
intellectual prejudice about China's historical changelessness. Every dynastic decline in
China was characterised by its peculiar historical circumstances and not by generalities,
he points out. It would be impossible to see a dynasty replacing another in the same
circumstances without any fundamental change. At the time of the Taiping Movement,
one can see many new factors especially the foreigners and the treaty port system.

Thus, it may be said that the causes behind this movement were embedded in the social
set up itself and which showed its symptoms in the manifested forms of degenerated
socio-economic conditions, financial stringency, political corruption, administrative
inefficiency, military degeneration, intellectual irresponsibility, the conflict between the
Hakka & the natives and the providential onslaught in the form of natural disasters.

IDEOLOGY
Facts prove that the Taiping Movement was just not a commonly seen outburst of
peasants. By virtue of its radical ideology, it was quite distinct from the past peasant
rebellions
96

that imperial China had witnessed. Firstly, it professed a religious ideology which was
hitherto foreign to the Chinese soil. Secondly, it attacked not only the political
superstructure but the entire social infrastructure by advocating social egalitarianism.
Therefore, the nature of the Taiping Movement can best be understood in terms of its
ideology and programme.

The political and social system of the Taipings is traced by Hsieh Hsing-yao to three
sources:
1. Their ideas on land distribution and political and military organisation were derived
from the Confucian classic, Zhou Li.
2. Their religious and social policies were copied from the Old and New Testaments.
3. Their actions and habits were mostly influenced by Chinese secret societies.

RELIGIOUS ASPECT
The basic cementing force of the Taiping Movement was its religious ideology, totally
revolutionary and heretical in nature. Paul A. Kuhn is of the view that the role of
Christianity in the Movement is rather confusing. This is so because most of the major
Christian teachings were not followed and whatsoever were accepted underwent a lot of
modification and distortion. Vincent Shih also holds a similar view. According to him,
though "the Taipings attempted to break away from the traditional pattern of Chinese
life... the Christianity as practised by the Taiping rebels was increasingly tainted by the
coloured glasses of tradition. The Taipings borrowed several rituals from the traditional
religion and sought to blend them within the framework of
97
Christianity." In fact, Shih goes to the extent of calling this form of religion "vulgar
Christianity."

SOCIAL ASPECT
The basic social ideas of the Taiping Movement were:
(i) Equality among men;
(ii) Equality between men and women; and
(iii) Brotherhood and Sisterhood of all men and women.

Social aspect of the Taiping ideology had its strings attached to the religious beliefs. The
concept of one God led them to emphasize the concept of universal brotherhood and
equality of men and women. Their economic philosophy was, therefore, egalitarian. One
of the Taiping documents titled The Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty read "All land
in the empire must be cultivated by the people as a common concern." Not only land, but
food, clothing, money and all movable properties were to be shared equally. This in
practice meant control of the state which was justified on the ground that everything
belonged to God.

As pointed out by Vincent Shih, "The principle of equality is most clearly expressed in
the Taipings' elimination of discrimination in their government examinations against
those traditionally considered as "mean people" or outcasts— for example, prostitutes,
actors and actresses, underlings, and yamen runners."

The concern of the Taipings over the question of emancipation of women is amazing.
They staunchly protested against loot-binding, polygamy, prostitution and others issues
which had made women subservient to men. In the process of improving the status of
women, the Taipings went
98

to the extent of establishing a women's militia. "Women were also allowed to compete in
Taiping civil examinations." "Women also occupied official positions similar to men."
"Sometimes they also went out to fight." The separation of sexes and the destruction of
the family unit were bold attempts at a social revolution aimed at the traditional Chinese
custom of staying in their ancestral villages for generations.

In the words of Shih, 'The Taiping social ideals were based upon the idea of
brotherhood... Taiping society was a sort of fraternity, whose members were not merely
sworn into a brotherhood but were considered real brothers on the theological ground that
God was the father of them all.”

The Taipings advocated strange form of sexual puritanism. Separate hostels were built
for men and women and sexual indulgence was discouraged. But in the later period, the
Taiping leaders themselves became self indulgent and maintained large harems.
Nevertheless, they did try to eradicate many social vices like opium smoking, drinking
and gambling etc.

POLITICAL ASPECT
The Taiping political platform may be summed up in the following slogan of the
Taipings:

To wipe out the Qing demons, restore the Chinese territories which long ago had fallen
into their hands, and then to establish a heavenly kingdom of equality.

On the political front, the Taipings sought to overthrow the Manchus and established the
Heavenly Kingdom
99

throughout China. Shih says that "the attempt to overthrow the Manchus too was a
concrete expression of their desire to give peace to the Chinese who had suffered
miserably under the Manchus." Further, according to the Taipings, the Qing demons were
preventing the implementation of God's will on earth. It was necessary, therefore, to
overthrow these demons if the Heavenly will were to be carried out.

The Taiping government in Nanjing was theocratic, the Heavenly King being both
spiritual and temporal ruler. Under the Heavenly King was the Eastern King, and under
the latter, four other kings. These five kings were both civil and military chiefs, and acted
as a supreme presidium.

Under the Taiping regime soldiers were at the same time farmers, the majority group in
society. The military organisation was also social and religious. Thus, it may be said that
the Taiping political, military, and social organization were identical i.e. the Taiping
church, state, and army were one.

The government nationalised all hand-industries and brought trade under its control, so
that regular supply of goods to the government and military could be ensured. The
Taiping government also converted the small handicraft workshops into large
government-managed factories. All handicraft workers were classified according to their
skills and organised into appropriate profession-based camps. The products of each camp
were placed in the public treasury. From the Heavenly King down to the rank and file, no
one in the Taiping army was allowed to own private property.

LAND SYSTEM AND SOCIALISM

The Taipings had in some ways a very attractive
100

economic system, a type of primitive communism. Their land system showed how the
Taipings planned to abolish private ownership of land, dividing the soil equally among
the people of the nation. Wherever the Taiping army went they burned deeds, documents
for collecting rent, and the receipts for payment. The land was to be divided into nine
grades according to its rice-producing capacity and was to be equally divided among the
people. The number of people in each family was taken as the basis for allocating land,
the more members the more land. If there were six members in a family, three were to be
allotted good land, and three bad land; the good and bad had to be half-and-half. The plan
for mutual aid between the areas of abundance and insufficiency was also well meant.
The aim of the agrarian policy was nationalisation of all the land and its equal
distribution among the people. This policy was apparently designed to satisfy the poor
people who had for long suffered due to lack of land to till and from the oppressive
policies of the privileged sections and the tax collectors. Its ideal was to establish a new
nation or even a new world. Clearly Hong Xiuquan attempted to carry out an economic
revolution. The source of this primitive communism was Christian belief combined with
Chinese one-world philosophy, which considered the empire as one large family. The
Taiping belief that everything belonged to God was based not only on the Zhou Li, but
was also influenced by the ancient idealised system under which arable land was equally
divided and assigned in sections to eight families, the central section being cultivated in
common to raise crops for the government. Hong had emphasised that in ancient China
people had shared natural products and had helped each other during calamities. It
appears that Hong Xiuquan was influenced more by the Chinese classics than by the
Bible.
101

MILITARY ORGANISATION

The Taiping army had a clearly defined organisation. In theory, each army controlled five
divisions, each division controlled five brigades, each brigade controlled five companies,
each company controlling five platoons {Hang); each platoon controlled five squads
(wu), and each squad consisted of five persons. The number of persons for each army
division was regulated on paper only. In practice, division sometimes consisted of only a
hundred or even several dozen soldiers. Besides, the regular army, the Taipings had four
auxiliary armies. In theory, the organisation of all armies was the same except that
division and brigade commanders were omitted in the women's battalions. There were
army registers and lists of qualifications for officers. Military training in peacetime was
very strict and included the careful observance of the Sabbath, when some Christian
doctrine was explained. This indoctrination was continued even during wartime. The Ten
Heavenly Precepts or Commandments had to be strictly observed, any violation brought
severe punishment. The soldiers and officers were by and large on equal terms. Taiping
force became a well-organised, disciplined, strong peasants' army. For this reason the
Taipings caused the common people little trouble. They concentrated on burning
government buildings and killing the Manchus, the gentry class, their servants, and local
militia members. Thus, the Taipings were popular with the poor people.

While critically evaluating the Taiping ideology, some scholars have pointed out that
though noble and attractive, it was worked out by an arm-chair scholar and therefore its.
scope was limited by his inability to foresee what would happen in practice. There was no
mention of a census nor of
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the method of confiscation and nationalisation, which would be necessary before the
land was equally redistributed. After a person received an allotment of land, it seems it
was meant' to become his or her permanent private property which of course, would
please the poor peasants. But if no land was returned to the government after the owner
had died or was too old to use it, soon there would not be enough to assign to future
generations, especially as the population had been increasing much faster than the
available arable land. Furthermore, there were no arrangements to store up a surplus for
famine years, if a widespread flood or famine ruined the harvest in a large area covering
several provinces for a year or more.

This unorthodox and heretical ideology was closely knit with its leadership. The initial
leadership originated from amongst the Hakkas of South China. This group of people had
migrated to the region centuries ago but had not been assimilated into the mainstream of
local life. Paul A. Kuhn. notes that "most of the early Taiping leaders resorted to
Christianity because they failed to get admittance into the Confucian society."

NATURE OF THE TAIPING MOVEMENT

The Taiping Movement has been variously described as "a social crusade expressing the
peasants' desire for equality," "a national campaign against the foreign dynasty," "a
modernist trend in response to the challenges posed by the West through the first Anglo-
Chinese War," and "Precursor of the Communists." P'eng Tse-i calls it "a religious... a
social... and an ethnic revolution," because it was "a movement to emancipate the people
from all kinds of bondage, including those imposed on the Chinese by
103

foreign nations." Lo Erh-kang calls it "a peasant revolution." and Mou Anshi goes to the
extent of naming it as "the highest peak of peasant revolution in Chinese history." Mao
and Chinese Communist historians perceive the Taiping Movement as a peasant
movement and a peasant war against the ancient regime.

It is an indisputable fact that the Taiping Movement was a peasant movement and a
peasant war against the ancient regime. In Marxist theory the basic contradiction in a
feudal society is between the peasantry and the feudal ruling elite. Mao Zedong
reinforced this by including the peasantry among the forces of Chinese revolution. This
Communist Chinese perspective defines peasant war on the basis of a broad historical
and sociological analysis. Of course, since the peasants always formed the overwhelming
majority of Chinese population, any large scale mass uprising was bound to be dominated
by the peasantry.

Vincent Shih sees not only the absence of "peasant consciousness" but also absence of
Taiping identification with the interests of the peasantry. According to him, "Taiping
followers cast aside with unbounded joy their role as peasants and had nothing but pity
for those who had to stay behind to farm." Shih' goes on to point out that the Taiping
leaders "did not attempt to do away with the landlords and give the land to the tillers and
at times- even sided with the landlord much as the Ch'ing (Qing) regime had done in the
past." Franz Michael too takes similar stance and points out that "in the hierarchy of rank
which the Taipings established and in which constant promotion and demotion was to be
based on merit and demerit in action, the lowest demotion was to the status of
husbandman— the Worker in the field and the lowest rung in their hierarchy." It is
difficult to say that the Taiping social structure
104

discriminated against the peasant class. It was an egalitarian society, of, by and for the
peasantry. At least, this was the goal of the Taipings. Strangely, Franz Michael thinks that
the Taipings did not fight for the well being of the peasants. "Though rebellious armies,
like all Chinese armies, were in the main drawn from peasants, but an escape from their
plight. They sought their luck in the opportunities provided by military adventure and
tried to gain power, wealth and official status in a career made possible by the rebellion."
Moreover, points out Tan Chung, both Shih and Michael have confused Taiping military
hierarchy with that of social hierarchy. In fact, the peasants dominated the high-ups of
their hierarchical structure which was formed for military efficiency.

WAS IT A REBELLION OR A REVOLUTION?

The controversy which has surrounded the Taiping Movement in the twentieth century is
over the issue whether it constitutes a rebellion or revolution. A concrete solution is often
defied by the fact that the interpretations provided by leading Sinologists are either
coloured by their own prejudices or their varying understanding of the conception of both
rebellion and revolution. At the beginning of the Taiping Movement, the Western world
seemed immensely impressed. Marx called it a "formidable revolution" and predicted that
it would affect the fate of entire Europe. The Times called the Taiping Movement "the
greatest revolution the world has ever seen" and "one of the most important and
remarkable movements of mass protest in modern history." Paradoxically, the more the
Western academics have understood China, the less appreciative they have been towards
the revolutionary character of the Taiping Movement. The Movement is commonly called
a rebellion and seldom a revolution.
105

Barrington Moore Jr feels that as the Taiping Movement "did not alter the basic structure
of the society," it cannot be called a revolution. In the Marxist framework even if the
Taiping Movement failed, the very fact that there was a genuine urge to change the
structure of the government and the society and it came very near to it, makes it a
revolution. Vincent Y.C. Shih sees genuine revolutionary possibilities only in the
borrowing of Christian and Western ideas of the Taipings. The Taiping Movement,
according to him, cannot lay claim to a revolutionary status, due the following three
reasons:

1. The Taiping leaders basically wanted to topple the government and rid the apex of
political pyramid and as such did not bother about bringing fundamental social
changes.
2. The Taiping leadership did not identify its aims with those of peasantry. Their attempt
at land redistribution was consequently half-hearted and in many cases the
landlords were left untouched.
3. The Movement lacked the peasant consciousness since no leader was from the ranks of
the peasantry.

The most complex solution towards this complex problem is. forwarded by Ssu-yu Teng
who distinguishes clearly between the two different phases of this Movement. The first
half of the Taiping Movement marked "a proletarian revolutionary movement" aimed at
overthrowing the Qing regime and its replacement by "a new nationalist government with
a radical economic, social and cultural programme." The Taiping leaders launched a
vigorous religious revolution with uncompromising iconoclasm. But this is all the story
of its beginning phase as later it failed to carry out its peasant
106

ideology due to degeneration in the Movement. The later part of the Taiping Movement,
according to Teng "resembled more a traditional Chinese 'peasant' insurrection than a
modern revolution."

Kung-chuan Hsiao defines rebellion as "open armed opposition to the established

government," whereas revolution is "aimed not merely at a change of rulers but at an
alteration of the form of government together with the principles on which it rests."
Similarly, Mark conceived change as the soul of revolution. Rebellion is a spontaneous
upsurge and it sparks out on any particular issue present at the time of its emergence,
whereas revolution has a deep rooted foundation and before its outburst, it has a
incubation period. Changes brought about by rebellion do not last long. Rebellion
ultimately sinks in the midst of obscurity. On the other hand, change brought about by
revolution is deep-rooted and leaves an ever-lasting impression on the structure , of the
society. Rebellion generally gives preference to notional and tangible change where as
revolution believes in fundamental change. Rebellion does not attain its goals, but a
revolution succeeds in its ultimate goals and objectives.

Whether this movement be called a rebellion or a revolution, the following criteria must
be examined:
(1) Ideology,
(2) Participation and
(3) Consequences.

In fact, as pointed out by Lenin, "without a revolutionary theory there can be no

revolutionary movement." The Taipings had a definite ideology. The Taiping Movement
was inclined not only to overthrow the Manchu dynasty but
107

establishment of a new socio-economic and religious order, which was provided by

Christianity from where it got its three "E’s” Escheology, Evangelicalism and
Egalitarianism. It was egalitarianism which influenced the ideology most. It was-to
materialise this ideal that the Taipings had established a "Sacred Treasury" where all the
property was kept and which formed the only source of national and equal income of the
soldiers, who were not allowed to hold private property in order to make egalitarian
society. The land programme of the Taipings was equally egalitarian though it was never
seriously implemented due to limitations of time. It was based on the principle of land for
all to till and food for all to eat, clothes for all to wear and money for all to spend. They
also wanted to abolish all forms of exploitation including private trade. But later they did
not find it feasible and they had to accept even the land for tax collection.

The Taipings prohibited prostitution, foot-binding, wine-drinking, opium- and tobacco-

smoking. The Taipings' efforts to create a popularised style of writing cannot be
minimised. It was a mass based movement, as far as the question of participation was
concerned and as Tan Chung points out it was "potential peasant power, well organised in
an hierarchical system." It was a movement against bureaucracy, landlords, moneylenders
and imperialism with definite organisation. The Taiping Movement "battered the
superstructure of the feudal society." Hong Xiuquan's denunciation of the Qing emperor
"was an indirect negation of monarchical dictatorship." His condemnation of the
Confucian classics "struck hard at the stubbornly fortified reactionary feudal
superstructure." "The Taipings sought to transform the feudal society by building an ideal
society where people were equal."
108

There was no deficiency of revolutionariness in the Taiping Movement. Liu Da'nian

holds the view that the Taiping Movement, along with the Boxer Movement, the
Revolution of 1911, and the May Fourth Movement, should share with Communist
Revolution the success of pushing China's social productive forces to a higher level. The
Taiping Movement also mobilized and organised the scattered struggle of the people to
sweep off the authority and order of the patriarchal society. It accelerated the pace of
decline and collapse of the Qing empire and the entire feudal order. It also smashed the
dream of the imperialist powers to colonise China. Moreover, it provided an example for
emulation for future mass struggles.

Thus, as pointed out by Jean Chesneaux, it was characterised by its triple content:
national, religious and social. It was nationalistic because it was anti-Qing and accused
the ruling dynasty for being "foreign and barbarous." It was religious in the sense that it
fiercely assailed Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and borrowed notions from
Christianity. It was a social protest movement because it not only shook the foundations
of feudalism in China by proposing a programme of remodelling the agrarian relations
but also stood for emancipation of women.

PRECURSOR OF COMMUNISM
Though the Taipings were defeated, this movement had far reaching consequences. Its
most significant result was the demonstration of potential peasant power which was later
recognised by Mao and assimilated in his strategy of Chinese revolution.' Though the
Taipings failed to uproot the traditional monarchical system, they cut its roots sufficiently
so that it fell in 1911. By giving a revolutionary social
109

ideology it started a process which reached the highest ebb on May 4, 1919.

Most historians agree with the fact that the Taipings sowed the seeds Communism in
China. Both the Taiping and the Communists were modernistic in their nature. Sudden
impact of the West and scientific, technological and social advances had their influence
on the ideology of Taipings. In the same way, the Communists provided a modern and
practical philosophy with which to reject "both the traditions of the Chinese past and the
Western domination of the present." Moreover, the Taiping Movement represented a goal
as yet unrealised in Western Europe and America, and its acceptance in China would put
it ideologically ahead of the capitalist states. Secondly, both the movements got their
inspiration from the literati. The Taiping emerged from secret societies which consisted
of both the illiterate and the unemployed literate who were aware of new trends in the
West. They inspired and encouraged Taipings to strive for the realisation of their destined
objectives. The Communist party itself consisted of literate persons, who were conscious
and aware of the positive modernist development of the West. Both the Taipings as well
as the Communists realised at different periods of time that any movement or revolution
in China could only be realised with the active support and participation of the peasantry.
They realised that China was an agrarian country whose peasant was the fulcrum of its
economy and thus, unless any movement had the peasantry as its mass base, it could not
expect to gain much ground. The idea of a revolution spearheaded by peasants came
actually from the Taiping leader Hong, which was used to its fullest extent by Mao. Both
of them had identical and similar kind of land programmes and envisaged redistribution
of land. They also stressed upon the importance of rural force.
110

The Taipings like the Communists abolished the concept of private property and
everything including land belonged to the state. Both gave a lot of importance to the
emancipation of women. Taipings like the Communists advocated the use of simple
languages in day to day work rather than classical style. Both were also anti-imperialists
and considered imperialism to be the main cause of the miseries of China.

CAUSES OF FAILURE
Hong Xiuquan, the most prominent of the Taiping leaders, and the Emperor of the
Heavenly Kingdom, increasingly verged into visionary realms. Moreover, hedonistic
behaviour of Hong and other top leaders at Nanjing brought further disrepute to the
Movement. After the occupation of Nanjing, Hung was virtually locked up in his
comfortable palace room and issued increasingly religious documents, which became
more and more confusing and incoherent. Factionalism not only among the top leaders
but also in regional divisions created serious problems for the Movement. The veterans
from Guangxi had the blue-eyed-boy treatment, while the non-Guangxi fighters were
discriminated against. A second line of leaders challenged Hong and attempted to
takeover the leadership. This was, however, firmly crushed. In a clash, three prominent
Taiping leaders were killed, while a fourth one ran away to the south. This reestablished
Hong's supremacy, but also contributed to weakening the Movement. At the later stages
of the Movement, leaders like Hong Renjin attempted to resurrect the Movement, but it
was too late and military defeat was staring in the face of the Taipings. The failure to
switch over from a fanatical and idealistic leadership to a pragmatic one, constituted a
major cause for the failure of the Taipings.
111

After a few years of vigorous activity, the Taiping leadership became increasingly
lethargic. Their slackening of military expeditions and indulging in feudal etiquette after
their conquering of Nanjing, became an important cause of decline. Moreover, their
programme had attracted a great deal of support from the peasantry. But they deferred
implementation of their programmes. This was perhaps justifiable from the point of view
of the war and the lack of time to devote to organisational matters. However, this
negligence caused growing alienation of the peasantry, whose enthusiasm for the cause
was rapidly dampened.

Missionaries in China were delighted shortly after the breakout of the Movement on
account of its Christian content. They initially asked their respective governments to
support the Movement. Foreign governments were indecisive about the Movement in the
early stage. While the Christian content of the Movement made them sympathetic
towards it, various other aspects like egalitarianism were disagreeable. Thomas Dong-wu
says that the Taipings were bad diplomats and did not attempt to cultivate good relations
with the foreign powers. Shortly, the foreign powers decided that they would gain more
by pressing the Manchu government than by supporting a movement whose chances of
success were not too bright. France and England, having imposed their will on the
Manchu government, once again in the Treaty of Tianjin, preferred to maintain a
conservative and docile government in Beijing. Western officials were now despatched to
train official troops, steamships were placed at their disposal and foreign detachments,
like those led by the English Commander C.G. Gordon, took active part in suppressing
the Taipings. The Ever Victorious Army under Gordon helped recapture of Nanjing in
1864. M.N. Royisays that the Movement would have been successful, had it been for
imperialist intervention.
112

Over the years, the Chinese scholar-gentry had come to acquire such vested interests in
the entire system that they were quite alarmed at the egalitarianism of the Taiping
peasants. The gentry in China derived its power at two levels. Gentry's ownership of land
was the first. The second source of power was that the educational system permitted only
the gentry to qualify for the Imperial examinations. Thus, the administration also
remained in the hands of classes with gentry origin. The Taipings were a source of
challenge to both. Quite evidently, the gentry reacted sharply to reserve their ancestral
privileges. Franz Michael says that though the Qing dynasty displayed all signs of
decline, "the social leadership of the gentry was still strong enough to maintain the social
order and defend it against attack. In defending the social order, the gentry had no choice
but to defend the dynasty as well.

When the dynasty failed, local gentry organised self-defence forces in order to crush the
Taipings. As pointed out by Philip A. Kuhn, although the Taiping army caught the Qing
rulers unawares and exposed their weaknesses, they were ultimately no match to the
military forces of the Chinese gentry founded by two talented elite, Zeng Guofan and Hu
Linyi. The appointment of the able and determined Zeng Guofan as the Imperial
Commissioner was an act of great importance. Zeng immediately began to organise local
forces and enlisted the support of the gentry and the intelligentsia for support rather than
rely on the decadent Imperial Army. Thus, we find the ability of ruling elite, at least at
the local level, to regain strength was a major factor leading to the eventual decline of the
Taipings.

Resilience of the old order, which the Taipings had challenged, was another important
cause of the defeat of the
113

Taiping Movement. This old order not only survived the Taiping challenge but was able
to put down two equally widespread rebellions, the Nian and the Muslim, which in
certain ways were linked to the Taiping Movement. Philip A. Kuhn observes: "The
Chinese, state, along with its Manchu overlords, was enabled to survive because
significant segments of the elite identified the dynasty's interests with their own and took
the lead in suppressing the dynasty's domestic enemies." The fact that the Qing dynasty
was thereby enabled to outlive its mid-century crisis by nearly 50 years, points
unmistakably to the toughness and resilience of the Chinese social and. political order
and further, to the persisting power and cohesion of the elite.
114

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Jean Chesneaux et al; China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, Delhi:
1978.
2. Tan Chung; Triton to Dragon, Delhi: 1985.
3. Philip A. Kuhn; Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and
Social Structure, 1796-1864, Cambridge Mass.: 1970.
4. Franz Michael; The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, 3 vols, Seattle &
London: 1967.
5. Barrington Moore Jr; Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant
in the Making of the Modern World, Boston: 1966.
6. Ssu-yu Teng; The Taiping Rebellion and the Western Powers, Oxford: 1971.
7. Ssu-yu Teng; New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Cambridge, Mass:
1950.
8. Vincent Y.C. Shih; The Taiping Ideology, Seattle & London: 1966.
9. G.E. Taylor; "The Taiping Rebellion: Its Economic Background and Social Theory,"
Chinese Social and Political Science Review , Vol. XVI, No. 4, Jan 1933:
548ff.
10. Foreign Language Press; The Taiping Revolution, Beijing: 1976.
11. .D. S. Zagoria, "Asian Tenancy System and Communist Mobilization of the
Peasantry," in John W. Lewis (ed); Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in
Asia, Stanford: 1976:29-60.
12. Kung-chuan Hsiao; Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century,
Washington: 1967.
13. Wolfgang Franke; Century of Chinese Revolution: 1851- 1949, Oxford: 1980.
14. Jack Gray; Rebellions and Revolutions, Oup: 1990.
CHAPTER: 6
THE SELF-STRENGTHENING MOVEMENT
NIRAJ KUMAR SINGH
Maharaja Aggarsen College
University of Delhi
Delhi-110 007

After the peace settlement with the Western powers in 1860 and the suppression of the
Taiping Movement, and the subsequent restoration of the Imperial throne at Beijing
(popularly known as the Dong Zhi Restoration), the central authorities embarked on the
policy of restoring the traditional order through emphasis on old values of morality and
application of knowledge to practical affairs. The movement for a stronger China, thus,
encompassed two aspects— Ziqiang (Self-Strengthening) and Fuqiang (Accumulation of
Wealth and Power). Ziqiang, which was characterised by the development of armament
industry, aimed at achieving these objectives with the help of Western technology and
men. After all, Western weaponry had impressed Chinese leaders greatly, not only during
the Opium Wars but also while suppressing the Taiping Movement. Fuqiang meant
strengthening China internally by way of developing her resources like mining and textile
industry as well as communication. The whole movement, also known as the Yangwu
Movement or the 'Foreign Matters Movement', was an overall attempt on the part of the
government at strengthening China economically so as to transform China into a
powerful state that could effectively withstand the challenges posed by the West.
Although the movement
116

lacked a central leadership .and direction, provincial leaders like Zeng Guofen, Zuo
Zongtang, Feng Guifen, Li Hongzhang etc played important roles in the realization of
these aims. Consequently, this led to regional imbalances and therefore, regionalisation of
the programme was one of the main characteristics of the Self-Strengthening Movement.

In the mid-nineteenth century, China was rocked by many mighty movements. One of
these was the Taiping Movement, which lasted from 1850 to 1864. It brought to the fore,
growing inequality in the Chinese society. The Taipings, led by Hong Xiuquan, fought
not only against the foreign Qing dynasty, but also vigorously challenged the threats
posed by the Western powers ever since the Opium War I. Although the movement failed
and was ruthlessly crushed, the magnitude of people's participation was unmatched in
Chinese history. The way the Taiping and other peasant movements spread from one
province to another, showed an outward sign of "an immense political and social crisis."

The suppression of these revolts by the government, even to the extent of seeking
desperate help from foreign powers, was an attempt on the part of the government to re-
establish the decaying system of government and society. Little did it understand the
messages conveyed through these revolts about the glaring disparity that plagued the
Chinese society. Both the Opium Wars had proved, beyond doubt, the superiority of
western weaponry. Western canons, in particular, not only exploded the myth of China's
might, it was also of great use while tackling the Taiping Movement. Western weapons
were extensively used to curb these movements. Therefore, in the post-Opium War II
years, it was the acquisition of foreign weapons that was emphasised
117

most. The Chinese authorities thought that it would serve the twin purpose of curbing
internal rebellions as well as repulsing any attack by foreign countries in case the
situation arose. It is a difficult story that they failed to realise the fact that without
effecting fundamental changes in the Chinese socio-economic and political structure, it
was futile to go ahead with plans of weaponry and arsenals.

The impact of Western countries on China was evident in other ways also. The opening
of Treaty Ports brought in more and more foreigners, who could now reside more freely
than their days at Guangzhou. Along with them came Western ideas, institutions,
diplomacy, beliefs, customs, and missionaries. Foreigners could move freely at these
ports and acquire some property also, particularly after the Convention of Beijing. Thus,
a different life-style developed at these ports and the Chinese were exposed for the first
time, to such activities on a large scale. This resulted, although indirectly, in a mood for
change. However, the Chinese authorities decided in favour of change mainly in the field
of military and diplomatic affairs, and at the same time not willing to do away with the
old Confucian order.

However, the most glaring impact of foreign intrusion is noticeable in arsenal factories
and navy. The Chinese authorities emphasised only the military humiliation faced by
China and consequently, we see the development of armament industry and navy in
particular. In the Confucian social structure, the society was led by intellectuals and the
gentry. In other words, education had special significance in the Chinese society.
Therefore, those who produced goods, i.e. the merchants, traders etc, were held in low
esteem. Moreover, in the old Confucian order, there was no role for military element and
Chinese failure* was revealed in this
118

field for which the Confucian order did not provide any safeguard. Thus, the Self-
Strengthening Movement gave a. shock to the Confucian order by over emphasising the
role of the army.

The penetration of foreign powers into the Chinese mainland had greatly altered the
prevalent political structure in China. The Chinese notion of "tributary system" was
effectively challenged by Western diplomacy and international laws. The Western
powers particularly emphasised on their being treated as equals and not to be put under
tribute paying category. And it was only after the Opium War II that they finally
succeeded in having their residences at Beijing. From now on, diplomatic relations were
maintained on equal terms. This development did away with the age old Chinese concept
of Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo). It had many advantages for China too. At least
diplomatically, China was brought into the fold of international law which was uniform,
even if theoretically. Now, Chinese scholars and diplomats could go out to Western
countries, with ease, to study and train themselves in Western science, ideas and thoughts
and international law.

The old system of administration in China had alienated itself from the masses. The
privileged classes— particularly gentry— wielded enormous power and influence in
Chinese society. They enjoyed unique privileges in legal matters as well as religious
ceremonies. The "gentry" received special treatment in courts, acted as intermediaries
between the local magistrates and the common people, made out of court settlements,
acted as guardians of cultural heritage and organised militia in times of rebellions and
unrest. On the contrary, other classes of the Chinese society i.e. the peasants, artisans, and
the merchants, were given a rather subordinate
119

status and were frowned upon. The merchant class, in particular, was looked down upon
with disfavour and discontent and was not trusted. The inferior status granted to the
merchants showed the "defensive reaction of an. agricultural society against economic
forces that were threatening its equilibrium." The position of the gentry was such that
people from other classes strove very hard to get into it. However, in order to enter the
gentry class, one had to pass through a series of examinations which was archaic in
nature and was characterised by Eight-legged Essay requiring great literary skill. It was
very difficult for people of other classes to afford time and money preparing for such
examinations. But, there was some provision of purchasing degrees and some wealthy
merchants managed to get these degrees for themselves and their sons so as to enjoy the
much elevated position of the gentry.

At the same time, the Qing rulers never tried to identify themselves with the Chinese
people. The Qing, who were outsiders and had dethroned the Ming dynasty in the
seventeenth century to capture power were not liked by the people either who still owed
their loyalty to the Ming. Thus, during, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
rebellions and secret societies repeatedly emphasised on the, slogan, "Fan Qing Fu Ming"
(Overthrow the Qing and Restore the Ming). The Qing rulers seldom cared for the
welfare and development of the Chinese society, thus creating a gap between the ruler
and the ruled.

The mid-nineteenth century Chinese economy was marked by severe crisis. The Chinese
social and economic structure had remained unchanged for the past many centuries. All
good quality arable land was owned by the privileged classes— rich families of gentry,
banner-men and
120

officials. The majority of the population was left with very little or no land of its own.
The landless peasants led a wretched life. They had to pay fifty percent of the yield as
rent; and since the rent was paid in cash and not in kind, another 30% was added in the
process of commutation. Thus, the poor peasant lived even below the subsistence level.
At the same time, increase in population resulted in continuous shrinkage of individual
land-holdings, thus, gradually many a peasant sold his land and became the tenant of a
landlord. One direct impact of high incidence of rent and shrinkage of individual land-
holding was that many displaced and unemployed peasants moved to cities as porters,
dock-yard workers, and sailors and still many just remained idlers and vagabonds. In fact,
these jobless vagabonds actively participated in various rebellions.

The Opium Wars had severely altered the trading relations between the foreigners and
China. A fixed tariff of 5% reduced China's income to a minimum. Also, the copper-
silver exchange rate was dislocated which resulted in an increase of 100% in exchange
rate reducing man's income by half. There was large scale influx of foreign goods at the
treaty ports which, by the end at the Opium War II assumed great importance especially
in trading activities. Influx of foreign goods dislocated local household industries.

The Opium Wars had another impact also. After the treaty of Nanjing (August 1842) and
the treaties that followed it, many ports of the Chinese eastern coast were opened. These
ports gradually emerged as flourishing centres of trading activity and modernization
assumed distinct identity. There was, thus, a growing disparity in the lives of people at
ports and the mainland. Thus, by 1860 the condition of China had reached such a level
whereby, unless concrete steps were
121

taken, the decline of the Qing dynasty could not be averted. The defeat of China in 1860
had shocked not only the officialdom, but also the intelligentsia. Hence, the chief task of
restoration was taken up by Prince Gong at Beijing and leaders like Zang Guofan, Zuo
Zongtang, Li Hongzhang etc in the provinces. It was with the individual efforts of these
provincial leaders with little central directive that the task of restoration and Self-
Strengthening was sought to be accomplished.

Prince Gong, who took up the responsibility at Beijing, had gained prominence during
negotiations with Western powers at the Convention of Beijing in 1860. He had
established, his political position through his talent as a diplomat. Although, initially the
prince was violently anti-foreign and resisted foreign demands, gradually he had come to
realise the realities of Western superiority which was proved, beyond doubt, by the end of
the Opium War II. Prince Gong, thus, resorted to a policy of diplomatic conciliation
whereby China could modernize herself with the help Western powers. At the same time,
the foreign powers too thought it wise that a stable China was more conducive to an
increasing foreign trade. Therefore, they did not hesitate in extending their help as long as
the authorities at Beijing were cooperative.

It was with these objectives in mind that Prince Gong recommended the establishment of
a new office, the Zongli yaman, to deal exclusively with foreign affairs. As stated earlier,
China had never accorded recognition to another country, on equal diplomatic level, but
only on a tributary or trading basis. Hence, the opening of the foreign office marked a
new phase in the development of foreign diplomacy in China. The Zongli yaman was
intended to be a temporary
122

office with the task of execution of foreign policy and not its. formulation which was to
be ultimately decided by the Emperor and his council. Organised into five bureaux—
British,, Russian, French, American, and coastal defence— it had two other organs also
viz. the Inspectorate-General of Customs, and the Language School.

Apart from dealing in foreign affairs, the Zongli yaman also promoted modern schools,
Western science, industry, and communication. Although, this office was repeatedly
criticised by the conservatives and did not do that well in foreign affairs, it succeeded to a
great extent in promoting modernization in China.

The Interpreters' College or the College of Foreign Languages {Tong Wen Guan) was
established in 1862 to train able language experts. Initially, the Chinese were not found
qualified enough to become instructors in foreign languages. Therefore, foreigners were
appointed to teach at the Institute. Later, other subjects like astronomy and mathematics
were added to the curriculum. One major translation work undertaken by the Institute was
that of Wheaton's work on international law by W.A.P1. Martin. Similar schools were
opened at Shanghai in 1863, Guangzhou in 1864, and at Fuzhou in 1866. Although very
few upper class students came at these institutes, and a considerable number of students
were mediocre, nevertheless, the College of Foreign Languages marked the beginning of
Western education in China.

One of the outstanding provincial leaders of modernization in China was Zeng Guofen,
who hailed from Hunan province. Under his leadership, the Hunan army had successfully
suppressed the Taiping Movement in the
123

province. It was under Zeng's leadership that the Jiongnan arsenal was established in
Shanghai in 1865 where apart from guns and canon, construction of ships was
undertaken. The jiongnan arsenal was an important achievement in. early phase of Self-
Strengthening.

Zuo Zongtang was another leader of Self-Strengthening programme. He valiantly fought

the Taiping armies and was in-charge of military operations in the Yangzi. Zuo had also
played instrumental role in crushing the Muslim and Nian Uprisings. He was particularly
interested in ship-building, and his efforts bore fruit with the establishment of the famous
Fuzhou Dockyard in 1866 with the assistance of French engineers. He also tried to
restore the agrarian economy and set up modern enterprises. However, the leading spirit
of the Self-Strengthening Movement was Li Hongzhang who had earlier defeated the
Taiping armies in Anhui and consequently formed the Huai army on which he founded
his personal power. He was greatly impressed by Western guns, explosives, and ships
which he emphasised as indispensable for any country in order to remain powerful: Li
served for a long time, as the Governor-General of Zhili and as High Commissioner of
the Northern Ocean. It was during these tenures that Li successfully built up a substantial
military and industrial empire in north China. At the same time, he .also performed many,
a functions of the central government, and acted like a "coordinator of Self-Strengthening
programmes throughout the country." His major achievements include the founding of
Nanjing Arsenal in 1867, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company in 1872, a
naval academy at Tianjin in 1885 etc. However, Li's fascination only for Western
weaponry and his negligence of Western political system, democracy etc retarded the
pace and extent of the Movement. It was mainly
124

due to his belief that except for weapons, China surpassed the West in every other sphere,
whereas what was needed was wide ranging changes in the Chinese socio-economic and
political structure.

It was with the help of these provincial leaders and many others that the task of re-
establishing the central authority was accomplished and the programme of Self-
Strengthening carried on successfully. Their material strength lay in the armies they
commanded. Nevertheless, they were mainly civil officials who had, in due course of
time, learnt to manage military affairs as well. Their continuance in power was based on
the belief that the preservation of the existing social order and the conception of the state
alone could bring peace and stability in China. Although the leaders were split by
personal antipathy particularly between Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang, their aims and
interests were identical i.e. they wanted the rebellions suppressed and ensure the survival
of the old political, economic and social regime.

ZIQIANG AND FUQIANG

The Self-Strengthening Movement had two important aspects— Ziqiang or Self-
Strengthening which was characterised by the development of armament industry, and
Fuqiang, which consisted, in the main, of development in communication, mines and
textile industry. The whole movement was also known as ‘Yangwu Movement' or
'Foreign Matters Movement', which meant an overall attempt on the part of the
government at economic development of China", to transform China into a powerful state
that could effectively withstand the challenges posed by the West. The objectives of this
programme were sought to be achieved with the help of provincial leaders of repute like
Zeng
125

Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, Feng Guifen etc. ; They had particularly excelled
during the suppression of the Taiping and other peasant movements. Nevertheless, Prince
Gong at Beijing also played a vital role in coordinating various activities especially
through the establishment of the Zong yaman, Interpreters' College etc.

China's defeat in the Opium War II in succession demonstrated the frail nature of her
military might. After the peace treaties, therefore, considerable thought was given to
military strengthening. Western powers were also willing to cooperate with China in
founding armament and other industries . Therefore, the provincial leaders made full use
of this opportunity. The individual role of provincial leaders in establishing armament
industries has been emphasised in an earlier section. The Chinese officials thought that
strengthening China militarily would help her in two ways. One, it would keep foreigners
at bay; and secondly, the weapons manufactured could be effectively used against
internal rebellions.

Foreign technicians were to be temporarily appointed at the time of the establishment of

industries. They were to subsequently train the Chinese technicians. It was with this
policy in mind that Li Hongzhang appointed Halliday Macartney for the manufacture of
ammunition at Songjiong which was later transferred to Suzhou. Following this, arsenals
were set-up at Liangnan by Zeng Guofan, at Nanjing by Li Hongzhang, at Fuzhou by Zuo
Zongtang, at Tianjin by Zhong Lou and so on. At the same time, many smaller arsenals
were opened up in provinces, which was obviated by recurrent rebellions. They were set
up in Xian, Yunan, Shandong, Guanghzou, Fujian, Sichuan, Hubei etc.
126

The establishment of these arsenals demonstrated the determination of the government to

prove itself not only in home affairs, but also in foreign relations. Also, their
establishment was likely to usher in a general economic development of China. It was,
consequently, hoped that a powerful China could effectively keep in check, ever-
increasing demands of foreign countries for concessions.

As stated earlier, the arsenals were established mainly with the efforts of the provincial
leaders and they wielded their power from these weapon-manufacturing units. For
example, Li Hongzhang controlled three major arsenals. Similarly, Zuo Zongtang was the
in-charge of the famous Fuzhou arsenal. Parochial nature of provincial leaders as far as
the control of these arsenals was concerned, enabled the foreign powers to establish their
superiority over them. This was mainly because Chinese men were not properly trained to
replace Western engineers and technicians. At the same time, the belief of the Chinese
leaders that only Westerners could keep pace with latest techniques, acted as drag on
indigenous development. Ziqiang, thus, worsened the trade deficit since technology
import was not replaced by indigenous machinery. Another serious implication was the
dependence of Chinese army on foreigners. Also, the Western countries supplied China
with outdated equipment and technology. Apart from countering internal rebellions, thus,
China could hardly be a match to a Western arm-technology.

Although better technology was introduced in arsenals and mechanised production had
started, technical revolution was still a distant dream in China. This was mainly because
there were only a few machines so that most of the work was still done by manual labour.
Working condition in the arsenals was not like in the modern industries. Yet another
127

limitation of Ziqiang was the absence of bourgeoisie which had not emerged. Entire
capital for the arsenals particularly in the first two decades of the programme came from
the state. Moreover, these arsenals were hot working according to modern managerial
system; rather the traditional bureaucrats held their sway over functioning which was
characterised by inefficiency and corruption. This severely limited the scope of these
arsenals and acted as breakwaters to the development of modern industry in China.

FUQIANG
Acquisition of wealth and power was another important aspect of the Self-Strengthening
Movement apart from military strengthening. Significant measures were taken in the field
of agriculture, industry and communication to strengthen China internally. After the
peace 'convention' of 1860 and consequent restoration of the imperial order at Beijing,
one of the main tasks that lay before the government was to create a stable agrarian
society. The Taiping and other minor movements as well as war with the West had
ravaged Chinese economy and resulted in extensive migration of rural population. New
terms of the Treaty had opened Chinese market to the industrially finished goods which
ultimately severed the delicate association between agriculture and family handicrafts.
Textile manufacture was one of the earliest handicrafts to be affected by imported yarn as
well as cotton fabrics, thereby severely altering the fortunes of not only weavers but also
farmers, since weaving and farming went side by side. At the same time, due to American
Civil War, when import of cotton to Manchester mills had ceased, the Chinese raw cotton
began to be exported to England. This again affected indigenous handicraft industry. Ever
increasing imports also affected iron industry, metal crafts
128

as well as oil industry (for example, imported paraffin replaced vegetable oils for lighting
purposes). However, certain Chinese specialities like porcelain, fire-crackers, paper-
money for the dead, drugs and medicines, lacquer ware, copper ware etc continued to
prosper. Tea and silk industries flourished considerably although there was a tough
competition in tea, particularly Sri Lankan and Indian tea.

Growth of commercial agriculture was one significant development during this phase.
Silk worm culture, tobacco and opium cultivation as well as tea plantations were given
due emphasis. After 1880, however, the Chinese tea met with tough competition from
Indian and Ceylonese tea so that any further expansion of tea plantations ceased.
Nevertheless, the growth of commercial agriculture and development of Treaty Ports into
urban centres facilitated grain trade. Also, there was a big boost to long distance trade
since many regions were no longer self-sufficient in food grain production.

Between 1872-1885, significant developments took place in fields of trade, industry and
mining. The establishment of China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company in 1872
marked the beginning of joint stock company in China. The founding of the company
was made possible with the help of leaders like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang who
assured considerable government investment. The company, with participation from
merchants, was to be supervised by the government and run by the merchants. This
policy of "government supervision and merchant operation" (guan du shang ban) was
followed while founding other industries as well. Merchants participated enthusiastically
in the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company whereas the government investment
came in the
129

form of loans. But, maximum profit from the company went to a small group of
merchants and officials who directly controlled the company. The shareholders were paid
a mere 10% of fixed dividend. At the same time, only a small part of the profit was
reinvested in enterprises. Moreover, the company could not eliminate the threat from
foreign shopping firms.

Mining industry, particularly of coal and iron started mainly with the aim of serving
arsenals. Later on, the founding of the Navigation Company gave fresh impetus to this
industry. Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang in particular played a significant- role in
mining industry as well. Here again the same policy (government supervision and
merchant operation) was applied. Very often, foreign engineers were employed to
supervise mining operation. Official attempts were also made at establishing textile mills
at Lanzhou, Shanghai etc, but they failed. Private enterprises also made very little
advance in this direction. The only successful textile industry, that manufactured silk,
was opened in 1872 in Guangdong. In silk industry particularly, private enterprises
played an important role.

As a part of the overall policy to modernise China, effective steps were taken in the
development of railways, telegraph and postal system. The first Chinese railway started
in 1881, although it was only 11 kms long and was used to transport coal from Dongshan
to Xugezhuan for the Gaibing Mining Company. Telegraph lines were installed in 1871
by foreign companies linking Hong Kong, Shanghai and Vladivostok. Later, it was
expanded to connect more regions. Attempts were also made to start a national postal
service. This met with tough opposition from official service
130

(Yizhang), the banks and other companies as well as foreigners who used to carry part of
the mail services.

With wide ranging changes taking place in China, a number of training institutes were
opened to prepare people to effectively handle these industries. These included, the
Institute of Western 'Knowledge at Guangzhou (1880), telegraph school at Tianjin
(1880), a naval school and an army medical school (1881), and a military academy
(1885). Yet another development in this regard was the programme for sending Chinese
students to the USA and Europe for higher studies. Such a programme did not prove
effective and was criticised by many Chinese officials as leading to "Americanization" of
Chinese pupils.

One of the most important accomplishments of the modernization policy in China was
the establishment of Western style enterprises. In this, a large part of capital came from
traditional revenues. The compradore class also invested considerably in many
enterprises. However, government investment was pivotal and acted as a channel for the
transformation of traditional revenues into capital for modern industries in China. The
system of 'guandu shangban' did provide protection to the nascent industries by way of
loans as well as public acceptance. However, since Chinese bureaucracy was marked by
corruption and incompetence, the system was not trusted by merchants and other
investors. This prevented private capital from being properly mobilised. The official
supremacy reflected the protection of the traditional social order. At the same time these
enterprises were dependent on foreign machinery and specialised man power. The private
investors were, thus, left with no choice but to invest in traditional sectors or in foreign
firms. Comparing government participation in China with
131

that of Japan, we find that the guandu shangban enterprise was not wrong but it was bad
government participation. Yet another factor why private enterprise could not come up
faster was due to the fact that the merchants were neither trusted nor protected and
recognised as indispensable to China's wealth and strength. Officials, on their part,
continued to exercise arbitrary power. Also, often commercial decisions were taken by
unqualified officials. These retarded the pace of overall development of Chinese industry.

Sometimes, it is alleged that the failure of guandu shangban enterprise was mainly due to
the presence of foreign powers in China. However, it may be noted that the foreigners
were not allowed into heavy industry sector. At the same time, the nascent industries did
enjoy much more privileges than the foreign countries as is evident from the
monopolistic nature of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, the Wuhan
Iron and Steel Complex etc.

With the establishment of modern enterprises and opening of mines, came two distinct
classes of people in China. The one was the industrial proletariat, and the other was the
bourgeoisie. Industrial and mine workers lived in wretched conditions, they were often
paid lowly and worked under hazardous conditions. It was worst in case of mines. The
bourgeoisie comprised, in the main, of officials, compradores, merchants, gentry and
landowners. Here, the bureaucrats dominated. They invested their money earned through
bribery and other corrupt practices in various enterprises.

With changing emphasis and aspects of the movement from time to time, historians have
divided the Self-
132

Strengthening Movement into three distinct phases. The first phase lasted roughly from
1861-1872 and was characterised by acquisition of Western arms, machinery, scientific
know-how, opening of diplomatic office, schools of foreign languages, and sending
students abroad for higher studies etc. Main accomplishments of this period were the
establishment of Zongli yaman (1861), Tung Wen Kuan (1862), Jiongnan Arsenal
(1865), Fuzhou Dockyard (1866) etc. The second phase (1872-84) of the movement was
characterised by emphasis on acquisition of wealth and power. This was to be achieved
with development in agriculture, industry and communication. Major developments of
this period were the inauguration of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company,
the establishment of Shanghai Cotton Mill and the Imperial Telegraph Administration
etc. The third phase (1885-94) was marked by establishment of light industries
throughout China.

LIMITATIONS
Although the Self-Strengthening programme was started with much fanfare and
optimism, its aims realised were fewer. One of the most important factors responsible for
such a gap was that without effecting structural changes in the substructure, the leaders
attempted to change the superstructure. That is, without undergoing changes at the
grassroots level or changes in the infrastructure, the programmes were sought to be
imposed from above. It is to emphasised here that reforms can succeed only if the society
is receptive to changes. This condition did not exist in China where the socio-economic
and political system had reached the stage of decay and hence it needed overall
transformation of the entire structure. At the same time, shortage of capital was another
constraint felt constantly by the government. From the very beginning the merchant class
did not have a respectable position in the Chinese society. And hence
133

the merchant class spent considerable sums of money in buying the gentry status. Thus,
very little money was coming from this class.

Presence of foreign powers in China had created several problems. They were to be
constantly attended and supervised and in due course they were granted several
concessions and benefits which would have otherwise remained with the Chinese. Thus,
the attention of the Chinese authority was continuously diverted towards the activities of
foreigners. The imperial motives of these powers in China, in long run, played havoc
with the whole socio-economic and political system. Another limiting factor was the
absence of any strong central leadership that could effectively coordinate with the
activities in various provinces. This led to lopsided development in China. Some regions
developed while others remained untouched. For example, the northern part of China
remained practically unattended. This problem was also due to the magnitude of the
empire. The Chinese territory was so vast that it was very difficult to pay attention to all,
regions equally specially at a time when the central leadership was weak and foreign
imperial designs reigned supreme. The court at Beijing was constantly busy in placating
various outside powers present in China.

CONCLUSION
The Self-Strengthening Movement, which had two cardinal features— Ziqiang and
Fuqiang— was aimed at strengthening China economically as well as politically.
However, the military aspect of the programme was over emphasised so as to bring China
at par with Western powers. On the other hand, there was limited stress on developing
Chinese economy. It was mainly confined to mining industry, textile, communications,
134

etc, and no efforts were made1 to effect sub-structural changes. Hence, the Self-
Strengthening Movement, from the very beginning was imposed from above without
bringing about fundamental changes, particularly in the agrarian and social structure.
Thus, the society was incapable of adjusting itself with the changes imposed from above.
Hence, the policies adopted by the government were at a superficial level and failed to
make wide impact in China. Here one may cite the example of Japan, where one of the
first tasks of modernization was emphasised on agricultural development which provided
a sound economic base for Japan to pursue further modernization programme. The Self-
Strengthening Movement was also weakened by its decentralised nature of
implementation or regional imbalances. This led to lopsided development of some
regions at the cost of others. Nevertheless, the Movement marked the beginning of
modernization, even if in its limited sense, in China. It set the pace and acted as model for
future developmental programmes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Jean Chesneaux et al; China from the Opium War to the 1911 Revolution, Delhi: 1986.
2. P.L. Clyde & B.F. Beers; The Far East: A History of Western Impacts and Eastern
Responses, 1830-1975, N. Delhi: 1988.
3. Jack Gray; Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s, New York:
1990.
4. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu; The. Rise of Modern China, New York: 1990.
5. Ssu-yii Teng & J.K. Fairbank; China's Response to the West, Cambridge, Mass: 1954.
6. Mary C. Wright; The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: Tong-Chih
Restoration, Stanford: 1957.
CHAPTER: 7
FINANCE IMPERIALISM IN CHINA
ARCHANA OJHA
Kamla Nehru College
University of Delhi
Delhi-U0 054
SHARMILA SHRIVASTAVA
Hans Raj College University of Delhi 07

In the sixteenth century Europe with the development of capitalism there was a
consequent movement for its growth. The concept of neo-imperialism which developed
in the second half of the nineteenth century was considered to be one of the most
important phases of European expansionist policies. Prior to this change, the classical
theorists were more concerned with Europe and rise of imperialism. But the
contemporary modern scholars instead of concentrating more on the causes of
imperialism prefer to study its impact and different processes.

The second phase of the Industrial Revolution which began in the middle of the
nineteenth century was both qualitatively and quantitatively different from the first phase
of the Industrial Revolution. In the second phase there was more emphasis on the
scientific and technical expertise, many nations were undergoing the phase of industrial
development and the rise of new industries was dependent upon the availability of
capital. As a result there was demand for new kinds of raw materials and consumer goods
in the market. Due to the development of large industrial units there was consequent
growth of new industries which were not only big but were also more complex.
136

By the end of the nineteenth century, such companies grew in Europe in which
concentration of capital took place. By this time an attempt was also made to make the
market system more systematic and result oriented. Even in the field of communications
unprecedented development took place. E.g. with the construction of railroads and the
establishment of shipbuilding industries, it became possible to despatch heavy goods at
less prices. Communication medium received further boost with the invention of the
telegraph system. All this resulted in the expansion of European population. But the
development of capitalism was not parallel in all the European nations. As a consequence
in terms of colonial relations, rivalry between the old and new industrial nations for the
procurement of new markets became fierce. The result was the imposition of tariff
regulations by the nations in order to protect their economic and colonial interests. This
tariff wall resulted in the beginning of economic tussle which in the later years turned
into military conflict.

Many reasons have been given for the growth of neo-imperialism: Social Darwinism,
developing industrialization, protection of colonial markets, conflicts for procuring raw
materials, increasing population in Europe, the growing influence of nationalistic
elements and military as well as colonial rivalries. Some scholars consider political
reasons as the prime cause for the beginning of imperialism and the symbol of the growth
of nationalist spirit, glorification of nation and also reflection of ultranationalistic
feelings. But such scholars over look the fact that imperialism cannot be studied purely
on political terms because the development of Western European nations was clearly
associated with its economic growth.
137

became the first economist to make an attempt to understand imperialism in a new way.
Though, in the later years, Hobson's theory had to face many criticisms but credit is given
to him for understanding imperialism in a modern way. Hobson gives economic reasons
for the rise of imperialism and considers that the prime factor was the growth of financial
institutions and the interests of small group of new classes who had sufficient capital to
invest and therefore wanted to invest and earn profit in minimum time period. In the
second phase of the Industrial Revolution with the growth of new capital and its
investment in shipbuilding and armaments industries helped these financial groups to
increase their political and social influence and put political pressure on their respective
governments to procure new regions in the underdeveloped countries for further capital
investment. With their social power, these groups were able to provide impetus to
missionaries, soldiers and nationalist elements to propagate the growing importance
of imperialism. In this way, according to Hobson, the development of imperialism was
done through popular humanitarian measure to become the tool for fulfilling the narrow
self-interest of the capitalist classes.

After Hobson, the most popular theory of imperialism was constructed by V.I. Lenin in
his article Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Monopoly Capitalism, published in 1916.
According to Lenin, by the end of the nineteenth century, the growth of capitalism
became a world wide phenomenon and some nations which had industrialised late began
the process of colonial rivalry to get their share of colonies. By the beginning of the
twentieth century, imperialism had developed into-a new form where, in place of free-
trade competition, there was growth of monopolistic tendencies. In Germany and
America, through the process of
140

economic effects of the Unequal Treaties, they also left social, moral and psychological
impact on China. According ' to Sun Zhong Shan, economic exploitation of China was
done through finance imperialism which was more harmful and disastrous than the
political exploitation. The rural economy collapsed with the economic penetration of
foreign goods, paper currency and tariff duties and the annual extraction of more than
1200 million taels from China financially drained that country. Since foreign imperialism
was being backed up by foreign governments this also meant loss of China's rights as an
independent sovereign nation and also led to the growth of numerous social, political and
economic problems like unemployment. The growth of railroads and shipbuilding
industries was done to provide avenues for foreign economic capitalism investment
which then destroyed China's industries and made them dependent on foreign
manufactured goods. In this way, through finance capitalism, the foreigners destroyed
China's life and economy in order to make more profits for themselves.

According to Parker T. Moon, there were two stagesol Western aggression on China:
(a) The first stage was from 1840 to 1880, in which imperialism had not as yet developed
in full form;
(b) 1880 onwards when the 'real' imperialism developed.

In the first stage. Unequal Treaties were reflection of free trade policy which were totally
opposite to imperialism. Under free trade policy when China's economic doors began to
be opened up. there was scramble between the foreign powers for market, mining, and
railroad concessions which finally resulted in the carving out of spheres of influence in
China. Finance imperialism was started by mixing business
141

and commercial enterprises. According to Tan Chung, Moon by not considering free-
trade policy as part of imperialism is wrong because in China, imperialism began from
the nineteenth century onwards— from the Unequal Treaties of nineteenth century
commercial imperialism developed which later in 1880s became finance imperialism.
According to traditional social theorists like Mary C. Wright, with the onset of foreign
capital and investment, modernization was brought about in China which assisted in the
development of pre-industrial economy. It was the foreign powers who brought modern
techniques and assisted in the growth of capital and industrial enterprises in China. The
Chinese government after receiving this assistance developed industrial capital and
bureaucracy to support it. In 1903-06 it was the private business classes and organisers
that provided the necessary capital and avenues which brought about the "re-development
of economic capital investment centers." These elements only in the later years helped in
the growth of capitalistic and nationalistic sentiments. In this way, foreign capital was on
the one hand reflection of foreign aggression and on the other hand assisted in the growth
of nationalistic feelings and nationalism in China.

Chinese people were provided with the incentive to develop and establish modern
industries. It was the modern factories which taught the Chinese modern techniques and
became breeding grounds for technical industries which also boosted Chinese
industrialization. Under such circumstances, there was bound to arise conflict between
Chilians traditional economy and modern system as new units were dependent upon
technique, knowledge, capital, demand and supply.
142

According to the World Economy Theories School, finance imperialism had universal
features. H.W. Singer, Gunner Myrdal, Frances Moulder and Andre Gunder Frank think
that white nations by applying economic pressures on non-white nations made them
economically dependent so that they could procure agricultural goods and raw materials
and in turn sold at high prices manufactured products to non-white nations. At the same
time, this policy also retarded the development of internal industrialization in China.

According to Francis Moulder in order to convert Sino-British trade and to earn more
profit, British joined the Chinese trade with that of India. From India export of opium
was made to China. From China export of tea was made to Britain. In this way, there was
no need for Britain to invest any money and the balance of trade was only in favour of
Britain. Gradually many Chinese towns became treaty port enclaves of white traders,
protected militarily and out of China's judicial authority. They also penetrated into the
interior regions to impose economic and political restrictions on them. Then by taking
away China's sovereign rights the foreign powers managed to take over control of ship-
building, manufacturing, mining, railways and banking institutions,' economically
exploited China and laid the foundations of finance imperialism.

According to Andre Gunder Frank the Chinese trade was utilized to develop foreign
finance imperialism in China. It was the Chinese economy that was used inside and
outside China to make it dependent upon the world capitalist economy. This led to the
rise of new classes in China who retarded the growth of modern Chinese compradore
bourgeoisie who worked as foreign agents.
143

In this way, two groups of historians emerge. According to one group of scholars, it was
only through finance imperialism that there was development of modern techniques,
bureaucracy and financial institutions in China. Another group of scholars believes that
by making the Chinese economy vulnerable, exploitative and unstable the foreign powers
made it dependent upon them.

Chinese interaction with the white nations through economic relations was the cause of
economic conflict because the policies of the foreign powers were hampering the
economic development of China as a modern nation. The restrictions were of two types:
firstly through trading activities foreign powers destroyed handicraft industry, self-
sufficient economic strength and instead developed a balanced trade beneficial only to
them. Secondly, through economic ventures and investment policy, the foreigners took
control of the Chinese economy, converted China into a semi-colony of foreign powers
and a source of extracting money. No foreign power had any intention of modernizing
China, their only desire was to fulfil their own narrow self-interests.

FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF IMPERIALIST POWERS IN CHINA

China came into the clutches of finance imperialism from 1895 onwards. This process
assumed serious proportions after the Qing government signed the Boxer Protocol. The
foreign customs were pledged as security for the Boxer indemnity. Provincial revenues
were mortgaged, the salt-tax was re-organised and brought under foreign administration
as it was pledged as security for loans that the Chinese government had taken from the
foreign powers. Railways trunk lines built with foreign capital and were
144

subject to varying degree of foreign control during the period of the loans. Finance
imperialism was, thus, a phase of the larger economic imperialism.

The main idea behind all the treaty stipulations and agreements including intercourse,
customs, extraterritoriality, spheres of interest, railway concessions and control was to
earn commercial profits by the opening of the Chinese empire. But even after securing
the Unequal Treaties, the movement of foreign investors was restricted outside their
spheres of influence. To invest in financial enterprises like mining, rail-roads and banking
outside the ports, special permission had to obtained from the Chinese government.
Taking advantage of the financial problems of the Chinese government, the foreign
powers gradually ushered in the era of finance imperialism.

China for a long time was almost completely dependent upon foreign capital for her
development and for meeting the increase in her government expenditure which
necessarily arose from the imposition of indemnity payments. China had no money
market and no capital was available because of lack of confidence in the government as
an agency for the construction of rail-roads and the opening of mines— which were the
two great fields for the use of capital. The Chinese were not familiar and had no
confidence in the stock company as a new form of financial organisation and therefore,
never developed it. To meet public expenditure— there was an inflexible revenue system
founded on custom taxes on land and production of salt. These taxes could not be
increased because of popular resistance. Foreign custom rates were fixed by the traders
and could not meet China's new needs by an increase in the foreign custom levies. It was
also impossible to produce increased revenue by a reorganisation
145

of the collection of the existing taxes because of official interest in the possibility of
"squeeze". Thus, the Chinese empire had to depend upon the foreign money market to
take care of its immediate governmental needs and to provide for \. the great
developmental undertakings such as the construction of railways.

The financial activities for the powers may be divided into two periods: (a) the period
extending from 1895 to 1908, a time of intense competition among the several powers
and (b) the years following 1908, when the powers showed an increasing realisation of
the dangers of an unrestricted competition and tended to cooperate in the economic and
financial exploitation of China.

Prior to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), China had no appreciable foreign debt. The
defeat in the war, however, resulted in her agreement to pay an indemnity of 230,000,000
taels and cession of the Liaodong Peninsula. Immediately Russia and France came to her
help. This loan of 400,000,000, francs while offered by Russia and France jointly, was
almost entirely subscribed in France. It was secured on the Maritime Customs receipts,
and by a Russian Government guarantee. Although Russia had no money to lend but it
was willing to guarantee the loan because of the effect it would have on her position at
Beijing. Russia, France and Germany forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to
China and as act of gratitude, all the three powers wanted more concessions from China.
Japan returned the peninsula and took the compensation of 30 million taels, secured
facilities to manufacture and establish factories in its sphere of interest. Japan next turned
her attention-to wards Manchuria where Russia was already trying to build the Trans-
Siberian Railway. But after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) in
146

which Russia was defeated, Manchuria was partitioned between the two foreign powers,
South Manchuria came under Japan and North Manchuria went to Russia. In 1897,
Russia sent its fleet and acquired Port Arthur or base from
the Chinese government.

Britain was concerned at the growing influence of; Russia. The British immediately
pressed on the Chinese ; Government a loan to meet the second instalment of the
indemnity, to the amount of 16 million pounds. This was an Anglo-German loan and
marks the beginning of cooperation of English and German finance in Chinese affairs. In
1898, when the final settlement was due, the Anglo-German financiers were forced to
compete with the Russians and French, both groups strongly urging, their claim to
consideration on the Chinese government. The former was successful, although offering
less advantageous terms, despite the fact that strong pressure was brought to bear on
China from the British legation. No Government guarantee, however, was involved in the
Anglo-German loans, which must be considered as more nearly financial in their ends
then the Russo-French loan. It was nevertheless, the desire to combat the Russian
influence which caused the British Government to insist that her financiers should have
the privilege of helping China out of the difficulties created by the war with Japan. Both
groups reaped an abundant reward for their benevolence when it came to the scramble for
economic privileges in the empire. In return, Britain enlarged its territory in Hong Kong,
occupied the fertile Yangzi area and got the island of Weihaiwei1( The name of
Weihaiwei, which means "awe-inspiring seafort", was changed to Weihai in 1949—
Editor.) which was opposite Port Arthur to keep an eye on Russia.
147

The next great public debt fastened on China resulted from the failure of the Boxer
Movement, the indemnity imposed amounting to 450,000,000 taels. The security taken
on this charge was the pledged balance of the Maritime customs, increased by the raising
of the tariff charged ad valorem 5%, the revenues from the native customs administered
in the open ports by the Maritime Customs Service, and the revenues from the Salt-
Gabelle. The maritime customs were taken as security for these early debts primarily
because it was a service efficiently organised and administered under foreign supervision.
It was not until 1911 that China was again forced to borrow for governmental purpose.
But with the (uncompleted) currency loan of that year and the Reorganisation Loan of
1913, following 1911 Revolution, she began, increasingly to seek funds abroad for
general administrative purpose. While governmental loans were important, the principal
field for foreign finance lay in securing and utilising railway concessions. It was through
railway construction that the powers could effectively penetrate the areas claimed by
them as spheres of interest, and it is in the control provisions of the various loan
agreements that the policy and intention of the several European states is most clearly
revealed. So far as the primary interest of a state was purely financial and economic, the
control provisions in its railway contracts were designed merely to offer security to the
bondholders. Where, on the other hand, the interest was partly or wholly political, more
extensive control was demanded. These control provisions, whether of one sort or the
other, were five in number. They involved:

1. Supervision of construction of the roads.

2. A national priority in the purchase of materials.
3. Audit, or other super vision of expenditure.
148
4. Actual operation of the road during the life of the loan,
5. Administration of the railway zone and police rights there in.

In some cases, the roads themselves were pledged as a security for the loan, whether with
or without the above-mentioned control provisions. In other cases the loan was secured
by a general imperial government guarantee, and by the pledging of certain revenues for
the repayment of the loan together with the interest on it. As examples of roads which
provided for control of operation for strategic or other political purpose, may be
mentioned the Russian and Japanese lines in Manchuria, the German Qingdao-Qinfu line
in Shandong province, and the French System in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces. The
several loan agreements for these systems contain all five of the provisions described
above. They were constructed, and for some years operated under the supervision of the
foreign government concerned rather than by the government of China. The nature of the
transaction in each case warrants the conclusion that the foreign government was
interested in the loan for its own purposes rather than on behalf of national finance. In
other words, loans were not made primarily as good investments. Moreover the roads
were constructed for the sake of advantage derived from the sale of materials to be used
in building them or because of the profits that would come out of their operation. In some
cases it was apparent that the road would not be immediately or even for a long time
profitable and the railway tariffs were not fixed with a view to profit but were established
for political reasons. Further more, the governments mentioned above, in addition to
specific concessions, sought continually to secure a general monopoly of construction in
their respective spheres, with a view to determining the course of development of those
areas. In consequence of this China was for some years greatly
149

handicapped in the development of her communications along national lines.

The ground work for the construction of these railways was laid in the years from 1898 to
1900, and the concessions obtained were, on the whole, in the respective spheres of
interest of the powers. Consequently they served to emphasize the division of China into
spheres. Each power sought to strengthen itself in its sphere by keeping out of the other
either by direct agreement, or by pressure exerted at peking to prevent the granting of
concessions to nationals of other states. This can be seen in the agreements reached
between U.K. on the one hand, and France, Russia and Germany on the other, providing
for mutual respect for each others priority of interest in a specified region. These
agreements were, on the whole, lived up to by both England and Germany. Russia
however tried directly to force her way in to the British sphere by utilising Belgian
capital, and France tried to project her influence northwards into the Yangtze provinces.
Now Japan embarked on a systematic development of her newly acquired holdings. First
of all she undertook negotiations with the Chinese Government to secure its acquiescence
in the transference of Russian rights and interest to Japan. In addition to this the Japanese
used their control of rail communications. To advance their business interests at the
expense of other foreigners doing business in Manchuria. The commercial port, Dalian,
was for some time closed to all but Japanese goods and vessels. In this way, the Japanese
attempted to establish a market for their goods before admitting their foreign competitors.
150

Further more rebates on the rail road were given to Japanese goods, the Japanese
demanded exemption from the operation of the Chinese consumption taxes, and in
general, they indulged in many of the practices which they had objected to and protested
against in the Russian action in Manchuria prior to the war and in the German action in
Shandong on the ground that such practices constituted a violation of the Doctrine of
Open Door. From the administrative side Japan balanced an efficient administration by
continued encroachments on and offense against the Chinese position outside of the
railway zone, and in the zone she made herself supreme so far as China was concerned.

The total effect of the unequal treaties, spheres of influence and war indemnities resulted
in the following situation:

1. China lost to the foreign countries her right to decide upon the course of railway
development within her territory.
2. Unbridled strategic and political interests of the foreign
nations jeopardized the smooth planning of railway system within China's territory.
3. The foreign nations usurped the right to decide and make arrangements of the
financiers, constructors and operators of railways within China's territory.
4. Great Britain reversed her policy returning to the sphere of interest conception and
partly repudiated the principle of Open Door.
151

5. The foreign nations were beginning to realize that there was room for all in the
financing of the great trunk lines of China. They were coming to perceive that
competition had the effect of playing into the hands of China by securing her more
favourable terms in the making of loans than could other wise have been obtained. Thus,
financial cooperation between various powers worked -to the disadvantage of China.
In the field of mining (1895-1911), Japanese controlled Fushin Colliery and Kailain mine
was under British control. They were the largest mines and therefore profitable for both
the powers.

Britain had complete monopoly over the banking sector till 1890. After that Germany,
Japan, Russia, France, Belgium, America and the Netherlands all entered. The field to
pledge loans to the Chinese government for construction of rail-roads, and for making
further inroads into China for economic exploitation. After the Revolution of 1911, when
the foreign powers gave a loan to the Chinese government for stabilising its
administration, they in return secured concession for direct investment in China so as to
increase Chinese imports. Japan and Britain also invested in cotton textile industries in
order to create more markets for their textile owners. Between 1900 and 1914 the capital
income of the foreigners doubled from 778 million dollars to. 1610 million dollars, this
figure redoubled to 3243 million dollars between 1914 and 1931.
152

By 1931, Shanghai had an average of 46% of direct foreign investments by Britain,

Japan, Russia and the USA. In Manchuria it was 36% and for the rest of China the figure
was 18%. Britain accounted for 37% and Japan 35% of all the foreign investments in
China.

After 1895, attempts were made to burden the Chinese government with high loans with
high rate of interests and since the Chinese government made no serious attempts towards
industrial development, this meant her inability to pay back debts thereby provide more
concessions to the foreign powers. Between 1861 and 1938, 44% foreign loans were
given to the Chinese government, 20% was for the general administration purposes, 5%
for industrial sector and 31% for the development of railways.

Railway and industrial loans were given only when the Chinese government pledged the
right of construction to the respective foreign power. In case of railway loans security
was taken in the form of net revenue of the railway concerned and the right to mortgage
upon the entire railway property. The general loans were given only when custom and
salt revenue were pledged as security. It was foreign maritime customs which controlled
taxes pledged as security.

Foreign investment was done only in those areas which would facilitate foreign trade.
The construction of shipyards was essential as ships were required for trading purposes.
To finance trade, banking sector had to be opened up. Mines
153

were controlled to provide cheap supplies of coal for streamers and also for export
purposes. Major investment was done in the transportation sector to procure minerals,
construct rail-roads and disrupt the self-sufficient agricultural economy of China and
make it dependent upon foreign imperialist powers. Special financial institutions usually
secured the exclusive support of their governments in seeking concessions and in other
ways securing the right to aid in the financing of China. Thus, in some cases (as the Crisp
Loan) it had been impossible for responsible financial concerns to participate in the
financing of China because they could not secure the support of their governments since
such support had already been promised exclusively to other institutions or groups. This
has had the effect of restricting China's access, on competitive terms, to the loan markets
of the world.
154

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Parker T. Moon; Imperialism and World politics, New York: 1926.
2. Mao Tse-tung; Selected Works, Vol. II, Peking: 1967: 311 ff.
3. Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China: 1840-1937,
Harvard University: 1965.
4. Tan Chung; Triton and Dragon, Delhi: 1986.
5. A. Feuerworker; The Chinese Economy Ca. 1870-1911,
Ann Arbor: 1969.
6. J. Gallagher & R. Robinson; "The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History
Review-, 2nd Series, Vol. VI, No. 1, August 1953.
7. W.W. Willoughby; Foreign Rights and Interests in China, 2 Vols, Baltimore: 1927.
CHAPTER: 8
REFORM MOVEMENT OF 1898
S.K.SRIVASTAVA
Hans Raj College
University of Delhi
Delhi-110 007

The nineteenth century witnessed events of far reaching significance for China, events
which exploded the myth about China's changelessness. The Chinese society had
witnessed an intensification of feudal exploitation under the impact of Western trade and
aggressive commercialism. These had led to a gradual erosion of China's sovereign rights
reducing it to a position of inequality and finally to one of hyper colony. The Manchus
not only lacked the determination but also ability to tackle this problem and coupled with
several riots and three major internal movements of the Taipings, Nians and Muslims.
The Manchus had no option but to compromise and ally with the imperialists and to
adopt a rigid attitude towards any change or demand for a change within China. Failing to
respond to the needs of the times Manchus sealed their own fate and even though in some
measures they did offer to the people some change in the first decade of the twentieth
century these were 'too little and too late', and could not save the Manchus from their
final overthrow.

The need to change and reform China has had a long intellectual tradition. During the last
years of Ming and early Qing scholars had urged against the traditional interpretations of
Confucianism and demanded drastic re-examination of the
156

classics. This was only set a precedent but provided a stimulus for scholars of late
nineteenth century. But this tradition should not be emphasised too much because they
did not come down in an unbroken tradition but came to be remembered only after
Western contact had exposed the weaknesses of the Chinese political, social, economic
and military system.

One may note here the contribution of two scholars, Huang Xungxi (1610-1685AD)and
Gu Yenwu(1613-1682AD)who not only proposed reforms but opposed alien rule also.
Gu Yenwu particularly laid a lot of emphasis on thorough reforms based on prevailing
conditions and not only restricted by ancestral laws.

Though China had come in contact with the West towards the close of the sixteenth
century and the beginning of the seventeenth century through the Jesuit missionaries who
contributed to the dissemination of Western learning through translations, it was only
after the. Opium Wars that the idea dawned on certain sections of the bureaucracy to
introduce reforms. The policy of 'Ziqiang' or Self - Strengthening with its emphasis on
keeping the 'di' and 'yung' bifurcated, ultimately ended in the humiliating defeat of China
at the hands of Japan in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki had ushered in new era of imperialism, the one characterised
by export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities-an era which saw
the keen struggle among the powers for the territorial division of China. The above treaty
had allowed the Japanese to set up factories in the trading ports and because of the most
favoured nation clause, the same came to be accorded to the other powers as well.
157

The period 1895 to 1898 saw the powers setting up textile mills, flour mills, oil presses
and various other enterprises which seriously inhibited the development of her own
industries. China was forced to take loans from banks established by the powers for
paying her war indemnities to the tune of 300 million taels of silver. The terms on which
the loans were given were very harsh and the Chinese government had to secure
important items of its revenue. There was a race among the powers to set up banks in
China which not only controlled the finances of the Chinese government but invested in
railways and mines, took in deposits, issued bank notes, manipulated the money market
and monopolised the foreign exchange operations.

There was also a scramble for Chinese territory, beginning with German occupation of
Liaozhou and Russian occupation of Liaodong. Soon all the powers made similar
demands resulting in partition of China into various spheres of influence. The Qing
government which had all been following a policy of least resistance to foreign pressure
could not be expected to stand up to this sort of imperialism. It was against this
background that the Reform Movement of 1898-- "flower that bloomed for a day" and
then faded, started.

Missionaries were the immediate channel for the growth of Western influence in human
and personal matters. Protestant missionaries played an indispensable role in the spread
of Western ideas. The publications of Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General
Knowledge were influential, while at the same time they: fostered readership for the new
Chinese press. The first of these newspapers were founded by the missionaries and their
associates and those that followed were by independent
158

and non-Christian Chinese. There was also a very rapid development in the publication of
new journals, most of which supported reform. These journals were not confined to the
Treaty Ports only but also produced in most of the provincial capitals and were closely
related to the new 'Study Societies' which were disguised political associations. One of
the influential Western book was Mackenzie's The Nineteenth Century: A History which
glorified the European idea of progress. It led to the questioning of the very concept of
'golden age' as the basis of Chinese social and political morality and thus the intellectual
foundation of reform was laid.

One should not, however, over emphasise the positive influence of the missionaries,
because the majority of the Chinese resented the increasing influence of the missionaries |
and anti-missionary movements had already begun in China. Moreover, as we have seen
earlier, traditions of reform were already existent in the Chinese writings of the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and also in the current writings of several Chinese
scholars. What was significant about the later writings was the painful acceptance of the
fact that mere adoption of certain Western techniques for preservation of Chinese values
was not enough, what was needed was a change of values themselves.

China's defeat in the Opium War was a irrefutable proof of the failure of the Self -
Strengthening Movement and there was a revival of demands for further reforms. The
humiliation with China suffered in renouncing its suzerainty over Korea and in
surrendering Taiwan, and Pescadores led to violent reactions. The path of revolution was
taken up by Sun Yatsen and that of reform by scholars like Kang Youwei, Wang Donghe,
Tan Sitong, Yung Wing and Yan Fu.
159

Kang Youwei, scholar from Guangdong, also known as 'Modern sage', undertook a six-
year tour of China and was greatly impressed by the model settlements of foreigners in
Treaty Ports. His knowledge of Western learning helped him in the reexamination of
classics and different interpretation of Confucianism- no longer a conservative but a
progressive. His interpretations led to the emergence of a new literary group which
looked upon Kang as the their master. In 1891 a school was opened in Guangzhou where
apart from the traditional subjects, Western learning was also taught.

Kang authored a number of important works: (a) The Study of Fundamental Principles (a
study of modern thought); (b) The Rise and Fall of the Nations (a study of European
colonisation of America and Africa); (c) History of the Glory and Downfall of Turkey
(saw a parallel in Chinese history); (d) A History of Constitutional Changes in
England— Kang "never preached republicanism except as an ideal unrealisable for China
and favoured the English constitutional system.

Japan was the model for kang in matters of reform and he worte books highlighting (a)
the recent literature of Japan to which Kang was indebted and (b) a treatise on reforms in
China. Kang also warned that if China remained inert it would soon lose Liaodong and
Taiwan to its more alert neighbours— a prophecy which came true in 1895. This also
brought him close to Wang Donghe, the tutor to Emperor Guangxu. He recommended
Kang to the Emperor giving him his first opportunity.

Kang had submitted his first memorial in 1888 in Beijing but it was not transmitted to the
court. In 1895, a memorial
160

signed by kang and 1300 examination graduates was sent to the Emperor and it found his
support. The memorial had several important demands:

1. It urged the government not to ratify the Treaty of Shimonoseki and to punish those
who were responsible for China's defeat.
2. The army was to be more thoroughly reorganised and modernized.
3. Encouragement of banks, railways, post offices, machinery, mines, monetary system,
and improved methods of agriculture'.
4. Government encouragement of private industry and commerce.
5. The study of agronomy, modern science and technical subjects.
6. Development of public libraries, newspapers, magazines, and schools.
7. Changes in the examination system.
8. Sending of Chinese to study in foreign countries.
9. Extension of the right to send memorials to throne directly and creation of annually
elected councils that would deliberate upon political and economic matters.

Confucianism was looked upon as a source of national strength and as a counterpoise to

Christianity. The memorial concluded with the remark that China's condition was
desperate and required such desperate remedies as memorial embodied.
161

By the time the memorial reached the Emperor, the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been
signed and the apprehensions of Kang had come true. The memorials of Kang were
circulated to all the provincial governors and a number of study societies sprang up in
the provinces in the cause of the newly proposed reforms. The reformist ideas gained
wider circulation with the expansion of the press. Between 1896-1898.. 25 new journals
were published, the Shiwu Bao and Guowen Bao being some of the more influential
ones. The active centre of the reform activities were regions in the lower Yangzi,
Guangdong, Hunan, and Zhili.

The contribution of Kang Youwei lay in his ability to place the demands of reform within
the framework of Chinese tradition itself. Despite his original interpretation of
Confucianism as a reforming ideology, he remained committed to abiding Confucian
values and to the role of elite in the regeneration of China. He wanted the elite to play a
leadership role in these reforms from above and was convinced that the Emperor in China
could assume such a role. Thus, Kang and his disciple Liang Qichao both wanted a broad
over all development of the country while preserving the institution of monarchy. Besides
Kang, Liang and his supporters there was Wang Donghe, the tutor to the Emperor and his
supporters who was pro-Emperor bureaucrat, conservative but inclined to changes. This
group acted as a bridge between the Emperor and Kang-Liang group.

The group led by Tan Sitong directly condemned not only the conservatism of the ruling
class, the Confucian moral codes, but more significantly the Manchu domination of the
Chinese.
162

They were nationalists and were opposed to any compromise or moderation in their aim.

Yan Fu played a significant role in the dissemination of Western ideas through his
translations of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, Adam Smith's the Wealth of Nations and
Herbert Spencer's A study of Sociology. Yan Fu argued for a more thorough re-
examination of China. However, his group mainly remained inactive and did not involve
itself directly in politics.

Finally, one may mention the Yung Wing group of the comprador type which was pro-
West and stood for a thorough Westernizaion.

In 1897, Kand urged the Emperor to act quickly to save China and suggested that the
Emperor should personally proclaim reforms using Japan as a model. Alternatively he
could call together able officials to chalk out a programme of reforms and put them into
effect according to priority; or to urge all high provincial officials to carry out reforms in
their respective provinces and the viceroys and the governors to produce results withing
three years— failure to do so to be punished with dismissal.

On 11 June a decree of Emperor Guangxu declared his intensions to introduce reforms

and marked the formal beginning of the Hundred Day Reforms. However, since January
important reforms had been initiated in the military examination - syllabus I consisted of
both Chinese and Western learning; the soldiers were to be tested in skill with rifle and
not bows and arrows. The practice of memorizing passages and reproducing them in the
examination was given up.
163

On 12 July 1898 Kang was summoned for an audience before the Emperor due to the
effects of Wang Donghe. Sometime earlier in the month of June he had been appointed as
a Counsellor at the court. The policies of Kang which came to be adopted by the Emperor
can be divided into a minimum and maximum programme. His minimum programme
was concerned with what Kang regarded as three essential preconditions of further
reform, namely the modernization of the traditional examination system, the elimination
of sinecures and the creation of a system of modern education. His maximum programme
towards which no steps were taken during these hundred days, was a constitutional
monarchy.

Benginning with 11 June decree, the reformers with the help of the Emperor, sought to
transform China in the next hundred days with hastily issued decrees giving scant
attention to the fact whether these were being implemented or not. The month of June
saw the abolition of the Eightlegged Essay' and the appointment of Liang Qichao as the
head of the translation bureau. In the subsequent month, decision was taken to set up a
university at Beijing and awards were announced for educationists, agriculturists,
industrialists, inventors, and writers. Unregistered temples and ancestral halls were to be
turned into schools. A special cadre was set up for the economic services. The month of
August saw the setting up of a Bureau for Mining and Railways, Agriculture, Industry
and Commerce. Foot binding was also forbidden. In the beginning of September, Tan
Sitong, Yang Jui and a few others were appointed as counsellors at the court. Edicts were
issued for setting up of post offices in the capital and the ports. Finally, on 21 September
a coup brought about by Cixi, the Dowager Empress put an end to all reforms. '
164

Historians have accused these reformers of bringing down opposition upon themselves by
trying to introduce radical reforms in too short a period. This does not appear to be true.
Much of what the 1898 reformers wanted to do had already been done during the earlier
reform effort and there was nothing drastic about them. The establishment of schools and
colleges to teach Western subjects did not go beyond what had already been done in
Hunan. Moreover, the study of classics remained the basis of education. The setting up of
bureaux for supervising industries, mines, railways etc can hardly be considered radical
in an age when already some of the enterprising viceroys had patronised such activities in
their provinces.

The issue which could have aroused greatest opposition in education was the abolition of
the traditional examination system. A large number of candidates who had prepared
themselves for the traditional examination would have been seriously affected. The
reformers were well aware of this fact and they made no attempt to abolish the system but
only the 'Eight-legged Essay, which had been the target of earlier reformers also. The
changes perceived were application of contemporary problems to questions from classical
texts and the questions to be supplemented by those from Western subjects starting with
economics.

There is no evidence that those who were affected immediately raised their voices against
these changes. In fact most of the people were hardly aware of the changes being
introduced. The opposition at court tried to create opposition beyond and therefore much
of the opposition came from the older generation rather than the younger one who were
directly affected by any change.
165

The reformers also undertook the abolition of certain sinecures and redundant posts They
were aware of the fact that a comprehensive policy of rationalisation of bureaucracy
would take time and therefore actually abolish, those posts which were notorious
examples of waste: Supervisorate of Heir-Apparent, Office of Transmission for Imperial
Edicts, Court of Banquets, Court of State Ceremonials, Court of Imperial Stud, Court of
Revision. There was a great reduction in the ranks of petty officials. The Emperor
ordered that those who had been made redundant should be maintained in Beijing on the
grounds that the development of China required more officials. The abolition of sinecures
may be a major factor in opposition to reforms, but certainly not because of sudden
removal of officials. The real problem was that the remaining sinecure posts were more
often occupied by the Manchus.

Not much was done for judicial reforms. An edict of 29 July asked the courts to make a
clean sweep of the cases pending in the courts. It also declared that new methods of
procedures would be instituted. Memorials were presented for appointing special judges
to try civil and criminal cases.

The reformers also attempted a reform of the public finance system and compilation of
state budgets and financial statements. Re-adjustments to be made and relevant
regulations worked out regarding taxes, Iijin (internal transit duties) military expenses
and revenues and expenditures. The Board of Revenue was to list the annual revenues
and expenditures and submit monthly reports regarding their fulfilment.

Intensified training for army and navy to be introduced along with new drill-methods
based .on Western lines manufacture of arms and ammunition to be standardised. The
166

irregular forces were to be disbanded. The Bannermen were asked to enter into useful
professions and allowances paid to them by the state were to be abolished.

The opposition to reforms or the struggle which took place at the court revolved around
two issues. The first was the question of communication and the second was the question
of patronage.

Kang Youwei's aims were democratic to the extent that he wanted the views of the people
to be communicated directly to the Emperor and the Emperor to take into consideration
the wishes of the people. For that purpose kang wanted the creation of some sort of
organisation whereby direct communication between the government and the people
could be established without the mediation of officialdom. There were two problems
here. Firstly, only officials of high rank could memorialise the Throne directly and none
of the reformers held such a rank. The reforms which were introduced was because of the
support of some of the officials of high rank, who later suffered for lending such a
support to the reforms. Such a system gave ample opportunity to the officials to reject a
document which did not suit the bureaucrats. The Emperor ordered that all the memorials
from his own group of reformers were to be sent to him unopened, even if they were from
the most junior official. This was resisted by the higher officials. The crisis occurred over
two issues.

(a) Xy Yinggui, the President, Board of Rites, was accused to be an obstructer of

progress. An other official Wen Di called for the degradation of these accusers. Wen Di
was dismissed.
(b) Wang Zhao, a junior official of the Board of Rites, wrote a
167

memorial urging the Emperor to visit Japan to study Meiji reforms at first hand. This
suggestion was not transmitted to the Emperor and when the matter was brought before
the notice of the Emperor, a number of senior officials of the Board of Rites were
dismissed and rank of Wang Zhao was upgraded. Such an act made the opposition of the
conservatives certain.

The question of patronage was equally explosive. The power of Empress Dowager Cixi
was built up by her assumption of imperial patronge. If this power of promoting or
demoting officials was taken over by the Emperor, her own powers would be lost. Rong
Lu. the Commander of the Northern Army, enjoyed her patronage. Guangxu was aware
of this delicate situation and therefore did not adopt any extreme policy of removing the
senior officials but resorted to giving his reformers only junior positions. This continued
to be the position until the dismissal of the senior officials of the Board of Rites. It was
then that Rong Lu recommended about forty of his own supporters to assist in the
reforms and this was rejected by the Emperor.

The opposition of Cixi therefore arose from this threat to her position. Guangxu was
aware that a reaction would certainly follow from the refusal to accept the
recommendations. This forced the reformers into taking a suicidal course of trying to Put
Cixi out of the way.

On 16 September Jiang .lie Shi was appointed Vice-president of Metropolitan Board and
Inspector General of Army Organisation and Drills for Beiyang Army. The Emperor was
asked by Cixi to arrest Kang Youwei. The Emperor asked Jiang lie Shi to arrest Cixi but
not to harm her. Jiang used the situation
168

for his personal gain and informed Rong Lu about the plan of the reformers and thus
resulting in a crackdown on the reformers.

Another version of the incident refers to the instructions to Jiang to go to Tianjin and do
away with Rong Lu, after which to imprison Cixi. On 21 September the Emperor was
seized and put under house arrest until his death in 1908. He believed that the failure was
due the treachery of Jiang but little did he realise that Jiang only hastened the debacle.
Guangxu and Kang Youwei both failed to inspire the officials with confidence. Kang
later realised this weakness.

The reform leaders were basically ideologists, inexperienced in politics, and issued about
110 reform decrees in about 103 days without attempting to see whether they were
effective or not. The bureaucracy itself was divided into two factions over the questions
of reforms. The southern faction supported reforms while the northern group rallied
around Cixi.

Among the provincial officials, except for Hunan which carried out the reforms, the other
either ignored it or adopt a wait and watch policy. There was also opposition from monks
and other vested interests whose temples, monasteries or ancestral halls were to be
converted into schools.

The anti-reformers believed that the Chinese ways were better than the Western ways and
there was no need for change. Moreover, they believed, Chinese human labour and
experience could achieve better results. There were objections to introduction of
machines on the ground that these would cause unemployment and would result in faster
depletion of natural resources.
169

There also was no popular desire for reforms and while the officials may have done their
best, the people remained unstirred.

After 21 September the conservatives and anti-reformists held sway. A period of reaction
set in . A number of reformers were executed, dismissed or downgraded. Kang and Liang
escaped from China. Cixi's own supporters were given high ranks. All the projected
reforms disappeared. A decree of 26 September repealed most of the paper reforms. The
examination system took its old form and the official newspaper China Progress banned.

To all outward appearance the Reform Movement had failed. But the imagination of a
few had been stirred. The realisation had dawned on them that reformism was a blind
alley. Nothing short of a revolution and overthrow of the Manchus could solve the
problem of China.
170

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Daniel II. Bays; China Enters the Twentieth Centur Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of
a New Age: 1895-1
2. M.E. Cameron; The Reform Movement in China: 1898-1912, New York: 1963.
3. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu; the Rise of Modern China. New York: 1970.
4. Foreign Language Press; the Reform Movement of 1898, Peking: 1976.
CHAPTER: 9
THE BOXER MOVEMENT
POONAM MATHUR
Deptt. of Chinese & Japanese Studies
University of Delhi
Delhi -110 007.

The late nineteenth century was a period of turmoil in China. By this time the imperialist
powers had spread their hold over large portions of China. On the one hand, attempts
were made to modernize China on the Western model, and on the other hand, there was
violent opposition to foreign penetration of China. This opposition crystallized in the
Boxer (Ye He Tuan) Movement of 1900. The main targets of the Boxers were the
Western imperialists in general, and the Christian missionaries and Chinese converts in
particular, as they were seen as supporters of foreign imperialism in China. It was
crushed by the imperialist forces who found a pliant tool in the hands of Empress
Dowager Cixi. It resulted in the signing of the Boxer Protocol in 1901 which further
infringed the Chinese sovereignty.

ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND

By late nineteenth century. Japan followed the Western countries in extending her control
over China. This intensified foreign aggression came at a time when natural disasters
were becoming frequent and social-economic condition of the large masses of people was
deteriorating. The ruling Qing dynasty had weakened considerably due to the internal
politics and imperialist aggression.
172

In the closing decade of the nineteenth century socio-cultural changes had put China in a
precarious position. Elements of old and new existed side by side. The pace of change
seemed overwhelming and irreversible in^ many aspects. Steamboats plied the Yangzi
river, new industries had cropped up along the eastern coast of China, more and more
scientific texts were being published, telegraphs made urgent matters known in different
parts of the country. Western powers had started investing heavily in mining,
communications, and heavy industry. Native capitalist class was also emerging turning
the Chinese feudal social-economic structure in existence for a long time into a semi-
feudal structure. While traditional hierarchical society continued to be in existence, new
forces of production emerged. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat classes though a small
group, became an important element of the social. structure.

Yet much of this change was confined to the treaty port cities and within them to the
Western concession areas. Penetration of the Chinese countryside by even the most
aggressive Western businessmen was slow and through Chinese merchant intermediaries
or the compradores. For most young Chinese men from well-to-do families, the ladder of
success remained through the examination system of the old style. The official position it
entailed was not only the most respectable in the society but also brought in fantastic
economic benefits. Girls still had little access to formal education, their feet were still
bound, and marriages still arranged. In the fields, the old techniques continued.
Foreigners were regarded as exotic or barbaric. Chinese diplomats in foreign countries
received little prestige, in fact, there were several instances of their humiliation on their
173

return. This greater hold of the traditional structure was evident in the nature of the Boxer
Uprising.

Some of the more gradual changes reflected a deeper intermixture of tradition and change
and reveal some of the problems ailing the Chinese social-economic system. During the
last years of the nineteenth century, the rate of growth of population rose. This had an
adverse impact on both the rural and urban economy. It led to a rise in the number of
unemployed among the educated as competition for official jobs became much more
severe. No attempt was made by the Qing government to reform its administrative
structure to meet the requirements of the day. This led to increasing corruption in
distribution of official degrees. Bribery, nepotism, and favouritism grew rampant. This
meant that the examination system which stood for equal opportunity for all, and for
social mobility for all. lost the basic premise on which it had stood.

In the rural areas peasant suffering grew manifold. Chinese farmers in response to new
demands for cash crops had started sowing cash crops like tobacco and cotton. Though
their profits increased, they became also more vulnerable to market ups and downs.
Those growing tea or silk for the world market were affected by world price fluctuations.
Rural handicrafts which had been one of the important elements of self-sufficient peasant
economy suffered as industrialisation and foreign capitalism penetrated China.

Peasant suffering grew also due to additional tax burden. Defeat in wars with foreign
countries in the second half of the nineteenth century, payment of indemnity to them,
increased the burden on the Qing exchequer which it sought
174

to replenish by increasing taxes. All these heavy demands could not be collected easily,
tyrannical methods were used by the officials, alienating the peasantry.

All these problems were confounded by the natural calamities which hit the Chinese
peasantry in the late i nineteenth century. Between 1886 and 1897 about 60 districts in
Jiangsu and forty in Anhui were ravaged each year by ' floods, or droughts. The most
severely affected were the regions along Yellow river. In 1897-98 in Shandong and Zhili,
in particular, flood and famine caused hunger and poverty for thousands of people. In
January 1898 it was reported that forty eight counties and districts in Shandong were
suffering from famine. The Qing government, with its weak resources could do little to
repair the canals or dykes, the local resources too were insufficient to solve the problem.
Situation became unbearable in some areas because of corruption and inefficient handling
of the relief operations by the local authorities.

Natural calamities in China have always been considered a consequence of some spiritual
cause, they are the manifest signs of the wrath of heaven, a punishment sent to avenge
some evils in the nation. The Boxer preachers did not fail to point the moral. They
proclaimed that the drought was due to foreign presence and the doctrine taught by them.
This social restlessness was intensified and complicated by international factors. The
imperialist aggression was leading to widespread dissatisfaction within the country.

Since the defeat of China in the Opium War (1 840-42), foreign powers had been
encroaching upon Chinese sovereignty. Repeated defeats at the hands of foreigners had
led to greater concessions for the foreign powers, opening
175

of a number of cities to the foreigners. The imperialist powers justified their actions in the
name of modernization. Undoubtedly, the Westerners introduced railways, telegraph, and
modern industry to China but at a very high price to the Chinese. The foreign powers
extracted concessions like fixed customs duty on foreign imports, extraterritorial rights
for foreigners, permission for missionaries to preach in the interior and so on. All these
clauses were a direct blow to the Chinese sovereignty.

The situation reached its climax after China's defeat at the hands of Japan in the Sino-
Japanese War (1895-95) and the signing of Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Treaty of
Shimonoseki allowed Japanese capitalists to establish factories in Chinese trading ports.
The Japanese capitalists, thus, found a place for investment of their capital. During this
time Japanese capitalism had reached what Lenin describes as the monopoly stage of
capitalism. The imperialists had forced China to accept the most favoured nation clause
in the earlier treaties. This meant when one country got any privilege in China, all others
got it. too. This led to an intensified exploitation of China.

Until the Sino-Japanese War. China had borrowed little from abroad, but due to the heavy
indemnity imposed by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Qing government had to take too
huge loans from two monopoly-capitalist groups— the Russo-French and the Anglo-
German. The loans were secured by pledging customs revenue and internal transit taxes
to the foreigners. As a result. China's regular revenues were brought under foreign
control. The opening of foreign banks further deepened the financial control of the
imperialists. The foreign banks arranged loans to the Qing
176

government, controlled its finances, invested in railways, manipulated the money market
and monopolised foreign exchange operations.

Moreover, after the Sino-Japanese War. China's weakness and her inability to defend
herself was clearly displayed. The foreign powers took advantage of this weakness and
the process of breakup of China started. Each power tried to obtain 'special privileges' in
China. Between 1896-98 most of China was carved into spheres of influence of different
imperialist powers. The imperialist powers collaborated to exploit China and zealously
guarded every concession and privilege they extracted.

This expansion of the activities of foreign imperialism in the interior, created a sense of
imminent extinction. On the one hand, it led the reformists to propose national salvation
through institutional reform, on the other hand, it infuriated the general masses who
sought a solution through violent overthrow of the foreigners. National pride was
severely hurt by the ceding of Taiwan to Japan, it led to dissatisfaction among people
with the government and their anger against the foreign intruders.

Foreign aggression was most evident to the general masses in the work of the
missionaries. The Unequal Treaties had allowed free propagation of Christianity in the
interior. These missionaries not only propagated an alien religion but also bought
converts by giving monetary subsidies to them. The preaching of Christianity was seen
by most Chinese as poisoning the hearts of their country men. Roman catholic bishops
and priests began to assume the style of great mandarins, they were supported in all their
actions by the foreign governments. Chinese converts received complete
177

protection of the foreign governments. No matter what he did, he ceased to be subject to

the law and authority of the Chinese government. Christianity, the foreign faith,
therefore, became a basic cause and focus of anti-foreignism.

The Chinese could not and did not appreciate the demonstration of cultural and racial
superiority of Western Christians in China. The Western Christian drive to destroy
China's cultural identity invited strong anti-Western and anti-Christian feelings. P.A.
Varg has gone to the extent of showing how this led to the clash of interests between
Chinese gentry and the Christian missions. After all the Christian missionaries were
disapproving of Confucius and the Chinese classics, whom they sought to replace with
the Bible.

To a common Chinese too the Christian culture and its ptopagators represented bigotry,
aggression and intolerance. It was clearly evident to them that the Christian missionaries
indulged in activities like occupying land and properties, and yet evaded government
revenues. They encroached upon China's sovereign rights and pressurised the Qing
government to punish those officials whom they did not like. They also blackmailed the
people and exacted money from them.

In 1896-97 there were anti-missionary riots in six provinces in central China— Hubei,
Hunan. Sichuan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Shandong. Each time the foreign powers
demanded heavy damages. It is debatable whether the murder of the German missionaries
was the work of any anti-missionary group. Missionaries were regarded as bringing the
control of the imperialists to the local areas and therefore abhorred.
178

Foreign imperialism, activities of missionaries and the increased exploitation of the

populace due to increased taxes by the Qing government burdened by war indemnities
and loans and frequent natural disasters in the late nineteenth century, all created a
situation of general unrest in China in general and Shandong and the neighbouring areas
in particular.

Shandong had particularly suffered the wrath of foreign imperialists. During the Sino-
Japanese War, the invading armies of Japan attacked the Shandong province and
occupied that region for three years. Jiaozhou and Weihaiwei1 in Shandong came under
the control of Germany and Britain. Germany also claimed the entire province as her
sphere of influence. The introduction of coastal navigation and railways by the
imperialist affected the employment pattern. As the Grand Canal was thrown out of use
many traders, porters, pedlars, and small traders were rendered jobless. Moreover, in the
spreading network of churches over China. Shandong had a large percentage of churches
and about eight)- thousand missionaries and Chinese converts. As already pointed out,
there was opposition to the missionaries not only because they were propagators of a
barbarous religion but also because they support of the imperialist aggressors. This
explains the frequency of anti-missionary activity in the Shandong province. These
incidents led to further exploitation by the imperialist who demanded punishment, and
compensation as a result, natural disasters also affected this region the most during the
890s.
THE MOVEMENT

The Boxers were a fairly disciplined group. The basic unit was the Ian. They, were
organised in companies often men for battle. Ten companies formed a brigade. The tan
leaders were given different ranks like overall-in-charge (zonghan). commander
{tangling), reconnoitrer (datan), patrolling officer (xunying), vanguard (qiandi),
commissar (cuizhen), and sentry squad (shaodui). The leaders of the Movement took up
titles like venerable Patriarch (laoshizu). Elder brother (dashixiong), and Second Elder
Brother (ershixiong). However, the Boxers did not have any fixed hierarchy under one
leader which generally leads to a great deal of politicisation. But the Boxers seem to have
avoided the autocratic behaviour of a few leaders in order to avoid the infighting that had
divided and weakened the Taiping Movement.

Popular struggle had been taking place against the foreigners since 1895. These activities
came to a head in 1 899-1900. In the winter of 1 899-1900. the Boxers, in order to oppose
imperialism attacked missionaries and churches in Shandong. Foreign pressure and fear
within a section of imperial government led the Qing government to crush the Movement.
Yu Xian. the governor of Shandong, who was known for his pro-Boxer and anti-foreign
attitude was removed and replaced by Yuan Shikai. Yuan Shikai was severe towards the
Movement and banned the society. The Yi He Tuan. however, continued its anti-foreign
activities along with their fight against Yuan's forces. This could not continue after the
spring of 1900. when Yuan used his New Army to completely crush the Boxer
Movement in the Shandong province. The Boxers thereafter shifted to Zhili.
180

Undeterred by the opposition, and the crushing defeats they had suffered in Shandong,
the Boxer bands grew and spread through the metropolitan province. They destroyed
churches, killed Chinese Christians, burnt railway stations while they moved in the
direction of Beijing. Local population came to their support. By late April the Boxers
captured several towns and began infiltrating Beijing. In May, foreign ministers at
Beijing sent a joint note to the Chinese government calling attention to the Boxer
troubles, but till that time the signatories themselves do not appear to have realised the
extent or design of the Movement.

The Qing court seems to have been divided on the way the situation was to be handled.
By this time, the Empress Dowager Cixi favoured the appeasement of the Boxers. By
May the Beijing city guards were no longer checking the identity of the insurgents
entering the city. Even earlier, small groups of Boxers had been secretly mobilising the
urban poor in Beijing. Anonymous posters calling for an "Exterminate the Foreigners"
campaign were being put up at a number of places. One such poster said: "Most bitterly
do we hate the treaties which harm the country and bring calamities on the people. High
officials destroy the nation. Lower ranks follow suit. The people find no redress for their
grievances."

The organised movement was now being constantly complemented by sporadic uprisings.
This gave the Boxers a great deal of confidence. This growing confidence and implicit
approval of the government was obvious in the way they paraded openly in Beijing. By
early June, the Yi He Tuan fighters, donning their red turbans, red girdles, shoes and
socks bordered with red, armed with broad swords or long spears became a common
sight on the Beijing streets. After having vacillated for sometime, the Qing government
181

also openly came to their support. As a result, Boxer fighters were stationed in the
imperial palaces, government offices and even in .residence of the royalty and nobility.
This alarmed the foreigners, feeling threatened they huddled together into the legation
quarter and Beitang Cathedral. In mid-June, the Boxers took over Beijing and besieged
the legations, pillaging and burning other foreign establishments and massacring Chinese
Christians.

Beijing's twin city Tianjin was also attacked by the Boxers at the same time. The siege of
Tianjin was much more severe, so much so that the relief column under Admiral
Seymour could not proceed to Beijing. Common interest of the imperialists made Britain,
Germany, Russia, France, the United States, Japan. Italy, and Austria join hands to
protect the Beijing legation quarters. The relief operation had to be postponed for more
than a month.

Meanwhile, the Chinese foreign office (Zongli yameri) called on the foreign powers not
to advance their reinforcements. The Allies did not take the call of the foreign office
seriously. They attacked the Chinese forces at Dagu. In Beijing it was rumoured that the
Allies had decided to demand that the Empress Dowager restore power to the pro-foreign
emperor Guangxu. This enraged the Empress who on 21 June issued an edict declaring
war on the powers and commanded the provincial leaders to mobilise for action. The
diplomatic community was asked to leave Beijing within 24 hours. On expiration of the
set time limit, Chinese troops opened fire on the legations.

This war lasted until 14 August, when international relief force of 20,000 men broke into
Beijing and rescued the foreign community and Chinese Christians. This war was
182

fought mainly in Zhili and on the Chinese side involved both the Boxers and the imperial
troops. Thus, the Boxer Movement turned from a mere opposition to the foreign forces to
an actual fight with them.

While war broke out in northern China, the governors and viceroys of southern provinces
cooperated with the foreign imperialists and ignored the central government's edicts.
Viceroys like Yuan Shikai. Li Hongzhang believed that opposition to the foreigners
would be futile and it was necessary for China at that point of time to gain scientific and
technical knowledge and to modernize China through cooperation with the foreign
powers. Whether their cooperation with the Boxers and Qing government at such a
critical juncture would have led to the victory of China is a moot question. On the one
hand, the aggressiveness of the imperialist powers and their willingness to join hands
against the local government, makes the possibility- of China's success quite remote. On
the other hand, it is also quite obvious that the foreign powers felt that their power was at
stake. And this made them join hands with each other. What is important is that it was
evident that the country was not united, this created a favourable situation for the
imperialists. They could proceed towards partitioning and subjugating China.

By mid-August the foreign powers succeeded in capturing Beijing. This led the Empress
Cixi to flee from Beijing to Shanxi. Meanwhile, senior ministers of the Qing court had
been trying to collaborate with the imperialist powers. With the fall of Tianjin on 14 July
success of the imperialists seemed quite evident they were therefore invited for peace
talks. The eight nation force, however, agreed to negotiate only after occupying Beijing.
183

It is interesting to note the way the issue was interpreted to suit the imperial government
and the imperialist powers. The foreign imperialists in order to retain their concessions
and gain more benefits and the Qing court in order to retain their throne joined hands to
create the concoction that the uprising had mainly been a rebellion by a secret society.
The Qing government had nothing to do with it, in fact it had always tried to crush it.
Because of Qing government's indecisive attitude towards it and because of the
differences of opinion in the Qing court it was easy to find arguments in favour of this
story.

In the intense fighting that took place between the Boxers and the forces of the foreign
powers, the Boxers put up a valiant fight. However, the foreign forces were much more
resourceful and technologically more advanced than the Chinese forces. Not satisfied
with victory alone the foreign troops indulged in all sorts of atrocities and excesses on the
Chinese people. They massacred thousands of men in Beijing, ransacked the entire city in
such a manner that women and at times even whole families committed suicide rather
than survive the dishonour. While contemporary population suffered, its history and
glorious civilization suffered too at the hands of the foreigners who looted and stripped
the imperial palace of most of its treasures. It was not Beijing alone which suffered the
wrath of the foreigners, other places where missionaries had been attacked also came
under fire, literally burning the whole villages.

In the meantime. Russia occupied Manchuria and wanted the whole of China north of the
Great Wall as her own sphere of influence. This led to an acute struggle amongst the
imperialist powers to maximize their gains from their Egression fn China. The British and
the Japanese were not billing to accept the Russian position without concessions
184

for themselves. As a result of this squabbling the final protocol was not signed until 7
September 1901, though the Qing Empress had already accepted the draft by 27
December, 1900.

As the Empress Cixi and the court had lied from Beijing to Xian and foreigners had been
left in control of the capital, the question of future of China raised itself in an acute form.
A number of alternatives were acceptable to the foreigners, they could partition China,
there was talk about establishing a new dynasty with international support. However, in
the end, the United States persuaded the powers to support the Qing dynasty and
quarantine China's territorial and administrative integrity" while in reality setting up a
condominium over China.

The Boxer Protocol was an unprecedentedly humiliating treaty. In fact it was no treaty at
all. China had no power to negotiate, it was a set of terms dictated by foreign powers,
which the Qing government had no option but to sign. The main text consisted of 12
articles. This was supplemented by annexure.

1. A member of the Chinese royal family was to proceed to Berlin to convey the regrets
of the Chinese Emperor to the German Emperor and the Grand Council for the
murder of a German minister, baron von Ketler. A monument was to be erected on the
spot where he was killed.
2. Suspension of the Civil Services Examination in 45 towns, where foreigners were
murdered or maltreated' Vice-President of China's Board of Revenue was to proceed to
Japan to express the Chinese Emperor and
185

government's regrets for the murders of the Japanese legation chancellor.

4. An expiatory monument was to be erected by China in each of the foreign settlements
which had been desecrated.
5. China had to forfeit the right to import arms and ammunition. .
6. The legation quarter in Beijing was to be enlarged and reserved for the exclusive
residence of foreigners.
7. Jaku and other forts which impeded free communication between Beijing and the sea
were to be razed.
8. Certain specified centres were to be occupied by the Powers.
9. An edict was to be issued which would stipulate a death penalty for anyone joining any
anti-foreign society.
10. Negotiations were to be held to amend the existing treaties of commerce and
navigation and the establishment of river conservancy boards with foreign
participation.
11. The Foreign office (Zongli yainen) was to be reformed and upgraded and it was to
have precedence over six other ministries.
12. An indemnity of US $333 million was to be paid over a period of fifty years.

The provisions of the Protocol were a blow to. the Chinese sovereignty and self-respect,
the clauses forbidding arms imports, ordering destruction of forts, arranging to station
foreign troops and suspending examinations were a flagrant interference in the domestic
affairs of China. The Punishment meted out to officials and suspension of laminations
demoralised the gentry, bureaucrats, and Punishment to high officials for anti-foreign
disturbances reduced China to a state of vassalage. The indemnities were
186

very harsh on the Chinese economy, and a tremendous drain on the nation's finances
making any kind of economic reform and development impossible. The interest rate was
so high that the amount would have doubled during the period of payment. The method
of payment implied a very extensive attack on Chinese sovereignty. The loans for the
payment of indemnity were secured against the maritime customs, inland customs, and
salt revenue, thereby strengthening the hold of' imperialists on China's finances.

NATURE OF THE BOXER MOVEMENT

The Boxer Movement has been described in a number of ways. In order to understand its
nature, the following aspects of the Movement need to be discussed:
1. Whether the Boxer organization was a militia or a heretical sect;
2. Whether the Boxer Movement was pro-Qing or Anti- Qing;
3. Whether the Boxer Movement was anti-foreign or anti-Christianity or anti-foreign
religion;
4. Whether the Boxer Movement was a peasant movement or a plebeian movement;
5. Whether the Boxer Movement was an epic or a catastrophe; and
6. Whether the Boxer Movement was a progressive or conservative movement.

The Boxers had not claimed to be "tuan" which connotes "militia" until the year 1898.
The change of name certainly had a political significance involving change in the
relationship between the Boxers and the imperial authorities. The Boxers were
experiencing a kind of crisis in their
187

political identity. Their original stance was to overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming,
as reflected in their slogan: Fan Qing Fu Ming (Oppose the Qing and Restore the Ming).
But the inroads made by the imperialist powers into China's social and economic life and
the widely prevalent anti-imperialist feeling, made the Boxers change their stratagem.
They grabbed the anti-imperialist slogans of "fan yang" (Oppose the Foreigners) and
"mie yong" (Exterminate the Foreigners). This development made the Boxers not only
accept the "milia status bestowed on them by the imperialist authorities," but also adopt a
new slogan of "bao Qing mie yong" (Uphold the Qing and exterminate the Foreigner).
After this the followers of Boxer leaders Zhu Hongdeng and Monk Benming started
attacking the churches in 1899. G.N. Steiger proposes that the Boxers had nothing to do
with any heretical sect, but a militia force recruited with the express demands of the Qing
government in November, 1898. He justifies it by saying that a secret society, holding
heretical doctrines and known to have revolutionary aims would never have attacked
Christian missions as the Boxers had done.

'Boxers" was the name given by foreigners to a Chinese secret society originally called
the Yi He Chuan literally meaning the Fist of the Righteous Harmony. This implied that
they Were ready to support the cause of peace and righteousness, if necessary, by force.
As its members practised Chinese boxing, they acquired the foreign name Boxers. The Yi
He Chuan or the Yi He Tuan as it came to be known later, is believed to have originated
from the White lotus Sect, a group of secret societies descended from the Ming
Emperors. It emerged during the reign of Jia Qing emperor (1796-1870). Its activities
were suppressed in 1808 but it maintained an obscure existence in many districts of Zhili
and Shandong. Steiger, however, contends that the
188

Boxers were a volunteer militia recruited in response to the command of the throne. This
appears quite doubtful as there is little evidence of connection between the Boxers and
the Imperial court till mid-1899.

On the other hand, Chester T'an points out that a clear kinship can be established between
the Boxers and three secret societies, viz. the White Lotus, the Eight Trigram; and the
Great Sword Society. But Victor Purcell propounds that the Boxers "originated
spontaneously and independently of the government'" and "belonged to the secret
societies and heterodox cults which had always been looked upon by the government as
centres of revolutionary danger."

Fan Wenlan considers the Boxer movement a potpourri {tuanti) of the anti-foreign forces
of the Boxers and the Gjeat Swords. He also points out that the rampant disunity amongst
the Boxer ranks was so typical of the secret societies. Fan Wenlan also sees religion as an
important component of Boxer life and discipline. Every Boxer while joining the
organisation had to go through a religious ordination. No doubt, Fan believes. 'The
Boxers who went to battle were all chaste juveniles of the peasant and working classes.
The constraints of superstition made the commandments sacrosanct to them." Hu Sheng
further supports this thesis when he points out that the celestial protection invoked by '
the Boxers was typical White Lotus indulgence in incantation. Moreover, Hu Sheng
points out. both the White Lotus and the Boxer organizations existed in same sort of
disorganized, small, and scattered groups. Thus, Hu Sheng also believes that the Boxers
were a secret society based.
189

Tan Chung believes that the Boxers can be treated as continuation of the White Lotus and
the Nian rebellions.

Jerome Ch'en, however, believes that as there were various types of militia and secret
societies, there were various types of Boxers. "The Boxers" social composition shows no
difference from that of either the militia or the secret societies (including religious sects).
This ambiguity made their transformation from one into another quite easy and formed
the basis of the government's decision to transform them into militia units under
government supervision." Ch'en also points out that the Boxers as well as their leaders
were drawn from various segments of the society. The main participants of the Boxer
Movement came from the peasantry and the urban lower middle class. This heterogenous
group consisted of water and land transport workers, handicraftsmen, wage labourers,
porters, small shopkeepers, pedlars, monks, some school teachers and their pupils. In
Shandong, the lop fifteen leaders had been salt-smugglers, bandits, soldiers, peasants,
local ruffians, convicts, medicine men and young boys, before they headed the
Movement. A large number of soldiers also participated in this Movement. Officials,
gentry and their families also took part once the Qing Court supported the Boxers.

According to Victor Purcell "the Boxers in 1899 consisted both of out-and-out anti-
Manchu rebels and of ordinary people who had joined the sect as a rallying-point against
the universally hated foreigner." There were both anti-Qing and pro-Qing Boxers, though
overall '"at heart they were always more 'anti' than 'pro' the Manc.hu government."
190

The pro- or anti-Qing question defies an either-or answer due to the complexity of
relationship between three parties involved: the infuriated underdogs of North China, the
aggressive Christian churches and foreign imperialists; and the Qing caught between the
two of them. The Qing were basically seen as anti-people and pro-church because of their
"capitulationist line in foreign affairs, selling out China's sovereign rights to the
imperialists." The government did not make up its mind in favour or against the Boxers
so long as their activities did not seriously threaten its own security. The declaration,
points out Hu Sheng, "was but a reluctant measure taken when the government was
unable to either suppress or pacify" the Boxers.

Though it is quite certain that the Qing government supported the Boxers in the final
stages of the movement, the formal relation of the government to the inception of the
movement cannot be fully established. It seems more likely that the Boxers who led the
anti-foreign movement in 1900 emerged as voluntary associations under the influence of
heretical sects who had their origin in the early Qing period. They were originally
opposed both to the Qing government and the foreigners but encouraged by some local
conservative anti-foreign officials they changed their slogan to Protect the Qing, Destroy
the Foreigners. Amongst the foreigners, the missionaries became their chief targets as it
was the operations of the missionaries which were clearly exploitative in the eyes of the
ordinary Chinese. Thus, it is quite clear that the Boxer Movement was mainly anti-
foreign and to the extent that the missionaries were foreigners, they became the chief
targets of the Boxers. But one cannot entirely rule
191

out the possibility of a section of the Boxers being anti-Manchu as well. It seems they
were willing to join hands with the pro-Qing dynasty forces as their common enemy were
the foreigners. This anti-colonial stand of the Boxers has created a niche for the uprising
in the history of China. Victor Purcell feels "the Boxer Movement was anti-foreign and
therefore anti-Christian." According to him the Boxers called the foreigners the "Primary
Devils" (da maozi) and the Chinese Christians and other pro-Western elements
"Secondary Devils" (er maozi) showing that they were strongly hostile to Christianity and
for the significant reason that Christianity was "foreign". Purcell further points out that
the meddling of foreign governments and other agencies with Chinese affairs was more
than the Chinese could bear.

However, the methodology used to achieve their aims, their military training and
weapons were all traditional. They also used traditional concepts and customs to mobilise
the masses against the common enemy. In sum, it can, thus, be described as a
conservative movement with progressive aims, reflecting the problem of a slow
developing society threatened by the new industrialised world.

CAUSES OF DEFEAT OF THE BOXERS

Hu Sheng maintains that the Boxers "had no leadership of an advanced class and no
guidance of progressive ideology." Hu further points out that the Boxers "became the
instrument of the imperialists in oppressing China. They failed to tackle the problem of
relating their anti-feudal struggle with their anti-imperialist struggle at the time when
192

the imperialist aggression had become the main target of the struggle. Their struggle
against foreign imperialism remained at the low. perceptive level, manifesting in their
indiscriminate anti-foreignism."

It is also interesting to note that despite the fact that the Boxers were in a position they
did not make themselves the real masters of Beijing when they were in a position to do
so. Hu Sheng points out that the greatest weakness of the Boxer Movement was its want
of desire to seize political power. Even after their entry into E3eijing. they still had no
central leadership and with a loose organisation it was difficult to put seizure of political
power on the agenda.

Hu Sheng points out that while the Western imperialist powers outsmarted themselves by
driving the Qing government into the camp of the Boxer Movement, the Qing de facto
ruler, Cixi and her courtiers, outsmarted the Boxer braves in fanning their anti-foreign
fury to cool their anti-dynastic zeal.

SIGNIFICANCE
As a consequence of the Boxer Movement, the Qing government stood exposed as a
collaborator of the imperialists, leading a large number of people to believe in
revolution as the only panacea for the country's problems. The Boxer Uprising was a bold
attempt to give a blow to the imperialist aggression.
193

Purcell thinks the Movement not only stopped the foreign powers' attempt to partition
China, but also signalized the birth of Chinese nationalism. According to him, the Boxer
Movement was a resurgence of revolutionary fevour of the peasantry of North China in
the true tradition of heretical sects. In the opinion of the Chinese historians, the Boxer
Movement scared the imperialist powers out of . their wits and put the brakes on
imperialist designs to partition China. Another great historical significance of the Boxer
Movement lies in the awakening of the Chinese people's patriotic consciousness. The
Chinese historians believe that, the Movement not only educated the Chinese people
about the true nature of imperialist aggression, but also ''exposed the treasonous character
of the Qing authorities. Fan Wenlan observes that the Boxer Movement shook the entire
country. Even the coolies and domestic servants of the foreigners in Shanghai felt that the
hour of finally settling score with the foreigners had arrives. Hu Sheng further goes on to
say that after this Movement, the Chinese people never looked back. Their revolutionary
movement surged forward wave after wave till they achieved complete victory over
feudalism and imperialism. The Chinese government in its official declarations calls this
Movement "a patriotic anti-imperialist uprising, mainly of peasants" and "the climax of
the Chinese people's struggle against aggression and .partition." which "also hit hard at
(the imperialism's) appendages, the feudal forces." Thus, the Movement is also seen as "a
cornerstone of the victory of the Chinese communist revolution."
194

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Victor Purcell: The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study. Cambridge: 1963.
2. Foreign Language Press: The Yi Ho Titan Movement of 1900, Beijing: 1976.
3. Tan Chung; Triton to Dragon, Delhi: 1986: 529-566.
4. Chester C. T'an; The Boxer Catastrophe, New York: 1955.
5. G.N. Steiger; China and the Occident: The Origin and Development of the Boxer
Movement, New Haven: 1927. '
6. Jerome Ch’en; "The Origin of the Boxers" in Jerome Ch'en.& Nicholas Tailing (ed).
Studies in the Social History of China and South-east Asia. Cambridge: 1970:
58ff.
7. P.A. Kuhn; China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of
Chinese Anti-Foreignism 1860-1870, Harvard: 1963.
CHAPTER: 10
THE 1911 REVOLUTION OF CHINA
K. T. S. SARAO
Deptt. of Buddhist Studies
University of Delhi
Delhi- 110 007

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 was a major land-mark in the history of the modern
world. This Revolution marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. It
brought to an end centuries old dynastic cycle of absolute rule once for all and in its place
came the republican form of government. At the same time this Revolution brought all
kinds of untold miseries and sorrows for the people of China. It brought chaos in the
shape of warlordism and left China under the imperialist and feudal oppression. In this
chapter, we propose to study the background to the causes of the origin and development
of the revolutionary movement as well as evaluate its consequences.

IMPACT OF THE DYNASTIC CYCLE

A decline and degeneration of the Qing (Manchu) dynasty could be seen clearly in the
second half of the nineteenth century. By this time it had become like an old and ailing
man dragging his diseased and worn out body in the evening of his life. The days of
simple movements and their easy suppression were over. The reformist path had not
achieved much and matters had gone beyond the critical stage. After the Boxer
movement (Yi He Tuan) a Qing decree issued on 12 February 1901 proved this fact
beyond any -doubt. In this decree Empress Dowager Cixi herself accepted
196

the weaknesses of the ruling dynasty. By now the western ideas had made deep
penetration into the Chinese society and institutions. Western imperialism had further
alienated the masses from their rulers. The '"Heavenly Mandate" of the Manchus was
getting exhausted at a pretty fast pace. What scholars have observed as the cyclical rise
and fall of 'dynasties had also contributed its share in accelerating the demise of a worn-
out dynasty. The dynastic wheel which had once carried the Manchus to the heights of
their glory was now dragging them quickly towards their nadir.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the governmental system had become corrupt
in all possible ways. As pointed out by V.P. Dutt in his unpublished Ph. D. thesis, the
system of "squeeze and jobbery" had become an art as well as an institution. One could
not expect longevity for a dynasty which was constrained to sell the offices of state and
thus, put a premium on money rather than merit. Perversion, degeneracy, debauchery,
profligacy, extravagance, recklessness and intrigue had made deep inroads into the
imperial court life which revolved around the whims and fancies of eunuchs. All the
corrupt abuses of the court were faithfully copied by the lower officials. The central as
well as the provincial administration remained unreformed and unsuited to the needs of
the changing times.

Famines, draughts, floods, stark poverty, dearth, starvation and pestilence along with
rampant corruption became responsible for the origin of numerous violent movements as
well as a multiplicity of secret societies. There were clear signs that all was not well with
the House of the Qing. Movements like the Taiping, Nian and Muslim had shaken the
very foundations of the Qing dynasty. Peace had become a story of the past.
197

The intelligentsia, as a result of long years of despotic domination and a purely literary
and useless education, had been reduced to passivity, submissiveness, sterility and
ineffectiveness. The Qing rulers looked back to the past by committing themselves to
conservative reforms in response to the grievous situation that the country was facing.
Absence of energetic and dynamic leadership added to the Qing problems and the attempt
to perpetuate rule through the use of force created further revulsion among a large
number of Chinese people.

IMPACT OF THE WEST AND JAPAN

The impact of the West and Japan was perhaps one of the most important factors that
convinced the majority of Chinese people that the Manchus had failed to uphold the Dao,
leading to disharmony in the society. The high tide of Qing power had already passed,
when China came face to face with Western imperialism. It was rather unfortunate for the
Manchus that they came into contact with the mercantile and rapidly industrializing
societies of the Western world at a time when they were the least equipped to meet the
challenge. It is true, as pointed out by Harold Issacs, that the Chinese society was on the
brink of a new era of political breakdown and chaos, when the first waves of expanding ,
Western capitalism broke against the Chinese shores. But the appearance of the new
"barbarians" aggravated, transformed and complicated the inner divisions in the Chinese
society. Their coining meant that the old and antiquated solutions devised in the
outmoded fashion, would no longer suffice. Instead of controlling the "barbarians", the
Manchus became manifestly, dependent upon their support. This shattered whatever
prestige the dynasty enjoyed with the population and it exposed the House of the
Manchus
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to be nothing more than a "paper-tiger". Haphazard attempts at reforming the

administration and providing a constitutional structure, instead of leading to the salvation
of the Manchus became instrumental in their downfall. The failure of the Reform
Movement of 1898, proved reformism to be a blind ; alley. All pompous proclamations
and ruthless measures of the Manchus against the dissidents failed to strike terror in the
hearts of their subjects.

After the ignominious defeat in the Opium Wars on account of the superiority of Western
gun-boats and weapons, a series of unequal treaties were imposed upon China. There
were further encroachments on China's territorial, administrative and economic integrity.
China was reduced to a state of demoralisation and distressing decrepitude. There was
also the influence of Western political philosophy. Practically all the Chinese
revolutionary leaders had studied abroad and were greatly inspired by the Western
revolutionary concepts. Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1904-05 convinced
the imperialist powers that the time was ripe for writing the epitaph on the empire and
partitioning out various parts amongst themselves. This was followed by a policy of
conquest by rail-roads and banks, which gave a ruinous blow to the Chinese economy.
This relentless exploitation carried out by the foreigners produced violent reaction from
the Chinese populace and went on until * the Revolution of 1911 intervened.

ECONOMIC DECAY AND SOCIAL UNREST

The economic forces which had characterised the rise and fall of the previous dynasties,
were also in operation in the case of the Manchus. Rapid increase in population without
any corresponding increase in the arable land,
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unfavourable foreign trade, foreign indemnities and natural calamities led to the
deterioration in living standards, particularly that of peasants, which resulted in uprisings
big 'and small, further aggravating the economic situation. As the burden had to be borne
by the masses, the government was compelled to tax people to the maximum extent
possible.

Increasing internal unrest, economic and social dislocation and distress caused by the
foreign economic pressure and penetration, huge indemnities and war expenditures, and
rise in various kinds of taxation— all served to upset the delicate balance of the Chinese
finances and the ruin of the traditional agricultural economy. Japan had met a similar
challenge through industrialisation and reform on a large scale, but the Manchus failed
miserably to embark upon a large scale industrialisation and to provide protection from
foreign competition, for the independent development of native industry and a business
class.

REGIONALISM
Regionalism and the rise of provincial leaders became a characteristic feature of the late
Qing period. Regional personalities like Zeng Guofan (Hunan), Zuo Zongtang (Zhejiang
and Sukien). Li Hongzhang (Zhili), and Zhang Zhidong (Wuhan and Nanjing) had arisen
in various provinces and this shift in power-balance was the direct result of Qing inability
to preserve peace and order and their manifest reliance on able provincial leaders to keep
the system going. The provinces had become states within state especially after the
Taiping Movement was put down with the help of some vigorous provincial leaders. Now
the Manchus could keep themselves on the Dragon Throne only by playing one powerful
mandarin official against another.
200

NATIONALISM
V.P. Dutt has pointed out that Nationalism "was actually the impact of the West which
fostered the incipient nationalism of the Chinese." There was the ignominious defeat in
the Opium Wars of the 1840s and 1850s, which inaugurated a series of unequal treaties.
There were further encroachments by Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Japan on
China's territorial, administrative and economic integrity at the end of the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth century. There was also the influence of
Western political philosophy: practically all the Chinese revolutionary leaders had
studied abroad, and were to a great extent inspired by the revolutionary concept in such
works as the Bible, L 'Espirit des Lois, Le Contract Sociale, Das Kapital etc. But still all
the credit cannot go to' the foreign influence. The native revolutionary thought and
institutions also played a significant role. Viewed in proper historical perspective, the
Chinese National Revolution was but the logical continuation of the struggle, started by
the Ming dynasty against the (alien) Qing conquerors of China— a struggle which was in
essence both anti-imperialist and anti-feudal due to the emergence of new social classes
opposed to its existence.

The spirit of nationalism, as demonstrated by Mary C. Wright was directed toward action
and change in three different directions through three related spheres. First, it was an
attempt to role-back the tide of imperialism so that China may regain all she had lost to
foreign powers— anti-foreign sentimentality perhaps, but far removed from the primitive
xenophobia to which many an anti-foreign movements of the nineteenth century had been
attributed. Second, nationalism demanded that a strong centralised
201

nation-state be established, capable of forcing back the imperialists, concurrently

forwarding the country's new aspirations in political, social, economic and cultural life.
Third, nationalism meant, of course, the overthrow of the Manchus.

Resistance to foreign imperialism began with a cry to "buy back China"— a nation
dissipated and literally squeezed dry by the tentacles of imperialism which had landed
into China through the unequal treaties emanating from her numerous defeats at the
hands of the imperialist powers. Apart from paying exorbitant indemnities, she had also
to concede rights, privileges and finally even the threat of disintegration persisted which
reached a crescendo of cutting up the Chinese melon after her innervation was revealed to
the world during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Chinese bitterness over loss of
sovereignty rights within China was as intense as the resentment on the frontiers. The
humiliating unequal treaties had resulted in various impinging concessions and the
Chinese reaction to such concessions revealed the depth and passion of nationalism.

In order to curb the tide of the rising nationalism, the Manchu government attempted to
satiate the nationalist demand of a centralised nation by instituting a few reforms.
Paradoxically, all the reforms that were attempted, proved double-edged, further
enervating the Manchus themselves. The educational reforms produced thousands of
young people, touched by new schools and ideas, confident of their own mission to create
a new world, and exerting an influence out of all proportions to their numbers. Military
reforms, too, made the modern army receptive to ideas of revolution in the name of
nationalism. The administrative reforms, too boomeranged, as provincial assemblies
provided fora for
202

sharp debates, undermining the government. Encouragement to industry at the last

moment only strengthened nascent bourgeoisie as a class who demanded more than the
imperial system was able to offer. Further, the fast efforts to reform on the part of the
government proved to be one of the main revolutionary forces of the period because of
the fundamental changes they constituted in nearly every sphere of the Chinese life and
directly precipitating political revolution. Unconsciously the Chinese were welding
themselves into a nation. Though Qing policy of discrimination in favour of their own
race might have served to sharpen the growing feeling of discontent with their role, the
main opposition was to the imperial system of the Manchus, not to their ethnic genesis.

ROLE OF VARIOUS CLASSES

'The rising tide of new nationalism influenced and was in turn motivated by five
emerging new classes who changed the fortunes of the anti-Qing movement strongly in
favour of the revolutionaries:
1. New soldiers,
2. Young men and students,
3. Young women,
4. Overseas Chinese, and
5. Proletariat.

In the fast changing atmosphere, apart from the above five emerging new class, the
following four classes were also getting adjusted to the new situation:
1. Bourgeoisie
2. Peasantry
203

3. Gentry, and
4. Artisans

Commercial Bourgeoisie held the Manchus responsible for the discrimination which they
faced at the hands of their foreign competitors and thus, sympathised with the anti-Qing
forces. As pointed out by Mary Rankin initially foreign returned young anarchists of
gentry background, imbued with ideas of revolutionary romanticism and heroic self-
sacrifice, tried to foment revolution in the countryside. Girls and young women played a
prominent role by joining anti-imperialist demonstrations and by forming societies as
"Patriotic Society" in Fuzhou. The new armies of lowest rank during the Wuchang
Movement took the lead in revolt and forced their superiors to join. The overseas Chinese
formed another revolutionary force by supplying funds and influence of their newspapers.
Another new channel through which the new ideas were beginning to affect the so-called
immovable mass of the Chinese peasantry, was the poorer peasantry recruited in new
industries.

THE NEW SOLDIERS

The traditional forces of the reigning house had deteriorated beyond redemption.
Inefficiency, corruption, complacency, opium addiction and years of inertia had made the
Banner Troops totally impotent. When forced by the growing foreign danger and internal
unrest, the Qing rulers had to create a new modern-style army, the old armies although
hardly of any use still continued to be on the rolls. Of the general revenue of about 92
million taels , the Chinese government was spending half of it only on the military
establishment, a large portion of which being expanded on the old armies. Thus, the old
armies had become an
204

unnecessary financial burden, when China was sinking under the back-breaking financial
strain. Even the efforts of the Manchus to modernize their army boomeranged. Firstly,
imperialism and modernisation cannot go hand-in-hand. The imperialist powers were
interested only in maintaining peace in China so that their business could go smoothly
rather than helping China in becoming a powerful nation. Secondly, as without
industrialisation a really modern army is a chimera, so China without the industrial
machine could hardly afford to feed the sinews of war and a stable economy which could
sustain a modern army. Thirdly, the infiltration of revolutionary ideas amongst the ranks
of the New Army proved to be a nail in the coffin of the Manchus. The revolutionaries
had been quite active among the New soldiers who were loyal to their commanders rather
than the Dragon Throne. The cadets who had gone to Japan for training came with new
ideas and were moved by feelings of nationalism and an acute sense of shame of national
humiliation under the Manchus. The young cadets in the army, hence, had easily come
under the influence of the revolutionaries who had been quite active in Japan especially
during 1900-1907. They responded readily to revolutionary propaganda and sympathised
with the developing nationalism of the enlightened literate, rich merchants, and modern
intellectuals. In the words of Y. Hatano, 'The new armies successfully channelled peasant
discontent into organized revolutionary form." When the salvos of rebellion were
sounded in Wuchang in October 1911, they not only failed to stand up for the Imperial
Court, but also took part in tearing it apart.

STUDENTS AND YOUTH

It was only after 1900 that young men started taking lead in various movements, and
upheavals in the lengthy
205

history of China. Young men, especially the students, played a stellar role in the first
phase of the Revolution in more than one ways. The youth who had kowtowed to the
authority of age in times of chaos as well as tranquillity, points out Mary C. Wright,
"suddenly became the most vibrant force in the nation." The new youth enjoyed more
influence and respect than their numbers. This was especially so because they were
brave, courageous and intelligent, and considered their cause above all other things.
Though they were in favour of destruction of old elite and its various bastions, yet they
received respect and inherited the social position which educated people in China got.
They got into military training schools or army units and various other rungs of the
Chinese society and gave shape to passionate ideas that were prevalent abroad.

The Chinese students who had received their education in Japan were the most active
politically. Some students picked up various new ideas in French Indo-China and British
Burma and were also quite active. But students from America and Europe were
comparatively younger as well as from technical subjects and did not take much interest
in the revolutionary movement. Though thir role cannot be minimised, yet there were
certain shortcomings in their revolutionary struggle. For example, in the opinion of Mary
-Rankin, they "were too urban, too oriented towards the life of 'student circle' to find a
large struggle in isolated areas congenial. Rather they wanted quick results that would
open opportunities to become a part of a modern world of national , power, individual
liberty, and scientific achievement."

GIRLS AND YOUNG WOMEN

The position of women was fast improving in Chinese society. Many girls, who had
earlier stayed within the
206

courtyards of their houses, now started going to private as . well as government schools.
The girls and young women of these schools, in the opinion of Mary Rankin, "played a
prominent role in the revolutionary youth movement." The "Tatsu Maru Incident" of
1908 brought them into the mainstream of patriotic demonstrations. Young women in
large numbers held protest meetings, organised demonstrations and expressed
unhappiness in public over the "National Humiliation." Their suffering in various ways
during this protest contributed to the revolutionary elan of the era. They formed various
societies in Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Shanghai and many other places and by the end of the
first decade of the twentieth century a wave of defiance by well-disciplined school girls
and their lady teachers had emerged to the extent that it became a new "model". Women
like Qiu Qin, who was executed in 1907 and Sophia Zhang became household names in
China. The boat-women of the Guangzhou area gave a new turn to feminism in China.
These women, who served on the combat field on the side of the revolutionaries, were
perhaps the first nurses in the history of China. In some areas, in fact, women won the
right to participate in the new provincial organs of self-government. A journal called
"Beijing Women" played a leading role in women's struggle. .

Women now started looking for freedom which went beyond politics. They started
defying foot-binding and restrictions on entry to schools even at the cost of their lives in
certain cases. They also could be seen increasingly in public and the shift in their position
and aspirations was as swift and dramatic as the shift in the role of youth as a whole was
lasting and irreversible. In this sense, it was. the hallmark of a major social revolution,
points out Mary C. Wright.
207

THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

Despite various legal obstacles for migration, Chinese from various regions particularly
the south-eastern provinces had been moving out in large numbers to settle down in
South-East Asia. Recently they had also started emigrating to Africa and the American
continent. Most of them made fortunes in these countries by moving into supply of
various types of skills that were in demand over there. By the beginning of the
Revolution of 1911 they had not yet made any attempt to get assimilated in their new
homelands. As pointed out by Mary C. Wright, "All their loyalties were focussed on their
native places in China, but the most they could hope for was. to send money home and
eventually to be buried there." Many of these overseas Chinese formed various
organisations for the establishment of New China. Almost all the revolutionary
organisations at home sought the support of these organisations, particularly in the shape
of funds. In fact, foreign money turned the scale in favour of the' revolutionaries and they
may not have been at the centre of the revolutionary struggle, yet their ability to supply
funds, the influence of their propaganda through newspapers and the competition for their
support, cannot be minimized.

THE PROLETARIAT
The advent of modern industries created the working class. The workers employed in
various modern industries like the railways, mining and textiles were though in small
numbers, yet at crucial times and places, large concentrations of them proved immensely
helpful in the revolutionary struggle. During this struggle as pointed out by Jean
Chesneaux, the strikes were without fail of a political nature rather than economic and the
period just prior to the outbreak of the Revolution witnessed maximum number of strikes
in
208

China. With many other groups, the proletariat shared anti-imperialist mood of the days
and demonstrated the same by refusing to unload the Japanese ships following the "Tatsu
Maru Incident"". Most of these workers were the ones who had been poor peasants. They
were still maintaining their village connections1. It was here that they made maximum
contribution. As pointed out by Mary C. Wright, they were the means that could put teeth
into protests initiated by others. With their periodic visits home, they constituted one of
the channels through which new ideas were beginning to affect the so-called most
immovable mass of the Chinese peasantry. But as Chen Tiejian suggests the proletariat
''would take some time before it could play an important role in the political arena.

The above emerging classes had certain eye-catching characteristics. All had been
subjected to more than average deprivation in the Chinese traditional society. All were in
a situation where they were more aware than most of what foreign pressure had cost
China. All were in positions where action seemed possible as all had less than average
stake in the preservation of existing institutions. Hence, they formed an impressive
revolutionary striking force.

THE BOURGEOISIE
At the turn of the nineteenth century, as a result of the impact of the foreign trade and
treaty port system, a new class of commercial bourgeoisie developed in China. As
pointed out by Marie-Clare Bergere, commercial bourgeoisie was "a group comprising
entrepreneurs in the modern style. businessmen, financiers and industrialists." Because of
their ignorance of Chinese language and customs and increasing dependence of Chinese
financial institutions, the foreigners
209

obliquely assisted in the development of new class, which though not a homogenous one,
yet was the most important Chinese component of the so-called "false modernisation"
initiated by Western commercial activities. Nonetheless, bourgeoisie was distinctive from
other classes on the basis of its material superiority, allegiance to economic organisations
as Chambers of Commerce and by its beliefs and manners of life which were influenced
by Western ideas and customs. Because of oppression by imperialism and feudalism, the
national bourgeoisie necessarily conflicted with them in order to survive and develop.
Thus, it was natural that the national bourgeoisie had the need to oppose both imperialism
and feudalism. However, since it was related to the two in more than one way, it could
not carry out thorough struggle against them and did not, in any case, believe in direct
political action accompanied by an ideology. The reason was particularly psychological,
as they were plagued by the idea of social isolation and had been looked down upon and
prevented from taking part in public affairs. Gradually a new self awareness and political
attitudes were adopted by the Chinese bourgeoisie, which largely were a crystallisation of
experiences undergone in dealing with Qing officials and Western businessmen. The
government failed to provide adequate protection against foreign encroachment, and the
privileges granted were rendered ineffective by the breakdown of administrative system.
The system of taxation made the merchants shy away from investment lest they should be
gratuitously exacted by the government or offialdom. The attempt at industrialisation
through the system of "social supervision and merchant management" instead of
providing any fillip to the industries, stultified them, because the officials were extremely
"unbusinesslike" and feudalistic in their approach. Government's financial structure was
equally unconducive. There was no unified
210

currency, no budgetary system and no organisation of public accounts. In such

circumstances, it was only natural that, despite the good relations which the merchants
were sometimes able to establish with the local officials, feeling of distrust and hostility
towards the Imperial government became widespread. On top of all this, the Confucian
mould of society and social values were hardly conducive to the development of a
modern entrepreneur class. The merchants were placed at the lowest rung of the social
ladder and could wipe out their "original sin" only by gaining admittance into the rank of
the officialdom or the gentry. Most of the Qing officials either looked askance at modern
industry or, at best, viewed it as another source of graft. More than this the impotent Qing
government could provide little protection to the native merchants, when the foreigners
with their resourcefulness, superior techniques and privileged positions posed a grave
threat to the infant industry in China. Inadequacy of capital was another handicap for the
native merchants. The government which was bankrupt could hardly provide any
financial help to its own businessmen. On the contrary, the Qing court made financial
demands on industry. The government policy of being averse to breaking away from the
Confucian morality and conservative past as well as the official depredations made the
merchants suspicious of the Qing policies.: They were convinced that the government
would not generally assist them, or even leave them alone, in establishing modern
manufacturing plants and enterprises, for in their daily lives, they had to contend against
official greed as well as incompetence. Moreover, unlike in any other country of the
world, they paid more taxes than the foreigners. Since they were involved in business,
they were most aware of China's exploitation which certainly gave rise to sensitive
nationalistic feelings within them. For an industrialist, it was very common to be harried
and harassed
211

not only by local and provincial bureaucrats but by Beijing itself. Fear of official
interference and exactions was a serious impediment in the development of modern
industry. Thus, after having exhausted all patience, the bourgeoisie opened its purses to
the revolutionaries with the aim of bringing about the end of the dynasty. The basic
purpose of such a move, as Mary C. Wright points out, was to bring about a strong
central, government which could end special foreign privileges and provide the
conditions in which a national market could develop. In the words of V.P. Dutt, "Though
the merchants were involved neither in instigating nor directing the revolutionary
movements, leading to the final conflagration, but by preventing any economic crisis,
they helped the revolution in its conclusion." The role played by the bourgeoisie in the
Revolution of 1911 was by no means unimportant, if only because it provided a link
between the imported ideology and the actual facts of China's situation, though the link
was a fragile one and since the bourgeoisie had not yet attained its full strength as a class,
its role could not be but subsidiary. Chen Tiejian sums up the role of the bourgeoisie very
succintly in these words: "Although the bourgeoisie had inherent defects and weaknesses,
it was the only progressive force that was relatively mature. It was barely able to start and
lead a revolution."

THE GENTRY
The Chinese gentry, through the Civil Service Examination, had been able to gain a status
which carried innumerable privileges. This class could acquire large chunks of land,
enjoyed fair amount of immunity from the law of the land and considered itself the
guardian of the higher culture of China. In fact, the old order and gentry were
synonymous with each other. However, during the first decade of the twentieth century,
the gentry was transformed.
112

The Civil Service Examination was abolished in 1905 and this development demolished
the fundamental basis of their privileged position. Now members of this class began to
train their children to adjust their careers to the new environment. They were now getting
ready to take up careers in business, various types of professions and new types of jobs in
the government. Though land rents still were a very important source of income for the
gentry, yet it was hard to see any member of this class depending solely on this sort of
income. New avenues of income and livelihood were being explored and taken up. As a
result, in almost every gentry family one could see either a radical student, an
entrepreneur son, or an officer in the new army. The gentry had also taken up leadership
of the local government and provincial assemblies. The organisations became hot-beds of
new nationalism and took keen interest in issues relating to western imperialism, reforms
in the country, and formation of constitutional government. At the same time, however, it
must be pointed out that some members of the gentry took advantage of the deteriorating
law and order. As pointed out by Mary C. Wright, many gentry families compromised on
all sides to stay out of trouble.

THE PEASANTRY
The peasantry, which contituted 80% o the Chinese population, also did not remain
unaffected by the changing conditions. The new armies were recruiting and
indoctrinating peasant troops who displayed high morale. Story-tellers, travelling theatre-
troops, and dissemination of the newspapers into the countryside, all supplied the
peasantry with material to ponder over and react. The internal and external problems
faced by China were beginning to effect the peasantry.
213

ROLE OF SUN YATSEN

Sun Yatsen (Sun Zhong Shan) was not only the promoter, but also the inspirer of the
Revolution of 1911.' Through the years he had been trying to free China from the reign of
a corrupt foreign dynasty and establish a new democratic government that would put her
in her rightful place in the modern world. A magnetic personality with a dominating will,
Sun surpassed all other revolutionaries of his time in the breadth of his ideas, and in the
accuracy of his forecasts. The incarnate spirit of the Revolution, he gave to it its guiding
principles and its plan of action. In spite of his preferred idealism, he was far from being
a mere abstract thinker, possessing as he did a sense of economic and political realities
such as no one had before him in China. His Xing Zhong Hid (Arise China Society)
founded in 1894, highlighted the social and political chaos prevailing in China as well as
the depredations by the foreign powers. Through this society Sun Yatsen raised the
banner of "expelling the Manchurians, restoring Chinese rule and creating a republican
government." In 1905 he set up the Tongmeng Hui, which marked the beginning of
bourgeois democratic revolution in China. He further put forward the theory of Three
People's Principles (sanminzhuyi) consisting of nationalism. Democracy, and People's
Livelihood. Sun awakened the Chinese people from their age-long sleep and gave them a
new sense of nationalism. He provided the new nation with a far reaching programme of
reconstruction. His tangible role as a fund raiser, his dextrous handling of foreigners
during the Revolution and his optimism throughout the turbulent days of the
revolutionary period played a decisive role in the overthrow of the Manchus.

1. See the next chapter for more details on Sun Yatsen and his Three People 's Principles.
214

SECRET SOCIETIES
Though secret societies were active in China right from, the time the Manchus had come
to power, but their anti-Manchuism became successful only when the Qing fortunes
began to dwindle and economic decay and social disorder became order of the day. In
fact, the turbulence of the times was reflected in the activities of these secret societies,
which were a traditional refuge for the discontented. They took in people from all kinds
of backgrounds and their simple motto was:

Officials and scholars, everyone

is received into our ranks
Runners, servants, and soldiers,
no body is turned away.

Secret societies played a significant role in the early stages of the Revolution, but their
role appears to have diminished as the Revolution progressed. In all probability most of
the soldiers who took part in the Wuchang Movement, were members of one secret
society or the other. Mao Zedong and Zhu De considered the role of the secret societies
as quite important. Ge Lao Hui, an outright anti-Qing secret organisation was based in the
Yangzi Valley arid had branches among the overseas Chinese. Zhong Nan Hui, Lung
Hua Hui, Wen Yue She, Gong Jin Hui and San Tien Hui were active in various other
parts of China. These secret societies had so many advantages over other organisations of
different sorts. As even simple things like freedom of speech, assembly and publication
were not available, the secret societies were a good means of mass action against the
government. These secret societies had their roots
215

amongst the poorest and hence could be used to establish good contacts and strong roots
among the people.

THE RAILWAY CRISIS AND THE REVOLUTION

Within a span of three years between 1906-08 there were at least seven major attempts
against the Qing rule. Though all of them failed, the cinders left by them were later to
flare up as a big conflagration. The successive failures of the revolts served to-increase
the sense of despair and disappointment. Sun was forced out of Japan, Vietnam* and
Singapore and had to leave for America and Europe. Another major movement planned
in April 1911 which aimed at capturing Guangzhou and then to fan out from there to
other parts of China failed to make the mark, but it turned out to be a prelude to the
ultimate successful revolution which began at Wuchang six months later.

The Sichuan railway crisis was perhaps one of the most important incidents that unfolded
the Revolution of 1911. The railway problem directly touched the bourgeoisie and gentry,
alienating them from the Manchus, adding to the boiling discontent and culminating into
the final outburst. This subverted not only the Qing dynasty, but also overthrew a deeply
rooted monarchical system and established in its place a republic which was without a
precedent in China.

On May 9, 1911 an imperial decree was issued in Beijing nationalising the trunk lines all
over the country and withdrawing the right of their construction from the provincial
merchant gentry classes. This was, as V.P. Dutt describes, "the spark that set the prairies
on fire." A wave of protest swept the country in Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei and Guangdong
which were directly affected as well as other parts of the country. Though there was
indignation all over
216

the country, but the storm broke out in Sichuan and proved to be one of the immediate
causes of the revolution.

The background to the nationalisation was provided by the government's intention to

unify currency for which two loans of £1 million and £6 million were taken from foreign
banks. The railways, no doubt, were assets of extreme importance both for development
and security of the whole" country. And the provincial interests were certainly not very
effective in its construction, constraining the government to think of their nationalisation.
But the railway nationalisation gave rise to unnerving consternation in Sichuan province.
And Vice-Chairman of the provincial assembly (Luo Lun) declared at the emergency
meeting of the share holders that the life and property of Sichuanese people had been sold
by Sheng Xuanhuai to foreigners. He declared to fight against this injustice done to them.
People from other provinces also organised themselves to oppose Beijing's decisions. An
organisation Bao-lu-tong-zhi-hui (Comrades Association for the Protection of Railways)
was formed as a result.

In the case of Sichuan, which became the main centre of this crisis, the government
followed the policy of "discrimination" as compared to say Hunan or Guangdong, and in
Sichuan, it proposed to make good only the sums actually spent upon rail road
construction, which was a good deal less than the subscribed capital, part of which had
been lost through investment in a Shanghai bank, which failed. Thus, the actual position
was that the government would pay only a little over half the sum actually subscribed. As
a consequence, representations were sent to different provinces for soliciting support and
put a united front for the recovery of railway rights. This hastened the process of
abdication of the Manchus as now the economic struggle got submerged in a political
battle against the Manchus.
217

P.H. Kent tries to give the impression that the struggle in Sichuan was in essence a
struggle between the rights of the centre and those of provinces, between central authority
and provincial autonomy. He, as an imperialist observer, writes that the provincial bodies
and their leaders were jealous and suspicious of the encroaching power of Beijing and
were only fighting for their narrow provincial interests to keep intact their power against
attempts at curtailment by the imperial court. But this view accounts only for one fact of
the struggle and overlooks many other issues. It was believed that the government was
bartering away vital interest for the sake of money and that the railways were being
"surrendered" to foreigners in order to satisfy the private ends of the corrupt court
nobility, reinforced by the government's decision not to make full payment to the
shareholders in Sichuan, which disturbed and agitated large sections of the populace. The
government also had not consulted the National Assembly. This could not, but rouse the
deepest suspicions of the people, because a government which claimed to be preparing
for a constitutional system and did not consult the National Assembly on such an
important issue could hardly be taken for its word.

But still an open revolt against the government was a distant proposition, though the
Board of Directors of the Sichuan Railway Company, the shareholders and the leaders
of the public opinion— the gentry and the merchants— had decided to fight out the issue
and not to submit to the taking over the company's assets by government officials. They
still hoped to solve the issue peacefully, as it is clear from their Persistent appeal to the
government that there was no need for nationalisation as it would only lead to foreign
ownership of the railways. .
218

Zhao Erfeng, who was appointed the new Governor General of this place tried to play
cool as he feared that use of force might boomerang. But Duan Feng, who was Director
General of Sichuan-Hankou and Guangzhou-Hankou railways was jealous of Zhao and
wanted to put him in some trouble. Duan Feng appointed Li Jixun, a government man, as
the General Manager of the Yichang Railway Company and there was a general strike in
Chengdu. All sections of the society came out in open support. Zhao was still hesitant to
use force as he was not sure of the loyalty of the army and also he thought that use
offerce might agitate the population. So he still believed that use offeree will be like
"putting out fire with more fuel".

The situation in the province, however, became grave and pitched battles between the
troops and the people became common place. More troops were sent to Sichuan. Now the
government thought of bringing the situation under control with double pronged policy of
suppression and appeasement. The condition, however, in lieu of improving further
deteriorated. Opposition between Zhao and Duan added insult to the injury. The Qing
court by now had little will left to withstand the united onslaught of not only people of
Sichuan but also those of Hunan, Hubei and Guangdong, who had joined the struggle.
The railway policy had proved to be an utter failure and had led from confusion to chaos,
and from trouble to calamity.

Nevertheless, here as in other spheres, it was a case of being too late with the
"concessions." The revolution in Wuchang broke out at this stage, and the railway revolt
in Sichuan got merged into the broader revolution against the dynasty. The Qing had
committed blunder after blunder in the railway affair and had only succeeded in knocking
out
219

their own prospects from underneath and alienating nearly all sections of the populace
with disastrous results for the dynasty. The railway movement gave ample scope to the
revolutionaries to spread their propaganda and influence among wide sections of the
population and opportunity to successfully launch a revolt against the Qing throne,
although they were animated only by narrow interests or motives. It, therefore, as pointed
out by V.P. Dutt, highlights both the limitations of the revolutionaries and the fact that
China was ripe for revolution.

The Wuhan explosion of October, 1911 gave further impetus to the revolutionary
movement. Then finally came the Wuchang Movement, also popularly called the
"Double Ten" Movement of 10 October 1911. It was the result of the developing
revolutionary situation in the whole country. The agitation concerning the railways and
the popular armed movement in Sichuan were the essential factors leading to the
outbreak of the movement. Within a couple of days the whole of Wuhan fell to the
revolutionaries. Thereafter one province after another declared its independence. Within a
week eleven provinces including Hubei, Hunan, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Jiangxi,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Sichuan and Shandong declared their independence from the
Manchus. Yuan Shikai was brought in by the Manchus as a last resort. He joined at his
own terms and assumed the office as the Premier. The Manchus were literally now in his
grip.

Yuan Shikai started making peace overtures almost from the very beginning. The
revolutionaries were also facing their own difficulties including dissention. There were
fears of China getting divided into two deadlocked portions. Sun Yatsen assumed the
Presidentship of the provisional government. The child Emperor Puyi abdicated on 12
220

February 1912. In his decree of abdication, the Emperor entrusted Yuan with "full powers
to organise a provisional republican government to negotiate with the revolutionary army
for unification measures." Sun resigned in favour of Yuan, who in turn was elected
unanimously by the Senate as the provisional President of the republican government on
13 February 1912.

EVALUATION OF THE REVOLUTION

The Revolution of 1911 was a momentous event, a tremendous change which had no
earlier parallel or precedent. It is true that Manchu dynasty had met with the same fate as
had befallen the preceding dynasties. But this time there was. a difference, a
revolutionary difference indeed. There was no dynasty to succeed, no emperor to ascend
the Dragon Throne. In fact, for the first time in the history of China, a republican form of
government rose up. The overthrow of an institution which was 2000 years old, was no
mean achievement.

The basic aim of abolishing the dynastic system and substituting it by a republican
system was successfully achieved. Despite futile attempts made by Yuan Shikai the old
system could never be revived. No doubt, the Revolution of 1911 marked the beginning
of a new phase. If the revolution led to political chaos, k must be viewed from the angle
that nowhere in the world a revolution has been unaccompanied by some kind of chaos
that follows it for quite some time and nowhere has a change from absolute autocracy to
democratic forces been smooth of even. It is only through struggle that new progressive
democratic forces replace the old, deeply entrenched traditional ideas and institutions.
The power of the new forces can be seen from
221

the fact that no subsequent attempt to bring back the old system succeeded. The
revolution marked the end of the dynastic cycle, loss of the Mandate of Heaven and in
fact, the beginning of the end of traditional China.

Although the Revolution of 1911 failed to wipe out feudalism completely, it gave
feudalism a fatal blow by bringing to an end the Qing rule and absolute monarchy. The
Revolution of 1911 was also a clear indication of gathering struggle against
Confucianism and the traditional system of education as well as economic and political
philosophy; it was a landmark in the process of modernisation of China. The May Fourth
Movement of 1919 was, in fact, a logical consequence of the Revolution of 1911. By
seeking to subvert the existing political institutions, the revolution also subverted the
traditional learning which had given rise to those traditional institutions. By attacking the
ruling dynasty for failure to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
country, the revolutionaries anticipated the coming resistance against the unequal treaties
and encroachment on Chinese rights.

Emergence of a business class with considerably more power and influence than before
and with fewer restrictions of the past framework-that had shaken its activities, was
another important consequence of the Revolution of 1911. The native industry was still
hampered by unequal privileges enjoyed by the foreign traders and manufacturers, but the
economic competition between the two became sharper. It manifested itself in rail-road
building, mining, banking,' [textile industry and a host of other things.

Modernisation to ward off foreign threat was the staple motivating force of the
revolution. The aim of total
222

"modernisation", though remained unaccomplished yet republic did push it to a greater

extent than would have been possible under the old system. The Revolution of 1911
succeeded more, than the "Self-Strengtheners" or "Reformers" because it attacked the old
political-economic system and institutions directly unlike the "Self-Strengtheners" who
rejected the modern political and economic ideas and systems or the "Reformers" who
wanted the change to be within the confines of the basic Confucian mould.

Nationalism was another vital element that came to the fore during the revolution. The
Reform Movement was one facet of Chinese nationalism; so was the Boxer Movement
(Ye He Yuan). But by 1911 Chinese nationalism had become a definite, concrete force
and its first target was the Qing rule, which had, failed to keep the foreign "barbarians" at
bay, thereby hindering modernisation.

The press also received a spurt from the revolution. Liang Qichao is rightly described as
the father of modern journalism in China, but the scope for the development of
journalism was widened by the Revolution of 1911 and the overthrow of despotic order,
though Yuan Shikai attempted to throttle it in its infancy. Revolutionary ideas through
press found wider audience and the tug-of-war between the revolutionaries and the
constitutionalists before 1911 was also conducted through the press. Political parties also
received a boost from the revolution. After the Double Ten Uprising of Wuchang many
political parties sprang up which vied with one another in attempts to participate in the
government. Many of their activities may look kiddish, but it cannot be denied that they
reflected the mounting spirit of democracy. The revolution created a new atmosphere
which
223

was praised by V.I. Lenin in 1913 in these words:

"New China is a land of seething political activity, the scene of a virile public movement
and democratic upsurge. "

But for the overthrow of the absolute monarchy by the Revolution of 1911, the
appearance of the new atmosphere would have been impossible. Mary C. Wright points
out that China experienced one single revolution, the salient features of which were
rooted in the early twentieth century experience. These were the persistent prominence of
educated youth, the unusually prominent role of women, suspicion of all foreign powers,
the insistence on strong leadership and revolutionary discipline (for the initial absence of
these had been tragic). She also mentions a kind of "great leap" psychology to reach
higher stages, a disinterest in classic Marxism and other theories that assume a slow
development of society and a conviction that by superhuman effort of an indoctrinated
elite, China could bypass the usual stages and achieve its own kind of good society
through sheer application of human energy and will power. Therefore, the roots not only
of the post-1919 phases, but also of the post-1949 phases of the Chinese Revolution lie in
the first decade of the twentieth century.

The Revolution of 1911 had its shortcomings and failures also. The revolutionaries
lacked unified thinking on the political problems of the day and the revolution lacked a
coherent and acceptable philosophy beyond the deposition of the Qing dynasty and the
establishment of a republic. There were acute differences over major issues. Sun's Three
Principles were opposed by many. Apart from factionalism, provincialism also plagued
the revolutionary organisation. The inner struggles made them weak, and therefore, not
224

surprisingly, as soon as victory was in sight many members of the Tongmeng Hui
faltered in their purpose and seemed to be keen to make a deal with the conservative and
militarists to enjoy the fruits of the victory.

Failure of leadership was another weakness. By way of lack of coordination and effective
handling of crucial situations, it led to gravitation of effective power in the provincial
assemblies. These assemblies had primarily conservative complexion and composition,
and thereby opposed progressive republican and democratic forms of government. The
old institutions though had been destroyed, the republic that was ushered in had little
settled institutional framework for effective functioning. As a result when the republic
was ushered only the skeleton was there and the flesh and blood were missing. The
Machiavellian mind of Yuan Shikai and his manipulation of events was a blot on the
revolution. Yuan is supposed to have turned the revolution to his own advantage,
manoeuvred the court and the revolutionaries into a situation in-which they neutralised
each other, and, exploiting his superior military strength and foreign support emerged
with the fruits of the struggle for himself as a first step in his scheme to become emperor.
Thus, as pointed out by Earnest Young, was achieved the ultimate irony; the first
President of a United Chinese Republic was neither a revolutionary nor a republican.

As the army had played a decisive role in the revolution and power in the republic fell
into the hands of arch-militarists like Yuan Shikai, it led to ruinous warlordism. Apart
from this, another weakness was that the foreign powers proved prominent vehicles of
reaction as they were left unopposed under the impression that they were encroaching
upon Chinese rights only because China was
225

weak for which the Manchus were held accountable. Lack of popular association or
participation was also one of the biggest weaknesses of the Revolution of 1911. because
it was only this participation that could have prevented the revolution from regression.
The revolution was mainly led by educated middle class. Probably because secrecy was
essential to prevent governmental retribution, mass mobilisation could never be achieved,
though peasants were not hostile but mostly sympathetic to the revolution, as they were
attracted by Sun's slogan of People's Livelihood and Tongmeng Hui's efforts to seek their
association.

In the opinion of Chen Tiejian, "Imperialism and feudalism took advantage of the
bourgeoisie's compromises and jointly killed the 1911 Revolution. Consequently, the
revolution only overthrew the last feudal dynasty. It did not end the exploitation and
oppression by imperialism and feudalism. China still remained a semi-colonial and semi-
feudal society. The bourgeois democratic revolution was far from completed." In spite of
all these deficiencies, the Revolution of 1911 can in no case be dismissed as a cyclical
dynastic change or a sub-grade revolution. It may not be out of place to quote of Mao
Zedong here:

"The revolution started by Dr Sun Yatsen has

had both its successes and failures. Was not
the Revolution of 1911 a success? Did it not
send the emperor packing? Yet it was a failure
in the sense that while it sent the emperor
packing it left China under imperialist and
feudal oppression, so that the anti-imperialist
and anti-feudal revolutionary task remained
unaccomplished. " '
226

Though Mao Zedong was no authority on the subject, but still one may see a fair amount
of truth in his assessment when he said that the Revolution of 1911 was the beginning of
the democratic revolution in a fuller sense because it overthrew the Qing dynasty, ended
the system of absolute monarchy which had lasted more than 2000 years in China,
intensified the Chinese people's consciousness of democracy and gave impetus to their
revolutionary struggle.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. V.P. Dutt; The Revolution of 1911, unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the
University of Delhi: 1961.
2. Foreign Language Press; The Revolution of 1911, Beijing: 1976.
3. H.R. Issacs; Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, Stanford: 1961.
4. M.B; Rankin; Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and
Chekiang 1902-1911 Cambridge, Mass: 1971.
5. T'ang Leang-li; The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, reprint, Virginia: 1975.
6. M.C. Wright (ed); China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913, Yale: 1968.
7. Jean Chesneaux et al; China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, New York:
1976. '
8. M. Mohanty (ed); Chinese Revolution, Delhi: 1992.
9. WuYu-chang; The Revolution of 1911, Peking: 1964.
CHAPTER: 11
SUN YATSEN AND HIS THREE PRINCIPLES
TARIKA UBEROI
Hindu College
University of Delhi
Delhi- 110 007

Sun Yatsen, the man who lived and died for the Republic of China, is known to the
Chinese as Sun Zhong Shan. He was born on 12 November, 1866 in Xing Shan near
Guangzhou. He was not only a man of great convictions but was a distinguished
visionary. He was not only a national leader of China but also the revolutionary spirit and
inspiration for all the people and societies of Asia. He was the vanguard of the
downtrodden and thus, won for himself the position of a demi-god after his death in
1925. His name became a watchword in every Chinese family and his views became the
basis for the social, political and economic development of the years to follow. However,
he was neither an astute organiser nor did he express his ideas in unambiguous and
conclusive nomenclature. As a result of this there was ideological warfare and party
strife. But his charismatic personality and ardent patriotism earned for him the titles
"Father of the Chinese Nation" and "Founder of the Republic of China."

Sun Yatsen was of a poor peasant parentage. He entered school at six, but because of his
family's poverty, was not able to receive a thorough grounding in Chinese classical
studies. In 1879, at the age of 12, Sun immigrated to
228

Honolulu. There he joined an English medium school and graduated in 1883. During his
schooling, he wished to adopt Christianity. But his family discouraged him from doing so
and for this very reason his ambitions to continue his studies in the United States were
thwarted.

He returned to Hong Kong towards the end of 1883 and was converted to Christianity.
Shortly afterwards he got married and after a short trip to Honolulu, returned in time to
witness China's defeat by France. Thoroughly disgusted by the Qing decadence, he began
to harbour ideas about overthrowing them. During his stay China between 1883 and
1886, people in China considered him to be a tactless and fanatical young radical.
Between 1887 and 1892, he studied in a missionary medical school in Hong Kong, and
successfully graduated as a doctor with proficiency in medicine and surgery. Hawaii and
Hong Kong had a strong influence on Sun during the formative period of his life. What
he saw there, in contrast to his native district, made a deep impression on his young mind.
At the medical college. Sun with three other associates thought of revolutionary changes
and earned the name of'"The Four Big Rebels." The contrast between the Chinese and
British administered cities kindled in Sun's heart a burning desire to overthrow the
inefficient Qing government.

Before 1894. while planning for the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. Sun also considered
reform as a means of saving China. In 1894, Sun went to the capital to seek an interview
with Li llongzhang, the viceroy. Li was too preoccupied with Japanese War and did not
see Sun. This disappointment, coupled with his observation of the Qing decadence in
Beijing, strengthened his determination to overthrow the dynasty.
229

After having opted for revolution, Sun decided to seek aid from overseas Chinese, the
secret societies, the Christian converts and the missionaries, i.e. from the men existing on
the fringes of the Chinese society. He organised the Revive China Society (Qing Zhong
Hui) on 24 November, 1894 in Honolulu with an initial membership of 112. On 21
February 1895, he established the headquarters of this society at Hong Kong, with its
branches in various Chinese provinces. Members of the society took an oath to "Expel the
Qing, Restore the Chinese Rule, and Establish a Federal Republic." In this way, the first
revolutionary body was born. Shortly afterwards at Guangzhou, Sun formed a secret
organisation "Scientific Agricultural Association" with an aim to capture the provincial
government at Guangzhou. However, his organisation headquarters was raided on 9
September, 1895 and he escaped to Hong Kong, and due to a five-year ban on him there,
he went to Japan.

On 1 October 1896, Sun Yatsen reached London and there due to his kidnapping incident
he became famous overnight. Sun remained in Europe for two years and studied the latest
political and social developments. Witnessing the growing trend towards social reform
and revolution in different industrialised countries, he wished to save China from similar
problems of strikes and labour disputes. In 1897, he developed the idea of a social
revolution to complement his earlier nationalistic and democratic revolution. This formed
the very basis,of famous "Three People's Principles of Sun" (Sanminzhuyi).

He returned to Japan in 1897 and was able to direct the revolutionary work more
conveniently. Noted Japanese figures became his supporters, who shared the common
feelings of Asia's grievance against Western imperialism.
230

The Chinese communities in Japan,however, by and large remained apolitical and

conservative, primarily due to the general fear of involvement in anti-Qing activities.
Although the secret societies were an exception, they lacked the necessary education,
cohesion, and sense of direction to offer any leadership. Taking advantage of the Boxer
Movement. (1900), Sun planned an attack on Huizhou, north of Hong Kong.
Unfortunately the plot was discovered, Sun fled to Taiwan and the Huizhou Uprising
ended in a fiasco. Still, Sun's image improved as a result and he was no longer regarded
as a rebel or an outlaw, but a patriotic, devoted revolutionary. The fortunes of the
revolution turned considerably for the better during the period 1902-05. Sun travelled
widely in Vietnam, Japan, Honolulu, and the United States rallying support for his cause.
In the spring of 1905, Sun visited Europe and initiated many people from Brussels, Berlin
and Paris into a revolutionary society. On 20 July 1905, Sun stressed the need for
unifying all revolutionary groups into one organisation to avoid duplication of efforts and
a struggle for power among themselves. The Chinese United League (Zhongguo Tong
Meng Hui or Tong Meng Hui for short) was finally established on 20 August 1905, with
Sun as its chairman.

The membership of Tong Meng Hui grew rapidly and its branches were established in
China and in many key overseas locations. Twentieth Century China became the official
publication of Tong Meng Hui, which was later banned by the Japanese due to
objectionable article published in it. The publication reappeared with a new name as
People's Tribune on 26 November 1905. The founding of party was a milestone in the
Chinese Nationalism, receiving support from all the sections and groups that traditionally
provided the leadership in China. The Tong Meng Hui was multi-
231

provisional and multi-class, which provided a unified modern political party and earned
the name of "the mother of the Chinese revolution."

Between 1895 and 1911, the revolutionaries made at least ten unsuccessful attempts.
Finally, they succeeded on 10 October 1911 at Wuchang 1 (For details, see the chapter on
the Chinese Revolution of 1911.). Though the Qing dynasty was removed, Yuan Shikai
proved equally dictatorial. The differences between Sun and Yuan widened to the extent
that in January 1914 the latter dissolved the provincial assemblies and a period of
dictatorship ensued in China. Sun went into exile till 1916. The Russian Revolution of
1917 excited a widespread interest in China,-especially amongst the intellectual classes.
Lenin had created a new type of democracy by a new revolutionary method. The Chinese
were conscious of the failure of their own republic, modelled after France and the United
States. 1918 to 1925 was the most active period of Sun's life, as it highlights his thoughts
about China.

For the accomplishment of his goals. Sun besides relying upon Western experiences,
drew lessons from the national spirit and moral strength of the traditional Chinese culture.
In an autobiographical sketch penned in 1923, Sun portrayed his own thought's formation
in these words: "Among the various revolutionary ideas I hold, some are adapted from
traditional Chinese thought; others are appropriated from theories and practices
developed in Europe and still others 'ire original insights grown out of my own critical
reflections." No doubt Ying-shih Yu comments that "It was probably this traditional
strain in his thought that prevented him from falling into the trap of radical iconoclasm,
which characterised many Chinese revolutionary intellectuals."
232

THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES OF SUN YATSEN

The basic idea of the three principles was found in the declaration of Tong Meng Hui
founded by Sun in 1905. These principles were accepted as the revolutionary philosophy
of the 'Pong Meng Hui. Sun Yatsen's political and social philosophy was influenced
mostly by his western education and experience. Sun acknowledged that his triple
formation of the three principles corresponded to the principles" stated by President
Lincoln, "Government of (he people, by the people, for the people." He had translated
them into Min Yu (the people to have), Min Qih (the people to govern), and
MinXiang{the people to enjoy). By expression these became Min Zu (Nationalism,
people's national consciousness, or the racial solidarity of the people), Min Quan
(Democracy, people's right, or the governing authority of the people) and Min Xeng
(Socialism, people's livelihood, people's welfare or the economic life of the people).
Accordingly, the state belonged to all the people and they all must have a share in
everything.

During the Revolution of 1911 and thereafter, China was faced with five major problems
as foreseen by Sun Yatsen. They were:

(a) The problem of Nationalism, which included overthrowing the Qing dynasty and
unifying the Chinese against domination and intrusions of China by foreign powers.
(b) Creation of a common political identity for various Chinese groups to fight for the
common national goals.
(c) To educate the Chinese masses for participation in the' governing process of the
republic.
233

d) Unification of various ethnic groups and vast territories of China into an integrated
geographical and political unit.
(e) The problem of equi-distribution of political power, social status and economic
wellbeing amongst the Chinese to ensure their continued support for the system.

Keeping in mind the above mentioned problems. Three People '.v Principles were to be
implemented as outlined in the "Manifesto of the Military Government of the
Revolutionary Brotherhood" made public in 1911. By this he.meant that China should
become a strong unified nation with self-government and free elections as well as a
guaranteed livelihood for his long suffering countrymen. Strong unified nation could be
called Nationalism, the establishment of self-government and free elections could come
under Democracy and assured livelihood could come under Socialism. Thus, it is said
that the broad silhouette of his three principles is Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism.

The first of the three principles. Min Zu or People's Nationhood, is generally known as
the Principle of Nationalism. In 1923 Sun wrote that "nationalist thought is a heritage
bequeathed to us by our ancestors which need not be imported from outside. The
nationalism I hold is nothing but an elaborate version of what I have inherited from the
past." To begin with, the only aspect of this principle was to oust the foreigners including
the Qing, which was considered by the Chinese as alien as any other outsider. Sun
wanted to emancipate the Chinese people by overthrowing the Qing dynasty. But in
course of time the other aspect of this principle, the unity and integrity of China was also
incorporated. At that time China was inhabited not only by
234

the Chinese but by many other races and clans including the Qing, the Mongols, the
Tibetans and various other lesser groups. Sun at first had to face a problem of extreme
delicacy over the question of the nature of the Chinese state. He was not clear about the
fact whether China should have a federal type of government by. granting autonomy to
the subject nationalities, such as Tibetans, the Mongols and the Qing or a totalitarian
government with Chinese domination. He saw that China had inherent feeling of clanism
amongst its people and not of nationalism. Sun wanted to get rid of the narrow
parochialism which was inherent in China. He apprehended that if there were a federal
government granting autonomy to the racial entities the weakness of China would further
increase, exposing the frontier races of China to foreign annexation. Hence, what he
chiefly emphasised on was integrity and solidarity of the country. Sun considered two
things essential for the salvation of the Chinese people— firstly, the realisation of the
danger of their position and secondly, the consolidation of the deep-rooted sentiment
prevailing in the family and clan into a powerful national spirit.

To counter the unifying factors like blood-ties, language, religion and customs of various
people. Sun called for discarding the feelings of localism and provincialism, through
participation in the Nationalist Revolution, failing which he warned them of "Destruction
of the Chinese state and perishment of the Chinese people." Besides, he believed in the
importance of military power, cultural heritage and moral character, as three other
important features to strengthen political identities amongst the people.

Sun clarified that his Principle of Nationalism was not meant for fostering Chinese
imperialism or colonial
235

expansion which are based on force and militarism. He wanted that all the inhabitants of
China, irrespective of their racial affinity, should think themselves in terms of being
Chinese rather than as Mongols, Manchus. Tartars or Tibetans. Taking Switzerland as a
model of an effectively integrated multiethnic and multilingual nation-state, Sun
proclaimed his movement's objective to establish a single powerful nation. Accordingly,
the declaration of the first national congress of the Guomindang, in January 1924,
recognised the right of self-determination for all nationalities in China and emphasised as
one of the party's most important objectives the creation of a free united Republic of
China, based on "principles of free alliance between its different nationalities." He asked
his people to think of the prosperity of China not at the cost of other neighbouring
countries. In general, by his Principle of Nationalism Sun wanted to stimulate Chinese
patriotism and to make China completely free from the economic and territorial
exploitation of the imperialist powers of the world. He wanted to liberate China by the
Chinese people themselves. Sun aroused their feelings of nationalism by citing the
suffering of the Chinese people at the hands of the imperialist powers and the will to be at
par with other nations of the world. Sun also challenged the usefulness of
cosmopolitanism and preached against the luxury of an internationally oriented ideology
for the Chinese. He called foreign nations to help China realise its goals of national
independence and the development of Chinese economy. As pointed out by Gottfried-
Karl Kindermann. Sun's nationalism transcended the limitations of self-centredness and
can be labelled a positive nationalism.

The second principle of Sun Yatsen. the People's Sovereignty was also popularly known
as Principle of
236

Democracy. Sun wanted to establish in China a government which would ensure popular
control through electoral processes. By democracy he meant not only the right of the
masses to elect their own government but it also meant four other things:

1. Initiative: it meant that the people should possess the right to initiate a law for their
own benefit.
2. Referendum: it meant that the government would take the opinion of the public
after passing a law.
3. Election: it meant a right which would enable the public to elect their won
representatives to power.
4. Recall: it meant the right of the public to call back their representatives in case they
were dissatisfied with their work.

The formula for guaranteeing these rights, he thought should be embodied in the
constitution, which in turn would be based on the five divisions of power such as the
legislative, executive, judiciary, the examination, and the control. Examination was made
into a different department because it was a traditional institution in China but now
officials were to be selected on their merit and capability.

Sun paid much attention to remove the defects of the suffrage. He abolished the property-
barriers of the franchise. He wanted to establish a kind of political democracy in which
the majority of the citizens of the country would take part. On the other hand, he did not
allow the privileged few to monopolise the democratic machinery to their best advantage.
He invited only those people to take part in his new system of democracy who were loyal
to the Republic. He wanted to limit the natural rights only to his revolutionary followers.
237

Sun's theory regarding the reorganisation of the government was based upon three
principles. He divided all citizens of the country in the Confucian fashion into three
categories: (a). The leaders, who could understand the past and thus guide people into the
future; (b). Those who could interpret the leaders to the masses; and (c). The rest of the
people who do not know and understand anything, but are only able to follow out
instructions. According to this system the first group would direct the state machinery by
discovering law and by inventing the necessary steps to implement these laws; the second
group who knew but were not able to apply their theories to practical reality, would
manage and the third group would only act according to the instructions of the second.
This meant that Sun wished that discoverers and promoters should assume more power
and obligations to manage the affairs of the state, while the operators should assume the
role of the followers in the fulfilment of national objectives.

Sun saw power as distinct from ability, believing that the one who has the power does not
necessarily have the ability. He stressed the distinction between the sovereign power and
of the people and the ruling power of the government and said that though the people
were endowed with the sovereign power, they did not have the ability to run the
administration machinery. According to him a selected few or a group elite who were
considered to be able and sufficient, were to be entrusted with the responsibility of
running the government. He further held that before the introduction of a purely
democratic government in the country, there should be a military rule and political
tutelage for a certain period by the efficient and expert people in order to train the mass in
the line of true democracy.
238

In Sun's plan of the revolution, there were to be three' years of military rule in the areas
liberated. During this period, the military would control all military and civil affairs-5 at
district level and would cooperate with the local people in eliminating the old political
and social evils, such as slavery, foot-binding, opium smoking, and bureaucratic
corruption etc. The second stage would be a period of political tutelage or a "Period of
Enlightened Despotism" not exceeding six years. During this stage, duly elected self-
government would be instituted for the local assemblies, while the military would
continue to retain control over the central government. During this period, the provisional
constitution would specify the rights and duties of the military government and the
people. At the end of the period of tutelage, the military government would be governed
by a new constitution and a national election would be then held in accordance with the
provisions of the constitution. Accordingly, Sun envisaged a three-stage revolution to
lead the country into constitutionalism.

Under the new republic. Mongolia. Tibet and Xinjiang had acquired a semi-autonomous
status, thus creating serious problems of political disintegration. Sun adopted a policy of
equality of every ethnic group as a larger social and political entity. While accepting the
federal form of government, he wanted decentralisation of powers down to the local
administrative levels.

Sun's third principle of People's Livelihood was nothing but the Principle of Socialism.
Under this principle Sun laid emphasis on two things, such as equal distribution of land
and the regulation or control of capital. In this one sees the ancient Chinese Utopian idea
of "land to the tiller" as well as the influence of the land programme of the Taipings.
239

According to him, one should first think of production than of distribution. China being
predominantly an agricultural country. Sun advocated an equal distribution of land. He
wanted to put an end to the monopoly of the minority in land ownership. He believed in
equalization of land ownership, both in respect of rural farm lands as also land ownership
in urban areas. He also felt that the process of relocation of land should be peaceful and
non-violent. Moreover, he wanted the government to compensate the landlords whose
lands were to be acquired for public use or for redistribution. He opined that land tax
should be determined according to the value of the land. Economic equality was Sun's
fundamental objective of the "'Three People's Principles." He was against concentration
of wealth and power by landowners, merchants and capitalists, as this could lead to class
war and revolution. Sun's land policy included firstly, self assessment of land value and
reporting to the government; secondly, imposition of land value tax by the government on
the basis of the reported value; thirdly, government may purchase the land at the reported
value: fourthly, unaccounted increments of land value shall go to the government, while
any increase due to investments shall go to the owner; and lastly, the revenue from
taxation and unearned incomes was used to finance government enterprises. His system
provided disincentives for private ' monopolising and speculation/ leasing of land at
higher rentals or outright sale due to the capital gains taxes. Consequently, land was
peacefully taken over from the landowners and given to the farmers." He asked the
landowners to cooperate in distribution of land to landless tenants.

To make China wealthier. Sun believed in further development of agriculture and

industry. According to him.
240

the key to the nation building was in the development of the economy. His plan called for
the development of manpower, agriculture, manufacture and trade. In manpower
development, he emphasised on education, an incentive system, and matching of jobs
with training. In agriculture development, he desired Hood control, water conservancy,
land reclamation, and advanced technology. For the manufacture, he believed in
machines and saving resources. Towards trade, he emphasised the abolition of internal
trade barriers, protection of merchants and improved transportation system. Towards the
internal development of China, his schemes consisted of six programmes for the
development of ports, railways, roads, canals, mines, and industry. Sun's development
scheme had foreseen the doctrine of balanced growth' or 'Big Push\ He believed in
growth with equality.

Sun believed that the state was to control capital and industry. He wanted to restrain
private capitalism from guiding and controlling the people's livelihood by nationalising
all large private enterprises such as banks, railroads and ship-lines. He supported the
existence of small private sector: He realised that China lacked in her capital
accumulation and as such was unable to invest capital for the growth of few industries.
He, therefore, was ready to welcome foreign capital as well as foreign technical know-
how to help the industrial development of China. He liked to apply technological
methods of the West to increase the per acre yield. He realised that land was to be more
productive to satisfy the needs of the growing population of China.

In 1923. Sun admitted that his third principle was arrived at by comparative examination
of social theories and the
241 .

selection of the best ideas from amongst them. Sun was more of a socialist as he
propagated equalization of land ownership amongst other policies, from 1895 till his
death in 1925. He always desired to establish a socialist state, where every citizen could
have a decent living. His revolutionary aim . was for welfare of the people and solutions
of the problems of their livelihood.

Sun's policy was based on those Chinese traditions, which sought to improve people's
livelihood and ensure equitable distribution of wealth. Dr Sun's actions were influenced
by the developments in the West, American Revolution, the British Industrial
Revolution, the Russian Socialist Revolution, and the ideas of Adam Smith, Karl Marx,
Henry George, and J.S. Mill.

It would be worthwhile, here, to mention in brief, the influence of the October Revolution
of Russia on the ideology of Sun Yatsen. The October Revolution of 1917 had aroused
apprehension in the West but a lot of hope and interest in Asia and especially in China.
Besides other things, Lenin in 1919 relinquished Russia's control in China by the
Karakhan Declaration and also proposed a united front against colonisation and
imperialism. This created tremendous goodwill in China and several intellectual groups
and societies to study Marxism came up and most importantly it led to the formation of
the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.

However, the important party still during this period was the Guomindang of which Sun
was the leader. This party
242

was not very unified and was more of an unstable floating crowd. Sun realised the need
for its reorganisation and so after the October Revolution and a meeting with Lenin. Sun
Yatsen tried to create a viable organisation. He reorganised his party on the Bolshevik
pattern as he was impressed with Lenin as an organiser. Thus, Sun tried to emulate
Lenin's organisation theory— the theory of democratic centralisation to reorganised the
Guomindang.

Under Sun's Three People's Principles, the government was not only expected to maintain
law and order, protect life, liberty, and property from internal as well as external threats,
but also further the general welfare of the people. Under the Principle of People's
Livelihood, the government was duty bound to make available the four basic necessities
of life— food, shelter, clothing, and conveyance— for all people, a concept similar to
that espoused in modern welfare states.

Moreover, Sun also redefined his ideology and gave to China what are called the '''Three
People 's Policies.^ These include— firstly, friendly relations with the Soviet Union. This
was an ideological and political alliance between Soviet socialism and Chinese
nationalism. Secondly, a union between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist
Party— which is popularly known as the First United Front. Sun had decided by then that
the forces of nationalism should unite to overthrow the twin evils of Chinese nationalism,
which were warlordism and imperialism, irrespective of which party they represented.
Thirdly, he aimed to go closer
243

to the Chinese people. He realised the importance of mobilising the masses for political
action.

Sun's theory of equality was also an important contribution. Sun advocated that man-
made inequality, not natural inequality, was the worst type of evil. China had practised
man-made inequality by structuring different classes of people in which the entire
economic burden of society was placed, on the common people at the bottom which
became the source of social unrest. Sun not only hated man-made inequality but also
opposed absolute equality because humans are not born equal. He felt that absolute .
equality was not only contrary, to nature but also a wasteful of talents. To Sun, true
equality was equality of opportunity for all people to develop best qualities in themselves
without the hindrance of society. Under true equality, the more intelligent and capable
people would make greater headway. To avoid unrest caused by natural inequality. Sun
advanced the concept of service to mitigate disparities. He felt that individuals could be
categorised into three groups: those of vision, those of understanding, and those of action.
The exceptional person could work for the good of millions, while the intelligent person
could do good to a few people; and the least gifted person could render service to at least
one other human being. Sun felt that if everyone in society worked unselfishly for the
good of others, natural inequality could be minimized.

Though Sun's analyses of war were not completely original, he provided his own
perspicacity for peaceful
244

solutions to conflicts. He felt that violent tussles in Chinese history were largely the result
of over-ambitious men's greed to become rulers. Future civil wars could best be avoided
through republicanism, besides laying emphasis on republicanism. Sun also talked about
the usefulness of moralism for creating peaceful atmosphere between nations. He
underscored a policy of economic cooperation among nations to enhance international
peace.

Sun was also fairly ahead for his day in recommending a mixed economic system in
which both public and private enterprises would work along side each other to develop
China industrially. "All matters that can be and are better carried out by private
enterprises should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully
protected by liberal laws." Still, Sun felt that the state would have to play an important
role in capital formation and industrial construction as individual capitalism in China was
relatively weak. Sun's socio-economic programme thus offered an amalgamation of
public and private sectors in a mixed economy.

In a political career that spanned thirty years, Sun never led a united China. Unlike most
politicians of his time, he had not used politics to build a personal fortune. He had spoken
for Lie big goals— a modern powerful, independent, democratic, and socialist Ch> a. As
slogans, untranslated into coherent policy commitments, these aims won widespread
support. The failure of Sun's long quest for power also assumed a symbolic quality; in
retrospect he came to epitomise the frustration of Chinese nationalism.
245

The search for Sun's "true" doctrine is less rewarding because he was not a great thinker.
He was an improviser. not a political philosopher. But neither his role in history no-r his
personal heroism need be diminished by our recognition that it was his political style, not
his ideas, which made him unique.

His improvised tactics can be explained as practical responses to unprecedented political

problems. His particular way of improvising reflected his temperament as well as his
social and educational background. Schiffrin opines that Sun was irrepressibly optimistic,
convinced that he could do no wrong, and he had the audacity to act which is the
indisputable ingredient of the revolutionary spirit. He was, thus, able to keep in step with
Chinese history.

Approval of the Chinese literati and receipt of foreign support were the two main goals of
Sun's pragmatic efforts. In pursuing these goals Sun often resorted to compromises and
manoeuvring which now seem incompatible with the nationalist, democratic impulse he
came to represent. Sometimes he was even forced into humble, and humiliating postures.
These were, then two faces to Sun Yatsen— the vulnerable aspirant and the confident
manipulator. Whatever his method might have been, all in all, Sun Yatsen did play a
major role in the Chinese major politics and has rightly been called the father of the
nation.
246

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. L. Sharman; Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning, New York: 1934.
2. C. Spencer: Sun Yat-sen: Founder of the Chinese Republic, New York: 1967.
3. M.B. Jansen; The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge, Mass: 1954.
4. Chu-yuan Cheng; Sun Yat-sen s Doctrine in the Modern World; London: 1989.
5. Robert Bruce; Sun Yat-sen; London: 1969.
6. C.R. Hensman; Sun Yat-sen, London: 1971.
7. Richard Rigby; Sun Yat-sen; St Lucia: 1980.
8. Paul K.T. Sih; Sun Yat-sen and China; New York: 1974.
9. Harold Z. Schiffrin; Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revoution, New York:
1974.
CHAPTER: 12

THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT OF 1919

RAJIV VERMA
Satyawati Co-Educational (E) College
University of Delhi
Ashok Vihar, Delhi-110052

The May Fourth Movement of 1919 was one of the social, political and cultural
landmarks of the twentieth-century China. Its objective was the accomplishment of
national independence, individual emancipation and creation of a new culture. The May
Fourth Movement was China's search between the mid-1 910s and mid-1920s for anti-
traditionalist political, cultural, and social alternatives, while at the same time it is a
symbol of passionate nationalism, often with a strong anti-Japanese tinge. This
movement aspired to attain its goals by means of an analytical and scientific re-
evaluation of the national inheritance and pernickety acknowledgment of foreign
civilization.

The May Fourth Movement was the acme of the intellectual fermentation which had
begun in 1915 or even earlier. It was also the genesis of a movement of sprouting
political awareness which primarily influenced not only young intellectuals but also
workers, resulting in the establishment of the Communist Party in 1921. The most
original aspect of the May Fourth Movement was that its aims for the first time in modern
Chinese history, concerned both home and foreign affairs. Thus, the May Fourth
Movement focused simultaneously on denouncing the Powers' policy on China and the
Unequal Treaty System. It
248

concentrated on criticising the conservative section of society which had given in to

foreign greed. This amalgamation, which led Mao Zedong to define the Chinese
revolution as anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, was wholly new.

The speedy advent of a politically aware merchant-entrepreneur clan and a labour force
"contributed to the rise of a new nationalism. The World War I period had witnessed an
unprecedented development of Chinese industry and commerce due to favourable internal
and external conditions. Internally, the replacement of the imperial dynasty by a new
republic in 1912 marked the beginning of a new era. The Republican government
promulgated a series of regulations to stimulate and safeguard industrial and commercial
production. Externally, the World War I had so perniciously affected European industries
and trade with Asia that it produced a golden opportunity for the Chinese indigenous
industries to grow uninhibited.

The new industries and enterprises gave rise to new market and labour classes, who were
sensitive to China's predicament under imperialism. They were determined to defend
their country's interests. They were imbued with a strong nationalist determination "to
save their country" from the twin danger of foreign imperialism and domestic disorder.
Though the Revolution of 1911 had been successful in packing off the Qing dynasty as
well as the dynastic system, yet for the common man things did not improve at all. The
political instability, economic recession and dictatorial powers all combined brought the
nation into a state of utter chaos and anarchy. The 1911 Revolution had failed to evolve a
stable and clean political system. Chaotic and corrupt internal politics along with
continued imperialist encroachment on China's sovereignty led to the coming
249

together of patriotic forces once again. That is why, the May fourth Movement has been
perceived by some scholars as the "logical consequence of the Chinese Revolution of
1911.

The returned Chinese students, who had studied abroad, were particularly eager to
introduce reforms. Among the most prominent returned students were Chen Duxiu and
Cai Yuanpei from France, Guo Mojo and Lou Shujen from Japan, and Bu Shi and Ziang
Molin from the United States. Chen, Cai and Hu rapidly became the guiding spirit of the
May Fourth Movement.

Li Dazhou and afterwards Chen Duxiu, who openly sympathised with Marxism, were
attacked by Hu Shi, who was strongly influenced by American pragmatism. Hu Shi
declared that quarrels over irritating "isms" should stop. He clearly advocated that
concrete problems could only be resolved in the context of an overall transformation of
society and in accordance with the will of the majority of the people. Hu cautioned
against blind activism and rudderless revolution, proposing instead spontaneous and
gradual reform to eliminate the five enemies of social progress: poverty, sickness,
illiteracy, corruption, and disorder.

Against this background, at the beginning of May 1919, the telegraph spread the news
that the peace treaty just signed in Versailles, bringing World War I to an end, had not
taken Chinese claims into consideration. Germany's rights and privileges in Shandong
had been transferred to Japan instead of being given back to China. However, since China
had joined the on the side of the Allies in the World War L the Chinese public expected
had the peace negotiators to restore Shandong to China. After the Versailles decision, the
Beijing students decided to organize a large protest demonstration
250

against Japan as well as the members of the government who supported Japan. 5,000
students gathered at the Tiananman Square on 4 May and marched on the Legation
Quarter, but they were barred from entering. The students then burned the residence of
Cao Rulin, the official regarded as the mastermind of collaboration with Japan. A number
of students were arrested. Indignation against the government mounted. Beijing Students'
Union was officially founded, to organize and spread the movement. The press supported
the students, as did the moderate sections of the bourgeoisie. Student demonstrations
spread throughout China. Throughout May and June, students, including women,
organized unions and staged demonstrations not only in Beijing but also in other major
cities. Among the student organizations were future leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou
Enlai, and Luo Jialun.

In order to quell the movement, the government declared martial law in Beijing. The
Japanese government demanded that its Chinese counterpart put an end to the agitation. It
also demanded that marines be sent into the large ports as a show of force. The Shanghai
merchants egged on by the local students, gave a call for general strike. Over 60,000
workers joined in the strike. The government had to give in. It had to release the students
and intellectuals under arrest. Three ministers, who were initially assailed by the students
and were favoured by warlord Duan Qirui, were sacked. The agitators also forced the
government to decline to sign the Treaty of Versailles. On the Chinese refusal to sign the
Treaty of Versailles, the U.S. President Wilson remarked that though it was most serious
as it would cause grave implications, but he did not know what could be done in the
circumstances.
The May Fourth episode acted as a catalyst for the
251

intellectual revolution in China. Those who were intensely frustrated by the Versailles
conference, began to turn to Marxist Socialism, and others held Western materialism
responsible for the World War I and suggested Chinese spiritualism as an antidote. These
different viewpoints catapulted the New Cultural Movement to loftier heights.

Historians disagree greatly over the nature of the May Fourth Movement. The earliest
liberal view held that the May Fourth Movement was a Chinese Renaissance. Scholars
with Marxist and liberal leanings believe that like the European Renaissance, the May
Fourth period also witnessed the transformation of Chinese economy from medieval to
capitalist condition and made similar cultural demands. But several differences between
the Renaissance and the May Fourth Movement can be observed. For example, Europe in
the late Middle Ages was the scene of a Commercial Revolution, while China after the
World War I was in transition from an agrarian to an infant industrial economy.
Moreover, the Renaissance in Europe was in a sense the rebirth of interest in an ancient
civilisation, but it would be a mistake to imply that the May Fourth Movement was a
rebirth of the ancient Chinese civilization. Finally, in the European Renaissance, most of
the great literary works in the vernacular language were written during and after the
Movement, whereas in China a number of excellent novels in the vernacular had existed
for several hundred years before the May Fourth period.

Some scholars have also tried to compare the May Fourth Movement with the European
Reformation. But in view of the increasing strength of anti-religious movements and
naturalism and materialism in China in the 1920s, this analogy of the May Fourth period
with a Reformation on the
252

European pattern is far from convincing.

Some have suggested that the movement was Die Aufklarung or a Chinese version of the
European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. According to them, the rationalism
and naturalism were the prevalent thought of the movement. But there are some basic
differences between the May Fourth Movements and the European Enlightenment. For
example, in the latter, a feudal aristocracy was dethroned by a rising middle class, while
in China the middle class did not play such a role independently, but rather there was a
coalition of various rising social forces against older groups.

According to the official attitude of Guomindang toward the movement, it was the result
of patriotic or nationalist sentiments against warlordism and particularly against the
aggression of the Great powers. Leaders of Conservative and Nationalist Chinese Youth
Party regarded the May Fourth Movement as a nationalistic student and popular
movement. They praised highly its patriotic and anti-Japanese sentiments-but
disapproved of the new thought tides.

The early communist leaders never claimed that the Movement was inspired by the
Russian October Revolution or led by Communists, but it was basically democratic in
nature. This view was not accepted by Mao Zedong, leader of the Communist Party.
According to him, the initiation of the May Fourth Movement as a cultural reform
movement was but a form of expression of China's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
bourgeois-democratic revolution. Mao laid stress on the following three points:-

(i) The May Fourth Movement was the jumping off point
253

of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal bourgeois democratic revolution leading to a new

period,
(ii) The national bourgeoisie might and did join the revolution as a united Trout together
with the proletariat and the intelligentsia.
(iii) The intelligentsia provided the leadership of this united front in the revolution.

Although Mao fully realized the political significance of the May Fourth Movement, he
appeared to consider it more especially a cultural revolution. He thought that the May
Fourth Movement was so great and so thorough a cultural revolution that it was
unprecedented in the history of China. Mao also says that it was at the summons of this
world revolutionary upheaval, of the Russian Revolution, and at the call of Lenin that the
May Fourth Movement actually took place. The May Fourth Movement formed a part of
the then world revolution of the proletariat class.

But it cannot be said that the movement formed a part of the then world revolution of the
proletarian class. Although numerous Chinese leaders were impressed by the October
revolution, but it must be remembered that the new thought and the new literature
movements had started to take form in 1916 and to gather force alter the summer of 1917,
all these before the October Revolution. Many other facts also contradict the assumption
that the movement took place at the summons of the October Revolution and at the call of
Lenin. Furthermore, the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ideas seem to have developed
after 1930. At least, most of the participants in the movement were not conscious of these
ideas before that time.

Chow Tse-tung believes that the May Fourth movement

254

was actually a combined intellectual and socio-political movement to achieve national

independence, the emancipation of the individual and a just society by the modernization
of China. According to him it was an intellectual revolution because it was based on the
assumption that intellectual changes were a pre-requisite for such a task of
modernization. This also accelerated numerous social, political, and cultural changes.

The leaders believed that ideological and institutional changes must precede a material
and socio-political transformation. They challenged authorities, cast doubts on the
existing social order and moral principles and re-evaluated all these in a utilitarian
manner.

After the may Fourth Movement, the modern western patriotism and nationalism as well
as the conception of an independent, socialist inclined nation-state developed rapidly in
China. Mass movement, propaganda, organization, and revolutionary discipline were
consequently regarded by the young intellectuals as a justifiable technique for their
struggle against world power, politics and warlordism.

On the whole ,the basic aspect of the movement was its traditional nature. After having
examined China before and after the Movement, one cannot fail to appreciate that she
had undergone a fundamental and thorough intellectual, social and political changes. ,

Appraisals of the significance of the May Fourth Movement have been many and diverse.
Liberals proclaimed it as a movement of emancipation from old thought, old-ethics, old
values and affirmation of human rights. Conservatives, however, attacked the Movement
for its
255

corrupting influence on the youth and lack of respect for traditionalism, although they
conceded its usefulness in stimulating nationalism, radicals eulogized the Movement as
not only a patriotic movement but also a part of human liberation. Mao Zedong described
it as essentially an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal bourgeois-democratic revolution of
China, propelled by a united front of workers, students, and national bourgeoisie under
the leadership of the intelligentsia.

For details, see the chapter on the Chinese Revolution of 191 /.Regardless of these
divergent view points, the fact remains that the May Fourth Movement was essentially a
socio-political-intellectual revolution aimed at achieving national independence,
individual emancipation and creation of a new culture through a critical and scientific re-
evaluation of the national heritage and selected acceptance of foreign civilization. Old
ethics, customs, literature, social relations, and economic and political institutions came
under disparaging attack to make way for the new. Immnanuel C.Y. Hsu enumerates
three main achievements of the May Fourth Movements, which are indisputable:

(i) The literary revolution led to the establishment of the Plain language in 1920 and the
rise of a new literature in vernacular style, based on humanitarianism, romanticism,
realism, and nationalism.
(ii) The influx of diverse foreign ideas and ideologies caused the emergence of two
opposing views on social reconstruction and national regeneration: the pragmatic,
evolutionary method expounded by. Hu Shi and later partially accepted by the Nationalist
Party; and the Marxist revolutionary approach adopted by the Chinese Communist Party.
256

Sentiments on the rise, fed by the example of Soviet Russia's growing strength, socialist
ideas became more influential in later years.

The May Fourth Movement focused simultaneously on denouncing the powers" policy in
China and the Unequal Treaty System, and on criticizing the conservative sections of
society which had given in to foreign greed.

The May Fourth Movement was also a generational movement. From the first days of
May, students played the vital role of detonators. They demonstrated against the
government, fought the police, distributed anti-Japanese leaflets, and formed "Groups of
Ten for National Salvation* which urged tradesmen and workers to strike and made the
boycott instructions effective. The struggle against the old society and culture and the
struggle against a China founded on the moral and ideological privilege of older people,
led to the younger generation's being entrusted with the political power they were
qualified to handle.

The May Fourth Movement was feminist and upheld women's rights not to marry
according to old rules.

The May Fourth Movement witnessed intellectual and political cosmopolitanism. There"
was a great enthusiasm for the pragmatism of the American John Dewey; for the
liberalism-Socialism of Bertrand Russell; for the Japanese utopianism of the new village;
for the idealization of the East by Rabindranath Tagore; for the anarchism of Peter
Kropotkin; for the humanitarianism of Leo Tolstoy and Romaine Rolland; and the
scientific socialism of Marx and Engels.
257

The May Fourth Movement represents China's third stage of response to the Western
impact. The first stage— the Self-Strengthening Movement from 1861 to 1 895— saw
cosmetic attempts at diplomatic and military modernization. The second stage— the era
of reform and revolution from 1898 to 1912— witnessed the acceptance of Western
political institutions. The intellectual awakening of 1917-23 marked a further shift away
from the traditional Chinese base towards complete westernization. By 1920 China had
become in many ways a part of the modern world.

Mao Zedong felt that the Movement had become a part of the then world proletarian
revolution, though it "was not broad enough to reach down to the masses of workers and
peasants." The most important achievement of the Movement was the ideology and to a
lesser degree, breakdown of the traditional alliance of the gentry, landlords and
bureaucracy, which was to be succeeded by the formation of a new alignment. This new
alignment consisted of the intelligentsia, workers, merchants, industrialists etc. This new
alignment rebelled against traditional ideas, institutions, and customs and the interests of
the warlords and bureaucrats. In this process of the formation of new alignment, ideology
played a striking role. Traditional ethical principles and dogmas were effectively
shattered. The worship of the old was replaced by enthusiasm for the new.

These ideological changes were accompanied by the adoption of the vernacular, by the
creation of a new literature based on humanitarianism, romanticism, realism, and
naturalism and by the rapid development of the press and popular education. Fine arts
such as painting, sculpture, and music were also greatly influenced by the Movement.
258

As a result of the May Fourth Movement, modern knowledge was increasingly taught in
the schools. Industrial training started to develop closer connection with the new national
industry. Modern economics, political science, and sociology began to take roots in
China. Notable advances were made in the fields of. biology, geology, palaeontology,
meteorology, physics, and physiology etc. Scientific methods and attitudes were
introduced and used far more than in earlier times.

The May Fourth Movement also resulted in social transformations. After the Movement
traditional family system gradually declined. Marriage based on love was more
frequently demanded. Against the old family and clan systems. Chinese youths strove to
assert their individual personalities and rights in society. The status of women began to
rise. Co-education was established. Women began to be emancipated from traditional
ethical, social and political shackles. The Movement brought women into political and
social activities.

The May Fourth Movement also led to changes in China's economic structure. These
were accompanied by the progressive decline of the landlord's position, unrest among the
peasantry, an increase of political activities on the part of the urban-dwellers and the
increasing significance of the labour problems. Under the influence of the young
intelligentsia, the labour movement started to gain in strength and organization and to
take on a political connotation.

In the political field, the May Fourth Movement facilitated the adoption of new principles
and methods of party organization and activity. Political parties developed close relations
with the common masses and especially with
259

the young intellectuals. Parties laid more emphasis on social problems in their platforms
and policies. Socialism. democracy, and the ideas of national freedom and independence
gained repute among the intelligentsia, while warlordism. imperialism, and colonial
policy became political targets and met more effective resistance by the public. Two
important political consequences of the May fourth Movement were increased
antagonism toward Japan and as the embodiment of foreign aggression, and growing
discontent with China's warlord governments. Students and journalists exposed the
warlords' lack of patriotism (some of them had close association with the Japanese), thus
hastening their demise at the hands of the Guomindang in 1927-28. The May Fourth
slogan "Save the Country from Imperialists and warlords" was taken up by the
Guomindang.

The May Fourth Movement also suffered from some shortcomings. Due to the attack on
the whole tradition, many excellent features of Confucianism and the national legacy
Were overlooked or left umnentioned. According to Hsu. "The May 4th Movement had
been far more effective at destroying the past than at constructing the future." Instead of
creating a new system of thought and new schools of philosophy, the Movement is
accused of primarily introducing Western thought and destroying Chinese traditionalism.
Benjamin I Schwartz also feels that this Movement "was not.a watershed in Chinese
history. It did not constitute a beginning, a milestone." Schwartz appears politically
somewhat biased. It was absolutely a first rate change. It changed the attitude of the
Chinese towards China as well as the world and was a soul-searching attempt. It was a
ruthless confrontation with the Chinese reality. No doubt, Chinese contemporary
historians regard the May Fourth Movement as the turning point between the modern and
contemporary history of their country.
260

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.Benjamin I. Schwartz (ed); Reflections on the May Fourth Movement: A Symposium?
Cambridge Mass: 1972.
2. Chow Tse-tung; The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China,
Cambridge Mass: 1967.
3.Vera Schwarcz; The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May
4.Movement of 1919, Joseph T. Chen; The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai: The
Making of a Social Movement in Modern China, 1971.
CHAPTER: 13
YUAN SHIKAI AND WARLORDISM
JAYAVERMA
Dr B R Ambedkar College
University of Delhi
' Delhi

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 brought the dynastic rule to an end. Though, politically
and also in the long term, the Revolution was an important event, but to the common
Chinese it did not make any significant difference. The political instability, strife and
disunity, that followed the Revolution of 1911, led to the emergence of warlordism and
posed a very serious threat to the very existence of China as one country.

On 1 January 1912 was established the new government of the Chinese Republic in
Nanjing and Sun Yatsen (Sun Zhong Shan) took over as the provisional president. But
Yuan Shikai, the former Commander of the Qing Forces and who had created the New
Army, had different ideas. He aspired to become China's ruler. As the Qing Court had not
yet resigned formally, Yuan enjoyed plentiful military support. From position of
authority, he was able to' bargain and manoeuvre with Sun and his Nanjing government.
As a result of the negotiations that followed, the Qing Court abdicated on 12 February
1912. Under the terms of agreement, Sun resigned in favour of Yuan. The Republican
government was shifted to Beijing and Yuan was elected provisional president of the
Chinese Republic. But the Republican government was organised only in name as police
provocation, military
262

intervention and political murder triumphed over constitutional opposition.

Yuan's mockery of the constitution, illegal manipulation of the Parliament, methods of

bribery, coercion, murder, and enslavement were an irreparable affront to public
character and morale. As pointed out by Liang Qi Qao, he laid the; foundations of
lawlessness and disorder in the decades that followed. Yuan Shikai saw no difference
between men and animals, assuming that all could be bought with gold and intimidated
by the sword.

When Yuan started on the road to personal power, he had one enormous advantage over
his adversaries. He was seen as the strongman, and recognised and supported by the
foreign powers. Therefore, when he became President of the Republic, the powers were
ready to help him. That help was precious in enabling Yuan to strengthen his regime, but
it was also costly in terms of independence" and national sovereignty.

Once elected the provisional President, Yuan started to make a travesty of the Republic.
In his first cabinet, the four substantive ministries went to his henchmen. Moreover,
under Yuan's confident Qao Bingchun, the cabinet was nothing but a puppet of the
President. Within five months, Yuan had succeeded in reducing the responsible cabinet to
a shambles.

According to the provisional constitution, a parliament was to be elected within six

months, of the formation of the government. The elections gave the Guomindang a
landslide victory under the effective guidance of Sung Chiaojen. Sung's organizing
ability irritated Yuan greatly. And Sung was assassinated.
263

To bolster his position against the nationalists, Yuan negotiated the so-called
Reorganisation Loan of £25 million from the Five Power Banking Constitution. When
the nationalist members of the parliament impeached the government on loan issue, Yuan
dismissed the nationalist military governors in Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Anhui, are his
army readied for an attack on the south. On 12 July 1913, the military governor of Jiangxi
declared independence and six provinces followed suit; starting what is known as the
Second Revolution. Yuan crushed this revolution and his generals took over the control
of the Yangzi areas as provincial warlords.

The easy suppression of the Second Revolution elated Yuan, whose personal ambitions
now knew no limits. No longer satisfied with the title of provisional President, he yearned
for it to be changed to President with a life time tenure, preparatory to his ultimate goal of
emperorship.

In a Presidential election. Yuan was formally inaugurated as President, and the

provisional government became the regular government. However, the Parliament
promulgated the Tien-tan Constitution, which adopted the cabinet rather than the
Presidential systems, to check Yuan's powers. Yuan dissolved the Guomindang. Having
brushed aside the constitution, the Parliament, and the opposition party, Yuan achieved a
virtual dictatorship.

Yuan called a national conference to revise the 1912 provisional constitution. The aim of
the conference was the shift from the cabinet to Presidential system and the authorization
of the President and the parliament to prepare a new constitution. The new constitution
extended the Presidential term to ten years, renewable by re-election
264

without limit. Moreover, the President had the right to nominate his own successor. With
this constitution Yuan was assured of the lifelong tenure as well as the right to pass it to
his offspring.

Yuan’s advisers and supporters stressed constitutional monarchy as the source of national
strength, as, in Japan and Britain. Therefore Yuan convened a National Congress of
Representatives which voted unanimously in favour of monarchy. Yuan decreed that the
next year, 1916 would mark the start of his new reign, to be called the Glorious
Constitution.

Yuan's imperial designs once uncovered, aroused growing opposition. At first, the
resistance came from the Moderates and the Progressive Party. They were joined by a
few former Guomindang members. The governor of Yunnan gave Yuan an ultimatum to
cancel the monarchist movement and on 25 October 1915 proclaimed the independence
of Yunnan. The aims of the anti-monarchical movement launched by the south-western
junta were to protect the constitution, drive Yuan out of the office of president, reorganise
the central government and restore provincial liberties. Guizhou and Guangxi also
declared independence. Despite Sun Yatsen's return from Japan to Shanghai, the Chinese
Revolutionary Party played a very minor role in this anti-monarchical movement. The
Japanese government also warned Yuan.

Facing these discouraging domestic and foreign developments, Yuan had no choice but to
forsake his monarchical dream and the reign of glorious Constitution. The various
revolutionary groups had also refused to recognise Yuan as President. Yuan's followers
one after
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another began- to disown him. Thus, deserted by his henchmen and overcome with
shame, anxiety and grief, Yuan suddenly died from natural causes, thus, saving the
situation. With the death of Yuan, the tragicomic drama of monarchism came to an abrupt
end.

Commenting on the personality and achievements of Yuan Shikai, a scholar has pointed
out that he was an atavistic product of an ancient society, who came too late into a new
world. His misfortune as well as that of his country was that he stood for a bygone age.
His views on government, on the administration of finance, and on centralisation, were
that of a statesman, but of the sort of statesman who was capable of being an old time
despot. "He would perhaps have made a good tyrant." Jean Chesneaux perceives the new
warlord era, with, its main characteristics of militarism and regionalism, as beginning
with the rise of Yuan Shikai, In fact, according to Chesneaux, he was the first warlord
although he was more intelligent and energetic and .worked under better circumstances
than his successors. However, his power was subject to similar hazards, rebellion by
unpaid troops, treachery by corrupt officers, outburst of hostility among the elite and the
indifference of the people.

During the republican period, the real power was wielded by military figures, the
provincial governors (officially known as dujun, although the Westerners called them
'Warlords'). They were the actual heirs to Yuan Shikai, whom they had given
unconditional support during the 1911-12 crisis. They were also called the Beiyang
group. They had a strong foothold in the provinces, where they constituted a cruel,
rapacious neo-feudal force. At the same time, they
266

tried to maintain their control over what remained of the central apparatus of the state.
Thus, the disappearance of a power-holder in China from 1916 to 1927 generated
centrifugal forces, plunging the country into a period of chaos and disorder. During this
period, the warlords fought against each other for power and self-aggrandizement without
any sense, logic or reason, rendering this period the darkest in republican history.

Among the warlords a certain hierarchy existed. Above the minor local potentates were
the warlords who governed entire provinces; a small number of these, in turn, were
inspectors-general— familiarly referred to as super-warlords. But irespective of the fact
whether their power happened to be great or small, it was always the same kind of power.
They were anti-parliament and advocated its abolition. A conservative Confucianist
ideology seemed to them a palliative for the disappearance of the imperial order and
loyalty to the dynasty; so several times they pressed for the restoration of Confucianism
as a state religion.

Some of the influential warlords were: Zhang Xun, Feng Guozhang, Ni Sizhong, and Xu
Shuzheng. Xu Shuzheng was the real political leader of the Beiyang group. But this
group dwindled rapidly, nearly all the Beiyang leaders disappearing from the political
scene after 1920, leaving the way open for a second, and finally a third generation of
warlords.

Initially, the warlords tried to maintain a sort of corporate spirit among themselves,
holding official inter-provincial meetings. In 1917,-this tie facto military authority, the
warlords' association (dujuntuan), spoke out on the entry of China into the European war
even before the government did so. But the tendency to form into rival groups was
267

stronger than any agreement among the warlords. In 1917, the group led by Feng
Guozhang opposed that of Duan and Ni.. This was the beginning of the rivalry between
what were later .known as the Zhili Group and the Anfu Group.

Some warlords looked upon their provincial base as a stepping stone to the control of the
Beijing government. The lower Yangzi provinces were intended to serve this purpose in
Feng Guozhang's pleas. Ni Sichong, leader .of the Anfu Group and governor of Anhui,
also thought of his province in this way. For others, control of province was an end in
itself, a means of securing material gains and power. In both the cases, provincial power
of the warlords was firmly rooted in their control of the local armed forces and the local
finances. The latter became intermingled with the private fortunes of the warlords,
usually based on opium smuggling, smuggling of arms or other exactions. The warlords
could count on the semi-feudal allegiance and personal loyalty of their subordinates and
soldiers. They practised intrigue and dissuasion as much as the resorting to force.

These warlords could nevertheless be differentiated along subtle political lines. Some
were ultra-conservative. Some had progressive leanings like Feng Yuxiang in Hunan,
who called troops a model-army of worker-soldiers, or Chen Jiongming in the south-east,
who had anarchist intellectuals as his advisers. Some warlora still thought that they were
fighting to defend the republican revolution. Ideological differences were also quite
notable among the warlords. Some were concerned only with brute force. Others, most
cunningly, invoked the spirit of provincial autonomy. In a China which was still marked
by hopes of the Revolution of 1911 and the May Fourth Movement, the warlords were
268

seeking to win over public opinion with a progressive form of demagogy. Xan Xishan
wanted to make his Shanxi into a model province, the youth were organised and people
urged to practise Confucian virtues. In Hunan, Zhao Henti undertook to support the
people and for some time he even cooperated with the students and the workers.

The power of the warlords was also based on their alliance with the local gentry, who
wanted to consolidate their own power within a province without paying much attention
to politics in general. The gentry's slogan: Protect the District by Maintaining Order
Among the People (bao jing an min) meant exactly that. The withdrawal of the provinces
into themselves was apparent in the economic, diplomatic, and financial spheres.
Warlords sometimes negotiated loans from a foreign banking group, with some of the
provinces' resources as a guarantee.

The pressure from provincial and regional forces increasingly deprived the state
machinery of all cohesion and efficacy. The ensuing disorganisation in China's
administrative life is illustrated by the provincial postal service reports written each year.
They are full of instances of military mutinies, plundering by bandits, civil war
operations, extortion of funds by the warlords, interruption in road and railway traffic,
requisitioning of coolies and destruction of every kind. The development of banditry was
an indication both of the political-military crisis, which was causing the disintegration of
the state and aggravating the agrarian crisis which was driving the poorest peasants out of
the villages.
269

The situation of the peasants deteriorated throughout this period. Warlords claimed
increasingly heavy taxes and surtaxes, collected them in advance, and sometimes several '
times a year. They allowed their soldiers to plunder and kill at will. They requisitioned
the peasants' animals and vehicles, if not the peasants themselves, without ceremony or
compensation. Thus, China further sank into chaos and poverty.

The warlords were particularly hard on the Chambers of Commerce, resorting to a form
of blackmail that was effective and easy to carry out: the threat that even troops would
mutiny if they did not receive help in paying the wages. In fact, the frequent mutinies
which sometimes ended in. the total destruction of towns induced the merchants to give
into these demands.

Thus, the power of warlords was as oppressive to the bourgeoisie as to the people. It was
a factor in the economic stagnation and contributed to the crisis, in the national industry,
primarily because of unsafe transport systems and instability of the market. Because of
the wars between rival cliques, the rail-roads were monopolised by the warlords and were
therefore not available for civilian passengers and merchandise.

Moreover, the warlords .were repressive where the people's struggles were concerned,
whether it was the national movement or the demands of labour. Zhao Henti brutally
stopped an anti-Japanese boycott movement which the students tried to start after
Japanese marines, attacking a demonstration for the return of the Japanese port Dairea to
China, killed four people in Hunan.
270

The warlords, entrenched in their provincial governments, were in fact, independent.

Some of them paid allegiance to more powerful groups. Others were solidly . entrenched
in single provinces and confined their ambitions to that province. Still others shared the
control of one particular province. Others formed sort of regional empires. In short, the
political geography of China under warlords was extremely complex and unstable, with a
proliferation of temporary coalition and changes of allegiance that depended upon the
interests of the moment. Infighting was frequent and wars between provinces sometimes
bloody, rivalries between the various warlords were often settled in other ways: through
intrigue, corruption, the defection of units into enemy's camp.

Conflicts among warlords were limited by the system of power to which they all
belonged and the specific political structure in which they were all deeply involved. Their
power was territorial in nature. The ambition of each was to establish himself in a given
area (usually a province) and draw the largest possible revenues from it through taxes,
manipulation of the provincial currency, extortion and various types of illegal trafficking.
It would not be going too far, therefore, to speak in terms of a neo-feudal system which
resulted from particular circumstances (many of the warlords came from among the
masses), but which was fundamentally still the feudal exploitation of the peasant
population of a given territory. The warlords worked closely with the gentry, the leading
rural citizens and the landowners and guaranteed , orderly villages and docile peasants. In
return, the gentry assured them of the services necessary for the smooth functioning of
the local administration. ;
271

This neo-feudal system did not neglect the profits to be derived from the capitalist
environment of the 1920s: the warlords bought factories and participated actively in the
opium trade and the arms traffic. Herein lies the significance of the warlords" struggle to
gain control of the coastal provinces, for possession put one in an advantageous position
as an intermediary in dealing with militarists" inland.

During the World War I. the Beiyang group wanted to declare war because it would
strengthen the position of the army in the country. But President Li Yuanhong, and most
members of the Parliament were against it. The movement for neutrality also had the
backing of Sun Yatsen.

In March 1917, the Prime Minister Duan Qirui. at the urging of the warlords association,
got parliament to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. But in May, President Li
counter-attacked and had him deprived of office. Li had also to call on another military
clan, led by Zhang Xun, for help. The latter occupied Beijing and. in exchange, got Li to
dissolve the Parliament. But Li and Zhang Xun could not stand up to the combined forces
of Duan and the other northern warlords. Zhang Xun gave in after a few days. Li
Yuanhong resigned from the presidency. Duan became prime minster once more, while
Feng Guozhang became President of the Republic. By 1918, the political-military group
led by Duan had gradually strengthened its hold over Chinese politics. The light between
Duan and Feng for supremacy resulted in Feng's replacement by Xu Shizhang, a member
of Anfu clique as the new President of the Republic.

When Duan dissolved the old Parliament in 1917, Sun Yatsen negotiated with the
southern military leaders who were hostile to Anfu party. The coalition they formed took
272

in several groups of conservative politicians. The coalition elected a military government

at Guangzhou led by Sun. Its theoretical aim was to restore Republican liberties in
accordance with the 1912 Constitution. However, Sun Yatsen quickly realised that he
was merely an instrument in the hands of the warlords and that the slogan 'Protect the
Constitution' was meaningless. He resigned in May 1918 and withdrew to Shanghai. The
Guangzhou government was reorganised under the leadership of Lu Yongding.

After the World War I, warlords became more powerful. They were ravaging the country.
The Beijing government, which had no real power, was being fought over by the two
military factions in North China. Sun Yatsen's government in Guangzhou, which claimed
to be the lawful republic, had only a shaky authority over part of South China. Very soon
militarists succeeded in driving Sun Yatsen out of his base in Guangzhou. • .

During this period, there were four important military -leaders such as Zhang Zuolin, the
leader of Fengtian group; Wu Peifu, the leader of Zhili group; Cao Kun, the nominal head
of the Zhili; and Feng Yuxiang. Since 1920, the central government had been controlled
by a coalition of the Fengtian and Zhili parties. But this coalition was shaky. And Wu
Peifu came out victories and he decided to have the members of the old Parliament of
1913 and the former President of the Republic Li Yuanhong brought back to Beijing. At
the same time Wu asked Sun and his southern government to resign. The new
government claimed to be the legitimate republic; it urged demilitarisation and the
peaceful reunification of China. But it was nevertheless based on the power of its army.
In 1913, Cao Kun was elected as the new President through dubious means. Sun Yatsen,
driven out of Guangzhou once
273

again, took refuge in Shanghai. In 1924, President Cao Kun was replaced by a coalition
consisting of the Anfu leadership. Duan Qixiang asked Sun Yatsen to see him and Sun
agreed.

Sun Yatsen's objective had been to punish the north and to liquidate the warlords' clique
by force. The First United Front of nationalists and communists also favoured the
offensive of the southern armies against the warlords. Keeping this aim in mind, Sun left
for Beijing in November 1924. He proposed a national convention which would bring
together delegates from among the businessmen, industrialists, teachers, union
workers, the peasant unions, and the universities. In order to implement the idea of
National Convention, the Guomindang and the Communist party launched a mass
campaign of meetings and rallies throughout the country. Unfortunately Sun died in
March 1925 and in his will, he called for continued struggle.

The crisis of 1924 did not affect the warlord system of power. The complicated rivalries
among the Anfu, the Zhili and the Fengtian groups continued to hold centre stage.
In1925, a new super warlord Sun Chuanfang took control of the five provinces of the
lower Yangzi.

These fruitless games played by the warlords became wearisome to the people. They
looked more and more to the revolutionary base of south arid to the surviving prestige of
Sun Yatsen. As a result, between August and December 1926, Wu Peifu was defeated.
Only the forces of the third northern group, led by Zhang Zuolin, remained intact.

In July 1927, the leftist government of Wuhan collapsed. But, the power of the warlords
remained intact in North China. Fengtian clique was in solid possession not only of
274

the Northeast but also of Beijing. In 1928, nationalist army converged near Beijing and
attacked the northerners. Zhang Zuolin was defeated and Beijing was evacuated. Zhang
was killed and his son joined the Guomindang. The Guomindang seemed to be in control
of China. Beijing (Capital of the North) was rechristened Beiping (Peace of the North)
and the government of Nanjing was established as the central government. The national
holiday on 10 October 1928 was celebrated as the end of the era of civil wars and
warlords.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Jean Chesneaux; China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation, Delhi: 1986.
2. Jerome Chen; Yuan Shih-kai: 1859-1916, Stanford: 1961.
3. Hsi-sheng Ch 'i; Warlord Politics in China: 1916-1928, Stanford: 1976.
4. L.W. Pye; Warlord Politics, Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican
China, New York: 1971.
5. J.E. Sheridan; Chinese Warlord: the Career Feng Yu- hsing, Princeton: 1967.
6. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu; The Rise of Modern China, Oxford: 1986.
7. Odoric Ying-kwong Wu; Militarism in Modern China, as Exemplified in the Career of'
Wu P 'ei-fu: 1916-1928, Michigan: Michigan University Microfilm: 1974.
CHAPTER: 14
RISE AND FALL OF THE GUOMINDANG

SREEMATI CHAKRABARTI
Department of Chinese & Japanese Studies
University of Delhi
Delhi- 110 007.

The Guomindang (Guomindang was earlier spelt as Kuomintang, hence its abbreviated
form K.MT.) was China's first modern political party. Traditional Chinese political
culture was not conducive to the growth and existence of autonomous political
organizations. The 'emperor system' characterised by autocratic and totalitarian rule did
not allow for any kind of open and organised dissent or opposition. As is well-known, all
organized political opposition was underground. Since very early times, China has had a
tradition of secret societies which organised many an uprisings. Banditry in China, as
also elsewhere, has been some kind of a socio-political opposition to state and society.
The Guomindang, China's first political party, also had its origins in secret societies.

The transformation from a secret society to a political party took more than a decade.
The initiator and leader was Dr Sun Yatsen (or Sun Zhong Shan). Dr Sun first founded a
society called Xing Zhonghui in Hawaii (USA) in the year 1894. The members were all
immigrant Chinese who were deeply concerned about their country's future and who
believed that the Qing government at Beijing and the imperialist powers encroaching
upon China must be resisted. The spirit of nationalism was created by this organisation,
276

its inaugural manifesto reflected the fear of the overseas Chinese when it said, "Our
nation is facing dismemberment and disintegration." Xing Zhonghui was fairly active in
Hong Kong—elections to the party were held regularly in the spirit of democracy. Its
activities included publishing newspapers, running schools, conducting lessons for
political education, and fund-raising to help revolutionaries in China. They did not give
much thought to details of the political system they advocated, but defined a
constitutional monarchy for China.

A federation of different revolutionary organizations joined the Xing Zhonghui to finally

establish the Tung Meng Hui in Tokyo in 1905. The ideological basis of the organisation
was to be the Three People 's Principles of Dr Sun Yatsen— People's Nationalism,
People's Democracy, and People's Livelihood. Of these greatest stress was laid on
People's Nationalism. Needless to say, Sun Yatsen was the unquestioned leader of the
Tung Meng hui, which soon after its inception, actively supported the anti-Qing activities
going on in China.

In the 1911 Revolution of China which overthrew the Qing,dynasty and brought an end
to monarchical rule, the Tung Meng Hui played a very leading role. Of course, the
militarists who had defected from the Qing government were the decisive factor in the
down fall of the Qing, yet the role of Sun Yatsen and his political followers cannot be
minimised. After the 1911 Revolution, the Tung Meng Hui became the Guomindang
(meaning National People's Party) and came out in the open. It tried to shed its secret
society characteristics and acquire the traits of a modern political party. Dr Sun Yatsen
was made the first President of the newly formed Chinese Republic and this gave an
honourable position to the Guomindang. However, the militarists who
277

played a key role in the overthrow of the Qing dynasty also coveted power. In the form of
Yuan Shikai, the civilian Guomindang lost to the militarists. A young and dynamic leader
called Song Jiaoren, under whose leadership the Guomindang won an absolute majority
in the legislature assembly election, was assassinated. The military had emerged so strong
in China that a civilian political party found its future in jeopardy. Dr Sun withdrew from
power but tried to reorganize the Guomindang in a region far away*, from the seat of
power in Beijing. Till Yuan Shikai's death in 1918, the Guomindang remained
disorganised and disoriented. To some extent, it again acquired its secret society
characteristics. For instance, members were given code numbers or fake names, loyalty
was directly towards the leader, Dr Sun and meetings were held behind closed doors and
so forth.

After 1916, the Guomindang found itself in a better environment. The cultural movement
was taking shape and ideas from the West were gaining prominence. The Russian
Revolution, which created the Soviet Union, had a deep impact upon the minds of the
young Chinese. Dr Sun Yatsen himself was much influenced by the Russian Revolution
and the leadership of V.I. Lenin. It is impossible to understand the Guomindang without
knowing the qualities and characteristics of Dr Sun Yatsen. This is what we will discuss
here.

It is said that Dr Sun Yatsen was a combination of a revolutionary and Western democrat.
It was the interplay of his revolutionary temperament and his democratic inclinations,
that sometimes made for a conflict within his personality. This was so, however, till
1919. After 1919 the revolutionary aspect of his personality dominated. He was
278

more eager than ever to wipe out the old regime and to instal his party in power. Dr Sun
got close to the Soviet Union and the Comintern leadership. Ideologically, he never
supported Marxism-Leninism as such, but the Soviet Union's decision to unilaterally
revoke some of its Unequal Treaties with China endeared the country to Dr Sun. Between
the Guomindang and the Comintern regular negotiations and cooperation went on. Soviet
influence played a key role in the reorganization of the Guomindang in 19,24, but along
with it, the rise of the student movement which was anti-imperialist and anti-tradition was
also a crucial factor.

Sun Yatsen's principal aim was to give a new vitality to his party so that his revolution
might soon succeed. Just the downfall of the monarchy was not a sufficient condition to
create a New China. He realised that the imperialists and the warlords who had taken
power have to be fought with greater zeal. He understood the reasons why the Russian
Communist Party had succeeded and admired the organization and techniques of that
party. If his own party could come to possess the energies and capacities of the Russian
party, all else was of secondary importance. He was no supporter of Communism, but
was also not worried about its influence in his party. All he needed was an ally to
influence the organizational features of his party. He was also eager to have a strong,
reliable military backing. He needed Soviet advice as well as aid.

As a result of his new orientation Dr Sun's Three People's Principles also underwent
changes. The other major change was the reorganization of the Guomindang in 1924.
This was preceded by agreements made between Dr Sun Yatsen and representatives of
the Comintern. This also marked a new phase of Comintern's interference in the internal
affairs of China.
279

The reorganization of the Guomindang took place at the First International Congress on
30 January 1924. Some of the fundamental features of this reorganization were stipulated
in the Draft Constitution of the party. It was decided to hold meetings every fortnight, to
form two committees, the executive, and the supervisory. The basic unit of the party was
to be a small nuclei of a few members. The Guomindang structure now resembled that of
the Soviet party— it formed a pyramid. In conformity with China's geographical
divisions of governmental structure, the Guomindang had from the lowest to the highest,
four tiers of authority. At the bottom was the Qu organisation, above it stood the Xian
organisation; higher still was the provincial organisation; and at the top of the pyramid
stood the central organisation. Each level of organization maintained an executive and a
supervisory committee, elected in the case of Qu by party members directly, but at higher
levels by Congress of the party delegates, elected in turn by the Congress on a lower
level. To illustrate: the party congress of a certain province elected the provincial
executive committee and supervisory committee which constituted the provincial
organization; the delegates to that provincial Congress were in turn elected by the Xian
congresses of the province.

The Qu was the lowest functioning unit. Below it, however, were Qu branches. Then
there were some special organisations somewhat distorting the rigorous lines of the
pyramid. Members who had no fixed residence, principally railway employees and
seamen, formed themselves into special organizations which were placed under the direct
control of the Central Organization. The organization of the Guomindang members
overseas was also irregular and held close to the central body. But the most extraordinary
was
280

the party organisation in the armed forces— the army, the naval, and air units— all had
their own party organisation. They formed a separate pyramid, and were placed directly
in the Central Organization.

According to the statute of the party, the National Congress and, after its adjournment,
the Central Executive Committee was the highest organ of party power. The Central
Supervisory Committee had only power of discipline and financial control. All this was
modelled after the Russian Communist Party as the latter stood in 1924.

The understanding of the Guomindang with the Soviet Union led to an alliance of the
party with the Chinese Communist Party, which had come into existence in 1921. The
name of this alliance was the United Front. Ostensibly, this was a joint front of anti-
imperialist and anti-warlord forces. Though ideologically very different from each other,
the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party managed to carry on the alliance for
about three years. Dr Sun Yatsen was. of course, the chief architect of this United Front.
His death in 1925 and various other factors brought dissentions within the United Front.
The new Guomindang leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), who was formerly a military
man, did not show the broad-mindedness of Dr Sun Yatsen and in 1927 organized a
massacre of Communists in the city of Shanghai. By then Jiang had been able to
consolidate his army and he launched, what is called, the Northern Expedition against the
warlords. To a great extent, this military adventure freed large territories of China from
the grasp of warlords. Military unification of China, therefore, began at the hands of the
Guomindang. It is interesting to note that during this expedition Comintern aid and
advice to China continued.
281

Jiang Jieshi's break with the Communists represented an effort to consolidate the gains of
the national revolution at a certain level in the revolutionary process, stopping short of
class-struggle, social revolution, and remaking peasant life in villages. Jiang and the
Guomindang were able to achieve a superficial national unity, secure the recognition of
the powers, and begin the process of administrative development which would be a
necessary prerequisite to the abolition of the Unequal Treaties.

From 1927 to 1937 the Guomindang's government ruled China with its capital at
Nanjing. It was, until then, the most modern government China had known. The Nanjing
government was controlled by the Guomindang on the basis of party dictatorship. It
followed Dr Sun Yatsen's five-power , division of government among army, executive,
legislative, judiciary, civil service, and censorial agencies. Of these, the executive, Yuan
as it was called, with its dozen ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economics,
Communications, War etc. became dominant and overshadowed others.

The Guomindang political philosophy also centred around Sun Yatsen's belief in the
three stages of the revolution i.e. military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional
democracy. In simple terms, it meant that first the military would be dominant in uniting
the country and would rule till all threats to its integrity are removed. In the next stage, it
would be a one-party rule of civilians but not quite a representative government. And
finally, after having consolidated the gains, a Western-style liberal democratic system
would evolve, where a multi-party system, .free elections, independent judiciary, freedom
of speech etc would characterize the system.
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However, all this remained on paper. The Guomindang was an authoritarian party with
militarists as its leaders. It could never overcome its fundamental nature. The Central
Executive Committee remained all-powerful and party and government eventually
became one and same. Gradually, the party lost its revolutionary mission. It abandoned
its work at the local level and also the mass organizations of workers, peasants, youth,
women etc. Power holders in Nanjing began to oppose student movements, mass actions
like processions, demonstrations, meetings. With this attitude, the Guomindang's
membership also declined. Most members, who remained with it, were officials, military
men and policemen.

In terms of economic development too, the Guomindang was unable to make much of a
difference to the lives of the Chinese peasants even during the years of its rise. One of the
major reasons for its downfall was that poverty and backwardness became even more
visible in China during the 1927-37 period and from 1937 up to 1949 conditions
worsened even more. The leaders and officials were corrupt and had no social
commitment. Moreover, resources generated by society were all spent on the military.
Above all, in the absence of political rights and freedom, people's disillusionment
increased manifold. On the other hand, the Communist Party, then with Mao Zedong as
its leader, presented a totally different picture.

During the Japanese aggression from 1937 to 1947, the Guomindang and the Chinese
Communist Party decided to have another United Front. This was a compromise for the
sake of nationalism. However, the Guomindang did not gain much from the Second
United Front. In fact, the Communists emerged as more staunch nationalists. Japanese
invaders
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were given a difficult fight by the Communist armies. In 1945, soon after Japan's defeat
in World War II, the Second United Front broke up and a period of civil war continued.
During this four year civil war, the Guomindang weakened even further. Many apolitical
and non-political people supported the Communists. There was large scale defection from
the Guomindang army to the Communist army. The United States support to Jiang Jieshi
also did not help the Guomindang. After the capital Beijing fell to the Communist forces,
the Guomindang leadership and senior military men fled to the island of Taiwan, which
they called the Republic of China. The rest of the country became the People's Republic
of China in 1949 under the Communist Party with Mao Zedong as its Chairman.

It seems quite obvious why the Guomindang fell from power and could never regain it.
The party remained heavily dependent upon its military leaders. A civilian liberal,
democratic party cannot emerge with an armed wing. Of course, China's political
situation was too averse for the growth of liberal parties, which could fight
constitutionally or at least through methods of agitation and protest. Its secret society
characteristics remained with it all the time.

The Guomindang's failure could also be attributed to the untimely death of its leader, Dr
Sun Yatsen. Dr Sun was an unquestioned leader and all members were completely
devoted to him. The Chinese Communist Party too probably would not have been able to
rise independently if Dr Sun had not reached an understanding with it. This political
philosophy was also acceptable to most Chinese intellectuals. After his death, Jiang Jieshi
took over. His personality was no where near Dr Sun's. Jiang was primarily a military
man— autocratic, undemocratic and quite ruthless against his
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opponents. His massacre of Communists in 1927 is one of the gruesome incidents in

modern history. Jiang had no original political philosophy of his own nor could he
implement that of Dr Sun. He never achieved the stature of Dr Sun as he lacked political
wisdom.

The Guomindang had also become a corrupt and undemocratic organization. Those who
achieved leadership positions misused power. Bribery, favouritism, nepotism, and . all
kinds of unfair practices were commonplace. The grievance of the ordinary person
always remained unredressed. Certain families became very powerful within the
organization and this caused corruption going unchecked. Around the time of its
reorganization, many intellectuals joined the party and 1930 onwards, membership
started dwindling. Respectable people never thought it honourable to join the
Guomindang. Gradually, ideology of the Party receded to the background and it became
an organization of unscrupulous, anti-people elements.

During the Guomindang rule, as stated above, the economy of China went close to
collapse. Price rise and inflation reached unprecedented levels and even the so-called
well-off found it difficult to live well. The poor lived in utter misery. Social evils like
infanticide, prostitution, murder etc became rampant. The resources generated went for
military adventures or filled the pockets of the leaders of the Party, many of whom lived
luxurious lives. Industrialisation was slow, so unemployment remained a constant
problem. The peasantry was so impoverished that agriculture too was unable to generate
resources. Social welfare measures like health care and education remained on paper. In
every way, the Chinese economy reached the brink of collapse.
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The Communist Party also caused the decline of the Guomindang. It proved to be a better
alternative in those circumstances. The leaders had the reputation of self-sacrifice and
dedication. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism was appealing to the impoverished
people as well as intellectuals of the middle class. Organizationally, too, the Chinese
Communist Party was more disciplined than the Guomindang. The army of the
Chinese Communist Party too became very popular among the peasant masses and when
the Japanese plundered villages, it was this army that came to their rescue. The
nationalism of the Chinese Communist Party was proved beyond doubt after their
resistance to Japan. More and more non-committed people joined the Chinese
Communist Party and supported it without espousing Marxism-Leninism. People started
seeing the future of their nation secure with the Communists. Towards the end of the civil
war, when the Guomindang had militarily weakened, many of its stalwarts and military
commanders quit the organization and joined the Chinese Communist Party. It is,
therefore, correct to say that the Chinese Communist Party provided a better alternative to
the Chinese people and this to the downfall of the Guomindang. This party still rules the
small state of Taiwan and is nowhere as powerful as the Communists. In theory, it
intends to recapture the mainland from the Chinese Communist Party, which may never
happen.
286

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bai Shouyi; Outline History of China, Beijing: 1982.
2. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu; The Rise of Modern China, Oxford: 1985.
3. Jean Chesneaux et al; China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberalism, Delhi: 1986.
4. William L. Tung; The Political Institutions of Modern China, The Hague: 1964:
Chapter V: 91-123.
5. John K. Fairbank; The United States and China, Cambridge, Mass: 1975: Chapters 9 &
14.
6. T'ang Liang-li; Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, Chapter X: 151-180.
7. George Yu; Party Politics in Republican China: 1912-1924, Berkeley; 1966: Chapters
IV-VII: 84-186.
8. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng; The Government and Politics of China, Cambridge, Mass: 1950;
Stanford University Press paperback: 1970.
9. F.F. Liu; A Military History of Modern China: 1924- 1949, Princeton: 1956.
CHAPTER: 15
RISE OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA
MANI BHUSHAN
Dayul Singh (E) College
University of Delhi
Lodi Road, N. Delhi-110 007

The Chinese Communist Party1 (I In the texts written in English, the most commonly
used abbreviated forms of the Communist Party are CCP and CPC. They stand for
Chinese Communist Party and Communist Party of China, respectively.)
was founded in 1921. The Communist movement which had begun inside the rooms , in
the form of discussions, debates, deliberations etc, gained in momentum and membership
gradually but solidly. Leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Zhen Duxiu, Liu
Shaoqi, Xiang Jingyi played important roles in the revolution. But, more than their
personalities, the strategies and goals decided by them enthused and attracted the masses
towards the CCP. The CCP had decided that their aim was to free the country from
imperialist control and to emancipate the Chinese people from their own ruling classes.

BACKGROUND
Theoretically, China was a republic ruled by the Constitution of 1912. But, the power-
struggle among the various political and military cliques in the centre (Beijing), and
among the personal armies of the warlords in the provinces had created a state of anarchy
in China which made it vulnerable to foreign pressure.
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While disappointment was growing about the effectiveness of the Western political
systems (including republicanism), the verdict of the Paris Peace Conference (The rights
and privileges of Germany in Shandong were transferred to Japan instead of being
restored to China.) further disillusioned the Chinese people from the sincerity of the
Western democracies. In such a situation, the Soviet Union came up as an alternative
where the Communists had overthrown the Tsarist despotism as well as the Western
imperialists. In order to win over the Chinese against the imperialists, the Soviet
government decided unilaterally in March 1919 to repudiate encroachments of the Tsarist
government in Manchuria; relinquished rights of extra-. territoriality in China and
Mongolia; waived Tsarist levies which had imposed on the peoples of China under
various pretexts like the insurrection of the Boxers in 1900; and withdrew all military
guards stationed by the Tsarist government in its consulate in China. All these decisions
embodied in the Karakhan Declaration of 1919 which also announced a Soviet campaign
to "free the people from the yoke of the military forces of foreign money which is
crushing the people of the East and principally the people of China.'" As a result, of
roughly ten percent literate population of China, some moved towards Marxism.

The May Fourth Movement was a landmark in so far as development of Marxism in

China is concerned. This movement brought different sections of the urban society— the
students, the intellectuals, the workers, and the bourgeoisie— .together in mass-
demonstrations against forces of imperialism and exploitation. The growth of press and
use of vernacular languages helped in propagation and acceptance of new ideas, mostly
among the literate urban
289

section. The most radical of them moved towards Marxism. Several Marxist texts and'
literature were translated into Chinese, study groups were formed and magazines were
published to study and propagate Marxism. The first Communist leaders, too, actually
emerged from amongst the leaders of the May Fourth Movement. The formation of the
CCP in 1921 was the result of a new consciousness that emerged due to the linkage
between progressive ideas and the struggles of the workers and peasants.

The social milieu in which Marxism emerged was marked by terribly bad living
conditions of the masses, while a small number of elites lived luxuriously. The peasants
were exploited and oppressed by the grain merchants, moneylenders, landlords 'and
administrative officials forcing more and more peasants to become agricultural labourers.
Population growth increased pressure on land as well as unemployment. In such a
situation, wages depended upon the whims of the elites who dominated the rural
economy. Some peasant groups had come up to fight against the landlordism but the
political horizon of the peasantry was extremely limited.

The working class, though numerically a very small force in China, became politicised
because the big industrial centres were also the main political centres in China. Nearly
half of all the industrial workers were concentrated in Shanghai. The rest were spread out
in the other centres of imperialism like Guangzhou, Hankou, Wuhan, Hong Kong and
Kowloon. Roughly one-third of the workers were employed in foreign concerns. The low
wages, long hours of work and miserable living conditions had forced the workers to
resort to strikes. In 1918, as many as twenty-five strikes took place. During the May
Fourth Movement they
290

came in contact with the radical intelligentsia which generated considerable political
consciousness among the workers. The 28,000 odd literate workers who had returned
from France after the World War I, too, had helped to radicalise the workers as well as
the May Fourth Movement. The Communist groups and these radical workers found
themselves as natural allies in the given situation. This alliance culminated in the
formation of the CCP.

THE EARLY PHASE

The first Communist political organization was formed in Shanghai by Zhen Duxiu in the
summer of 1920. The second group was formed in Beijing by Li Dazhou followed by
various groups in different parts of China. The main thrust of the activities of the Marxist
groups was to forge a link between the theory of Marxism and the actual problems of the
Chinese working class. The titles of their papers The World of labour {Shanghai), The.
Voice' of Labourer (Beijing), The Workers (Guangzhou). Women at Work (Guangzhou),
etc. reflected this concern.

The different groups of Marxists met at a girls' boarding school in Shanghai and then in
Zhejiang in hiding from the police between 1 and 15 July 1921. This meeting of twelve
Communists representing seven regional groups, along with a Comintern agent, Maring,
is regarded as the First Congress of the Chinese Communists. Although, neither Zhen
Duxiu nor Li Dazhou could attend the, meeting due to police repression, they were
declared the co-founders of the CCP, and Zhen Duxiu was made the first Secretary-
General of the party.

Inspired by the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and the

291

concrete example of the Bolshevik Revolution, the CCP came to believe that it was
possible even for an industrially backward country to move towards socialism i.e., a
society free from class-exploitation, in which private property, 'the root of class
oppression' is eventually destroyed, and where the political structure is guided by the
interests of the working people.

On the basis of Marx's ideas, the CCP considered the working class to be the most
revolutionary social force because it 'had nothing to lose but its chains.' As, the working
class does not have any stake in the system based on private property, it could be most
interested in the establishment of a system in which each gets according to his labour.
Thus, the CCP saw its role as that of educating the workers politically in order to enable
them to bring about socialist revolution.

The CCP realised that as in Russia, they would first have to overthrow the system of
warlordism and feudalism, and for this, alliance of the working class with the peasantry
and the national bourgeoisie (whose interests lay in the demolition of warlordism and
feudalism) was considered to be essential. Still, the basic thrust was on the advancement
of the working class movement. It was only after 1925, that the CCP realised the full
potential of the peasants which became its major source of strength.

The Bolshevik Revolution had shown that it was possible to skip over the stage of full-
fledged capitalism to reach the socialist stage. Hence, Lenin formulated a policy specially
suited to the specific needs of colonial China in the Comintern in 1920. According to
that, the overthrowing of
292

colonialism and feudalism was the first priority for which the proletariat was to join the
bourgeois-democratic revolution as ally of the bourgeoisie.

The CCP moved into the workers' movement and founded trade-unions and planned
strikes. The political consciousness developed among the workers became evident in the
form of new issues taken up in their demands. Labour Union Secretariat was founded,
Trade Union Congress was held, numerous strikes took place in navigation, railways,
coal-mining, metal-works and silk-spinning industries involving 30,000 to 40,000
workers and small artisans. But the warlords, in whose areas most of these strikes took
place, unleashed a brutal wave of repression. Unions were closed down, strikes were
disrupted and workers were massacred which brought the first phase of the movement of
the working class and the Communists to an end. This step made them' realise the ardent
need for allies. One potent ally was the; peasantry but only in Guangzhou did the
Communists try to organise the peasants and peasant movements. More stress was laid
(following Lenin's line given in 1920 Comintern) on alliance with the nationalist
bourgeoisie represented by the Guomindang which also was fighting imperialism and
warlordism.

THE FIRST UNITED FRONT

In the first formal secret meeting of the CCP in 1921. the Comintern dispatched Maring
as an observer. The participation by the followers of biblical socialism, of social
democracy, of anarchism, and of socialism, paved the way for considerable
disagreements. In drawing up a draft programme Zhen Duxiu had emphasised the
necessity of giving education to the members of the party, the guidance
293

of this party in a democratic spirit, the development of party discipline and desirability of
approaching the masses very cautiously in order to bring them into the Communist fold.
He stressed the need for carrying out the vital preparatory work. One of the crucial
questions was that of policy guideline towards the Guangzhou based government led by
Sun Yatsen. It was argued by some that the Communist Party and the party of Sun Yatsen
represented two diametrically opposite classes, between which there could be no
compromises since Sun was considered to be confusing the masses with his demagogy.
This argument was ultimately rejected by the Congress and an attitude of cooperation
developed towards his practical and progressive actions. This laid the basis for further
collaboration between the Communist Party and the Guomindang and for the
development of anti-militarist and anti-imperialist movement.

In 1922, both CCP and the Guomindang members were invited in Moscow. The CCP
members realised that the Washington treaties had aggravated the exploitation of the
oppressed nation by imperialist powers and the need of the hour for the colonial and
semi-colonial countries was to unite and resist these imperialist powers by means of
revolutionary mass movements. The CCP was willing to support this movement only to
the extent it was directed against imperialism; its ultimate aim was struggle for the
proletarian revolution. As a result, the CCP at its Second Congress at Hangzhou called
for a joint conference with the Guomindang for the purpose of creating a United Front for
the 'liberation' of the Chinese people from the 'dual yoke' of local militarists and foreign
exploiters. The party manifesto of the CCP's Second Congress made it clear that support
for the Guomindang was temporary and did not imply surrender to
294

the capitalists; that its aims were to organise the proletariat, to struggle for the
establishment of the dictatorship of the workers and the peasants, to endeavour for the
abolition of private property and the gradual attainment of a Communist society. The
CCP believed that since a successful democratic revolution would develop Chinese
capitalism with opposition to the proletariat, the proletariat must simultaneously launch
the struggle of the second phase i.e., the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and
peasantry against the bourgeoisie.

After obtaining favourable response from Guomindang leader Sun Yatsen, the
Communist Central Committee decided upon an alliance with the Guomindang. The first
Communist to take membership in the Guomindang was Li Dazhou who joined with the
understanding that he would retain his Bolshevik allegiance. In 1923, Sun, Yatsen sent a
young Guomindang military officer Jiang Jie Shi(Though to the English speaking world
he is better known as' Chiang Kai-shek, in Pinyin his name is spelt as Jiang Jie Shi. As
uniformity is to he maintained by keeping the Pinyin form of spellings throughout the
text, the same is retained in this chapter – Editor) to the Soviet Union to study the
Russian Red Army and even asked for a Comintern representative to be sent to
Guangzhou for advisory and organisational purposes. Subsequently, Mikhail Borodin
was sent to Guangzhou for this purpose. He began immediately to reorganise the
Guomindang and its armies after Soviet pattern. The party structure was shaped into a
series of organisational units pyramiding upward through sub-district, district, and
provincial level to an annual National Congress designed as the final authority on both
party and governmental policy. A Central Executive Committee was founded to direct
party affairs between the meetings of the congress. Of the 24 members of the Central
295

Executive Committee, 5 were leftist and three were communist. Their presence
radicalised the Guomindang in its politics as is evident by the new interpretation given to
the Three Principles which read:

(i) Nationalism with emphasis on anti-imperialism and equality for all the nationalists
within China;
(ii) Democratic rights of free speech, organization, and struggle for better living to all
individuals and organizations that opposed feudalism and imperialism; and
(iii) Emphasis on the anti-feudal demands such as "equalization of land-ownership, "land
to the tillers", etc. which meant opposition to the control of national Wealth by a small
section of capitalists and landlords.

The United Front was not only able to offer stiff resistance to the imperialist forces
(particulalry Japan and Britain), the nationalist army went on defeating the armies of the
landlords during its 'Unification of China' campaign which is better known as the
Northern Expedition.

The United Front played crucial role in the development of popular movements during
1925-26. The 13 Movement is particularly significant as, according to some scholars, this
movement so radicalised the Chinese political life that it can be said to have marked the
beginning of a truly •evolutionary period. Various organizations representing various
sections of the society in Shanghai had answered the call of the Communists to come out
in protest. Like in Shanghai, strikes, attacks against foreign companies, boycott °f foreign
goods, etc. took place in various parts of China. Since the Communists were the most
active ones in Organising these movements, the period between 1925-27
296

saw a tremendous growth in the membership and political strength of the CCP. Its
membership rose from less than 1000 in 1926 to 60,000 by April 1927.

These popular movements not only threatened the imperialist powers but also the right
wing reactionaries within the Guomindang. The tension within the Guomindang between
'pro' and 'anti' Communist groups had aggravated to the breaking point. The nationalists
realised that the Communists were gaining the leadership over the revolution. The strikes,
boycotts, demonstrations and violent acts of the mass-movements which in 1924-25 had
directed primarily against British interests, by 1926 became increasingly focused on
Chinese elites and vested interests as well. This, in turn, led to a realisation among the
Chinese nationalists that the Chinese revolution under Soviet-Chinese Communist
influence was rapidly turning into a social class war, or a Communist revolution, in stead
of a nationalist democratic revolution as originally envisaged by Sun Yatsen,

Jiang Jie Shi, the new leader of Guomindang had never favoured a course like this and in
1926 Jiang began to take an open stand against the Communists. By the end of 1926 he
completely disassociated himself from the leftist Guomindang government in Hankou
and established rival government at Nanjing. While the Guomindang leftists and the
Communists rallied under Borodin, the conservatives rallied under Jiang.

Jiang Jie Shi receiving the assurances of financial support from the Chinese banking
group, initiated a policy of suppression of the Chinese Communists by force, beginning
with the labour massacre in Shanghai in April 1927. The Communist sponsored policy of
land confiscation
297

led to anti-Communist riots among troops of the Hankou government at Changsha and
after this the movement against the Communists spread throughout China. On 6 April
1927, the Chinese police and troops raided the Soviet embassy and the relations with the
Soviet Union broke off. Guomindang's final break with Soviet Russia and the Chinese
Communists came in July 1927 after an Indian representative of the Comintern, M.N.
Roy had revealed a Soviet plot which practically amounted to ousting the Guomindang
from power.

By the end of 1927, Jiang Jie Shi had formed a new Guomindang government at Nanjing
which started military operations against the leftist government at Hankou. Hankou fell to
the Nanjing forces in November 1927. In December, Jiang ordered all Soviet consulates
in central and south China to be closed. By the end of the year, thousands of Communists
and their sympathizers among farmers and labourers had been killed throughout China.
The labour unions had been dissolved. While many Communists fled to Russia, those
remaining in China, either went underground in the treaty ports or fled into rural districts
to rally the support of the peasants. Thus, the period of Guomindang-CCP cooperation,
known as the First United Front, came to an end.

The United Front (1924-27) of the CCP and the Guomindang began to break down on 12
April 1927 when Jiang Jie Shi, the leader and army chief of the Guomindang unleashed
unprecedented repressions in China. On 15 July he formally expelled the Communists
from the Guomindang who were forced to go into hiding. Actually, the Guomindang had
within its ranks sections of the warlords, urban merchants and financiers, and some
industrialists who were all opposed to the radical programmes outlined by the
revolutionary forces. For them the workers ,and the peasants (and the
298

Communists) were bigger threats than the imperialists who did not threaten their
privileges. These sections prevailed over those in the Guomindang who wanted
cooperation with the CCP to continue till the ouster of the imperialist forces. Thus, the
First United Front failed. This failure, however, was a boon in disguise for the CCP as it
initiated the process of reorganisation of the revolutionary forces as well as the formation
of a new strategy for revolution.

After this severe jolt, the Communists at first planned to occupy some of the larger cities
and use them as bases from which to counter the armed opposition of the Guomindang
and, when this strategy failed, attention was shifted to the hitherto despised peasants.
Since then the peasants began to play the dominant role in the Chinese Communist
Movement. This shift in policy under the leadership of Mao Zedong in the 1930s and
1940s, led to the strengthening of the Red Army in order to protect Communist rural
areas rather than attacking the Guomindang strongholds in the cities.

SECOND UNITED FRONT

In 1935, the Comintern put forward the United Front as a worldwide Communists policy
and the united front between the Guomindang and the CCP began with the CCP's
statement of 22 September 1937 on Guomindang—CCP cooperation against the Japanese
oppression. The Japanese hostility dates back at least to the 21 Demands (See a separate
appendix on The 21 Demands )of 1915 and became very apparent since the seizure of
Manchuria in September 1931. The Japanese activities climaxed with its invasion of
China in July 1937.with brutal suppression and killings all over the country. Thus, there
developed a

.
299

determination among the various Chinese groups to resist the aggression by joining hands
in stead of fighting amongst themselves for political supremacy.

The CCP had announced its willingness to come to an agreement with all anti-Japanese
groups as early as in 1932, following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria on September
18, 1931, but it is not certain that agreement with the Guomindang was actually intended
at this time. Even in April 1932, the CCP seems to have advocated for a "united front
from below" i.e., a united front to be set up after the forcible overthrow of the
Guomindang regime. During the Long March (1935) the Communists tried in vain to
build up a united front with the dissident nationalist groups more or less opposed to Jiang
Jie Shi and the Guomindang dictatorship— namely Guomindang liberals led by Mme
Sun Yatsen, Sun Fo and others, the Guangxi military clique and the North Eastern Army.
The failure of the united front endeavour in 1935 was not because of lack of response (the
popular sentiment in China was strongly in favour of discontinuance of the government's
anti-Communist campaign and concentrating the nation's united power against Japan),
because none of the dissident nationalist groups dared in 1935 to subscribe openly to the
Communist idea of a united front. Following the Seventh World Congress of the
Comintern, the Chinese Communists changed their tactics. In January 1936 Mao Zedong
publicly offered the hands of friendship to Jiang Jie Shi if he would take up arms against
Japan, with the assurance that the "Workers' and Peasants' Government had been
renamed People's Soviet Government" and that "the former laws about workers' control
and leadership in the various enterprises have been repealed and the workers have been
advised not to put up demands which may be in excess of what can be granted."' He
assured that
300

they would not work to accentuate the anti-capitalist struggle in the non-Soviet districts.
Jiang Jie Shi was still not willing to accept the united front idea, but many of his field
commanders were. At the same time, a strong wave of nationalist feeling was sweeping
through China. The Japanese incursion into Inner Mongolia, eastern Hubei and Qingdao
led to anti-Japanese agitation among the Chinese people. The danger from the Japanese
seemed much greater than that from the Communists who we're confined to semi-
wastelands of Yan'an. In November 1936 Zhang Xueliang of the North Eastern Army
appealed to Jiang Jie Shi to permit him to shift the Northeastern Army to the Suiyuan
province front to take up defence against the Japanese. Jiang, however, decided to go
ahead with his programme and to dismiss those who failed to comply with orders. But
Jiang, with the help , of others not only militarily occupied Xian but also arrested Jiang
Jie Shi on 12 December 1936.

The rebels demanded reorganisation of the government to admit all parties, an end to
civil war and immediate adoption of a policy of armed resistance against Japan, the
guarantee to the people of liberty of assembly and pardon of political prisoners, on 14
December the rebels announced from Xian that all orders for war against the Red Army
were cancelled and that an anti-Japanese Army had been formed comprising Northeastern
army and Red Army troops. It seems certain that the rebels and the Communists received
assurances from Jiang Jie Shi that the civil war would be stopped and he would give his
support to the united front movement. Then while Jiang Jie Shi was released, Zhang
Xueliang was kept as a prisoner for many years. After this, efforts for agreement on the
United Front began. In March 1937, the Guomindang while announcing that it would
continue its policy to "uproot the Communists," laid down
301

its formal terms for accepting the Communists' submission:

i. Abolition of Red Army and its incorporation into the government's central army
under direct control of the Military Affairs Commission;
ii. dissolution of the Soviet republics;
iii. cessation of all Communist propaganda; and
iv. suppression of the class struggle.

The Chinese Communists formally acceded to these terms on 15 March 1937. Although
no formal agreement seems to have been signed between the Communists and the
Guomindang, the Red Army was reorganised with Zhu De as the commander.

On 22 September 1937 the Communists announed from Yan'an the formal dissolution of
the Soviet republics and affirmed their adherence to Sun Yatsen's Three People's
Principles and their unity with the Guomindang. The next day Jiang Jie Shi gave them his
approval. Other dissident Chinese groups also joined the government for united resistance
against Japan. Thus, the united front was established and included all resistance groups in
China.

In the course of the Long March, Mao emerged (from the intense criticisms, policy
debates and power struggles within the party) as the single most influential figure in the
Chinese Communist movement. He assumed the newly created posts of Chairman of the
politburo and head of the party's military committee. Mao's voice became the most
important one in party,, army and government. Here it is pertinent to mention that both
both his authority and the party's united front orientation stemmed from the internal
dynamics of the Communist movement in China rather than from decisions in Moscow.
302

The Shen-Gan-Ning border areas became the most important centre not only of anti-
Japanese resistance movement but also for the Communist activities since the CCP had
already transplanted (in skeletal form) the full, organisational apparatus from Jiangxi. At
this time Shen-Gan-Ning was, in fact, the only functional unit of Soviet in China where
the land confiscated from the landlords and rich agricultural elites had been distributed to
the benefit of a large number of small and middle peasants. The agrarian reforms
implemented widely in 1935 and developed along more moderate lines during 1936 was
the most significant consequence that initially won widespread support and paved the
way for effective military and political participation of the rural population. It radically
altered the pattern of village life in much of the Soviet area, creating the necessary
preconditions for an egalitarian social order. Peasants' inclination towards the
Communists and the Red Army was also determined by the oppressive treatment by the
armies of the Guomindang, which aroused the peasants all the more towards the
revolution and convinced them of the Communists' genuine intensions. The revolution
contained a hope for freedom from harsh and arbitrary exactions of the Guomindang
armies as well as the tax collectors. While comparing the Communist movements in
Jiangxi and Yan'an with that in Shaanxi, virtually every observer has remarked on the
predominance of youth from the lowest ranks upon the leadership.

The genuine cooperation characteristics of the United Front in early phase of war
degenerated during 1938 into increasingly bitter conflicts between the Guomindang and
the Communists. The basic reason for the mounting antagonism was the spectacular
growth of Communist-
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sponsored governments behind Japanese lines from late 1937 coincident with the massive
military set back to Guomindang. Following the fall of Hankou to the Japanese in. 1938,
the Nationalists were driven back from the coastal areas (which had long constituted their
base of power) to Sichuan in the remote west. While the Guomindang armies were in full
retreat, the Communist forces spearheaded guerilla resistance throughout north China and
expanded the territory under their control.

The increasing friction between the Guomindang and the CCP camps after 1938 led to
fighting between the two, and by early 1939 the stage was set for more serious clashes.
The sixth plenum of the CCP Yan’an in November 1938 maintained that there should be
both unity and struggle within the united front and that the proposition "everything
through the united front" did not suit Chinese conditions. It also criticized, therefore, the
mistake of accomodationism in the united front which was blamed on Wang Ming, Mao's
major rival, whose eclipse began with the sixth plenum. From this point onwards, the
official attitude towards the United Front stiffened, particularly due to the strengthening
of Communist position in north China and the escalation of military confrontation with
the Guomindang. On the other hand, the Guomindang’s fifth CEC in January 1939
adopted "Measures to restrict activities of alien parties" which signalled the onset of what
the Communists had called the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Steps were taken in
accordance with these measures to tighten control over all political activities in
Guomindang areas, and repeated military clashes with the Communists culminated in
December 1939 in the blockade of the Shen-Gan-Ning region, followed by serious
fighting in 1940.
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When all possibilities of cooperation permanently shattered by escalating military

clashes, the Communists announced an ambitious political programme, known as "Three-
thirds system,'" which was symbolic of their commitment to the United Front. In this
system, the Communists formally restricted themselves to a maximum of one third of all
positions in government and council in the base area. These three principal goals were

i. unswerving loyalty to the principle of cooperation with all classes and parties in
fighting the common enemy, Japan;
ii. commitment to sharing power with non-Communist elites to secure their cooperation
in guerilla warfare;
iii. struggle against hostile armies of both Japan and Guomindang.
The three-thirds system in Shen-Gan-Ning and other base areas helped unify and
strengthen administration and legitimised the party's claim to represent the entire Chinese
nation. On paper, the Guomindang, too, adopted policies strikingly similar to those of the
Communist mobilization programme, but had little to offer to the peasantry except the
theft of grain, brutal seizure of young sons to man the armies of the status quo, and empty
words and slogans. The Guomindang continued practising its monopoly of power,
granting limited rights to the Communists, non-Communists and non-Guomindang
political elements.

By the end of 1944, while Japan was losing, the CCP was getting stronger. The Red
Army included 910,000 men in addition to the Communist Rural Militia of more than
2,200,000. The CCP had under its control 19 Soviets whose population numbered
95,500,000. The membership of CCP grew to 1,210,000. This phenomenal expansion
was the result of CCP's policy of United Fr.
305

Mao Zedong, the theoretician of the CCP raised the concept of the United Front to the
level of a Marxist category He advocated the permanent institutionalisation of the United
Front Mao did this in two of his most important pieces of theoretical writings during this
period. The first was his Political Report to the Seventh National Congress of the CCP
and the second was his celebrated essay entitled On People’s Democratic Dictatorship
written on 30 June 1949. Mao s Sew Democracy was a united democratic alliance based
on The overwhelming majority of the people under the leadership of the working class.
Mao said that what was on agenda in China was not socialism but bourgeois democratic
revolution.

After the defeat of Japan in 1945 till October 1949 when the CCP came to power in
China, the struggle for supremacy passed through different stages. First came a period of
negotiations and manoeuvres which lasted till early summer of 1946. The second was the
phase of Guomindang's military initiative which lasted till May 1947. The third was the
period of CCP's military initiative and Guomindang's collapse. Mao in his essay On
People's Democratic Dictatorship acknowledged that the "United Front is one of the three
main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy.

PEASANT NATIONALISM
A very significant contribution of the CCP was that it recognised the potential of the
Chinese peasantry (even Tough several well-known Communists considered the pedantry
to be a passive force who could, at best play. Hide-role in the Communist revolution in
industrially less developed countries), and worked tirelessly to mobilise them to counter
the 'evil-forces' in order to realise the go of he 'establishment of a Communist system..
As against the
306

proletariat movement, the peasant movement in China had deep historical roots.
Predominance of agriculture in China is evident from the fact that about eighty percent of
the Chinese population were peasants'. Though they had a long history- of struggles
against oppression, they did not have the awareness to analyze the system they were
fighting, nor did they have a clear picture of their ultimate purpose. The Chinese
intelligentsia including the CCP remained preoccupied with their 'revolution's in the cities
and reached out to the countryside only after the failure of the First United Front. The
only exception in this regard was the work done by Peng Pai, a Communist from
Guangzhou who organised peasant movements in the districts of Haifeng and Lufeng to
fight for reduction of land rent and abolition of cover system. In 1924, Mao Zedong
began his famous investigations of the peasantry in Hunan. However, the change in the
method of struggle by the CCP gets clearly reflected with the establishment of the Jiangxi
soviet "red" base. By this time it had become clear that the revolution in China would
proceed from the countryside to the cities and not vice-versa; that the CCP would be a
peasant party rather .than a proletariat one; and that peasant nationalism would be the
basis for national liberation and social transformation in China. This break from the
"Moscow Line" (which provided for the united front of national bourgeoisie and the
working class) is believed to be based on Mao's writings on peasantry, particularly his
'Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan' written in 1926. which is referred to as the
"China Path" to revolution. Another point of view, however, is that there was no clearly
demarcated "Moscow Line" or the "Chinese Path," and that the post-United Front stress
on the peasantry was in fact based on the experiences of the United Front itself.
307

For certain 'specialists' notably in the USA, the Communists succeeded in seizing power
by renouncing the principle of political hegemony of the industrial proletariat (hitherto
considered as the only class capable of overthrowing capitalism and establishing
socialism). This argument, however, is over-simplified. It is true that after 1927, the
centre-of-gravity of the revolutionary struggle shifted to the countryside (to Jiangxi
during 1927-34; to the anti-Japanese bases during 1937-45; and to the old and new
liberated areas which surrounded the Guomindang-held cities during 1946-49), but the
relationship established under Mao's, direction between the peasant movement and the
socialist revolution was a complex one.

Chalmer Johnson and Barrington Moore, Jr. hold the view that it was 'peasant
nationalism' which in the end defeated Japan and brought the Communists to power.
They claim that the Communists were defeated during the Jiangxi period when their
strategy was based on agrarian revolution; success came to them only when they became
leaders of national resistance against Japan. Moore argues that the Japanese performed
two important revolutionary tasks for the Communists— the elimination of old elites and
the forging of solidarity among the oppressed masses. As a result of Mapan's occupation,
Guomindang officials and landlords fled out of the countryside leaving the peasants to
their destiny. In such a situation, Japan's intermittent mopping up and extermination
campaigns forged a sense of solidarity among the peasants.

Some other scholars like Mark Selden. Jean Chesneaux and Lucian Bianco do not
completely agree with the above analysis. Though they do not undermine the role of the
Japanese imperialism in the success of the Communists in
308

mobilising the peasantry, they point out certain other important factors which Johnson
and Moore overlooked, Selden insists that the CCP did not simply move into a vacuum
created by wartime conditions. What distinguished the CCP from other power-contenders
operating under the same conditions is that it was able to create viable alternatives to
decaying institutions and that, it was eventually able to win the voluntary enthusiastic
support of the people in the areas under their control. Jean Chesneaux observes that even
though the temporary needs of political strategy led to a postponement of agrarian
revolution during Japanese intervention, in the eyes of the peasants of north China the
CCP remained the party of the poor with a new 'social model' demonstrated at Yunnan
and other border regions. Bianco, too, considers the Japanese aggression to be only a
contributory factor. He feels that the CCP succeeded primarily because it was the party of
the people— conversant with their problems.

All the scholars, however, agree that external stimuli did play a vital role in helping the
CCP emerge as the party of the people. The impact of external factors, especially
imperialism was such that scholars like Bianco argue that the history of modern China
can be seen as a reaction to imperialist forces that threatened the country's very existence.
Hostility towards Japan by the Chinese nationalists can be traced back to the '21
demands' of 1915. However, it became widespread after the seizure of Manchuria in
1930. As Japan went on invading, winning and exploiting the Chinese territory, hostility
towards them, too, went on increasing. But, the Guomindang government led by Jiang Jie
Shi did not fight the Japanese, rather it went on deserting
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area after area leaving the people at the mercy of the ruthless Japanese. Actually, a strong
section of the Guomindang (the landlords, industrialists, merchants, etc.) felt that the
Communists were a far greater enemy who were working for the Abolition of all their
powers, positions and privileges by establishing their "new social order. This strategy of
the Guomindang ("unification and then resistance") backfired as it went on losing
people's support to the CCP who were tirelessly mobilising people against the aggressive
Japanese realising that it was a matter of survival for China.,

It is pertinent here to have a brief discussion of the impact of Japanese aggression on the
Chinese people. Imperialist control over Chinese economy was complete in all sectors of
economy. In 1937, 90.7 percent of China's railways investment was foreign; 55.7 percent
of China's coal output, 18.9 percent of the vessels plying in the Yangzi river and 55
percent of the electricity production were in foreign hands. All the iron production was
with the Japanese. In 1936, 46.2 percent of China's spindles and 56.4 percent of her
looms were owned by foreign capital. The foreign banks also enjoyed the privileges of
issuing bank notes controlling the customs duty and salt tax. These imperialist
investments were, by and large, squeezed from China itself while the huge profits were
drained out to the imperialist powers. It is significant that after 1930, British investments
did not increase and American investment (the entire amount was not much) .increased
by 20 percent, while the huge Japanese investment increased by 48 percent between 1930
and 1936. The Japanese investment amounted for half of the total foreign investments in
China. In the north east particularly. Japan monopolised the market, land, factories,
mines, industrial raw materials, communications and transport. The three biggest textile
centres in China were controlled by Japan.
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Japan launched its first attack on China on 18 September 1931. By January 1933 they had
penetrated into the whole of north China plain, by 1935 they had occupied inner
Mongolia, and by 1937 they were the paramount power in China. Using a minor incident
at the Marco Polo bridge (to the south of Beijing) at this time. Japan invaded all of China
without actually declaring war. Their brutality could be seen when after the fall of the
Nanjing government, 30,000 people were massacred. Then, in the Yangzi region,
refugees were subjected to a rain of a machine gun firing. The massive loss of life and
property was similar in other parts of China. The fear of, and hatred for, the Japanese
among the Chinese was natural.

The Jiangxi Soviets declared war on Japan in 1932 as a protest against the invasion of
Manchuria, and gave a call for a new United Front to fight Japan. The intelligentsia
began to activate public opinion and organise boycott of Japanese goods. The students
took to demonstrations to force the government to stop negotiations and to declare war on
Japan. The Japanese offensive in North China provoked a mass students' uprising, known
today as the 'December Ninth Movement' (1935). They played an important role in
preventing the Japanese from carrying out their plan to detach the five northern provinces
from the rest of China. In May 1936, at the initiative of the students, the 'Pan-China
Federation of Association for National Salvation' was formed which became the
organising centre for a powerful nationalist movement. This prestigious association, with
various well-known lawyers, journalists and professors as its directors, called for an end
to the civil war and united resistance to Japan. In effect, this meant the endorsement of
the CCP and Comintern appeal for a new United Front. In the cities of the East, the
Federation worked in co-operation .with the
311

Communists. Before the Japanese aggression, the. Communists' sphere of influence was
restricted to South where Jiangxi and other Red bases were situated. The anti-Japanese
sentiments of the people of North China (the area of Japanese aggression) helped them
gain popularity in the North as well.

In the meanwhile, on 12 December 1936 the Xian Incident took place as a result of which
the Second United Front came into existence which brought about a realignment of social
and political forces in China. The United army confronted the Japanese at Shanghai but
due to the big difference in the kind of military equipments, the Chinese patriots suffered
huge losses. But, in the political sense, it did succeed in kindling a spreading bonfire of
patriotic feelings. Those who reported on this battle, pointed out, "'the winter of 1937-38
worked a miracle in China." As a result, in April 1938. for the first time in the history of
Japan, her armies suffered a defeat in China.

However, after April 1938. one place after another in China fell before the economic and
military superiority of the Japanese. Jiang Jie Shi felt that the only option before China
was to avoid head on confrontation with Japan until international assistance came, while
the Communists felt that peoples' war should continue. This marked the beginning of the
breaking up of the United Front. Jiang Jie Shi realised that the Communists were winning
the loyalty of the people by effectively organising the people for guerilla war-fare against
the Japanese from the Red Bases in Yarf an. As the rise in the popularity in the CCP
would have gone against the interests of the Guomindang, he opened up war against the
Communists in Hunan, then Hubei and Hebei. In November 1939, his troops partially
dismantled the southern
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part of the Yan'an base. In January 1941, the Communist head-quarters were attacked,
and many of their leaders were captured or killed. And all these offensives were against
the organisation which was spearheading the resistance movement against the most
dreaded enemy, namely Japan. This might have gone a long way in bringing various
patriotic sections of the Chinese people closer to the Communists. Chalmer Johnson
argues that the triumph of the Communists was based on their acknowledgement as
patriotic nationalists by the masses including the peasantry. However, a more palatable
assertion is that the Communists succeeded because the peasantry was convinced that the
defeat of the Japanese at the hands of the Communists would usher them in an era of
actual democracy as demonstrated by the CCP in their areas of influence and control.
This conviction made them support all the programmes and actions of the Communists
including their army operations. This close connection of the Communists with the
peasants during the war years was to prove decisive when the revolutionary struggle with
the Guomindang resumed with full fury in 1946.

Actually, while attributing CCP's success to fortuitous circumstances, Chalmer Johnson

completely ignored the ideological differences between the CCP and the other parties
including the Guomindang. These differences were not only on theoretical level; in
practice, they were clearly manifested in the form of the socio-economic policies of the
CCP. Thus, in accounting for the success of the CCP, due respect must be paid to the.
"peasant programme' devised by Mao and his associates. In effect, it was this programme
and, more significantly, the fact that the CCP was a government and army of the people
which was the single most important factor for the Communist victory. Johnson also
forgot that the most important determinant of Mao's strategy for
313

revolution was the 'mobilisation of peasantry' and consequently, the implementation of

policies and programmes which would make this possible. Thus, the success of the CCP
can be attributed not so much to the fortuitous circumstances created by the Japanese
aggression as to the correct strategy, tactics, objectives and programmes of the CCP.

STRATEGY, TACTICS AND PROGRAMMES OF THE CCP

After the defeat of the working class uprising in Shanghai and Guangzhou in 1927 and
with the breaking up of the United Front, the CCP adopted a new strategy of "peasant
revolution" taking inspiration from the successes at Hunan and Guangdong. The basic
tenets of this strategy were—

(a) the revolution in China would proceed from the countryside to the cities and not vice-
versa;
(b) the CCP would be a peasant party rather than a proletariat one; and
(c) peasant nationalism would be the basis for national liberation and social
transformation in China.

This new policy of considering the peasantry as the leading social force for revolution
was based on Mao Zedong's writings on the peasantry, particularly, his Report on the
Peasant Movement in Hunan written in 1926. This report announced that "in a very short
time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million
peasants will rise like mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no
power, however great, will be able to hold it back".
314

The initial movements namely, the Nanchang Uprising, which marked the beginning of
the Communist 'Red Army' and the Autumn Harvest Uprising under Mao in Hunan, were
crushed by the Guomindang forces. The uprising in the Haifeng and Lufeng districts in
the province of Guangdong where Peng Pai had been at work among peasants since 1923
lasted longer. Finally, in December 1927, the Communists attempted to take over
Guangzhou and set up a 'commune'. These, too, were crushed by the Guomindang forces.
Mao and Zhu De fled to Jing Kangshan where they organised the "First Division of the
Workers' and Peasants' Army," established 'soviets' of peasants and workers and tried-to
bring about agrarian reform. When the Guomindang forces blockaded it in 1929, Jiangxi,
where a base was established in 1931, became the centre of the Chinese Soviet Republic
with Mao Zedong as the President.

The Jiangxi Soviet continued the agrarian revolution that had begun at Jing Kangshan. In
his writings entitled Why is it that Red Political Power can Exist in China?, The Struggle
in the Jing Kang Mountains, and A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire, Mao Zedong
argued strongly that the main character of the Chinese revolution was to be agrarian
armed struggle with the peasants providing the main force. In 1933, in a document
entitled How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas, Mao identified the different
classes and groups in rural China. In the first place, there were landlords who lived by
exploiting the peasantry, and hence, were the enemies of the revolution and were to be
eliminated as a class. Then there were rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants.
The communists concentrated initially on the poor peasants and later included middle
peasants to accomplish the revolution.
315

At Jing Kangshan, the land of the rich peasants, too," were confiscated along with those
of the landlords. But, after the passing of the New Agrarian Law in 1931 in Jiangxi, only
the landlords were to lose all their land. The rich peasants could retain some if they were
willing to work on it without hiring labour. This was done by Mao Zedong to broaden the
social base of the revolution. In fact, one important objective of the land policy was to
enlarge the number of middle peasants by raising the poor peasants to this category with
the help of the distribution of land procured through confiscation. The 'Red Army' played
a crucial role in implementing the measures of agrarian revolution. The CCP had made
conscious efforts through political education to make the 'Red Army' committed to the
cause of social revolution and to integrate it with the peasantry. The guiding . principle
of the Red Army was: "The Red Army does not , make war for the sake of war, but for
the people- to organise the people, arm the people, to help the people to establish
revolutionary power."

Alongside the regular army, voluntary militia and self-defence organisations were
organised in 'red bases'. Villagers in the age group of eighteen to forty years were
organised as 'Red Guards'. These militia organisations played crucially important
supportive role in the military operations of the Communists. With their knowledge of the
local terrain, they guided the Red Army in its movements, supplied all necessary
information, food, transport and nursing care.

Against the larger armies with superior armaments, the Red Army developed guerilla
tactics- "If the enemy attacks, retreat; if the enemy retreats, pursue him; if the enemy
stops, harass him; if the enemy regroups, disperse." This kind of
316

unconventional warfare could not have succeeded without local support.

The 'Soviets', the Red Army, the Red Guards and other para military groups, and the
peasants' associations formed the bases of a new kind of social and political system in the
'Red Bases'. They created a government which was elected openly with direct
participation of the masses. A new land system was brought into force where the peasants
could hold land fairly and equitably. A general programme of eradication of social evils
like black marketing, gambling, oppression through class and religious authorities, was
also undertaken. By all these, the poor peasants got the taste of justice and freedom which
they had never had before.

Between. 1930 and 1933, Jiang Jie Shi carried out as many as five 'Campaigns of
Encirclement' against the Communists. The 'Red Bases' were encircled and an economic
blockade laid on them. As a result, the communists had to abandon Jiangxi. And thus
began the legendary Long March, an outstanding feat and a turning-point in the Chinese
Communist Movement. Though there were differences within their ranks regarding the
direction, strategy and destination, at the end of the March in 1936 when the different
divisions of the armies converged in north Shaanxi, Mao Zedong emerged as the
undisputed leader of the CCP.

The Long March was not a movement of the armies alone, but of the civilian population
as well— including women and children. All through the 8,000 miles long distance, the
marchers had to face the hostile topography as well as attacks from Jiang Jie Shi's armies.
At the end of the March, the CCP was not only able to establish itself firmly in a
mountain stronghold against the Guomindang forces but
317

also place themselves in a strategic position against Japan. Another significance of Long
March was that the survivors of the tough March emerged as a hard-core force, steeled as
it were in body and in spirit, to lead the Chinese Communist movement to an eventual
victory. Apart from the leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai, there
were thousands of cadres who gained immensely in physical endurance and human
experience. As they took care of the old, the sick, the women and the children during the
course of the March amidst incredible adversities, their training to serve the people,
begun since the Jiangxi days, became concrete. The March also brought the Communists
in contact with remote tribes and newer regions which itself was a useful political
education for the party, for the future. All through the March, the CCP also carried out a
propaganda for an anti-Japanese United Front and the end of the fratricidal war. This
helped in establishing the credibility of the CCP and the Red Army as truly patriotic and
just.

In December 1935, Mao Zedong wrote a document entitled Tactics Against Japanese
Imperialism, in 1936 he wrote Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, in
1937 he wrote The Policies, Measures and Perspectives of Combating Japanese Invasion
and in 1938 he wrote Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan. Through these
he highlighted the strategy to be followed by the Communists to prepare themselves for a
long, protracted war against an enemy which was many times stronger to them. A crucial
aspect of Mao's strategy in this war was to gain the confidence of the civilian population
and to diffuse distinction between the military and the civilian. He tried to give it the
form of a true peoples' war. This was so because to the Communists, war was not an end
in itself; it was a means towards building up a new China. Therefore, apart
318

from carrying on independent guerilla warfare, it was seen as necessary to establish anti-
Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines. Anti-Japanese democratic governments were set
up in these bases; and a new society was created which practically transformed all
spheres of life.

Having remained bogged down during 1941-43, the tide was turned in 1944. The peasant
militia was expanded and a final desperate struggle ensued. By 1945, the Peoples' Army
had expanded to 910,000 men, the militia to 2,200,000, and the self-defence corps to
10,000,000 men; nineteen liberated areas had been established covering an area of
950,000 square kilometres inhabited by a population of 95,500,000; most of the Japanese
occupied major cities, communication lines and coastal lines were surrounded by the
peoples' troops. After the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship and Alliance in
August 1945, the Red Army launched a new counter-offensive and liberated 315,000
square kilometres of territory with a population of 18,712,000, and recovered 190 cities.
The Chinese war with Japan ended with the dropping of the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima.

POST WAR SITUATION

After the Japanese defeat a civil war ensued not only to decide who would be China's
future rulers but also to decide the future of millions of Chinese, people, i.e., what their
politics, society and everyday lives would be. Thus, it is significant to understand not
only why the Guomindang lost, but also why and how the Chinese Communists won. It is
equally important to understand that in fighting along-side the Communists the Chinese
people were fighting for themselves. Thus, it was a revolutionary process, by
participating in which, the Chinese people were transforming
319

themselves as much as they were transforming the Chinese Society and all that it stood
for.

Meanwhile inflation and rising prices in the Guomindang areas threatened a

situation where civil war ' would be carried into the Guomindang areas themselves. On
the other hand, in the liberated zones, the Communists launched a "movement against the
traitors". For example, the landlords who had sided with the Japanese were denounced in
village assemblies. In 1946, on the bases of an earlier directive, a mass movement was
launched for the reduction of rent and interest rates,-apart from abolishing all prior debts
of the poor and middle peasants. In May-1946, the slogan "Land Belongs to the Tillers"
was popularised. The Chinese people, although sick of war, became prepared for another
war in order to ensure a better society for themselves.

In the spring of 1947, the Peoples Liberation Army, under Lin Biao's Command, carried
out a series of offensives which left the city bound Guomindang forces dazed and
confused. Except for the cities, Manchuria was firmly won by the Communists. By the
end of 1947, the Communists were able to regain control over Hebei, Shandong and
Shanxi areas. They defeated 97 Guomindang brigades by September 1947 which
amounted to the defeat of nearly 1/4 of the Guomindang army.

The Japanese had surrendered all the industrial equipment, the banking and financial
institutions worth 1800 million dollars to the Guomindang. At that time 70-80 percent of
the total industrial capital was owned by the "Four Big Families" who along with their
collaborators forced the National government to mortgage the entire Chinese
320

economy to the United States. During the civil war itself, in November 1946, the
Guomindang signed the Sino-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which
opened China to American products. By 1947 the United States occupied a decisive role
in China's foreign commerce: 51 percent of all imports and 57 percent of all exports.
They made use of Guomindang state organs to evade taxation, monopolise raw material,
control the market and transport facilities. All this meant a virtual colonisation of Chinese
economy by American capital. This brought a large section of Chinese bourgeoisie and
entrepreneurs in the fold of the Communists. The slogan of Communist International
"Leave China" became very popular and a mass movement ensued for the ouster of
American troops from China. This along with the hardships due to steep price rise (110%
during 1937-47), the difference between the treatment of people in the CCP and
Guomindang controlled areas, the workers' and peasants' revolts, and the conviction of
the people that the socio-economic system advocated by the CCP was better, brought the
Communists to power in 1949. The Communists called it a peoples' democratic
revolution which brought to political power the Communists who stood for socialism.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Jean Chesneaux; Peasant Revolts in China: 1840-1949, London & Washington: 1973;
2. Jean Chesneaux et al; China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation, Indian Print, N.
Delhi: 1986.
3. Jean Chesneaux (ed); Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China: 1840-1950,
Stanford: 1973.
4. Mark Selden; Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge Mass: 1971.
5. Lucian Bianco; Origins of the Chinese Revolution: 1915- 1949, Stanford: 1971.
6. Barrington Moore, Jr; Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Peasant in the making of the Modern World, Boston: 1966
7. Chalmers A. Johnson; The Chinese Revolution, California centre for Chinese Studies:
1969..
8. Chalmers A. Johnson; Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of
Red China: 19 57 - 1945, California: 1964.
9. Mao Zedong; Selected Works of Mao Tse -tung, 5 Vols, 4th edition, Peking: 1977;
Hindi edition published by Current Book Depot: Kanpur: 1969.
10.C.P. FitzGerald; The Birth of Communist China, Washington: 1964. 11. Edgar Snow;
Red Star Over China: New York: 1938.
322

12. Harold Issacs; The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, revised edition, Stanford:
1951.
13. Jerome Chen; Mao Tse-lung and the Chinese Revolution. Cambridge: 1970.
14. Ho Kan-chih; A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution, Stanford: 1974.
15. J.H. Boyle; China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Polities of Collaboration,
Stanford: 1972.
16. Benjamin I. Schwartz; Chinese Communist and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge: 1951.
17. James P. Harrison; A History of the Chinese Communist Party, New York: 1972.
18. James Chieh Hsiung; Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism,
London: 1970.
19. George Thomson; From Marx to Mao Tse-tung: A Study in Revolutionary Dialectics,
London: 1977.
20.J.W. Lewis (ed); Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, Stanford:
1974.
APPENDIX: I
MANCHUGUO
R. K. Rana
Dept of Buddhist Studies
University of Delhi
Delhi— 110 007

Manchuguo (or Manshukoku of the Japanese) was the. puppet state installed by the
Guangdong Army of Japan after it had overrun and conquered Manchuria in 1931.
Though after the weakening of China, both Russia and Japan became seriously interested
in Manchuria, Japan gained an advantageous position after her victory over Russia in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. But Japan was able to consolidate her position in
Manchuria only after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. After this incident the Guangdong
Army initiated its assault on the Chinese troops at Shenyang (then Mukden) on 18
September 1931 and the take over of Manchuria commenced. Thereafter for more than
thirteen years, till Japan's defeat in World War II in August-1945, Manchuguo continued
to be a protectorate of Japan. In order to give legitimacy to the regime, the Guangdong
Army installed Henry Puyi( His original name was Xuantong, which he had given up on
becoming the Emperor of China in 1908).as the regent of Manchuguo in March 1932. In
March 1934 he was made the emperor. Henry Puyi had been the last Qing emperor at
Beijing before the dynasty was abolished in 1912 as a consequence of the Chinese
Revolution of 1911. Since his removal, Henry Puyi had been in seclusion. Doihara Kenji
of the Guangdong Army was largely responsible for bringing Henry Puyi out of
324

seclusion. The city of Changchun in the province of Jilin, was chosen as the capital of the
new kingdom and was given a new name of as Xinjing (meaning New Capital).

At the time of its establishment, it had a population of about 40 million people. Most of
these people were Manchurians, Mongolians and Chinese, though there were also White
Russians (around the city of Harbin), Koreans (near the Yalu river), Japanese and
Tibetans in smaller numbers. In order to represent the varied population background of
Manchuguo, a flag consisting of horizontal bands of red, yellow, indigo, white, and black
was chosen as the national emblem. Geographically, Manchuguo comprised whole of
Manchuria consisting of three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, and portions
of Inner Mongolia. The province of Rehe (Jehol) was annexed and added to Manchuguo
in 1933 making-1.4 square kilometres as the total area of this kingdom. Later the whole
of Manchuguo was reorganised into a total of nineteen provinces.

Japan had all kinds of difficulties getting international legitimacy for this kingdom. The
United States of America strongly condemned Japan's actions and applied the Non-
recognition Policy to Manchuguo. Lytton Commission Report released on 2.October
1932 also condemned Japan's action as aggressive. This report argued that the Japanese
general staff "provided assistance and gave direction to the organisers of the movement."
It was further pointed out that the new state could not have been formed but for the
presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and
military. And the report led to the inevitable conclusion that "The present regime cannot
be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and
325

spontaneous independence movement." In fact, H. Kamikawa frankly admitted that close

relationship existed between Japan and the independence movement in Manchuria and
said that the movement would not have been carried through but for the presence of the
Japanese troops. Japan also got into difficulties in the League of Nations and in fact, in
1933 she withdrew from this organisation. Within Japan also there was some resentment
at the actions of the Guangdong Army. Formal recognition from the Japanese
government also did not come about immediately and ungrudgingly. Prime Minister
Inukai Tsuyoshi took objections to the arbitrary action of the Guangdong Army and
resisted the recognition. Many top officials also were not happy with the events as they
were getting adverse publicity for Japan. However, in May 1932 Inukai was assassinated
by young army extremists. The new Prime Minister Saito Makato, recognised
Manchuguo fearing that any further delay would only cause violence and distress because
the actions of the armed forces had not only become irreversible but also irresistible.
Ultimately, Manchuguo was able to get recognition from about a dozen countries,
primarily the Axis powers and their allied or occupied nations in Central Europe. The
only Asian country to recognise Manchuguo was Thailand.

On 15 September 1932 Japan and Manchuguo signed the protocol known as Nichiman
Giteisho. Under the terms of this protocol Japan took upon herself the responsibility of
Manchuguo's internal as well as external security. As a result the affairs of Manchuguo
were directed by the Guangdong Army through the General Affairs Board. Without the
consent of this body, no ordinance, policy, law or rescript could become applicable. The
General Affairs Board, whose members were invariably Japanese coordinated its plans
and decisions with the Japanese government's
326

Manchurian Affairs Board in Tokyo. In July 1932, was established the Concordia
Society. On paper its function was to promote harmony amongst the different ethnic
groups. In reality the function of this society was not only to stifle opposition but also to
gather intelligence through its network of offices in the provinces. In 1934, the
commanding general of the Guangdong Army, was appointed the ambassador
plenipotentiary to Manchuguo.

Some immigration of the Japanese people into this region had already taken place from
the turn of the nineteenth century. But as a result of the harsh climate and inability of the
immigrants to compete with the local peasants, immigration had not been encouraging at
all. But after 1932, in order to safeguard against the Russians and the Outer Mongolian
troops, it became essential for Japan to populate the outlying area. The Japanese
government tried various schemes, but still in the year 1940, there were less than 20,000
Japanese households with 181,000 acres of cultivable land under their control in
Manchuguo. However, the Manchuguo government was quite successful in getting the
Korean immigrants into Manchuguo in order to increase rice production and also to pave
the way for Japanese colonists. As a consequence, the number of Koreans in Manchuguo
increased from 800,000 in the late 1920s to more than 2,000,000 in 1945.

The South Manchurian Railway Company had spearheaded the penetration and
expansion of Japan's interests in Manchuria since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
The holdings and operations of the company included public transportation, mining, and
agriculture, besides administration of areas near the railway over which it slowly, gained
control. There appeared enormous opportunity for all
327
types of exploitation. But when writ of the Guangdong Army started running in
Manchuguo in the 1930s, the railway empire started dissolving. The Control Law of May
1937 stipulated the integration of major industries of Manchuguo into Japan's five-year
programme toward national mobilization. When the war with China broke out in 1937,
various branches of the South Manchurian Railway Company 4t were taken over by
Nissan of Aikawa. Nissan was supported by the Guangdong Army and ran into extremely
serious financial difficulties shortly before Japan's defeat.

One of the many problems faced by the Japanese in Manchuguo was that of the
marauding bands of armed men of various types and backgrounds. They included
religious fanatics, anti-government dissidents, dispossessed peasants, and remaining
followers of the deposed warlord Zhang Xueliang. Russia was another threat to
Manchuguo. In 1932, Japan had rejected Russia's offer to negotiate a non-aggression
treaty, but in 1935 negotiations for the transfer of Russia's shares in the Chinese Eastern
Railway to Manchuguo were successfully concluded. Nevertheless, border clashes with
the forces of Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union became quite frequent. Two of the
serious pocket wars with Russia were the artillery clash at Changgufeng in July 1938 and
the ferocious air and tank battle at Nomonhan in May 1939.

After Japan jumped into World War II in December 1941, Manchuguo started reducing
imports from Japan and increased her own production of metals, minerals and
agricultural products to aid Japan's war effort. American bombers began their attack on
Manchuguo in the summer of 1944. Guangdong Army was transferred to the Pacific front
or to Japan's homelands The Soviet Union invaded
328

Manchuguo on 9 August 1945. Xinjing was hastily abandoned and the capital was moved
to Dunhua. Puyi abdicated on 18 August 1945. He was captured the next day at the
Shenyang airport while trying to flee to Japan. With this Manchuguo and Japan's control
over it came to an end. Japanese settlers were expelled after the defeat of Japan in World
War II.
APPENDIX: II

EMPRESS DOWAGER CIXI

(1835-1908)
SHALINI SAKSENA
Smt C.H.M. College
Ulhusnagar-3
University of Bombay
Bombay
Empress Dowager Cixi was an able and ambitious queen mother who ruled supreme in
China for nearly half a century. When Emperor Xianfeng was alive she had grown
accustomed to political intrigue and had learnt the art of finding allies among the
different factions that divided the court. During the reign period of her minor son
Tongzhi she firmly grasped power as regent, in violation of dynastic custom forbidding
women to reign. On his death, she manipulated to put her young nephew Emperor
Guangxu on the throne and became co-regent along with Prince Gong. She came to
power through crime and stayed there through deceit.

Empress Dowager Cixi was of above average intelligence. But she had no training or
experience to deal with government routine or the numerous internal difficulties of the
empire and the impact of foreign intrusion. She gradually consolidated her power to be in
a position to exercise despotic authority. She was proud and worked ceaselessly to
promote and project her own interest and continuation in power.
330

Cixi 's thirst for power and political intrigue influenced her governmental actions.
Though a conservative herself she befriended men of liberal, enlightened and modern
views. She had able advisers like Prince Gong, Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan and Zhang
Zhudong. The Empress Dowager used the imperial prerogative of appointment and
decided all promotions, demotions and punishment of high officials. Entrenched in
power, she governed with the aid of palace eunuchs who were allowed to interfere with
state affairs particularly in matters of appointments through purchase, of diverting public
funds for personal use and of substituting irresponsible advisers for responsible officials
at Beijing. Though she herself violated dynastic laws and customs, she inflicted severe
punishment on those Manchus who did not strictly observe them. She was shrewd enough
to perceive the degeneration of the Manchus and therefore appointed more Chinese
officials to important posts. But she was responsible for creating a cleavage among the
Manchus and the Chinese.

Empress Dowager could not grasp China's problem of modernization. She encouraged
the revival of government on Confucian lines but could not take steps towards
modernization. She promoted rivalry between the conservative and radical factions in
order lo control them. For a short time Empress Dowager Cixi ’s power seemed
threatened when the Reform Party supported by Emperor Guangxu launched the
Hundred-Day Reforms. Though she was not opposed to reform as such, she did not
approve the supplementing of indigenous institutions and Chinese cultural values and
heritage by foreign methods. She used the Northern Army to break the power of Emperor
Guangxu and the reformers. With their suppression a period of reaction set in and
Empress Dowager again held the reigns of power.
331

During the Boxer Movement Empress Dowager's duplicity was evident in her pursuing
simultaneously policies of exterminating the foreigners as demanded by the Boxers and
buying peace with them as sought by her envoys abroad. During the last decade of the
Qing dynasty she proceeded to give effect to the radical reform programme she had
rejected earlier. In the Manchu Reform Programme she did not agree to introduce any
real limitation to her own power or to Manchu Supremacy.

During the long period when the "Old Buddha" as she was commonly known, was at the
helm, she by her acts of omission and commission created those circumstances which
inevitably led to dynastic decline and eventually the revolution of 1911. Her sudden death
in 1908 removed the strong hand of a truly remarkable woman who ruled China since
1860.
APPENDIX: III

OPEN DOOR POLICY

R.K. RANA
Department of Buddhist Studies
University of Delhi
Delhi-llOOO7

After the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the imperialist powers
engaged themselves in a scramble for concessions in China. Some of the imperialist
powers intervened on the side of China against Japan. They successfully blocked the
Japanese efforts at getting hold of the Liaodong peninsula, that had to he ceded to her by
China as per the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (17 April 1895). In return for this
favour, these powers started pestering China for various favours. In the loot that
followed, different areas of China were claimed as "spheres of influence'" by the various
imperialist powers. As these "spheres o\' influence" meant exclusive economic privileges
to the concerned powers, the carving of China into such spheres alarmed those countries
like America, who for one reason or another could not get their own spheres for
exploitation through investment and trade. To meet the exigencies of such a situation, the
US government announced in 1899 the doctrine of equal commercial opportunity in
China for all foreign powers. This doctrine is also known popularly as the Open Door
Policy because its declaration meant a free passage through the doors that the various
powers had already hewn in the Chinese empire.

Though the Open Door Policy was formulated and declared by America. Britain played
an important role in its
334

conception. Britain had the biggest stake in China and controlled more than 65% of her
trade. As pointed out by .I.K.. Fair bank. "No amount of success ii\a partition of China
could benefit British interests when they already dominated the trade of the whole
country. Concessions and spheres could only reduce her area of trade." It has been
pointed out that if all the discriminatory tariffs in different spheres and concession areas
were to be removed, then it were the British who would have benefitted the most. The
British "unique position as moneylender and exporter would enable her to get more from
her rivals' spheres than they would get from hers." No doubt. Britain showed a lot of
enthusiasm in supporting such a doctrine.

Before the American declaration. Britain had tried to convince the Russians and
approached US twice. But America not only refused both the limes to accept such a
doctrine, but a little later went ahead herself with the declaration of the same. The reason
for such a contradictory attitude of America is that at the time when Britain was making
the overtures, the Latin American market was enough for the US and she did not have
much interest in China. But by the lime when she herself made the declaration, enough
domestic and commercial pressure had built up within America that the potential of
Chinese market could no longer be ignored.

By the lime the Americans felt the need to the search for new and potential market in
China, they found themselves in a position of exclusion from the Chinese market.
Besides this, the Christian missionaries from America had been exerting pressure on the
American government for action. The missionaries were apprehensive that their freedom
of activities may be curtailed by different powers within their spheres and concession
areas.
334

The US Secretary of State John May sent notes to various countries through US
representatives in Sept-Oct 1899 in which the Doctrine of Open Door was specified. It
was announced that the US government "will in no way commit itself to any recognition
ol the exclusive rights of any power within or control over any position o( the Chinese
empire under such agreements as have recently been made." The Hay notes placed the
powers in a big dilemma. On the one hand, they were unwilling to accept any restriction
on the exploitation of their "spheres of influence" and leased territories and on the other,
none of them was prepared to come forward openly in favour of a policy of open
annexation and monopolized "spheres of influence." In other words, none o\ the powers
could either openly reject or accept the American proposals. Since no nation could dare
issue a public denial of his declaration, on 20 March 1900 Hay declared that the replies
received by him were satisfactory arid that concurrence of all the powers was "final and
definitive."

The Hay notes were followed by the Yi He Tuan Movement. It was perceived by the
powers as a threat to their interests in China and hence, they joined hands in crushing it.
Though the movement had been crushed but the presence of large number of troops from
countries like Russia in the region created more worries for America. .As a result, on 3
July 1900 the US declared that they were in favour of China's territorial and
administrative integrity, protection of all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty
and international law. and safeguard the principle of equal and. impartial trade with all
parts of China. 1 his announcement is significant in the sense that now in stead of the
"spheres of influence"' the whole of China was roped in by the US. Though this second
note of July 1900 was merely a declaration of policy and did not call for any reply, still
many
336

of the powers found it advantageous and accepted the principles enunciated by Hay by
making identical declarations of policy. Within a few years almost all the powers one
way or the other expressed their adherence to the Open Door policy, though each of them
interpreted this doctrine, in the manner suitable to their own interests and convenience.

It has been pointed out by J.K. Fairbank that "'the Open Door doctrine developed two
main tenets: the integrity of China and the equal treatment of all foreigners there." But
many scholars do not agree with this analysis of Fairbank. It has been pointed out that
Open Door was primarily meant to protect those American economic interests which
were bound to be in jeopardy by the partition of China. Thus, it has been pointed out that
it was a policy of "hitch-hiking imperialism and me too imperialism." Open Door did not
halt imperialist demands on China. It merely registered a claim of "me too." Rivalries and
jealousies amongst different powers actually saved China, from division and not the
Open Door. The international balance of powers prevented any single power from
unilaterally destroying China's sovereignty. The main aim of the US was to take full
advantage of the newly opened economic opportunities in China through this doctrine.
This policy could also create conditions which would lead to her . supremacy in the
long run because of US primacy in modern finance and industry. Thus-, the idea was to
change the form, and not the substance. of imperialism through Open Door. Further, the
Open Door also helped in regulating and controlling the rivalries amongst the imperialist
powers over the spoils in China. In this-way. the Open Door became the basic policy of

all the powers in their mutual relations within China.

APPENDIX: IV

KANG YOUWEI (1858-1927)

TANSEN SEN
University of Pennsylvania
United States of America

Kang Youwei, along with Sun Yatsen, Liang Qichao and Lu Xun, was one of the leading
figures of modern Chinese history. He lived in a period of turmoil and transition. While
Sun Yatsen advocated the path of revolution, Kang Youwei suggested reforms under the
monarchy. Ti 11 the very end of his life, he remained a loyal and "obedient official" of
the Qing dynasty.

Born in Nanhai county (near Guangzhou) in Guangdong province, Kang Youwei came
from a family of scholar-officials (shenshi). Kang Zanxiu, his grandfather, received his
"graduate degree" (juren) in 1846 and served as a sub-director of studies in Linshin and
Lianzhou (Guangdong province). Kang Youwei's father, Kang Dachu, held the post of
district magistrate in Jiangxi. The Kang family supported the Qing government against
the Taipings. As a result the family rose to local prominence when the Taiping
Movement was finally suppressed. Their fight against the Taipings, however, did claim
its casualties. Kang Youwei's father died in 1868 of tuberculosis soon after he returned
from the campaign. Youwei was then ten years old.

Kang Youwei's studies began under one of his uncles with the Tang poems, the Great
Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects, and the Classic of Filial Piety. After
338

the death of his father, Youwei's studies continued under Kang Zanxiu. His grandfather
taught him the views and teachings of Song Neo-Confucians. At the age of twelve, he
hired a special teacher to prepare Youwei for civil service examinations. Youwei.
however, failed to qualify for the exams that he took in 1876. He then started studying
under Zhu Ziqi, an eminent Confucian scholar in Guangdong and a friend of Kang
Zanxiu. In the same year he married Zhang Miaohua, three years his senior and to whom
he was engaged at the age of seven. A year later Youwei's father died of drowning.
Depressed, he left his house in 1879 to meditate at the Xiqiao mountain. Here he led a
life of a Taoist hermit, and studied books on Taoism and Buddhism. He did return to lay
life few months later, but only upon insistence from one of his uncles.

From 1879 to 1884, Youwei engaged himself in studying Western works, writings of
Neo-Confucianists.. books on governmental organizations, and Buddhist literature. He
was impressed with the "disciplined" Western system from what he saw in Hong Kong
when he visited the place in 1879. On his return journey from Beijing in 1882, he once
again caught a glimpse of Western system and civilization in Shanghai. He was now
determined to learn more from the West. He bought Chinese translations of books on
Western history, science, and geography. But, his interest was focused on the Western
ideas on political administration. By 1884-85,4 Youwei was trying hard to combine the
Confucian, Buddhist and Western ideas.

Between 1886 and 1889 he drafted a book called A Study of Confucius as a Reformer,
which he finally completed in 1895. In this work he tried to show that Confucius believed
in change and development. Therefore, he argued,
339

institutional and scientific elements from the West should be introduced into China.
During this period he also wrote two other books called Universal Principles of Mankind,
and The Inner and Outer Books of the Philosopher Kang. Outraged by the Shimonoseki
Treaty of 1895 between the Japanese and the Chinese. Kang Youwei sent a memorial of
18,000 characters to the Emperor. In the memorial he ,pointed out the need for the
following three reforms and changes:
1. Reform in economic and educational system,
2. Changing the capital from Beijing to Xian, as the former was too vulnerable to foreign
powers,
3. Modernize Chinese military.

He suggested that the Qing government should increase taxes to raise domestic revenue;
develop railway network; encourage shipping and machine industries; develop mineral
resources, unify the Chinese currency; and set up a effective postal system. The memorial
also showed Youwei's pro-Confucian stand. He suggested that Confucius should be
recognised as founder of religion. Confucianism established as the state religion, and the
year 551 BC (Confucius' year of birth) be taken as the first year of Chinese history.

In 1898, Youwei was summoned before some of the most powerful officials of the Qing
empire. He was asked to write down his specific suggestions for the Emperor. When he
was about to return home, after waiting for five months in vain, he was finally summoned
for an audience with the Emperor Guangxu. In the two and a half hour meeting with the
Emperor, Youwei reiterated what he had suggested in his memorial.
340

Soon after the audience, on 11 June, began the Hundred Days Reform. Youwei. now
appointed as a secretary to one of the Beijing bureaux, instrumented the reforms. Many
young reformers were appointed as secretaries in the Grand Council, a policy-planning
organisation. Steps taken to implement the reforms included establishment of an Imperial
University in Beijing, publication of an official newspaper, encouragement. of
suggestions from private citizens, expansion of railway network, improvement and
simplification of legal codes. But, before the reforms could be carried out in full swing,
troops loyal to Empress Dowager Cixi moved in Beijing. The hundred and three days old
reform came to a violent end on 20 September. Emperor Guangxu was placed under
arrest. Tan Sitong, one of the newly appointed secretaries of the Grand Council, along
with Youwei's brother Guangren were beheaded. Youwei himself was able to escape to
Hong Kong.

Later that year; on an invitation from Japanese prime minster Okuma Shigenobu, he
visited Japan. Between 1899 and 1901. Youwei visited Canada, England, Hong Kong,
Singapore to gather support from these countries and from the overseas Chinese
community. In December 1901, he and his daughter Tongbi came to India. During his
one and a half year stay in Darjeeling he wrote the Book of the Great Community. In this
work of his Youwei propounded that people of the world should remove all the
boundaries, class distinctions and form a ''Great Community" of harmony.

After leaving Darjeeling in 1903, Youwei travelled to

341

Canada, United States of America and Japan. He finally returned to China in December
1913. For China the era of turbulence began during this period. In 1908, both Emperor
Guangxu and Empress Dowager died. Within three years the Revolutionary Alliance,
under Sun Yatsen, brought an end to the Qing rule. On 1 January 1912 Sun Yatsen was
proclaimed as the president of the Republic of China. Youwei was then in Japan' along
with Liang Qichao. They both expressed their concern for the possible fall out in the
Revolutionary Alliance. They, therefore, proposed a system called "token monarchy in
the republic," in which Puyi or a direct descendent of Confucius would serve as a figure
head. Their plan, however, fell through as Puyi was forced to abdicate in 1912. A year
later Yuan Jie Shi (Yuan Shikai) was made the president of China. On his return to
China, Youwei was offered a post in the Chinese government by Yuan Jie Shi. He
refused the offer and settled down in Shanghai.

But, Youwei did not withdraw himself from Chinese politics. In 1916, he proposed to
General Zhang Xun the idea of restoring the Qing rule. General Zhang, himself a Qing
loyalist, in June 1917 led his army into Beijing, and on 1 July reinstated Puyi as the
Chinese emperor. Youwei was appointed as the deputy director in the Emperor's advisory
council. The restoration, however, collapsed within months because Zhang Xun and most
of Puyi's advisors wanted full imperial power. Disappointed, Youwei returned to
Shanghai in February 1918 and was never to play any important role in Chinese politics.
342

On 31 March 1927, few days after he had written a "thank you" note to the Emperor for
the gifts he had sent on his seventieth birthday, Youwei died of a congestion in the
brain. Loyal to the last day, Youwei had written the note with full Qing etiquette, which
concluded with "your obedient official."
APPENDIX : V
MANCHU REFORMS (1901-1905)
SHALIN JAIN & SANTOSH KUMAR RAI
History Department
University of Delhi
Delhi

The Boxer Catastrophe and the resulting insult at the hands of the foreigners proved to be
a traumatic experience to the Empress Dowager. Her political sagacity and shrewd
instinct dictated that it would be difficult for her to regain foreign esteem and domestic
respect unless she showed some semblance of repentance and initiated measures of
political reform. On August 20, 1900, while still in flight, she overcame pride and issued
a decree blaming herself for China's misfortune. It was an expression of Qing.
government's determination to modernize for its own benefit.

In a statement of January 29,1901,the dowager solicited advice on reform from ministers

of state, provincial authorities, and envoys abroad. She allowed them two months to make
detailed recommendation. They were to base their suggestions on Chinese and Western
political systems, in order to indicate how best to renovate existing governmental
institutions, administrative procedure, people's livelihood, methods of education, the
military organization, and the financial system.
344

According to Jean Chesneaux, reform was intended to create modern state by developing
centralization, specialization, and information. On April 21, 1901 a Superintendency of
Political Affairs ( Tu - Pan Cheng-wu Chu) was instituted to formulate a legitimate
program.

The Governor General of Yangtze province Chang Chih-tung and Liu-KA Eun-I jointly
presented three memorials in July 1901 in response to the court's call. While stressing
loyalty to the existing system, they primarily gave suggestions given below -

1. At every stage along with instituting educational reform cohesion should be

established between China and Western disciplines and also reforming the examination
system.
2. The second memorial continued with a discussion of the essentials of good
government, investigating methods of acquiring wealth and power. It also suggested
termination of sales of office, and the reduction of the obsolete. Green standard army, as
well as the dismissal of useless scribes and clerks in government offices.
3. With the aim of redressing the Chinese system in order to implement the Western
reforms were also suggested in the field of defense, agriculture, mining, railways,
commerce, industry and technology, currency and postal services.
345

Predominantly on the basis of these recommendations, the dowager initiated an

institutional reform which differed little in content from the reform of 1898. It lasted over
a more extended period, commencing in 1901 and terminating in 1905. The dowager
reluctantly admitted that China could not be saved by patchy, piecemeal reforms and that
complete reorganization and self strengthening provided the only hope for the future.
While giving priority to educational reform, Chang Chih-tung ideas were accommodated.
The eight legged essay (bagu) was abolished and new examination were based on the
history of China and information about foreign countries. The network of new schools
was planned to cover the whole country, forming a hierarchy that corresponded to the
governments administrative division: elementary schools in the districts, secondary
schools in the prefectures and a college for each province. Peking University established.
In 1902 also had to compile a new curriculum. The abolition of the traditional
examination in September 1905 and the creation of a Ministry of Education in May 1906
confirmed the arrival of modern education in China.

The central government could not finance the new education system alone, however the
entire program depended on the liberality of the provincial governors and the gentry. By
1909 China possessed over 100, 000 modern schools. From the very beginning, however
there were severe shortages of text books and competent teacher. Foreigners, particularly
the Japanese, furnished some help, but the quality of the teaching remained highly
variable. Number of students
346

going abroad for higher education increased so much that only in Japan which had 271
Chinese students in 1902 increased to 15,000 Chinese students in 1907.

Taking lessons from defeats suffered during the Boxer rebellion, military reform were
also introduced in which Yuan shikai governor general of Jhili played a central role. On
August 29, 1901 the traditional military examination were abolished. On 1st September
governor generals were required to form military academies in the provinces and on the
next day it was ordered that Green Standard Army and Brayes had to be reduced by 20 to
30 percent within a year. New units were to be organized according to Western concepts
of active and reserve troops. With the help, support and subsidies from the central
government, Yuan Shikai created the Northern Army (known under the name of
Beiyang). They had modern equipment, Japanese instructors and offices of high quality,
trained either abroad or in the new schools opened in the provinces. It was an army of
personal loyalties whose officers were devoted to Yuan Shikai and threw in their lot with
him. Although a war ministry was established m 1906 which was more highly specialized
than the old war ministry, it was riot able to impose centralization in the absence of any
central financial power.

The strong regionalism which slowed down educational and military reform was seen by
the court as an obstacle to its policies and its authority. So Beijing was working to
develop the branches of the central administration and to
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increase their efficiency. The process was, often carried out by degrees; committees or
offices was created within the existing administrative structures and later raised to the
rank of ministries. The Foreign Ministry appeared in 1901, the ministry of trade in 1903,
and Ministries of Police, Education, and war in 1906.

The rule stipulating that a numerical balance should be maintained between Manchus and
Chinese in official appointments was abolished. The practice of serving in many ports,
which has been common among seniors officials, was also condemned. The reform
removed about 1,400 officials from office. Before this sale of offices was already
terminated in August 1901. The elimination of a compulsory quota of posts to be allotted
to Chinese officials worked in favour of the Manchus. In 1907 an edict attempted to
introduce specialization in administrative, economic and legal duties at the different
levels in the hierarchy. This administrative reform was not, however, accompanied by the
tax and financial restructuring which would have made it effective. Taxes levied in the
provinces were still applied directly to local needs; only a small proposition of the funds
were turned over to the central government. This archaic structure inevitably weakened
the measures taken for administrative centralization.

Jean Chesneaux is of the opinion that like administrative reform, the reform of
institutions aimed at uniting the nation behind the central power. Institutional reform,
which
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developed between 1905 and 1911, introduced parliamentary features into the Chinese
political system. An edict of September 1, 1906, proclaimed the thrones approval of the
principle of constitutional government and stressed the need for closer links between the
governors and those they governed. The Reformers had drawn there inspiration for
institutional reform from the example set by Japan. Accepting the recommendation of a
committee of 12 scholar presided over by Prince Chun, in August 1908 the constitutional
principles were published and made public. This was a hardly written document in which
the parliament was to have a purely consultative role with no power of decision and there
would be a nine year interval of preparation before the constitutional regime was
inaugurated. Provincial consultative assemblies were to be created in 1909 and a national
assembly in 1910.

Some social reform with long term implications were also implemented. Ban on
marriages between the Manchus and Chinese was abolished. Opium was fully prohibited
and women were liberated from" foot binding.

In fact due to practical situation of the Manchu power and Cixi's profound distaste
against the things foreign even in that situation, these reform programs became
essentially a noisy demonstration without much substance or promise of accomplishment.
Anti Chinese discrimination, regional factor and inept Manchu leadership also
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the programme. But these reform designed the path
of some future trends. Since its aim was
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conservative, a reform program such as this could not won over the progressive forces.
Since its effects were revolutionary, it estranged the vested interests. Modernization of
education concealed future changes because instead of contributing to the restoration of
government power, the new intellectuals swelled the ranks of the opposition. Students
and soldiers sent abroad felt that 'it will not work by only changing a wheel but the whole
structure will have to be replaced'. Regionalism and personality based loyalty reflected
in the military reform prepared the background of warlordism. The reform which had
been desired by the dynasty as a way to salvation became instrumental in its downfall.

To conclude this program was a shrewd effort on the part of the dowager to disguise her
shame over her role in Boxer Catastrophe so that the collapsing Manchu power could
gain some more breath. But the path of history was pre-decided and reform also got
swayed away in that stream. Death" of empress Dowager in September 1908 ended the
reform movement and 3 years after that, revolution of 1911 sealed the fate of Manchu
dynasty.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. M.E. Cameron, The reform movement in China, 1898-1912. Stanford, 1931.
2. Immanuel C Y HSU. The Rise of Modern China, 4th ed., New York: OUP 1990.
3. Jean Chesneaux et.al., China from the Opium War to the 1911 Revolution, New York:
1976