Chapter 5

Ursua vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: To Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly
petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman
because his law firm’s messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his
name wrote the name “Oscar Perez” when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who
gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar
Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be
accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his
innocence.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was charged
under the wrong law.

HELD: The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has decreed
that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to
be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the
statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
Chapter 6

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached
“Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
(3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No.
6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
is valid. .

HELD:

NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the
main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution are declared void.

RATIO:

Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars,
in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission
must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Chapter 7

Vera v. Cuevas

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/may1979/gr_l_33693_1979.html

Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products
throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are
marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk
Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc.,
under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of
the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its
highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are
members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not
bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in
skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty
part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly
marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with
the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the
labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year
of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents
related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms
"skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been
removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term
"skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has
been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both
to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies
both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the
petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of
all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have
not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Chapter 8

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS

236 SCRA 197

Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as theSamahang Katandaan
ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,
a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation
was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a
consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation
Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for
charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the
construction of a chapel.

Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a
religious purpose?

Ruling: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not
have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose
are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot
be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.