Commentary on the basic philosophy and recent development of

safety margins
FRANZKNOLL
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Nic.olc/ Co~.~.iec.
Drc,s.cc,l tr~~tlAs.soc.icc/c~s.
I P1tcc.r Ij'illc M o r i r , I M O I I / I , ~P.Q..
Y I I . Ctet~ocltrH.1B 3NI
Rcccivcd October 3 , 1975
Accepted May I I . 1976

The principal effects influencing safcty margins arc ~ . c c a p i t ~ ~ l i ~Human t e d . e~.rorsarc found to
be the major source of str~rct~l~':il failure. A ~.eviscdfol-mat fol- safcty mal-gins is p~.oposed.using
p:u.tial factors. one of which should represent the effect5 of l i ~ ~ m acrro~.s. n I t should he used ass
basic safcty margin, rcllccting the fact of the importance of human c ~ . r o ~ . s .
Recent changes in dcsign r ~ ~ l as c s sct I'orth in the National B ~ ~ i l d i nCode
g of Canaclir 1975. arc
discusseel and criticized for having rcducccl eff'ectivc safety rn211.ginsto ~ ~ n ~ i c c c p t a lo\\ b l y Icvcls.
Ex;~mplesarc given to i l l ~ ~ s t l xpossible
te consequences of the L I ~ ofC such low safcty margins.

L'articlc ~+capit~llc Ics principaux k ~ c t c ~ c~l ~r isiiiffectcnt Ies ni;ll.gcs de s6curiti. 12'cr~.cur
li~lrnziinesc rivble la cause rnajeure b I'originc des del.aillanccs clc s t ~ - ~ ~ c t ~L ~' ar~cl st e. u rPI-oposc
uric dcsc~,iptionnouvcllc clcs cocfticicnts clc sCcu1.it4dont la composition rcSo~.mulieinclurait Ics
cffcts de I'crreur h~lrnaincct I c u ~ . g ~ x n dimpo~.tancc.
c
I l discute ct ~.enicten q ~ ~ c s t iccrti~ins
o~i changemcnts apportks riccmmcnt XI Cocle national d u
BLtimcnt ct qui i m p l i q ~ ~ c n;I t son
. avis, des reductions de la margc dc secul-iti ii dcs n i v c a ~ ~trap x
bas. inacccptahles ct clangcrcux. Dcs exemplcs illustrcnt Ics c o n s i q ~ ~ e n c cpossiblcss de tclles
For personal use only.

riductions.
[ T ~ x d u ipar
t la 1.evuc1
Can. J . Civ. Eng.. 3.409 (1976)

Safety margins1 and thcir justification and
calibration towards the cxpectations and re-
quiremcnts of society, and of the engineering
profession itself. have becn a much dwelled-on
subject it1 recent decades f o l the academic as
wcll as for the professional commul~ities.T h c
vital importance of safcty margins for the dc-
sign and construction makes it mandatory that,
unless final ancl ~lnecluivocal solutions can be
found for their evaluation, cliscussion must go
on with the p~lrposcof contin~louslyand g r a d ~ t -
ally adjusting numbers and proccclures.
The purpose of safety margins is, and has
a l w a ~ sbccn, to protect society from the con-
seclueticcs of structural failures. Safety margins
also represent a protection and a control in a
fashion to tlie desigller who is faced with the
fact that crl-ors occur which make his assump-
tions at dcsign time differ from the future
reality of the structure, but who is operating
~ ~ n d cthcr continuous pressure of economics,
'Stcjr/\ t~rcrtgctr 1s used In this papel to mean in
general an arithmetic relationship comparing resistance
to loatl, whatever format it takes (safety factor, a n
evpression of partial factors, o r a difference between
numbers) Usually the safety factor is the preferred
f o r m since it is readily understood, other expressions
have, however, been used.
having to sharpcn his pencil and being forcecl
to cut all the 'fat' out of his clesigns.
Tlirec p a r t i c ~ ~ l aaspects
r of these considera-
tions merit recavit~~lationbecausc of their
importance. They arc the mechanism of control2
(supervision, inspection, and subsequent cor-
rection), the sousces of crrors and the liiddcn
strength rcservcs. All threc clirectly affect tlie
true safety of any s t r u c t ~ ~ r cand, they arc all
very closcly relatccl to the technical allel social
development.
Control (Supervision, Inspection, and
Correction)
Every designer has the mandate from his
clicnt, and from the public, to ensurc that S~SLIC-
tures built from his plans arc safe a n d con-
structcd to 'reasonablc stantlards of structural
safety, quality, and worknianship'. Economy
on tlie otlicr hand illlposcs the comp~ilsionto
'Cotltrol is used to m e a n in general t h e entire
mechanism involving checks, verification, supervision,
detection of error, and subsequent correction, o r in
other w o r d s the measures counteracting e r r o r s . This
meaning of the word is f o u n d in the G e r m a n and
French languages and is commonly used in this sense.
T h e author was unable t o find a correct translation in
English covering all the activities involved.
 410 C A N . J . CIV. ENG. VOL. 3, 1976

design and built1 with a minimum investment considerations, is that errors with smaller ef-
in materials, money, and man-hours, all these fects are more likely to go undetected and arc
commodities being of a limited availability in thercfore morc frequent, and that their total
gcneral tcrms as well as in tcrms of the owner's effect will depend o n the intensity of control.
mcans. This antithesis is usually resolved by Also, the effects of human errors will be sub-
nicans of ~iioscor less rational consiclcrations ject to the influence of control. This, if drawn
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resembling an optimization process. Control is up in a very simplified graph, would appear

onc of the specific functions entering it. Funds about as shown in Fig. 1.
havc to bc provided for its implcmentation and A firming up of this rather poorly defined
as it ~ ~ n f o r t ~ ~ n aproduces
tcly no ostensible re- relationship could only bc gained from a large
tusns, control is quite ~ ~ n p o p u l aasr an itcm on scale survey on structural failures, and on the
the final bill. Therefore it is ~ ~ s u a l l rather
y much more frequent ncar-failures. This, alas,
limited in scope. It does not also appear directly is made q ~ ~ i impossible te by tlie customs im-
in tlic spending schcdule for construction, Ieav- posed by our lcgal system which, instcad of
ing aside routinc testing of matcrials, b ~ is~ t making it mandatory that structural failures
subortlinated to thc engineer's own activitics, be reported, in ett'ect usually prevents this due
and for that reason it is restricted by the to unresolved liability suits and the like, or, in
scope of remuneration of the latter which also thc case of the more frequent near-failures, by
principally covcrs design and documcntatio!~. thc common intercst of all parties involved to
Without lamenting about thc current proportion kecp silence.
of cxpenditurc assigned to the control function, On the other hand, it has been demonstrated
this same proportion appears to be generally time and again that human errors are quite
For personal use only.

accepted as 'standard practice' and thus ac- regularly thc cause or among the principal
ceptcd fact. A universal changc in scope of causes of structural failures (IABSE 1974;
control would takc a long time of introduction Knoll 1966; Allen 1975). This view is cor-
and h-nee today's customs must be made the roborated by the same lcgal proceedings that
basis of an evaluation of today's safety stand- tend t o obscure tlie truc circumstances but LISU-
ards. ally aim at and succced in finding thc indivi-
d u a l ( ~ )who can b e held responsible for any
Human Sources of Errors failures. The point is not to discuss the right or
For sevcral decades tlie application of tlic wrong of this legal principle but the fact that it
classical theory of matlieniatical statistics on has been accepted through all the ages and
tlie niultitude of errors in building has bcen cultures. It suggests that tlie individual is indeed
tricd, with mixed succcss. Certain spccific areas ~.esponsiblcfor all shortconiings that lead to
arc q ~ ~ i treadily
e accessible to such method7 structural failure. This is true in spite of the
like propertics of properly manufactured ma- fact that the means a t his disposal t o counter-
terials, and loads duc to natural causes. Tlic act the danger of human errors a r e restricted
rationally statistical approach becomcs, liow- by limitations of time and econoniics imposed
evcr, much more difficult as soon as personal by other conditions than the after-the-fact legal
decisions of individuals become involved. It procedu~.es.
could be thought that even tliis group of causes
could be treated with statistical methods. This
has, to the knowledge of the writer, never been
seriously attempted simply because tlie task is
too formidable. No increase in knowledge can
be hoped for in tliis direction beyond very
generalized considerations of the type that
social and political sciences produce on human
behaviour, and which cannot be of much use
when dealing with down-to-earth design prob-
lems. m a g n i t u d e of e r r o r
All that can be presumed about the be-
haviour of human errors, from vcry practical FIG. I . Efrec~sof human e~.~.or-s.
 KNOLL 41 1

Again then: human errors must be accepted with S, reflecting a statistically cxpected scatter
to be at the bottom of most or all that goes of relevant material properties, S,: representing
wrong in building. And: human errors arc n o t , a similar compensation f o r uncertainties o n the
at least for the time bcing, accessible t o ra- loading side, and S, being the insurance against
tional, statistical methods of evaluation. errors f r o r ~human ~ sources.:+
Consequently and by exclusion the 'statistical It could be argued that it would not b e wisc
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errors' like scatter of material properties, o r to demonstrate to the designer or builder that
of load predictions due to wind, water ctc. care is taken of these shortcomings, through the
must be considered of relatively minor im- very format of the safety margin. However, this
portancc when it comes to assess the grounds fact has hardly escaped thc dcsigncrs and it
of structural failure or deficiency. can be arguctl quite contrarily that a reminder
It appcars then that the only reason for these to cotlc cornmittecs a n d other such bodies
'statistical' errors to become so popular as a about the true nature and purpose of safety
basis for the evaluation of safety margins lics margins coulcl be quite L I S C ~ U I , at least as a
in the very fact that they can be statistically s a f e g ~ ~ a ragainst d hasty changes.
evaluated-rather a case of scientific wishful
thinking or giving in to temptation. Development of Safety Margins,
Traditionally, safety margins havc been ca- Hidden Reserves
librated and gradually ndjustctl to a tolerable Econonlic pressure as well as competition
rate of failures which depends on the valucs among altcl-native construction methods, re-
assigned to property and human life in society presenteci by different trades, compel en&' '[necrs
there and t h e n . T h e relationship between to minimize safety factors. ~ o n s c ~ u c n ad- tl~
For personal use only.

the state of the art of builtling and the neces- justn~cnts of the current margins tend t o go
sary safety margins was assessed purely on invariably in the samc clircction with the ap-
the basis of common consensus, without ml~cli parent justification that technical dcvclop~ucnt
of a rational basis either, save the general has advanced and methods of design. control,
experience. The traditional way to detcl-mine and construction have improved.
safety margins has, however, served quite ati is- But havc they? Is i t really true that the elfcc-
factosily in at least providing safety margins tivc safcty of b~iildinghas improved in recent
which, if conservati\le, reflected the levels of time? Certainly, routinc control of matcrir~ls
skill, dcclication, and acceptable risk of thc clay. as well as knowledge about some loads, in
But, sure enough, it does not respond to today's particular those from natural sources, have
urge for rational and scientific appearance. improved. But can the samc be said on work-
Which approach then is to bc follo\\~ed-The manship, design procctlurcs. ant1 generally on
traditional way of cautious calibration t h r o ~ ~ g h tllc i ~ t t e ~ l t i oevery
n structure gets from thc pro-
-
c x ~ c r i c n c eo r the rational nlethotl using sta- fessionals? Is it not so that cases of shoddy
tistics? As in a11 cases of uncertainty, doubt, o r work and 'rough riclirig' over problc~nsknown
insufficient kno\\~ledge,the best results will surely to exist but ncglectcd, have b c c o ~ u c morc
be obtaincci by sing all the information avail- frequent ~inclerthe evcr increasing pressure of
~tblc,irrespective of form, but with thc proper construction schctlulcs with their dramatically
-
weight attached to every contribution. direct rclationshiv to economics? Is it not so
Since the general experience from use of thc that pencils are beconling sharpcnccl evcr morc
safcty margins in the past still represents our finely ancl reserves that were not a c c o ~ ~ n t cfor d
only source of information on the effects o f earlier become eviclcnt and are being removed
human errors, i t should not be forgotten that
-
it carries a tremendous weight whether or not 'This format does not, in effect, ~eflect t h e true
nature of interaction of errors. It is however i n com-
it is ditficu]t to be cast illto rational f o r m , The
most rational format for a safety \\,auld
mon use and has the advantage to be easy t o read.
A format based on the root-mean-square rule which
then be O n e t h a t t h e two would strictly apply to e r r o r s o f a statistical character
separately. In terms of partial factors it w0~1ld is rather doubtful also, in t h e light of the statement
then read: about the nature of the m o s t important portion of
~ ~ n c e r t a i n t i e sancl
, the 'factor' format can be con-
s = s, .S2.S:: sidered 'as good as any' i n this author's opinion.
 412 C A N . J . CIV. E N G . VOL. 3. 1976
to gain savings in materials? Does rationaliza-
tion of design not cliniinisli tlie true safety of
structures, demanding tliat every structural
nlembcr be cut back to its niinim~~m size, and
laying out structures in such a way tliat 're-
dundant' elements arc eliminated. If one com-
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pnrcs olclcr builclings with tlicir recently erected
counterparts, one finds that there exists a niulti-
t~ltlcof walls, secondary beams, slabs, columns,
and thc like that make LIPinfill, or curtain walls
of olcler builclings. They wcrc not considered
as taking part in the overall transfer of loads
ancl ~ I ~ L I s they
, were not accounted for in tlie
assessment of structural safety. Nevertheless
they are very often of sturdy construction and
certainly contribute substantially to stability
antl overall stiffness of the structure. In nioclern
buildings however, minimization of cost has
also had its consequences on these typcs of
elements. Their design has in general become
n i ~ ~ clighter;
h heavy curtain ~vallsare 1.cplaced
by light framing :uid wintlow sizes increase. Infill
For personal use only.
walls arc made light and removable for the sake
of llesibility and partitions are clisconnectecl
as much as possible from tlie structural skeleton
in orclcr to avoid cracking and other damage
related to builtling motion. If one were to com-
pare the s t r ~ t c t ~ ~safety,
ral as establishctl by the
engineer, on the basis of his design, with the
effective safety as a result of the total strength
of all elements, rcg:~rclless of their purpose ancl
character, a gral~hcould be tlra\\~nshowing tlie
clevclopment of tlie two tliffercnt safety margins
over time (Fig. 2 ) , if only in terms of a tl-ellel.
This graph illustrates how the safety margin,
as laid clown in cotles, is bcing graclually re-
CILICCCL ;lnd tliat. at the same tinie, tlie true safety
niargins are bcing reduced much niore dra-
matically ancl tend to approach the latter,
with the hidden or ~~naccountctl reserves ra-
pidly disappearing.
It is clear that the t r ~ l esafety is tlie one
th:~t governs the failures and ~ v emay thank
our ancestors that so little has happened to
their buildings so far, certainly in part clue to
the fact illustrated in tlie graph above. W e may
also ask ourselves if our lighter and more
econoniical structures will pcrform equally
\veil.
These general deliberations :Ire not intentled
as a lamentation. They shall rather shed some
light on a few aspects that seem to have es-
4 - llrdden r e s e r v e
Eficcrlve s a i c t y r n a r s i n s
i n c l u d i n g ,111 r l c m e n r s
Calculated saicty niargina
b a s e d tin " S t r u c t u l - a 1 olcrncnts"
~nly
FIG. 2 . D e v e l o p m e n t of safety marsins. real and
calculatetl.
caped recent interpretations on snfcty niargins,
maybe because they are not readily presentable
in strictly rational forni.
Recent Changes in Safety Margins,
National Buildi~igCode 1975
Under subsection 4.1.4, a new design ap-
proach is set forth ~lndertlic heading Liniit
States Design. In this approach :I new format
as well as new val~tesfor the safety margirls
are given. It is basically broken down into
four part5, one defined as a performance factor
</I, another as a lo:ld factor n , an importance
factor y, ant1 a load combination factor $. The
total satcty margin is then simplified:
In tlie following brief discussion, t h e emplia-
sis shall he on stecl S ~ ~ L I C ~Icavi~ig
L I ~ C Saside
,
other types of constr~lctionfor which, at tlie
moment, the National Builtling Code (NBC
1975) has not yet intl-otluced limit state design.
Some examples, however, will follow to illus-
trate that stcel constructio~?is not an exception.
T h e performance factor + for steel structures
call be found in the draft of tlic new issue of
Canadian Standard Association ( C S A ) Stand-
ard ,516 which is quoted in NBC 4.1.4. Its
value is give11 as + = 0.9.
T h e loat1 factors set forth are a,, = 1.35 for
dead weight ( D ) , n l , = 1.5 for live load ( L ) ,
antl cvcl = 1.5 for other loads such a s wind or
earthquake ( Q ) . T h e importance factors ./
( N B C 4.1.4.2(5)) vary from l .0 to a s low as
0.8 for buildings of low human occupancy.
A graph of safety margins can now be con-
structed (Fig. 3 ) . Froni this graph it can be
seen clearly that safety margins will vary from
a little less than unity ( ! ) to about 1.65 for
all cases of practical importance. This, if com-
pared to the previous level of about 1.667 (as
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For personal use only.
 414 C A N . J. CIV. ENG. VOL. 3. 1976

Intcd, relating loacl cffects to rcsistancc. Both
arc assumed to be their prcdicted values (for
simplicity local bending is neglected as well as
the part of thc cross section that would be added
to account for it) :
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concrete instead of spray fireproofing, and the
likc, the total amounting to an additional 5 % .
An analysis of second order effects is not
~ ~ s u a l lmade
y for buildings of this type. Experi-
ence shows it to be in the order of less than
10%. With a deflection rate of storey height/

400 at maximum predicted wind, its effect

Considering that the three loads working at would amount to an additional axial load on
oncc reprcscnt a very real casc, this statement the column in question of approximately 4.5%
must mnkc a practising cnginecr rather ap- for elastic conditions. At limit state, however,
prchensivc. the reduction in resistance due to the larger
This shall bc illustrated briefly in terms of inelastic deflection will be substantially more,
a n account of deviations that wcre, hypothcti- say 7 . 5 % .
cally, committed during design, co~lstruction. A number of minor adjustments, relating to
and occupancy of the building. It is not this inaccuracies of the mcthods of analysis used,
writer's intention to over-dramatize and ~ I I L I S etc. will be neglected herc. They are nevcr-
the following deterministic list of errors is but thelcss q ~ ~ i tnormal e and rcprescnt adclitional
a mocicst compilation of real cvents that arc sources of unccrtainty.
not at all out of the ordinary. All of t h c ~ nmust T ~ L Ithe S total effective loacl on the column
+
be assumecl to be within current 'reasonable corresponds to ( ( 2 5 0 0 440) 1.05 1570 X +
standards of cngineering'. 1.35) 1.075 = 5600 k
Thc wind forces, bcing of very complcx Fabrication and construction tolerances (off-
For personal use only.

origin, werc underestimated in four respects: set at splice, straightness of plates a n d shapes)
Other buildings are likely to be constructed allow for cccentricities of the order of more
~ ~ p w i nfrom
d n a latcr than : in. (6.4 m m ) . This would producc an
the onc in q ~ ~ e s t i oat
elate, this produccs buffeting cffects which rc- additional moment of 5600 x : = 1400 in. k
sult in an overall increase of motion (and base (15 0 0 0 mkg). Hence the cross-~ectional area
loading) of 10% or so, with respcct to wind of thc column available for axial load is rc-
load. This has bccn shown to be a vcry real duccd by about 3 in."( 9.3- cm" .
consiclcration in reccnt research. Heavy shapcs a n d plates uscd for columns
Since many buildings are of ncarly symrnetri- ~ ~ s u a l lshow y a reduction of yicld strength for
cal layout, no torsional effects are ~lsuallycon- the total section whcn co~nparedwith mill tests.
sidercd. Effective loaci distribution and the posi- Scc for instance 'Commcntary on Plastic De-
tion of the ccntrc of shear, however, can be sign in Stccl' whcre an average rccluction of u p
offset by 5 % or so q ~ ~ i easily.
tc Add 5% LO to 2 0 % for stecl colunlns is quoted. 111 this
column loads. cxample a nlodest 1.eductio11 of 2 ksi (142
No mctcorological in-depth study is norn~ally kg/cm" is assumed.
madc for buildings of this scale. An increased T h u s thc effective resistuncc of the column
maximum wind specd over thc originally as- against yielding uncier axial load is found to bc
sumed 5 % is q~litepossible. In terms of load,
this represents about 10%.
Thc natural period of thc building is usually and the effective safety margin for a realistic
~~nclercstimatedcluc to the approximative working load is
methods uscd for its determination. This leads S,,,,,, = 5650/5600 = 1.01
to a lower cstimatc of dynamic motion effccts
to about the samc degree, say 10%. It would have bcen, with the previous design
Hence thc effcctive wind forces are exceed- approach (nominal colum~lcross section 195
ing those originally assumed by about 35 5%. in.Vnstead of 174 in." :
A slight increasc in loads relating to gravity
S,,,,,= 195 - 3 ) x ( 3 5 - 2 ) / 5 6 0 0 = 1.13
was found to cxist, mainly relating- to minor
corrections like a hcavier type of partition This result has bcen arrivccl at in a p ~ ~ r e l y
used here and thcre, cncasing of columns with deterministic fashion, in order to illustrate, on
 KNOLI
the basis of current design and construction
practice, what the real safety margin of stecl
buildings would be. A number of statistical
variations have not been iiltroduccd in the
reasoning (e.g. deviations in Live Load, in-
accuracy of analysis, exceedance of thc ex-
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treme wind load, or accidents like fire, collision,
corrosion etc.) assuming that at the end of thc
account there would still be somc rescrve left
in the resistance of thc member. This turns out
to hold true for the original design approach,
to whatever modest extent. For the newly
introduced limit state approach, however, no
reserve is left to resist exceptionally high winds,
or to compensate for slight errors in the anal-
ysis.
Two other examples will deal with another
construction material and mcthod. They relate
to typical incidents this author has had the
opportunity to attend to and may illustrate that
for other construction methods than steel, safety
margins are also at their rock bottom and
For personal use only.
should not be further reduced.
Example 2: Precast Concrete Roof
Precast slab clemcnts were installed with a
span of some 3 1 ft (9.1 in) which represents
about thc upper linlit of application of thc par-
ticular type. A slip of mind of the designer
caused him not to consider the possiblc snow
accumulation due to the adjacent portion of
the building which was about 15 ft (4.5 m )
higher (this might as well have occurrcd due to
later construction of the adjacent building,
this possibly being somebody else's property).
Sincc it is not the intention of this account to
deal with legal aspects, thc fact that the snow
:iccumulation was not considered may be ac-
cepted as a case existing in a multitude of ap-
plications.
Thc precast elenlent in qucstion was found
to exhibit excessive deflections under an ac-
c u m u l a t i o ~of~ snow that occurred some years
after installation, the weight of snow incidcn-
tally being quitc in excess of what the NBC
(1975) stipulates. It failed to collapse, how-
ever, by a margin that was established to be
miraculously small. Had n lower safety margin
been used, a collapse would have inevitably
resulted in this case, as indeed it has in numer-
ous occasions, due to, or better, partially due
to snow accumulation.
Thc point of contention is not, again, the
establishment of guilt, or the inclusion of higher
risk assessment for snow load, or the like; it is
the conclusion that these cascs happen and
that $1 lowcring of the safcty margins woultl
increasc their numbcr drastically, if not ca-
tastrophically, converting cases of 'margii~al
design' into collapscs.
E,tnt~zple3: Precast Eletnetzts, Exposltre t o Fire
Precast doublc T elements were installed to
cover a comincrcial area. 111 thc course of
building alterations it became eviclcnt that a
small fire had occurred at o n e time in the build-
ing. It occurrcd in a inezzaninc space immccli-
ately under the roof element in question. I t re-
sulted in blackening of the concscte and somc
of thc stems of thc T's.
spalling at the ~~ildcrside
The concrete was subsequently clcaned a n d but
for thc reconstruction thc case woultl havc gone
~~nnoticed. As it was, two facts were estab-
lished:
The mezzanine that was hung from thc prc-
cast roof clemcnts. was installed without au-
thorization by thc owner of thc building,
adding substantially to t h e sustained load on
the roof (which hntl not bcen providctl f o r in
thc dcsign) .
The firc had, as was concluded from thc
microscopic appearance of the spallcd pieccs
of concrete, caused considerable heating of the
cmbetldcd wires. Thc degrces of altcrntion of
the concrete infcrsed that thc effcct of cold-
drawing of the wires (; in. concrete cover) was
rcduccd if not eliminated, thus rcducing the
cffectivc strength of these wires to a fraction
of the specified valuc. T h e structurc was sub-
sequcntly salvaged by an auxiliary stcel fram-
ing. It surely represents a ncnr-failure which,
with lowcr safety margins, woultl most certainly
have bcen n real collapse.
Conclusion
Thc number and gravity of structural col-
lapses and failures, and thcir consequcnces has
so far not exceeded a tolerable level. It is re-
ported to compare quite favorably with hazards
due to other causes, e.g. fires (IABSE 1974).
Economics would therefore seem to present
incentives for reducing construction costs a t the
price of a reduction of safety margins. Statisti-
cal consideration would then appear to offer
 4 I6 C A N . I . CIV. ENG. VOI.. 3. 1976

the tool for a rational approach to this task of
optimization.
This approach clocs not, howcver, consitlcr
tlie inlicrently irrational compolicnts of con-
struction wliercver thcy relatc to the tlccisions
antl, alas, shortcomings of human individuals.
Can. J. Civ. Eng. Downloaded from www.nrcresearchpress.com by University of Western Ontario on 11/14/14
control. Therefore the conclusion woultl be a
gcneral format of t h c safety margin as follows,
in closc adhercnce to thc format of the NBC
( 1975) :
s = a ,l3 ( o / +

Fro111 legal and practical cvitlencc it must be whcre tu rcprescnts statistically rationalized
concl~~clcclthat the majority if not all failurcs variations of the loatls, + compensates for
can bc directly relatccl to this plienomcnon statistical tleficicncies of thc resistance, /jr is the
(Knoll 1966; Allc~i 1975). Consequently tliis 'basic safcty m a ~ g i n ' , ant1 (0 is the importance

IIILIS~ bc so as well for all ncar-failures. Taking factor. The value p should, in tliis writer's
thc a~.gumcntonc step furthcr, it can surely bc jutlgmcnt, nevcr be less than /jr = 1.2, ant1 in
saicl ant1 I I I L I S be
~ kcpt in mind tliat tlie n ~ ~ n i b c r
no case should a combination of all factors, in-
of near-failurcs is orclers of magnitude greater clutling the importance factor, o r load com-
than that of the collapses which become p ~ ~ b l i c bination factors yield a total safety margin of
knowleclgc. The qucstion then to bc askcd is: lcss than about S = 1.3. Even buildings where
(lo wc wunt to convcrt thc m ~ ~ cgrcatcr li n ~ ~ m b e r collapsc is not likely to cause injury represent a
of near-failuscs into manifcst collapses, and/or certain value and, i f tlicy fail, entail rathcr un-
to \vliich clcgl-ec? pleasant conscquenccs for all involvetl.
It ~voultlsccm that the tools for answering Thc rcccnt substantial reduction in safcty
tliis cl~~cstion arc still lacking. Then: if a general margins then, as implictl by the Limit Statcs
sctluction of safcty margins (= increase of risk) Design approach of tlic NBC ( 1 9 7 5 ) I I I L I S ~be
For personal use only.

s*:cms intlicatcd, slioulcl not evcry effort bc sccn as a rathcr dangerous lapsc tliat slioultl bc
mudc for i t to rcflcct thc actualities of tlic corrcctetl as cl~~ickly as possible. O r tlo we
s i t ~ ~ a t i orelating
n their main coniponent to tlic really wunt to be tlic guinea pigs for otlicl-
CA'CC~S it is rc;~IIy co~iipcnsatingfor; na~iicly countries or, as a foreign cnginecr remarkctl
the human crrors. Ancl, niorc important, sliould on tlie subject: "Lct tlic Canadians try it out,
not this component of tlit safety margin be \ \ c will be gratcful to know. ..."
maintainetl as a rock bottom minimum through- A , ., 11,E, 1975. ~ i , , , i ~ clesign-a p,.o~yclbilistic
out, rcgnrcllcss
- or othcr considerations. If o ~ i c st~ldv.Can. S . Civ. E n r . ~ ( 1 .nn. L
). l a y .
llcsitatcs to name it 'hLlman error margin' or CAK:\DI,\S S . I ~ N D A I I ASSO(.I-\.IION. DS 1976. S l ~ e lst~'Llc-
~ L W L ' Sk)r h~iilclillgs.(CSA)S-16. 1'1.oposedRevision.
like, specifying its llatul.c thereby in-
IN'TLRN;\.I I O N A L ASSUCl ~ 108 l F U R B R I D GA~N D S.llItiC-
viting tlic builders to thc vicw that tlicy can
now 'afiorcl bluntlcrs', it could bc r~.namccl
.,,,
R,-". ". 79.
,,
E N c ; I N I ~ E R I N G , 1974, Syn,posillm Quehcc, Final
8 2

'basic safcty margin'. Thc only variation that KNOLL..F. 1966. Gruncl~;i~zlichcs rur Sichcl-heitdel-Twg-
,,,iglIt bc r;ltionalizecl for this basic margin is "el-kc. Sch\veizerArchi\ f~lera~~ge\vanclIc Wissenhchaf~
uncl Tcchnih.
the intensity of control (supervision, checking) ,\,. N,\L
CclDt O F C c \ N A D A ( N B C , , ,y75.
which, alas. is itself very cliflicult to assess ancl p. 148.