Table of Contents

Introduction

Importance of Topic

Methodology

The Soviet Experience

Historiographical Arguments

The Soviet Explanation

The American Explanation

Scholarly Explanations

My Take

The American Experience

Historiographical Arguments
 At the beginning of the semester I began this class with a simple question: why is

America still stuck in Afghanistan? This was supposed to be a short lived war in a country

unable to put up much of a fight. Ten years later the original assessment of a quick and easy

operation seems laughable. As I began reading further into the history of Afghanistan it became

apparent that this was not the first time that this barren, backward, poverty stricken country

has succeeded in stifling much more powerful and prosperous nations’ forces. Thus, the scope

of my question widened. Whether it was the ancient Romans, the British in the 1800’s, the

Soviet Union in the 1980’s, or America currently; Afghanistan has become a sort of graveyard

for powerful empires. How is this possible? How is a nation of such little resources and no

military to speak of able to bog down, frustrate, and even defeat such overwhelming forces?

This question became the central theme for all of my readings and will be the focus of this

paper.

Importance

This topic, and my question in general, is of the utmost importance for anyone

interested in the welfare of both America and the world in general. The Middle East in general

is essential to a growing global economy and oil plays a large role in that importance. Although

in the case of Afghanistan oil has never been linked as a reason for invasion, interest in the

region in general typically stems from the need for cheap resources. America entered

Afghanistan in 2001 on a mission to avenge the fallen of 9-11, root out the Taliban who was

harboring al-Qaeda, and kill Osama bin Laden. In the 13 years that followed, American lessons

in Afghanistan have come at a great cost. Between 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom
began and 2012 over 2000 American soldiers have been killed in combat1. Although counting

the exact toll in civilian casualties has proven to be a difficult task it is estimated that between

18,000 and 20,000 Afghan civilians have been killed in that same time period2.

And what exactly has been accomplished? Over 13 years have passed and little progress

has been seen. The Taliban is as resilient as ever, drug production has skyrocketed, the

international community is losing the political will to remain, transitioning to Afghan security

forces has been slow and bumpy, the government in place is shaky at best and still has many

rule of law issues to resolve, America has overstretched and overused its military and put a

major strain on its economy at home, and al-Qaeda is flourishing both in the Hindu-Kush region

as well as other countries like Syria, Libya, etc. America has spent over $641.7 Billion on the war

since 2002 with over $198 Billion being spent in the last two years alone3. Sure Osama bin-

Laden is dead but was one man worth the extreme cost? I would hope that every American has

a keen interest in both how and why this has happened in the hopes that it can be avoided in

the future, if only for their own health and prosperity.

Beyond the ramifications for America, Afghanistan and the Afghan people, in the age of

terrorism the concept of “blowback” is frighteningly real. As ex-CIA spook Chalmers Johnson

puts it, “”Blowback" is a CIA term first used in March 1954 in a recently declassified report

on the 1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran. It is

a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the US government's international activities

1
"U.S. Death Toll." USA Today, n.d., Newspaper Source Plus, EBSCOhost (accessed May 7, 2014).
2
Dreyfuss, Bob, and Nick Turse. "America's Afghan Victims." Nation 297, no. 14 (October 7, 2013): 1-14. Political
Science Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed May 7, 2014).
3
Cordesman, Anthony. "The US Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013." Center for Strategic and International
Studies. N.p., 14 May 2012. Web. 07 May 2014.( https://csis.org/publication/us-cost-afghan-war-fy2002-fy2013)
that have been kept secret from the American people. The suicidal assassins of September

11, 2001, did not "attack America," as our political leaders and the news media like to

maintain; they attacked American foreign policy. Employing the strategy of the weak, they

killed innocent bystanders who then became enemies only because they had already

become victims. Terrorism by definition strikes at the innocent in order to draw attention to

the sins of the invulnerable.4” This is not to excuse the actions of those taken on 9-11 but

instead tries to explain the logic behind their methods. It is important that Americans

understand that the world is a much smaller place than it once was. An ocean no longer

affords the protection it once did and actions taken abroad can very quickly and lethally

effect the homeland. And as the world’s only remaining superpower, having an aggressive

foreign policy places a giant target right on America’s back. “Blowback” is important when

discussing any use of force that a country decides to take. The people we embrace today can

quickly become our biggest threat tomorrow, as is the case with America and the Mujahedeen

they armed to fight the Soviet’s in the 1980s. What would be called by many our greatest

victory in the Cold War came full circle on 9-11, the most horrific case of “blowback” in

American history.

To understand Afghanistan is to understand why overwhelming force is not always the

answer, and that technology and money is not always the determining factor in a conflict. The

Soviets had overwhelming force, advanced technology, and an iron fist. It helped led to the

downfall of the entire Soviet Communist system as they spent a decade stuck in the sand. To

understand Afghanistan is also to begin to understand human nature. The will to fight can out

match an overwhelming force and advanced weaponry, as Americans should well know from
4
Johnson, Chalmers. "Blowback." The Nation. N.p., 15 Oct. 2001. Web. 07 May 2014.
<http://www.thenation.com/article/blowback>.
their own story of independence. This is especially so if those you are fighting against are well

trained from years of constant warfare and believe that they are doing the will of God (Islamic

extremists) or are defending their homeland (political factions vying for power or Afghan

security forces). Whether Americans like it or not many around the world see them as a large,

aggressive, empirical power that only holds its own interests at heart.

Wars of aggression, (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) no matter how well intentioned,

typically do not help to change this view and can very well increase the chances of more

terrorism in the future. What kind of “blowback” are we creating with our actions in

Afghanistan today? And will we look back and say it is worth it? These are questions that

demand answers. Far too often history repeats itself either because humans do not learn from

the past, or even worse they learn the wrong lessons from it. To learn the correct lesson you

first have to start with the right question. That question for me, which I hope to shed light on

with the rest of this paper is: what lessons can be learned from both the Soviet and American

experience in Afghanistan, what does America need to do going forward to avoid more

blowback at home, and how does Afghanistan recover?

Methodology

The history of Afghanistan is rich, full of violence, and extremely long; something that I

would not dare to tackle in one relatively short paper. The scope of my topic is also rather large,

which unfortunately leaves very little historiographical work directly dealing with my question.

Thus, during the course of the semester I have broken it into three main historical time periods:

first, pre-WWI Afghanistan and the “Great Game” era; second, the Soviet communist era; and
third, the post 9-11 era. I chose to do this because each of the last two eras are both closely

intertwined and very recent, while the first one helps to establish a broader historical context

for the culture and people of Afghanistan.

Although both the Soviet and American experiences have their own historiographical

arguments for as to why the results were what they were, I believe that there are themes and

similarities between the two that will be quite illuminating and will help to guide my final

analysis. As such, the structure of this paper will be: first, examine the historiographical

arguments for why the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan; second, to examine the current

American conflict in Afghanistan and evaluate the arguments for why it has not gone as

expected; third, look at the broader historical and cultural arguments for why Afghanistan is the

way it is; and finally, I will try and garner any themes or similarities between the two most

recent conflicts, put them in historical context with the larger Afghan history and try to provide

an answer to my initial inquiry.

The Soviet Experience

Russian interest in Afghanistan extends back long before the Soviet Union was ever

formed. During the 1800’s the Russia Tsars and the British Empire continually fought over the

region both clandestinely and openly during a period known as “The Great Game”. It was not so

much Afghanistan itself that held interest for either nation, but instead the British hoped to

maintain the area as a buffer against any invasion of its colony India. The idea of being
important only for their ability to be used would become a theme of Afghanistan and its people

for the next 200 years.

Between 1919 and 1978 Afghanistan was constantly weighing the balance between its

immediate neighbors and major foreign powers such as Britain, Germany, and the United States.

Its proximity to the Soviet Union and other Soviet satellite states led to a normalization of

relations between the two countries, and eventually in April of 1978 a “leftist band of Soviet-

trained officers” overthrew the ruling government and established the Democratic Republic of

Afghanistan. They immediately became the newest client state of the Soviet Union and made

sweeping changes to the country that ran opposite of the popular culture5. The communists

who seized power spent more time fighting with each other for power than actually

implementing socialist reforms in the country. As such, in order to consolidate power and stop

the infighting, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev decided military intervention was the

only means of controlling their new government proxy6. With such a large and powerful military

at his disposal, how could this possibly be hard?

Initially the Soviets sent 30,000 troops into the country but that number would

eventually grow to over 100,000. Immediately a force from both within the country and from

neighboring Arab states began to fight back. Known as the Mujahedeen, these fighters would

find external support from places like the USA, China, and Saudi Arabia. Although much smaller

in numbers and outdated in technology they were able to resist the Soviets over the course of

5
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), xxii.
6
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), xxiii.
10 years. So much so that the Soviets were forced to withdraw in 1988. In 1992 the puppet

government in Kabul fell and the country was thrown into the throes of civil war.

Historiographical Arguments

As with any historical event, or any event really, there are multiple explanations as to

why the outcome was the way it was. Each explanation has its merits as well as its faults and

none tend to ever explain the whole truth of the matter. In almost all cases what is the “truth”

is often dependent upon who is telling it. In the case of major historical events there are

typically the same sorts of people who will tend to see things in relatively the same way. In the

cases I will be looking at there are similar categories of thought. In this case I have divided the

categories into: scholarly explanations, the Soviet explanation, and the American explanation

(as told through politicians and the CIA).

The Soviet Explanation

The Soviet General Staff, which wrote the book The Soviet Afghan War: How a

Superpower Fought and Lost ascribes the loss to both a lack of political support for the war at

home as well as a disregard for Afghan history and culture. They believe that their forces were

seen as complete outsiders and because of this could never garner the support of the people

for the cause of socialism nor for the Communist leadership either in Kabul or Moscow. As they

wrote “It is now clear that the Afghans, whose history includes many centuries of warfare with
various warring groups, could not see these armed strangers as anything but armed invaders.

And since these strangers were not Muslim, a religious factor was added to the national

enmity.7”

Further adding to this problem was the decision to use a large amount of Central Asian

forces in their divisions. The high counsel had hoped that being neighbors and also ethnic

minorities within Afghanistan that they would be less likely to be seen as outsiders and be able

to bridge the cultural gap8. It is the determination of the General Staff that this actually

compounded the problem because the pushtans in charge of the resistance in Afghanistan had

traditionally been in conflict with the ethnic minorities of the north.

They go on further to claim that the war they were fighting was not a typically defined

war. It had no front lines per se, the Afghans had no military vehicles, no aircraft, and used

guerilla tactics that the Soviet military structure was ill suited to combat. The rugged terrain as

well as the need for quick deployment, fighting, and extraction, placed a heavy burden on the

Soviet’s helicopter force. Which according to the staff “disclosed serious shortcomings in pilot

training and the capability of the aircraft to perform adequately in Afghanistan. Further analysis

disclosed very weak preparation of combined arms commanders and staffs in organizing and

maintaining coordination with army aviation on the battlefield.9”

7
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 304.
8
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 305.
9
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 308.
 Lastly they blame the political will of both the people and commanders in Soviet Russia.

High rates of casualties with very little, hard to define successes sapped the nation of its will to

fight in Afghanistan over the time period. Although the staff claims the morale of troops in and

returning home from Afghanistan was high, this is unsupported by the suicide rates of returning

soldiers as well as actual accounts.10

In general the Russians tended to blame their own military structure, supply lines, the

new type of warfare and lack of political support for the war for their failure. They note that the

commanders neither knew nor cared for the culture or history of the Afghans and tactically it

hurt them. However, they fail to mention how that culture and history perhaps prepared the

Afghans to fight a much more powerful force. They also do not give any credence to the fact

that by the end of the war exterior forces were at work in Afghanistan both funding and arming

the rebel fighters. It is also important to note that in their assessment they would be required

to inform their leaders, which were apt to “kill the messenger” if things were not explained

delicately or “spun” in the correct way. Because of this it is hard to decipher what is spin and

what the generals truly thought at times.

The American Explanation

If you ask any fan of Ronald Reagan, or most politicians at the time, the Soviet withdraw

from Afghanistan had very little to do with the might and power of the Soviets, or their lack of

ability to supply their troops. Nor was it due to the ethnic cleavages that helped to provide an

10
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 309.
unstable country to try and build on in the first place. If you ask a politician in the early 90’s why

the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan it was because of Charlie Wilson, the Mujahedeen, and

the politicians responsible for supporting these “freedom fighters”. Of course this is how all

politicians tend to spin things. When things are great they take all of the credit and when things

are bad they try and deflect all of the blame. However, it is my job to inspect the validity of this

set of arguments.

Officially the United States began helping to fund Afghan rebels after the Soviets

invaded in December of 1979. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carters National

Security Adviser, it actually began in July of 1979 prior to the invasion. Although it was not an

overt attempt to draw the Soviets into military action in the country it was designed to help

nudge them in that direction11.

After the invasion support for the Mujahedeen was fairly limited. It consisted mostly of

monetary support funneled through Pakistan’s ISI intelligence service, as well as some small

amounts of specialized training. America was interested in seeing the Soviet Union experience a

Vietnam type of moment but were hesitant to dip more than even a silent toe into the action.

They did not want to risk a hot war breaking out over a country they didn’t have all that much

personal interest in. Although they were keen to give the Soviet Union their own version of

Vietnam.

Although the Carter administration started the funding, it wasn’t until President Reagan

was into his second term that support would dramatically increase. Unlike the Iran/Contra

11
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan." Centre for Research on Globalisation. N.p., Jan.
1998. Web. 07 May 2014. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html>.
situation, Congress was fairly supportive of both Afghan self-determination and supporting the

rebels monetarily12. In 1984 congress even passed legislation supporting Afghan rebels and

called for material aid for the rebels although they were still hesitant to ship American made

weapons in directly. In October of 1984 CIA director William Casey made a trip to Afghanistan

to inspect Mujahedeen training camps where he “watched Mujahedeen rebels fire heavy

weapons and learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic explosives and detonators13.” “By

1987 the US was providing nearly $700 million in military assistance a year14.”

Although casualty rates for the Soviets remained fairly low and the casualty rates of the

rebels were high, they were able to survive and thus draw the war out ever longer. It was

thought by many that more was needed to push the Soviets over the edge. Although there was

some fear in both Congress and the CIA that the introduction of high-end, American, anti-

aircraft technology (namely the Stinger Missile System) to the Afghan may have unintended

consequences (“blowback”). Senators like Charlie Wilson and Gordon Humphrey, who had

both been consistently hawkish on the issue, forced the CIA’s hand and in 1986 the

Mujahedeen had their most formidable weapon.

For many politicians and some American scholars, American assistance was the biggest

reason that the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, and the Stinger system was

the final straw that broke the camel’s back. Although the Soviets had been in a stalemate with

12
Galster, Steve. "Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War." Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War. The National
Security Archive, 9 Oct. 2001. Web. 07 May 2014.
<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html>.
13
Coll, Steve. "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War." Global Issues. N.p., 19 July 1992. Web. 07 May
2014. <http://www.globalissues.org/article/258/anatomy-of-a-victory-cias-covert-afghan-war>.
14
Galster, Steve. "Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War." Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War. The National
Security Archive, 9 Oct. 2001. Web. 07 May 2014.
the Afghans for years many believe that it was the introduction of the Stinger that finally tipped

the scales. Most politicians at the time would agree that American support had protracted the

war and was bleeding the Soviets dry slowly, and this does seem to be the case. However the

ability for Mujahedeen forces to be able to effectively neutralize the Soviet Hind helicopter,

which was extremely effective at cutting casualties for the Soviets, was the tipping point in the

war15.

Although I tend to agree with many of these assessments I think it is a little bit Amara-

centric in its view of history. Yes, America was partially responsible for helping to support, fund,

and train these fighters, but they did not create the fighters themselves. They also did not

create the rocky terrain and difficult to maintain supply lines that hindered the Soviet efforts.

There is much more to the story than just technology and monetary support. The will of the

Afghan fighters to hold on for over 7 years before any major support would come from exterior

forces is a testament to their will. The ability to use the terrain and geography of the country

side, especially in the Afghan-Pakistan border region was a huge key in being able to sustain

their guerilla operations. The American explanation also does not take into account the geo-

political timing of the Soviet withdraw and the political climate within the Soviet Union which

had switched to reform and resumed detente under Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Scholars Explanation

15
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 305.
 Although not all scholars agree of course, and some explain the Soviet loss through a

combination of both of the above explanations. They tend to agree that American support for

the Mujahedeen prolonged the war and seriously weakened both the Soviet resolve and ability

to operate on the battlefield effectively. They also tend to agree that the Soviets ability to fight

this sort of war was less than perfect. Beyond that though they tend to put the Soviet Afghan

conflict in a larger Cold War context.

By 1985 social reform was becoming a much more important issue at home in the Soviet

Union than external conquest. “Moscow began to pull back from costly and failing ventures, to

cut losses abroad and attempt to achieve political settlements16.” Détente was becoming to be

the new Soviet foreign policy and Afghanistan was a sticking point between the two nations

that the Soviets felt they could relinquish. “Guns gave way to butter as the Soviet’s economy

and domestic needs demanded attention over costly foreign ventures17.

Domestic economic issues were causing the population in Soviet Russia to change their

mind about socialism and communism in general. Blue jeans, rock music, American pop culture,

and the prosperity they saw in Western Europe all effected the willingness of the Russians at

home to spend what little they had maintaining an empire abroad. The morale of the troops

coming home was also an issue as it spread the distaste for the war even further. The economic

situation of course was not solely due to Afghanistan. Years of Cold War, corruption in

leadership, conquest, and military expansion had worn down the Soviet economy to a breaking

16
Rogers, Tom. The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan: Analysis and Chronology. London: Greenwood Press,
1992, 3.
17
Rogers, Tom. The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan: Analysis and Chronology. London: Greenwood Press,
1992, 4.
point. Keeping up with American technology in both the space race and the atomic arms race

took a huge economic toll as well. The Americans had given them their Vietnam to be sure, but

it was not just the protracted war in Afghanistan that doomed the Soviets.

Although I do like most of the scholarly arguments that I have read, it seems that very

few reverence is given to Afghanistan itself for the win. In the game of geo-politics the Afghan

people were the pawns and the two kings had dueled using them. Their arguments put this

conflict in the larger Cold War paradigm they still tend to focus on solely the issue of east versus

west. Though they do tend to give credence to the fact that Afghanistan, due to its social

cleavages, ethnic makeup, and long history of guerilla war, they tend to overlook them when

explaining why either the Soviets failed or the Americans won. Neither of these explanations

really account for the will of the Afghans as well as foreign fighters who flocked to their cause.

They also don’t take into account the actual fighting of the war and the tactics required to win a

guerilla style conflict. The Soviet army was built to fight wars against major powers on the

planes of Europe, not tiny hit and run forces in an extremely disperse, mostly barren, dry and

rocky, Afghanistan.

My Take

As with any major military conflict there are hundreds of thousands of individual events

that slowly shape the course of the war. Even the most well laid plans have to endure the “fog

of war” where everything you planned no longer matter as situations on the ground change. So

to try and ascribe one direct cause for the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan is both impossible and

foolhardy. Many factors came in to play but I think a few are most important.
 In general though, the Soviets found themselves in an artificially limited war. In a total

war your nation is fully invested in the outcome and the war typically effects the entire society.

World War One and Two were both examples of total warfare. These types of wars tend to pit

nations against other nations, have large uniformed armies, and your entire nation’s existence

was dependent upon the outcome. Natural limitations to war include things that are out of

your control, such as terrain, climate, population, economic development of the country, etc. In

an artificially limited war there are limits placed on the amount of effort, money, manpower,

and political will that will be expended in achieving the wars overall objectives.

The Soviets did not want to draw America into direct conflict over Afghanistan,

especially in the early to mid-80s when détente became the focus of their foreign policy with

America. As such, they limited themselves on what they were willing to do to ultimately win in

Afghanistan. Initially they did not want to occupy the country with thousands of troops as

ultimately happened. Typically, in an artificially limited war, you end up fighting a protracted

defensive war of attrition, and if you come into it with little political will in the first place, that

will can dry up rather quickly. If you start out playing not to lose, how do you ever expect to win?

This is one of the biggest problems with fighting any artificially limited war.

In the case of Afghanistan the objectives were fairly limited for the Soviets. They initially

did not want to occupy the country by force at all. The proximity to Russia made it natural that

they would hold distinct interests in the region and as such they wanted another satellite state,

both increasing their power in the region as well as providing more of a buffer against Islamic

radicals (as found in Iran and Pakistan). They believed that they could install a Communist ruler

who was already in Afghanistan, control them from Moscow, and institute sweeping social
reforms in the country. They quickly found out that local and regional issues would make this a

much more difficult task than they first expected.

The Communist party in Kabul squabbled and fought over power and who would rule to

the point that a direct Soviet invasion was required. This should have been the first clue that

working with the Afghans was going to be extremely difficult. Afghanistan is a diverse yet

extremely religious country, with deep ethnic differences that make it extremely hard for even

local rulers to govern. Socialism and Soviet Communism is a completely foreign concept to a

country full of devout and sometimes extreme Muslims. Trying to make this change, I believe,

would have proved impossible enough.

Added to the ethnic makeup of the population is the complications that the countryside

itself offers. It is completely landlocked and is mostly desert or extremely rocky mountainous

terrain. Supplying a large army was inevitably going to be a serious challenge. The Soviet army

was ill equipped to deal with this, which their generals readily admit. The terrain also made it

very difficult to stop guerilla fighters from making quick strategic strikes and retreating to the

mountains where large amounts of troops and bulky tanks could not be effective. What is more,

the Mujahedeen was mainly comprised of Pashtuns who were also found in bordering Pakistan.

Thus their ability to both safely retreat into and recruit from Pakistan (and many other Middle

Eastern nations) was something that the Soviets could do little about. The Soviet strategy

seemed to hinge upon the Hind helicopter and its ability to quickly move troops from one brush

fire to another. Because these attack helicopters were well armored and able to deliver their

payload from distances that the small arms of the Mujahedeen could not reach they were fairly

effective.
 This is where I believe the Americans were most helpful. Although they had been

supporting the Mujahedeen for years with training and money, it was not enough to overcome

the Hind helicopter. The Afghan and foreign fighters were fierce in their resolve and it is to be

commended. Many in the Islamic world saw the Soviet takeover as a threat to both the region

as a whole and Islam itself, and thus they flocked to Afghanistan to help kick them out. They

had made great progress in stalemating the second most powerful nation on earth, but the

Hind was proving to be extremely effective at limiting Soviet casualties and increasing rebel

casualties.

Finally American politicians convinced the CIA and DOD that if they wanted to really

give the Soviets their own Vietnam, America had to provide more than just small arms and

money. They needed to give them a weapon that could counter the Hind. The introduction of

the Stinger missile system to the Mujahedeen increased the cost of continuing the war in

Afghanistan to a point that political will to stay was completely sapped.

So, to me it is a combination of things that doomed the Soviets: first, they

underestimated the challenges that the ethnic and religious makeup of Afghanistan would

create in both installing a Communist ruler and later occupying the country; second, their army

was ill equipped for the terrain and geography of Afghanistan; third, the terrain was built for

guerilla fighting and the mountainous region that bordered Pakistan made it easy for

Mujahedeen to both recruit and seek haven; fourth, and this may be the most important, if you

fight in a defensive war of attrition, which is what Afghanistan became, you need either

extremely high political will to win or you must accomplish your goals quick enough that what

will you have is not spent completely; fifth, geopolitically the Soviets were already beginning to
draw their empire back as reforms at home focused their attention more internally, which

ultimately made Afghanistan expendable; and finally, I believe that the Americans helped to

ensure that the war was drawn out long enough that what little will to win the Soviets did begin

with was completely drained.

The American Experience

In the years that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the country fell into

civil war. America had stopped actively supporting the Mujahedeen and was for the most part

ignoring Afghanistan in the aftermath of the proxy war they had just ostensibly won. The power

vacuum left by the retreating Soviets would eventually be filled by the Taliban. Ironically, it was

the Soviet-Afghan war that helped to create this violent brand of Islamic fundamentalism.

Refugees from this conflict migrated to Pakistan where they were taught a violent and extreme

view of Islam, and by 1996 they had secured power in Afghanistan. They maintained this

control in brutal fashion but America still had no more than a passing interest in the country.

That would all change on September 11th 2001.

The story does not have to be told in great detail to any American who was old enough

to have memories of that day. America had just experienced the greatest instance of terrorism

in its history and it was searching for both answers and culprits. It quickly became apparent that

those we had helped to create in the 1980’s had come back to haunt us.

Within a few days it was determined that Islamic fundamentalists were behind the

attacks, namely Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda, and Afghanistan was their main refuge. When
America demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama and end any support for terrorism they

were giving, the Taliban refused. With the entire world behind them and their cause, America

began Operation Enduring Freedom in October of 2001.

Although it was technically an invasion and could be considered a war of aggression, this

was not the same as the Soviet invasion in the 80’s. While the Soviets were looking to expand

their influence in the region and add another satellite state to their union, the American

invasion was based upon moral principle and bringing justice to those who had attacked them

on 9/11. They went in with a broad coalition of other nations and had the moral high ground in

the eyes of the international community.

America along with Northern Alliance forces were able to capture Kabul in less than a

month. It took less than a month for the NA to capture almost all of northern Afghanistan and it

seemed militarily victory would come fairly easy. By December NA and American forces had

pushed the Taliban all the way to the edge of Pakistan in the Tora Bora region. It is during the

fight for Tora Bora that Osama bin-Laden was able to slip into the mountainous region on the

border of Pakistan and escape coalition forces. This would prove to be a major failure that

would haunt America for over a decade.

By the end of 2001 an interim government had been sworn in and the reconstruction of

the country could begin. It was at this point that the war turned from offense and trying to rout

out the obvious enemy, to a war against insurgents still left in the country after the Taliban left.

Counter-insurgency warfare is in essence a form of artificially limited warfare. Your objective is

limited in that you are not going to target everyone in the country. In fact, your enemy is fairly
hard to define and find because they slink back into the shadows as soon as their attacks are

done.

Americans faced challenges both in the cities with insurgents as well as near the

Pakistan border with al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters who were using the same tactics they had to

defeat the Soviets. In March of 2002 America and their allies launched Operation Anaconda,

which was the largest anti-Taliban and al-Qaeda operation since the Battle for Tora Bora.

Although America would claim numerical victory, in the end it did very little to stop what was

going on in the country as a whole.

By 2003, with progress being seen for Afghanistan’s new government and their security

situation, America decided to invade Iraq. This turned a lot of attention and manpower away

from Afghanistan at what might have been a very critical time for stabilizing the country.

During this time the Taliban was able to regroup and increase their own ability to strike at the

new Afghan government fairly well unchecked. Terrorist attacks were becoming the norm in

Afghan cities during 2003-2006 and eventually America would have to turn its attention back to

this growing problem. A problem that persists to this very day, and has made Afghanistan

America’s longest war to date.

Historiographical Arguments

Let us make no mistake in terms of casualties inflicted and sustained, territory taken,

and what most people would consider military objectives in Afghanistan, America won the

“war”. What they lost was the peace. After over a decade in Afghanistan the situation is just as
precarious as it ever was. The elected government still has issues with the Rule of Law,

terrorism, the Taliban, and finding a way to rebuild a country that has been in constant rebuild

mode for the last 200 years. How is it that once again a major power has been thwarted in such

a backwards nation? America had the world behind them when the initially invaded

Afghanistan, and more importantly they had the moral high ground in the situation. How then

were they able to be strung out in the desert for over a decade while seeing relatively little

progress in the meantime? If their only goal had been to find and capture or kill Osama bin-

Laden how did it take them 10 years to do so? I have some explanations of my own but there

seems to be a few schools of thought on why America has struggled to secure the peace, which

I will try and diagram here.

American Military Explanations

Most of the military explanations I have seen for why America has been bogged down in

Afghanistan typically revolve around counter-insurgency war strategy. Take for example Donald

Wright’s book A Different Kind of War in which he and the US Contemporary Operations Study

Team attempt to analyze the American efforts in Afghanistan. Although this was printed in the

early part of the war they paint an optimistic picture of how the US could win it. This is to be

expected as coalition forces had quickly taken the country. It was their assessment that the

Americans had to be seen as liberators and not occupiers, which is what the Soviets had been

and was part of the reason for their failure. To do so they had to secure the country as fast as

possible with as little force as possible.

 They also believe that because of the lack of boots on the ground Americans

squandered early opportunities to secure the country, had there been more troops on the

ground, they believe that the Taliban and al-Qaeda could have been crushed in the Battle of

Tora Bora. The author calls it a bit of a paradox because too many troops and you look more

like invaders, but not enough and you risk allowing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to escape and

begin a guerilla war that could last years. Which is exactly what happened.

Tactically, the reason that America has had so much trouble remains fairly the same as

the Soviets in the 1980’s. Although better trained and equipped for guerilla warfare, the terrain

was still much more conducive to those taking the offensive in this war than those on the

strategic defense. Tora Bora, which Operation Anaconda focused solely on, is still hard to take

because the rocky, cave strewn, mountains do not allow for heavy armor or bombardment to

be effective. Because the Americans relied heavily on air power and technology instead of men

on the ground, they could only project so much of their power.

It is also the argument of many in the military/political class that Iraq was a distraction

at just the wrong time. Because the country had shown signs of progress prior to 2003, America

thought it was able to take its eye off the ball and thus allowed the progress to regress. In

addition to allowing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to regroup and rearm, it increased war fatigue

within the American populace. It is hard for any nation to fight two major wars, both

economically and mentally. The will to fight is of utmost importance when you are dealing with

insurgency and guerilla warfare, and Iraq drained that will even further than Afghanistan. So by

the time America turned its attention back to Afghanistan a lot of the progress that had been

made was lost, and there was even less interest at home to correct it. As well the invasion of
Iraq eroded the moral high ground that America had relied upon to gather such a large coalition

of forces in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, once again America found itself in an extremely artificially limited war,

which they have never had great success in. They had to walk a very tight rope between

securing the nation itself, rooting out who the enemy was, stop terrorism, and all the while be

seen as liberators and not occupiers. 10 years later it is hard to convince a people that you are

liberating them.

Scholarly Explanations

In his book In the Graveyard of Empires, Seth Jones of the foreign policy think-tank

RAND Corporation offers an explanation for why the insurgency has been so hard to counteract.

He believes that America had both the technological and economic means to both depose and

install a new government successfully in Afghanistan. However, he believes two major

problems plagued them in implementing their strategy. First and foremost he lays blame with

the Afghan government itself. Hamid Karzai was not perfect by any means and he blames both

corruption and incompetence for a lack of good governance after the Taliban fell. Because of

this lack of strong leadership it created discontent in rural areas which became a ready supply

of guerilla fighters willing to conduct terrorist attacks inside the cities. Supply is only half of the

equation though. The second half is demand, which was provided for by religious zealots in
both al-Qaeda and the Taliban who helped to convince already angry rural Afghans that they

should retake their Muslim homelands from the “Great Satan.18”

Another explanation is offered by Steve Cole, Pulitzer prize winning journalist and the

author of Ghost Wars, which looks at America’s relationship with Afghanistan beginning just

prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979. He doesn’t believe that the US ever really respected the

ethnic and religious makeup of the country, nor the long history of military intervention in that

country. They thus underestimated the amount of resistance any force, no matter how well

supported internationally and how morally justified, would create. It is his contention that

because Afghanistan has been a “laboratory for political and military visions conceived abroad

and imposed by force,19” that they were a culture that would automatically be resistant to

exterior forces shaping the country.

This is made especially true by who America was choosing to rely on for intelligence and

support, namely Pakistan and their ISI. Pakistan, which had provided America assistance during

the Soviet-Afghan war was tapped once again. The problem this time though was they were

harboring the same enemy they were supposedly helping America to root out and stop. Even

worse, many of the Taliban had deep roots in Pakistan and the Tora Bora region in particular.

Pakistan has never been a true ally of America. They are a regional power who stand to gain by

either a weakened Afghanistan or even better a Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Thus it is Mr.

Cole’s belief that Pakistan, which is where the Taliban originated, never really tried to stop

forces from fleeing through Tora Bora into their territory and constantly played on both sides of

18
Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. Xxix.
19
Cole, Steve. Ghost Wars. New York: Penguine Press, 2004. 569.
the fence when it came to the Taliban and America. Because America was keen to keep

whatever shaky alliance they had with Pakistan intact America never really addressed this

glaringly obvious issue.

Still another explanation is offered by British historian and author of Breeding Ground,

Deepak Tripathi. He maintains that the reason both the Soviet Union and America failed in

Afghanistan is much larger than any alliance, tactics, or strategy. Instead he believes that after

centuries of violence that the culture itself is almost impossible to impose exterior reforms on.

Afghanistan is said by many to have little to no national identity, and is divided deeply by its

ethnic and religious differences. Tripathi argues instead that the only national identity that they

do have is the ability to withstand foreign invasions and use of force to change their society.

Because of the massive amount of violence that has been imposed on this country for the

entirety of its existence he believes that violence has become the norm. As such, any change

either culturally or politically has to be achieved through the use of violence. The west, not

having a culture based on this sort of violence does not have the capacity to comprehend this,

and thus have no chance to change it.

As an explanation of what he means I think you can look at who have been able to

assert control in Afghanistan and how they were able to maintain it over any amount of time.

The Taliban was a ruthlessly brutal regime. In a “culture of violence” as Tripathi calls it, only the

threat of even greater violence can force compliance. Americans do not have the stomach

(rightfully so) to provide the amount of violence needed to control this sort of culture. Another

example that helps to further this theory is the insurgency that has plagued Iraq. Sadaam was

just as brutal as the Taliban in many regards but he was able to maintain control because those
who opposed him feared him enough to still be compliant. While the US could establish some

sort of security while trying to implement some form of constitutional democracy, culturally

they are unable to be brutal enough to gain complete compliance. In a country born and bred in

violence that has gone through a Communist coup and invasion, ten years of brutal civil war,

another five years of Taliban extremism, and a second invasion in the course of just 40 years it

is hard to argue that violence and warfare are not deeply engrained in their pshycie. Because of

this, he maintains, that America had no chance at making any lasting change.

My Take

America went into Afghanistan with the world behind them and what most would

consider the moral high ground. Unlike the Soviet Union, they were not supposed to be going in

to occupy the country. Had the goal of Operation Enduring Freedom been to merely depose the

Taliban and kill Osama bin Laden I believe that America could have succeeded rather quickly.

The problem is when you get rid of the Taliban you create a power vacuum which inevitably

must be filled. Because of this America had an obligation to not just oust the Taliban, but to put

in its place a government that would be friendly to the American cause as well as work for the

Afghan people. It is this third mission that has made it so difficult to leave.

The arguments above provide a fairly good assessment of what has gone wrong for

America in Afghanistan. Tactically we did not have enough boots on the ground to properly root

out l-Qaeda and the Taliban when they were forced all the way to the Tora Bora region.

America, as it seems to always do, relied on superior firepower and technology in hopes that it
would accomplish the missions goals. However, the terrain and climate of the Pakistan/Afghan

border does not allow for Americas superior force to translate. Much like the Soviet Union they

were unable to project their power, which in many cases is much more vital than actually

possessing the power in the first place.

In addition to America’s inability to project the proper amount of force in Afghanistan

they ran into another problem, namely Pakistan. Pakistan is and it isn’t an ally of the United

States. When most people thing of a nation-state they think of a centralized western style

government that has control over the territory it has staked out. This is not the case with either

Afghanistan or Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan this became extremely troubling because those

who America called allies were unable (or perhaps even unwilling) to take the steps necessary

to stop Afghan rebels from crossing into their territory. Much like Cambodia and Laos in the

Vietnam war, guerilla fighters were able to safely reach Pakistan, where they knew America was

very hesitant to strike in full force.

Beyond the tactical difficulties that America faced on the battlefield they also had the

hard task of winning “the other war,” as many have called it. To be able to both reconstruct and

secure Afghanistan at the same time America would needed the cooperation of the Afghan

people. At first, with such sudden success, they were able to get the support needed and

progress was shown. The Taliban was a brutal regime that most the country was glad to be rid

of. However, corruption and incompetence within the Afghan leadership quickly bogged down

the progress that America was able to make. Eventually America stopped looking like liberators

and became what we had set out not to be, occupiers.

 Compounding all of the troubles in Afghanistan was the issue of the Iraq War. Now not

only was America working to both secure and rebuild Afghanistan, they were suddenly trying to

do it in two countries. If, as some of the arguments above outline, the issue of boots on the

ground and manpower was a major cause for America’s struggles in Afghanistan, adding

another war to the mix only made it worse. Although many in the military and political class

believe that America is capable of fighting two wars simultaneously it has been proven

otherwise. Resources that could have been used to secure the Pakistan/Afghan border now

found themselves fighting the same sort of insurgency war in another country. America is a

great and powerful nation to be sure, but the task at hand in Afghanistan was a lot larger than

many were willing to admit at first, and could never have been done with America’s resources

spread so thin.

Finally, and I think this has been proven numerous times now (the biggest example

being Vietnam), America is not good at fighting a protracted defensive war of attrition. The

American culture of war, the way most Americans believe that war should be fought, is not to

be on the defensive. General Patton in one sentence described exactly how Americans feel

about war when he said “I don't want any messages saying 'I'm holding my position.' We're not

holding a goddamned thing. We're advancing constantly and we're not interested in holding

anything except the enemy's balls.” Although the language is a bit course for most readers, the

attitude remains the same. America, and Americans, do not see themselves as those who sit

and wait for an enemy; they march foreward, find them, kill them, and keep marching. Thus the

entire idea of an artificially limited defensive war of attrition is a foreign concept to most

Americans. As such, the political will to fight this kind of warfare is quick to vanish. At the outset
of Operation Enduring Freedom the American populace was completely onboard and gung hoe

to go and kick the Taliban out and find Osama; 13 years later that will has vanished as yet

another nation has found itself stuck in the graveyard of empires.