LAGUNA LAKE DEV’T AUTHORITY V.

CA

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters
since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of
the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake
with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31,
1993 are declared illegal;
(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal
Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA
4850 as amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.

Issue
Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Held
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.

The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.

Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the Infiels
over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan land sought to be
registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable
or disposable public land or within the public domain Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has
introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought
to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela.

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N the land is already a private land - YES
(2) W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations applies- NO

HELD:
(1) YES already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

(2) NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it
must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares.
Alexander A. Krivenko v. The Register of Deeds, City of Manila (1947) [2] was a landmark
case decided by the Philippine Supreme Court, which further solidified the prohibition of
the Philippine Constitutionthat aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including
residential lands.
This was the outcome of the petition by Alexander Krivenko, a Russian citizen, who bought a
residential land in Manila, Philippines on December 1941. However, he failed to register the same
due to Japan’s declaration of war. [2]
Later on in May 1945, he again sought the registration of the same land but the herein respondent,
Register of Deeds, denied the application because as an alien, Krivenko was disqualified to own land
pursuant to the laws of the Philippine jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the Court of First
Instance of Manila which sustained the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Manila. He then appealed
to the Supreme Court.[2]
During the pendency of the appeal, a new circular by the Department of Justicewas released,
instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.
With the effect of the circular swaying in his favor, Krivenko thereafter filed a motion to withdraw
his appeal. However, the Supreme Court deemed it best to exercise its discretionary powers and
denied Krivenko’s appeal, in order to tackle the more pressing constitutional issue; and in the
process, established itself as a landmark case with regard to foreign ownership of lands in the
Philippines.

Issues
There are two material issues in this case.

 The first involves the substantive issue of whether or not a conveyance of a residential land to
aliens infringes Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution.
The above-mentioned provision of the 1935 Constitution provides, to wit:
Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.[3]

 On the other hand, equally relevant is the procedural issue of whether or not
Krivenko's Motion to Withdraw Appeal should be granted.
It is the position of the Court that the granting the motion would result to Krivenko winning
the case not by a decision on the merits but because of the circular of the Department of
Justice.

Ruling
The Supreme Court deemed it wise to tackle the more important constitutional issue rather than
merely give way to the procedural aspect of Krivenko’s appeal. The Court convened for days as to
what course of action to take, and in the end voted in denying the motion withdrawing the appeal.
Borrowing the words of the penned Supreme Court decision:[2]
“We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question
becomes unavoidable…”
“…the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result
that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.”
The 1935 Commonwealth Constitution served as the main point of reference in this case; the
following facts however, should be noted:

1. The 1943 Constitution was already in place at the time this case was penned in 1947
2. Krivenko bought the property in December 1941
3. The dispute about the registration and the denial of such by the register of deeds occurred
in May 1945.
4. Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution was reproduced verbatim in Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1943 Constitution
Dissecting Section 1 of Article XIII (1935 Constitution)
The discussion delved into the definition of the term, “public agricultural lands.” The court made
reference to Section 1, Article XIIIof the 1935 Constitution as the springboard for its discussion.[4]

"SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all sources of potential energy, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens…"[4]

The provision refers to the lands of the public domain as falling under three distinct categories:
Agricultural, Timber and Mineral lands.
It should be clear that lands of the public domain are by the State first and foremost, but its
utilization is limited to Filipino citizens only, or to corporations whose 60% capital stock are owned
by Filipinos. It is clear from these phrases that the bent towards excluding foreigners is already
evident.
“…Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-
five years…”[4]

Applying statutory construction, it would be appropriate to apply the Doctrine of Necessary

Implication. This doctrine is explained in the book of Agpalo:
"The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose..."[5]
It thus is clear that public agricultural land is not within the contemplation of inalienable natural
resources. Public agricultural land is thus alienable.
The term 'alienable', taking root from 'alienation', is described under Act 2874 of 1919 to mean
“…any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use or benefit of the lands of
the public domain other than timber or mineral lands.” [6]
Act 2874 is likewise a relevant piece of legislation in this discussion, because it compiled the laws
relative to the lands of the public domain. Under this act, Agricultural Land is also synonymous to:
Alienable or disposable.[7]
Definition of Public Agricultural Lands
What then are the categories of land falling under “Public Agricultural Land” – those lands which
are exclusively alienable and disposable?
The Supreme Court made reference to various laws and cases, such as the 1908 case of Mapa vs.
Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), the Public Land Act (No. 926), Commonwealth Act 141,
among others.[2]
The general tenor of those references is that agricultural land does not really refer to a literal use
for agricultural purposes, but as to its “susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.” A
technical term whose usage was known and understood by lawmakers and by the Constitutional
Commission during that period, it basically referred to lands not falling under timber or mineral,
and thus includes residential lands.
Equally telling was the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos to a 1939 query as to the
interpretation of the term in question. The Supreme Court gave great weight to the later Chief
Justice’s opinion, to wit:
...At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public
lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase
'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber
nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent
case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity,
therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or
not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and
Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural
purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs.
Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be
sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a
site for his home. [2]
Rounding out the Prohibition against Foreign Ownership
Seeing as how Article XIII section 1 limits the alienation of public agricultural lands to Filipino
citizens, this may easily be circumvented by a simple transfer from a Filipino citizen in favor of an
alien.[2] Thus, Section 5 of the same constitution addresses this explicitly.
Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.[3]
When Sections 1 and 5 are read together, it is therefore clear that aliens are prohibited from
acquiring lands in the Philippines, subject to exceptions provided by law.[2]
The penned decision referred to the Constitutional Convention, specifically the report of the
Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources, for the
purpose behind the principle:
"that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the
Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that
nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.)[2]
This is further supported by the CA 141, which blocked out the right of aliens from acquiring
property by reciprocity; previously granted them by the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and
121.[2]
The Supreme Court affirmed the act of the Register of Deeds in denying the registration of
Krivenko’s land, and established itself as a landmark case when addressing the issue of foreign
ownership of lands within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.

Jurisprudence
The case of Nicolas and Sinforoso Mercado against Benito Go Bio began as a suit “brought in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (civil case No. 55449), to annul a contract of sale and another of
lease on two parcels of land with improvements thereon, on the ground that the deed of sale
purporting to convey to the defendant the parcels of land and improvements is not a sale with the
right to repurchase but a mortgage to secure the payment of a loan.”[8] A settlement was agreed
upon on that case on June 24, 1940.
An execution of judgment was filed by Bio and Mercado based on their right to repurchase the
property offering to pay for his liabilities which Bio rejected, claiming that the right to repurchase
had already expired. Plaintiffs in this case raised the constitutional question because Bio is a
Chinese citizen. The court reiterated the ruling as established in Krivenko, stating:
The rule laid down in the Krivenko case, supra, construing the provisions of section 5, article XIII, of
the Constitution, until over-ruled or reversed by this Court, is binding upon it. Under that rule, the
defendant being an alien or a Chinese citizen cannot acquire urban lands in this country from and
after the date of the taking effect of the Constitution which was approved on 8 February 1935. The
sale of the lots involved in this litigation was made on 21 February 1938 when the Constitution was
in full force and effect. Consequently, the sale to the defendant of the parcels of land and
improvements erected thereon comes under the constitutional prohibition. Such being the case, the
sale is null and void.[8]
The case of Halili v CA once again highlighted the importance of this case, thus stating: “the
landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds settled the issue as to who are qualified (and
disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the Philippines.”[9]
However, the issue at hand involved the subsequent sale from an alien to a qualified Filipino citizen.
Jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid."[8] The court thus held that the selling and
acquisition of a Filipino citizen of land improperly transferred to a foreign national is thereby cured
because the purpose of the lawmakers, as gleaned from the Krivenko ruling, of keeping the land to
Filipinos is thereby upheld. It can be seen here that not only the ruling made in Krivenko is
considered by subsequent jurisprudence but discussions made therein as well.
The Krivenko doctrine has a far reaching application and unless subsequently overruled, remains to
be a controlling doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence.

Public Impact
A little over two months after the promulgation of the decision by the Court on the Krivenko case,
the implication of the ruling is made apparent by a subsequent case. The court narrated in
Cabauatan et al. v Hoo [10] that:
On March 18, 1943, plaintiffs sold to Uy Hoo, married to By Siat, and Siy Hong, a widow, all Chinese
citizens two parcels of residential land situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, which were
formerly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63967, in the consideration of the sum of
P13,000 in Japanese war notes. On November 15, 1947, the case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds,
G. R. No. L-630 was decided by this Court holding that a conveyance of a residential land to aliens
infringes Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution. As a result, on December 15, 1947, plaintiffs
demanded from the defendants to restore to them the lands above-referred to on the ground that
the sale they made thereof to the defendants was null and void, but the latter refused to do so.
Hence the plaintiffs brought this action on January 14, 1948, seeking the anullment of the sale
above-mentioned.
The court in said case that the Krivenko doctrine does not apply because at the time of the contract
of sale was executed on 1943, the Philippines was under Japanese occupation thus the Constitution
of the Philippines, political in nature, being the basis of the Krivenko ruling, was not in force at that
time. Hence, the Krivenko doctrine was not yet used by the court although the court still denied the
application of the plaintiffs for declaration of nullity of the contract of sale because of their “guilty
knowledge” in contracting an illegal sale.
This ruling in Cabauatan v Hoo was further reaffirmed by courts in subsequent proceedings seeking
to annul a contract of sale made during the Japanese occupation and depending on the Krivenko
doctrine.
Examples cited in Arambulo v So, G.R. No. L-7196, August 31, 1954: Ricamara vs. Ngo Ki, 92 Phil.,
1084; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, 49 Off. Gaz., (10) 4321, 93 Phil., 827; Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, 49 Off.
Gaz., (10) 4345, 93 Phil., 861; Cortes vs. O. Po Poe L-2943, October 30, 1953; Talento and Talento vs.
Makiki, et al., 93 Phil., 855.
Exceptions
Eugene Moss[11] appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte denying his
application for the registration of a ten-hectare island on the ground that, being an American citizen
or an alien, he is disqualified to acquire lands under section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
following the decision in Krivenko v Register of Deeds. The case involved Calumpihan Island
acquired by Moss on January 20, 1945 from Rufino Pascual. On March 27, 1962, Moss was
proclaimed its sole owner. On April 3, 1965, Moss, through Dr. Teodorico H. Jaceldo, his
administrator and attorney-in-fact, filed an application for the registration of the said land. Moss is
a retired army colonel, an American citizen, and a resident of Texas, USA.[11]
The court reversed the denial of registration made by the trial court clarifying the prohibition made
on Krivenko. The court held that “while aliens are disqualified to Acquire lands under the 1935
Constitution, citizens of the United States can acquire lands like Filipino citizens.” [11]
Thus, while Krivenko laid down the ruling to prohibit all aliens or those of foreign nationals from
acquiring agricultural land in the Philippines, an exception was made in the form of the Ordinance
appended to the 1935 Constitution by Resolution No. 39 of the National Assembly dated September
15, 1939 hereinafter provided for:
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing Constitution, pending the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines —
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the
Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof.
Clearly, while Krivenko laid down the foundation for prohibition on aliens acquiring land in the
Philippines, it is not an absolute ruling and admits of exceptions.

REPUBLIC v ca
243 Phil. 381

CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private.[1] In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin
and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application. Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and
Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. [2]

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to Lots 1-9.[3]

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription. Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly
after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents
under claim of ownership.[4] Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella
Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to
bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence.

She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession
of the land by Alberto's father.[5]Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax
receipts from that year to 1964,[6] Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts
from that year to 1964.[7]

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.[8]

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded
on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims,
such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.[9]

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which provided that:

"SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands both surveyed and
unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and
the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or
of said islands."
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to
be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217
dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under
the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.[10]

The trial court** denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.[11] The applicants appealed to the
respondent court,*** which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.[12] In other words, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
alienable and registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:

"There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet
and the 'Fredia and Emma' mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet
was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, an American and mining locator. He filed his
declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining
Recorder's Office on October 14. 1909. All of the Kelly claims had subsequently-been acquired by
Benguet Consolidated. Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June Bug
mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of
annual assessment. After World War II. Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June
Bug. and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948.
Benguet redeclared the 'June Bug' for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.

"The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in 1931. and
which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.

"The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having
been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935. they were
removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.

'it is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to
November 15, 1935. when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated: and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDuniel v. Apacihle and
Cuisia (42 Phil. 749). a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain.
Said the court in that case: 'The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the
lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law. the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located
claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could
be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include
prior mineral perfected locations: and. of course, il a valid mining location is made upon public
lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity
of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the
public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith. 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v.
Roonet. 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc 546).

'The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public
domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.'Where there is a valid
location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of
the locator.' (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co.. 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320.
322.) 'When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States
of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the
extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the
issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location
made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues.'
(18 R.C.L. 1152;' (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez. Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259. 265-266).
"It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek
Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.

"We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the
mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government of the
Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private
properties of the oppositors. they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law."[13]
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:

"SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural resources
with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which case beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

"Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding, all
locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve
under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location
except to the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of
the date of their respective locations."
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then
in force removed it from the public domain.[14] By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights
over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of
the land or the obtention of a patent over it.[15] As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership." or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is
not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves
had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier
alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest.[16] The trial judge, who had the opportunity to
consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their
credibility wr. not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was
reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis.[17]

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the rights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below"[18] but she did
not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for it is a
well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.[19] Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the
crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely
mineral once the mining claims were perfected.[20]

As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be
so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:

"Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of
government established under the Constitution."

"SEC. 4. The ownership of. and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of. nor the right to
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface."

"SEC. 5. The ownership of. and the right to extract and utilize the minerals included within all areas
for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and e.xcepted from all such
patents."

"SEC. 6. The ownership of. and the right to extract and utilize. the minerals included within all areas
for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles."
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the Stale, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) an purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ow netship of such land does not give him the right to extract or ulili/e
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be
used by any-private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. For the loss sustained by such owner, he is
of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.[21]

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of
the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. [1] In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for
the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus
be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings
and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section
3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary
for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.[2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.[4]

These provisions are:

(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials
over said area terminates;
 (3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation
thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]

Petitioners pray for the following:

(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of
the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management
to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions
of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine
natural resources.[7]

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.