BOSCO MUN 2019

UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS
COUNCIL
 STUDY GUIDE

AGENDA:

HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN
PALESTINE AND
OTHER OCCUPIED
ARAB
TERRITORIES.
 LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

“When the power of love overcomes the love of power,

Only then will the world know peace.”

Dear Delegations,
This world has been successful in transferring a clear epithet to war.
War, a formula tested when civilizations were just extending in all the
prospects the entities were trying out to draw in, is detested today. It
has been rightly said,
“What the horrors of war are, no one can imagine. It is not a
wound, blood or fever, not the spotted and low, nor dysentery,
chronic or acute, nor cold, heat and famine. They are intoxication,
brutal demoralization, drunken disorder on the part of the
Inferior… and jealousies, meanness, indifference and selfish
brutality on the part of the Superior.”
The Genesis or the foundation of every Constitution derives the
striving quality of a nation for providing the rights to the marginalized
polity. And, it is the Executive Board’s primitive duty to give you an
insight on the situation of the agenda in the demarcated frontier of the
Arab. Delegations, the situation of the Arab can now be given a new
direction only because of your compass.
Master Tejus Arya, presently studying in Class XII, Don Bosco
School, Siliguri pursues commerce and is an avid MUNer. He shall be
serving as the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
He has been a part of prestigious MUN conferences in the country
and is the person you’re trying to look out for to procure command on
the very details of MUNing. Besides being an excellent aficionado for
MUNs, he is also a lover of the cinema. He is an enthusiastic
dramatist, and his words are about to sway you to the utmost, for he
shall be heading you all with all the incentives this committee has to
offer.
 Your first Vice-President is Master Sarthak Ojha, presently studying
in Class X in DBS Siliguri. An ardent debater and an enthusiastic
MUNer, Sarthak has curated a reputation of being a very diverse one.
He has been a part of various simulations, and loves the UNHRC as a
council for budding MUNers. He is young, full of vigour and zest,
and is quite keen towards the development of the MUNing circuit. He
is an Indian committee lover, and while he’s not debating, he can be
found sitting in front of his laptop, binge-watching SUITS.
The young and vigorous Varen Arya shall be heading the HRC as its
second Vice-President. He is the best person when it comes to the
functioning of the UN committees. He is currently studying in Class
X, DBS Siliguri and loves to play basketball. He is a lovely reader too
and is a fan of International Relations. He is a great person to spend
time with, as he is jolly and jubilant, and secures a review as a fun
delegate and EB member.

We await your presence and request you not to rely just on the study
guide for your research work. We hope you come prepared with arms
and ammunition in the committee, and work for peace, for you need
to,
“Be the light in the dark. Be the calm in a storm.
And finally, be at peace when at war.”

Yours sincerely,

The Executive Board, UNHRC

BOSCO MUN 2019.

Tejus Arya Sarthak Ojha Varen Arya

President Vice President Vice President
+919002422105 +919749056538 +917585951520
 HOW TO READ THE STUDY GUIDE
Study Guides are, contradictory to popular belief, not supposed to
contain all the information on a certain topic. A good study guide
consists of information that a delegate can use to gain basic
information on the issue at hand and the links for further research that
they must use to prepare for the final conference. All the information
given in this guide is from an unbiased perspective and we have
refrained from making judgments as much as possible if none has
been made by the United Nations.
An advised pattern of research is the following:
1. Understanding of the UN and the Committee – Mandate, etc.
2. Research on the allotted country, especially with respect to the
agenda, past policies or actions taken
3. Understanding the Foreign Policy of the allotted country by
studying past actions, their causes and consequences
4. Reading the Study Guide
5. Researching further upon the Agenda using the links given in
the guide
6. Preparing topics for moderated caucuses and their content
7. Assembling proof/evidence for any important piece of
information/allegation you are going to use in committee
8. Keeping your research updated using news websites given in the
Proof.

Note to the Delegates:

1. Refer to the UN Charter and UN Today for the mandates of
various organs of the UN.
2. Refer to the structure of UN System.
3. Do not quote this guide as evidence or as an answer to a
question or claim. This is simply to guide you, and be the
bedrock of your research, but should not form the source or
corpus of your research.
 4. The proof you need to submit when it comes to validity of
claims is in this order of priority: i) Reuters reports, ii) Reports
of UN Offices, iii) State/Government Sources
5. Usage of laptops and other electronic devices would be allowed,
during the committee to make work easier for you, and to save
you from carrying enormous amounts of paper, however the use
of internet, need we say it, is strictly forbidden inside council
and any infringement of this rule will make you liable to be
debarred from committee.

Proof / Evidence in Council

Evidence or proof is acceptable from sources:
1. News Sources:
a. REUTERS/AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL – Any article which
clearly makes mention of the fact or is in contradiction of the fact
being stated by a delegate in council. b. State operated News
Agencies – These reports can be used in the support of or against the
State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or
substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any Country
as such but in that situation, they can be denied by any other country
in the council. Some examples are, RIA Novosti (Russia), IRNA
(Iran), BBC (United Kingdom) and Xinhua News Agency and CCTV
(P.R. China) 2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a
similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in
all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a nuance is
that a report that is being denied by a certain country can still be
accepted by the Executive Board as credible information.
Examples are,
a. Government Websites like the State Department of the United
States of America or the Ministry of Defence of the Russian
Federation b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like
India8, People’s Republic of China, France, Russian Federation
c. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations – Reports and
other documents d. Multilateral Organizations like the NATO,
ASEAN, OPEC, etc.
3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible
information or evidence for the Executive Board of the Security
Council. a. UN Bodies: Like the UNSC, GA, HRC etc. b. UN
Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency, World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Committee of the
Red Cross, etc. c. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty
System, the International Criminal Court

Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia, or newspapers

like the Times of India, etc. be accepted as PROOF; but may be used
for better understanding of any issue and even be brought up in
debate, if the information given in such sources is in line with the
beliefs of a Government.

OBJECTIVE

The focus of this background guide is to direct the research of the

delegates on the issue of the Middle East. The Study Guide talks of
the committee and its mandate, the agenda overview, historical
background, timeline, current scenario, position of major countries,
past actions and initiatives and possible solutions. The committee
should come up with a resolution that solves the crisis at hand and
establishes peace in the Middle East.
 COMMITTEE DESCRIPTION

The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the

United Nations system responsible for strengthening the promotion
and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing
situations of human rights violations and make recommendations on
them. It has the ability to discuss all thematic human rights issues and
situations that require its attention throughout the year. It meets at the
UN Office at Geneva. The Council is made up of 47 United Nations
Member States which are elected by the UN General Assembly. The
Human Rights Council replaced the former United Nations
Commission on Human Rights. As the principal United Nations office
mandated to promote and protect human rights for all, OHCHR leads
global human rights efforts speaks out objectively in the face of
human rights violations worldwide. The HRC provides a forum for
identifying, highlighting and developing responses to today's human
rights challenges, and act as the principal focal point of human rights
research, education, public information, and advocacy activities in the
United Nations system. Since Governments have the primary
responsibility to protect human rights, the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) provides assistance to Governments, such
as expertise and technical trainings in the areas of administration of
justice, legislative reform, and electoral process, to help implement
international human rights standards on the ground. They also assist
other entities with responsibility to protect human rights to fulfil their
obligations and individuals to realize their rights.
 INTRODUCTION
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been lasting since the end of the
19th century. The modern one, however, dates back to 1948 when the
Jewish state was proclaimed. There were several acts of violence
between Palestinians and Jews in post-war years (1945-1948). The
most famous was the massacre in the Palestinian village Deir Yasin
which was attacked by Israeli militias, triggering a large exodus of the
Palestinians. This event is often recalled and is even denounced in
Israel, as it divided the Zionist groups.
The first official Arab-Israeli war which marks the beginning of the
modern era of the conflict, began immediately after Israel's
declaration of independence in 1948. Israel calls it a “war of
independence”, whereas Palestine calls it a disaster. Its most
important consequence was that the borders of the UN plan dividing
the territory were not created, while the territory on which Palestine
should be established has been occupied by Jordan (West Bank) and
Egypt (Gaza Strip). In the 1950s and 1960s, large Jewish immigration
took place in Israel and political clusters began to emerge in order to
begin negotiations in the Palestinian territories. The best known was
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which housed the
People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah and others.
At that time, the antipathy of the neighbouring countries to Israel
begun to intensify, resulting in the Suez Crisis, and subsequently in
another war called the Six-Day War which the Israelis won and
captured three times larger territory than they had had before. Sadly, it
was later estimated that almost 21 000 people, of which about 20 000
Arabs, died in just 132 hours of fighting. In that way Israel began to
build the "Great Israel", which has been the centrepiece of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to this day.
In the 1970s and 1980s the peace talks have begun. PLO moderated
and began to meet with representatives of Israel. PLO leader Jásir
Arafat was gradually being accepted as the head of the State since he
was representing Palestine at international stage. Despite peaceful
efforts, another armed conflict called the Yom Kippur War took
place: Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in an attempt to take back the
occupied territories (Siani and Golan). The Arab coalition launched a
joint surprise attack on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism,
which also occurred that year during the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan. Despite initial disadvantage, Israel repelled the attack due
to the weapon supply from the USA.

The consequence of this conflict was beneficial in the end as the

diplomatic negotiations between all parties of the Middle East
conflict, mediated by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and
negotiations on the withdrawal of the hostile armies, began. However,
in December 1980, the first intifada (uprising) broke out in response
to occupation, rising unemployment, settlement and other bloody
struggles. It was mainly characterized by demonstrations and riots,
throwing stones and using light weapons but the Israeli army
responded much harder to this non-violent uprising. It ended with the
signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. In the 1990s peace processes
were restored, and the leaders of both sides even received the Nobel
Peace Prize. At that time, the West Bank was also divided into zones
A, B and C under an Oslo Accords.
Despite the optimistic-looking peace treaties, the second intifada,
which was more violent than the first one, broke out in 2000. The
conflict petered out in 2005 and cost more than 400016 lives since the
Palestinian tactics centered on suicide bombings, rocket attacks, and
sniper fire17. The rebellion triggered an increase in unemployment
and Jewish settlers, restrictions in the Palestinian economy and a
sharp increase of violence between the parties. All of these factors
resulted in the Israeli government's decision in 2002 to build a wall
separating the Gaza Strip and the West Bank from Israel. This project
has significantly affected the geographic and demographic structure
of the entire territory. In order to prevent the "imprisonment" of
Israeli settlers on the Palestinian side, all settlements in Gaza and in
the West Bank were evacuated.

II. Current human rights situation (FROM

THE RAPPORTEUR OF THE HRC)
[THE OFFICIAL REPORT]
1. Palestinians living under Occupation are
increasingly without hope, as the Occupation
continues into its second half-century and the human
rights situation deteriorates day-by-day. Although
not possible to provide a comprehensive review of all
human rights concerns in the period since the
Rapporteur’s last report to the Human Rights
Council,1 the Rapporteur would like to highlight
several situations which merit particular attention at
this time. In particular, this includes the
demonstrations in Gaza and the ongoing
humanitarian and human rights crisis for Gaza’s
residents; the continued advancement of settlements
in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, along
with decisions which appear to pave the way for mass
evictions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem; and
finally the situation of Human Rights Defenders, an
issue on which the Rapporteur previously focused in
his first report to the Human Rights Council
(A/HRC/34/70).

A. Gaza
2. The humanitarian and human rights crisis in
Gaza, as well as the security of its population,
deteriorated significantly in 2018, reflected in the
high loss of life and injury suffered by Palestinians.
The majority of the casualties occurred in the context
of large-scale demonstrations along Israel’s
perimeter fence with Gaza, known as the “Great
1 A/HRC/37/75
 March of Return.” The demonstrations, which began
on 30 March 2018,2 called for the right of return for
Palestinian refugees and an end to the blockade of
Gaza. Although largely peaceful, some
demonstrators reportedly burned tires, threw stones
and Molotov cocktails, and flew kites bearing
incendiary devices over the fence into Israel. While
acts of violence must be condemned, grave concerns
arise with regard to the excessive use of force by
Israel against the demonstrators.3 Between 30 March
2018 and 31 December 2018, 180 Palestinians were
killed by Israeli Security Forces in the context of
demonstrations, including over 30 children,4 while a
further 24,000 were injured. Of those injured, it is
estimated that 1,200 would require long-term limb
reconstruction and extensive rehabilitation.5 In the
same period, 1 Israeli was killed and 3 injured. In
total, 260 Palestinians in Gaza were killed by Israeli
forces in 2018,6 the highest death toll since the Gaza
conflict in 2014.
Access to Healthcare
3. In response to the demonstrations, Israel
tightened the blockade on Gaza. These additional
punitive measures have had a detrimental impact on
an already untenable situation for Palestinian
livelihoods and well-being. Permits for travel outside
of Gaza have been severely restricted, as has the
import and export of goods, including the passage of
essential fuel supplies into Gaza. Medical patients

2 The demonstrations were still ongoing at the time of reporting.

3 According to the Basic Principles on the Use of Force, law enforcement officials must see an
imminent threat to life or of serious injury for the use of lethal force to be permissible. See
A/HRC/73/447 para. 12, with references.
4 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-snapshot-casualties-context-demonstrations-
and-hostilities-gaza-30-march-31-0
5 According to the World Health Organization (WHO) pp.2-3
http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/documents/WHO_Health_Cluster_SitRep
_23_Sep_-6_Oct_2018.pdf?ua=1
6 For the period 1 January to 31 December 2018
https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties?tab=palestinianfatalities&tab=palestinianfatalities
 have been particularly affected, either due to the
denial of exit permits or on account of the
deteriorating conditions in hospitals within Gaza and
the lack of needed supplies and electricity. As of
October 2018, almost half of essential medicines
were completely depleted in Gaza.7 Israel continued
its practice of preventing patients from leaving Gaza
for medical treatment – including for life-saving care
– where there was a family connection with Hamas.8
Such a sweeping travel ban, which aims to assert
political pressure on Hamas, represents a form of
collective punishment prohibited under Article 33 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention. In a positive
development, the Israeli High Court struck down the
practice in its ruling of August 2018.9
Realization of Economic and Social Rights
4. As the blockade on Gaza enters its twelfth year,
the economy has all but collapsed,10 compounding
the daily suffering of the population. The enjoyment
of the most basic socio-economic rights –
employment, healthcare, housing, food, water and
sanitation – are a luxury in scarce supply, if at all. The
statistics reveal the dire reality of life in Gaza; 95%
of the population do not have access to clean water,11
while the sewage crisis has prompted an imminent
threat of an endemic disease outbreak.12 The
unemployment rate across the Occupied Palestinian
Territory is the world’s highest, according to the
7 44%, according to Gaza’s Central Drug Store and reported by Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine
8 https://www.timesofisrael.com/government-to-ban-all-humanitarian-visits-to-israel-by-
hamas-members/. The restriction of access for treatment has also been used in instances
where the patient has a family member living in the West Bank without a permit
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-gazan-patients-face-new-limitation-on-
travel-for-medical-treatment-1.6573119
9 https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/182789-180827-israel-s-high-
court-allows-vital-medical-treatment-to-hamas-relatives
10 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/25/cash-strapped-gaza-and-an-
economy-in-collapse-put-palestinian-basic-needs-at-risk
11 https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip
12 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/study-warns-water-sanitation-crisis-gaza-may-cause-
disease-outbreak-and-possible-epidemic.
 International Labour Organization.13 In Gaza
specifically, over half of the workforce is
unemployed, with 78% of women without work.14
The situation for youth in Gaza – who make up
almost 30% of the population15 – is particularly dire;
70% are unemployed according to the World Bank.16
The bleak economic prospects, coupled with the
constant climate of fear and insecurity caused by the
hostilities, has had a severe impact on the mental
health of the population. According to the
Humanitarian Country Team, 210,000 residents of
Gaza already suffer from severe or moderate mental
health disorders, while in the wake of the violence
surrounding the Great March of Return, a further
52,098 people, including 26,049 children, are in need
of mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS)
responses.17
5. Poverty in Gaza is pervasive; 53% of the
population survive on less than 4.6 USD/day, with
two thirds subsisting on less than 3.6 USD/day.18
Access to food is one of the most fundamental
challenges facing the population in Gaza, where 68%
of households are severely or moderately food
insecure.19 Although residents of Gaza have rich
farmland and 40 km of coastline, the Israeli blockade
has severely restricted the ability to properly exploit
domestic food sources available through agriculture
and fishing. The strict limitations on fishable waters

13 https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_630876/lang--
en/index.htm.
14 Report of the World Bank, p. 9 (27 September 2018)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/413851537281565349/pdf/129986-REVISED-
World-Bank-Sept-2018-AHLC-Report-final.pdf.
15 Data by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017. Youth covers individuals between
the ages of 15 to 29 years http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3215.
16 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/overview
17 Humanitarian Country Team in the occupied Palestinian territory, “2019 Humanitarian needs
Overview” p. 17
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/humanitarian_needs_overview_2019-
%281%29.pdf.
18 Ibid, p. 7.
19 Ibid, p. 24.
 – which have been reduced at certain points to as little
as three nautical miles20 – have severely hampered
the livelihood of Gaza’s fishermen, 95% of whom
already live below the poverty line.21 Fishermen are
routinely pursued by Israeli Security Forces where
they have allegedly transgressed the permitted
fishing zone, resulting in arrests, confiscation of
vessels, and in extreme cases the use of lethal force
by Israeli Security Forces. In the last two years,
Israeli Security Forces have killed two fishermen,
and injured dozens with rubber-coated metal
bullets.22 Though the maritime restrictions have been
recently extended to twelve nautical miles,23 they
remain subject to frequent change causing
uncertainty amongst fishermen, and in any case still
fall far short of the 20 nautical miles established
under the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.24
6. The agricultural potential of the Gaza strip has
been equally undermined by the blockade, where
some 35% of farmland falls within an Israeli-
enforced “buffer zone”.25 Farmers wishing to use this
arable land do so in constant threat of being targeted
by Israeli Security Forces, including with live fire.
Meanwhile Israel has damaged Palestinian farmland
in Gaza by aerially spraying the land with herbicides.
In one such aerial spraying operation by Israel in
20 Ibid, p. 24.
21

https://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/20190211_gaza_fishermen_plight_due_to_israeli_re
strictions.
22 Ibid.
23 As of January 2019 https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-to-reopen-gaza-crossing-extend-
fishing-zone-if-quiet-remains/.
24 Article XIV of The Israeli-Palestinian interim Agreement Article XIV – Annex I, 28
September 1995 https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israeli-
palestinian%20interim%20agreement%20-%20annex%20i.aspx.
25 Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, “Gaza Strip: Attacks in the border areas and their
consequences”
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ReliefWeb%20Mail%20-
%20%5BPchrgaza-
e%5D%20Fact%20Sheets_%20Gaza%20Strip_%20Attacks%20in%20the%20border%20are
as%20and%20their%20consequences.pdf.
 January 2018, 550 acres of agricultural lands
belonging to 212 farmers were affected, with an
estimated loss of 1.3 million USD.26
7. While Israel’s blockade on air, sea and land is a
predominant cause of the economic crisis within
Gaza, the situation has been exacerbated by other
internal and external factors. A significant reduction
in international aid – in particular the loss of critical
US funding to UNRWA – has had crippling effects.27
In addition, as the Palestinian Authority continues to
withhold salaries of civil servants in Gaza, as part of
an ongoing political divide, the livelihoods of
thousands of employees hang in the balance.28 In
such a political climate, the economic crisis is set to
continue its rapid decline, at the expense of the most
fundamental human rights and basic human dignity
of the population of Gaza.

B. The West Bank, including East Jerusalem

Settler Violence
8. Tensions between Israeli settlers and
Palestinians in the West Bank have reached a boiling
point. Israeli settler violence increased significantly
throughout 2018, resulting in the killing of three
Palestinians, the injury of 83 others – including 20
children – and numerous cases of vandalism, stone-
throwing and intimidation.29 Over 200 instances of
violence by Israeli settlers were recorded in 2018,
representing the highest monthly average of incidents
since 2014.30 Meanwhile, 144 attacks by Palestinians

26 OCHA, “The humanitarian impact of restrictions on access to land near the perimeter fence
in the Gaza Strip”, 3 August 2018 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-impact-
restrictions-access-land-near-perimeter-fence-gaza-strip.
27 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/palestine-us-cuts-un-refugee-
agency-united-nations-speak-out-a8521396.html.
28 Haaretz, “Abbas Suspends Salaries, Allowances to Over 5,000 Gazans”, 15 February 2019
29 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/high-level-violence-israeli-settlers-rise-israeli-fatalities
30 Ibid. OCHA has recorded 217 incidents attributed to Israeli settlers, including assault and
damage to Palestinian property.
 against Israeli settlers and other Israeli civilians in the
West Bank were reported in 2018, including seven
fatalities.31 As of early 2019, the tension has shown
no signs of abating, particularly in the governorates
of Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah.
9. Specific concerns arise in the context of Hebron,
since the removal of the Temporary International
Presence in Hebron (TIPH) – an international
observatory task force assigned to monitor the
situation in the divided city.32 The Palestinian
population in the H2 sector of the city – an area under
the security control of Israel33 – has been subject to
attacks of increasing frequency and severity. Reports
of aggression by settlers have been particularly
prominent on Al Shuhada Street and in the Tel
Rumeidah neighbourhood,34 where Palestinian
residents live in constant fear of attack on their
person and property. The few international protective
actors who have remained in Hebron have also been
subject to harassment, intimidation and threats from
settlers. Such incidents have prompted several
organisations to pull out of the city due to safety
concerns for their staff.35
10. Settler violence continues to go largely
unchecked by Israeli security forces;36 widespread
impunity emboldens settlers in their campaign of
harassment against Palestinian residents. With the
withdrawal of the TIPH, as well as the decreasing
presence of international monitors, Palestinians in H2

31 Ibid, for the period January–November 2018.

32 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-to-expel-international-monitoring-
force-in-hebron-after-20-year-presence-1.6883412
33 https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/h2_fs_2018_v5_english11.pdf
34 http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=782539
35 https://www.oikoumene.org/en/press-centre/news/wcc-pulls-accompaniers-from-hebron-due-
to-security-concerns
36 https://www.timesofisrael.com/leftists-on-tour-of-hebron-confirmed-in-view-that-settlers-
already-won/
 are left in a grave and precarious situation with little
recourse or protection from settler violence.
11. Settler violence is one factor that contributes to
the existence of a coercive environment in many parts
of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. In such
an environment, Palestinians may feel there is no
choice but to leave their homes, which could amount
to forcible transfer – a grave breach of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and a war crime under the Rome
Statute.37
Forced Evictions in East Jerusalem
12. Across the occupied West Bank, home
demolitions and forced evictions continue, resulting
in the displacement of Palestinians and raising
serious concerns of forcible transfer.38 At the same
time that Israel is supporting the expansion of
settlements – including those built on private
Palestinian land39 – it continues to order the
demolition of Palestinian homes, ostensibly for the
lack of planning permission, though Palestinians are
systematically denied building permits. These double
standards are manifestly discriminatory, while the
settlements themselves are illegal under international
law.40
13. Occupied East Jerusalem is home to 3,500
Israelis living in settlements in the heart of
Palestinian communities.41 The East Jerusalem
neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah has been particularly
affected by settler activity due to its location near the
Old City, as well as competing historical legal claims
to land rights. In 1956, under an agreement between

37 A/71/554 para 34 with references.

38 https://www.ochaopt.org/theme/displacement
39 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-says-will-legalize-west-bank-homes-
built-on-private-palestinian-land-1.6919910
40 Security Council Resolution 2334 (23 December 2016).
41 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/un-officials-and-ngo-partners-call-halt-plans-displace-
palestine-refugees-sheikh-jarrah
 UNRWA and the Jordanian government – which at
the time controlled the West Bank – 28 Palestinian
refugee families were resettled in Sheikh Jarrah.42
The families initially rented the homes, on the
understanding that they would eventually receive
legal property title.43 After the 1967 Six-Day War
and subsequent occupation by Israel of East
Jerusalem, land administration matters came under
the control of Israeli authorities. In this context, two
Jewish Committees claimed ownership of the land in
Sheikh Jarrah on the basis of a historical and religious
affiliation. Legal disputes to the land have been
ongoing for decades,44 where today there are more
than 200 Palestinians at risk of eviction in Sheikh
Jarrah.45
14. The Sabbagh family is one such case of those
facing imminent forced eviction and heightened risk
of forcible transfer. The Sabbaghs are Palestinian
refugees originally from Jaffa, who were settled in
Sheikh Jarrah under the 1956 UNRWA/Jordanian
agreement. Though their original home still stands in
Jaffa, they are precluded from reclaiming it under
Israeli law.46 After a protracted legal battle against an
Israeli settler organisation over the disputed land
ownership – including a failed appeal to the Israeli
Supreme Court47 – the family were given an eviction
notice by the Israeli Law Enforcement and Collection
Authority on 3 January 2019.48 Thirty-two members
of the Sabbagh family, including six children, now
face forced eviction from their home in East
42 https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/newsletter/eng/feb10/docs/Sheikh_Jarrah_Report-
Final.pdf
43 Ibid. In accordance with certain conditions including surrendering their refugee ration card
and payment of nominal rent.
44 Ibid.
45 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/un-officials-and-ngo-partners-call-halt-plans-displace-
palestine-refugees-sheikh-jarrah
46 http://peacenow.org.il/en/sabagh-family-sheikh-jarrah
47 https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-israel-s-top-court-won-t-
rehear-case-on-eviction-of-palestinians-in-east-jerusalem-1.6830318
48 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/imminent-eviction-palestinian-family-east-jerusalem
 Jerusalem, while an additional 19 members will be
directly affected by the loss of the family property in
the event of the eviction.49 There are serious
concerns that the High Court’s decision not to re-hear
the case will pave the way for similar evictions across
East Jerusalem.
15. This situation of forced eviction in Sheikh Jarrah
is mirrored in other Palestinian neighbourhoods
across East Jerusalem, including Beit Hanina, Beit
Safafa, the Old City, Ras Al’Amud, and Silwan.
OCHA estimates that 199 Palestinian households are
subject to eviction cases, placing 877 people, almost
half of whom are children, at risk of displacement.50
The eviction cases, the majority of which have been
brought by settler organisations, exist within the
context of Israel’s unilateral annexation of occupied
East Jerusalem. UN Security Council resolutions
affirm that all legislative and administrative measures
taken by Israel to alter the character and status of
Jerusalem are null and void.51
16. Forced evictions constitute gross violations of
human rights law, including civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights.52 In particular, forced
evictions have devastating impacts on the enjoyment
of the right to adequate housing, food, water, health,
education, work, security of the person, freedom
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and
freedom of movement.53 In addition, forcible
transfer, which may result from forced eviction, is a
grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention as
well as a war crime.54

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Inter alia Security Council Resolution 252 (21 May 1968); Resolution 267 (3 July 1969);
Resolution 471 (5 June 1980); Resolution 476 (30 June 1980); and Resolution 478 (20
August 1980).
52 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS25.Rev.1.pdf
53 https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/housing/pages/forcedevictions.aspx
54 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 147; Rome Statute of the ICC, Art. 8.
C. Human Rights Defenders
17. Since the Special Rapporteur’s report to the
Human Rights Council at its 34th session, there has
been a rise in intimidation and threats against civil
society actors who advocate for the protection of
international human rights and humanitarian law in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Israeli authorities
have continued to use a number of measures to
obstruct human rights defenders’ work and narrow
the space for advocacy and litigation. Such measures
included movement restrictions in the form of travel
bans and visa denials, public stigmatization, arbitrary
arrests and prosecutions, and reports of ill-treatment.
18. Of particular concern are the harmful practices
employed by political leadership and States
authorities in Israel to silence human rights
defenders’ criticism of certain government policies.
This includes verbal attacks, disinformation
campaigns and de-legitimization efforts, as well as
targeting of civil society funding sources. For
example, the Money Trail Reports, published by the
Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs in May 2018 and
January 2019, accused the European Union of
granting financial aid to organizations that allegedly
promote boycotts against Israel . Those accused
included respected European and Palestinian
organisations such as Al-Haq, the Palestinian Centre
for Human Rights and Al-Mezan. Israel. The report
also alleges that several of the NGOs have ties to
terrorism. The report provides a list of statements or
actions allegedly supporting boycotts of Israel
purportedly made by each organization, and follows
this with a screenshot showing funding provided to
that organization by the EU. The European Union
strongly rejected the allegations as unsubstantiated.
 19. Further legitimization of the harm inflicted on
human rights defenders is reflected in recent legal
developments. In the words of the Human Rights
Defenders Fund in Israel, “the damage to human
rights organizations in Israel is being formally
imposed and institutionalized by parliamentary
activity.”55 The organization provides legal
counselling and representation to human rights
defenders, in an attempt to mitigate the curtailment
of the rights to freedom of association, expression
and assembly. It cites as examples the Anti-Boycott
Law passed in 2011 (which allows the State to
withdraw benefits to organisations calling for
boycott, and does not distinguish between boycotts of
goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory); the NGO
Transparency Law passed in 2016 (which requires
Israeli organizations that receive more than half of
foreign public funding to disclose this in all
publications, a rule which predominately affects
human rights organizations and has the effect of
singling them out, while organizations receiving
private funding are not affected); and the
amendments to the Entry into Israel Law in 2017
(which restricts the entry into Israel for individuals
calling for boycotting Israel and its settlements).
These initiatives have seriously curtailed the ability
of human rights defenders to carry out their
legitimate work, provide protection, and call for an
end to violations of human rights in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.

III. The Right to Water, Natural Resources and the

Environment
20. A cluster of Palestinian villages in the South
Hebron Hills have had their newly-laid water pipes,
55 http://hrdf.org.il/legislative-initiatives/, 26 February 2019.
 which had finally brought them clean running water,
destroyed by the Israeli Civil Administration, forcing
them to buy expensive trucked-in water for their
homes and animals.56 In Gaza, the collapse of the
coastal aquifer, the only natural source of drinking
water in the Strip and now almost entirely unfit for
human consumption, is contributing to a significant
health crisis among the two million Palestinians
living there.57 Throughout the West Bank, Israeli
quarry companies extract approximately 17 million
tons of stone annually, almost all of which is destined
for the Israeli local market, notwithstanding strict
prohibitions in international law against a military
power economically exploiting an occupied
territory.58 The Dead Sea and its plentiful natural
resources, part of which lies within the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, is off-limits to any Palestinian
development while Israeli companies are permitted to
harvest the minerals in an apparent act of pillage.59
Groves of West Bank olive trees – which are both an
economic wellspring for thousands of Palestinian
farmers and a symbol of Palestinian identity – are
routinely destroyed by Israeli settlers with virtual
impunity.60 The transfer of Israeli industrial waste to
treatment plants in the West Bank – through the
creation of so-called ‘sacrifice zones’ that are less
rigorously regulated – contributes to the
environmental scarring of the occupied territory,
without the involvement or consent of the
Palestinians.61
21. For the almost five million Palestinians living
under occupation, the degradation and alienation of

56 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-why-doesn-t-israel-want-palestinians-to-
have-running-water-1.6959524
57 S. Efron et al, The Public Health Impacts of Gaza’s Water Crisis (Rand Foundation, 2018).
58 Yesh Din, The Great Drain: Israeli Quarries in the West Bank (2017).
59 Al-Haq, Pillage of the Dead Sea (Ramallah, 2012).
60 https://www.timesofisrael.com/olive-tree-sabotage-plagues-palestinian-farmers/
61 B’Tselem, Made in Israel: Exploiting Palestinian Land for Treatment of Israeli Waste (2017).
 their water supply, the exploitation of their natural
resources and the defacing of their environment is
symptomatic of the lack of any meaningful control
they have over their daily lives as Israel, the
occupying power, exercises its military
administrative powers in a sovereign-like fashion,
with vastly discriminatory consequences. All
peoples, including peoples under occupation, enjoy
the sovereign right to control their natural wealth,62
and international law strictly regulates what an
occupying power may do with the resources of an
occupied territory. Yet the Israeli occupation – with
its appetite for territory and settlement-implantation,
and its sequestration of natural resources – has
become virtually indistinguishable from
63
annexation.
22. Accordingly, this section of the Special
Rapporteur’s report focuses on whether Israel has
respected its solemn duty under international law to
protect the right of the Palestinian people to their
water, their natural resources and their environment
in the context of its five-decade-long occupation.

A. Sovereignty, Occupation, and the Right to

Natural Wealth under International Law
International Humanitarian Law
23. The relevant body of international humanitarian
law, including the law of occupation, applies in toto
to the Palestinian territory: the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem, and Gaza.64 As the occupying power,
Israel is restricted by law to acting only as the
temporary administrator of the Palestinian territory
62 UNGA Res. 73/255 (20 December 2018): “Reaffirming the principle of the permanent
sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural resources”.
63 A/73/45717.
64 UNSC Res. 2334 (23 December 2016): “Reaffirming the obligation of Israel, the occupying
Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12
August 1949…”
 until it returns the territory in full, in as short and as
reasonable a time as possible, back to the inherent
sovereign and protected population: the Palestinian
people.65 As such, the occupying power acquires no
sovereignty right over any of the territory, and it is
prohibited from taking any steps towards
annexation.66 It must govern the occupied territory in
good faith, and it must act as trustee in the best
interests of the protected people throughout the
occupation, subject only to its own legitimate
security and administrative requirements.67 In
previous reports, the Special Rapporteur has
determined that Israel is in breach of these
foundational principles of international humanitarian
law, and it is now presumed to be the unlawful
occupant of the Palestinian Territory.68
24. While acting as the temporary occupant, among
Israel’s most important legal duties is to respect and
preserve the fundamental rights of the protected
population under international law.69 Regarding the
natural wealth of the occupied territory – which
includes its water, its soil and lands, its environment
and both its finite and renewable natural resources –
the occupying power assumes a number of specific
legal responsibilities. Three can be mentioned here.
First, the occupying power is entitled only to a limited use of the
public natural resources of the occupied territory. Article 55 of the
1907 Hague Regulations stipulates that the occupying power is acting
“only as administrator and usufructuary” of the public immovable
property of the occupied territory.70 Flowing from this, it must
safeguard the capital of these resources according to the principle of
65 A. Gross, The Writing on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation
(Cambridge University Press, 2017).
66 O. Ben-Naflati et al, The ABC of the OPT: A Legal Lexicon of the Israeli Control over the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Cambridge University Press. 2018).
67 A/72/556.
68 Ibid, and supra, footnote (64).
69 P. Spoerri, “The Law of Occupation” in A. Clapham & P. Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, (Oxford University Press, 2014), chap. 8.
70 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/195-200065
conservation.71 Accordingly, the occupying power has no legal
authority to exploit any of the resources and property of the territory
for the benefit of its own economy.72

THE YEMEN QUESTION:

The Yemen conflict dates back far more than the Yemeni revolution
in 2011. After the unification of Northern and Southern Yemen in
1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was president of Northern Yemen at
the time, was named president of the Republic of Yemen. Since then
Saleh has had to deal with several uprisings and insurgencies, such as
the Houthi insurgency which started in 2004 and an ever-growing Al
Qaeda presence. The hard economic and humanitarian situation in
Yemen were other factors that plagued Saleh’s rule and caused
dissatisfaction throughout the country.
An uprising against poverty and corruption in early 2011 resulted in
Saleh’s power handover to his vice president Abd Rabbuh Mansur
Hadi in 2012. However, Saleh has remained influential within
Yemen, having the support of government officials as well as several
influential tribes. Since 2015 the country has been caught up in a civil
war.
In September 2014, former president Saleh supported by the Houthis
and other northern tribes have launched an attack on Yemen’s capital
Sana’a and forced the government led by President Hadi to resign.
They have since set up a temporary government in the southern city
71 M. Bothe, “The Administration of Occupied Territory”, in A. Clapham et al (eds.), The 1949
Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015), chap 69.
72 I. Scobbie, “Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation”, in S. Akram et al (eds.)
International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (London: Routledge, 2011), chap. 8.
of Aden. Saleh along with the Houthis formed the Supreme Political
Council (SPC) which was tasked to govern temporarily.
The civil war is also part of a bigger power struggle in the region. The
SPC are supported by Iran who are believed to aid with military
equipment and training. The Hadi government is supported by the
Saudi coalition which consists of other Middle Eastern and African
countries and have carried out airstrikes on Houthi territory since
March 2015. Like any civil war, this one also has great consequences
on Yemen’s population. Malnutrition, mass displacement and a huge
Cholera outbreak are the biggest challenges that the Yemeni people
have to deal with due to the war.
CURRENT SITUATION:
 Hadi government: The Hadi government is currently the only
government in Yemen that is recognized by the UN and the majority
of the international community. The government resides in Aden in
the south of the country. Recently; however, Hadi’s advances against
Houthi forces have been halted as he has been facing a power struggle
from southern Yemeni politicians who have called for an
independence referendum. Their forces have recently clashed shifting
the focus away from the Houthis. The Saudi-led coalition have
continued their support for the Hadi government and are still
launching airstrikes against Houthi controlled areas.
 Houthi and Saleh government: The Houthis and former president
Ali Abdullah Saleh have formed a partnership to govern the country
since Hadi’s resignation and currently reside in Sana’a. In September
2017, the Houthis have accused Saleh of negotiating with Gulf states
and have replaced several of his ministers with Houthi officials
causing a rift in their partnership. Nevertheless, the Houthi-Saleh
forces have recently acquired advanced anti-air capability, probably
assisted by Iran, which can strongly aid their fight against the
coalition air strikes.
 AQAP: As the AQAP began to lose territory due to the aggressive
drone campaign by the US, they have shifted their strategy from a
full-frontal war to targeting specific officials and Imams mainly in
Aden and Taiz. Due to an Emirati-backed counter terrorism campaign
they have lost influence over several cities and villages in southern
and eastern Yemen. War crimes During its airstrikes, the Saudi-led
coalition has been accused of violation of laws of war, such as:
 Using cluster bombs near civilian population
 Declaring whole territories as military target, such as Sa’ada
 Strikes against schools, hospitals and aid organizations
 Strikes in areas with high civilian density
The coalition forces have denied almost all of the accusations
of war crimes, blaming Houthi forces of using schools and hospitals
as hideouts or weapon storages. They have only admitted to several
incidents being mistakes. Another aspect that the coalition has been
accused of is the blocking of aid and medical equipment deliveries
into Yemen. The Houthis have also been accused of committing war
crimes, violently opposing any peaceful protests against their
movements while also using human shields and hiding their weapons
in areas with high population density to provoke coalition airstrikes
on these areas. Both parties have been accused of neglecting civilian
casualties in their conflict and have therefore been blacklisted by the
UN. Another party which has been accused of indirectly committing
war crimes is the United States. They have been accused of neglecting
civilian casualties that have occurred during coalition air strikes and
have continued supporting them with intelligence and the supply of
weapons due to their damaged relationship with Iran.
QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS AS A COMMITTEE:

The civil war in Yemen is one of the most complicated conflicts

currently going on with 5 different belligerents each following their
own interest. It is the task of this council to define a path for this
conflict to be solved. So far there are already measures in place but
they didn’t achieve lasting peace or a drop of violence. Therefore you
as delegates have to think if there are other possible measures to
implement or if you’re in a dead end without any possibilities left.
Some questions the delegates should answer in a resolution:
- How to deal with the Irani government presumably supporting the
rebels?
- How to deal with the activity of AQAP in the region?
- Support the coalition bombings harming civilians, condemning them
as warcrimes like other humanitarian organizations or trying to
exercise control?
- Is there a possibility to extent the scale of the current measures
already employed?
- Would the establishing of an Observation mission (like during the
Yemeni civil war 1962), a peacekeeping or training mission by the
UN help?
- Is there any possibility to force the Houthi rebels to negotiate and
follow the political transition process established after the resignation
of Saleh?
 OTHER ONGOING CRISES IN THE ARAB
THE CRISIS IN JORDAN:
1. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a barren, resource-poor
nation. Perched on an arid plateau, the country is bound to the
west by a sliver of arable land along the banks of the Jordan
River and to the east and south by deserts. As a testament to the
inhospitable nature of its landscape, the country’s only remnants
of ancient civilization hug the Jordan Valley or are desolate,
Roman-era defensive outposts. Not naturally endowed with the
makings of a great state, Jordan’s security and prosperity have
relied heavily on the interests of external political players since
the British first conceived its borders in 1921.

2. The geopolitical history of Jordan set the kingdom up for its

contemporary challenges. Jordan is politically vulnerable due to
its resource impoverishment, externally oriented rentier
economy, limited sources of internal revenue, and extreme
population growth.1

3. What is more, situated at the crossroads of a region in turmoil,

Jordan has a long record of providing asylum to persecuted
peoples. Throughout the kingdom’s history, it has adroitly
leveraged refugee populations to obtain greater political and
economic support from patron nations. Indeed, while the scale
of the Syrian refugee crisis presents a difficult challenge, the
Jordanian government’s response to the arrival of Syrian
refugees must be understood as a continuation of its historical
response to refugee inflows into the country, most notably those
of Palestinian and Iraqi refugee populations. Increases in
international aid have previously accompanied refugee influxes
into the kingdom. Jordan is a country accustomed to negotiating
its survival through foreign aid, and moments of refugee influx
 have provided opportunities for it to capitalize on international
support.

4. Unsurprisingly, Jordan has demonstrated the most sophisticated

regional response to the Syrian refugee crisis of all the major
neighbouring host countries. Led by the Ministry of Planning
and International Cooperation, Jordan demonstrated its
willingness to use the Syrian population as a lever to garner
international development aid through the Jordan Response Plan
for the Syria Crisis, which is described as “the first nationally-
led response of its kind, joining refugee and development
responses in one comprehensive national plan.”2
5. Jordan is politically vulnerable due to its resource impoverishment,
externally oriented rentier economy, limited sources of internal
revenue, and extreme population growth.

6. Jordan has always viewed hosting refugees through a utilitarian

political lens. The Syrian refugee influx has provided it with
further opportunities to leverage international support to its
benefit. While Jordan undoubtedly has been burdened by
hosting an increasingly vulnerable Syrian refugee population, its
responses to the crisis have demonstrated its understanding of
the significant relationship between the hosting of refugees,
increased international aid, and the opportunities provided for
nation building.

7. REFUGEE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

8. Jordan faces an incredibly complex refugee situation, hosting

the second-greatest ratio of refugees to citizens of any country in
the world and the fifth-largest refugee population in absolute
terms.3 Since the outbreak of political violence in Syria in 2011,
more than 620,000 Syrians have obtained refuge in Jordan.4 Of
these, nearly 84 percent live in host communities.5 The impact
 would be like the United States welcoming over 29.4 million
refugees in the span of four years. Government estimates of
Syrians living in Jordan are as high as 1.4 million, which
includes those who had left before the war.6

9. Despite hosting one of the largest refugee populations in the

world, the Jordanian government has a remarkably under
articulated refugee policy. It has not signed any international
conventions or protocols that govern the treatment of refugees,
including the UN’s 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its additional 1967 protocol. Jordan’s lack of
international obligations under these treaties affords the
government a greater degree of agency in its policy responses to
refugee influxes.

10. Jordan does not have a legal obligation to continue admitting

refugees; thus, the human security of Syrians fleeing their war-torn
country is at risk.

11. Nonetheless, Jordan has a relatively progressive stance on

refugees and generally upholds international standards on their
treatment. Its 1998 memorandum of understanding with the
UNHCR outlines the extent of Jordan’s refugee policy for non-
Palestinians. Significantly, the document includes the major
principles and standards of international protection for displaced
persons, including the 1951 convention’s definitions of refugee
and asylum seeker.7 The kingdom allows Syrian children access
to public education and, until November 2014, facilitated Syrian
access to subsidized medical care. The memorandum provides
the parameters for cooperation between the UNHCR and the
government; however, it does not constitute a legal obligation.

12. The country also has a legal obligation to respect the

principle of non-refoulement, which is widely considered a
 component of international customary law to which all nation-
states must adhere.8 It is defined under terms expressed in the
1951 convention as “No Contracting State shall expel or return
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”9 Beyond
international customary law, Jordan has explicitly committed to
not return persons through its ratification of the UN’s 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

13. Notably absent from Jordan’s memorandum are a variety

of legal rights enjoyed by refugees in states that are signatories
to the United Nations convention. These include the rights to
housing, employment, public education, freedom of movement,
and public relief and assistance. Moreover, Jordan has begun to
restrict the protection space for Syrian refugees, terminating
their healthcare provisions and limiting their freedom of
movement. Indeed, the absence of the United Nations
convention’slegal framework has sparked debates across the
official Jordanian community and humanitarian sector about the
rights of Syrians within Jordan, and the most contentious among
them has been the question of the right to access livelihoods.

14. As a consequence of Jordan’s limited obligations under

international law, refugees within the country remain legally
vulnerable. Jordan does not have a legal obligation to continue
admitting refugees; thus, the human security of Syrians fleeing
their war-torn country is at risk. The kingdom has increasingly
turned Syrians away at its borders and reduced freedoms and
services for refugees. The humanitarian community has also
accused Jordan of repatriating refugees back to Syria,
particularly unaccompanied men and Palestinians. Such actions
amount to a violation of the principle of non-refulement.
15. PATIENCE WEARS THIN.

16. As the Syrian war enters its fifth year, the Syrian refugee
situation has morphed into a protracted crisis. The majority of
Syrian refugees have settled into some of Jordan’s poorest
northern municipalities, with the governorates of Amman, Irbid,
and Mafraq hosting more than 76 percent of all Syrian refugees
in Jordan.10 Patience and generosity in host communities have
worn thin as refugees compete with Jordan’s vulnerable
populations for scarce resources, employment opportunities,
healthcare, shelter, and education.

17. Though Syrians have stressed host communities, Jordan

was already facing substantial challenges to its resource,
economic, and social sectors before the influx. In the lead-up to
the Arab uprisings, Jordan struggled with massive water
scarcity, climbing youth unemployment, rural marginalization,
and development deficits in sectors like healthcare and
education. Syrians triggered a rapid increase in public
frustration about these issues.

18. Syrian refugees have impacted Jordan both in positive and

negative ways, but the public narrative is overwhelmingly
critical of the Syrian presence. According to a report by the
International Labor Organization, 85 percent of Jordanian
workers believe that Syrians should not be allowed to enter
Jordan freely, and 65 percent believe that all Syrians should live
within refugee camps.11 In a period of peak political instability
in the region, this deleterious public sentiment has significantly
undermined the government’s willingness to host additional
refugees. Decreasing confidence in international support, a
destabilizing security context, and pressure on resources have
only served to enhance this attitude.
19. The nature of negative public perceptions highlights a
primary challenge facing Jordan: politically, how does the
country negotiate the demands of its populace, while
simultaneously accruing the benefits of hosting the Syrian
refugee population?

20. GOVERNANCE

21. The Syrian refugee influx has illuminated a crisis of

governance in Jordan. In particular, the government is stretched
beyond its capacity to deliver essential services like healthcare,
education, and waste management in the municipalities most
affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. As the quality of services
deteriorates, Jordanian citizens place increasing blame not just
on Syrian refugees but also on the government for service
delivery failures. This dynamic presents the government with a
significant political challenge and constrains its range of options
in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis.

]
 CONCLUSION
Despite the limited outcomes achieved so far, the UN is seeking every
possible actions better addressed the situation in the Middle East. The
Human Rights Council, with its commitment to the responsibility to
protect human rights, shall focus on particular aspects of the issue and
take necessary, effective and positive actions. A genuine solution to
the humanitarian crisis as well as mediation efforts between
governments and opposition forces shall be addressed by the members
of the Human Rights Council. We would like to suggest delegates to
consider following question as they attend the Bosco Model United
Nations 2019: Is it possible to map out a solution to the situation in
the Middle East? Could the solution be acceptable to all parties? Why
past actions failed? What steps shall be considered necessary to the
solution? How should your country contribute to the situation and
how will your country be affected? Also, how could international
community response to the humanitarian crisis in a timely and
effective matter?

The United Nations made it their mission to act as a moderating

platform for dialogue between states and to promote global peace, and
with such a solution for one of the thorniest issues affecting the
humanity at large, we can create an equal, prosperous and most of all
safe future for our generations to come.

“We are not developed nations,

We are not developing nations,
We are the UNITED NATIONS”